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Korean War - U.S. Pacific Fleet Operations - Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet: Interim Evaluation Report 


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U.S. Pacific  Fleet Operations

Comander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Interim Evaluation Report No. 1 

Covering Period

25 June to 15 November 1950

Volume 1 

PDF version [19,274 KB] 






Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Interim Evaluation Report No. 1


Covering Period

25 June to 15 November 1950




14ND-CINCPACFLT-35 (Rev. 2-26-51)

Navy – Pearl Harbor, T.H.



* ** ** ** ** ** ** *





   Main Report, Volume I, reading time 50 minutes, is provided to give the reader a quick view of the most important factors in the Korean War applicable to the Navy and Marine Corps.
   The fifty-three (53) project studies contained in Volumes II to X inclusive provide studies of a functional nature as noted by their titles.
   The thirty-seven (37) chronological narratives in Volumes XI to XVI inclusive are those submitted by type and operational commanders and provide, in addition to the narratives, the problems faced by these commanders.









T-A-B-L-E   O-F   C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S



    Major Features of the War in Korea







   A. Naval Air (Other than Marine Air)

       1.  Organization
       2.  Operations

           a. Fast Carrier
           b. Escort Carrier
           c. Close Air Support
           d. Interdiction
           e. Attack
           f. Air Defense
           g. ASW
           h. Anti-Mine
           i. Patrol Squadrons
           j. Helicopters

      3.  Personnel

      4.  Training

      5.  Air Intelligence

      6.  Logistics

      7.  Equipment

      8.  Bases



      1.  Organization

      2.  Operations

         a.  Close Air Support
         b.  Air Defense
         c.  Air Transport
         d.  Helicopter
         e.  Observation



      3.  Personnel

      4.  Training

      5.  (Blank)

      6.  Logistics

      7.  Equipment



        1.  (Blank)

        2.  Attack Force

        3.  Landing Force (Including Land Operations of FMF Units and Air)

        4.  Air Support

        5.  Naval Gunfire Support




         1.  Shore Bombardment

         2.  Blockade & Escort Operations

         3.  Submarine

         4.  Air Defense & ASW






        1.  Surface

        2.  Underway Replenishment

        3.  Shipping Support (By other than Pacific Fleet Forces)

        4.  Air Lift

        5.  Fleet Marine Force
















 1. Fast Carrier Task Forces

 2. Support Carrier Task Forces



            3. Air Defense

            4. Amphibious Attack Forces

            5. Fleet Marine Forces

            6. Blockade Forces

            7. Convoy Escort Forces

            8. Naval Bombardment Forces

            9. Mine Countermeasures



(A) COMNAVFE – Staff History, 25 June – 15 November 1950

(B) COMSEVENTHFLT Conf ltr rrr/F1 A12 Ser 0181 dated 4 December 1950 (Subj: Chronological narrative of the Seventh Fleet related to the Korean War)

(C) COMFAIRJAP Conf  ltr  CFAJ/11/h A9 Ser: 096 dtd 24 November 1950 (Subj: Commander Fleet Air, Japan Evaluation Report, submission of)

(D) COMFAIRWING 6 Secret ltr CFAW-6/A9-8 10/JRC: asc  Ser  0066 dated 28 November 1950 (Subj: Evaluation Report; Submission of – Enclosure, PATRON SIX Narrative)

(E) CO USS GARDINERS BAY Conf ltr AVP39/A16 FGR: rlr Ser 044 dated 2 December 1950 (Subj: Korean War Historical Chronological Narrative and Comments on Experiences)

(F) CO USS CURTISS CONF ltr 3: WAC: fht AV-4/A12 Ser 051 dtd 22 Nov 1950 (Subj: Evaluation Report, submission of)

(G) CO PATRON 42 Conf ltr VP-42/A9-8 RLD: cn Ser 048 dtd 25 Nov 1950 (Subj: Evaluation Report; Submission of)

(H) CO PATRON 47 Conf ltr FVP-47/A9-8/ks Ser 031 dtd 25 Nov 1950 (Subj: Special Historical Report; submission of)

(I) FASRON 11 – Narrative (Conf) – undated

(J) FASRON 120 – Conf Chronological Report – undated

(K) NAF, Yokosuka – Conf Chronological Narrative – undated

(L) VU- 5 Det. Japan Conf 1 December (Subj: Historical Report; Submission of)

(M) Commander Fleet Activities, Japan-Korea Conf ltr Ser 0183 dtd 6 Dec 1950 (Subj: Narrative of Fleet Activities, Japan-Korea, for the period 25 June to 1 November 1950)

(N) COMTRACOMPAC Conf ltr A12 (30)/Ser: 0449 dtd 21 Nov 1950 (Subj: Historical Narrative of COMTRACOMPAC ACTIVITES)

(O) Commander Underway Training Element Japan Conf ltr UTE 3923/jg A9 Ser 081 dtd 15 Nov 1950 (Subj: Historical information, submission of)

(P) COMFLTTRAGRUSWESTPAC-UTE  (Underway Training Element) SUBIC Conf  ltr HBL: chb A12 Ser 058 dtd 17 Nov 1950 (Subj: Historical Information; Submission of)

(Q-1) COM UN Blockading and Escort Force (CTG 95.9) Conf ltr A9-8 Ser 039 of 6 Mar 1951 (Subj: Evaluation Information)




   (Q-2)  COMCRUDIV-3 Conf Ser 057 of 22 Nov 1950 (Subj: History of Task Groups 96.5 and 95.2 while under command of COMCRUDIV-3 during the United Nations Police Action in Korea)



   (R) CTF-77 (Report Air Operations) (Informal Copy)

   (S) COMCARDIV 15 (Restricted) – Narrative of participation in the Korean Campaign (Part 1 – 1 July – 15 November 1950)



   (T) COMAIRPAC Conf ltr FF12-5/A11 ser 30/01302 dtd 22 Nov 1950: (Subj: Air Force, Pacific Fleet Evaluation Report, Part 1, forwarding of)

   (U) COMAIRPAC Conf ltr FF12-5/A11 ser 30/01365 dtd 5 Dec 1950 (Subj: Air Force, Pacific Fleet Evaluation Report, Part II, forwarding of)


   (V) COMADCOMPHIBPAC Conf ltr ser 0106 dtd 20 Jan 1951 – Chronological Narrative Report

   (W) FLOGAIRWINGPAC Conf (undtd) Chronological Historical Report, Part 1 – Technical, Part ll)

   (X) PACRESFLT Conf ltr (30-3n) A10 ser 0229 dtd 21 Nov 1950 (Subj: Chronological Narrative of Pacific Reserve Fleet activities during the period 24 June – 15 Nov 1950 (Inclusive) related to or affected by the Korean War)

   (Y) Confidential Report of Hydrographic Office Representatives on Special Trip to Far East from 9 November to 26 November 1950 to study Map and Chart Problems arising out of the Korean Hostilities

   (Z) FMFPAC Secret Report of Activities from 25 June 1950 to the Amphibious Assault at Inchon

   (AA) COMPHIBGRU ONE (CTF 90) Secret Ser 002 of 17 Jan 1951 – Report COMPHIBGRU-1 (CTF 90) report of operations for period 25 June 1950 to 1 Jan 1951

   (BB) Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Conf ltr A9-1/JLM/44b Ser 076 dtd 24 Nov 1950 (Subj: Historical Report; Submission of)

   (CC) 1st Marine Air Wing, FMFPAC, Report Operations in Korea, 24 November 1950

  (DD) Headquarters 1st Marine Division (REINF). FMFPAC, Conf Special Report, Period 1 August – 15 November


   (EE) COMSERVPAC Secret ltr 10: rag A1 Ser 0091 dtd 21 Nov 1950 (Subj: “Evaluation of Logistic Requirements and operations, other than air”, forwarding of – Historical Section, Phase l – Statistics, Phase ll – Major Lessons and Features)

   (FF) COMWESTSEAFRON Conf ltr WSF: 08:fg A12 Ser 0329 dtd 22 Nov 1950 (Subj: Chronological narrative of Western Sea Frontier activities related to or affected by the Korean War, Part I – Historical)

  (GG) DEPCOMSTSPAC Conf ltr MSTSP-21 Ce A12 Ser 0190 dtd 20 Nov 1950 (Subj: MSTSP Chronological Narrative of Activity as affected by Korean War)



(HH) DEPCOMSTSWESTPAC Secret ltr MSTSWP-2-mn A12 Ser 0068 dtd 1 Dec 1950 (Subj: Evaluation Report; Part I– Historical Narrative)

(II)  DEPCOM3TSMIDPAC Conf ltr MSTS-MidPac: 00:gs A9 Ser 35-50 dtd 21 Nov 1950 (Subj: Evaluation Report Report No. 1)

(JJ) COMSUBPAC Secret ltr Ser 00011 of 28 Nov 1950 (Subj: Submarine operations in Korean War; report of (Part 1) (and COMSUBPAC Conf ltr Ser 0762 of 11 Dec 1950 (Subj: COMSUBPAC Ser 00011 of 28 Nov 1950; Downgrading of))

(KK) COMCRUDESPAC Conf ltr FF4-5/FF4-9 A16-1 Serial 0107 dated 4 February 1951 (Subj: Readiness of destroyers departing for Far East areas)











A 1













    Major Features of the War in Korea





      This Interim Evaluation Report was prepared under the guidance and supervision of CINCPACFLT, in accordance with CNO Confidential ltr OPO3D; ly, Ser 015P03D dtd 20 Sept 1950. In general, this report covers the period from the beginning of Korean hostilities, 25 June 1950 to 15 November 1950, but takes cognizance of major actions subsequent to the latter date until approximately 31 December 1950.

      To the best of knowledge, no precedent existed for an overall concurrent evaluation of a major military effort in the Navy and o organization within the Navy existed nor were personnel trained to undertake such a task.

     Interpretation of the basic directive for the evaluation of the Korean War effort, lead to the conclusion that three courses should be followed. These were:

     a. A recording in detail of what happened within the various naval operational and administrative commands in the Pacific.

     b. Establishing the difficulties, deficiencies, and problems as well as the successes of the various naval commands of the Pacific.

     c. The undertaking of detailed staff studies of functional components of the Navy with the view of submitting constructive recommendations for improvement.

          In undertaking these tasks, the basic concept was held that it was the Navy’s responsibility that its own house be in order and that it was neither the Navy’s responsibility nor right to extend beyond those perimeters into other services except where naval operations were adversely affected.

     Additionally it was not considered within the purview of the basic directive to inquire into national policy nor major strategy, nor to become involved in detailed technical matters for the administration of which adequate machinery already existed.

      Accordingly, the major evaluation efforts have been concentrated upon systems that combined, represent the naval contribution to the national military potential.

Continuing Evaluation
      CNO’s basic directive provides for a continuing evaluation of the Korean War effort. Based on the concepts outlined above it is considered that the Interim report and its various enclosures submitted herewith outline the major areas of deficiency requiring correction or improvement as well as indicating those areas of successful development that warrant maximum military exploitation. Accordingly, it is currently contemplated that the continuing phases of the evaluation will consist of assembling narratives of various naval commands in the pacific, conducting a continuing review of the conclusions and recommendations submitted in this interim report in the light of subsequent events, and the making of a limited number of technical staff studies bordering on the OEG type, plus special project studies that may be warranted by subsequent events.





     The chronological narratives of the various commands of the Pacific Fleet and the naval Forces Far East appended hereto contain a wealth of information as to what happened  when it happened, and the problems and difficulties experienced by those commands.

     The various project studies included within this report cover a multitude of subjects including Intelligence, Communications, Close Air Support, and others of considerable importance to the effectiveness of the naval service as a whole. Each of these reports contains its own conclusions and recommendations.

     To the date of this report, the Korean War was peculiar in that there was no effective enemy opposition on the seas, in the air or by submarines. During the months of November and December, 1950, the principal opponents were the Chinese Communists, whose Manchurian base enjoyed immunity from attack although openly providing support and bases for active offensive operations against the United Nations.

     Because of these unusual circumstances and the type of military operations resulting, it is recognize3d that had any of these major factors been changed, an entirely different type of conflict might have ensued. Therefore, there exists a marked hesitancy to attempt to outline major lessons growing out of the Korean War that would be applicable to future conflicts less circumscribed than the present Korean War. However, there have been developed to date certain major features that warrant very careful consideration as signposts for the future.





Major Features of the War in Korea

       The Russian Nation from the time of Napoleon has evinced a high degree of aptitude for irregular and guerrilla warfare on land and later, defensive mining of seaports.  These methods on land were developed during periods of military adversity, and generally have resulted in ultimate military victory over what were considered relatively superior forces.  The Soviets trained the North Korean Army, which demonstrated high capability in irregular guerrilla warfare as well as a high degree of effectiveness in more orthodox types of military action.  The Soviets are presumed to have given training to Chinese Red Communist Armies who have utilized the same types of tactics with considerable effectiveness.  Chinese Communist engaging the French in Indo China have been using similar tactics successfully.

       It appears reasonable to assume that Soviet trained satellite nations as well as the Soviets themselves will again use such tactics when forced to do so.

       U.S. Naval forces, particularly Navy and Marine Air, should make every effort to develop ways and means of countering such actions particularly with interdiction weapons and techniques that will tend to reduce the necessity for major engagements between ground forces.

       Sea Power, Air Power, Ground Power, Amphibious Operations and the Marines all have been topics of serious military discussion since World War II.   Modern schools of thought have deprecated sea power, amphibious operations and the Marine Corps and have exalted the potentialities of air power. None of the extremist versions of the modern school of thought have been substantiated by actual fighting in Korea.

       Under the guise of economy and peacetime roles and missions, naval forces and the Marine Corps have been reduced to dangerously low levels with the Marines largely relegated to garrison tasks in War Plans.  The future of amphibious operations has been denied.  Perhaps if any major lessons have evolved from the Korean War, the most important are the complete fallacy of these modern schools of thought.

      There were no war plans for the commitment of the United States forces in Korea.  Nevertheless we were committed.  The traditional policy of the Navy of maintaining balanced forces in ships, aircraft and the Marine Corps has been proven eminently sound.

       Sea power and air power have one major characteristic in common in major wars. Each strives to eliminate or reduce to relative impotence its military counterpart in order that its full weight may be used against the enemy during the exploitation stage.

       The first seven months of the Korean War have been peculiar in that neither the sea power nor the air power of the United Nations forces have faced the necessity of eliminating their military counterparts. As a result, the full exploitation stage was available to the navies and the air forces of the United Nations from the onset of the Korean War.  Had serious opposition been met, particularly in the form of submarine warfare and air warfare, the nature of the Korean War undoubtedly would have been entirely different, but since this opposition did not occur, the Korean War constituted in effect an almost perfect laboratory for the test of exploitation abilities of both sea and air power as they currently exist.


Sea Power
    Sea Power again reaffirmed its vital importance to the United States by enabling the projection of much of the military strength that it had in readiness overseas against North Korean forces.  It not only permitted the projection of our ground and air forces against the enemy in numbers that would have been impossible by any other method, but it also directly exerted its own considerable power in the form of withering ship gunfire support, marine ground action and naval and marine air action.  It completely eliminated the possibility of enemy surface action against Japan and Formosa.  It played a vital supporting role for both our ground and air forces. It transported to the combat area approximately 98% of the tonnage required to support our United Nation forces in action.  It did not win, nor was it expected to win, the Korean War.  However, it did enhance the military effectiveness of both our ground and air forces to an incalculable degree.  Without sea power, the United Nations effort in Korea could not have taken place. 

Air Power
    The United Nations air power in Korea consisted almost totally of Air Force, Navy and Marine air augmented by a relatively few number of military aircraft of Great Britain, Australia and South Africa.  It was supported by some commercial air support across the Pacific Ocean.  In general, air power constituted a supporting arm to the ground forces.  In that capacity, it was extremely important.   In the first seven months of the Korean War, however, air power, enjoying almost complete freedom of skies, was unable to prevent military reverses to our ground forces, generally was unable to deny enemy territory to enemy usage, locate or detect the development of large enemy concentration on the ground, or to isolate a battlefield.

Ground Power
    During the first seven months of the Korean War, the tide of war was determined by the success or reverses of our ground forces.  Both the North Korean and the Chinese Communist Armies clearly demonstrated their ability to support themselves, concentrate and engage in major ground battles in spite of the best overall efforts of the United Nations air power.

      In the Korean War to date, the Navy again demonstrated the incalculable value of amphibious operations.   The withdrawal of an isolated and surrounded ROK division from Pohang without casualty during the early Pusan perimeter defense was little known or recognized, but, defended by the guns of the fleet, an implacable enemy was kept at bay and an entire division of our allies was saved and redeployed within our lines for further combat.

     The Inchon amphibious assault landing of the 1st Marine Division on 15 September 1950 changed the entire aspect of the war against the North Koreans within a matter of a few days after the landing.  The North Korean organized effort, on the verge of success of completely over-running the Pusan perimeter, completely collapsed.  It was only the subsequent intervention of the Chinese Communist Red Armies that prevented the complete occupation of Korea and the cessation of hostilities.  This historic landing, changing as it did the whole course of a war against the North Koreans, opened new vistas of strategy to many military leaders previously limited in vision to purely ground operations. 

     The equally historic Hungnam evacuation was an amphibious operation in reverse.  CINCUNC determined as a matter of military strategy to evacuate northeast Korea.  As the major part of the forces in this operation, under the guns and the aircraft of the fleet, the 3rd and 7th divisions of the U.S. Army and the 1st Division of the U.S. Marine Corps as well as approximately 91,000 refugees were evacuated without the loss of a man or a single useful piece of equipment.  No corresponding operation exists in modern military history.  


      The story of the Marine expansion, hasty deployment from the United States to Korea and their subsequent amazing exploits in the first seven months of the Korean War adds new lustre   to the proud traditions of the Marine  Corps.  Within a month’s time and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade consisting of approximately 5,000 officers and men was organized and deployed some six thousand miles away and committed to combat in Korea.  Within less than six weeks additional time, this brigade participated in three major actions, twice prevented a break-through that threatened the complete collapse of the Pusan perimeter, and in effect destroyed two entire North Korean divisions as effective military units, causing casualties estimated to be approximately twice the Marines’ original strength.  Upon completion of this amazing series of actions, this brigade reembarked in Navy amphibious ships prepared to participate in the Inchon amphibious landing. 

       In the meantime the remaining portions of the 1st Marine Division based on the West Coast of the United States numbered less than 3,500 officers and men.  Within six weeks time this organization expanded more than three times its original strength from 105 posts and stations in the United States, from 22nd Marine Division units, and from its organized reserve.  It constituted the only assault force in the Inchon landing.  Later this same division, deployed to the Chosin Reservoir area in northeast Korea, decisively defeated and eliminated as a military organization six Chinese Communist Red divisions and detachments of four more divisions. Throughout this period neither the early 1st Provisional Marine Brigade nor later the 1st Marine Division ever retreated.  As a matter of routine they advanced in the face of superior numbers and when directed by superior authority to withdraw for strategic reasons, they withdrew as intact fighting organizations with all of their usable equipment and wounded. 

      No descriptive superlatives can add to the tradition of the Marines as a fighting military organization.

       Intelligence was either inadequate or, if adequate, improperly evaluated as to the original intentions of the North Koreans to attack the Republic of Korea and of the Chinese Communist Government to invade Korea and assume the brunt of the military effort when defeat of the North Koreans appeared imminent. 

       The difficulty of obtaining intelligence information from behind the iron curtain is widely recognized.  However, in the Korean War the two major hostile participants, the North Koreans and the Chinese Communist Reds, are actually engaged in civil war in each of their respective countries.  With civil war existing between the North and South Koreans and between the Chinese Communist Reds and the Chinese Nationalist Government, much valuable information should be forthcoming from friendly elements of these two nationalities.  Judging from results of the past, more effort should be expended on collection of intelligence from these sources.  A concerted effort must be made to obtain advance information of the enemy’s  intentions. Both the North Koreans and the Chinese Reds have displayed great adeptness at moving by night and supporting large bodies of men, in numbers sufficient to cause sever reverses to United Nations ground forces.  To date the Untied Nations Ari Forces, consisting of the United Sates Air Forces, Navy and Marine Air as well as small detachments from other nations, enjoying almost complete freedom of the skies have been unable to obtain tactical intelligence of the location or movements of hostile forces on an effective scale.  The equipment and techniques necessary in obtaining such tactical intelligence are apparently completely inadequate at the present time.  Recognizing that we may face such tactics on a much greater scale at any time, major research effort should be devoted to the solution of this problem.

      The Far East Command is a “joint” command. At the beginning of the hostilities in Korea, the naval component of the Far East Command was negligible in size and staff, whereas the Army component, being the service designated to head up the joint command, maintained a large and functioning staff Intelligence organization. Although the staff of the Commander Naval Forces Far East progressively grew in size, there remained a general tendency for the Navy to rely upon GHQ G-2 for much


intelligence essential to naval operations.  There also existed on the part of GHQ G-2 a tendency to subordinate and channel the efforts of the intelligence sections of the Navy and FEAF staff’s into G-2 and to promulgate from G-2 such intelligence information as G-2 considered necessary for the benefit of the other services.  The principle should be impressed upon naval personnel that naval intelligence staffs are basically responsible to naval command to provide essential intelligence necessary for naval operations.

    Combat air intelligence for the Navy was totally inadequate during the first few months of the campaign and still is well below acceptable levels.   Ships and Air Groups lack trained combat intelligence officers.  There is no experienced senior combat intelligence officer in the entire theatre to coordinate combat air intelligence efforts. 

    Although South Korea was occupied by U.S. forces for four years following World War II, there was almost no intelligence available of the type required by amphibious forces.  This should serve as a lesson for the future.


   Although marginal in quantity, purely naval shipping for the resupply of naval surface forces functioned in a highly satisfactory manner under the control of COMSERVPAC and his subordinate echelons.

   Support shipping for all the services in the Far East theater,  a naval responsibility delegated to MSTS, was not efficiently operated due to factors beyond the control of MSTS.  Excessive port times in both Japanese and Korean ports were experienced through no fault of naval administration.   U.S. efforts in this regard were no improvement over World War II standards.

   The control of MSTS shipping between ports in the Pacific and Far East was a function of MSTS.  In accordance with the MSTS charter policy of delivery of cargo “Free on board” at port of destination, the control of this shipping for all practical purposes passed to the terminal operator,  generally a U.S. Army port organization, for all loading and discharging operations. 

   The estimated delay in time charter ship turnarounds due to all causes in Japan and Korea between 1 September and 15 November, the period when excessive delays were experienced due to the heavy concentration of shipping in the Far East, was 4328 ship days.  This loss represented sufficient shipping to lift 17% of total major cargo requirements from U.S.A. Japan during the period of 24 July to 15 November 1950.
   The basic causes for this delay in the turnarounds are considered to be the following:

    a. The lack of adequate port facilities in Korea.
    b. The lack of adequate stevedoring personnel and equipment to unload ships.
    c. The lack of adequate personnel, transportation and organization to efficiently move unloaded cargoes to dumps.
    d. The lack of adequate roads and railroads in Korea to properly handle Army logistics, resulting in the need for coastal shipping for Army support.
    e. The lack of sufficient numbers of efficient amphibious shipping types such as LST’s to handle the coastal shipping problem.
    f.  Unrealistic scheduling of the arrival of resupply shipping in objective area.

In addition to the above basic causes there were, or [sic] course, numerous problems growing out of the interpretation at various staff levels among the services as to service authority and responsibility with regard to shipping.  The Army in Korea set up the requirements for supplies and exhibited an inclination to specify how many and what types of ships should deliver these supplies but displayed inadequate sense of responsibility for the unloading of ships and as to the resultant delays in turn-around time.  In addition, there was frequently indicated the desire to use shipping as floating warehouses.  The Navy is on somewhat delicate ground in criticizing this tendency too  severely since the Navy itself sponsors mobile support for its own forces. 


     The Congress of the United States authorized and appropriated funds for the construction of 50 fast (20 knot) merchant marine ships as a part of the overall rearmament program.  This additional speed will be quite valuable from anti-submarine defense point of view and will reduce steaming time between ports.  The full advantage of the additional speed and greater cargo capacity will not be realized unless shipping turn-around is improved.  In connection with turn-around time, it should be recognized that the techniques and methods affecting expeditious loading and unloading in large ports with extensive docks and other facilities will not apply to shipping terminals lacking such facilities.  In shipping, as in other endeavors, responsibility must be accompanied by positive authority to ensure that responsibility being discharge.  The impression is generally held that the Navy (MSTS) has the responsibility for controlling the shipping for all three services.  In actuality, at the present time, the Navy has only the responsibility to provide the ships and to control the ships between ports.  After arrival in port the Navy has little control at the present time over how ships will be unloaded or whether they will be unloaded or not, regardless of the effect this will have on the over-all shipping problem.  A full and mutual understanding between the Navy (including MSTS) and the other services as concerns the exact responsibilities of each and full acceptance of responsibility for turn-around time of shipping will be mandatory if we are to attain improvement in future operations.  Such understanding does not now exist.  Although it is recognized that responsibility for port operations in Army ports and cargo handling now required by shipper or consignee is not   a desirable or proper burden for the Navy, it is felt that much can be done within the following recommendations:

    a. Undertake at Department of Defense level further study and review of the problems brought out in this report.
    b. Initiate at Department of Defense level a program of indoctrination in the requirements to improve shipping utilization.
    c. Initiate at Department of Defense level directives which will insure that shipping priorities and requirements within a Unified Command are handled in a section of a Joint Staff in which all services are represented. 
    d. Promulgate at Department of Defense level directives which will clarify the responsibilities for unloading MSTS shipping in amphibious operations.
    In connection with Navy Shipping responsibility, the following considerations are pertinent:

   a.  It should be recognized and plans made accordingly that during war it will be necessary to send shipping to ports or open roadsteads in which fixed port facilities are limited or nil.
   b.  A certain amount of floating storage in many instances will be essential for support of the ground forces.  It would be desirable to utilize the slow liberty type for this purpose. 
   c.  In many instances in support of ground forces, coastal shipping and trans-shipping will be essential.
   d.  Quick turn-around time cannot be effected unless adequate stevedoring and optimum equipment is available.

The shipping delays in the Far East during the Korean War demonstrated need for recognition of these basic considerations.  It may be assumed that these considerations will be valid in other parts of the world lacking adequate port facilities in the event of war.

During  the first four months of hostilities, naval communications in the Far East area approached a chaotic state.  Within every major naval command in the Far East and at Guam, large backlogs of classified dispatches developed, causing serious delays in delivery of important operational information and orders.  The volume of traffic was so great that top naval commander frequently could give attention only to action dispatches and little or none to information dispatches.  These traffic jams had a snowball effect in the tendency on the part of all dispatch originators to assign higher and higher precedence and classification to their outgoing dispatches in the hope that such action would assure preferential treatment.  It had,


of course, the opposite cumulative effect in making practically all dispatch traffic of the same top priority.

   Communications personnel were unable to determine among the mass of incoming encrypted dispatches which were important and which were not. With the fairly  rapid buildup of naval forces in the Far East coupled with the critical military situation in Korea, a large buildup in traffic was to be expected.  It is probable that this buildup could have been handled to a reasonable degree by naval forces had it not been for the additional back-breaking load of traffic thrown into the naval communications system by the Army and the Air Force.  Literally, these service do not speak the same language as the Navy in terms of conciseness, assignment of precedence and classification of dispatches.  A fairly reasonable state of affairs in naval communications in the Far East was not reached until COMNAVFE took steps to reduce the volume of Army and Air Force traffic on naval circuits.  By far the greatest volume of Army and Air Force traffic on naval circuits originated from the intelligence branches of those services at various levels with each higher echelon originating new dispatches with the same basic and frequently unimportant information.

   It should be recognized that these difficulties will be repeated in other theaters involving joint operations unless the Navy is prepared to assig liaison officers to Army and Air Force commands to advise those commands as to what information is of value to the naval service or to arrange to receive all incoming intelligence from Army and Air Force sources ad to screen and condense this information for further  distribution to naval commands. 


      During the greater part of the first six months of the Korean War, Marine fighter-bomber squadrons operated from two escort carriers.  The primary mission of these ship based Marine squadrons was close air support, augmenting the efforts of shore based Marine fighter-bomber squadrons.  The operation of these squadrons in their close air support mission was very effective, although the munitions carrying capacity of the F4U, with which these squadrons were equipped  was one half or less capacity of the F4U, with which these squadrons were equipped was one half or less per airplane than Navy dive bombers.   In this regard, however, the F4U’s were greatly superior in load carrying ability to jets.  During periods of low wind the take-off ability of the F4U loaded as a fighter-bomber for close air support missions was marginal and in a few instances, it was necessary to further reduce the munitions load to assure safe take-off ability.

     At the present time all Marine day combat squadrons in the Far East are equipped with F4U’s with the exception of one squadron that received jets during the latter part of November 1950.  All Navy fighter production for the past year or more has been of the jet type.  None of the jets can operate from CVE’s.  as the present inventory of F4U’s is depleted it will be necessary for the Marines to adopt dive bombers to continue their close air support functions in addition to jets for air combat missions.

     Since neither the current dive bomber, the AD, nor any of the current or forseeable jet aircraft can operate from the CVE in its present form, and since CVE’s constitute a large percentage of the carrier decks for future emergency, it will be necessary to re-evaluate our planned policies and programs for ship based close air support in the light of the numbers and types of CV, CVL and CVE which can be made available, and their compatibility for operations with the numbers and types of aircraft available and in the procurement program.


    There is widespread misconception as to the difference between the terms of air interdiction and armed reconnaissance.  Air interdiction requires that the air effort be sufficiently continuous to prevent the assembly of hostile concentrations, reinforcement and logistic support against friendly forces.  Armed reconnaissance on the contrary promotes intermittent or sporadic search for and attacks on targets of opportunity.


     During the first six months of the war in Korea, the greater part of Marine air effort both shore and ship based was devoted to close air support.  Some effort was devoted to so called air interdiction.   Most of the effort of the fat carrier forces was devoted to so called air interdiction that in actual fact was armed reconnaissance.  The box score of Navy air effort devoted to so called air interdiction was impressive but the combined results of all of the services in this effort was by no means decisive as evidenced by the fact that our ground forces met with frequent military reverses at the hands of their ground opponents. 

     Based on the results in Korea, it must be assumed that neither the techniques nor equipment of either the Navy or the Air Force is adequate to produce real air interdiction at the present time.   At no time was air alone ever able to interdict a single  battlefield against the clever tactics used by both the North Koreans and Chinese Communists of moving large forces by night and utilizing highly effective concealment by day. 

     It is commonly accepted that the United Nations ground forces will face a severe numerical disadvantage against Soviet and satellite ground forces if we become involved in a general war.  Under those circumstances it is reasonable to assume that in a large scale war, naval air will be called upon to provide assistance to the ground forces both in the way of close air support and interdiction.  If that assumption is valid, then it is most important that intensive research by undertaken by the Air Force or  the Navy, or both, in an effort to develop[ positive means of locating concealed troops and equipment by day and moving troops and equipment by night. 

      Close air support has been a highly controversial subject among the Air Force, Army, Marines and Navy.  The underlying causes of this controversy are believed to involve the question of semantics and fundamental differences in concept between the Air Force on one hand and the Navy and Marines on the other. 

      The semantics differences are easily described.  The term “close air support” as used by the Air Force generally applies to a type of operation considered by the Marines and Navy to be “deep support”.  The operations considered by the Marines and Navy to be “close support” is generally not engaged in the Air Force.  Broadly speaking, the two sides of this controversy believe that each is providing close air support, neither understanding the terms as used by the other. 

      The essential difference in concept between the two sides of this controversy are that the Air Force believes “mosquito airplanes” are competent to find the target and control attack on those targets.  Technically the request for close air support by the Army evolves from the ground forces, but the actual procedures are such that in general the “mosquito” is largely on his own. 

      The Marine-Navy concept on the other hand provides that front line ground troops through the medium of Tactical Air Control Parties designate the targets and control the strikes.   The Marine-Navy system does not reject the employment of air observers in close air support operations.  However, the Marine-Navy proponents insist that the air observer (mosquito), if used, be used only as the extension of the eyes of the forward ground controllers and under ground controller authority. 

      The Marine-Navy system of close air support has proven its effectiveness under visual flight conditions.  It has not been particularly effective during darkness and conditions of limited visibility.  As in air interdiction considerable effort should be devoted to the development of around the clock air support capabilities. 

      The opinion persists that the difference between the Air Force and the Marine-Navy proponents of close air support cannot be resolved until each use terminology with the same meaning and a common concept is adopted governing the tactical air control of close air support missions. 

      The Marine-Navy close air support system has produced positive beneficial results over protracted periods of time. It has produced high customer satisfaction


on the part of Marine ground  forces.   The Marines and the Navy should continue to adhere to their system until a better system can be developed.  Under no circumstances should the present system employed by the Air Force be adopted by the Navy and Marines.

    Navy aircraft in the fast carriers undertook numerous close air support missions under both the Air Force system of control and the Marine system of control.  Under Air Force control, Navy close air support missions were rarely effective. Under the Marine system of control, Navy close air support missions were very effective. 

    Up to the month of December 1950, Marine air squadrons were not provided with jets in the Korean War.  All of the fast carriers engaged in the Korean War were equipped with at least one squadron of jets with the exception of one ship.  As compared with the dive bombers of the fast carrier task forces, jets were highly inefficient in munitions carrying ability and endurance on station.  For those reasons, jets were almost never assigned to close air support tasks.  No current American jet aircraft is considered comparable to the current Navy dive bombers for close air support tasks. 

During the first six months of the Korean War, Task Force 77 consisted of from 1 to 4 CV-9 class carriers with one cruiser and normally one battleship in the supporting group and a screen of destroyers.  Throughout this period and under the conditions existing in Korea, the CV-9 carriers of this task force were able to operate the three basic types of airplanes assigned to the air groups quite effectively.  The three basic types of airplanes assigned to the air groups were the AD, F4U and the F9F jet fighter.  The marginal takeoff factor of safety existing in the CVE’s under low wind conditions did not apply to the airplanes operating from the fast carriers. 

    There existed two potentially serious Task Force deficiencies had the tempo of war operations increased materially.  These were the low effective intercept ranges of task force radar for air defense purposes and the frequency of gasoline replenishment required by the fast carriers. 

    By actual test over a period of two weeks during the middle of November 1950, the best performance of the Task Force as a whole was a detection of 60% of raids (friendly) at 50 miles range.  The Task Force was operating in circular formation without the use of pickets or airborne early warning aircraft.  None of the ships in the Task Force were equipped with AN/SPS-6B model radar during the period of this test.  Had the threat of air attack been serious it must be assumed that both pickets and airborne early warning aircraft would have been utilized.  However, even utilizing pickets and AEW, the effective range of the shipboard air search radar is entirely inadequate for interception of jet aircraft approaching at high altitude. 

    Reports of two destroyers equipped with model AN/SPS-6B radar indicate detection ranges between two and three times the average of Task Force 77.  While the ranges obtained by these two destroyers may be appreciably better than can be expected in normal service, the reliability of detection of the AN/SPS-6B model radar is appreciably superior to that of the radars currently installed in the ships of Task Force 77. 

    Replacement of existing radar sets with AN/SPS-6B radar should be effected at an early date if the full capability of carrier based jet fighters for interception are to be realized. 

    The second deficiency that was clearly defined was the replenishment requirement of aviation gasoline by the fat carriers.  The normal replenishment rate of the carriers was one day out of three thus automatically reducing the average availability of strength by 1/3.  This is in direct contrast with the corresponding replenishment requirement of CVE’s which was one day in 8 or 9.  The loss of 1/3 of the effective combat strength of fast carriers in the operating zone is excessive, especially in view of the trend in close support and interdiction operations toward requiring aircraft on station around the clock.  To some extent this same comment


is applicable in any type of fast carrier operations in which the carriers are confined to restricted waters.  Carriers are more vulnerable to air and submarine attack while replenishing fuel, ammunition and stores. 

   This deficiency points to the early need of appreciably increasing the gasoline capacity of the CV-9 class carriers.

   Up through November 1950 10 United Nations ships were sunk or damaged by enemy mines in the Korean Campaign.  In contrast with this number only five United Nations ships were sunk or damaged by enemy gunfire or bombs.  All naval vessels in the foregoing numbers were of the destroyer type or smaller. 

   The first enemy mines were discovered off Chinnampo on the northwest coast of Korea on 4 September 1950.  Intelligence indicates that the major minefields later encountered by UN ships were laid commencing in early September.  Some 4,000 mines were shipped by rail through Wonsan.  The preparation and laying of the mines at Wonsan were done under Soviet supervision according to intelligence reports.  Those laid on the northwest Korean coast were handled entirely by North Koreans.  The mine laid were predominantly of the chemical horned type moored mine and the magnetic bottom mine.  No hydrostatic pressure mines were discovered.

   The enemy mine fields  were cleverly  and effectively laid including moored mines in shallow water within six feet of the surface which made neutralization of the mine field very difficult and dangerous.  Primitive and inexpensive but highly effective methods of laying these fields were utilized.  Fortunately, the North Koreans had not undertaken extensive mining in time to affect the amphibious landing at Inchon on 15 September 1950.  Subsequent to that date enemy mines in North Korea had the effect of delaying shipping logistic support to the 8th Army by denying the use of Chinnampo until after minesweeping had been effected, delayed the administrative landing at Wonsan by five days and required the clearance of the ports of Hungnam and Chongjin before these locations could be used by our shipping.  In addition the mine threat forced our naval gunfire support ships outside the 100 fathom cure on the east coast and mineable waters on the west coast of Korea.

   Due to the great difference in depth of water and tides between the east and west coasts of Korea, mine clearance was appreciably easier on the west coast than on the east coast.

   Primarily due to the Navy’s austerity program during the preceding years, the naval weapons system for mine countermeasures in the Pacific Ocean was totally inadequate.  When the first North Korean mine was discovered there was no mine force type commander or staff experienced in mine counter-measures in the Pacific.  Active minesweepers in commission were very limited in number and those based on the west coast of the United States were employed principally in other than mine type operations.  Experienced minesweeping personnel were difficult to find.  Rapid reactivation subsequent to September 1950 plus use of Japanese minesweepers improved this situation to an extent that permitted coping with the North Korean minefield to an acceptable degree in November 1950.  The expansion of forces and organizations in the Pacific currently underway will further improve this situation but much larger expansion will have to take place before the Pacific Fleet is prepared for major war operations. 

   Numerous deficiencies in present minesweeping equipment and material were noted during the Korean operations.  There were no mine locator ships in the Pacific.  None of our surface ships, and only four of our submarines, were provided with mine detector equipment to enable them to avoid mines.

   An innovation of the Korean campaign was the use of patrol seaplanes and helicopters for the location and destruction of mines and the use of aircraft to drop bombs and depth charges for counter-mining purposes.  The location and destruction of mines by gunfire was quite effective and warrants continuation of this procedure in the future.  The counter-mining of mines by bombs was ineffective and the counter-mining of mines by depth charges only slightly better.


     Our present concept of operations for minefield clearance in offensive operations and the clearance of enemy mines from friendly ports will establish requirements for extremely large forces in the event of a general war.  These requirements will be so great that it appears highly desirable to turn to research now in the effort to design new and economical approaches to the problem.

    One of the few new tools that has made its presence felt in the Korean War is the helicopter.  For broad utility purposes, helicopters compare somewhat with the appearance of the jeep in the last war. 

    The helicopter itself has not been employed extensively in offensive military operations, but its utilization  in support operations  of many kinds has been so great as to assure its continuing requirement over extremely wide fields of employment in naval and ground warfare.  Its important uses have included the following:

     a. As a plane guard during carrier takeoffs and landings.
     b. As quick and easy transportation between ships of a task group and ship to shore movements thus reducing considerable requirements for courier duty on the part of destroyers.
     c. As an airborne spotting platform for sip gunfire spotting.
     d. For rescue purposes frequently behind enemy held lines ashore.
     e. As an ambulance.
     f.  As a conveyance for the rapid deployment of patrols in ground warfare and for the servicing of these patrols with food and ammunition.
     g. As a courier plane between various ground stations.
     h. As an observation platform for ground observation.
     i.  Locating mines in minefields.

    It is difficult to determine which of the above operations have the greater military value.  From time to time depending upon the military situation, each of the various utilization assume the greatest importance for the time being.  Collectively, they make the helicopter of such great value as to warrant a permanent place in the list of essential military equipment of both ground and sea forces. 

    In addition to the above employments, there exists a widespread conviction that this type of aircraft will become of considerable military value when developed to the point of permitting the deployment of troops from ship to shore in amphibious landings or from point to point not readily reached by surface transportation in ground warfare.

   The speed and ease of transportation in helicopters as evidenced by its employment in Korea has created a widespread requirement for helicopter landing platforms on numerous types of ships.  These types extend to all combatant naval vessels having sufficient size to permit a landing platform, to hospital ships from direct delivery of seriously wounded, to amphibious command ships, various types of underway replenishment ships and LST’s or similar ships for work in minefield clearance and various types of spotting during amphibious landing operations. 

   The helicopter has established itself as an essential item of military equipment.  At the same time, its operational limitations and the need of improvements have made themselves clearly outlined.  The helicopter is a relatively fragile aircraft that needs considerable improvement in ruggedness.  In addition it requires from four to five times as much maintenance per flight hour as the standard carrier aircraft.  The models in service are exhausting to the pilot and permit almost no night or weather flying.  Added to these shortcomings are the limited endurance and weight lifting capacity of current models, particularly at altitude.

   In spite of these clearly recognized shortcomings, the helicopter even at its present state of development is a recognized “must” for many types of operations.  The number of useful purposes to which it may be pointed make it imperative that in future helicopter designs, the helicopter itself be so prototyped that it can be employed in as many different types of operations as practicable, using packaged equipment as necessary for any particular type of operation.


     There were no hostile submarine operations during the first six months of the Korean
War.  As a result, there were no operating lessons learned or deficiencies noted that are not already matters of knowledge to CNO.  Had submarine warfare broken out, it is certain that the entire aspects of the war would have changed since our resources, principally in destroyers and destroyer escort types and means for harbor and ort protection were totally inadequate to face an all out submarine campaign.

        No effective enemy air opposition developed.  Accordingly, our air defense measures were not tested in combat. Air defense measures were used to a partial degree in the form of maintaining circular anti-aircraft cruising formations at sea with day combat air patrols.  Combat air patrols were also maintained over amphibious concentrations of shipping.  However, radar picket ships and airborne early warning airplanes generally were not used for air defense purposes.  Small Task Units of naval vessels and shipping operated along the Korean coasts away from fighter air cover. 

        The IFF situation was poor.  The Mark 3 IFF used by United Nations aircraft has been compromised.  Friendly aircraft frequently failed to use their IFF in the vicinity of our surface forces causing many unnecessary alarms. 


        In few fields of endeavor were the naval forces in the Far East less prepared for war operations than in public information.  During the first month or six weeks of the Korean War so little space in the press and time on the radio were given to naval operations as to leave doubt that the Navy was actively engaged against the North Koreans.  The reason for this is quite simple.  There was almost a total lack of public information personnel in the theater while at the same time operational commanders were engulfed in urgent operations.  At that time, the public information personnel in the Far East consisted of one Lieutenant on the Staff of COMNAVFE assisted by a newly graduated journalist and one Commander on temporary duty on the Staff of Commander Seventh Fleet assisted by a journalist and an unqualified photographer.  This small force coupled with the communications log jam that immediately developed were able to accomplish very little during the early hectic days of the war. 

       Personnel-wise the situation gradually improved and with it came increased public information press and radio coverage as to the Navy’s accomplishments in the combat zone.  At the present time, the public information service from the Far East is generally quite satisfactory. 

       The Navy’s first major operation, the amphibious landing at Inchon, and later the planned amphibious landing at Wonsan were badly marred by serious differences with representatives of the press as to treatment extended to them and facilities offered them for the transmission of their news stories.  Several of these gentlemen were vindictive toward the Navy and showed no reticence about stating that one way to make the Navy realize its mistreatment of the press was to keep news of naval operations out of the press. 

       Groups of press correspondents are like other groups of men.  Most are reasonable but a few are unreasonable and arbitrary.  Navy personnel must learn to be broad minded in their relations with the press and to maintain good relations with this group.

          A number of deficiencies of various kinds combined to create the unsatisfactory relations with the press at Inchon and Wonsan.  One of the major deficiencies in this regard was largely unavoidable under the circumstances since there were inadequate accommodations in the limited amphibious shipping available.  Closely related to the lack of accommodations was the lack of radio circuits available to handle press traffic.  These deficiencies combined with a lack of tact on the part of some naval personnel in contact with the press p representatives and lack of public information officers to assist the correspondents resulted in the development of poor


Relations.  It seems probable that these same complications will rise again in each major operation that the Navy attempts to undertake as long as correspondents must be crowded aboard the important combat ships in the operation.  With a rising level of combat readiness in both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, active press ships with those Fleets appear to be the best solution to prevent recurrences. 

          There still appears to exist an apathy on the party of numbers of naval officers as to individual responsibility toward the building of good will between the public and the naval service.  Increased educational effort in this regard and tangible acknowledgement by appropriate marking of fitness reports appears to be warranted. 


          In almost every phase of naval operations during the first six months of the Korean War, the result of the sever austerity of personnel forced upon the Navy during the last several years is clearly evidenced.  The buildup of new staffs, the necessary augmentation of existing staffs and augmentation of personnel for the operating forces was a haphazard affair constantly lagging behind the need. 

         The recall to active duty of Reserves to fill immediate needs is not the answer.  Reserves, officers and enlisted, cannot in justice to them be expected to step directly from civilian life into full scale military operations.  As a group they require a transition and training period in the rear areas.  Judging from the buildup that occurred in the Pacific and Far East, the Navy’s available cushion of trained officers and men is inadequate to meet unexpected emergencies without severe strain. 

         In attempting this evaluation of the Navy’s participation in the Korean War, wide coverage has been given to almost every phase of expansion in the Far East and to all major functions performed by the Navy in that area.  This coverage has been handled in some detail in the project studies included in the following sections of this report together with the chronological narratives of various commanders of the Pacific Fleet and the Far East.  Included in the project studies are a large number of conclusions and recommendations of varying importance in the over-all picture.  It appears desirable to boil these conclusions and recommendations down at this point to indicate major areas of deficiencies.  These follow: 

 Conclusion 1:

     Plans for hostilities in the Far East apparently did not visualize a limited action, without general mobilization, of the scope developing from the so-called ‘Police Action” in Korea.

 Recommendation 1:

     Conduct a continuing examination for “Koreas” in other parts of the world.  Prepare tentative plans on a priority basis for such other “Koreas”.

 Conclusion 2:

     The provision of qualified and trained personnel (particularly staff personnel) lagged well behind requirements in the Far East. 

 Recommendation 2:

     Develop plans for the provision of adequate initial personnel and increments of necessary trained personnel to implement the plans in recommendation #1, allowing adequate lead time
 for necessary specialized training.

  Conclusion 3:

      Equipment and techniques do not exist at the present time for successful air interdiction of enemy ground forces.


Recommendation 3:

   Undertake with the Air Force or unilaterally a research program for the development of new equipment and techniques to permit successful interdiction of ground forces.

Conclusion 4:

   Our present methods of clearing enemy minefields is entirely to slow and expensive in forces required. 

Recommendation 4:

   Undertake a research program to develop new and relatively economical methods for the rapid destruction of minefields. 

Conclusion 5:

   The anti-submarine forces and harbor defenses in the Pacific and the Far East would have been inadequate to cope with the outbreak of a submarine campaign. 

Recommendation 5:

   Expand anti-submarine forces as practicable.  Assign top priority to the plans for harbor defense and for reactivation of anti-submarine forces in the event of the outbreak of a major war. 

Conclusion 6:

   The handling of shipping in the Far East theatre with regard to turn around time of ships was no improvement over World War II standards.  The type of delays experienced would be extremely serious in the event of a World War. 

Recommendation 6:

   Undertake at Department of Defense level with representation form all services a thorough study of shipping utilization in the Korean Campaign, with the objectives of preparing directives which will establish basic concepts, ensure Joint Staff cognizance over shipping in Unified Command theatres, strengthen MSTS position, and emphasize responsibilities of shipper and consignee services. 

Conclusion 7:

   The landplane patrol squadron is currently not organized or equipped for deployment to advanced airfields that are under other than Navy control or support except for conditions of total mobilization.

Recommendation 7:

   Develop the necessary supporting organization for patrol landplane squadrons which will allow them to be deployed to advanced airfields under other than Navy control or support during conditions of limited action such as existed in Korea. 


    In conducting a detailed examination of a major naval effort such as Korea, it was inevitable that a large number of deficiencies in plans, organizations and functions would be uncovered.  Such was the case in the current evaluation of naval effort in Korea. 

     Lest the large number of conclusions and recommendations developed in connection with this evaluation lead to a misunderstanding of the Navy’s total effort in that area, it is desired to emphasize most strongly that in spite of shortages and deficiencies of many kinds, the Navy’s overall accomplishments in the Far East were of a very high order.  There was no indication at any time, formal or informal,


on the part of the Commander in Chief, Far East or of his major subordinate commanders that the Navy’s performance was not of the highest order.  On the contrary because  of the “can do” spirit continuously displayed by naval and Marine forces, there was and is considerable danger that the high command and top commanders of Army and Ari Force in that theatre might expect the impossible form the Navy in any situation that might develop. 


Published: Mon Jul 23 09:30:05 EDT 2018