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1 March 1970

VIETNAMESE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE [DECLASSIFIED]                                                                                                                  

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   A. Historical Documentation

   B. Mission and Functions

   C. Organization/Structure

   D. Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E)


    A. Organization/Management/Financial Administration

    B. Collection

    C. Processing, Analysis, Production

    D. Dissemination/Communications

    E. Personnel

    F. Training

    G. Summary Evaluation


  6. The introduction in 1965 of a substantial number of US Naval Forces and rthe US Naval Advisory Group created the catalyst for the establishment of a functioning intelligence organizarion within the VNN structure.  Such an organization intelligence organization within the VNN needs.  However, tradiation and apathy had to be overcome so that the organization remained mostly collection oriented until 1969 when a shift with the advent of the greatly increased USN and VNN offensive operations under the SEA LORDS concept.

   7. The advent of the expanded US Naval operational concepts demanded a concimitant increases in the quality and quantity of intelligence support to the naval operating forces, both in headquarters and within the Naval Intelligence Field Organization.  The introduction of Vietnamese Naval units into operations, formerly the sole responsibility of US units, served to point out the necessity for intelligence support to VNN forces on a comparable level.  While the VNN did possess a collection capability of sorts, their collation, analysis and dissemination capabilities were not up to the task of meeting requirements for timely operational intelligence.

   8. In late October 1969, VNN/CNO directed that VNN/N-2 prepare daily briefs and present them on alternative days.  Working in conjunction with COMNAVFORV, on 3 November 1969, the first daily brief was written and presented entirely by the Vietnamese.  One week later, daily intelligence summaries were started and were forwarded to all major VNN commands.  By January this operational intelligence section had developed into a competent collation and analysis center for the dissmeninated of intelligence.

   9. Concurrent with the development of a collation, analysis and dissemination capability, was the improvement in collection reporting.  Using their daily briefs as the catalyst, VNN/N-2 demanded and began to receive regular reports from all the field intelligence forces.  In January 1970 alone, over 375 Vietnamese field intelligence reports were filed.  Reports have also started to filter in about the improvement in the VNN field forces.  VNN Intelligence has come a long way.



    1. (U) The missions and functions of the Vietnamese Navy Intelligence Organization have changed only slightly since its inception.  Functions have been added and removed both by formal directives and by verbal orders.

    2. (U) The Naval Headquarters N-2 was assigned the following functions with the overall mission being "to provide intelligence requirements for the Vietnamese Navy":

        a.  Collect, process, and disseminate intelligence of interest to the Vietnamese Navy.

        b.  Provide intelligence support tot he Navy Headquarters Staff, to the headquarters of subordinate forces and to the operating forces.

        c.  Maintain intelligence liaison with the Vietnamese JGS, other RVNAF intelligence units, MAAG delegation (currently MACV-NAVADVGRP/COMNAFORV), as well as other friendly free world intelligence organizations in accordance witrh JGS directives.

        d.  Provide for the management of the intelligence organization and conduct intelligence training.

        e.  Organize and manage the physical security program including recommending procedures for the protection of classified documents, and providing for the security of the headquarters arsenal.

        f.  Organize, manage, train and supply the clandestine collection organization.

        g.  Manage the survey of coasts and landing beaches and maintain a supply of naval maps and charts and intelligence studies.

        h.  Organize the intelligence secrion of each sea force, riverine area, naval station and junk force, and account for the personnel assigned.

    3. (U) Functions (a) through (e) preceeding were assigned by the original establishing document.  Function (f) was assigned in 1967 and documented in 1968.  Function (g) was assigned sometime in 1965 by the verbal order of the Chief of Naval Operations.  Function (h) was assigned in 1962 and gives the Headquarters N-2 some administrative control over the subordinate field command intelligence organizations.  The area intelligence officers, however, are under the military command of the coastal zone or riverine area commanders.  Function (e) was never actually previously assigned to the Navy Security Bloc of the Vietnamese Military Security Service (VNNSB/MSS) - an organization with primarily investigative and counterintelligence functions.  The responsibility for the care of rhe headquarters arsenal was transferred to the Navy Military Police.



      1. Under the present organizational concept the Vietnamese Naval Intelligence Organization is located in the Operations Bloc (Figure 1).  This bloc contains N-2 Intelligence, N-3 Operations, N-5 Plans, N-6 Communications and the Combat Operation Center (Figure 2).  This concept of organization is found at all staff levels of the navy.

    2. VNN Intelligence is organized into a Headquarters Staff and a Field Intelligence Organization.  The VNN Intelligence Staff serves to provide intelligence support for the VNN/CNO and VNN operational commanders through assigned intelligence officers.  VNN/N-2 Headquarters Staff is organized (Figure 3) generally along the present US Navy Headquarters Intelligence Organization in Vietnam.

   3. The present Headquarters Staff Intelligence Organization was developed in August 1969.  This organization recommend a number of changes in organization from the previous one (Figure 4).  Among the changes included the establishment of three major branches - Collection, Administration and Intelligencel.  Collection now coordinates all overt and covert collection assets.  The Collection Detachment Chief, who had previously reported directly to the N-2 on matters of covert collection, has been relocated into this branch.  Administration controls training, personnel, plans and supply.  The Intelligence Branch combines the functions of OPINTEL, tactical has been to facilitate Vietnamization.  Thus far the results have been gratifying, creating a far greater involvement by the Vietnamese in the full spectrum of intelligence activities.

   4. The Field Intelligence Organization consists of the intelligence staffs of the Coastal Zone/Riverine Area/Rung Sat Special Zone Commanders, NILO's Unit Intelligence Officers, Field Collection Detachment Teams and the Field Sensor Detachment Teams.  The Field Intelligence Organization functional interrelationship with VNN/N-2 Headquarters is shown in figure 5.  Wile the Chief N-2 is not shown as having direct control over the Coastal Zone/Riverine Area/Rung Sat Special Zone Intelligence Officers or Unit IO's, he does exercise considerable control through the selection and training of their intelligence personnel and can levy requirements on them through the CNO.

  5. The newest organizational change was made in January 1970, when the VNN Sensor (DUFFLEBAG) Detachment (100men) was assigned to VNN/N-2.  This detachment was been placed under the Collection Chief and reports through the Collection Chief to the Deputy Chief for Naval Intelligence.  The detachment will eventually consist of seven teams and one headquarters staff with a total of 160 officers and men.

  6. Finally, the Navy currently operates four combined task forces, 20 coastal groups and 15 river assault groups.  Each major unit should have an intelligence officer(s) or intelligence petty officers (s) assigned.  Most do not, however, when they are assigned, these Unit IO's will become part of the formal intelligence organization as has been the case with the IO's of CTF 211 and CTF 212.



    1. General.

        a. The foundation on which the VN naval organization is based is the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E).  In the TO&E are listed all the authorized personnel and equipment a unit, such as intelligence may have.

        b.  TO&E's are reviewed annually by commanding officers.  However, changes, in the TO&E are made only periodically.  For instance, VNN/N-2 Headquarters is still operating under the TO&E submitted in 1967.

    2. VNN Intelligence TO&E's.

        a.  The TO&E's for naval intelligence can be broken down into:

            (1) VNN Headquarters TO&E

            (2)  Collection Detachment TO&E

            (3)  Sensor Detachment TO&E

            (4)  Area/Unit Intelligence TO&E's

VNN/N-2 submits the first three TO&E's and area/unit commanders submit the fourth.  The fact that each operational commander submits his own requirements for intelligence has created a major variance in the intelligence requirements.  In fact, the difference in intelligence requirements for similar areas and units has often been absurd, creating a problem of determining what the VNN overall TO&E requirements actually are.

    3.  Revisions in VNN Intelligence TO&E's.

        a. In January, a team arrived from the United States for the expressed purpose of reviewing all VNN TO&E's.  Using this as an excuse, VNN/N-2 has begun rto revamp all their intelligence TO&E's, including those of unit and TO&E's.  Those that they do not control will be submitted as recommend changes.  By this means VNN/N-2 hopes to achieve uiform TO&E intelligence requirements throughout Vietnam.

        b.  The VNN/N-2 Headquarters collection detachment and sensor detachment TO&E's will generally reflect the present organziation under which VNN/N-2 now operates.  Major changes will be to strenghten the collection branch; to create a field activity for rhe exploitation of POWs, documents and material; to create a small staff for the covert intelligence school and to from a mobile Hydrographic Survey Team.  The intelligence section and administrative section will basically remain the same.  Figure 6 outlines the proposed VNN/N-2 Headquarters Staff TO&E.




        1. Organization.

            a.  The Vietnamese Naval Intelligence Organization under the present basic organization is satisfactorily structured to carry out its producing desired resuts.  While it wouild be preferable for the N-2 to be accorded ACOS status and report directly to the Chief of Staff and the CNO, the current organization is flexible in practice, and the N-2 normally does have sufficient access to command, so that timely intelligence information and reaction decisions can be accomplished (mainly through daily briefs and INTSUMS).

        b.  Within the Headquarters N-2 staff all sections have clearly defined functions and areas of responsibility; a clear line of control is maintained.

        c.  In the field, Intelligence Officers are militarily subordinated to their respective area, unit or zone commanders.  However, Headquarters N-2 has the ability to levy requirements and monitor their activity through the medium of CNO requirements.  This insures the integrity of the deployed commanders staff and unit of effort.

        d.  The field collection team elements are each headed by a junior officer and are under the command and control of VNN/N-2.  Most of the team leaders are physcially located in the same building with the coastal zone field intelligence officers. The collection team leaders are required to coordinate with, and be responsive to the field intelligence officers, but are not under their direct control.  This is considered a desirable organizational feature in that it insures the centralized direction and professional management of clandestine sources and also insures that the operational commander can lay immediate requirements on the collection organization without time-consuming administrative delay.

        e.  The VNN NILO's report organizationally to VNN/N-2 Headquarters and militarily to the area commander.  This can create problems if not handled diplomatically and with finesee.  The present VNN/N-2 Chief is quite capable in this regard.  However, administrative, logistic, personnel and communication problems require continous Saigon command attention.

        f.  The field sensor detachments report organizationally to VNN/N-2 through their commanding officer who is located on the collection department staff and militarily to the local area commander.

        g.  Unit intelligence officers report directly to their unit commanding officers.  N-2 is able to levy requirements through the CNO.


    2.  Management.

        a.  Vietnamese Navy Headquarters is managed in accordance with general Navy directives.  Vietnamese naval officers represent a wide variety of educational, social and military backgrounds.  Many are former Army Officers who either volunteered for naval service or were involuntarily transferred into the Navy at various stages of their careers.  As a result management and administrative practices reflect a blend of Oriental, French and American as well as Army and Navy philosophies in method and approach.

        b.  The N-2 or Chief of Intelligence manages the division by daily personal contact.  Major assignments are normally made verbally but are occasionally submitted in writing.  Requirements levied on the division are normally reviewed by the N-2 and outgoing products are signed by him.  The Deputy is kept in close contact with all projects, particularly those of intelligence production.  Because of problems which occurred in the past, the Deputy is now more fully informed than at anytime previously.

        c.  Officer and enlisted evaluation is maintained by daily contact and a variety of officer briefings, meetings, all hands meetings and occasionally division parties.  Officers are also often assigned collateral duties outside their normal responsibilities which increases their scope, knowledge and productivity.

        d.  The Field Intellignece Organization is managed primarily by local administration through the chain of command.  The N-2 maintains inability to assign officers to intelligence billets.  N-2 recommends all intelligence officerss for new assignments.  As a result very few intelligence officers looking for good assignments are willing to occur his wrath.  Thus, N-2 is able to exert his influence and guidance upon the field organization and insure continuity and unity of effort.  In this same regard, N-2 exerts additional management effort and policy guidance through the medium of rhe quarterly Field Intelligence Officers, by attending these meetings are thus permitted a maxium vertical and horizontal flow of information, innovations and directives.  In addiion, the Field Intelligence Officers submit intelligence reports and evaluated by VNN Headquarters. Returned phone calls, messages and evaluation reports reward or criticize field personnel as required.  As a result a definite amount of command and control has been established in a relatively short period of time.

    3. Financial Administration.

        a.  N-2 financial and logistical considerations are conducted as an integral portion of the overall Vietnamese Navy budgt and supply system.  The fiscal and calendar year are the same. The divison submits each year in September, its estimated needs in consumable, non-consumables, and cash.  Once an overall Navy budget is decided upon by the CNO, it is submitted to the JGS to be reviewed, approved (as submitted or revised), and assimilated into the overall military budget.  The budget is reviewed each year in May for adequacy.


N-2 does not receive a specific budget but is awarded a certain monetary allowance.  Vouchers are submitted against this allowance through supply and logistics channels as needs occur and are satisfied from that available at the time of request.  If material or funds are not available at the time of request, a new request must be submitted as a separate transaction.  New equipment or non-consumable items can be obtained through the US MASF military aid program.

        b.  In theory this should work, but in actual practice it does not.  This is because VNN/N-2 is awarded an amount of money similar to what other offices get with little or no regard to what their actual needs or requirements are.  For instance, during the first six months of 1970, VNN/N-2 was awarded approximately $140 for consumbable supplies for their entire department.  Not very much in the way of new consumable supplies can be purchased with this amount money.  Also, new equipment and non-consumable supplies ordered through the US MASF military aid program normally take an inordinate length of time to arrive.  As a result the US is called on to provide most of their supplies and a great deal of their equipment.  VNN/N-4 does not now support VNN/N-2 adequately.


 B.  Collection

    1.  Clandestine collection.

        a.  One of the earliest major problems of VNN Intelligence centered on the physical collection of information.  As late as 1966 there was no systematic, organized, or regular method of collecting informarion country-wide, or of transmitting information to VNN Headquarters.  The establishment of the Field Intelligence Officers in 1965 provided some information to the headquarters, but only on a very sporadic basis.  Intelligence collection was a matter of each locally deployed commander obtaining what information he could by his own means.  Some commanders developed local agent networks, loyal only to the commanders themselves; others assigned Navy sailors as so-called "undercover agents" to operate in the local area.  These sources were paid or compensated for by whatever means the commander had available.  Military personnel assigned as agents were subject to recall at any time to their local military station to perform draft age civilians from being drafted into the Army, many Navy commanders brought their agents into the navy on an ad hoc basis to keep their personal nets from disintegrating.  These personnel, however, were not on official Navy records or payrolls.  The intelligence obtained was political or for local self defense and was seldom passed on to any other authority.  Some the collection of information.  There were no safeguards to prevent VC infiltration into the local nets.  And there was no substantive intelligence production to permit an assessment of the situation.

        b.  In 1964, the VNN/N-2 initiated an exploratory collection net in the Gulf of Thailand.  Although most of the first agents were Navy sailors, some were civilians, and the net was under the control of the Intelligence Organization.  This net was followed in 1965, by a similar venture in Kien-Hoa province.  Basically these nets had essentially the same characteristics as the others except that they were under intelligence management.  Guidance for the nets, however, was almost non-existent; everybody "knew" to report VC in the area or to provide information about sea infiltration attempts.  These two nets were the forerunners of the present system.

        c.  In October 1966, COMNAVFORV/N-2 proposed that all clandestine collection activity by the Navy be centrally directed by VNN/N-2.  A plan was put forward jointly by VNN/N-2 and the US Advisors that a professional collection organization be formed country-wide under the operational control of VNN/N-2 and supported by the US.  The plan called for the formation of five teams, each headed by a trained officer, to operate in the coastal provinces.  The mission was established "to collect information concerning VC/NVA operations and plans pertaining to the infiltration of men, munitions, and materials by sea; intra country movement along the coastal waterways; and any information regarding VN/NVA activity which can be used to support Vietnamese/US Navy units operating along the coast or in the inland waterway system".  COMNAVFORV/N-2 was to act as a bilaterial partner in the project by providing assistance in management control, source control, product dissemination, and agent funding.  The plan was staffed and approved through CHNAVADVGRP, COMUSMACV, VNN JGS, and the US Director of Naval Intelligence.


Final approval was granted in Spring 1967.  The VNN/CNO establishing instruction was promulgated in January 1968.

        d.  Vietnamese officer team leaders and headquarters staff officers began specialized off-shore training on Okinawa in January 1967.  The first team to become operational, Team 5, began operations by taking over the Gulf of Thailand net and reorganizing it to the approved concept in August 1967.  Team 4 began operations in April 1968, and Teams 1 and 3 began operations in September and October 1968.  One final team, Team 2, of the originally authorized 5 teams, remain on the TO&E, but was not formed due to the non-availability of personnel for training.  This team will probably not be formed.

        e.  The collection teams areas of operation generally conform to the boundaries of the Corps Tactical Zones and the Naval Coastal Zones.  Team 1 covers all the Corps coastal provinces.  Team 3 covers all the II Corps coastal provinces.  Team 3 covers all the II Corps coastal provinces. Teams 4 and 5 cover the III and IV Corps coastal zone boundaries rather than the Corps Tactical Zone boundaries.  Now three additional teams also operate in the two riverine areas and the RSSZ.

        f.  Originally, collection team leaders were required to go into the field and study their areas, select and train their net chiefs and principle agents and write a detailed collection plan.  This plan was reviewed by VNN/N-2 and COMNAVFORV/N-2 and then approved.  The team leaders were granted permission to commence operations.  Each time is sub-divided into agent nets generally conforming to the boundary of each coastal province.  In most cases a Vietnamese Navy NCO, under civilian cover, has been assigned to operate as the net chief with an agent network of from five to fifteen agents per province depending upon evaluated requirements.  Sources are civilians outside draft age, when possible.  Active duty naval personnel are not suppose to be employed as agents.  The management of the system, registration of sources, management sections.  Additionally, COMNAVFORV has dispatched trained Area Collection Officers rto work as team leader counterparts in the field.  Collection guidance and specific EEI's can be developed at naval headquarters or at the local level and be levied on the collection team.

        g.  In the past several months., COMNAVFORV/N-2 working in conjunction with VNN/N-2 has sought to upgrade the quality of their agents.  Detailed Informant Utilization Programs (IUPs) are now required and agents are targeted against specific objectives.

        h.  In conjunction with this effort to upgrade the agents, COMNAVFORV, again working with VNN/N-2, has established a covert intelligence school designed to train personnel in all aspects of covert intelligence.  Normally personnel assigned to this school have completed basic agent handling training and are assigned to this school for advanced training.

    2. Overt Collection.

            a. Area Intelligence Officers.

               (1)  There are currently in Vietnam, seven Area Intelligence


Officers - one each for the four coastal zones and two riverines areas and the Rung Sat Special Zone.  These intelligence officers are assigned by VNN/N-2 and report directly to the area commander.  VNN/N-2 has no direct authority over these officers but can, as has been discussed previously, exert considerable influence through the office of the CNO and through future billet assignments.

          (2)  Area Intelligence Officers are suppose to coordinate all the intelligence activity in their area.  This while in theory NILO and collection teams report directly to VNN/N-2 Headquarters, in actual practice areas where the Area Intelligence Officer is strong, this is no problem; however, where the intelligence officer is weak or assigned too many additional officer, the intelligence effort in that area suffers, and the individual intelligence officers act independently of each other.

          (3)  In order to reduce the amount of additional duties levied on the Area Intelligence Officer, VNN/N-2 has sought to bring pressure through the office of the CNO on the area commanders.  Success to dare has been marginal.

    b.  VNN Naval Intelligence Liaison Officers (NILOs).

          (1) Since 1964, the US Navy in Vietnam has deployed officers titled Naval Intelligence Liaison Officers, to various key locations in Vietnam.  Their mission has been to provide operational and tactical combat intelligence by maintaining constant and open liaison with all field intelligence organizations in their area, to conduct visual exploitation of captured documents, and to provide intelligence support and assistance to US and Free World Forces in their areas.  No similar program existed in the Vietnamese Navy until 1969.

          (2) The VNN NILO program was first proposed in late 1966 and accepted the same year.  A TO&E submission was made to assign twenty-four billets to the coastal zone and riverine area commanders.  Four NILOs were to be assigned to each commander.  By March 1968, the TO&E was approved.  In September 1968, twenty Vietnamese officerss were chosen and sent to basic intelligence training in Saigon.  In October 1968, the CNO establishing instruction was promulgated, clearly setting forth the mission and functions of the NILOs, and reaffirming their subordinarion to the coast zone/riverine area commanders.  In December 1968, fifteen officers completed their basic training, met the security requirements for assignment, and were asigned to posts throughout Vietnam in January 1969.  Many problems were then encountered, mainly in logistics, communications and command control.  Originally the idea was that US NILOs would take the VNN NILO under his wing and train him.  In most cases this occured and when it did, a minium of problems resulted.  But in other areas where, for various reasons, the US and VN NILO did not work togeter problems were numerous especially in logistics and communications.  The reasons were simple.  VNN/N-2 did not have sufficient funds to provide all the supplies needed by the VN NILOs.  VN commanders were reluctant to supply office space.  And VNN communications was and is inadequate.  The US NILOs normally have had to provide support in each of these areas.  If a US NILO was not present to VN NILO


had to fend for himself - normally wih little results.  The biggest problem though was in command and control.  Because VNN/N-2 did not have a large enough staff to provide proper direction and some control over the NILO, he enough staff to provide proper direction and some control over the NILO, he was left to do more less what he thought was right.  Again in some cases rhe VNNILO performed very well but in others he did little or nothing.

          (3) During the last year however, many of the problems have been reduced considerably.  VNN/N-2 has established a Collection Branch (though there are still some problems).  VNN commanders appreciate intelligence more now and have begun to assist in the logistic support of the area NILOs, and the US has at every VN NILO post provided communications support.  VNN NILOs and US NILOs have, in fact, in many locations formed an effective, combined team which is far superior to the previous single US NILO.

          (4)  In December 1969, a Joint Proposal by VNN/N-2 and COMNAVFORV was submitted which outlined the utilization of forty officers and forty two petty officers per year to be assigned to the intelligence department in 1970.  Thirty two of the forty officers will be assigned to field intelligence units, many of which will be NILOs.  Thus as Vietnamization continues and as US NILO posts are turned over to the Vietnamese, every effort is being made to insure that there will be no reduction in efficiency in the Field Intelligence Organization.

    c.  Unit Intelligence Officers.

         (1)  Deployed fleet units and forces are being assigned Unit Intelligence Officers as they become available.  These officers collect and evaluate intelligence from their AO then disseminate it to other interested forces, Coastal Zone Headquarters and VNN Headquarters.  These officers report directly to their unit commanders but are coordinated by the Area Intelligence Officer.  Unit Intelligence Officers move with the unit and are thus not normally assigned a fixed local area of responsibility.

        (2)  To date only two units (CTF 211 and CTF 212) have Unit Intelligence Officers, but as more officers are made available to intelligence this program will grow.  The plan now is to have Unit Intelligence Officers assigned to all major VNN units.

    3.  Technical Collection.

         a.  A Sensor Detachment (DUFFLEBAG) has been formed which was assigned to the VNN/N-2 Collection Branch on 8 January 1970. (DUFFLEBAG is the code world for this electronic sensor system currently in use.)  This detachment which had been previously controlled by COMNAVFORV/N-3, is now being rapidly turned over to the VNN as teams are trained in the employment and operation of these electronic devices.  Detachment strength, started with 25 VNN officers and men, will expand to 100 officers and men by 30 June 1970.  Plans now tentatively call for a total of 160 officers and men in seven field teams and one headquarters team consisting of 20 men each by 1 January 1972.


        4.  Hydrographic Section.

             a. In the Vietnamese Navy, the Hydrographic Section is assigned to Intelligence and is located under the Collection Branch.

             b.  The Hydrographic Section of Headquarters N-2 is responsible for the maintenance and provision of all hydrographic charts and maps for rhe Vietnamese Navy.  Previously headed by an exceptionally well-trained officer, this section is well organized and efficient in maintaining it's supply of maps and charts and overseeing their distribution.  While small, this section produces landing beach studies and port studies from available information.  In December 1967, nine Vietnamese petty officers were trained in-country in hydorgraphy and were subsequently assigned on a temporary basis to assist the field intelligence officers.  While this effort is currently small, rthere are a sufficient number of trained VNN sailors and officers to form the nucleus of a larger hydrographic program available when required.  Considering the current program and needs of the Navy, however, this program has taken a low priority.  The planned mobile Hydrographic Survey Team and the assets currently available are sufficient to meet the current emergency needs of the Navy.  he major problem that they now face is a lack of proper equipment to do the job, and the loss one one officer and five petty officers.

             c.  Over the past year, in order to stay proficient, VNN petty officers have joined the US Army Hydrographic Survey Team One (HST-1) on a Vietnam, their equipment will be turned over to the VNN.  Additionally, it has been requested that an Advisor from HST-1 join the VNN Intelligence Advisory Staff during the transition phase to implement Vietnamization.  THis can do nothing but help.

        5.  Aerial - Photographic Section.

             a.  Also located in Collection is the Aerial-Photographic Section (Figure 3).  This is a small section which covers both basic ground photograpy and photo interpretation.  A one man photo lab is maintained.  The lab has the basic equipment for the developing and printing of 35 mm film.  A protable Kodak enlarger permits prints of up to 8x10" to be made.  N-2 maintains a single 35 mm camera on loan from COMNAVFORV and one 4x5 GRAFLEX hand held camera.  The photo interpretation equipment consists of two Abrams 2-4 steroscopes and one RICHARDS 9x28" light table with a Bausch and Lomb steroviewer.  Aerial and hand held photogeraphy are utilized in the production of beach and port studies and any other special studies conducted by N-2.  All aerial photography made available to the VNN comes from US or VNAF assets.  The VNN has no air arm and, thus, has no capability to collect aerial appears to remain as a serious support deficiency.  In-country basic photo interpretation training is available, so that, given the necessary personnel and equipment, N-2 could increase their capability quite readily.  The current organization is quite small.  Increasing equipment in quality and quantity is a function of MASF funding.  The new equipment required to perform increasing photographic requests is presently on order.


        6. Collection Assessment.

            a. The basic mechanisms to collect intelligence are largerly in being and are being improved upon.  Currently the most significant problem areas concern personnel, experience, commuications and the addition of sensors.

            b.  The current manning level of the Collection Branch is too small to cope with the size task before it.  The current headquarters section (Figure 7) programmed to consist of twelve officers and two petty officers has actually been manned by two officers and one petty officer.  This has been inadequate to properly manage the field forces, maintain files, write information reports, produce collection guidance, fully utilize presently available photographic and electronic sensors and participate in the bilateral activities of the collection program.

            c.  The forty officers being programmed for assignment to N-2 in calendar year 1970 will fill eight headquarters billets and thirty-two collection field organization billets.  The field organization billets consists of ten Unit Intelligence Officers, one Assistant Area Intelligence Officer and twenty-one NILOs.  This will definitely help.

            d.  In January 1970, an entirely new section was added to the Collection Branch to supervise and operate "DUFFLEBAG".  The TO&E for the sectiuon alone calls for one hundred personnel in 1970 and an additional sixty personnel during 1971.

           e.  Other organizational changes include the placing of the Meterology officer and Charts Unit, AErial Photographic Interpretation Unit and Photographic Laboratory under the Air/Sea Support Section.  The gathering of intelligence - supervised by the Acquisition and Control Section - will be accomplished by the Area and Unit Intelligence Officer, Outside Source Exploitation Officer, Collection Team Officer "DUFFLEBAG" Officer and the Survey Team Officer.

            f.  The problem of acquiring experience is one which can be overcome, provided many of the officers currently serving in intelligence billets are returned to increase the basic strength and provide guidance and training to newcomers.  Most of the officers in the field are on heir first tour of intelligence.  It takes time to develop the necessary questioning and follwo-up attitude required to successfully collect and produce operational intelligence.  The field officers need current and continued guidance and support.  The assistance of the US IOs, ACOs and NILOs has been invaluable but more guidance, direction and support must emanate from the Senior VNN Field Intelligence Officers and the VNN Chief of Intelligence in Saigon.

            g.  A Current problem being resolved jointly by the US Navy and the VNN is that of disseminating collected information in a timely manner.  Agents have in the past submitted reports by motorbike, sampan, and courier.  The result has been historical information of no OPTINEL vaue.  Unfortunately,


Vietnamese electrical commuications still remain insecure and insufficient to pass classified material.  This problem will lessen as better equipment becomes available which is still in the long term future.  In the interim, COMNAVFORV/N-2 has assisted in increasing reporting timeliness by establishing liasion between the agent nets and the US and VN NILOs, field intelligence officers, or operating units so that US commuications facilities can be utilized to speed the delivery of information.  Voice radios are bing made available to the Vietnamese, but they do not provide security unless used with an operations code.  Additionally the range is limited except for tactical use in the immediate area.

            h.  Collection also faces the problem of lack of additional non-human sensors.  The VNN has no integral aerial capability.  Aerial photo and visual reconnaissance requirements are met by US and VNAF resources.  VNAF has not been programmed to be a large force in the future so that Navy requirements will continue to be difficult to meet. The addition of the "DUFFLEBAG" program will add substantially to the collection of data concerning enemy movement of supplies and personnel via infiltration routes and may provide real time intelligence for immediate response by operating forces.

            i.  Overall, the major VNN collection deficiencies that existed four years ago have been reduced.  Many problems still remain, some of which are major.  Nevertheless, an organization and experience foundation has been built which will lead the way to a more self sufficient operation.



        1.  Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) is basically the processing, analysis and dissemination of raw collected data into a basis for plans, policies, and operations.  OPINTEL is responsible for extracting all information from the myriad sources and transforming this information into meaningful and effective intelligence briefs, target and area-situation studies and estimates of interest to the CNO and trhe naval operating forces.  Its concentrated effort is to keep the operational forces informed, up to the minute, of possible activity, so that they can exploit the situation to the maximum extent possible.  VNN operational intelligence functions as shown by Figure 8.  Combat Intelligence and Basic Intelligence Sections exist as integral parts of OPINTEL rather than separate branches.

       2.  VNN/N-2 Operational Intelligece Branch has been on paper since November 1968, but it was June 1969 before any officer personnel were assigned to VNN Headquarters.  In that month, three totally untrained Aspirants (Warrant Officers) were assigned to VNN Headquarters as analysts.  From June, until November little progress was made.  However, during this time a total of seven officers were assigned, consisting of a Lieutenant as Branch Head, three Lieutenants Junior Grade as analysts, and two Aspirants and one Ensign as assistant analysts.

       3.  In November 1969, the OPINTEL Branch began to function and move forward in an all out effort to prove that OPINTEL is an essential element for the efficient and effective operation of naval forces.

       4.  OPINTEL now has in its possession most of the tools required to process, analyze, disseminate and produce intelligence output.  Among these tools are maps, charts, photos, CDEC readouts, and most importantly message traffic from collection posts. Each day documents are collected from CDEC.  In additon OPINTEL maintains wall plots of the four tactical plots of special interest areas such as the Long Tau Shipping Channel, Rung Sat Special Zone, Vinh Te Canal, U Minh Forest and CMD are kept.

       5.  The brain of OPINTEL is the analyst. VNN/N-2 Headquarters has a I and II Corps Analyst, a III Corps Analyst and a IV Corps Analyst.  For the most part these officers have developed a comprehensive background of their areas of study.  Through a daily update of the OOB (enemy), they are able to stay abreast of the enemy's strength and movement.  In addition, the branch head functions as the Cambodian Analyst.

       6.  The heart and lifeline of OPINTEL is the input - the information provided by forces in the field.  Daily VNN OPINTEL receives between 200 and 300 English Language Confidential messages and reports from US originators in Vietnam, and 10-15 Vietnamese Language messages - most of which come over US circuits and a few over VNN circuits.  In addition, information is received from VN JGS.  From these messages and reports VNN OPINTEL produces:


        a.  Intelligence Summary.

            (1)  A daily intelligence summary of the most significant information for past twenty-four to forty-eight hours country-wide by Corps with appropriate Field N-2 and Headquarters N-2 comments is disseminated to the operating forces over US communication circuits.  

        b.  Weekly Intelligence Summary

            (1) The weekly intelligence summary disseminated each Saturday is similar to the daily INTSUM but it incorporates a weekly wrap up (review) of significant activity and discusses the estimates of activity for the coming week.  Through the weekly summary, operational forces are able to review significant intelligence output for the present week as well as be exposed to the projected Headquarters N-2 estimates of forthcoming enemy activity.

        c.  Briefs.

            (1) Daily.

                (a) Each day a brief is prepared by the analysts.  Since November 1969, briefs have been presented three days a week at fifteen hundred at the TOC of VNN Headquarters for the CNO, COMNAVFORV and numerous operational commanders.  The bilingual brief encompasses significant activity for the past twenty-four to forty-eight hours.  The Friday brief, additionally includes a wrap up of significant activity during the week as well as estimates of activity for the coming week.  VNN/N-2 is prepared to brief daily in Vietnamese.

            (2) Monthly Brief.

                (a) On the fifteenth of each month the analysts prepare a detailed Corps by Corps brief containing a summary of activity for the preceeding thiry day period, a synopsis of the present situation, and an estimate of activity for the next thirty day time frame.  These briefs are presented by the VNN/N-2.  View graphs, and slides are also prepared to enhance these briefs.

            (3)  Special Briefs.

                  (a) A general information brief is prepared monthly for presentation to the foreign Attaches.  Other special, general information briefs are given when necessary.

          d.  Spot Reports.

               (1)  Message reports of immediate intelligence importance to the operational forces are prepared and sent out when deemed necessary.  The analysts is in a position whereby he may be able to see the situation much more vividly and he can send out his analysis of the situation.


    7.  Combat Intelligence.

         a.  The Target Analysis Center (TAC), is the hub of Combat Intelligence.  TAC is composed of a series of maps and charts of the four Coastal Tactical Zones and two riverine areas, as well as detailed maps of operational areas such as rhe Vinh Te Canal, Cua Viet and Cua Dai Rivers, and the Minh Forest.  TAC records and plots symbolically on these status charts and maps such intelligence information as may be required to produce analysis of areas, organizations and intentions of the enemy.  TAC could just as well stand for Trend Analysis Center because TAC provides the visual picture whereby trends in enemy activity can be spotted and analyzed such as infiltration routes, cache sites, hospitals, POW camps, sampan activity and a complete picture of enemy as wellas friendly initiated fire fights and engagements.  The plots are maintained and updated daily.  Each day a TAC summary for activity during the past twenty-four hours is prepared for use by the analysts and N-2.  The progress of VNN/N-2 TAC (Combat Intelligence Section) has been satisfying.  The main area of difficulty has been getting the analysts to make use of it.  Finally TAC is ready to brief at anytime.  A monthly TAC brief is prepared by the section head with special emphasis on VNN operations.

    8.  Basic Intelligence.

         a.  Basic intelligence, like combat intelligence, is not a separate branch of VNN/N-2, but is an integrated part of OPINTEL.  Basic intelligence deals with studies and estimates are formulated.  VNN/N-2, due to lack of personnel, has had to neglect this area somewhat, but an effort is now being made to devote more time basic intelligence.

            (1) Studies.

                 (a) Studies are of two general types; area and situation.  VNN analysts have the ability to deal in depth with both types.  Through processing and analysis the VNN/N-2 analysts can produce detailed reports of situations and of areas of particular naval interest.  These studies consist of such things as new infiltration routes, document exloitation, etc.

          (2)  Estimates.

               (a)  VNN analysts have the ability to formulate detailed estimates of given situations.  These estimates can be of significance and of great importance to the operating forces in preventing unforseen initiation of enemy activity.  The analysts, through this basic intelligence phase, attempt to provide estimative intelligence.  By processing and analyzing information of the past and present the analyst is able to estimate the future.

    9.  The development of OPINTEL has given a meaning to VNN Intelligence.  Collection now has a reason to collect information.  Good intelligence now requres beter communication.  A reason for training can be seen.  The development of OPINTEL and at the daily brief has given the VNN/CNO a greater insight into the enemy situation with which to make his decisions.  OPINTEL is the 


axle around which all other VNN Intelligence revolves.  It is the heart of the organization.  No other factor has done more for intelligence than the development of OPINTEL.

        10. The progress of the Operational Branch of VNN/N-2 is impressive in both quantity and quality.  Two of the analysts have formerly served as NILOs, as well as has the Branch Head.  The Branch Head, along with the three analysts have completed the intelligence course at F. Cay Mai and two of them studied in Okinawa.  The three assistant analysts will complete the eight week intelligence course at Ft. Cay Mai in April 1970.  In addition, there are three petty officers and one seaman who plot OOB and perform other tasks such as maintaining plots and typing.  TAC is manned by one Aspirant, one Chief Petty Officer and one seaman.

        11. The organization is rapidly taking shape.  Files are kept by the analysts for use at anytime references are necessary.  Comprehensive TAC files are kept.  Each OPINTEL officer assigned is becoming more efficient daily.  Each man is becoming increasingly aware of his requirement and responsibilities.

        12. VNN/N-2 Operational Intelligence Branch has now begun to produce an output derived from analysis.  This analysis provides the depth which is so vital if meaning is to be wrought from seemingly unrelated information collected over a period of time.

        13. A daily effort is also made to improve the quality and to increase the quantity of VNN/N-2 field reporting by OPINTEL. In January, the analysts began message evaluation.  Each analyst completes at least three evaluation forms every two weeks per reporting post.  Through these evaluations the analyst is able to tell the originator what information he desires, what information is lacking.  This method of feedback has proven most effective in upgrading the useful of VNN reports.

        14. VNN field officers return to VNN Headquarters periodically for two weeks training.  During this time, the field intelligence officer works with the analysts in order tro learn what the analysts expects of him and in turn what the officer expects from the analysts.  A complete and thorough study of TAC is also part of this training.  Once the field officer returns to his post, he has a much clearer picture of his duties.

        15. Most NILOs and IOs maintain plots of activity in their areas as well as a minature TAC.  They also are required to brief their respective area/zone/unit commanders on a regular schedule.

        16. With the current accelerated turnover of US Navy assets to the VNN and the intended VNN assumption of floating task forces has come the recognition that increased intelligence support to these forces is vital and that Headquarters N-2 must provide the framework for this support.

        17. The major deterent to OPINTEL progress at VNN/N-2 Headquarters is the shortage of personnel.  Additional officers needed for special studies 


and estimates.  The workload of the analysts is just too extensive.  How fast this shop will progress depends, to a large extent, on rthe receipt of these additional officers.



        1.  Vietnamese Naval Intelligence is disseminated by the following methods:

            a.  Oral Briefings - The Headquarters N-2 briefings have been concise and have effectively utilized available graphics which include maps, charts, view graphs, slides, photos and objects.  The headquarters daily briefings are bilingual in order to be most effectively comprehended.  Briefings differ, of course, according to individual capabilities but are most effective technique of dissemination.  The analysts are presently progressing at an encouraging pace and are developing into good briefers.  The field intelligence officers normally brief each fleet command ship or other naval units deployed in their areas periodically.

            b. Written Intelligence - Most of the remainder of the intelligence disseminated is through written material, photos and chart displays.  The daily Intelligence Summary is he major item disseminated by N-2 Headquarters.  It is sent all field forces via US circuits and to info addees via guard mail or courier.  The use of US circuits which began in June 1969, was a tremendous advancement toward rapid and effective dissemination of intelligence output.  Studies, estimates, spot reports and any other necessary communicarions is also sent out via US circuits.  VN NILOs, IOs and CTs utilize US circuits in transmitting information to headquarters.  Finally, VN circuits are used fdor transmission to and from headquarters, but their use for intelligence purposes has been discouraged.

          2. Vietnamese Naval communications generally lack the security required for transmission of intelligence information below major command level.  This deficiency is primarily due to a lack of sophisticated cryptographic equipment to provide real time data transmission to consumers.  Present equipment is limited to manual off line systems at major commands and paper codes at minor commands.  Both systems have major dificiencies.  The manual off line systems (ADONIS0KL-7, OLYMFUS-M209) provide adequate security but are not presently widely distributed, and are inherently slow and difficult to maintain.  The paper code (AN-C) provdes little or no security but is widely distributed and used.

          3. An interim solution to the above problem was provided when the US Navy authorized transmission of Vietnamese message traffic, including intelligence, via USN on line communications.  This system has worked well, however, obvious disadvantages remain.  These involve additional processing requirements, courier handling between USN and VNN communications organizations and the major factor of not always having communications at the required locations.  Furthermore, this problem will be compounded when USN operations are reduced and communications facilities are phased out.

          4. Concurrent with phase out of USN operational communications, the USN advisor communications network is being developed. The advisor network will provide secure communications between all major operational commands and will be geographically distributed throughout South Vietnam. This system will be available for the forseeable future for us in intelligence collection/dissemination.


        5. To supplement this advisor network a plan has been developed to supply secure voice equipment to most USN advisors. Secure voice equipment will provide a readily available means of intelligence dissemination although there may be some limitations due to unfavorable geographic distribution.

          6. The Vietnamese Navy communications system is being radically reconfigured in order to provide the three essentials of security, reliability and speed.  It is anticipated that this program will be completed by 1973. Sufficient secure communications should exist by late 1970 to provide for dissemination of intelligence to most locations by secure off line means although not necessariy in real time.

          7. As a corollary of the communications improvement program it has been recommended to JGS that an ARFCOS service be established to provide for the secure distribution of cryptographic material.  The proposed ARFCOS service would be similar to that in existance within the US Armed Forces.  This service could also be used for secure transmission of intelligence information on a scheduled basis. Planning is in the early formative stages and remains to be developed fully.



        1. Background.

            a. VNN Intelligence existed for many years as a small organization whose major function was provide local self defense information and political stability.  No real OPINTEL requirements were levied on VNN/N-2 and nothing was expected.  But, when the VNN began to change, its role and function changed and its organizational grew.  With these changes in the VNN came the requirement for a new concept in Naval Intelligence.  AN Operational Intelligence Force was needed.  More personnel were needed - many more personnel.

        2. Sources.

            a.  Officers - Four sources provide officers for Naval Intelligence the Naval Academy, THU DUC (ARVN) School, Officers augmented from the enlisted ranks and volunteers from the officer corps.  Most of the present VNN/N-2 officers have come from the latter source.  In fact, all officers that transfer into intelligence must be volunteers.  VNN/N-2 has this year requested nine officers, from the Naval Academy, forty-seven officers from THU DUC and two officers from the enlisted ranks.  VNN/N-2 will also accept those qualified volunteers that are allowed to transfer into intelligence.  However, there are major problems for volunteers which include:  (1) a call for volunteers must be made, (2) they must be acceptable and (3) commanding officers must agree to the transfer. Very few commanding officers allow good men to transfer.

        b.  Enlisted - All enlisted men assigned to intelligence are volunteers either directly out of school or from the fleet.  In some cases civilians have been recruited as agents and then, to protect them from the draft, have enlisted in the navy and continued to act as agents.

    3. Evaluation.

        a. One of the major problems for intelligence has been the small number of officers in the VNN.  As a result, few officers have been allowed to transfer into intelligence.  In addition, intelligence, heretofore, did not rate a high priority.  Therefore almost all of the newly graduated officers and augmented officers were assigned to fleet operational units.  Fortunately this priority has been changed to the extent that the VNN/CNO has ordered forty officers be assigned to intelligence this year "as quickely as possible".  These additional officers are urgently needed.

       b.  Because most intelligence personnel are volunteers, motivation is normally not a problem.  In fact, a strong esperit de corps is growing in intelligence as the organization develops.  In those areas where officers have not produced, the present VNN/N-2 intends to replace them with motivated officers and allow those non motivated officers to return to assignments outside intelligence.  Fortunately the number of these officers is small.


        F.  TRAINING.

            1.  (U) Intelligence training for VNN officer and enlisted personnel is available from three basic sources and provides a foundation for general intelligence as well as for several specialty occupations.  Formal basic and and advanced courses are available and are utilized by the VNN.

            2.  (U) In-country training is available for officers and enlisted at the RVNAF Military Intelligence School, Fort Cay Mai, Cholon. The school has a capacity of 350 students and serves all Vietnamese military services.  It is operated primarily by ARVN instructors and is advised by a US Army officer.  Cay Main officer courses include Basic Intelligence, Aerial Photography and Basic Security with an Advanced Intelligence course being planned,  Non-commissioned officer (E-5 to E-8) and enlisted courses (E-1 to E-4) include Basic Intelligence, Aerial Photography, Agent Handling and Security.  It is the intent of rhe Cay Mai facility to provide as much in-country training as possible so that there will be only a minium requirement for off-shore training.

            3.  (U) Almost all of the VNN officers who are assigned to intelligence duty are assigned to the basic course at Cay Mai before assuming their duties.  Exceptions to this are those officers who are promoted from NCO to officer rank while serving in N-2, or those officers who, like the present N-2, have completed a more advanced intelligence training course elsewhere.

            4.  (U) Off-shore training is primarily an officer program, although there have been a few exceptions, sponsored by the US Army at USARPACINTS, Okinawa.  The concept of the off-shore program is to provide training that can not yet be obtained in-country for a selected cadre of Vietnamese officers.  Those so trained are expected to form an experience base from which indigenous training cn be accomplished.  Personnel selected for this training are required to serve in an occupation where the training.  Vietnamese Navy personnel have attended off-shore courses at least since 1962, but the current planned program concerning naval intelligence personnel dates back only to 1966.

            5.  (U) Additional specialized intelligence or intelligence related schools are also conducted in the United States; Vietnamese Navy officers have attended the Senior Foreign Intelligence Officer course at Fort Holabird, Maryland, the one year Hydrographic course conducted by the US Navy Oceanographic Office, Suitland, Maryland.  Approval is currently being sought to send selected Vietnamese officers to the United States for intelligence training,  The purposes of this training is to provide a cadre with training experience directly related to intelligence plus to provide US Naval Orientation in VNN training.  Most aspects of basic, staff, or even specialized intelligence disciplines utilize principles which are necessarily service oriented.  Naval Intelligence officers, somewhere in their training, need to consider and be subjected to purely naval applications of these principles and the hardware involved.

        6.  In addition to the formal schools available, VNN/N-2 also provides on-the-job training and informal "indoctrination" training on an 


"ad hoc" basis. A two week indoctrination course for Operational Intelligence was established in November. This program has involved bringing to Headquarters, field intelligence officers periodically for indoctrination and consultation. To date the program has proven quite successful.

            7. Also, COMNAVFORV has established a special covert training school consisting of three weeks of agent handling training. This school is designed to augment the training VNN officers receive at Fort Cay Mai.

            8.  VNN/N-2 has made extensive use of training facilities available insofar as operational commitments and personnel manning levels allow.  N-2 policy has generally been to absorb as much training as possible.  Personnel have been utilized almost 100 percent in intelligence occupations following their training.

            9.  (U) There is coming into being in the Vietnamese Navy a number of officers and men who are both formally trained and field tested on the job.  Within the not too distant future these officers should be called upon to form a seminar, to meet at regular intervals and to begin to develop a syllabus for VNN internal training, and to update present training for newcomers and incoming officers.  The Cay Mai school can be expected to continue and to expand its capabilities in the years to come; however, with the knowledge now being developed, VNN/N-2 should soon be in a position to develop naval doctrine in several areas.  The recognition of the need and the willingness to sacrifice for the training of personnel which is so virtally needed, is one of the VNN/N-2's brightest areas.



        1. Major Strong Points.

            a.  By far the strongest point in VNN Intelligence is its Headquarters OPINTEL Section.  This section has developed over the past eight months from one of the weakest aspects of Vietnamese Intelligence into a competent, professional organization.  Daily, quality briefs are prepared and presented on alternate days with NAVFORV/N-2 to the VNN/CNO and COMNAVFORV.  Dissemenation of intelligence in the form of INTSUMS, threat evaluations and report evaluations is made daily throughout the VNN fleet.  Studies are prepared periodically covering the enemy situation in Vietnam.  And, in general, a professional air of competance prevails.

        b.  The overall training area is also a strong point. A Significant percentage of deployed field intelligence and headquarters officers have been formally trained or are scheduled for advanced training, thus, intelligence is developing a sound cadre of offices, with formal training and growing experience under wartime conditions, who are capable of independent and semi-independent action.  These officers will also form the basis of a currently lacking "middle management" group capable of instructing and directing intelligence operations in the future.  The same is true of enlisted personnel - trained in the intelligence specialty occupations such as photo interpretation, defense against surrepitious entry and POW interrogations.

        c. The overall organization is well organized and managed considering its small number of personnel and the continually increasing demands.  Areas of responsibility are clearly defined, requirements and responsibilities are codified, and the evaluation of personnel and product is a matter of continuing review.  The present N-2 is especially strong in management and organization and it has begun to show throughout the VNN/N-2 organization.  Given the personnel, VNN/N-2 could be a very powerful organization in the future Vietnamese Navy.

    2.  Improving Rapidly.

A by product in the development of OPINTEL has been the remarkable upswing in collection.  In 1968 and early 1969, a grat deal of effort was devoted to creation of a strong field intelligence organization.  Clandestine teams were created and NILOs added to the already existing Area Intelligence Officer Organization.  However, once created with the men in the field, very little was done to obtain the benefits. What intelligence that was gathered seldom went further than the loal commander and no attempt was made to do more than basic local analysis.  Fortunately, this period of backsliding has ended and real signs of improvement are showing.  Field intelligence reporting has improved dramatically from something less than 50 reports per month to better than 350 reports to headquarters per month.  Most of this improvement has occured since October 1969.  Now a real use is made of field reports and evaluated intelligence is returned.  Collection is fast becoming, once again, one of the strong points of VNN Intelligence.


        3.  Major Weak Points.

            a. The major weak point in VNN Intelligence is the lack of officers and petty officers.  Simply put, there are not enough officers for more and better intelligence have steadliy increased without a sizeable increase in the N-2 personnel strength.  A plan has been drawn up and approved by the VNN/CNO that will add forty officers and forty-two petty officers to intelligence during CY 70.  If this plan is fullfilled it will go a long way toward the solution of his problem.

            b.  A second major weak point is logistics.  VNN/N-2 does not receive sufficient money or equipment from VNN supply to satisfactorily perform its mission.  This problem will not be solved, however, until the VNN gets more money in its budget.  In the 

meantime, the US Navy will have to provide supplemental logistic support if VNN/N-2 is to perform as an intelligence organization.

            c.  A third major weakness is intelligene dissemination via VNN circuits.  VNN communications and communication security is very poor. This is due mainly to a lack of proper equipment.  As an interim measure the US has allowed the VNN to use its circuits.  So far this has proven quite satisfactory.

            d.  Command interest - the VNN Commander that refuses to use intelligence officers in intelligence - is another weakness.  This has been a major problem in both riverine areas and the third coastal zone.  The present N-2 has made a concerted effort to correct this problem mainly through personal intervention. The daily delivery of INTSUM and Intelligence Reports has also helped.  Fortunately, this problem appears to be reducing as commanders take a greater interest in intelligence.

            e.  At Headquarters, the major weakness remains one of command and control.  Collection does not, as yet, control and direct the field intelligence forces properly.  No concerted attempt has been made to keep up daily with the field forces.  OPINTEL should feed into collection their done often enough.  Improvements however, have been made in this area - marked improvements - but a great deal more work has to be done.  The field forces should have no question in their minds as to what their mission is and from where intelligence direction comes.  The solution to this problem will come mainly with more officers assigned to the collection staff. 

            f. Finally, a major weak point is VNN/N-2's past total reliance on HUMINT Collection.  An integral technical collection capability must become a part of VNN/N-2 to supplement HUMINT Collection.  A very positive step in this direction has been the addition of the Sensor (DUFFLEBAG) Detachment. In addition to this detachment, there must also be more reliance on aerial photographic interpretation and a greater utilization of Red Haze and SLAR.


        4. Mission Achievement.

            a. As currently constituted, VNN Intelligence satisfies, in part, all of the elements of its basic mission.  It is clearly organized and is managed by an experienced, capable N-2.  Its shortcomings are basically a lack of personnel, communications and money.  These shortcomings can and are being overcome.  It will just take time and a lot of effort on everyone's part.



       A.  The Vietnamese Navy Intelligence Program is in a period of transition and change.  Many new ideas will probably develop as the current programs become consolidated and improved.  However, it must be born in mind that the US overall goal is the turnover of all USN Intelligence assets and responsibilities to the Vietnamese Navy.  Therefore, in order to develop an effective, competent VNN Intelligence Organization, major US objectives include the following:

             1.  To develop within the Vietnamese Navy an overt intelligence collection and liason field organization with the mission of providing operational intelligence to the Vietnamese coastal zone/riverine area commander, operating forces, and other Vietnamese, FWMAF, and civilian agencies.

             2.  To develop a cadre of well-trained and knowledgeable officers in basic intelligence staff work and speciality skills, and to assist in the production and acquisition of pertient intelligence materials to end the requirements for significant outside assistance.

             3.  To develop and upgrade the Operational Intelligence capability of Vietnamese Naval Intelligence by placing increased emphasis upon analysis, specil studies, direct support of deployed naval forces and the use of secure electrical communication for dissemination.

             4.  To develop and maintain modern organization, management programs, techniquies, and systems to build a professional and viable intelligence organization.

              5.  To enhance the operational and administrative abilities of the Vietnamese Navy Security Bloc/Military Security Service (VNNSB/MSS) and to aid in the expansion of this bloc into a fully Navy orientated counter-intelligence and Naval security organization.

              6.  To develop and maintain within the Vietnamese Navy a clandestine intelligence capability with the mission of collecting information concerning Viet Cong/NVA operations and plans pertaining to the infiltration or exfiltration of men, munitions and material by sea; intra-country movement along the coastal waterways; and any information regarding Viet Cong/NVA activity which can be used to support Vietnamese Navy/US Navy units operating along the coast or in the inland waterway system.

              7.  To establish within the Vietnamese Navy a VNN Sensor Detachment (DUFFLEBAG) with the mission of 


organizing, controlling and utilizing sensors to collect accurate intelligence information and to provide that intelligence information to operational forces. 


Vietnamese Navy Organization

VN Organization Chart

VNN Headquarters N-2 Organization (OLD)

VNN Organization Diagram for Intelligence

VNN Field Intelligence Organization Control

VNN N-2 HQ Organization (proposed)

Current Collection Hdqtrs Organization

VNN-N2 Operational Intelligence Function Chart

Published: Thu Jun 14 06:36:31 EDT 2018