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Magic Background of Pearl Harbor Volume II
Appendix
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND
OF
PEARL HARBOR
VOLUME II
Appendix
Department of Defense
United States of America
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402 (8-part set; sold in sets only)
APPENDIX II
PART A-HULL‑NOMURA CONVERSATIONS
(May 12, 1941‑ August 6, 1941)
No. 1
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 295.
Part 1 of 6.
The Government of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.
Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and un-fortunate consequences.
It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of an entente cordiale, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.
For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill‑suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both governments in honor and in act.
It is our belief that such an understanding should compromise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective Governments.
Trans. 5‑14‑41
No. 2
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 295.
Part 2 of 6.
Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to with:
1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and character of nations.
2. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.
3. The relations of both nations toward the China affair.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
Accordingly, we have come to the following natural understanding.
A-1
1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.
Trans. 5‑14‑41
No. 3
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 295.
Part 3 of 6.
Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.
Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interest regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of backward nations.
Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order in national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.
Trans. 5‑14‑41
No. 4
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 295.
Part 4 of 6.
2. The attitude of both Governments toward the European war.
The Government of the United States and Japan make it their common aim to bring about the world peace; they shall therefore jointly endeavor not only to prevent further extension of the European war but also speedily to restore peace in Europe.
The Government of Japan maintains that its alliance with the Axis powers was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the nations which are not at present directly affected by the European war from engaging in it.
The Government of Japan maintains that its obligations of military assistance under the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy will be applied in accordance with the stipulation of Article 3 of the said pact.
The Government of the United States maintain that its attitude toward the European war is, and will continue to be, directed by no such aggressive measures as to assist any one nation against another.
A-2
The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European war is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.
Trans. 5‑14‑41
No. 5
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 295.
Part 5 of 6.
3. The relations of both nations toward the China affair.
The Governments of the United States, acknowledging the three principles as enunciated in the Konoye statement and the principles as enunciated in the Konoye statementa and the principles set forth on the basis of the said three principles in the treaty with the Nanking Government as well as in the joint declaration of Japan, Manchukuo and China and relying upon the policy of the Japanese Government to establish a relationship of neighborly friendship with China, shall forthwith request the CHIANG KAI‑SHEK regime to negotiate peace with Japan.
4. Commerce between both nations.
When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such commodities as are, respectively, available or required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and Japan.
________________
a The repetition in the text actually occurred.
Trans. 5‑14‑41
No. 6
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 295.
Part 6 of 6.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
As Japanese activities in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried out by peaceful means, American cooperation shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
a. The Governments of the United States and Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands on the condition that the Philippine Islands shall maintain a status of permanent neutrality. The Japanese subjects shall not be subject to any discriminatory treatment.
b. Japanese immigration to the United States shall receive amicable consideration‑on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.
A-3
ADDENDUM
The present understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.
The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this understanding will be agreed upon by both governments.
Trans. 5‑14‑41
No. 7
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 294.
Re your # 214a.
The English text, complete, my # 295b (six parts), is not in Government Code. Therefore, please exercise great care.
______________
a Matsuoka suggests revision of the text.
b Text of proposal.
Trans. 5‑14‑41
No. 8
FROM: Tokyo May 13, 1941
TO: Washington # 219.
(In 3 parts‑complete).
Strictly secret. Separate message.
"The governments of Japan and the United States accept joint responsibility for the negotiation and conclusion of a general agreement concerning the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.
"Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and arrested in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.
"It is our earnest hope that, by a joint effort, the two nations will establish a just peace in the Pacific, and by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.
"For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill‑suited and weakening. We, therefore, suggest that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both governments in honor and in act.
"It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which would be deliberated at a later conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective governments.
"We presume to anticipate that our governments could ‑‑‑‑ relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit
A-4
"1. The concepts of Japan and the United States respecting international relations and the character of nations.
"2. The attitudes of both governments toward the European war.
"3. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.
"4. Commerce between both nations.
"5. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
"6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.
"Finally we have come to the following mutual understanding:
"1. The Concepts of Japan and the United States respecting International Relations and Character of Nations.
The governments of Japan and the United States jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.
Both governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation between our peoples.
Both governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.
"2. The Attitudes of Both Governments toward the European War.
It being the common aim of both governments to establish world peace, they will join forces with a view to preventing the extension of the European War and restoring peace speedily.
The government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the participation of nations in the European War not at present involved in it.
The government of Japan declares that there is no question that the obligation of military assistance under the Tripartite Pact comes into force in the case stipulated in Article 3 of the said Pact.
The government of the United States declares that so far as its attitude toward the European War is concerned it does not and will not resort to aggressive measures aimed to assist any one nation against another. The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.
"3. The Relations of both Nations toward the China Affair.
In appreciation of the three principles set forth in the Konoye Statement and the treaty concluded with the Nanking government upon the basis of the said Statement and the joint declaration of Japan, Manchukuo and China and also in reliance upon Japan's policy of friendship and good neighbour toward China, the government of the United States will immediately request the Chiang Kai‑Shek regime to negotiate peace with Japan.
"4. Commerce between both Nations.
When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both governments, Japan and the United States shall assure each other to supply mutually such commodities as are, respectively, available or required by either of them. Both governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between Japan and the United States. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both governments, it could be elaborated as soon as possible and concluded in accordance with usual procedure.
A-5
"5. Economic Activity of both Nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
Noting that Japanese expansion in the direction of the southwestern Pacific is declared to be of peaceful nature, American cooperation and support shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.
"6. The Policies of Both Nations affecting Political Stabilization in the Pacific.
(a) The governments of Japan and the United States jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands provided that the latter observes perpetual neutrality and accords to the Japanese subjects a treatment equal to the Commonwealth citizens.
(b) Japanese immigration to the United States shall receive amicable consideration on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.
ADDENDUM
The present understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the governments of Japan and the United States. The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this understanding will be agreed upon by both governments."
Trans. 5‑14‑41
No. 9
FROM: Tokyo May 13, 1941
TO: Washington # 218.
In writing up separate message # 219a (English text) we have made use of the text in your message # 256b as much as possible. However, it was necessary to revise certain parts, in order to conform more closely to the Japanese text (our revised proposal). When presenting the above ( # 219) to the Secretary of State please eliminate these portions ‑‑‑‑‑.
_______________
a See II, 8.
b Not available.
Trans. 5‑14‑41
No. 10
FROM: Tokyo May 9, 1941
TO: Washington # 206.
(3 parts‑complete) (Secret outside the department).
Regarding my message # 204.
Main reason for the revision and other points to be noted:
(1) Clause 2 of the "Understanding Agreement" #2 was revised, despite the fact that no further provision should be required in view of the obvious nature of Japan's partnership in the Tripartite Pact, because we felt that our position in relation to the aforesaid pact should be made clear before adopting a provision of this nature.
(2) Each clause in "Understanding Agreement" # 3 was struck out, because, to seek a U.S.-Japanese understanding on the basis of such itemized provisions appears too much as though these questions were dictated by the United States.
A-6
The clause relative to migration of our nationals to China was eliminated because it may give a mistaken impression to our countrymen who from the beginning resented emigration to the United States, that the U.S. is directing even our immigration in China.
Although it might be said that there should be no objections to this so long as it is kept secret, matters such as this have a way of leaking out occasionally, therefore we should be prepared for such an event.
We wish to obtain the United States' assurance, in a separate secret clause, to the effect that she will stop aiding Chiang Kai‑Shek in the event that Chiang accepts our peace suggestion. However, if for any reason this is unacceptable to the United States, we are willing to have merely the responsible parties adhere to this provision.
(3) "A" and "C" of # 4 was eliminated because we consider it more realistic to wait and see the effect of the "Understanding Agreement" on the strained U.S.‑Japanese relations before taking up this matter.
"B" should be considered as a separate item of understanding and a great deal of thought should be given to determining the time, method and intentions regarding its fulfillment.
Please bear in mind that we must consider the effect of such matters as these on our allies.
(4) # 2 and # 5 (Revised proposal # 4) was eliminated on the same ground, as "A" and "C" of # 4.
(5) "A" of # 7 (Revised Proposal # 6). At present Japan has given assurance regarding the Philippines, however, we cannot commit ourselves to assume the responsibilities implied in this clause.
The phrase "and the southwest Pacific" in "C" of # 7 was eliminated for the reason that., when necessary, we will carry on negotiations in these parts independently of others.
(6) We have eliminated the entire reference to the hope of holding U.S.‑Japanese conversations. In its stead we wish to make an arrangement whereby desires of both sides will be expressed by exchange of notes, to hold a conference between the President and the Premier or their respective representatives when it is deemed necessary, after the present proposal has been in effect.
(7) Please take note that the draft for the establishment of the present proposal will be drawn up by us and sent to you.
Trans. 5‑12‑41
No. 11
FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) May 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 206.
ADDENDUM
Insert the addendum incorporated in this wire as paragraph 5 immediately following paragraph 4. Please move paragraph 5 down in its proper order.
(5 and 6) (Revised draft of paragraph 5).
The reason the statement "there shall be no recourse to armed force" has been deleted is that in the Imperial peace plans, Premier KONOYE and this Minister have frequently found it necessary in the past to use armed force. The Imperial Government's most ardent wish is that the Southwestern Pacific question, as it applies to our expansion, be peacefully concluded; but, in the light of the current international situation rampant with unprecedented confusion, no one can say what changes will have to be brought about. In the future developments of the international situation, the Imperial Japanese Government, should it ever be provoked beyond
A-7
endurance will not be able to avoid exercising military force and that she give a guarantee not to do so would be very difficult. However, regardless of the future developments of this situation, it is very clear that Japan alone could not determine such a course. I believe that on this point now is the time clarification should be made rather than to wait until difficulties have arisen.
Trans. 5‑13‑41
No. 12
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 297.
Separate wire.
The three principles of Prince KONOYE as referred to in this paragraph are:
1. Neighborly friendship.
2. Joint defense against communism.
3. Economic cooperation‑by which Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly in China nor to demand of China a limitation in the interest of Third Powers.
The following are implied in the aforesaid principles:
1. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
2. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace.
3. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.
4. No annexation, no indemnities.
5. Independence of Manchukuo.
Trans. 5‑16‑41
No. 13
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 296.
Re your # 205a.
When I talked with Secretary of State HULL on the 12th he demanded a formal explanation of the three basic principles outlined in Premier KONOYE's statement contained in the third paragraph (on the relationships of the two governments to the China incident), as well as the Premier's statement regarding the proclamation of the treaty base upon these three principles. But there being the matter of instructions from you, I made presentation of the explanation of my plan as outlined in my # 297. I wonder, though, whether it might of be a better plan to explain to him that there is virtually no difference between this and the various provisions of paragraph 3 of the original proposals made in my # 256b (having to do with organized immigration). Therefore, I would like to make formal explanation in any case along a line which we feel to be most advantageous to us. Please wire me any comments that you have on this subject.
_______________
a Containing Matsuoka's revisions to the test of the proposal.
b Not available.
Trans. 5‑16‑41
A-8
No. 14
FROM: Washington May 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 299.
I met with Secretary Hull last night (the 12th) and I submitted my explanations and the revised proposal contained in your message # 214a.
He glanced through the papers. Then, while looking at the paragraphs regarding our south-ward expansion and the China Affair‑on which the most importance is placed by Japan‑he implied that there was nothing further to be guaranteed in the case of the former and made inquiries concerning the realistic values of the latter. This is as I reported to you in my earlier message # 296b.
I told the Secretary that Japan had absolutely no aggressive ambitions in the southern area. However, it is natural, I explained, to avoid tying the hands of one's own country, and that country only, in the event of unexpected misfortune in the future. For example, I said, in the event that the United States puts a powerful navy in the Pacific, Japan does not want to be placed in such a position which would prevent her from doing anything about it.
Translator's note: Following paragraph garbled, contains guesswork.
The Secretary replied that there would be no reason for the United States herself to do some-thing which she can have Japan do for her. As a matter of fact, the United States would prefer to have some other country do it for her, if said other country can do it to the same extent.
With regard to the matter of security, the Secretary said that every precaution was being taken to protect the secret, and that there was absolutely no danger of any leakage.
______________
a See II, 17.
b II, 13.
Trans. 5‑15‑41
No. 15
FROM: Tokyo May 13, 1941
TO: Washington # 216.
Please transmit separate message # 217a to the Secretary of State without delay.
_____________
a Not available.
A-9
No. 16
FROM: Tokyo May 13, 1941
TO: Washington # 213.
Regarding my # 206a.
Please have it understood that the attitude of the United States government towards the European war, as stated in the provision "The Attitude of both countries towards the European war" in Clause 2 of the "Understanding Agreement" represents merely the declaration of attitude on the part of the United States government and is not to be taken to imply Japan's approval of present acts and attitude of that government towards the European war.
______________
a See II, 10.
Trans. 5‑13‑41
No. 17
FROM: Tokyo May 13, 1941
TO: Washington # 214.
In presenting the revisions contained in my message # 205a I assume that it was necessary to reword some of the parts of the English text in your # 256b. While I feel certain that you have already made appropriate rephrasing for instance, of Clause 6 where it relates to economic activities of both countries in the southwest Pacific, I feel that the following might be acceptable, "having in view that the Japanese expansion in the direction of the southwestern Pacific is declared to be of peaceful nature".
I am suggesting the above because of the importance of this point. (The original text's "without resorting to arms", etc., alone is unacceptable. If I think of any other changes which should be made I will let you know.
In view of the importance of this negotiation please call on the Secretary of State this evening (?) and obtain his decision regarding it (?).
_____________
a Not available.
b Not available.
Trans. 5‑13‑41
No. 18
FROM: Tokyo May 13, 1941
TO: Washington # 215.
Re my # 214a.
In matters as important as this, it is necessary to include the original Japanese text as well. Will you please, therefore, give the United States a copy of the Japanese version of the text revised by us immediately.
A-10
We are at present drawing up the English version of the above text and we will probably cable it to you sometime on this, the 13th. Upon its receipt, will you please deliver it to the Secretary of State.
________________
a See II, No. 17.
Trans. 5‑13‑41
No. 19
FROM: Tokyo May 13, 1941
TO: Washington Unnumbered.
Your "very urgent" dispatch of the 13th (May), cannot be decoded after the 15th letter. Please verify and repeat.
Trans. 5‑14‑41
[Note: No #20 or 21 in the original text.]
No. 22
FROM: Washington May 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo Unnumbered.
Special.
Your messagea of the 15th cannot be read. Please verify and reply.
_____________
a See II, 27.
Trans. 5‑19‑41
No. 23
FROM: Tokyo May 13, 1941
TO: Washington # 221.
Regarding your message # 302a.
Please add on to Clause 4 of my message # 205b, which relates to "commerce between two nations", the following paragraph which was accidentally left out in enciphering the message:
"If a new commercial treaty is desired by both governments, it could be elaborated as soon as possible and concluded in accordance with usual procedure."
________________
a Not available.
b Not available.
Trans. 5‑14‑41
A-11
No. 24
FROM: Tokyo May 13, 1941
TO: Washington # 222.
In the fourth par graph, which relates to trade between the two countries, of our revised proposal, contained in my message # 205a, will you please correct the words reading "(at ? subsequent to ?) the Japanese‑U. S. conference" to read "(as soon as possible?)".
______________
a Not available.
Trans. 5‑14‑41
No. 25
FROM: Washington May 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 302.
Re your # 222a. In the 4th paragraph of our revised proposal, contained in your message # 205b, the paragraph headed "Trade between the two countries" ends with the phrase "shall consider ways and means". There is no such phrase as "at the Japan‑U. S. conference".
Please check and advise immediately.
_______________
a Not available.
b Not available.
Trans. 5‑15‑41
No. 26
FROM: Washington May 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 305.
Personal to the Minister.
All of us are overwhelmed with gratitude at your giving us your support in the matters pertaining to the "Understanding" pact.
As you are aware, only the President, Secretary of State, and the Postmaster‑General are concerned in this "Understanding" pact on the U.S. side. Not even the other Cabinet officials nor officials of the State Department are being consulted in this matter.
In view of this fact, I feel hesitant to handle this matter in a too business like manner as yet. Moreover, I have already handed over the rough draft of the proposal to the U.S. aide and have made all of the general explanations.
If we continue to submit minor revisions from time to time, I am afraid that the United States may get the impression that we have entered into this business without being too well prepared. This, naturally, reflects upon my integrity and may give rise to doubts in the other parties concerned as to my sincerity. This could lead the negotiations into a failure.
It is, therefore, my fondest hope that you will limit all further instructions and cautions to me. Please allow me to exercise my discretion on all the minor details.
Trans. 5‑16‑41
A-12
No. 27
FROM: Tokyo May 15, 1941
TO: Washington # 228.
(Badly garbled)
Re your extra (message).
This understanding is "bind both governments in honor and in act". (Please note that this is to be carried in the English (text?).)
Trans. 5‑19‑41
No. 28
FROM: Tokyo May 15, 1941
TO: Washington # 229.
Re your # 305a.
I took careful note of the various items you set forth.
Please change the words "entente cordiale" in paragraph I of your message # 295b, to "amicable understanding". Please use the wording as used by me (in my message # 219c) with regard to part 2, paragraph 4, of your message # 295b (the proposal concerning the prevention of the entrance into the war by those countries which are not already in it).
I presume that the corrections I asked for in my message # 221d have already been made.
Since your English text and my English text are identical in so far as the gist is concerned, I see no reason for making a special effort to revise them at this time. However, whenever the opportunity arises while discussing the matter, please revise to approximate my text. (The words "at a conference", as used at the end of paragraph 1 of your # 295b, should be changed to a simple "later" at the first opportunity. Also change that part of paragraph 5 of your message # 295b, concerning the Konoye principles, etc.,
(Translator's note: garbled from here to end, guesswork used) so as to place emphasis on the said principle and that all alliances and agreements will have to be based thereon.
Please give these points your consideration.
_______________
a See II, 26.
b See II, 1.
c Not available.
d See III, 23.
Trans. 5‑16‑41
A-13
No. 29
FROM: Tokyo May 13, 1941
TO: Washington # 217.
Separate telegram.
Strictly confidential.
I feel it hardly necessary but in order to leave no room whatever for any misapprehension, I wish to put the following on record at this juncture. It must have been clear from what I have often stated publicly or otherwise that my decision to follow the Pour Parler between Your Excellency and Ambassador Nomura and open the present negotiation was based on the promises that the United States would not enter the European War and that the United States government agree to advise Chiang Kai‑shek to enter into a direct negotiation with Japan with a view to bring about peace between Japan and China at the earliest possible date. Of course, it must have been plain from the start that on no other promises would or could Japan possibly come to any understanding of the sort held in view in the present negotiation.
Trans. 5‑14‑41
No. 30
FROM: Washington May 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 304.
Re your # 217a.
The talks (as Secretary Hull has said, we are still in the stage of "off‑the‑record private talkings" and have in no way entered into official negotiations as yet. As you are well aware we are conducting the talks along the general lines set forth in the "Understanding" agreement.) are being carried on with the two points you mentioned in your message, i.e., prevention of the U.S. entrance into the war, and the matter of urging Chiang to make peace, as the focal points. I, myself, have constantly kept these points in mind in all the efforts I have been making.
During the night of the 11th, I submitted our revised proposal and am, at present, awaiting their reply. At a time like this, I fear that if we submitted such writings (setting forth our two focal points) it would make further talks exceedingly difficult, and may even interfere with the establishment of the "Understanding" pact.
For this reason, I did not hand the papers over. I shall, at an opportune moment during our talks bring up the subjects of prevention of U.S. entrance into the war and immediate U.S. recommendation for (Japan‑China) peace.
I shall appreciate your giving approval to my procedure.
______________
a See II, 29.
Trans. 5‑16‑41
A-14
No. 31
FROM: Washington May 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 310.
(In 3 parts‑Complete.) (Part 1 of 3.)
Last night (the 14th) I called on Secretary Hull and explained to him‑in accordance with your message‑that all of the items listed in the section on the China Affair in the first draft were to be included with the exception of the matter pertaining to emigration.
In reply to this, the Secretary implied that there was a need to have some sort of a preliminary understanding with China and with England.
Following this, we discussed the various phases of the matter at hand. This was done in a conversational tone throughout, and at no time did we assume what could be termed an argumentative attitude.
First of all, the subject of American security was brought up. I stated that there wasn't another country which was so fortunately situated as was the United States from the viewpoint of safety of the nation. There is practically no possibility of an invasion from foreign countries, I said. For this reason it was exceedingly difficult to see from the Japanese viewpoint, I continued, why there was so much sentiment in the U.S. favoring U.S. entrance into the war.
In reply to this, the Secretary asked me if I had read the speech he made at the meeting of the members of the American Society of International Law on the 24th of April. He followed this up with the explanation that he was one who placed much importance in South America. Should Hitler succeed in completely subjugating Europe, and should he extend his grasping hands in the direction of South America, there is a grave danger that several of those countries would be immediately conquered.
Of course, he continued, he realized that before he could do that, he would have to have the control of the seas. But, he added, such an eventuality could be possible if an English Quisling develops at the time that Germany succeeds in conquering England. Such a Quisling could conceivably hand over the British navy to the Germans, the Secretary said, keeping a very straight face while so saying.
I, therefore, countered by saying that I had understood that the British had promised not to turn their navy over to the Germans under any circumstances. Furthermore, I said, wasn't the Secretary just dreaming up possibilities.
The Secretary replied: "No, No. France, though promising many times that she would not turn over her fleet to Germany ‑‑‑‑‑.
(End Part 1.)
Trans. 5‑17‑41
No. 32
FROM: Washington May 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 310.
(In 3 parts‑complete.) (Part 2 of 3.)
In spite of these French promises, Darlan and Laval are apparently about to transfer the French fleet to Germany. Taking into consideration the possible materialization of such a move, the United States has no alternative than to aid the Churchill government. This step would not be taken merely for the protection of democracy as a whole. It is, as a matter of fact,
A-15
imperative for the United States to do so to protect the United States, the Secretary of State said.
(I take this opportunity to report that Colonel Iwakuroa making various indirect approaches in attempting to have the United States abandon its convoy project.)
Apparently it is Japan's policy to prevent the United States from aiding Britain. Minister Matsuoka, it is said, (Secretary Hull continued), even went so far as to threaten war in his conversations with Ambassador Grew. Not even Ambassador Grew has been advised of the conversations being carried on here, he said.
The Secretary seemed to be of the opinion that though there would be considerable difficulty in the attempt to invade England, he did not believe that the possibility could be discounted.
I asked him if Hess' flight to Scotland had any implication of peace overtures. The Secretary replied that he had been made aware of absolutely no such motives. He added that though he knew of nothing definite with regard to Hess' trip to England, he looked upon it as an indication that a portion of the German government was crumbling.
______________
a Aide to the Military Attaché in Washington.
Trans. 5‑19‑41
No. 33
FROM: Washington May 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 310.
(In 3 parts‑Complete.) (Part 3 of 3.)
I, therefore, pointed out that should the U.S. Fleet come into the Pacific, Japan's hands would be tied against protecting herself because of the terms of the "Understanding Agreement". You made reference to this possibility in your conversations with Ambassador Grew as I also did on one previous occasion.
However, due probably to the medicine's having reacted on the patient too vigorously, he apparently was not thoroughly convinced regarding the possibility of an armed southward expansion. I, therefore, told him that Japan absolutely would not take the soldiers, upon being relieved of their task in China upon the conclusion of the China Incident, and use them for a southward expansion program, thereby breaking her promise (to the United States).
However, I apparently did not thoroughly convince him, for he said that Hitler, for example, has been signing treaties only to break them ever since 1933. The Munich agreement was one of these, he said. Napoleon was likewise an untrustworthy treaty signer, for he too merely signed them to break them immediately.
The way I look at it, the thing for us to do now is to strive to have the Secretary become thoroughly convinced of the Japanese government's sincere intentions. Now that we have submitted our proposal, we should sit back calmly and watch the next moves from the United States.
I firmly believe that we should enter into this Understanding while the United States is interested in the proposition and before any outside interference enters into it. Towards this end, I am making every possible effort. All the persons concerned in this matter are of the same opinion.
Trans. 5‑17‑41
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No. 34
FROM: Tokyo May 15, 1941
TO: Washington # 230.
In 2 parts‑complete.
Re your message # 304a.
The other signatories of the Tripartite Pact, Germany and Italy, are affected by the proposed Understanding Pact between Japan and the United States. Furthermore, it affects their domestic policies as well as ours.
Therefore, I had the Chief of the Europe and Axis Section explain the proposal to the Ambassadors from those two countries. The explanations touched only upon generalities, and no details were divulged. He carefully pointed out that this proposal was originated by the United States and went into some detail of how this came about. They were also told that the United States was handling this matter with the utmost secrecy and that only the President, Secretary of State, and two or three of their colleagues were even aware of its existence. This being the case, the Ambassadors were cautioned to divulge this information to Dictator Hitler, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, Premier Mussolini, and Foreign Minister Ciano. They were further requested to exercise every precaution against its leaking out.
At the same time, it seemed unwise from various viewpoints to keep our Ambassadors in Germany and Italy uniformed concerning this matter, as there is a possibility of misunderstandings arising from such ignorance in the future. Moreover, I even had an inquiry from our Ambassador in Germany about this on the 10th, I dispatched a cable worded in the same manner of my message # 231b. (The serial number of this cable to Germany was my message to Germany #396c.) The above are the circumstances and because of our relations with Germany and Italy ‑‑‑‑‑ (Many groups missed here).
For these reasons, I believe that there is a necessity for us to put our request that the United States stay out of war, and also that the United States promote peace between China and Japan, in a written form.
I am aware of the great importance of this matter, and appreciate your standpoint. However, will you please make arrangements in accordance with my message # 217d.
_______________
a See II 30.
b Not available.
c Not available.
d See II, 29.
Trans. 5‑16‑41
No. 35
FROM: Tokyo May 17, 1941
TO: Washington # 234.
Re your # 310a.
Of course, there is no way for me to know what was in the report received by the government of the United States from Ambassador Grew. However, it is a fact that I had neither the intention or a cause to threaten or intimidate the Ambassador. I merely replied to his questions in a conversational tone.
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The Ambassador is one who easily becomes excited. Moreover, as you are well aware, he is quite hard of hearing. Therefore, there is a possibility that he misunderstood my words.
Should an opportunity present itself, please explain this matter to the Secretary of State.
____________
a See II, 31‑33.
Trans. 5‑23‑41
No. 36
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 314.
This morning's New York Herald Tribune carried an article written by NEWMAN from Tokyo with a headline "Japan Asks United States to Mediate Sino‑Japanese Conflict", a summary of which I am sending in my # 315a. This being not in accordance with our past policy, please see to it that special measures are taken to prohibit articles of this type being reprinted in Japan.
_____________
a See III, 37.
Trans. 5‑20‑41
No. 37
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 315.
The New York Herald Tribune of the 16th quoted a telephone conversation with NEWMAN of the 16th which, though it was unofficial, quoted a responsible source as having disclosed the authoritative information that, in order to sound out American opinion, a Japanese‑American understanding proposal had been presented to American authorities here. It continued in the following line:
The United States was to lend its assistance between Tokyo and Chungking toward the settlement of the Sino‑Japanese Incident.
The United States recognized Japanese position of leadership in China.
Japan guarantees not to use military force in the South Seas.
The United States recognizes Japan's rights in the South Seas of carrying on enterprises and economic endeavors (including loans).
Japan will revise her declaration to the effect that she would not deal with CHIANG KAI-SHEK.
Japan guarantees to revise her declaration that she will not brook the interference of third powers in the China Incident.
Japan will clarify her intentions with regard to her place in the Far East.
Japan guarantees not to take hostile measures against the United States dictated by the Axis Alliance.
Furthermore, NEWMAN added that though there were strong expectations of a settlement being brought about of the China Incident through Japan‑American negotiations, in
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view of Ambassador FONDA's [a] return to Japan and the strong local military and naval authorities support of the WANG CHING WEI Regime, he thought that an understanding between Japan and the United States would be made impossible.
Relayed to New York.
_____________
a Ambassador to Japanese Puppet Government in Nanking.
Trans. 5‑20‑41
No. 38
FROM: Tokyo May 17, 1941
TO: Washington # 235.
Re your # 314a.
Although they do not cover all of the points contained, it is true to a considerable degree. The leak seems to come from (New York) Japanese circles to local financial circles. These have given rise to numerous rumors.
We are doing everything to check these leaks and would appreciate your doing likewise.
_______________
a See II, 36.
Trans. 5‑17‑41
No. 39
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 330.
(In 2 parts‑complete.)
Part 1. I am advised that ‑‑‑‑‑ requested a statement from (Your Excellency?) with regard to Hull's plans for the post war economic set‑up.
The policy outlined by the Secretary deviates considerably from the economic policy which the United States has actually pursued heretofore. There have, no doubt, been various reactions to the Hull statement of policy in Japan. Many opinions were expressed here.
I called on the Secretary of State last night, the 20th (Tuesday). He said at that time that after the Understanding Agreement was entered into, there would be a need to explain matters to business circles, so that trade between the two countries could be promoted. Japan must consider the development of the Far Eastern economic bloc and at the same time must constantly be striving for economic development of various areas. There is, therefore, absolutely no reason why we should express any disapproval to the policy outlined by the Secretary. On the contrary I am of the opinion that it should be supported.
Part 2. Immediately following the Hess incident, peace talks have cropped up in Paris and in Vichy. In this country, too, there is a minority such as the Anti‑war involvement advocates, the Hearst newspapers, Senator Wheeler, and others, who support a peace movement.
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When your good friend ‑‑‑‑‑ also said that he knew of nothing definite, he was aware that there was some peace talk in the air. Permit me to express my humble opinion that this is a very critical time.
The Secretary of State also said that if, upon the establishment of the "Understanding", the first step in the direction of a permanent peace on the Pacific is built, then much will have been done in behalf of general peace.
Trans. 5‑23‑41
No. 40
FROM: Washington May 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 320.
At present, while on the one hand we are trying to feel out the other party's intentions through undercover channels, I am continuing my conversations with Secretary Hull. The nucleus of the entire matter is British aid by the United States, our relations to our treaty partners, the China Incident, and Japanese southward expansion. You are already aware of this through my earlier reports.
There are as yet considerable differences of opinion between us, so there is no room for too much optimism. In the meantime, I am working in close cooperation with the military and naval (attachés ?), in order to carry out the spirit of your instructions to the maximum degree.
Trans. 5‑21‑41
No. 41
FROM: Tokyo May 24, 1941
TO: Washington # 250.
Part 2 of 3a.
‑‑‑‑‑ the fact that ‑‑‑‑‑ made a ‑‑‑‑‑ that ‑‑‑‑‑ presented to the Emperor ‑‑‑‑‑ would probably agree. Although this was the strictest of secrets, I believe that in the meantime you must have learned it. For this reason, although the intelligence has every indication of being correct, I can hardly bring myself to believe it readily. What went awry, or through what circumstances all this happened, is beyond my powers to surmise. But howsoever all this may be, there are indications that Secretary HULL got the aforementioned impression also from conversations with Your Honor. Will you, therefore, at the earliest possible opportunity, clear Secretary HULL's mind of this misconception. You, yourself, Ambassador NOMURA, know that all through my life up to the present day I have been a zealous advocate of amity between Japan and the United States. You never could have had any doubt about that. In a wire which I recently sent HOWARDb, I expressed great grief over the tragedy rife in the world today. I said that some method ought to be devised to stop this horrible war which threatens to lead our civilization downward into chaos, and that something ought to be done to stop the havoc of this conflict.
(Rest of message missing.)
______________
a Parts 1 and 3 not available.
b Roy Howard, President of Scripps‑Howard Co.
Trans. 5‑29‑41
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No. 42
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.
I have respectfully perused your message. It is absolutely baseless. My! My! To say the least I was surprised. When the President and the Secretary of State have questioned me with regard to Japan's procedure in establishing diplomatic policy, I have told them that Japan's diplomacy was in the hands of the Foreign Minister. However, when important questions having great bearing on diplomatic policy which are within the scope of Army and Naval Ministers arise, those ministers, as a matter of course, participate in these deliberations. Then, too, it naturally follows that the Premier wields enormous influence. I have told them, too, that as far as Japan's officialdom is concerned, they function in an advisory capacity to the Foreign Minister; also, that Dr. MATSUNAMI and other men of incomparable ability function in a similar capacity (the Secretary of State occupies a position which is virtually the same). When I told the President this, he said that in the United States practically the same procedure was followed. The Secretary of State's position does not differ in the slightest degree.
Further, when the Secretary of State asked me the same question, I replied in the same manner, and these replies are just as I have told you in each of my wires.
Now, should I have voiced erroneous statements which in themselves are incredible, then by that fact alone I deserve punishment. Had I, as a military man, made any such statement, after it be proven, I believe that I should not be permitted to continue my existence. I am convinced that I have absolutely made no such statement. And as far as the Secretary of State is concerned, I do not believe by any stretch of the imagination that he labors under any misunderstanding. However, as you have requested in your wire, I shall outdo myself in extending my best efforts.
Regardless of the impressions imparted by newspaper dispatches from Japan, I am quite cognizant of Your Excellency's fundamental feelings with regard to the Japan‑American questions, and do not entertain a single doubt with regard to it. I have even told the Secretary of State as much one or two times.
Trans. 5‑27‑41
No. 43
FROM: Tokyo May 26, 1941
TO: Washington No number.
It is clear that what happened is as you guessed in your message of the 24th. I am very much relieved, but there is no doubt whatever that the American officials entertain the misimpressions mentioned in my previous message, so please be sure to clear the matter up for them.
Either some Japanese or an American caused all this and created this impression in the minds of the American officials. Will you please try to find out exactly what happened and take the proper measures.
Trans. 5‑29‑41
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No. 44
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 345.
The newspapers are playing up the fact that the other day our army is said to have seized some goods destined for CHIANG KAI SHEK, said to belong to Americans. It is widely held that this is in connection with RAEDER's recent statement, and that the Axis countries are going to exert pressure in unison, and Secretary HULL, himself, in a press interview, brought up this question. Therefore, for my information, please let me know the facts and what steps you anticipate taking.
Trans. 5‑29‑41
No. 45
FROM: Washington (Nomura) May 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 354.
Regarding the President's speech:
1. The tone of the speech, insofar as Japan was concerned, was very mild. There was not a single direct reference to Japan by name, and even that part concerning China was touched upon very lightly. These are points in the speech which are worthy of noting.
Apparently there was considerable difference of opinion on these points among the leaders of the Congress who were quietly advised of the contents of the speech before its delivery over the radio. Their replies to questions by newspaper men have given rise to numerous rumors. The Chief Executive's office is letting it be known that it was done "designedly". Before the speech was broadcast, the Secretary of State, through a certain foreigner, reported that special attention was paid with regard to U.S. relations with Japan, in drafting this radio speech.
From all these indications, I come to the conclusion that the President wished to avoid exciting this Ambassador unduly and was anxious to have the Japanese‑U. S. negotiations continued.
2. As I pointed out in my message # 350 [a] the United States is bent on self defense. This was made clear in the President's speech and his words were very flexible (insofar as the methods of carrying out this defense are concerned).
_____________
a Not available.
Trans. 6‑2‑41
No. 46
FROM: Washington May 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 356.
(In 3 parts‑complete)
Subsequently, I met and talked with Secretary of State Hull on the 16th (Friday), 20th (Tuesday), 21st (Wednesday), and the 27th (Tuesday). However, we have not as yet reached any concrete agreement.
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The Secretary said:
(1) That he would like to have the people in general come to recognize the meaning of maintenance of peace on the Pacific. As long as there is a shadow of a doubt in the people's minds, the plans cannot be successfully carried out. (He, on one occasion, expressed himself in favor of maintaining the status quo on the Pacific, including the southwest Pacific area. At that time, I advised him that that would be unacceptable to us. It is our hope that we are to take the (leadership ?) in the economic development of the southwestern area with U.S. cooperation and support. The Americans, on the other hand, wish to put this in a bilateral form, placing both countries on an even basis and give each country equal opportunities.)
The Secretary again asked me about Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact. I replied that I was sure that even if I made inquiries on this point to (Tokyo ?), (Tokyo ?) would only reply that Article 3 has no (hidden implications ?). I added that I was sure that there would be no need for any clarification of the meaning contained therein. Apparently the Secretary's colleagues, referring to various dispatches from (Tokyo ?), make numerous inquiries of the Secretary.
(2) With regard to China, the Secretary apparently does not want to put Chiang Kai‑shek in a tight spot. In this he is receiving the support of his colleagues. The Secretary further insists that before the United States will assume the role of mediator, we must list the peace terms. Moreover, it would be impossible, from the U.S. government's standpoint, to make any reference to Japan's agreement with the Wang government or to the Tripartite (Japan, Manchukuo, China (Wang) ??) Declaration. (Translator's note: Following sentence slightly garbled; contains guesswork). Outside of these points, there are indications that the United States is willing to make considerable concessions.
The Secretary seemed to be of the opinion that to cooperate in anti‑communism and ‑‑‑‑- were inconsistent and made several inquiries concerning them. I replied that the general aims of ‑‑‑‑‑ could clearly be seen in the agreement signed with the Wang government. Such matters as anti‑communism and garrisoning of troops would be taken up in the direct negotiations between China and Japan that would take place later.
Translator's note: One sentence here garbled, impossible to read.
What we desire is to have some mediator such as Dunn and Denby in the Sino‑Japanese War and Theodore Roosevelt in the Russo‑Japanese War. We must in this war carry on a direct negotiation with Chiang. Chiang at present is in a difficult spot and is depending entirely on the United States for necessary aid. I told the Secretary that in my opinion it would be of interest to China should the United States suggest mediation to Chiang.
Translator's note: Next paragraph badly garbled, can only guess at contents.
The Secretary said that he did not want to use the term "communism" because of U.S. relations with the U.S.S.R. and China. Instead, he would prefer some such expression as "subversive", adding that an instrument such as the one being discussed now could not be kept a secret for long. He further told me that the United States government has no secret agreement with any other country.
Since receiving your instructions, I have met with the Secretary seven times already and on each occasion, we discussed matters, off the record and informally, for from one to two hours. However, we seem to be repeating the same things over and over, and are unable to get anywhere. Last night I asked if he had any other suggestions, and he said that he did have two or three minor ones and added that he expects to have it done in two or three days. (Apparently the United States is taking into consideration the effect that this "understanding" agreement will have upon the other Cabinet members and bureau officials.)
A-23
I, therefore, said that after all, the real motive of this "understanding" agreement is to change the war psychology which exists in both countries, to one of peace. There is a danger that while we are dickering about the use of a certain word, some untoward incident will break out sending all of our efforts up in smoke. The Secretary seemed to be in agreement with me in this respect.
It is natural that the United States should take Japan into serious consideration in any of her political or militaristic moves. That she is doing so, may be seen by the way the President handled the situation in his speech night before last.
Trans. 6‑4‑41
No. 47
FROM: Tokyo May 31, 1941
TO: Washington # 262.
Translator's note: message badly garbled.
Re your # 356a.
You apparently are comparing Japan with some of the small countries which were born as a result of the war. It is true that Japan asked Minister Dunn to mediate in the Sino‑Japanese War and that Theodore Roosevelt's good offices were requested in the Russo‑Japanese War. However, Japan's position in the world today is very different from that of the earlier times mentioned above.
I wonder if it is wise to even compare Japan today with Japan of those days in discussing the issues with the United States. The only thing that this Minister would have the United States do with regard to mediating in the China affair, would be for her to tell Chiang Kai-shek: "Negotiate with Japan. If you refuse, we shall stop all aid to you."
I am sure that you are well aware of my intentions in this matter through my previous messages. However, because of the brevity of cables, you may have missed the point. Will you carefully bear it in mind in the future.
_____________
a See II, 46.
Trans. 6‑4‑41
No. 48
FROM: Tokyo May 30, 1941
TO: Washington # 257.
(Very urgent)
Secret outside the Department.
A Domei wire of the 26th, quoting statements made in the Times and Herald Tribune of that day, referred to the declarations of Senator GEORGE and others in the Senate to the effect that the reason Japan was not referred to in the Fireside Chat was that Japan's ardent backing of the Tri‑Partite Alliance was perceptibly cooling and the tendency in Japan to anticipate her southern penetration by means of military force was definitely waning. Now,
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as you know, the Imperial Government's and this Minister's policies have been minutely enumerated to Your Excellency. This dispatch has not been publicized here as there can be no guarantee that this sort of news would not cause dissension within the country. Therefore, as soon as you have immediately made an investigation as to how this got out, should they not ‑‑‑‑‑, please arrange to file a "demand" for ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑.
Trans. 6‑2‑41
No. 49
FROM: Tokyo May 31, 1941
TO: Washington # 260.
Re my # 257a.
Probably through the channels mentioned in my message # 235b, there are many persons in various circles in this country who seem to have proof (though they are vague) that a Japanese‑American negotiation is underway. They have given rise to numerous and varied unfounded rumors which has led to the need of taking some measures domestically. It was under these conditions that the incident involving (HETATUGU? Henning ?‑(garbled)) arose.
I, therefore, issued a statement for publication, a copy of which is being cabled to you as my separate cable # 261c.
Please do everything in your power to prevent the recurrence of such an incident on the U.S. side.
_______________
a See II, 48.
b See II, 38.
c Not available.
Trans. 6‑2‑41
No. 50
New York Times
June 6, 1941
(Page 1, Column 4)
JAPAN ASKING U.S. FOR NO‑WAR PACT
SHE URGES ACCORD LIKE THAT BETWEEN TOKYO AND MOSCOW
WASHINGTON COLD TO IDEA
By Hallett Abend
Washington, June 5.
For nearly 2 months Japan has been attempting to induce the U.S. Government to conclude with her a neutrality and non‑aggressive pact similar to that recently concluded between Tokyo and Moscow. So far the reactions of the State Department have been unenthusiastic and at present there appears little likelihood that Japanese hopes will be fulfilled.
The Japanese overtures have been made through Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, Tokyo Ambassador here. The continuing talks between Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Admiral
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Nomura have been entirely informal and off the record, so that if the preliminaries which Japan hoped would result in formal negotiations, break down entirely, neither side will officially have to bear the blame for failure.
Although it is learned that the first approach was made by the Japanese ambassador, the Japanese Embassy does not acknowledge this. Spokesmen there say vaguely that the informal talks seem to have sprung from a mutual desire to find some means of preventing a heightening of the concededly dangerous tension between Japan and the U.S.
To the chagrin and disappointment of the Japanese Government the response of the State Department to the overtures has been‑in what the Japanese term "an excessively formal and stilted manner", that the value of the kind of treaty proposed would be extremely dubious for two reasons:
1. The responsibility of the leaders of the Japanese Government is subject to grave doubt and their ability to carry out agreements questionable.
Time after time since the outbreak of the "China incident" almost 4 years ago, Japanese leaders individually, and the Japanese government officially have reiterated promises to respect the Open Door in China and to assure "equal opportunity for all" but these promises have never been kept.
This sensational Japanese attempt to effect a formal rapprochement with the U.S. has aroused the liveliest speculation in the small circle here that is aware of Tokyo's proposals. Of particular interest is the bearing that such a pact, were it ever concluded, would have upon Japanese formal adherence to the European Axis agreement between Germany and Italy.
The Axis pact entered into by Japan late in September 1940 binds her to go to the assistance of Germany or Italy if either is attacked by any three powers not engaged in hostilities with the Axis at the date of signing. Seemingly this pact would bind Japan to make war upon the U.S. if this country became involved in hostilities with Germany or Italy.
But Japan, it has been long conjectured here, has sought a loophole of escape from the obligation, and she thinks she has found it in the word "attacked". If, for instance, Germany were to shell or bomb a U.S. patrol ship in the Atlantic and if war were to result, Japan might legalistically plead that she would not have to fight this country since Germany would have "attacked" the U.S.
The Moscow‑Tokyo Accord signed in Moscow on April 13 of this year or about the time Admiral Nomura first approached Secretary Hull for a neutrality and non‑aggressive agreement‑consisted of only four articles and a "frontier declaration".
The third article specifies that the life of the agreement shall be for 5 years, renewable automatically for 5 years more if neither party denounces the agreement one year before the expiration date. The fourth article provides for immediate ratification and the frontier declaration relates to the "inviolability and integrity" of Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic.
It is Articles I and II that Japan would like to duplicate in a treaty with the U.S. These read as follows:
Article I‑Both contracting parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other contracting party.
Article II‑Should one of the contracting parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third powers, the other contracting party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict.
Proposals of this kind from Tokyo where Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka continues to proclaim that loyalty commitments to Germany and Italy is the "immutable basis" of Japan's foreign policy comes as a great surprise here. In view of some observers they mean
A-26
either that Mr. Matsuoka and the Cabinet of Prince Fumimaro Konoye are ready to scuttle the Axis agreement, or that Japan is trying to lull the U.S. into a false sense of security by concluding a pact that she does not mean to live up to.
Translated into working world politics in view of the present international situation, the agreement that Admiral Nomura is seeking to negotiate would bind Japan not to attack the U.S. if this country should become involved in war with Germany and Italy. The obligation would be absolute and would not hinge on any interpretation of the words "attacked" or "attacker".
Conversely, if the U.S. were to sign such a pact with Japan this country would be honor bound not to fight Japan if she became involved in a war with Britain or the Netherlands. In practical terminology this would leave Japan free to attack Singapore or to seize the Netherlands East Indies without fear of U.S. intervention either to protect those areas or to protect this country's own vital sources of supply for rubber and tin for which it looks almost exclusively to Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.
As a problem in practical diplomacy the Japanese move for a treaty with this country raises several grave questions:
First, if the move is sincere, is the U.S. Government entitled to consider Foreign Minister Matsuoka's statements as a bluff to frighten this country into negotiations at the same time that he deceives Reichfuehrer Hitler and Premier Mussolini.
Secondly, if the move is insincere, is it perhaps an effort to lull the U.S. into a sense of security under which it might transfer a greater part of its fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic.
Thirdly, if the Japanese advances for an undertaking are made with the foreknowledge of Berlin and Rome what kind of new betrayal are the Axis powers planning as a group.
Finally, if the advances are sincere would it mean that the Japanese Navy, doubtful of the outcome of a war with this country, has finally persuaded the firebrands of the Japanese Army that conditions necessitate a policy of appeasement toward the U.S.
The reaction of Berlin and Rome to the revelation of the Japanese‑attempt to reach a neutrality accord with the U.S. will be watched with keenest interest here as will Mr. Matsuoka's explanation to the Japanese Army and public of the reversal of his "immutable" policies of loyalty to the Axis agreement. The Japanese Army, it is reported, is now convinced, that Germany will be triumphantly victorious over Britain, while the Japanese Navy is said to be troubled by waivering and doubts.
When Mr. Matsuoka concluded his Moscow negotiations in April, he exultantly declared that he had no doubt that the new neutrality pact with the Soviet Union "laid a foundation for the solution of all outstanding Soviet‑Japanese problems" and would be followed soon by a new trade treaty, a new fishery accordance and the settlement of other troublesome questions.
It is believed here that probably Mr. Matsuoka has had hopes that if he could obtain a neutrality treaty with the U.S. such a pact might. be followed by a new trade treaty, for the abrogation of the old trade agreement by this country in the summer of 1939 was a terrific blow at Japan's economic and financial stability. Disappointment of these bright hopes it is believed would be another staggering blow.
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No. 51
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 368.
On the 6th the New York Times, in an article by ABENDa, states that Japan has been considering a neutrality pact with the United States similar to the one she has contracted with the Soviet, and that I am conferring thereon with Secretary HULL.
Therefore, I have advised the Government of the United States to do the proper thing about this.
_________________
a ABEND, in an article in the New York Times, states Japan is considering a neutrality pact with the U.S. The U.S. Government has been requested to do the right thing about this.
Trans. 6‑10‑41
No. 52
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 371.
Strictly secret.
With regard to ABEND's article in the New York Times on the 6th, I called A.P., U.P., Tribunea Domei and Asahi correspondents together and categorically denied that there was any truth in this article. This is for your information alone.
Furthermore, this morning, the 6th, the President in his press conference in answer to questions on this matter said that he knew nothing about it. And continuing he said, "Though the Ambassador and the Secretary of State occasionally have interviews, these conversations concern ordinary matters and have no connection with this matter."
_________________
a Ambassador Nomura calls a conference of A.P., U.P., Tribune, Domei and Asahi to deny the truth of ABEND's statement in the N.Y. Times to the effect that Japs are considering a neutrality pact with the U.S. The President stated at his press conference on the 6th that he knew nothing about it.
Trans. 6‑10‑41
No. 53
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 375.
(Part 1 of 4)
I have perused your message.
At the risk of a certain amount of repetition, I am reporting for you the substance of subsequent developments:
Since I presented our final draft, I have held conversations several times a week. Finally, an American plan was offered me unofficially in which two or three questions concerning the China incident were left pending. I thought that if this were left up to a drafting committee of
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both countries, it would be a good thing from the point of view of convenience in phrasing the clauses, so after getting their approval, on the 4th it was discussed in a joint committee. But, to my surprise, this was seized upon by various quarters in this country for demagogical and estranging propaganda. Every letter and every phrase was the object of suspicion and speculation, so this only goes to show how delicate international relations are today. So Saturday afternoon I went to see Secretary HULL and talked with him for an hour and a half.
Trans. 6‑10‑41
No. 54
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 375.
(Part 2 of 4)
He has always insisted on the following:
1. The maintenance of peace in the Pacific is the basis of this understanding and it is not desired that this point be glossed over in such a manner as to deceive anyone. As soon as it is put into effect, suitable negotiations can take place with industrial circles to provide for Japanese and American financial and economic cooperation. On two or three occasions he has told me this.
2. In considering the Pacific question, the matter of Japan's and the United States' own relations with the European war, and their relations to the Japanese‑Chinese incident have to be considered. The United States is worried about the Chinese question and wishes to improve Japanese‑American relations, American‑Chinese relations and Japanese‑Chinese relations. Consequently, the United States does not, by any means, wish to do anything that will cause the Chinese to harbor ill‑feelings toward them. That is what he always says.
During the course of our conversation I said, "Well, then, for the sake of peace in the Pacific and for the sake of rehabilitation of the human race, could not the President, himself, go ahead and advise China to make peace?" He replied, "Well, don't you think that depends, after all, on whether or not we can see eye to eye on this agreement?"
Trans. 6‑10‑41
No. 55
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 375.
(Part 3 of 4)
In speeches and in newspaper articles, a number of times, he has repeated in effect the following statement with respect to the European war:
"HITLER is planning to conquer the world, and if England goes under, the Atlantic will be under his domination, South America will be his supply base for raw materials and the Western Hemisphere will become an armed camp. It does not make sense to wait until he invades our sphere before we take action. America does not want to repeat the mistake made by so many other nations." (I know just how much danger there is of the United States entering the war. Along the lines you have pointed out, I have done my best to reason with the Americans and to correct some misapprehensions which you think they have. But after all, it
A-29
is now not a question of correcting their way of thinking. Our future diplomatic relations with the United States will center around the question of whether or not we are able to keep them out of this war.) Furthermore, the time has not yet come to harp on peace. Many peace rumors have been afloat lately with the return of WINANT, but the President has squelched all, as you know.
Trans. 6‑10‑41
No. 56
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 375.
(Part 4 of 4)
He (the Secretary) said that the United States regards the principle of commercial nondiscrimination as important in the Pacific, and that the United States practices this principle toward the American States, if Japan is willing also to use this principle, the United States intends to do nothing to hinder the progress of Japan. He said that if we will not accept these promises, he has no interest in either of the proposals.
Well, I feel that it will be very difficult to get anywhere by outright dealings and feel the need of conducting some other sort of activities which might be more direct. Well, I and my associates are certainly not optimistic, but on the other hand, we are not pessimistic. We will do our very best to carry out your instructions. Unless something unforeseen happens within the next ten days, I think that the points now pending will so crystallize that I will be able to let you know something more or less definite. I do not doubt his zeal in the matter at all. I call on him two or three times a week. We confer until late at night and when I leave he always says, "Come back to see me anytime you wish."
It is evident that the President and the Secretary now view things identically, so I have asked him to let me know just exactly what the attitude of both is.
Trans. 6‑10‑41
No. 57
FROM: Tokyo June 7, 1941
TO: Washington # 277.
Regarding your # 356a.
The United States' reply seems to be unreasonably delayed. Isn't quicker action possible? If not, how long do they expect it will take? Please let me know by telegram. We do not intend to rush them, so please take care not to convey the wrong impression.
________________
a See II, 46.
Trans. 6‑11‑41
A-30
No. 58
FROM: Tokyo June 9, 1941
TO: Washington # 281.
Re your # 375a.
Please telegram the entire text of the so-called "Unofficial American Proposal" which you received on May 31st (?).
______________
a See II, 53.
Trans. 6‑11‑41
No. 59
FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 377.
Re your # 281a.
This consists of the American proposal, the Annex and the Explanation for the proposal, each designated as "Unofficial, Exploratory and without Commitment". I am sending you the entire text (as follows).
(1) The American proposal‑ # 378b.
(2) That portion of the Annex intended as a statement by Japan‑ # 379c.
(3) That portion of the Annex intended as a statement by the United States‑ # 380d.
Excerpts from Hull's speech of the 24th relating to the "attitude of both countries towards the European war"‑ # 381d.
(4) Explanation‑#382d.
_____________
a See II, 58.
b See Il, 60.
c See II, 66.
d Not Available.
Trans. 6‑11‑41
No. 60
FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 378.
(Part 1 of 6)
Extra Secret.
Strictly confidential.
Unofficial, exploratory and without commitment.
The governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration.
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Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.
It is our present hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.
For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill‑suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.
It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a conference.
Trans. 6‑11‑41
No. 61
FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 378.
(Part 2 of 6)
Both governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:
1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both governments toward the European war.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.
Accordingly, the government of the United States and the government of Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy:
Trans. 6‑13‑41
No. 62
FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 378.
(Part 3 of 6)
1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
Both governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation among our peoples.
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Both governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, conception and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other nations.
Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.
Trans. 6‑13‑41
No. 63
FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 378.
(Part 4 of 6)
Extra Secret.
2. The attitudes of both governments toward the European war.
The government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to prevent the participation of nations in the European war not at present involved in it. Obviously, the provisions of the Pact do not apply to involvement through acts of self‑defense.
The government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self‑defense: its national security and the defense thereof.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
The Japanese government having communicated to the government of the United States the general terms within the framework of which the Japanese government will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement with the Chinese government, which terms are declared by the Japanese government to be in harmony with the Konoye principles regarding neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States will suggest to the government of China that the government of China and the government of Japan enter into a negotiation which is mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.
Trans. 6‑12‑41
A-33
No. 64
FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 378.
(Part 5 of 6)
Note: The foregoing draft of section 3 is subject to further discussion of the question of cooperative defense against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.
4. Commerce between both nations.
When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them. Both governments further consent to take necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both governments, it would be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance with usual procedures.
Trans. 6‑13‑41
No. 65
FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 378.
(Part 6 of 6)
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non‑discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese government and the government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining nondiscriminatory access by Japan and the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.
6. The policies of both nations affecting peace in the Pacific area.
‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ (several lines garbled ‑‑‑‑‑ that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs on the ‑‑‑‑‑ in the area mentioned.
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.
The government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time as the government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine independence shall have been achieved.
Trans. 6‑13‑41
A-34
No. 66
FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 379.
Extra Secret.
Annex and Supplement on the part of the Japanese Government.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follow:
1. Neighborly friendship.
2. (Cooperative defense against malicious communistic activities‑including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.) Subject to further discussion.
3. Economic cooperation‑by which China and Japan will proceed on the basis of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations.
4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace.
6. Wit ‑‑‑‑‑.
(Message incomplete)
Trans. 6‑11‑41
No. 67
FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 380.
(In 3 parts‑complete)
Extra secret.
(Part 1)
Annex and supplement on the part of the United States.
1. The attitudes of both governments toward the European war.
The position of the government of the United States toward the military movement of conquest inaugurated by Mr. Hitler is set forth in a public address made by the Secretary of State on April 14, 1941. Some extracts which are directly in point and which are basic in relation to the entire situation are as follows:
(Part 2)
The foregoing statements make it clear that the attitude of the government of the United States is one of resolve to take measures of self‑defense in resistance to a movement, which, as has been made unequivocally clear by the acts and utterances of Hitler, is directed to world conquest by force from which no country and no area are excepted. This attitude is based upon a most fundamental consideration‑that of the inalienable right of self‑defense. The only other attitude this government could assume would be the suicidal attitude of some fifteen countries in Europe which also were told, as our country is being told, that they would not be molested [a]; but if they should undertake to resist beyond their own boundaries they would be charged with being aggressors and with having assumed the offensive.
A-35
A similar course by this nation from the standpoint of effective defense against the Hitler movement of world conquest would be absurd, futile and suicidal from the standpoint of reasonable precaution for its safety.
(Part 3)
In the light of existing situation, Hitler is the one person who can promptly remove the necessity for efforts at effective self‑defense by this country and other countries similarly situated, whereupon for any other nation to request that the United States desist from any such resistance would in its actual effect range the country making such request on the side of Hitler and his movement of aggression by force. Hitler is therefore the person who should be addressed in support of peace, rather than those whom he is attacking for the purpose of bringing about their complete subjugation without color of law, or of right, or of humanity.
"Yes, it makes a difference who wins‑the difference whether we stand with our backs to the wall with the other four continents against us and the high seas lost, alone defending the last free territories on earth‑or whether we keep our place in an orderly world."a
______________
a In a later message, Washington to Tokyo, Gogai, dated June 9th, See II, 68, the following corrections were made: "In the middle of Part 2, 'molested, but if' should be corrected to read 'molested but that if".
'Also, will you please add the following to the end of the same message:'
'Annex and supplement on the part of the government of the United States.'
'4. Commerce between both nations.'
'It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States shall each permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre‑war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self‑defense.' "
Trans. 6‑13‑41
No. 68
FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.
Gogai
Re my # 380a, part 2:
In the middle, "molested, but if" should be corrected to read "molested but that if". Also will you please add the following to the end of the same message:
"Annex and supplement on the part of the United States.
"4. Commerce between both nations.
"It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States shall each permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual pre‑war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self‑defense."
_______________
a See II, 67.
Trans. 6‑13‑41
A-36
No. 69
FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 382.
(In 5 parts‑complete)
Extra secret.
(Part 1)
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
May 31, 1941
NONOFFICIAL, EXPLORATORY AND WITHOUT COMMITMENT ORAL
EXPLANATIONS OR SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE JAPANESE
DRAFT
Introductory statement.
A few minor changes have been made in phraseology with a view to clarifying the meaning.
In the list of points enumerated on page two of the Japanese draft, the title of Section 3 has been altered to conform more accurately to the subject matter; the word "southwestern" has been omitted from point numbered five and, in view of the new subject matter under point six (for explanation see INFRA), part of the subject matter under point six incorporated in an additional Section, the title of which is therefore listed, and part of the subject matter in Section 6 of the Japanese draft has been omitted (for explanation see INFRA).
1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
The first paragraph has been omitted in as much as the statement of the fact is as ‑‑‑ (remainder of Part 1 missing).
(Part 2)
2. The attitude of both governments towards the European war.
The first paragraph of the Japanese draft has been omitted in order to avoid any implication of inconsistency with statements made by the President to the effect that the present is not an opportune time for the American government to endeavor to bring about peace in Europe.
To the second paragraph of the Japanese draft a new sentence has been added to emphasize the aspect of self‑defense.
The third paragraph has been omitted inasmuch as the text of the Tripartite Pact has been published and no purpose would appear to be served by express reference to any of its provisions.
The fourth paragraph of the Japanese draft has been revised to emphasize the protective and self‑defense character of the attitude of the United States toward the European hostilities.
A statement in the annex and supplement on the part of the government of the United States contains an elaboration of this government's viewpoint toward the military movement of conquest inaugurated by Chancellor Hitler.
(Part 3)
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
As already stated, the title has been altered to describe more accurately the contents.
The statement in the Japanese draft has been rewritten to keep the underlying purport and at the same time to avert raising questions which do not seem fundamental to the basic
A-37
subject and which are controversial in character and might present serious difficulties from the point of view of the United States.
The statement in the Japanese annex and supplement in regard to this section has also been revised in a few particulars in conformity with the considerations mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In addition, point numbered three in regard to economic cooperation has been rephrased so as to make it clear that China and Japan intend to follow in their economic relations, the principle to which it is understood the Japanese government and the Chinese government have long subscribed and which principle forms the foundation of the commercial policy of the United States. As it is assumed that the term "troops" in point numbered six is meant to include all armed forces, the language of this point has been slightly rephrased to avoid possible ambiguity.
As already stated, the question relating to communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory, is subject to further discussion.
(Part 4)
4. Commerce between both nations.
A statement is included in the annex and supplement on the part of the United States clarifying the point that as a temporary measure during the present international emergency it is understood that each country may restrict export of commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self‑defense.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
The language of this section has been rephrased to make the provisions thereof applicable equally to the United States and to Japan.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
This section has been revised to make it consist of a clear‑cut statement of the fundamental purpose of the understanding. The thought in mind is to give emphasis to this purpose so that the document may speak for itself on this all‑important subject.
The statement of fundamental purpose has been assigned a section by itself in order that it may gain added emphasis.
The statement in the Japanese draft in regard to the Philippine Islands has been dealt with in a new section bearing number 7.
The statement in regard to Japanese immigration has been omitted in view of the established position of the United States that the question of immigration is a domestic matter. For that reason, to attempt to include a statement on this subject would stand in the way of the underlying purposes of the agreement.
(Part 5)
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.
The phraseology of this section has been altered so as to bring it into conformity with the language of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, approved March 24, 1934.
ADDENDUM.
In view of the traditional policy of the United States and various practical considerations in the United States, important difficulties would be presented should the government of the United States endeavor to keep secret the understanding under reference together with its annexes. This government could probably arrange to keep the understanding secret for a period of a few weeks, during which time it believes that the two governments should work out procedures covering the scope, character and timing of the announcement of the understanding and of at least the definitive substance thereof.
Trans. 6‑13‑41
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No. 70
FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 384.
(Part 1 of 3)
There were many points unacceptable to me in the proposal of the United States which I am transmitting to you this date (message #377a). At the same time, this proposal being unofficial, the American side expressed its desire to go over the objectionable parts with me before submitting it to Japan. However, I am asking for a preliminary draft which will approximate as much as possible the final proposal, which I intend to submit to you for your consideration.
_______________
a See II, 59.
Trans. 6‑11‑41
No. 71
FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 384.
(Part 2 of 3)
1. Among the main points relating to the European War:
a. Eliminating the phrases regarding the right of self‑preservation.
b. Eliminating Secretary Hull's speech in the Annex.
2. Regarding the China Incident:
a. In accordance with your telegraphic instructions, the suggestion to China to be made by the President;
b. The working out of a mutually satisfactory phraseology regarding the desire for peace.
3. In place of a statement regarding justice and non‑discrimination, the inclusion of a clause regarding peace in the Pacific.
Trans. 6‑12‑41
No. 72
FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 384.
(Part 3 of 3)
In addition to the foregoing, the inclusion of stipulations relating to the prevention of the spread of the European war, to efforts for future world peace, and peace in the Pacific.
Also, in an Annex, stipulations that Japan and the United States mutually .recognize Japan's national aspirations in the Far East, including the southwestern Pacific and those of America in the Western Hemisphere; and that Japan plans no military bases in the Western Hemisphere and the United States none in the Far East.
A-39
Your telegraphic instructions are requested regarding the admission of manufactured goods.
The mediation proposal be acted upon in three days. Secretary Hull has been indisposed since the night before last, and an end should be put to the too numerous delays.
Trans. 6‑12‑41
No. 73
FROM: Washington June 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 385.
The contents of the American proposal and the present condition of negotiations are as reported in my # 377a and # 384b, but in the American proposal there are many points which still require further deliberation and for this reason they are reluctant to report to Japan. However, I expect that the report will be sent in a few days. In the meantime please accept the preliminary proposal for your study.
_______________
a See II, 59.
b See II, 70, 71, 72.
Trans. 6‑11‑41
No. 74
FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) June 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 286.
To Counselor IGUCHI from Secretary TERAZAKI.
Officials, as well as outsiders returning to Japan from Washington, report that harmony is lacking among the members in the Embassy there. I have been sensing this for quite a while and lately it seems that the sneers are gradually getting more and more unbearable. I have also heard that Ambassador NOMURA called the members of his staff together and begged them to keep peace. I have just received a report that Consul General MIURA felt terribly ashamed for an outsider like Ambassador NOMURA to find matters in such a regrettable state. Now, when the world situation is in such a critical state, will you, as the Counselor, advise all the staff to please conduct themselves in a more seemly fashion.
Trans. 6‑11‑41
No. 75
FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) June 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 284.
Strictly Secret.
To Counselor IGUCHI from Secretary TERAZAKI.
In the telegrams concerning the adjustment of Japanese‑American relations such as secret message # 377 [a] on the 9th, there are some sentences which do not seem to make good sense
A-40
and I am at a loss at times to know just what is being said. It is not that I insist on your troubling yourself with a perfect job of drafting, but please wire me back just why it is that clearer messages cannot be sent.
______________
a See II, 59.
Trans. 6‑11‑41
No. 76
FROM: Washington June 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 396.
Re your # 284a.
Hereafter, we will try to correct our shortcomings.
______________
a See II, 75.
Trans. 6‑17‑4
No. 77
FROM: Washington June 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 392.
To Bureau Chief Terasaki from Iguti.
Many of the messages connected with this subject have been drafted by the Ambassador himself and although before they are sent they are submitted to Colonel Iwakuro, the Naval and Military Attaches and to me and other officials for consideration, we have been sending them whenever possible as nearly as originally drafted as possible in order to convey better the feelings of the Ambassador who has discussed the matter with the Secretary of State.
The tone of your message # 285a is very disconcerting in view of our Ambassador's supreme effort to promote adjustment of American‑Japanese relations. Therefore, I trust that you will take a more sympathetic view of the matter.
_______________
a Not available.
Trans. 6‑17‑4
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No. 78
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 424.
(Part 1 of 2)a
Re my # 384b.
1. As I said in my caption message, I have repeatedly negotiated with them on their former proposals for an understanding, on the basis of your instructions. On the 15th I talked with the Secretary while he was sick in bed. (Since the 8th he has been up and about, and I understand that he is soon going to Hot Springs.) The Secretary said: "According to our reports, in Japan there are influential people who do not wish an understanding between Japan and the United States, so I don't suppose that, after all, Japan considers the composure of the relations of our two countries as so important." "Could you not, he hopefully asked, "at your discretion, once more report all the details to the Imperial Government and find out whether the Imperial Government is really in favor of composing relations between our two countries or not?" I replied: "Well, such concessions as the American Government has made are really not worth our consideration. I must repeat that I am negotiating entirely within the limits of the instructions of my Home Government. So long as you do not give us a concrete and fair proposal, there is no sense in requesting instructions, at least on the basis of what you have offered us so far." Since then I continued with my negotiations and on the 22nd(?) the Secretary handed me the Oral Statement in my # 426c preliminary to making the proposal in my # 425d.
The latest American proposal which contains the following excuse, "unofficial, exploratory and without commitment", is far from being in accord with your instructions and I must say that I am myself thoroughly dissatisfied but still, in view of the preceding facts, I am sending it to you for what it may be worth. In connection with this American talk of self-defense and peace terms relative to the Chinese Incident (commercial non‑discrimination), they stated that they would like for us to inscribe in official letters and documents our accord with what they have insisted on all along. However, the Imperial Government could not by any means recognize some of these terms, so last night, the 23rd,(?) I sought an interview with the Secretary and told him frankly that I could not submit this to my Government.
_____________
a Part 2 of 2 follows, (See II, 79).
b See II, 70, 71, 72 in which Nomura tells Tokyo that he has requested a preliminary draft, which will approximate as much as possible the final proposal, which he intends to submit to Tokyo for their consideration.
c See II, 87, 88, 89.
d See II, 90.
Trans. 6‑27‑41
No. 79
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 424.
(Part 2 of 2)
2. I have told you in several messages that there are three important discrepancies in the demands of both sides:
A-42
(1) When it comes to the European war, Anglo‑American self‑defense rights, and the Tripartite Pact, they will not yield to anything we advocate.
(2) When it comes to the question of our stationing of troops for protection against Communists, they strangely enough declare that they cannot interfere with Chinese‑Japanese peace terms, but in the same breath show considerable ire, declaring that this interferes with the sovereignty of a third power.
(3) Secretary HULL's pet principle is that of commercial non‑discrimination. He repeats that the Pan‑American policy of the United States consists in this. He often says that if we applied the principle of non‑discrimination to China and all the Pacific, we would have nothing to lose and it would, as a matter of fact, be to our material interests.
These have all been very hard points but they took the attitude that if they were absolutely certain that Japan actually and earnestly desired to compose relations between the two countries, there was room for negotiations. However, when we talk peace with CHIANG KAI-SHEK, points two and three will be among the peace terms and we do not believe that the United States would support us on those points. The United States, furthermore, strongly insists that it is against her principles to counsel CHIANG KAI-SHEK to accept our demands on these matters.
3. We were exempted from the order freezing foreign assets; the affair involving naval officers has been settled amicably; and the Secretary of State, while in bed, interviewed me three times. These things and others lead me to think that the President, his immediate associates, and the Secretary of State have not cooled any in their zeal to adjust the relations of our two countries but, judging from reports coming from the American Embassy in Tokyo and from financial quarters in New York, I think that some American officials of the United States are by some means endeavoring to cast suspicions on the sincerity of the Japanese Government. There are, indeed, many indications that this is true.
4. Thus, though it can be seen that there are discrepancies between the views of our two countries, I would not say that there is no room for negotiations. There are various reasons why I think it would be to our advantage not to break off negotiations; however, if our high officials in Tokyo think that the time has come to stop these talks, let them remember that the United States Government will freeze our credit, strengthen the embargo, and by every other sort of oppressive measure crowd us more than ever. If they decide to rupture these negotiations, let them begin immediately to take every possible measure to prepare for the worst.
Translator's Note: Messages dictated by Ambassador NOMURA are extremely poorly phrased and difficult to translate.
Trans. 6‑27‑41
No. 80
FROM: Washington June 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 388.
Strictly Secret
Of the three secretaries in this embassy, as you know, one is worked to death on a special assignment and has no time at all to devote to general work here. One or the other of the other two is always sick or something, so I find it absolutely impossible to do things right with just one secretary. True, I do have three or four aides, but they are either totally inexperienced, just having graduated from school, or up to their necks in telegraphic work. None of them can take
A-43
the place of secretaries. I feel this shortage most keenly now that this country is gradually turning toward war, because I have to send these men here and there both within and without the country on various missions and have very much work to do in connection with our business in South and Central America. You can well imagine my difficulty. I know that our whole department is short of men, for that matter, but I feel constrained to request that you send to me two third class secretaries immediately. If you do not have any suitable men in Tokyo at the moment whom you could send, we here would prefer Secretary AOKI now at Vichy, because he knows general embassy work as well as commercial and economic conditions in Central and South America, or Business Official TAKAGI, who is now touring South and Central America along with Minister YAMAGATA. We would like you also to have Consul INAGAKI, now in San Francisco, sent here. We will be very grateful if you will accommodate us in this matter.
Trans. 6‑13‑41
No. 81
FROM: Tokyo June 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 285.
(Part 1 of 3)
Re your # 375°a.
Needless to say, I am glad that you have without the loss of time submitted to our Government a proposal, even though it be unofficial, on such an important matter as this. Furthermore, this matter, in view of our relations with Germany and Italy which are the axis of our diplomacy and in view of world events, is very important. I also think that you fully realize how delicate it is. A thing of this nature is first and foremost a matter to be handled primarily by the Government. It is certainly lacking in propriety for you and the Secretary of State to get together and submit the proposal to a drafting committee of both countries. As for the points which the committee is to consider (superfluous or non‑essential phrases are quite beside the point), only after the Imperial Government and the Government of the United States have reached an understanding between themselves, and after instructions have been received from this Foreign Minister, is re‑action to take place. That is the formula. You tell me that there were some important points on which both committees disagreed. But in any case, the time has not yet come to submit the matter to such a committee. Any matters presented to a committee under the present circumstances should be distinctly understood as without commitment but it would already seem that you have made some commitments which will be difficult to explain away.
___________
a Ambassador NOMURA informs Foreign Minister MATSUOKA that he and Secretary HULL have submitted a proposal for the adjustment of Japanese‑American relations to a joint drafting committee which disagreed on important points.
Trans. 6‑10‑41
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No. 82
FROM: Tokyo June 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 285.
(Part 2 of 3)
As soon as I have received the full text of the unofficial American proposal, we will discuss it in Government circles, and until you get some further instructions from me, please stop these committee talks. Of course, I know that you will have to do so in a friendly and inoffensive manner, but I will leave that up to your tact.
I do, as you know, and have always considered good relations between Japan and the United States as important. However, no matter how urgent this adjustment might seem, it is not so important as the Axis Pact, and no bad effect must be brought to bear on that Pact. Therefore, our first and foremost objective is to maintain the integrity of the Japanese, German, Italian Alliance and to do everything we can to keep the United States from entering the war, or at least to prevent her from taking any more direct anti‑Axis measures than she has up to the present day. I feel that our dauntless attitude has already achieved much in this direction. When you left Tokyo I told you this by word of mouth and you agreed with me, but unfortunately there are many outsiders who seem to think that even though the United States fights, we Japanese will not necessarily do so.
Trans. 6‑10‑41
No. 83
FROM: Tokyo June 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 285.
(Part 3 of 3)
As a matter of fact, the impression is imparted that the Japanese‑American negotiations are centering around that very impression. The President of the United States and the Secretary of State are scheming to include in this proposal for an understanding the basis for giving to the American people and to the world at large such a false impression. From the point of view of our intention to cooperate with the three powers, we must therefore be ever on the alert. I think that I have informed you on this matter through my various instructions. When we come to take this matter up, this is one point which we must carefully consider, and on which we must allow no error to be made. Summing all this up, if the United States fights Germany, no matter what sort of agreement exists, after all it will inevitably have to be broken. That is clearer than the light of day. The important thing today is for us to maintain a relentless attitude. Even though it is beyond our power to make the United States feel friendly toward Germany, we must keep her from making an outright attack. Compared with this, any advice that the United States might give CHIANG KAI SHEK to make peace with us is of secondary importance. I think we all know that by now.
I will wire you more later.
Trans. 6‑10‑41
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No. 84
FROM: Tokyo June 13, 1941
TO: Washington # 289.
Regarding your # 384a.
Since reading your telegram I feel that I understand better the development of the discussions between you and the other party. If the "committee" is the type of which you speak, we may authorize the instruction to ‑‑‑‑‑.
We are now studying the unofficial American proposal (your # 378b) which you received from the Secretary of State on April (?) 10th. Please bear in mind that our opinion regarding it will be sent to you.
Although the proposal in question may be of the sort you mention, it nevertheless is useful to this Minister when making translation of notes to be exchanged and for this reason it should have been telegraphed to him without delay.
Please bear in mind in the future that a proposal of this nature is also very important in finding out just how the President's and the Secretary of State's, minds work, which is useful to our government's deliberation on this matter.
______________
a See II, 70, 71, 72.
b See II, 60‑65.
Trans. 6‑17‑41
No. 85
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 401.
On the ‑‑‑‑‑ I called on the Assistant Secretary, WELLES (HULL is at present ill) and requested that the TACHIBANA incident be dealt with from the standpoint of the general political trend. WELLES agreed to do so.
Trans. 6‑30‑41
No. 86
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 405.
It goes without saying that Japanese‑American relations being very delicate, we must be ever on the alert.
There are a number of influential persons who are advocating placing a general embargo on oil. However, due to diplomatic reasons, both the Secretary of State and the State Department are exercising restraint. They are also said to have advised the press to maintain a calm attitude regarding questions affecting Japanese‑American relations.
Trans. 6‑19‑41
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No. 87
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 426.
(Part 1 of 3)
Strictly secret outside the Department.
(To be handled in Government Code)
ORAL STATEMENT‑June 21, 1941.
Oral Statement.
The Secretary of State appreciates the earnest efforts which have been made by the Japanese Ambassador and his associates to bring about a better understanding between our two countries and to establish peace in the Pacific area. The Secretary of State appreciates also the frankness which has characterized their attitude throughout the conversations which have been held. This Government is no less desirous than the Japanese Ambassador to bring about better relations between our two countries and a situation of peace in the Pacific area, and in that spirit the Secretary of State has given careful study to every aspect of the Japanese proposal.
The Secretary of State has no reason to doubt that many Japanese leaders share the views of the Japanese Ambassador and his associates as indicated above and would support action toward achieving those high objectives. Unfortunately, accumulating evidence reaches this Government from sources all over the world, including reports from sources which over many years have demonstrated sincere good will toward Japan, that some Japanese leaders in influential official positions are definitely committed to a course which calls for support of Nazi Germany and its policies of conquest and that the only kind of understanding with the United States which they would endorse is one that would envisage Japan's fighting on the side of HITLER should the United States become involved in the European hostilities through carrying out its present policy of self‑defense.
Trans. 6‑26‑41
No. 88
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 426.
(Part 2 of 3)
Strictly secret outside the Department.
The tenor of recent public statements gratuitously made by spokesman of the Japanese Government emphasizing Japan's commitments and intentions under the Tripartite Alliance exemplify an attitude which cannot be ignored. So long as such leaders maintain this attitude in their official positions and apparently seek to influence public opinion in Japan in the direction indicated, it is not illusory to expect that adoption of a proposal such as the one under consideration offers a basis for achieving substantial results along the desired lines?
Another source of misgiving in the Japanese proposal relates to the desire of the Japanese Government to include in its terms for a peaceful settlement to be offered to the Chinese
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Government a provision which would permit the stationing of Japanese troops in certain areas in Inner Mongolia and North China as a measure of cooperation with China in resisting Communistic activities.
Trans. 6‑26‑41
No. 89
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 426.
(Part 3 of 3)
(Strictly secret outside the Department)
While this government has given careful thought to the considerations which have prompted the Japanese government to make such a proposal, and while this government does not desire to enter into the merits of such a proposal, it feels that the liberal policies to which the United States is committed, as explained on numerous occasions to the Japanese Ambassador and his associates, would not permit this government to associate itself with any course which appears to be inconsistent with these policies. Furthermore, although in matters affecting only this country, there might be some latitude of decision as to the qualifying of rights, the matter under discussion affects the sovereign rights of a third country, and accordingly it is felt that this government must be most scrupulous in dealing with such a matter.
The Secretary of State has therefore reluctantly come to the conclusion that this government must await some clearer indication than has yet been given that the Japanese government as a whole desires to pursue a course of peace such as constitute the objectives of the proposed understanding. This government sincerely hopes that the Japanese government will manifest such an attitude.
Note: In order to bring the current discussions up to date as far as the American attitude is concerned, there is being handed the Japanese Ambassador separately a revision, bearing the date of June 21, of the document marked "Unofficial, exploratory and without commitment", which was handed the Japanese Ambassador on May 31.
Trans. 7‑7‑41
No. 90
FROM: Washington June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 425.
(In 2 parts‑complete)
(Secret outside department).
(Chief of Office routing).
Re my # 424a.
The U.S. text of the 21st consists of the following changes made in the text of May 31st. An annex is being sent separately in # 427b.
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Add at the end of Paragraph 1 of the Preamble: "For the resumption of traditional friendly relations".
Change "present" to "earnest" in the first part of Paragraph 3 and insert next to "understanding" the three words "encourage world peace".
Insert "deliberated" next to "later" in Clause 5.
In Clause 1 (national rights) at the end of Paragraph 1 change "among" to "between". In Paragraph 2 insert "living under the ideal of universal concord through justice and equity" next to "one household". At the end of the same paragraph change "nations" to "peoples".
In Clause 2 (European war), in Paragraph 1, substitute "to contribute to the prevention of an unprovoked extension of the European War" for the phrase between "to present" and "self defense".
In the May 31st text eliminate the entire phrase beginning with "obviously".
No revisions made in Paragraph 2.
In this Clause, the following paragraph, "There is appended a suggested draft of an exchange of letters as a substitute for the annex and supplement on the part of the government of the United States on this subject which constituted a part of the draft of May 31, 1941", has been added as Note; please refer to my # 424a regarding this.
Clause 3 (China affair), no revisions, but note "The foregoing draft of section 3 is subject to further discussion of the question of cooperative defense against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory, and the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. With regard to suggestion that the language of Section 3 be changed, it is believed that consideration of any suggested change can most advantageously be given after all the points in the annex relating to this section have been satisfactorily worked out, when the section and its annex can be viewed as a whole," has been added.
Clause 4 (trade relations), no revision.
Clause 5 (economic activities in the Pacific), no revision.
The beginning of the paragraph dealing with political activities in the Pacific has been changed to "both governments".
Clause 7, no revision.
_______________
a Amb. Nomura wires Tokyo that in an interview with Secy. Hull he made the statement that there seem to be influential people in Japan who do not desire an understanding with the U.S., so, after all, does Japan consider the composure of relations between the two countries so important. Nomura replies that such concession as the U.S. has so far offered are not worthy of consideration.
b See II, 91.
Trans. 7‑1‑41
No. 91
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 427.
(Part 1 of 2) Separate wire.
To be handled in Government code.
Strictly secret outside the Department.
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Annex and supplement on the part of the Japanese Government.
2 (or 3?). Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:
1. Neighborly friendship.
2. Cooperative defense against injurious Communistic activities‑including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory. Subject to further discussion.
3. Economic cooperation. Subject to agreement on an exchange of letters in regard to the application to this point of the principle of non‑discrimination in international commercial relations.
4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming an East Asian nucleus contributing to world peace.
6. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from Chinese territory as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.
7. No annexation.
8. No indemnities.
9. Amicable negotiations in regard to Manchukuo.
Trans. 6‑26‑41
No. 92
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 427.
(Part 2 of 2) Separate wire.
To be handled in Government Code.
Strictly Secret outside the Department.
Annex and supplements on the part of the Government of the United States.
4. Commerce between both nations.
It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre‑war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self‑defense. These limitations are mentioned to clarify the obligations of each Government. They are not intended as restrictions against either Government; and, it is understood, both Governments will apply such regulations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.
Trans. 6‑26‑41
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[Note: No #93 in the original text.]
No. 94
FROM: Tokyo June 25, 1941
TO: Washington # 309.
Secret outside the Department.
Regarding paragraph 1 of your message # 425a.
It is not clear to us just how the phrase "encourage world peace" in (1) is to be fitted in. Please send the revised text.
____________
a Changes to be made in the U.S. text of the "understanding agreement."
Trans. 7‑3‑41
No. 95
FROM: Washington June 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 439.
Re your # 309a.
Secret.
Before the third paragraph of the text reading as follows: "It is our earnest hope that, by a cooperative effort, that the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and arrest, if not dispel the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization", please insert a comma after "if not dispel".
______________
a "It is not clear to us just how the phrase "encourage world peace" in (1) is to be fitted in. Please send the revised text."
Trans. 7‑3‑41
No. 96
FROM: Tokyo June 26, 1941
TO: Washington # 312.
Secret outside the Department.
Concerning part 2 of your # 427a in your last sentence, repeat immediately all the words following, "it is understood."
______________
a See II, 91 which gives the annex and supplement on the part of the Japanese and United States Governments to the Oral Statement.
Trans. 7‑1‑41
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No. 97
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 443.
Re your # 312a, as follows:
It is understood that both governments will apply such regulations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.
_______________
a See II, 96.
Trans. 6‑30‑41
No. 98
FROM: Washington (Nomura) June 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) No number.
For the information of the Foreign Minister.
Believing that the question of reestablishing better Japanese‑American relations is one of the important phases of our national policy today, since my assumption of this post, I have devoted all my time, putting aside all personal considerations, to its promotion. However, some time past Your Excellency saw fit to question my motive and I trust that it was made clear at that time that any suspicion regarding my motive was unjustified. However, since then I have been quietly making inquiries to locate the source of such suspicion.
On the other hand, in the "Oral Statement" which was handed me together with the U.S. proposals, there are many indications that the United States government doubts the good faith of our government. Thinking that there might be some complicated reasons behind this attitude I made inquiries and obtained from various reliable sources the following facts, in general, regarding the true status of the American proposals.
As I have already reported the proposal for American‑Japanese understanding was, originally, being handled only by the President and a few heads of the government secretly. Subsequently, it became necessary to disclose some phase of it to other members of the Cabinet and certain officials of the State Department. It appears that two or three members of the Cabinet (probably Morgenthau, Ickes, and Jackson) are not in favor of Japanese-American understanding and some of the State Department officials oppose it as a matter of course. Adhering to their traditional views they are trying to attach ulterior meaning to the proposal. These officials also resent the fact that the negotiations were being carried on over their heads.
It is also clear that both in America and Japan there are those who do not view with sympathy the idea of closer relationship between America and Japan. And these groups are submitting unfavorable reports to their respective Ambassadors, or Foreign Offices, with intent to wreck this plan. They are also working through the New York financial circles to influence unfavorably a certain member of the Cabinet (presumably Morganthau), and it appears that Secretary Hull is at times confused by these reports submitted to him by his colleagues and subordinates.
On several occasions I have been asked by the Secretary whether it is not true that certain influential groups in Japan are opposed to the American‑Japanese understanding. (It goes
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without saying that each time I have strongly denied this allegation.) In this manner, those who wish to see our plans wrecked are using all sorts of means to give the unfortunate impression that my views do not represent the true views of the Japanese government.
Although it is to be regretted that I have not always been able to carry out your instructions fully, Your Excellency may be assured that I will not do anything that transcends the limits of Your Excellency's instructions. I trust that my clear record of the past, our friendship extending to more than 26 years, and the circumstances of my appointment to the present post, are sufficient evidence of my good faith. And I have no doubt that Your Excellency will accept them as such.
I submit the above for Your Excellency's information.
Trans. 6‑30‑41
No. 99
FROM: Washington June 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 452.
(In 2 parts‑complete)
I am awaiting your instructions regarding my message # 313a, but as I assume that the German‑Soviet war, which broke out since my message in question was dispatched, is causing you a great deal of anxiety, I submit herewith my humble opinion.
The United States does not desire a two‑front war, and it goes without saying that for this reason she desires peace in the Pacific. However, as you already know, she is feverishly preparing to meet any eventuality. Although the United States is trying to assure greater freedom of action regards the European war, through the proposed American‑Japanese "understanding", actually it is unlikely that she will join the war for some time to come, and there is some possibility that after the proposals for the Japanese‑American "understanding" have been adopted, we can restrain America's war attitude through diplomatic manipulations. The United States is watching Japan's action very closely since the declaration of the German-Soviet war and the opinion here is that although Japan's position is improved in the Far East by lessening of the Soviet pressure, Japan will not be able to conduct a large scale operation in Siberia so long as the China Affair remains unsettled. Also, that her southward advance, checked by the consorted air and submarine defense efforts of the Netherlands Indies, Britain, and the United States, and increasing determination of these countries to protect these areas, are driving Japan to an attitude of watchful waiting rather than to risk a large scale war involving herself with Britain and Australia.
It has already been reported to you that the United States intends to give aid to Russia, but I doubt very much whether she is prepared to effectuate her intention.
Now then, if the United States government loses interest in the proposed Japanese‑American "understanding", it may be said that all efforts towards better American‑Japanese relations have come to a standstill. This means decisive economic action leading to our southward expansion which, in turn, is replete with danger of collision with Netherlands (?). In the event of the above, not only will it be difficult to maintain trade relations with the Americas and the British Empire, but it will mean eventual severing of diplomatic ties with these countries.
It is my belief that our adherence to the Tripartite Pact should in no way affect the preservation of peace in the Pacific by virtue of the American‑Japanese "understanding" agreement.
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For reasons given above, I feel that broadly speaking, this "understanding" agreement will prove advantageous to Japan and as I am of the opinion that the three proposals supplementing my message can be made acceptable in some way, I await your instructions.
I wish to emphasize the importance of proving to the United States government that the Japanese government is truly interested in the proposed Japanese‑American "understanding".
_______________
a DoD comment: Should be message number 424 (II, 98). Ambassador Nomura wires Tokyo that in an interview with Secy. Hull, he made the statement that there seems to be influential people in Japan who do not desire an understanding with the U.S., so, after all, does Japan consider the composure of relations between the two countries so important. Nomura replies that such concession as the U.S. has so far offered are not worthy of consideration.
Trans. 7‑10‑41
No. 100
FROM: Tokyo June 30, 1941
TO: Washington # 1367.
(Circular)
As present conditions indicate a critical period, it is necessary to bring to the attention of all of the administrative personnel the regulations concerning fiscal matters. Furthermore, the previous conditions have already been ‑‑‑‑‑, it is hoped.
1. All of the (confidential ?) reports and intelligence reports are to be dispatched as soon as possible. In case of withdrawal, the reports in the process of preparation are expected to be sent out.
2. The documents having relation to the (confidential ?) reports and intelligence reports should already be destroyed by fire.
3. Before withdrawing, the notice should be given as provided in leases for the disposal of the rented property. You are to consult either this office or the nearest diplomatic post concerning the remaining amounts to be paid and other obligations which must be carried out.
4. Japanese Government‑owned properties shall be placed in the custody of the proper administrative representatives.
5. The furnishings are to be sent (to Japan), or if it is not practical to store them, they are to be sold in such a manner as not to give the appearance of closing the establishment.
6. The local personnel of the offices, in case of withdrawal, shall be discharged. Those of third countries shall be paid in the amount which has heretofore been the rule. Payments shall be made to Japanese corresponding to the lowest amount of freight charges necessary for their return. Enemy members of the personnel shall receive no payment whatsoever.
7. Although inevitably a certain amount of public funds designated for miscellaneous expenditures will be lost ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ -----, and (differentiation?) of private and official documents will be ‑‑‑‑‑.
Trans. 7‑9‑41
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No. 101
FROM: Washington July 1, 1941
TO: Moscow # 041.
(Washington Circular # 143.)
Retransmission. # 445 to the Minister.
Acting Secretary of State Welles explained America's attitude toward the German‑Soviet war in his press conference on June 23rd. He said that America is equally opposed to a Communistic dictatorship or a Nazi dictatorship, but the problem at present is the destruction of Hitlerism throughout the world and to that end aid to Russia had been ordered. The following day the President declared in his press conference that as far as possible America would aid Russia but that as yet Russia had made no request for aid and therefore he did not know what materials Russia stood in need of and inasmuch as aid to Britain would receive preferential treatment, he did not know to what extent aid to Russia would be possible. As one step in the aid to Russia program, Russia was exempted from the order of the Secretary of the Treasury of the June 14th freezing of all funds of European countries here, and thus the $400,000,000 that Russia has in America was made available for the purchase of American materials. On the 25th, the President announced that the Neutrality Act would not be invoked in the present conflict. (The excuse given for not applying the Neutrality Act in the present German‑Soviet war is that this act is not necessary for the preservation of American lives and the public peace.) The question of whether the Lend‑Lease Act would be applied to Russia or not is being given study. For the present all efforts are being concentrated on aid to Britain in the hope that she will be able to deliver a knock‑out blow to Germany.
America at this time is paying particular attention to Japan's attitude. There are, no doubt, arguments for a northern advance or for a southern advance. For the present the situation is being kept under observation.
That Japan will exercise a restraining influence as to whether America enters a state of war or not goes without saying. At any rate, public opinion is becoming more settled and decisive action only awaits the completion of preparations. This may be only a matter of a few months. I have heard persons of influence discuss the inevitability of war. Preparations are all in terms of along war. Plans are being laid for two years or more in the future. Not a few influential persons are saying that the European war will result in anarchy and bankruptcy and plunge Europe into a state of chaos paralleling the Dark Ages.
Trans. 7‑9‑41
No. 102
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 457.
The New York Times and other papers on the 26th published the views of Premier KONOYE as expressed to U.P. reporters. The Postmaster General ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ----‑, so it seems that he, too, was perturbed.
Yesterday in his press conference the President made it clear that he hoped the United States could keep out of the war. I think that the President and the Postmaster General
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conferred and decided, as an indirect reply to Prince KONOYE, to allay Japan's worries concerning any possible conflicts between a Japanese‑American understanding and the Axis pact.
Trans. 7‑7‑41
No. 103
FROM: Tokyo July 2, 1941
TO: Berlin # 1390.
Circular. (Part 1 of 2) (National Secret.)
At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd "The Principal Points in the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing Situation" were decided. This Policy consists of the following two parts. The first part "The Policy" and the second part "The Principal Points" (I am wiring merely the gist of the matter.) Inasmuch as this has to do with national defense secrets, keep the information only to yourself. Please also transmit the content to both the Naval and Military Attachés, together with this precaution.
The Policy.
1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co‑prosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change.
2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self‑existence and self‑protection.
Trans. 8‑8‑41
No. 104
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 2, 1941
TO: Washington # 1390.
(Circular)
(Part 2 of 2.)
The Principal Points.
For the purpose of bringing the CHIANG Regime to submission, increasing pressure shall be added from various points in the south, and by means of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in the south. Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be reenforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French Indo‑China and Thailand shall be executed. As regards the Russo‑German war, although the spirit of the Three‑Power Axis shall be maintained, every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States
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from joining the war, if need be, Japan shall act in accordance with the Three‑Power Pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed.
Addresses to which this message is sent: U.S., Germany and Soviet Russia. From Germany transmit to Italy.
Note: The system used in this message is considered to be of the highest type of secret classification.
Trans. 8‑8‑41
No. 105
FROM: Washington July 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 463.
(Part 1 of 2.)
At this time when the changes in international situation, brought on by the declaration of the German‑Soviet war, has placed Japan in an extremely delicate position, her stand against Russia, whether it be by use of force or by collaboration with Germany, will tend to worsen the relations between Japan and the United States and may drive the United States that much closer to war.
However, if Japan took an independent action against Russia, on the pretext that the dislocation of political situation arising out of the German‑Russian war, necessitates her stand in order to preserve peace in the Far East and to fulfill her obligation towards China, it might help somewhat in alleviating this trend. I wonder how it would be, in the event that we decide on a definite stand against Russia, if we were to hasten the consummation of the proposed Japanese‑American understanding so that this traditional question of self‑preservation will become a question common to both Japan and America.
Trans. 7‑9‑41
No. 106
FROM: Washington July 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 463.
(Part 2 of 2.)a
Now that Germany and the Soviet are at war, if we are definitely determined to make a military stroke southward, there is absolutely no way to adjust our relations with the United States.
My studied judgment concerning the status of Japanese‑American relations being thus, I consider it of the greatest urgency that whatever policy the Imperial Government takes, we must play our hand immediately with the United States; therefore, I await your advice. I have received your Circulars # 1366b, # 1367c, and your # 321d and we know full well that they imply a serious decision on the part of the Japanese Empire. We are all tense and on our
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toes, and doing our best to get everything in readiness for whatever may happen, so let your mind be at rest so far as that is concerned.
_______________
a Part 1 of 2.
b MATSUOKA directs that every precaution be taken in readiness for any emergency that might arise in order to assure the safety of documents contained in the official buildings.
c See II, 100.
d Not available.
Trans. 7‑9‑41
No. 107
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 470.
(Part 2 of 3)a Very urgent.
I said: "Yes, I glanced over that newspaper. I have not received any reports on this, but your country is assisting CHIANG, giving him economic help, sending him airplanes and munitions, and lending him pilots. Under these circumstances it is absolutely necessary for Japan to take measures to offset such acts. This has been going on already for a long time. Some time ago your fleet cruised to Australia. You have placed attachés everywhere. It is reported that you have conferred with the military officials of the Netherlands and British Indies and the military preparations in those areas have increased. In addition, you are strengthening the defenses in the Aleutians and it is even reported that you are going to work out a reciprocal assistance agreement with Soviet Russia. I could go on enumerating such things and they are all military steps aimed at Japan. Furthermore, there is a report that you are going to extend the embargo to oil. As this tendency progresses it becomes more and more difficult to maintain peace. That is why I am trying so hard to establish an understanding between Japan and the United States."
_____________
a Parts 1 and 3 of 3 not available.
Trans. 7‑8‑41
No. 108
FROM: Washington July 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 476.
(In 3 parts‑complete.)
Tokyo to Berlin as Circular # 1471 on 9 July.
Note: Italic words in the following translation were omitted from Washington's message when it was circularized by Tokyo.
1. About one month ago we learned from Source "A" that America was already putting into practice the convoy system but the information was not complete enough to warrant a
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report on it. Recently, this report has been indorsed indirectly from Source "B" and we have the following to report:
The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator George, said recently that although the Lend‑Lease Act had been passed with the understanding that there would be no convoys or at least that convoys would not be instituted without the consent of the Senate, the President has been "misleading" us. Immediately following this Senator George on the 28th of last month, made his first speech attacking the government since his assumption of the Chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee. Since that time the attitude of his Committee toward the President has stiffened.
In answer to this opposition, President Roosevelt gave expression to his resolute determination through Knox's speech in Boston on the 30th of last month, in which Knox said that the American Navy should take action in the Atlantic immediately. (As heretofore, Roosevelt will leave it up to men like Stimson and Knox to impose his definite decision on an indecisive Congress.)
In the above‑mentioned speech, because of the opposition of public opinion, a desire for a Senate investigation to determine whether or not convoys were being used was expressed. In his press conference on July 2, Knox denied the existence of convoys. But as a matter of fact, the government is employing convoys.
Roosevelt's attitude toward the Orient and Europe in general is summed up in the fact, that we have verified, that last fall the President instructed influential members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to seize upon one of the incidents that were occurring between the U.S. and Japan and use it as a pretext for war. However, the members of the Committee opposed this attitude and the President dropped the matter. However, since January of this year, the President has entirely changed his attitude and is now earnestly desiring an adjustment of U.S. ‑Japanese relations.
The President's attitude toward Germany has also undergone revision. At first he had hoped through aid to Britain to be able to lead Britain to victory without entering the war, but Germany's astonishing victories in the Balkans and Crete have caused him to change his policy and as yet he has not formulated a new policy and due to the problem of regulation of relations with Japan his fireside chat was postponed two weeks.
On the one hand Roosevelt's aid to Russia which he declared upon the outbreak of the Russo‑German hostilities got off to a bad start. The American First Committee, which claims 10,000,000 members made a direct frontal attack on the government, and this was not the only obstacle placed in the path of his desire for war. (Roosevelt's calling Lindberg a "copperhead" turned out to be a great failure.) In addition to the American First Committee, the following religious organizations also adopted resolutions opposed to war: Methodists, 8,000,000; Baptists, 7,000,000; Presbyterians, 7,000,000; Congregationalists, 2,500,000; Disciples, 1,500,000. In considering the attitude that should be adopted toward Germany and Japan it was necessary to take into account the above arguments for peace.
Since there was not a background of united public opinion Roosevelt was perplexed as to how to dispose of his dagger. Influential Senators were divided in opinions and the government is at present in a dilemma. Roosevelt will decide his policy in the next two or three weeks. He desires to advance toward some definite action and finds it very difficult to support the present ambiguity. (This is similar to Japan's position.) The thing that concerns America most at the present time is Japan. One way of breaking the present dilemma is regarding the Japanese-American understanding. Even though Roosevelt's and Hull's fervor may not change they still doubt Japan's sincerity. If Japan expands toward the south (even though the army isn't prepared) America will use the navy which is prepared to open war on Japan and thus popular
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opinion will be unified. (America does not wish to fight on two fronts but in view of the German-Soviet war she can neglect the Atlantic) and thus the present dilemma would turn out as America desires.
Trans. 7‑15‑41
No. 109
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 455.
(Foreign Office Secret.)
Although we are unable to definitely ascertain it, a certain person who is very prominent in political circles in this area, told a person connected to this office that Germany has dispatched an agent in secrecy to the United States to discuss peace. Our informant says that this German is at present in touch with persons in U.S. governmental circles. It is said that the gist of the peace proposal is that Germany will leave the British Empire untouched.
I forward the above information to you just as I heard it and for whatever value it may have to you.
Trans. 7‑5‑41
No. 110
FROM: Washington July 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 477.
Recently there has been a great deal of rumor concerning American intervention for German-British peace negotiations, according to information obtained from financial circles. A German secret emissary, SUTAARUFERUTO, (said to be an American‑born German), entered the United States by way of Mexico sometime ago bringing with him a letter from the heads of the German government, with the intention of making overtures for German-British peace. But because the general atmosphere in the United States at that time not being favorable and also because of the harshness of the peace terms he returned to Germany without broaching the subject.
However, he reentered the United States just about the time of the Hess incident and since then he has been working secretly to accomplish his mission.
Through the efforts of the ‑‑‑‑‑a he became acquainted with Secretary Hull's friend ‑‑‑‑‑a who in turn introduced him to Hull. Since then, he is said to be carrying on secret meetings with the Secretary of State and is continuing his efforts with somewhat modified peace terms.
I had a certain influential person in Washington (name kept secret) ascertain the above, and he confirmed the circumstances of the negotiations. However, it is believed that although neither the President nor those who are close to him are considering any move in this direction, there are a number of persons in his Cabinet who are in favor of it.
I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the above information but I submit to you for whatever it may be worth.
________________
a DoD Comment: Names withheld.
Trans. 7‑11‑41
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No. 111
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 8, 1941
TO: Washington # 345
Strictly Secret.
1. I am very much interested in reports like you mentioned in your # 455a, so please continue to keep me advised on this matter.
2. As I understand it, as a matter of form the Oral Statement will not be an integral part of this proposal for an understanding and that, as a matter of fact, this question has been settled according to my # 329a. However, so that I may be sure, wire me back your views.
______________
a See II, 109, in which NOMURA tells of rumors that Germany has dispatched an agent in secrecy to the United States to discuss peace. The gist of the peace proposal is that Germany will leave the British Empire untouched.
Trans. 7-10-41
No. 112
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 506.
(Part 1 of 5)
Secret Outside the Department.
To be handled in Government Code.
Re the matter of my # 477a.
The points learned since last I wrote you are as follows:
1. Early in February of this Year ‑----b, accompanied by -----b, and -----b, had an interview with the Secretary of State in his apartment in the Carlton Hotel here in Washington.
_____________
a See II, 110 in which NOMURA tells Tokyo of the rumor concerning American intervention for German-British peace negotiations and of a German secret emissary entering the United with the intention of making overtures for a German-British peace.
b DoD Comment: Names withheld.
Trans. 7‑10-41
No. 113
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 506.
(Part 2 of 5)
2. On that occasion, according to what -----a tells me, he being an American of German extraction, from 1920 to 1939, resided in Berlin as the representative of a certain American financial interest (since then I have ascertained underwritten the Japan Electric Company through the New York Organization of -----a) while there he became very
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intimate with HITLER, GOEBBELS, and GOERING. Especially the fact that during the early days of the Nazi movement he gave them financial assistance gives evidence to his considerable faith in the current leaders of Germany. (Incidentally, the ‑‑‑‑‑a has underwritten this man's entire family because it was through his efforts that the ‑‑‑‑‑a rights and properties in Germany were saved from encroachment.) However, during the latter part of last year this man returned to the United States by way of Mexico and on that occasion the leaders of the Nazi Party made him an offer of a European peace plan. Furthermore, in order to certify this man's position, HITLER and GOEBBELS gave him a written document and this he offered to Secretary HULL for his perusal. According to the peace proposals this man carried, HITLER is of a mind to open peace negotiations with Great Britain at any time. In order to do this, he hopes for the good offices of the United States. The preservation of the integrity of the British Empire is naturally one of the essential points of that peace proposal. France, Belgium and Holland are guaranteed their existence. Poland and Czechoslovakia alone are to be eliminated. The fates of Norway and Denmark are not to be touched upon in the discussions.
_____________
a DoD Comment: Names withheld.
Trans. 7‑18‑41
No. 114
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 506.
(Part 3 of 5)
(Secret outside the Department. To be handled in Government code.)
3. Though Secretary of State HULL looked at these representations, he entertained some doubt of their authenticity, but on the 15th of February this year, the first meeting of this group was held in the State Department. ‑‑‑‑‑a making up one group; the Secretary of State, the head of the European Division, other competent heads of departments, as well as two members of the Intelligence Section, making up the State Department group, participated in these conversations. At the opening of this meeting, ‑‑‑‑‑a presented HITLER and GOEBBELS' letter and at the same time, in order to substantiate his authority, he requested that telephone communication be made possible for him from the State Department to the Nazi authorities by international telephone. On the afternoon of that day in the presence of the State Department officials, telephone connections were made with GOEBBELS, and this man's position was satisfactorily substantiated.
4. Until the 10th of April last (during the interim this man lived in New York), conversations were carried on on four occasions. On the basis of propositions made by this man in those conversations, the State Department gave him a diplomatic passport on April 11. Accompanied by one member of the State Department staff, this man boarded a clipper for Berlin by way of Lisbon. After having conferred with the Nazi officialdom, he returned to the United States under an assumed name on board he same clipper May 27. At the present time, negotiations are continuing, and he has already talked with the President.
_____________
a DoD Comment: Names withheld.
Trans. [No date in text.]
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No. 115
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 506.
(Part 4 of 5)
5. When he went to Germany, he was charged with negotiating the sale of German ships to the United States, as well as with the peace proposals. As a result, a purchase arrangement had been worked out before the President's order expropriating these ships was issued. The procedure for the transfer of the purchase price to German funds abroad evolved.
6. At the time the aforementioned representative of the State Department and HESS, GOERING, and GOEBBELS with the heads of the Army conferred together, HESS stressed that the group of German leaders were persistent in their desire for peace. In order to bring this about, if necessary, it was hinted that the retirement of HITLER would be effected with the mitigation of the Jewish problem.
7. Besides ‑‑‑‑‑a, a secret German Army representative is now negotiating in Washington. I understand that the State Department is now in a perplexed state, and that there are great discrepancies of opinion.
______________
a DoD Comment: Names withheld.
Trans. 7‑18‑41
No. 116
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 506.
(Part 5 of 5)
8. The Germans, in order to guarantee their supply of internal foodstuffs and petroleum, made demands upon Russia. They expected America to assist in this, but it is clear that they could not be obtained. The United States and Great Britain were of the opinion that the massing of troops on the border was a form of bluff. It can be said that they were in error on this point. At the same time the Germans figured that any help to Russia from England or the United States was beyond possibility. Influential persons in the Government are now asking if a miscalculation was not made.
9. It has lately begun to become evident in this connection that one of the reasons for the standstill of American‑Japanese negotiations toward improvement of relations is that the Americans mistakenly harbored the idea hat there was a connection between the German peace movement and the Japanese negotiations.
Trans. 7‑18‑41
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No. 117
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 8, 1941
TO: Washington No number.
Secret within the office.
In the Oral Statement referred to in your message # 326a, the words "his associates" are used. Please find out in a casual manner just exactly what is meant by these words and wire me back.
_______________
a See II, 87, 88, and 89‑text of Oral Statement dated June 21, 1941.
Trans. 7‑9‑41
No. 118
FROM: Tokyo July 9, 1941
TO: Washington # 345.
(Secret outside Department)
Regarding your # 424a.
As the text of the United States government's communication regarding the question of the "Right of Self‑defense" and peace conditions relative to China Affair, which you have been asked not to transmit to this office, may be very useful in sounding out the American point of view, therefore, please send the text upon receipt of same.
______________
a Amb. Nomura wires Tokyo that in an interview with Secy. Hull, he made the statement that there seems to be influential people in Japan who do not desire an understanding with the U.S., so, after all, does Japan consider the composure of relations between the two countries so important. Nomura replies that such concession as the U.S. has so far offered are not worthy of consideration.
Trans. 7‑10‑41
No. 119
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 489.
(In 2 parts‑complete)
(Chief of Office Routing.)
(Very secret)
The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador:
In Section 2 of the joint declaration which was entered into today on behalf of our two governments, statements are made with regard to the attitude of the two governments toward the European war. During the informal conversations which resulted in the conclusion of this joint declaration I explained to you on a number of occasions the attitude and policy of the
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government of the United States toward the hostilities in Europe and pointed out that this attitude and policy were based on the inalienable right of self-defense. I called special attention to address which -----.
(Part 2)
The Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State:
I have received your letter of June.
I wish to state that my government is fully aware of the attitude of the government of the United States toward the hostilities in Europe as explained to me by you during our recent conversations and as set forth in your address of April 24. I did not fail to report to my government the policy of the government of the United States as is therein explained to me, and I may assure you that my government understands and appreciates the attitude and position of the government of the United States with regard to the European war .
I wish also to assure you that the government of Japan, with regard to the measures which the government of the United States may be forced to adopt in defense of its own security, is not under any commitment requiring Japan to take any action contrary to or destructive of the fundamental objective of the present agreement.
The government of Japan, fully cognizant of its responsibilities freely assumed by the conclusion of this agreement, is determined to take no action inimical to the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific Area.
Trans. 7-11-41
No. 120
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 490.
Strictly secret outside the Department.
(To be handled in Government Code.)
1. Does the term "economic cooperation" between Japan and China contemplate the granting by the Government of China to the Japanese Government or its nationals of any preferential or monopolistic rights which would discriminate in favor of the Japanese Government and Japanese nationals as compared with the Government and nationals of the United States and of other third countries? Is it contemplated that upon the inauguration of negotiations for a peaceful settlement between Japan and China the special Japanese companies, such as the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company and their subsidiaries, will be divested, insofar as Japanese official support may be involved, of any monopolistic or other preferential rights that they may exercise in fact or that may inure to them by virtue of present circumstances in areas of China under Japanese military occupation?
2. With regard to existing restrictions upon freedom of trade and travel by nationals of third countries in Chinese territory under Japanese military occupation, could the Japanese Government indicate approximately what restrictions will be removed immediately upon the entering into by the Government at Chungking of negotiations with the Government of Japan and what restrictions will be removed at later dates, with an indication in each case insofar as possible of the approximate time within which removal of restrictions would be affected?
3. Is it the intention of the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government shall exercise full and complete control of matters relating to trade, currency and exchange? Is it
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the intention of the Japanese Government to withdraw and redeem the Japanese military notes which are being circulated in China and the notes of Japanese-sponsored regimes in China? Can the Japanese Government indicate how soon after the inauguration of the contemplated negotiations arrangements to the above ends can in its opinion be carried out?
Trans. 7-11-41
No. 121
FROM: Washington July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #478.
(Part 1 of 3)
Re my #424a and your #329 (?)b.
Well, since I asked you for instructions already considerable time has passed and still I get no decision. In their Oral Statement they make it clear that they entertain misgivings concerning our real intentions. The instructions in your caption message clarify the intentions of our Government and did something to mitigate this, but did not succeed in dispelling their suspicions. We are delaying a reply and, thinking of this in connection with certain other circumstances, they consider that this mistrust is justified. Gradually they are losing hope of ever seeing an improvement in Japanese-American relations. Gradually they are beginning to believe there is no chance of these negotiations ever amounting to anything. A certain Cabinet member confidentially told a man connected with our Embassy that unless we immediately resume our conferences, it will be too bad and that he is worried because the situation is taking a turn unfavorable to the parleys.
_____________
a Ambassador NOMURA discusses the attitude of the United States towards the proposal and the three important discrepancies in the demands of both sides.
b Not available.
Trans. 7-9-41
No. 122
FROM: Washington July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #478.
(Part 2 of 3)
I am sorry that in my negotiations, I have been unable to drive home your instructions, but since hostilities broke out between Germany and the Soviet the tendency is to closely scrutinize the moves that Japan makes or seems about to make. Some say that Japan will now try to realize the hopes she has entertained for many years of expanding northward and that she will not put much stress on the Japanese-Soviet treaty. Others say that she will now continue to move southward and that this coincides with the desire of Germany. There are even some who say that it does not matter which or what Japan does, and that the thought of her disturbing the peace of the Pacific or broadening the theater of war is merely an illusion because, after all, she is worn out and has no international credit. The Secretary of State has talked
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with me altogether seventeen times because he regards the Japanese-American question as very grave. Every time we have talked on this subject he has repeated this fact twice. Those working on the flank have ceaselessly contacted Cabinet members with whom they are intimate. The President also is just as much concerned, so I have heard.
Trans. 7-9-41
No. 123
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 478.
(Part 3 of 3)
By and large, Navy quarters also take the same view. This, I think, would be only natural because of the political situation here as well as this country's defense program. I must say that I cannot believe, if we stick to our present adamant attitude, that they will finally give in. Everything I read in the newspapers and magazines leads me to believe that the Government of the United States would not show a softer demeanor. I rather think that there is a great danger that they will break off the negotiations at the first opportunity. The main thorny points in the pending proposal are the right of self-defense, the stationing of troops, and the principle of non-discrimination in commerce, and I am completely at my wits' end, but still I feel an urgent impulse not to break off contact with them. If you want to send me another definite proposal, I will present it to them, but cannot you possibly reach some decision on their proposals which I have already sent you? I am sorry to keep troubling you with this matter.
Trans. 7-9-41
No. 124
FROM: Tokyo July 10, 1941
TO: Washington #350.
At present there are some things under discussion concerning Japanese-American matters for which I cannot depend too much on telegrams; and as there are certain reports I want to get first-hand from Consul General WAKASUGI, please send him home immediately.
Trans. 7-11-41
No. 125
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #495.
Re your # 350a.
Immediately following the opening of the war between Soviet Russia and Germany, I noticed that the United States was eager to adjust Japanese-American relations before it was too late. Information received since then seems to indicate that she is very suspicious of Japan's attitude. If we negotiate quickly, it may be said that the possibility of a settlement
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is not entirely hopeless. However, under the present circumstances there is no time for you to recall a man, get from him the facts of the situation, and then appoint him to carry on the negotiations. There is no reason to believe that an understanding could be arrived at by doing so. It is my opinion that circumstances which would necessitate severance of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States are much more imminent than we think they are and so my remaining here would avail nothing. Since I believe that I should personally report to you the facts and, also, that my leaving would have no serious effect on the United States, I would like to have you permit my returning to Japan and making a report.
______________
a See II, 124 in which Tokyo requests Washington that Consul General WAKASUGI be recalled to report first hand.
Trans. 7-11-41
No. 126
FROM: Tokyo July 11, 1941
TO: Washington #356.
Regarding your # 495a.
As U.S.-Japanese relations become more critical, it becomes increasingly necessary for you to stick to your post to represent Japan.. It goes without saying that you should remain there and do everything in your power to improve conditions.
I realize, of course, that there could be nothing better than to hear you report on the situation in person. However, because of the above consideration, I ordered Minister Wakasugi home immediately in place of yourself.
Even if we do not refer to our Emperor's wishes, your return home at this time cannot be countenanced from the standpoint of public opinion. Even assuming that a successful conclusion of a U.S.-Japanese understanding seems hopeless, I am convinced that you should remain at your post to the last and attempt to figure out ways and means of making the best of the situation. (If I were to express myself bluntly on this point, I would say that it would be of more importance for you to do so, if circumstances do not allow any optimism.)
For these reasons, this Minister cannot grant your request to return home at this time.
______________
a Jap Amb. Nomura wires Tokyo requesting that he be allowed to return to Tokyo instead of Minister Wakasugi, stating his reasons therefore. See II, 125.
Trans. 7-14-41
No. 127
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.
Re # 356a.
I am extremely sorry and I wish to apologize for having caused you displeasure on account of my lack of experience, though, in obedience to your instructions, my intention was to remain here and do my utmost until the present critical situation reached a stage of
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possible solution. Quite contrary to my original intention, it seems that my successive telegrams have had much to do with the decline of our country's honor in the eyes of the people within and without the country. I will, in the future, be especially cautious and endeavor to avoid errors even in small matters. However, in view of the fact that the bringing up I have had was in a society in which I was allowed to use my own judgment more or less freely even in matters which I have been ordered to carry out, and so to exercise my judgment has become my second nature, I cannot be sure of not troubling you again and thereby doing harm to my country. Therefore, no matter from what angle I regard the question, I cannot help but keenly feel that I should resign as soon as possible for the good of the country. In view of the political situation, I earnestly hope that you will not hesitate in transferring my duties to ----- person whom you have selected as being more in accordance with your desire. I fully realize that I am not the right man. I am, in fact, no more than a temporary stop-gap. As I have assured you previously, I have no intention whatsoever of bringing any degree of disaster to this position before my return to Japan. I most earnestly hope that you would consider this point carefully.
The matter that was discussed recently and for the transmission of which the return of WAKASUGIb became a question, was an off-the-record discussion of a private nature, and since it had chiefly to do with political matters, I personally assumed the responsibility. However, it was not a matter of such importance that it requires reporting personally in part, that is, in addition to what has already been communicated to you by telegram. As I have already wired you, I cannot help but advise you against recalling WAKASUGI and settling the matter discussed after you have heard the details from him. WAKASUGI was sent here to assist me in the performance of my duties. He wishes to remain here so long as I am at this post. Will you, therefore, reconsider the matter? However, if you insist on his returning to Japan, I have no more to say in regard to this question. In that case, I would like to have you wire me your decision.
______________
a See II, 126, MATSUOKA, replying to NOMURA's wire requesting that he be allowed to return to Tokyo instead of WAKASUGI, says it is absolutely necessary that NOMURA stick to his post.
b Consul General, Japanese Embassy in Washington. Chief Advisor to Ambassador NOMURA.
Trans. 7-16-41
No. 128
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 479.
Re my # 426a.
The word "associates", I have been given to understand refers to all persons who have conferred with them upon orders from myself, that is, WAKASUGI, OKUMURA, MATSUDAIRA, IWAKURO, and IKADA.
______________
a Text of Oral Statement dated June 21, 1941. See II, 87-89.
Trans. 7-10-41
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No. 129
FROM: Tokyo July 11, 1941
TO: Washington #355.
(In 5 parts-complete.) Strictly confidential.
Re your # 479a.
It should be needless to say that they are on your "staff" and are not your associates. The only exception to this rule is when the Foreign Minister names a person to a specific commission. Hence, unless Colonel Iwakuro is specifically named to some post by this Minister, he is in no position whatsoever to be considered an associate.
With regard to IKAWA, I am sure that you will recall that I sent you a cable in considerable detail before I embarked on my tour of Europe, that he is in no way connected with the Premier or with any other member of the Cabinet. He was brought up in the Finance Ministry, and, as you will find out if you make inquiries of persons in that Ministry, he is held in low esteem by them.
You must be aware of the fact that a person of that sort should not in any way, either directly or indirectly, be connected with a matter of such vast importance as the one in hand.
It is obvious from the text of the oral statement that the United States is of the opinion that these men are your associates. This is a point which this Minister considers exceedingly regrettable, and I request that you take immediate steps to correct this misconception.
(Part 2)
Moreover, the "oral statement" implies that as long as there are questionable persons in the Konoye Cabinet, the "Understanding Pact" cannot be put into effect, even presupposing that such an instrument is signed. In other words, as it must have become apparent to you upon reading over the "oral statement" once, the wording of that statement is tantamount to demanding that we reorganize the personnel of our Cabinet.
Under these circumstances, it should be plain to see that not only the government of Japan, but those persons representing it, have the perfect right to reject the "oral statement". However, keeping in mind the condition of U.S.-Japanese relations as well as the general outlook on the world, I, for one, made a decision to suffer in silence.
I, of course, assume that you, realizing the importance and gravity of the contents of the "oral statement" insisted upon fully discussing the various points. You no doubt pointed out that you were requesting the detailed explanation on the grounds that the instrument has had only a very few, if any, comparable parallels in the history of the world.
For your reference, I bring out the following points, with the request that you explain them fully to the other side in order to correct whatever misconceptions they may harbor:
(Part 3)
1. You will recall that Premier Konoye was interviewed by newspaper men on a train subsequent to the signing of the Tripartite Pact. You will also remember that the greater part of that interview was falsely reported by the press, as was made clear at the time.
2. The greater part of the interview published, which I allegedly gave to an American magazine writer, was also false. The magazine writer even broke his promise to submit a copy of the interview before it was dispatched. Moreover, he even went so far as to release the information to the United Press without obtaining any permission to do so.
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The gist of what I actually said at that time was that Japan has every intention of being loyal to the terms of the Tripartite Pact. I added, however, that should the United States go to war, forcing a clash between Japan and the United States, there would be, without a doubt, a horrible effect on all mankind. For this reason, I explained, every effort should be made to prevent its being brought about.
As I reported to you at the time, that was as far as I went in my interview. If all of the statements that I have made to Parliament and to all other persons and groups are read carefully and in a calm atmosphere, it will be found that I have never once gone beyond the limit described above.
While on this topic, although it does not have a direct bearing on the subject at hand, I wish to say that the published report of Menken's interview with Premier Konoye, the effects of which you recently reported, was false, almost in its entirety. Menken brought along a letter of introduction from a certain prominent American, and requested that he be permitted to take pictures of the Premier. The Premier gave his permission and while they were being taken, Menken and the Premier conversed (while standing) for a matter of possibly two or three minutes. Menken wrote up a story and released it to the United Press; (probably sold it to them).
This is another example of exceedingly unethical and damaging acts. Even if it is true that it had little or no effect in the United States, the very unfavorable reaction in Germany and Italy is one which cannot be lightly discounted. The Premier feels very strongly about this case of libel and is determined to act with more caution in the future.
In view of my past experience, I have adopted a policy of refusing to grant any interviews except to persons whose characters are guaranteed by the United States Ambassador and for whose acts and words the U.S. Embassy agrees to be held responsible.
I mention this for your information.
(Part 4)
3. The explanations made by Chief of the Information Section Ishii who is frequently termed "the spokesman for Japan", to the Approval Committee did not go beyond the bounds described above.
If the United States expects Japan to double-cross her Axis partners or even wishes Japan to assume a lukewarm attitude towards them on the basis of any of these public statements, the United States is being unreasonable, and is in for a disappointment. I am convinced that if the United States were in the same position as we, she would assume the same, or possibly even stronger, attitude.
4. If it is generally believed that there is a split within the Japanese cabinet, the so-called "lying reports" must be responsible for the misconception. As you will have no difficulty in guessing, these reports are probably based on rumors started by those who have not been able to make the grade into the Cabinet.
When confronted with a matter as important as the one at hand, any country's government would thoroughly discuss it from all possible angles. That is all that we are doing, and any report of dissatisfaction within the Cabinet is coming from without.
(Part 5)
It is true that the United States and British Ambassadors in Tokyo have a tendency to seize upon these rumors and place considerable weight on them when reporting on them to their home governments. It may be that the President and the Secretary of State have an entirely misrepresented picture of Japan because too much credence has been given to idle rumor.
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Since this is an exceedingly grave matter we are discussing, please make every effort to correct such erroneous opinions, if indeed they exist, for as long as they exist, we cannot hope to ever reach a successful agreement.
There is absolutely no truth in the rumor that Premier Konoye and I do not see eye to eye on matters. (These rumors have died down in Japan of late.) The truth is that the Premier and I are in complete agreement where improvement of U.S.-Japanese relations is concerned. In other words, we both are anxious to bring about an "Understanding Pact" between Japan and the United States as I have made clear to you right from the beginning. The War and Navy Ministries, also, are in complete accord in this matter as are all of the other Ministers.
Since this is an exceedingly important point, please explain it to the President and the Secretary of State so that they can make no mistake about it.
________________
a See II, 128.
Trans. 7-12-41
No. 130
FROM: Tokyo July 11, 1941
TO: Washington #357.
From Chief of American Bureau, Terasaki, to Counselor Iguti:
Message # 355a from Tokyo to Washington contained the Minister's immediate reactions upon receiving the "oral statement". Please bear that in mind.
With regard to message # 356b, please be advised of the fact that the official Japanese attitude concerning the U. S. proposal will be cabled to you very shortly.
________________
a Matsuoka wires Nomura that the U.S. "oral statement" implies a misconception on the part of that country as to Japan's motives and attitude toward the "understanding pact". In a four-page message, he clarifies various points in this connection. See II, 129.
b See II, 126.
Trans. 7-14-41
No. 131
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #508.
Part 1 of 8.
Re your # 356a
1. I agree with you upon the importance of their Oral Statement, but I do not think we could go so far as to say that they were trying to bring about a revision of our Cabinet. I think that all they were trying to do was to find out how sincere we were in our apparent desire to improve Japanese-American relations. What Your Excellency complains about was naturally the result of a one-sided misunderstanding on their part. All too often did the American Embassy in Tokyo send in malevolent reports and all too often did your so-called friends, who wished
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to thwart these negotiations, engage in damaging activities (take the words of the Americans as they stand). Another trouble was that Germany (who originated the broadcast containing rumors of Your Excellency's resignation) and China engaged in every sort of activity possible to thwart us. There are many indications that this is the case. All along I have repeated to them two or three times what you have told me in your instructions. Each time they were persuaded but ere long they received reports from financial circles which upset everything I said and suspicions were again aroused.
_______________
a See II, 126 in which Matsuoka, replying to Nomura's request that he be allowed to return to Tokyo instead of Wakasugi, says it is absolutely necessary that Nomura stick to his post.
Trans. 7-17-41
No. 132
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 508.
Part 2 of 8.
2. I believed and never once doubted that it was at this stage the serious policy of the Imperial Government to improve Japanese-American relations. But, since then Oh, how often have I met with opposition! How often have I lost faith in my subordinates! But, in spite of that and enduring it all, to this day I have held to my post and while enduring every sort of bitterness I have stuck to my ideal; that is because I have had faith in what I conceived to be the primary policy of our Government. As I reflect upon the general atmosphere in this country when I took office, I can see how relations between our two countries were following an ever roughening road. I thought that perhaps I could make our two countries each understand the position of the other; but, alas, I can see that that was only an airy story told in a dream.
Trans. 7-17-41
No. 133
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #508.
Part 3 of 8.
In order to begin negotiations under the conditions I have described above and seeing how much dissatisfaction there was over the content of the negotiations (it is clear that there is a limit to dissatisfaction), naturally I had to make ready. So, I came to entertain the view that it would be hopeless to deal with the Secretary of State alone and thus try to bring about the desired results. (On this point the Postmaster General, PURATO [a], and other well-known men of my acquaintance agreed with me.) When I began the unofficial negotiations which I am now conducting, members of the Embassy and the Military and Naval Attachés were consulted by me and we decided to use underhanded means to feel our way here in Washington and to hurry along the unofficial negotiations. (As you requested I have reported to you on this matter.) Since then, under my direction, the negotiations have been progressing and I have been having reported to me the details of how the underhanded schemes are working
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out. Thus, I have been trying to coordinate the work of the people concerned. I can assure you, however, that in this connection I have overlooked nothing and nothing has gone amiss.
_______________
a Kana spelling, probably PRATT.
Trans. 7-17-41
No. 134
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 508.
Part 4 of 8.
Furthermore, it is perfectly evident that in making our proposals, as well as in countering theirs, especially in all important matters, I personally conferred with the Postmaster General. I naturally expect that you are aware of this, also, in the light of the fact that I have negotiated with the Chiefa as many as seventeen times. Then, there is the fact that I have assisted the negotiations in no small way by conferring again with the Postmaster General. In the meantime, as it became clear from your telegram that Germany had sent a secret agent and also that T. V. SOONG and other Chinese agents had been sent and had been actively negotiating in secret, I became increasingly certain that, resorting to under-cover methods in carrying on these negotiations, I had chosen the right method. Naturally, I came to appreciate your wisdom in having used MATSUMOTO and NISHI in this connection. For this reason, I was secretly expecting that I would be given your approval.
_______________
a Probably HULL.
Trans. 7-17-41
No. 135
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #508.
Part 5 of 8.
The word "associates" which appears in the Oral Statement they gave us was used also in the Oral Statement which I handed to them in accordance with instructions (?). The word simply means HULL's cooperators, namely, such persons as HAMILTON, BALLANTINE, and the Postmaster General, and it should be taken in a very light sense, for in both cases it is not a word having a strictly limited legal sense, so I would like to have the word understood simply as meaning cooperators. There is absolutely no such misunderstanding on their part as to believe that Colonel IWAKURO and IKAWA and others were authorized by our Government to represent us. Because of the fact that the Postmaster General is truly desirous of seeing these negotiations brought to a successful end, he is naturally one through which we could carry on our undercover campaign. Whenever any matter is brought up, the responsibility of which is clearly defined, he always says, "Go and ask HULL about it." Please, therefore,
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understand that both of these men have a clear-cut conception as to how far they may exercise their respective authorities.
Trans. 7-17-41
No. 136
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #508.
Part 6 of 8.
Before Colonel IWAKURO came here as my assistant, I requested the Army and Navy to send a competent man. I suppose that an understanding was reached between the Foreign and Military officials as to his duties. Thank you for your caution concerning IKAWA. For a time, since the last of last month, there was a misunderstanding between him and the members of our Embassy concerning the handling of intelligences and telegrams. However, since the beginning of this month, under the supervision of IWAKURO, he has been acting as an interpreter and in his contacts with American agents of the inner circle he has been quite zealous and has achieved a great deal. He is continuing his work along these lines. I can assure you that all rumors concerning the undependability of this man are false.
Trans. 7-17-41
No. 137
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 508.
Part 7 of 8.
The foregoing is the explanation of how the word "associates" has been used in connection with our undercover activity. Personally, I saw nothing wrong with the word and was very much grieved to find unexpectedly that in using it I acted against your wishes. The most pressing question before them is whether Japan at this critical moment should adjust her relations with the United States or give up all attempts in this direction for she must at this moment choose either one of these two alternatives. Moreover, if the matter is decided too hastily, the situation is so pressing that a good opportunity might be lost forever. I, therefore, do not wish to waste time at this critical moment bickering over the question of procedure. Besides, for compatriots to be arguing over details and to be casting suspicion on one another in the face of a serious crisis threatening the country would cause the enthusiasm and courage of those who are sincerely working in this matter to wilt, and would interfere with the progress of the negotiations. Since I feel this very keenly, I do not wish to go further into a discussion of details.
Trans. 7-17-41
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No. 138
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #508.
Part 8 of 8.
If, in the negotiations and measures which naturally come within the sphere of my responsibility, you have any faults to find, after negotiations are broken off, since you have not yet seen fit to order me back to Japan, I am determined to exercise my own judgment as to how the final details are disposed of. On these points, at least, I hope that you will trust me for a while. This request is not based upon any willful or dogmatic determination to have my own way in carrying out the high policies of our government, nor is it that I am unwilling to listen to good advice. As I have told you in many telegrams, I have not dealt in any secret talks in the negotiations. On all the proposals I presented them, beforehand I always conferred with the members of the Embassy staff and with the Military and Naval Attachés and got their assistance. I want you please to bear these points in mind.
Trans. 7-17-41
No. 139
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #507.
While Secretary HULL is away recuperating from an illness at a summer resort where the air is better than here in Washington, on the 13th I sent him my good wishes for a quick recovery. On the 14th HAMILTON came to see me on the Secretary's behalf. He said that Mr. HULL thanked me for my solicitude and continued that if there was anything on my mind, whatever it might be, to let him know. I replied: "Well, Premier Konoye and Foreign Minister Matsuoka both equally hope that relations between Japan and the United States can be harmoniously settled. The Ministers of the Army and Navy and other Cabinet members are all agreed on this. Among them there is no difference of opinion. Irresponsible high officials have spread rumors and perhaps officials in the American Embassy in Tokyo have sent in reports which have done harm." HAMILTON then said: "While HULL considers peace desirable between Japan and the United States, he also hopes that Japan will not make war upon other countries." I retorted: "Well, when it comes to that, aren't there rumors that the United States is also getting military bases in other countries?"
For your information.
Trans. 7-18-41
No. 140
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington #364.
(Part 1 of 4)
I have not yet received a reply but in any case, whether they intend this Oral Statement which you have sent me to be a part of the proposal for an understanding or not, it is a detestable document beyond any doubt. For one country to tell another totally independent power
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how its Government should be organized and criticize important elements in that Government and to suggest that this person or that person be eliminated, is unheard of. Under these circumstances, even if we would conclude this understanding, its result would be nil. I might say that it would be a mere phantasm. In the last paragraph just before the note there is something abominable written. They ask that we change the set-up of our Government and its attitude. Such a thing belongs to the realm of the fantastic. If my memory serves me rightly, during the summer of 1905, in connection with the Tangiers Incident, the German Kaiser asked the French to banish THEOPHILE DELCASSE, but France did not listen, of course, and the incident was never settled harmoniously. A country can only tell its dependencies and protectorates such things as that. If you will carefully scrutinize this Oral statement, you can well see that so far as the present government of Japan is concerned, it is enough to cause a rupture in the negotiations.
Trans. 7-15-41
No. 141
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington #364.
(Part 2 of 4)
I, the Foreign Minister, have confidence in the majesty of the Empire of Japan and its basis as an independent nation and I have worried night and day, thinking of every angle in this case because I have hoped to settle the matter pleasantly and without harshness, but this Oral Statement is something which strikes me to the very heart and which I cannot bear. Note the following:
1. This Oral Statement: You, Sir, and your so-called fellow travelers have an attitude which is entirely at variance with the attitude of our present Government and the horrible thing about it is that you have willingly allowed the United States to mold your opinions. Saddest of all, here in Japan you have a few adherents. For the representative of a country to directly oppose the Government he represents is almost unforgivable and I know of no precedent for it in our history. For a representative of a given country to allow foreign leaders to influence him and for him, in turn, to try to influence his Government belongs not only to the realm of the preposterous, but also to that of base rudeness.
2. This Oral Statement! Had I been a proud man on my dignity, when I received this Oral Statement on 8th, Sir, I would have flashed back to you my resentment, but the reason why I have waited until now is that I did not wish to cause hard feelings and wished to avoid offending the Americans in the least. Hopeless as it seemed, I still wished to see something achieved in these negotiations, but when this Oral Statement came, you may be sure that we examined it from every angle. I do not doubt that you have been put out through waiting so long for instructions, but we, too, have had our worries over the matter here.
Trans. 7-15-41
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No. 142
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 364.
(Part 3 of 4)
3. Do you not know that, if the Imperial Government had presented an Oral Statement like this to the American Government, their indignation would have been unimaginable.
4. In my opinion, although it is possible that Japanese-American relations may be adjusted at some time in the remote future, for this sort of hideous document to stand like a shadow between our two nations, would bode neither of us ever any good.
5. For the American Government to even hint that so long as the present Government is not changed in its constituency probably an understanding cannot be established, is inconceivable. The present Cabinet is not by any means ready to consider this proposal seriously. I do not think that the Secretary of State thought quite that far, but, depending upon whether he is sincere and upon how sincere he is, the Imperial Government is disposed to draw up a proposal which we hope will bring a solution to the problem.
Trans. 7-15-41
No. 143
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington #364.
(Part 4 of 4)
Proceeding from this point of view, if the United States will not rescind the Oral Statement, the Japanese Government cannot proceed to consider a plan for an understanding. I feel sure that the American Government would not like to break off with us. I want you please to go to the American officials and tell them that this Oral Statement is extremely hateful to us. Explain to them the position of the Imperial Government and see if you cannot show them what we are trying to have them understand. Most of all, without any delay, be sure to send the Oral Statement back to them with our veto. Tell them that the reason why we waited so long in doing this was because we felt a little delicacy and did not wish to hurt their feelings, and hoped that the matter could be settled without any wrangling.
Well, I am thinking this matter over seriously indeed and in a day or two I will send you a revised proposal of ours, accompanied by a list of whys and wherefores. Will you please explain this to the Secretary of State.
Trans. 7-15-41
A-78
No. 144
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 365.
(Part 1 of 6)
Secret outside the Department. Re your # 424a.
Though their proposals along many important points are extremely divergent from our own, in view of the great importance of Japan-American relationships, we have plumbed the depths in endeavoring to bring about some sort of conciliatory proposals. Making repeated profound studies, we have at long last finally drawn up a series of proposals which have been discussed in secret conclave lasting several days. Through these we have hit finally upon a solution which is in keeping with the plans of the Imperial Japanese Army. This is incorporated in my # 366b. These proposals reflect the maximum limit to which we can comply with the purport of the American proposals. In spite of the fact that the phraseology and gist of the preface, clauses 1, 4 and 6 differ greatly from our proposals, we have decided to adopt them as they stand. However, the other clauses in their proposals, not being in accord with the Empire's fundamental national policy are impossible to accept as they stand, much as I regret it. We have, however, gone to great pains in order to make our revised proposals in detail and in form as closely similar to theirs as is possible. After your Excellency has given those points due consideration, I would like to have you do your very utmost to bring about their acceptance of these proposals. The reasons underlying our revisions are as follows.
_______________
a Ambassador NOMURA wires Tokyo that in an interview with Secretary HULL he made the statement that there seem to be influential people in Japan who do not desire an understanding with the U.S., so, after all, does Japan consider the composure of relations between the two countries so important. Nomura replies that such concessions as the U.S. has so far offered are not worthy of consideration. Nomura also discusses the three important discrepancies in the demands of both sides.
b Japan's revisions of the original text.
Trans. 7-16-41
No. 145
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington #365.
(Part 2 of 6)
2. The attitude of the two countries with regard to the European war.
(a) They will object doubtless in principle to the gist of clause 1 of our original proposals; i.e., that we, together with the United States, would do our utmost to bring about international peace by an early restoration of peace in Europe. We feel that it is absolutely essential that the spirit and object of our activities shall be for the restoration of such a peace, and through from considerations of internal politics this clause should by all means remain in the final text, after considering all possible conciliation to their views, it is felt that the words, "At a fitting opportunity in the future," be inserted in the phrase, "assist in the bringing about of a settlement of the European war". Thus, we will make it easier for them to accept it.
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(b) With regard to clause 2 of our original proposals, as long as we do not abrogate the Tripartite Alliance between Japan, Germany, and Italy, we must insist upon its remaining in the proposals. Further, clause 3, as the United States pointed out, since the agreement has already been publicly announced, it is necessary that this be retained, and there should be no objection to this. It isn't that the Tripartite Alliance is at variance with Japan-American understanding and that this should be made absolutely clear is a major issue in the stand of the Japanese Government. Though I believe that they will permit clauses 2 and 3 to remain in the text, after giving due consideration to the position of the United States, in the light of the temper of their proposals, we will take the first part of clause 2 of those proposals intact and place it in the preface of our revised proposals. Thus, the substance of clause 3 of our first proposal will be incorporated in that clause. We, therefore, can let clause 3 go.
Trans. 7-16-41
No. 146
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington #365.
(Part 3 of 6)
(c) Reviving the fourth clause of our original proposals, that clause being so dependent on (a) and (b), we shall make it the third clause of our revised proposals. In the past, this clause has found its place in the American proposals. With regard to this, since it is tantamount to demanding the revision of the phrase, "that we will not take an aggressive stand," though they may continue to oppose this revised proposal to the bitter end, I do not think that they will. I want you to take steps so that in the minutes of these negotiations, it will be noted that we have again and again, as on this occasion, assumed the position of not approving the unfriendly steps taken by the United States in the past against Germany and Italy.
3. The steps for the bringing about of peace between Japan and China. In referring to these articles and clauses which are of the essence of the Imperial Government's policies toward China, as well as for the establishment of the new order in East Asia, they have consumed much of our attention. It is hard for us to accept the American proposals which would drastically revise the gist of our original proposals. The American proposals reject the tenor of our statements in our original proposals with regard to the fundamental agreement between Japan and China and the tenor of the joint declaration by Japan, Manchukuo, and China. In view of the fact that in the statement, "Peace negotiations shall be carried out with the Chinese Government" (It is clear that they mean the CHIANG regime), they demand that we nullify our achievements thus far, as well as our policy of regarding the Chungking Government as merely a regional regime. On the other hand, though it is thought that much confusion would be brought about by leaving out such important matters as joint anti-Communistic endeavors, the independence of Far Eastern countries, (?) and other things which make for the survival of the people of the Far East and the safety of our Empire, we have deleted phrases and clauses from our original proposals with little consideration. Thus, we have, by incorporating limited revisions of their proposals, tried to bring about a conciliatory settlement.
Trans. 7 -18-41
A-80
No. 147
FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington #365.
(Part 4 of 6)
Thus, the statement in the revised proposal "regulations and terms already put into effect on the basis of this principle" means comprehensively, an agreement between Japan, and a joint declaration on the part of Japan, Manchukuo and China. But since we saw that if we made this too obvious we could not get their approval, we decided to put it into less conspicuous phraseology.
Furthermore, in our revised proposal we are avoiding using the title "Chungking (?) Government," which the Americans did not like in our first proposal. You know how we, on the other hand, detest the phrase "Government of China;" so that is why we have chosen to use such a simple and vague expression as "the CHIANG regime." We hope that this will be agreeable to both sides. Finally, in our first proposal, we merely wished to inform the United States that we earnestly desired peace negotiations with China. We merely asked them to intervene with CHIANG KAI-SHEK. That did not mean that we wished to conclude an agreement with the United States concerning peace with China. The Chinese Incident cannot and must not be decided through the intervention of any third country .That has been, is, and will always, be our irrevocable policy. Thus, the "annex" to the American proposal must all be eliminated.
I want you to be sure to get a promise from the United States that if CHIANG will not listen to their warning, they will stop assisting him in any way.
Trans. 7-16-41
No. 148
FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington #365.
(Part 5 of 6)
4. Commerce between both countries. In the revised proposal we accept this clause bodily from the American proposal. Our own first proposal will be entirely forgotten. However, if we let that "annex" stand, our commercial dealings with the United States might fall back into the same state they were before the incident. We need, for our National Defense and for the development of our industries, military goods and other important commodities from the United States, and if the "annex" stood, these could not be obtained and they might lay further embargoes and limitations against us. This would stand as a great obstacle in the way of an improvement in the commercial relations between our two countries. That is why we eliminated it.
5. Economic activities of the two countries in the Pacific area. We have changed the Pacific Area which they mention in their proposal to "Southwestern Pacific" (in the preface we made the same change), thus restoring our first proposal. That is because the area where we feel the need of cooperation is specifically the Southwestern Pacific. That is the area where we need to cooperate as I say, but that does not mean that we desire or need any pact concerning this matter. Therefore, the American proposal is totally and abso-
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lutely at variance with our own. Thus, we will insist upon our first proposal. However, your message # 234a reveals some changes which the United States already seems willing to make, so I do not suppose that they will object very much.
_______________
a The text of the Proposal for an Understanding between the United States and Japan dated (April 17, 1941).
Trans. 7-16-41
No. 149
FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington #365.
(Part 6 of 6)
6. The policy of both countries relative to the political stability of the Pacific Area. We have revised our first proposal concerning the Philippines, mentioned in clauses 1 and 2 of the 6th article of the American proposal. The question of Philippine independence is a question concerning the United States alone. We are not in a position to interfere in this matter, but yet that area comes under our East Asia Area of Co-prosperity. Therefore, they must guarantee the independence of these Islands and friendly treatment to Japanese residents. It is our mission to see that the various races of East Asia prosper and receive good treatment. Therefore, we wish assurance from the United States on these points. As I said, while we do appreciate the position of the United States, if this understanding is to be concluded, it is only natural that the United States must also consider our point of view. As for clause 3 concerning the immigration question, we have restored our proposal. That is because we cannot disregard the welfare of our own country in order to adjust our relations with the United States. We consider the position of the United States and know that such matters as this have to be submitted to Parliaments. Therefore, we have changed the expression "will give indiscriminatory treatment" to "the American Government will endeavor to give indiscriminatory treatment."
ADDENDUM
We have restored our first proposal. However, we do not think that any explanation is necessary.
Trans. 7-16-41
No. 150
FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington #366.
(Part 1 of 3)
(To be kept secret within the Department).
1. Above "Tiaheiyo Chiiki" (Pacific Area) in the 5th article listed in the beginning of the American proposal, we will add the two words "nansei" (Southwestern) and clause 7 of the American proposal will not be an independent section, but it will rather be made (b) of clause 6. (See clause 6 of the basic proposal.)
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2. Clause 2. The attitude of the Governments of the two nations concerning the European war.
(a) We will make a number of revisions in the first clause of the first Japanese proposal and restore it as the first clause. It reads "The Governments of Japan and the United States will have as their joint objective the bringing about of world peace and when a suitable opportunity comes to prevent the expansion of the European war, both countries will work together for the restoration of an immediate peace."
(b) We will revise the second clause of the first Japanese proposal and leave it as the second clause. We will eliminate the first clause of the American Proposal. Thus: The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Agreement was and is defensive and designed to prevent the participation of nations in the European war not at present involved in it, but if unfortunately the European war expands, the Japanese Government will carry out its treaty obligations and, with solely the safety and welfare of the nation in mind, decide upon her attitude.
Trans. 7-16-41
No. 151
FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington #366.
(Part 2 of 3)
(c) We eliminate clause 3 of our revised proposal.
(d) We restore clause 4 of our revised proposal and eliminate clause 2 of the American proposal.
(e) We eliminate the note at the end of the American proposal.
3. Article 3. Steps for the restoration of peace between Japan and China.
We will revise this and eliminate the statement under Article 3 and also "The Japanese Government wishes to point out clearly that the basic principles relative to the settlement of the China incident do not conflict either with the principles revealed in Premier KONOYE's statement or with agreements and other measures which Japan has already effected. The President of the United States will request that the CHIANG KAI SHEK Regime, in order to bring about an amicable settlement to the war and peaceful relations, begin negotiations with the Japanese Government," and -----.
4. Clause 5. The economic activity of the two nations in the Pacific Area.
This will be revised as follows: "Inasmuch as it has been clearly indicated that economic activity of the United States and of Japan in the southwest Pacific should be carried on by a peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of non-discriminatory treatment in international trade, the Japanese Government and the United States Government shall cooperate in the production and acquirement of natural resources in that area which the two nations desire (such, for example, as petroleum, rubber, tin, and nickel).
Trans. 7-16-41
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No. 152
FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) July 14, 1941
TO: Washington #366.
(Part 3 of 3)
5. Article 6. The policy of both countries with reference to the political stability of the Pacific Area.
(1) We will make the American revised proposal the first clause as it stands, and place (a) at the heading.
(2) Concerning the Philippines, we will revive our first proposal and place (b) at the heading.
(3) Third clause ((c) The Government of the United States will consider the Japanese immigrants in the United States in a friendly manner, and endeavor to grant them the same non-discriminatory treatment as other nations). This stipulation may be made a separate agreement.)
Article 6. ADDENDUM.
The last sentence in the last paragraph of the addendum to our first proposal (i.e., The scope for the application of this agreement, ----- and the period of validity will be agreed upon by the governments of both nations) will be appended to the revised proposal.
Trans. 7-16-41
No. 153
FROM: Tokyo July 16, 1941
TO: Washington No number.
To Counselor IGUCHI from Chief of American Division of Foreign Ministry, TERASAKI.
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, who understood the American Oral Statement to mean that the United States is demanding that we revise our present cabinet, wrote my # 364a as well as # 365b with his own hand. How about asking Ambassador Nomura to wire him back this explanation immediately: "There are many rumors at present to the effect that the Secretary of State and the other officials did not mean the Oral Statement to be taken in such a way as that. Its object was only to dispel opposition to an adjustment of Japanese-American relations within the United States. The Oral Statement was designed purely and simply to route opposition. It had no other meaning."
Let this matter be between you and me because I have taken it upon myself to wire you this.
______________
a II, 140-143.
b II, 144-149
Trans. (Not dated)
No. 154
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 520.
On the evening of the 15th, both HAMILTON and BALLANTINE called on me. Saying that they had come in compliance with the desire of the Secretary of State who is now convalescing,
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they stated: "We are now having a series of conferences to discuss questions centering on maintenance of peace in the Pacific. However, we are in receipt recently of information to the effect that Japan is going to acquire naval and air bases in French Indo-China. We would like to know the truth of all this." I replied: "I, too, know nothing about this question except what I have read in newspapers. By assistance being given by both Britain and the United States to Chungking; by the cooperation effected between the United States and Soviet Russia, Japan is gradually being encircled. Under such circumstances it is not at all surprising to me that such rumors are current at this time. When you realize that the United States has actually occupied Iceland and when it is rumored that she is about to put her hand on Dakar and the Azores, it would not seem strange at all if Japan should do what she is reported to be planning. However, I will give you a reply after I have asked my Government about it." They next asked: "Has Japan, in addition to the Alliance Agreement, a special understanding with Germany and Italy whereby she will fight against the United States in case the latter enters the war?" To this I replied: I don't think there is such an agreement, but in such an event, the duties specified in the third clause of the Alliance Agreement will come into effect and as to what these duties really are, I don't see that there is any need of asking Tokyo about them; they are included in the agreement. I once told Secretary HULL that the Japanese Government will not be able to tell whether what the United States will do in the future will be entirely in the nature of self-defense, and, so, would have to consider each move individually. The United States is, from the standpoint of national defense, the safest of all countries and has little danger of being invaded by another country. Having a special relation with Canada; with Mexico in a position similar to Manchukuo; and with the countries north, as well as south of Panama coming under her influence, the question of safety from the viewpoint of national defense is not such that can/be discussed in comparison with that of Japan."
I then repeated what I had once discussed with Secretary HULL, whereupon they spoke of ----- of Secretary HULL.
Trans. 7-18-41
No. 155
FROM: Tokyo July 16, 1941
TO: Washington #377.
Re my # 365a.
It has been confidentially decided that the present cabinet must go; therefore, before it is dissolved, I desire that you dispose of the matter of the Oral Statement and put this question to an end without a second's delay. Please carry out my instructions.
________________
a See II, 144-149, inclusive.
Trans. 7-16-41
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No. 156
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #529.
(Strictly Secret).
To the Vice-Minister from WAKASUGI, concerning the Japanese-American conversations here in Washington. In glancing through your various messages, I can see that the home office entertains certain misconceptions concerning the nature of these talks. The worry you seem to entertain over the associates on the drafting committee and the oral statement seems to be based upon these misconceptions. So that things may proceed better in the future, I mention the following for your information. These are the facts, so please make them known to the Foreign Minister also. When we began these parleys, in view of the internal situation here, we saw that we could not make progress or get the desired effects by official diplomatic negotiations. Therefore, we took what might be called the "nimble road" and enlisted the cooperation of influential Americans in undercover activities, at the same time having Ambassador NOMURA carry on a number of entirely unofficial talks with Secretary HULL. These talks were entirely off the record, and opinions were freely exchanged. We were agreed that as soon as we found ourselves on common ground to turn these conversations into official negotiations. We thought that if no unanimity could be attained, it would be as though these talks had never existed. Secretary HULL, himself, said that these exchanges of opinion were not negotiations. As for the scene where they took place, the State Department was avoided and, as you know from various messages from here, the meetings took place in Secretary HULL 's apartment. What I say is further clarified by the fact that at the head of all the proposals advanced by both sides, the words "Unofficial, Explanatory, and without Commitment" were clearly written. You gentlemen seem to have made the mistake of thinking that these written memoranda constituted what is tantamount to official negotiations. In Part 2, paragraph 4 of your # 365a, you say "Please have this written down in the minutes of the negotiations." This shows that you did not understand. It seems that you also misinterpreted the explanatory statement contained in my # 528b. In order to sound out the outlook, in addition to members of your staff, we did use under-cover agents. If we view this from the standpoint of normal diplomatic procedure, this may have been a questionable activity, but as I told you earlier in this message, in view of circumstances we were forced to take the "nimble road." I must say, however, that in view of the way things have turned out, no advantage has accrued to us. I would further say that in view of the present Chinese situation, we could not hope to get anywhere.
Well, that is how it is. Dissatisfied as you may be over certain phases of what has taken place, though I am sorry, we did the best we could, and it is too late now to retrace our steps, so please give us due consideration.
_______________
a See II, 144-149 incl., in which MATSUOKA gives the reasons underlying Japanese revisions of the American proposal.
b Not available.
Trans. 7-22-41
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No. 157
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 540.
(In 5 parts-complete.)
(Foreign Office Secret.)
1. I assume, of course, that there is no change of policy in the new Cabinet in so far as its desire is to improve Japanese-U. S. relations on a fair basis. I would, however, appreciate your giving your attention once again to my messages pertaining to this matter as well as the points listed below. In that light, I would appreciate your giving the matter your consideration and instructions.
2. I have given my undivided attention to the matter contained in your message # 366a. Through discussions and thought we have given this problem it is now clear to see that there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the two countries. In view of this fact, we doubt that the proposal referred to above will lead to an understanding.
Bearing that in mind, will you please advise me of your opinion on the following points.
(a) The matter pertaining to the attitudes of the two countries concerning the war in Europe.
(1) Joint mediation to bring about the return of peace in Europe:
They claim that the President does not wish to say at this time that the two countries wish to mediate in the European war to bring about peace. For this reason, he opposes the insertion of this into the "understanding" as an expression of the attitude of the two countries.
After discussing the matter with them several times, we finally came to an agreement to delete that part (paragraph 3) and insert in its place the words: "Encourage world peace". With this compromise, that point was settled for the time being.
I do not believe that it would be wise to bring up the matter again for I feel that we would encounter considerable difficulty in gaining our point. (It is quite possible that this point could be left out entirely without impairing the main objective of improving Japanese-U. S. relations.)
(2) The rights of self defense:
They wish to make the wording of the paragraph on self defense as elastic as possible so that it may be applied on anyone of various possible developments in the war in Europe. It is apparently their intention to utilize this paragraph to prevent us from fulfilling our treaty obligations.
We cannot, of course, permit the possibility of leaving room for such an interpretation of self defense. They insist that the term "aggressive military action" is too ambiguous. We, on the other hand, have been insisting that the simple expression "self defense" was insufficient, for in this day and age an all out war may be launched in the name of self defense. The Understanding Agreement cannot contain expressions which can be given such interpretations, we have been claiming.
On the other hand, neither the United States nor Japan wants restrictions placed on its maneuverability in behalf of a real defensive action, because of the Understanding Pact. I believe that it would be to our country's interest to compromise on some wording which would prevent aggressive action but at the same time would in no way hinder action in behalf of self defense. It is clear, of course, that the interpretation given by the United States to date is entirely unacceptable to us.
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(b) Matters pertaining to the China Incident.
Translator's note: from here to Paragraph 3 badly garbled.
With regard to this point, they as may be seen clearly by their proposal, they insist that unless we come to an agreement with regard to the contents of the "annex" it would be just wasting time to discuss the contents of the actual proposal. It is clear that they will refuse to accept our suggestion that the annex simply be deleted and that we plunge into discussions on the actual formula of the proposed agreement.
They take the position that as long as they are asked to advise China to negotiate a peace, they (the United States) should be advised of the basis on which a peace settlement is to be made.
I do not believe that we will be able to continue the discussions if we insist upon deleting the annex. Furthermore, if we do begin discussion on the contents of the annex, I expect to be asked some difficult questions with regard to the stationing of anti-Communist troops and the nondiscrimination among business firms. I expect this to be particularly true of the former question and would appreciate being advised of the government's attitude once again.
3. You are aware, of course, difficulties are to be expected during the discussions on our deleting the annex to the paragraph on trade between the two countries; giving our nationals the same treatment in the Philippines as the Filipinos, as was demanded in our proposal in the paragraph pertaining to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific; and the matter pertaining to our U.S. emigration.
It is my opinion that we could find a way to agree on the matter pertaining to self defense. At the same time, the matter pertaining to our garrisoning troops to combat communism, which is an essential point to us since it is one of our basic principles, is going to be a harder problem. The crux of the situation is to find just the wording in both instances, to make them acceptable to both parties concerned. I feel that those are going to be the most difficult points to agree upon.
If we are able to make a peaceful penetration of French Indo-China, I do not believe that it will cause undue excitement here. If, on the other hand, we have to resort to military force, these negotiations will undoubtedly come to an end.
Secretary Hull is expected back on about next Sunday. I plan to visit Admiral Pratt's home in Maine, at his invitation. I, therefore, would appreciate your advising me of your opinions on the matters contained in this message, during next week.
______________
a List of deletions, additions, and revisions in the Jap & U.S. proposals for an Understanding Pact, to which the Jap Foreign Office has agreed.
Trans. 7-22-41
FROM: Washington July 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 545.
At the request of Acting Secretary of State Welles, Wakasugi called on him on the 21st. (The Ambassador is expected back in Washington tomorrow morning.) Welles said that he has been giving careful study to recent world conditions. He had asked Wakasugi to come to his
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office, he said, so that he could express the opinions reached by Secretary Hull and himself, in the light of recent world developments, regarding the unofficial discussions which have been taking place for the past several months between the Ambassador and Secretary Hull.
After thus prefacing his remarks, the Undersecretary said that the real objectives, set up by the Ambassador, Wakasugi, et al., of the Japanese-U. S. conversations, were identical to those towards which the Secretary was striving.
According to information received from various sources in various areas, he continued, there are definite indications that Japan is planning to take some steps very shortly which would upset the peaceful status of certain areas. If these reports are based on fact, he said, there would be a conflict between Japanese acts and the gist of the Ambassador's intentions expressed during the conversations.
Recently when the Ambassador met with him, Welles said, Japan's position was discussed. In the course of those conversations, the Ambassador claimed that Britain, the United States and other nations were applying the pressure on Japan, and described this as an "encirclement" of Japan. This expression is identical to that employed earlier by Germany, he pointed out.
As a matter of fact, the Undersecretary continued, the above was clearly a misunderstanding on the part of Japan, because the United States has no such intentions as those Japan apparently feels. It is because the United States wishes to maintain peace between the two countries that she has been continuing the talks.
He went on by saying that the advices received were to the effect that Japan would take the southern portion of French Indo-China by force within the next few days. Such an act would definitely be in violation with the spirit of the Japanese-U. S. conversations which are being conducted in behalf of maintaining peace in the Pacific.
That is the American viewpoint, he said, but he would appreciate being advised of the Japanese viewpoint.
Wakasugi, therefore, replied that he was well aware of the fact that the Ambassador and the Secretary were conducting negotiations aimed at improving U.S.-Japanese relations, and that he, himself, prays that they will succeed. By "a reliable source of information", Wakasugi asked, did the Undersecretary mean the U.S. Embassy in Japan? To this, avoiding a clear answer, Welles merely replied that the report was an accurate one.
Wakasugi then said that he would relay the information contained in the report referred to the Ambassador. In the meantime, he said, he would like to make an inquiry, as one emanating purely from himself and one which in no way should be considered an official one. Assuming, Wakasugi said, that Japan is planning to make a move in the manner described by the Undersecretary in some direction, what effect would that have on the U.S.-Japanese discussions which were being conducted?
Welles replied that such an act on the part of Japan would be in direct conflict with the spirit of the discussions. So saying, he implied that further discussion would be in vain. On the other hand, he continued, he had been led to understand that the new Foreign Minister of Japan was a close friend of Ambassador Nomura. Moreover, in view of the fact that very little time had elapsed since the new Cabinet was installed, probably it had not decided upon any definite policy as yet. In view of this fact the United States would patiently await developments before taking any steps to halt the discussions.
Wakasugi told Welles that he would report this conversation to the Ambassador in detail, and withdrew.
Trans. 7-25-41
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No. 159
FROM: Washington July 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 555.
(In 2 parts-complete.)
Since Wakasugi had called on the Acting Secretary of State, as reported in my message #545a, I called on Welles myself this afternoon. I explained to him that our southern occupation was absolutely essential from the standpoint of national security and economic safety. I further pointed out the impossibility of Japan to pursue a "do nothing" policy in the face of the embargoes being clamped down against her by various countries, for such a policy would lead to national suicide.
After carefully explaining the above situation, I said that according to press reports the French Indo-China affair was apparently being carried out peacefully with the full approval of the Vichy government. I added that in view of those circumstances, it was my hope that the government of the United States would restrain itself from jumping to hasty conclusions, and instead would watch the trend of further developments for a little while yet.
I told him that I feared considerable repercussions among the general public, if measures such as an export embargo on oil is put into effect at a time such as this.
The new Cabinet in Japan, I advise the Undersecretary, is as anxious to bring the U.S.-Japanese "Understanding Pact" to a successful conclusion, as was the previous cabinet.
To the above, the Undersecretary replied that he would not reiterate his statements to Wakasugi. He could not, he said, reconcile the Japanese policy with regard to French Indo-China with the basic principles of the plans being discussed by Secretary Hull and myself. Neither Great Britain nor the United States had any intention of attacking French Indo-China, he said. The consensus here is, he said, that Vichy's submission came as a result of pressure from Hitler and that Japan intends to use French Indo-China as a base from which to make further southward moves.
The U.S. Government, he continued, has not for the past many years made any hasty conclusions. Her actions are governed by Japan's policies.
Although he did not mention what steps the United States is planning to take in the future, he did say, as I was about to depart, that Secretary Hull was expected back at his desk very shortly and that he would no doubt welcome an opportunity to discuss matters with me.
In reply to my inquiry, the Undersecretary said that traffic through the Canal has been indefinitely suspended while it is undergoing repairs. He asserted that no particular nation was suffering discriminatory action.
(Time at present: 2130.)
_________________
a Acting Secretary Welles, in a requested interview with Japanese Minister Wakasugi, states that the reported aggressive move by Japan toward F. I-C. would violate the basis of proposed understanding with Japan. Requests Japanese statement of intentions. Wakasugi asks for source of Welles information and is told that "it is accurate".
Trans. 7-29-41
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No. 160
FROM: Tokyo July 23, 1941
TO: Washington #396.
(Foreign Office Secret.)
Re my # 368a.
As the result of our negotiations with the Vichy government, we were able to come to an understanding on the 24th, with regard to jointly defending French Indo-China. Under these terms, we are to peacefully occupy the southern part of French Indo-China on or about 28 or 29 July. (These dates are for your information only .)
Please, therefore, advise the government of the United States along the lines contained in my message referred to in the heading and that you have been informed by this Minister that in spite of this occupation,
(1) The territorial sovereignty of French Indo-China will be respected by Japan;
(2) There will be no interference in the domestic administration of French Indo-China;
(3) There has been no letup in interest on the part of Japan in the discussions concerning U.S.-Japanese understanding being conducted unofficially between the Secretary of State and yourself. Rather, it is because we desire it so highly, that we make this report.
Please make these points clear to the government of the United States.
_____________
a Tokyo informs Washington of the contemplated negotiations with France for establishment of Jap naval and air bases in F .I-C.
Trans. 7-24-41
No. 161
FROM: Tokyo July 23, 1941
TO: Washington #397.
Regarding your message # 545 [a].
1. You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined upon a definite policy because of the fact that I have not been in office very long.
As was pointed out in my message # 368 [b], our occupation of French Indo-China was unavoidable. This step had been decided upon by the Cabinet even before I assumed office. It is to be carried out peacefully for the purpose of jointly defending French Indo-China. It is my intention to continue to make an effort to decrease the friction between Japan and .Britain-U. S.
Should the U.S., however, take steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (such as closing of for all practical purposes and the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the United States of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation.
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2. Please carefully reread messages Nos. 368b and 396c, and make an effort to improve the situation.
3. With regard to your message # 536 ----- (last 13 groups garbled) .
______________
a Wakasugi reports conversation with Under-secretary Welles.
b Tokyo informs Washington of the contemplated negotiations with France for establishment of Jap naval and air bases in French Indo-China.
c See II, 160.
Trans. 7-25-41
No. 162
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 24, 1941
TO: Washington #401.
(Secret outside the Department.)
Re my #396a.
The Imperial Government will issue the statement contained in the separate telegram #402b at noon of the 26th, Tokyo time (10:00 P.M. of the 26th your time). A statement will be given to the United States Ambassador in Tokyo at 9:00 A.M. on the same day, so will you confidentially transmit the statement to the United States Government at 6:00 P .M. on the 25th.
_____________
a See II, 160.
b Tokyo wires Washington the increasingly intimate relations between Vichy and Tokyo, see II, 164.
Trans. 7-28-41
No. 163
FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941
TO: Washington #403.
Re my # 68a
Representations were made to the Vichy Government on July 14, and again on July 20. The French accepted all of the Japanese demands on July 21, with final arranging of details and the signing of the agreement at Hanoi on July 23. The public announcement will be made on July 26, noon (Japanese time). You will be advised of the contents of the agreement by special message # 404b.
This message has also been separately sent to England.
_______________
a In which Tokyo informs Washington that within the next few days, commercial negotiations between Japan and the Vichy Government will begin.
b II, 165.
Trans. 7-28-41
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No. 164
FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941
TO: Washington #402.
Secret Outside the Department.
Statement of the Imperial Government:
Beginning with the conversations which began between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and Ambassador HENRI last August, several agreements have been reached between Japan and France whereby recently Franco-Japanese relations have quickly become more intimate. Now, once again concerning the joint defense of French Indo-China, the Governments of the two nations have agreed on a friendly policy.
The Imperial Government is determined to maintain the various understandings existing between Tokyo and Vichy. The responsibility of the Imperial Government, based upon its solemn promise to support the territorial integrity and sovereignty of France, will be maintained and hereafter we will endeavor to increase a relationship of amity between our two countries and thus strive to achieve joint prosperity for both.
Trans. 7-25-41
No. 165
FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941
TO: Washington #404.
Separate Message.
(Part 1 of 2)
1. On the 14th Ambassador KATO interviewed Foreign Minister DARLAN and presented to him the demands of the Imperial Government concerning joint protection of French Indo-China and military cooperation, saying that we would like to have the French reply by the 19th. Then on the 15th Ambassador KATO interviewed PETAIN and transmitted to him a message from Premier KONOYE, making the same request. Again, on the 16th, he interviewed DARLAN and requested an immediate reply from Vichy.
2. On the 19th, at the request of DARLAN, Ambassador KATO had another meeting with him. At that time the French reply was that this demand on the part of Japan, because of its very nature, required contact and consultation with Germany, with whom France has an armistice agreement and that unless this took place France herself was not in a position to make any decision. DARLAN replied that within a few days he would be in a position to submit a definite answer.
3. Regarding this as a design to hold us off on the pretext of France's armistice agreement with Germany and Italy, on the 20th we had Ambassador KATO return to DARLAN and demand that he accept our proposals in toto. After this conversation he held another talk with BUNOIR-MESSIEN and, as a result, discovered that France was inclined to accept the demands of Japan. On the 21st at noon DARLAN submitted an official reply.
4. In this official reply it was stated: (1) The French Government cannot but submit to the demands of the Japanese Government.
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(2) The French Government guarantees joint defense of French Indo-China on the basis of cooperation with the Japanese Government; however, she will not participate in aggressive war.
(3) As soon as informed of the locales wherein Japanese troops will be stationed, France will evacuate them.
(4) The Japanese Government will make public a declaration that she will respect the territorial integrity of Indo-China and French sovereignty over the Indo-Chinese Federation, and will make this statement at the earliest possible moment.
Trans. 7-25-41
No. 166
FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941
TO: Washington #404.
(Part 2 of 2)
5. When he submitted this reply, DARLAN stated: "The reason why we used the words, 'cannot but submit to the demands of the Japanese Government,' is this: We are now resisting the British forces in Syria and, if it appeared that Japan was taking advantage of this situation to grab French Indo-China, criticism both at home and abroad would be heaped upon our heads and we merely wished to avoid this. Another important point is this: Japan must not demand the retirement of French Indo-Chinese troops now in French Indo-China, nor confiscate the material the French troops are now using, nor must she demand their complete withdrawal. If at present it were ordered that French troops withdraw from the areas where they are now stationed, they would be infuriated and, as a result, unfortunate incidents would probably ensue. This point must be given special consideration."
6. Regarding this as an acceptance in toto, Ambassador KATO handed the Foreign Minister a memorandum which he had prepared and stated that he would like to send in news to Tokyo that France had accepted our proposition and that he would like to have this accord written down in black and white in an official document. Thereupon he also handed DARLAN a protocol proposal and the suggested text for a public announcement. This correspondence was finished on the 22nd, but before that, on the 21st at noon, the text of the French reply was affixed and we accepted the following incidental terms and desires of the French:
(1) Support on the part of the Japanese Government for supplementary defensive measures of the French Indo-China troops.
(2) Continued use of the existent military facilities by the French Indo-Chinese forces.
(3) A statement as early as possible from the Imperial Government to the effect that the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and French sovereignty will be respected.
(4) The term concerning the temporary evacuation of French Indo-Chinese troops shall be eliminated.
We affixed these four terms and began detailed negotiations in French Indo-China. As a result, an agreement was signed in Hanoi on the 23rd in the presence of Rear Admiral (?) SUMITA and Governor General DE COUX.
(Our army is scheduled to move in on the 28th and 29th. This is for your information only.)
Trans. 7-25-41
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No. 167
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 24, 1941
TO: Washington #405.
(Secret outside the Department)
Re your # 5504.
As I have reported to you in my # 368b, the steps we have taken in regard to French Indo-China were not taken with the intention, as the United States Government alleges, to occupy that country; it was really a matter of necessity for the fact of peace in the Pacific. Is it not clear that we are endeavoring to maintain peace in that area from the peaceful attitude our government took in the face of the fact that the negotiations with French Indo-China, long drawn-out affair that it was, had ended unsatisfactorily and as a result caused public opinion to be excited considerably? To say, as the Americans are saying, that we had informed the Axis powers that the Japanese-American negotiations were only a side-talk which was the last until Japan completed her southward advance is indeed far from the fact (my #329a). This is all the more true in regards to the allegation that Japan was intending to wreck these negotiations. This is carrying falsehood to the limit. Although those who want to profit by falsehood make the insinuation that the recent political change in Japan was due to United States pressure (the Oral Statement is implied), the Japanese Government has become, as it were, one body and as such is eagerly wishing that the Japanese-American negotiations would be continued. On the basis of my past telegram and ----- telegram, I gave the time in my # 401c as 6:00 P .M. of the 25th, but I would like to have you explain at once to the United States Government our real intention in regard to the French Indo-China question as well as the purport of my # 406d.
_______________
a Not available.
b Tokyo wires Washington the reasons for and intentions of her demands on Vichy.
c See II, 160.
d See II, 168.
Trans. 7-25-41
No. 168
FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941
TO: Washington #406.
Secret outside the Department.
Re my # 397a.
That the leaders of the United States Government will at this time display a high degree of statesmanship is what I am secretly hoping for the sake of maintaining peace in the Pacific. The Japanese Government would do likewise and would like to reciprocate. However, according to information received by us lately, especially according to newspaper reports, there is the possibility of the United States freezing Japanese funds or of instituting a general embargo on petroleum, thus strongly stimulating public opinion in Japan. Should this plan of freezing Japanese funds be put into effect, it would have an adverse effect on many aspects of our domestic life and might compel us to resort to diverse retaliatory measures. This would lead to a
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breakdown of Japanese-American economic relations and we cannot be certain that it would not in turn hasten the development of the worst situation. Will you please get in touch with Finance Official NISHIYAMA and, in accordance with the contents of the caption telegram, request the United States Government to favorably treat this question.
______________
a Not available.
Trans. 7-25-41
No. 169
FROM: Tokyo July 25, 1941
TO: Washington #408.
(Separate cable)
Financial Ministry message # 34.
Because relations between the United States and Japan have become exceedingly critical recently, the Foreign Minister instructed Ambassador Nomura, last night, to request the government of the United States to act with the utmost caution where any application of pressure, such as freezing of assets, against Japan is involved. Will you please be advised of the various points listed below and, after establishing close connection with the Ambassador, take appropriate steps.
Recently, when the assets of Germany and Italy were frozen, Japan was excepted from this ruling. Although, in view of the present trade conditions between the two countries, there was absolutely nothing extraordinary in this attitude of the United States, still we wish to express our appreciation because we feel that the government of the United States acted in an exceedingly courteous manner .
Once again, however, rumors of freezing of Japanese assets have flared up of late. We are of course in the dark as to whether there is any basis of fact in these rumors. If by any chance, these rumors are found to be well based, we shall be forced, though reluctantly, to take retaliatory measures. These will include the non-payment of principal and interest on debts in the United States as well as to freeze all of the American property in Japan. (Refer to Financial Ministry Message # 33a.) This will, of course, lead to exceedingly unfavorable economic conditions between the two countries, and, depending on subsequent developments, may lead to complete collapse of Japanese-U. S. economic relations. If the trend in that direction continues, it is hard to even imagine what the ultimate outcome will be.
In view of the possibilities of exceedingly grave consequences of effectuating this move, will you please urge the leaders of the Treasury Department, which will be responsible for any such move, to give this matter their deep consideration. We pray that through cooperative action we shall be able to prevent Japanese-U. S. relations from becoming any worse.
_______________
a Not available.
Trans. 7-26-41
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No. 170
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #565.
(Part 1 of 2)
Feeling the urgency of the situation on the occasion of a luncheon alone with the Chief of the Operations Section, I asked him to procure for me a conference with the President. Today at 5:00 P .M. I had a secret meeting with President ROOSEVELT. In conformity with your several instructions, I explained that because of economic considerations and the necessity of stabilizing the situation in that area, the measures we took were absolutely necessary. I pointed out that our intentions are to respect territorial integrity and sovereignty and said that the present cabinet also is eager for a Japanese-American understanding. Finally, I urged him for the sake of maintaining peace in the Pacific, to exercise a high order of statesmanship. The President replied, "Already the people have been strongly insisting that an embargo on oil should be put into effect against Japan, but in spite of this, I urged them to keep calm, saying that it was necessary in order to keep peace in the Pacific, but now I can no longer use this thesis." The President then hinted that an embargo on oil might be imminent.
(This message sent at 8:00 P .M.)
Trans. 7-26-41
No. 171
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 565.
(Part 2 of 2)
The President told me the gist of the statement issued by the State Department today, the 24th, and clarified the views of the American Government. Prefacing his statement by declaring that there is a feeling that the time is already late and that he had not already conferred on this matter with the State Department, he continued, "if there is some method whereby French Indo-China can be evacuated and if the various countries can (as heretofore) guarantee its neutrality and if all countries can equitably have free access to materials from French Indo-China, I will spare no effort. I myself am extremely sympathetic with Japan in her need of procuring materials." Well, I got the impression that some economic pressure is going to be exerted immediately. Undersecretary WELLES and the Chief of the Operations Section were invited and sat with us.
Trans. 7-26-41
No. 172
FROM: Washington July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo #566.
During my conversation with the President yesterday, the following points were brought out:
1. The President said that world subjugation was Hitler's aim. (When I saw the President on 14 March he said the same thing. On that occasion the opinion of the Secretary of State who
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was also present was sought. The Secretary replied that was indeed the truth of the matter.) After Europe would come Africa, the President said, and after that there would be no stopping him. That being the case, the time may come when Japan would be fighting on the same side as the United States, he said.
In reply to this, I told the President that there is an old Japanese proverb which goes as follows: "If a country likes to fight, it is already on the brink of being destroyed", I added that the sword is purely an instrument with which to prevent damage or destruction.
2. Since the President's tone seemed to imply that our occupation of French Indo-China was done under pressure from Germany, I advised the President that there had been no German pressure, and that Japan had acted entirely on its own accord.
On the surface, the President accepted this explanation. However, as you are aware, the general public in the United States is convinced that Japan in cooperation with Germany, or independently of her, is awaiting the opportunity to move southward and northward.
Trans. 7-30-41
No. 173
FROM: Tokyo July 27, 1941
TO: Washington # 413.
Please report on your conversation with the President of the 24th in further detail.
Trans. 7-29-41
No. 174
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 589.
(Part 1 of 5)
Re your # 413a.
When I talked to President ROOSEVELT, I held in my hand a memorandum which I had prepared in Japanese. I spoke with the President as follows in English, in which OBATA had carefully coached me before my visit.
1. "The reasons why we occupied French Indo-China are: (a) To obtain the foodstuffs of French Indo-China which are necessary to the economic existence of Japan. When we think of the economic measures which the various nations are now taking (waxing of the economic war) and of the new order to come, if we Japanese stood idly by with folded arms, we would be crushed while sitting down.
(b) From the point of view of our own security, if French Indo-China the sphere of influence of some third country, we would be in danger. Therefore, we are preparing jointly to defend it and thereby stabilize our Empire's relations with its homeland.
(c) The occupation of French Indo-China will take place peaceably, and Japan will respect territorial integrity and sovereignty. It is desirable that the United States recognize these facts and take no too extreme attitude.
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a II, 173.
Trans. 7-31-41
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No. 175
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 589.
(Part 2 of 5)
2. The kind of understanding which I have been negotiating with HULL, of course, had the maintenance of peace in the Pacific as its object. During the negotiations I said:
"(1) I am very sorry to note that you doubt the sincerity of our Government but the fact is that the Japanese Government is all the time desiring it and the present cabinet has already on two different occasions issued instructions for this purpose.
"(2) Among the difficult points, as regard to the question of self-defense, we continue to hope that somehow the difficulties involved will be overcome and a compromise arrived at. While it is logical for a country to exercise its legitimate right of defense when it has been unjustifiably reproached, the question as to what constitutes exercise of the right of self-defense, I believe, would naturally have to be decided after a peaceful relation has been restored."
Trans. 7-30-41
No. 176
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 589.
(Part 3 of 5)
"The stationing of troops in a part of China is not of a permanent nature and will be based upon an agreement with the Chinese Government. The question of freedom of commerce is on the road to a spontaneous settlement. In short, in the larger view I think that there is a way to let everything settle itself."
The President replied: "As I have already told you, popular appeal for an oil embargo against Japan was clamorous. The reason why, in spite of this, I toned it down, was that I wished to keep peace in the Pacific." Changing the subject to French Indo-China, he went on: "In Japan's need for procuring materials I have ample sympathy for her, but now I do not know but what the opportunity has already been lost. First, let me say that I have not previously conferred with the State Department on this matter, but if it is possible for troops to be evacuated from French Indo-China, for the several countries to guarantee its neutrality as before, and for the several countries to procure an equitable share of its goods freely-for example, Japan obtaining rice and foodstuffs, and the United States, rubber-1 will spare no efforts."
Trans. 7-29-41
No. 177
FROM: Washington July 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 589.
(Very urgent)
(Part 4 of 5)
I went over the principal points which the President brought out and he confirmed them. Then he turned his head toward WELLES as if to see what WELLES had to say, but the latter,
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maintaining a humble attitude, did not mention a word. It was about this time that the President took out his cigarette case and offered it only to me. (The withdrawal which the President spoke of is strange in one sense and yet not so strange in another sense. His "good neighbor" policy is one in which military power is not used. At one time, after ordering troops to -----, he cancelled the order and did not allow the troops to land. Also, in his policy toward Mexico he has never landed troops at Vera Cruz or mobilized forces on the border, but he managed to bring about a normal condition by reconciliation. This avoidance of using troops and the principle of nondiscriminatory freedom of trade are two points which the President himself spoke of at the time of our second conversation and are what both the President and the Secretary of State strongly advocate.)
Trans. 7-30-41
No. 178
FROM: Washington July 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 589.
(Very urgent)
(Part 5 of 5)
The President spoke disapprovingly to the effect that the recent southward advance of Japan was a result of German pressure and that Japan had gone too far in it. So, I explained that it was not so and that Japan acted on her own initiative and independently. To this statement the President replied lightly. I then said: "Previously you said that Japanese-American relations were deteriorating. I have ever since been endeavoring to improve the relations and although my efforts have not yet been rewarded, I have not yet given up hope and intend to carryon to the finish." Whereupon the President said: "HITLER is determined to conquer the world. After Europe he will conquer America and so on, not knowing when to stop. Ten years from now Japan will find an enemy against whom she will fight on the same side with us." I countered this statement, as I have reported to you in my telegram, by saying in effect that from ancient days it has been said that those who take the sword will fall by the sword and Japan is doing nothing of the sort.
Trans. 7-30-41
No. 179
FROM: Washington July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 574.
Regarding your # 396a and # 401b
I carried out your instructions on the occasion of my interview with the President (The Acting Secretary of State was also present) on the 24th.
On the 25th, I had Wakasugi call on Hamilton and had him hand over a copy of the English text of the statement which is to be published tomorrow by the Imperial Government concerning the Japanese-French accord on the French Indo-China affair. Wakasugi asked that the Secretary be advised of the contents of the statement.
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Taking this opportunity, Wakasugi pointed out that even after the Japanese occupation, the sovereignty and integrity of French Indo-China would be preserved and that Japan would in no way meddle in the domestic politics of French Indo-China. Wakasugi said that these two points were clearly brought out in the text of the statement.
Wakasugi then handed Hamilton our revised note concerning the halting of traffic through the Panama Canal.
Then the two men unofficially discussed the Japanese-U. S. relations and exchanged opinions on the possibility of finding ways and means of countering its increasingly unfavorable trend. Hamilton said that there was probably not another person who has worked as hard as Secretary Hull in an effort to maintain friendly relations between the United States and Japan. In spite of the fact that he has been the target of protests from the public as well as from his colleagues in the Cabinet, he has patiently strived toward that end. He did so because both the President and he were convinced that it would be to Japan's interest not to resort to force of arms but instead pursue a policy of peace.
However, even he could not approve Japan's resorting to the force of arms to carry out an expansion program in the Hitlerian manner. As long as Japan does not renounce such a policy, there is no hope for the continuation of the unofficial Japanese-U. S. discussions which were being conducted, Hamilton said.
________________
a Occupation of Southern F. I. C. will take place 28 or 29 July.
b Official statement re F. I. C. will be published 26 July.
Trans. 7-29-41
No. 180
FROM: Washington July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 571.
Apparently Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of (Naval) Operations, for even since I assumed this post, I have been shown many courtesies by him. His opinions concerning U. S.-Japanese relations coincide with mine; he once told me that the only result of a war between the two countries would be mutual exhaustion.
Once while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) I happened to mention that it seemed to me that the higher officials in the Navy Department here seemed to be men of excellent character and qualifications.
To this, the Admiral replied that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of War Plans were exceedingly able men. The same is true of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleets, he continued, both Kimmel and King were recommended by him, and both are of the highest caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of retirement, he had been kept on in active duty because of the critical times, he added.
Please relay this information to the Navy.
Trans. 7-29-41
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No. 181
FROM: Washington July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 572.
(Official code message.)
I would like to have Minister Wakasugi and Colonel Iwakuro return home on the first available sailing for the purpose of reporting on the state of things in this country. The approval of the Minister of War should be secured in the case of Colonel Iwakuro.
We have counseled together over the question of having one person of the Navy return too, but with the shortage of personnel there seems to be no one to send, and therefore we would like to have the Navy receive the reports of the Minister and Colonel Iwakuro.
In this connection we are asking that Obata be left here a little longer.
We have conferred with both the Military and Naval Attachés.
Trans. 7-31-41
No. 182
FROM: Washington July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 567.
Foreign Office Secret.
We have been having hima make some undercover investigations in an attempt to discover what economic moves against Japan are being contemplated by the government of the United States.
He reports as follows:
1. A secret conference was held this afternoon by Cabinet members to discuss measures to counter Japan's southward move. The majority of them were of the opinion that the present move on the part of Japan was instigated by Germany. The step was taken as a supplementary measure of the next maneuver in Europe, they believe. There is also a strong belief among them that the continuance of U.S.-Japanese discussions would be useless because it would be meaningless. He says that regardless of what excuses he tries to make for Japan, his hands are tied. It is unfortunate, but that is the situation.
2. Up to now, he states, he has been able to prevail on Secretary Hull and others to keep the government from freezing our assets and from clamping on an oil export embargo. Now, however, he believes that these measures will be adopted. Moreover, there is a good possibility that the "freezing" phase will be put into effect at an unexpectedly early date. Confidentially, however, he is trying to prevail upon the U.S. government to restrain itself until he has had an opportunity to thoroughly discuss the matter with Secretary Hull who is expected to return to Washington this Sunday. (The truth of the matter is that, probably due to the fact that he is a new member of the Cabinet, he was ignorant of the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China last year. Upon being advised of this today, he asked me why we were making such an issue of our latest move. He stated that he has difficulty in trying to reconcile himself to that.)
3. He says that the persons who have really been put "on the spot" by recent developments are Secretary Hull and himself. He says that he recently held quite a long discussion with President Roosevelt who is going to his home in Hyde Park after granting me an interview this evening. On the occasion of that talk the President expressed his hope that some means
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could be found to make Japan reconsider her policy so as to enable the continuance of peace on the Pacific. My informant, therefore, has not given up in despair as yet, but instead, would continue to put forth his best efforts in an attempt to smooth things over. His main hope is that Japan will respond favorably to these overtures on his part.
4. Germany's attempts to bring about peace through the good offices of the United States is still being continued. Japan is in no way involved in the terms being proposed by Germany. It is interesting to note, he said, that though he and some of his colleagues are against the terms being proposed by Germany, some of those who are against the U.S.-Japanese "understanding" are in favor of the terms being offered by Germany.
_______________
a The third person referred to throughout this message is not identified.
Trans. 7-28-41
No. 183
FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi) July 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 132.
At 6:00 p .M. on the 25th, the local Yokohama Specie Bank and the Sumitomo Bank branch offices were given a thorough inspection by bank examiners, and all safes were sealed. At 1:00 A.M. on the 26th, a general license was granted the Yokohama Specie Bank. Business was conducted as usual during the examination of the books. Because the Sumitomo Bank deals largely in drafts rather than in deposits, a general license was not granted to that firm.
Trans. 10-6-41
No. 184
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 534.
On the 25th when WAKASUGI conferred with HAMILTON, he asked frankly as follows: "As you know from newspaper reports, Japanese ships, fearing seizure by the American authorities are hesitating to enter American ports. Is it the intention of the American Government either to tie up or seize Japanese ships?" HAMILTON replied: "The State Department has nothing to do with this; in fact, it is hard to understand why Japanese ships are afraid to enter American ports; so much so that some people even telephoned the State Department to find out the reason, and so I am not in a position to reply to your question." Then Wakasugi stated: "If the United States Government has no intention of tying up Japanese ships, would not an assurance to that effect be useful in eliminating any such doubt?" To this HAMILTON replied: "I see no necessity for the Government to guarantee to ships whose avoidance of entering American ports is an enigma, whether it would seize those ships or not." Thus our conversation availed nothing. However, I am sending this much for your reference.
I understand that a man acting on behalf of the Secretary of the Treasury stated at a press interview on the 26th that the freezing of funds does not apply to Japanese ships, but that it is not certain whether their departure from ports will not be interfered with in case the
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emergency regulations issued by the Treasury Department are applied to them. I will report on this subject again after getting more information on the matter from the Government.
Trans. 7-30-41
No. 185
FROM: Tokyo July 27, 1941
TO: Washington Circular # 1622.
In retaliation for the steps taken by the British and United States by which our assets were frozen, the rules restricting foreign business transactions in Japan which are included in the rules governing foreign exchange, shall be put into effect on the 28th by order of the Finance Ministry. Manchukuo will also take similar steps, while in China proclamations by the Consulates will be made subsequently. As an emergency measure, the above regulations will be announced by the Consulates as a bulletin and will be made effective for all practical purposes. (All transactions involving Britain and America will be placed on a license basis.) At the same time, the Chinese will receive instructions to put similar measures in effect.
With regard to the Customs, all exports to countries which have frozen our assets, shall have to receive licenses in accordance with orders issued by the Financial Bureau. Guidance will be given to settle all complications which accompany the materialization of these regulations.
Ample study has been made so as to make these measures counter whatever measures the opposition should choose to actually take.
This message addressed to London and Washington.
Trans. 7-29-41
No. 186
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 597.
Re your # 412a and # 418a.
The ruling promulgated by the Treasury Department for critical limitations might be called a recapitulation of the actuation of the President's orders for the freezing of the assets of Japan, Germany, Italy, and other foreign countries (see my #5794 and my ordinary letter message of June 17 this year, # 312) .2 c. of clause 130 of this ruling under the freezing order includes among the properties of foreign countries whose activities are forbidden, ships, cargoes, bills of lading, etc. The legislation upon which this step taken by the United States is based, as I have pointed out in numerous telegrams, on the following acts. Please refer to them again.
1. The Espionage Act of July 15, 1917 (my # 100a).
2. The law authorizing the commandeering of ships (my Nos. 373a and 374a).
3. The law stipulating the order of priority of commercial shipments for the sake of national defense (my Nos. 344a and 519b).
_______________
a Not available.
b (Not given in text. LWJ)
Trans. 7-31-41
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No. 187
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 28, 1941
TO: Washington # 419.
(Secret outside the Department)
On the 25th I asked Ambassador GREW to call on me, and I handed him a memorandum giving the purport of what is contained in my # 368a and then explained the principal points therein as follows:
1. It is an undeniable fact that in the areas covered by Burma, Singapore, and centering on French Indo-China, a line of encirclement against Japan is being formed. Naturally, Japan is afraid that French Indo-China will meet the same fate as Syria has met, and Japan's recent action in French Indo-China has for its object nothing other than the joint defense of that country.
2. Judging from the statement which Assistant Secretary of State WELLES made on the 25th at a press conference, he seems to think that the occupation of northern French Indo-China is only a preliminary step looking toward a further southward advance; but this is clearly a misunderstanding of the truth. This step was taken with a view to bringing the China incident to a close. The reason why I had informed the American Government of our steps before they were taken is that the Ambassador and I are on friendly terms.
The Ambassador regarded with a great deal of importance the point, in the memorandum, concerning the fact that Japan has no intention of making southern French Indo-China a base for advancement into the territories adjacent to that country. He said that this was the very point which the United States Government wanted to know about, and now that he has my assurance regarding it, he was extremely happy and would transmit the news at once to his government.
______________
a In which Tokyo informs Washington of the negotiations to be begun between Tokyo and Vichy for the establishment of naval and air bases in southern Indo-China in the name of mutual defense.
Trans. 8-2-41
No. 188
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 28, 1941
TO: Washington # 420.
Secret outside the Department. (Part 1 of 2)
Re my # 419a
On the 26th I again requested Ambassador GREW to come to see me and I talked over this matter with him. The Ambassador read the entire copy of the telegram giving the conversation which had taken place on the 23rd between you and Assistant Secretary WELLES. I spoke frankly to the following effect:
(1) Judging from Mr. WELLES' opinions, he seems to be under the impression that recent action on the part of Japan toward French Indo-China was a result of pressure exerted by Germany; but this is far from the truth. Japan took that action as a result of the conclusion of a treaty in a friendly manner between Japan and France for the purpose of defending
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French Indo-China. In fact, the authorities in French Indo-China themselves were fearing, not being sure that French Indo-China will be able to escape the fate which befell Syria.
(2) Mr. WELLES believes that the recent occupation of French Indo-China by Japan was accomplished with the intention of securing bases from which Japan may advance to other places. This, too, is an entirely mistaken view of the matter. As I have repeatedly pointed out, the recent action of Japan has had no object whatsoever other than the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Therefore, that had resorted to the means which she did, is to me a very regrettable fact.
(3) I am extremely chagrined over the fact that relations between Japan and the United States have reached such a stage in less than two weeks after the formation of the new cabinet. This is entirely due to United States' misunderstanding of the real intention of the Japanese Government.
_______________
a See II, 187.
Trans. 7-29-41
No. 189
FROM: Tokyo July 28, 1941
TO: Washington # 420.
(Part 2 of 2)
(4) I am afraid that if the United States should adopt further measures which will be provocative to Japan a most unfortunate situation will be brought about between the two countries. The Imperial Government has been by every means endeavoring to quiet the resentment which the people have been harboring against the United States' giving aid to CHIANG and against other actions. Therefore, if the situation is made worse, the Government will find it more difficult than ever to suppress their emotions. Furthermore, among what Assistant Secretary WELLES stated to you were these words of Secretary HULL, "was unable to see that any basis for continuing the talks which Admiral NOMURA and Mr. HULL had been conducting." Do these words signify that the negotiations now being carried on with a view to adjusting Japanese-American relations should be dropped?
The Ambassador avoided giving a definite reply by saying that he was not at all familiar with the conversation on this question. No doubt, in accordance with the instructions sent to you, you have made explanations regarding this question; however, I would like to have you emphasize at every opportunity you may get the fact that Japan's action was one which could not have been avoided in the light of the situation prevailing internally and externally.
Trans. 7-30-41
No. 190
FROM: Washington July 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 600.
(In 2 parts-complete.)
On the 28th, yesterday, I saw WELLES. On that occasion reference was made to the statement that during the past ninety years, peace has been maintained between the United
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States and Japan without one single break. Unless, however, some way out is found from the policies being pursued by the two countries today, our relations shall become increasingly critical, causing justifiable anxiety. If this dark abyss cannot be circumvented through statesmanship, then, indeed, a great crime on mankind cannot be prevented, I said.
To this WELLES replied that the proposals recently made by the President were sound and that considerable importance should be attached to them. In spite of this, in his conversations with Ambassador GREW, the Foreign Minister implied that he was ignorant of them.
I therefore replied that at that time I reported only the gist of the proposals, but a detailed report was dispatched today.
WELLES expressed the same attitude as the President: That the United States would in no way interfere with the accessibility of American materials to Japan on an equal basis as to other nations on condition that Japan makes no conquests through the use of force. Moreover, no threat to the safety of French Indo-China exists, he said.
If we look at the trend in a detached manner, we find that we are moving alone, heading toward the worst possible eventuality in East Asia, and may come up against Britain, the United States, the Netherlands East Indies, and China, and probably the U.S.S.R. as well.
Our duty to restrain the United States in behalf of Germany ----- (two badly garbled lines) ----- the United States and Germany are avoiding armed conflict. In the meantime, and unconsciously, we are rushing towards a war against Great Britain and the United States; a war in which we would have to stand alone against them.
I beg of you to give careful considerations before you take any steps. It may be true that circumstances may arise which need immediate local attention from the military. Politically, however, I beseech you to take a broad view, consider all of the angles, before making a move. It is my undying hope that you proceed in behalf of the everlasting glory of our country.
Trans. 8-1-41
No. 191
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 614.
Re my #611a
When I expressed to WELLES that we hoped for a certain degree of magnanimity regarding ship loadings, in view of the famous "fair play" and "square deal" policy advocated by the United States, he prefaced his remarks by saying he was pleased to receive a straightforward expression from me and would also give a clear statement of opinion. He said that for the last four years the United States has been long-suffering in the overriding of American interests in China by the Japanese. He added that he, himself, still desired, for the improvement of Japanese-American relations, that there should be an adjustment along the lines of the conversations held between Secretary HULL and myself. This is given for your reference.
________________
a Not available.
Trans. 8-4-41
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No. 192
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 604.
I communicated with the Secretary of State in accordance with your instructions. On the 29th, I received a reply by (note?) saying that in view of the great increase in the number of Japanese living in New York on a diplomatic status, in the future only the ranking Commercial Attaché and Financial Attaché would be placed on the diplomatic list.
In the case of Financial and Commercial Consuls and Secretaries already on the diplomatic list permission to increase the number or to replace them would not be given, in accordance with the policy decided upon in 1939; therefore, although the United States Government has no objection to Assistant Financial Attaché YOSIMURA residing in New York as a Japanese Government official, it is impossible to put him on the diplomatic list.
Trans. 8-12-41
No. 193
FROM: Washington July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 608.
On the 30th the Acting Secretary of State requested me to call on him. WELLES handed me the memorandum contained in my # 606a and, with an extremely austere look and prefacing his statement by saying that he spoke in the name of the President, proceeded:
"1. When the Panay incident happened the President got a guarantee that such a thing would not recur, so why did the present incident happen?
"2. Under what sort of orders did the Japanese forces and responsible officials permit such a deed?
"3. The American Embassy in Chungking and the gunboat are on the other side of the city, supposedly in a safe place, so how did this incident come about? Now, I want to get an immediate explanation from the Japanese Government."
To this I answered, "Well, Sir, personally I cannot bring myself at all to believe that an act like this was perpetrated intentionally. I myself am quite familiar with the geography of Chungking. The river there is narrow, to say the least, and novices when they let bombs fall are quite apt to make this sort of mistake. I don't know what we can do in order to do away with such untoward events unless we either stop bombing Chungking or you move the American Embassy and the gunboat. In any case, I want to report this to my Government and then answer you later on."
Thus our conversation ended.
______________
a Not available.
Trans. 7-31-41
A-108
No. 194
FROM: Tokyo July 31, 1941
TO: Nanking, Hankow, Circular # 1683.
Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking & Hsinking
(Message from Washington # 605.)
It seems that one of our naval planes damaged an American gunboat, the TUTUILA, at Chungking. On the 30th, the Acting Secretary of State asked me to call on him and told me that it was a very grave incident. He handed me a memorandum contained in my separate message # 606a and asked me to get an explanation from the Japanese Government. I will wire you the details immediately. However, this is a serious matter, and it is necessary to take immediate steps.
_______________
a Not available.
Trans. 8-2-41
No. 195
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 609.
Re my # 608a.
Today I knew from the hard looks on their faces that they meant business and I could see that if we do not answer to suit them that they are going to take some drastic steps.
During my first conversation with Roosevelt after I took office the President, referring to the Panay incident, said that at the time he cooperated with the Secretary of State and succeeded in restraining popular opinion but that in case such a thing happened a second time, it would probably be quite impossible to again calm the storm. The latest incident brought all this back to me and I can see just how gravely they are regarding it. Think of it! Popular demand for the freezing of Japanese funds was subsiding and now this had to happen. I must tell you it certainly occurred at an inopportune moment.
Things being as they are, need I point out to you gentlemen that in my opinion it is necessary to take without one moment's hesitation some appeasement measures. Please wire me back at the earliest possible moment.
_______________
a Welles summons Nomura and demands explanation of Tutuila bombing immediately, see II, 193.
Trans. 8-2-41
A-109
No. 196
FROM: Washington July 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 612.
Re my 609a.
I think that the best possible step we could take at the present is to stop bombing Chung king for a while and to publish this without delay.
____________
a Not available.
Trans. 7-31-41
No. 197
FROM: Tokyo July 31, 1941
TO: Washington # 429.
Before receiving your # 605 [a] I had Vice Minister Yamamoto call on the American Embassy as my representative even though we had had no official word from the American Embassy as yet. I sent word to the effect that if the injury to the Tutuila was an actual fact it was a most unfortunate occurrence. The said Minister had a confidential chat with the American Ambassador who said that as yet he had no instructions from his government but that he thanked the Minister for his visit. Furthermore, the Minister of the Navy sent an official to call on the American Naval Attaché ----- (last 2 lines garbled).
____________
a Not available.
Trans. 8-1-41
No. 198
FROM: Tokyo July 31, 1941
TO: Washington # 435.
Re my # 429a.
At 2:45 p.m. I requested Ambassador Grew to call on me and at that time I expressed my regrets and the Ambassador presented the official text corresponding to your telegram # 606 [b] (?). I said that I was sure the incident was simply a mistake on the part of the aviator and that without doubt there was something wrong with the "release gear" of the bomber. I told him that I had previously had experience with aircraft and that I could well understand such a thing occurring. However, no matter what the cause may be it is very regrettable that such a thing should have occurred for we have been exercising the greatest caution to prevent the recurrence of such incidents and have issued strict orders concerning them. Not only that but according to my recollection orders have been issued very recently again regarding this. As a military man myself I know that the military men are accustomed to give absolute obedience to instructions. I will do the utmost within my power to see that a recurrence of this does not eventuate, I said.
____________
a See II, 197.
b Not available.
Trans. 8-1-41
A-110
No. 199
FROM: Tokyo July 31, 1941
TO: Washington # 434.
(Utmost secrecy, Chief of Office routing.)
Re your # 612a.
In regard to your proposal, please tell the President immediately that in view of the general state of relations between Japan and America, bombing of Chungking will be suspended for a time. In view of these relations between Japan and America this step which you suggested would be a very serious one indeed and if it were publicly announced in America it would give an unnecessary shock to one section of public opinion in Japan. This would defeat the very purpose of the step itself. Please call the attention of America to this point particularly.
My # 435b is an answer to the three questions (of Welles) brought up in your # 608a.
_______________
a Nomura recommends that as the best possible step Japan could take in the Tutuila matter, Japan stop bombing Chungking for a while, and publish this fact immediately, see II, 196.
b See II, 198.
c See II, 193. Welles summons Nomura and demands explanations of Tutuila bombing immediately. [No "c" footnote in original.]
Trans. 8-1-41
No. 200
FROM: Washington July 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 623.
(Strictly Confidential. Chief of Office Routing.)
Re your #434a.
I called on Welles on the afternoon of the 31st and told him that I wished to have the gist of my separate telegram # 624b conveyed to the President.
Welles expressed his gratitude and said that he would make arrangements immediately.
I said further that in case there was anything the President did not understand, I desired an opportunity to explain it to him, and closed the interview.
(Time 8:10 p.m.)
________________
a Nomura is directed to inform the President that bombing of Chungking will be suspended for a time; requesting that this action not be publicly announced.
b See II, 201.
Trans. 8-3-41
A-111
No. 201
FROM: Washington July 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo #624 (or #622),
(Separate telegram).
Strictly confidential. Chief of Office routing.
I have come to convey to you personally the regret of my government over the Tutuila incident. I am instructed to inform promptly the President of the U.S. that the Japanese government has decided to suspend for the time being all bombing operations over the city area of Chungking. Let me say that this is a step I myself recommend to be taken in the interest of Japanese-American friendship. And I feel that this decision of my government should be held confidential inasmuch as publication of it would arouse unnecessarily a section of public opinion in Japan ----- defeat the very purpose for which the measure has been adopted.
I am fully convinced that the Tutuila incident was an accident pure and simple. This, I believe, was made entirely clear to Ambassador Grew by our Foreign Minister, Admiral Toyoda, at the time when he offered his government's apologies, and it seems scarcely necessary for me to give detailed explanations. I should like to add that the Japanese Government will be prepared to pay indemnities for any damages to American property upon the completion of the necessary investigations.
Trans. 8-6-41
No. 202
FROM: Washington July 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 526.
Re my # 623a.
During the evening of the 31st, Welles announced that the United States has accepted Japan's apology in connection with the Tutuila incident and that the matter was now closed.
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a See II, 200
Trans. 8-5-41
No. 203
FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 591.
(Secret)
According to information emanating from ----- office, AP reports from ISTANBUL concerning British-German peace negotiations are not entirely without foundation. However this may be, the President and the Acting Secretary of State have intimated that Mayor LA GUARDIA of New York, former National Defense Head, has let something slip.
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As a matter of fact, the German Government has recently again added to its personnel and is successfully engaging in undercover work. This is being fervently supported by Americans of German extraction.
Trans. 7-31-41
No. 204
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 31, 1941
TO: Washington # 433.
(Part 1 of 4)
(Message to Berlin # 708)
From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions about what we ought to do to help Germany who desires our assistance now that she is at war with Russia. After a conference with military, at the risk of a certain amount of repetition which may cause you some ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government's policy and views. Hereafter, will you please act accordingly.
1. In a cabinet meeting during the forenoon of July 2, the broad outlines of our decision concerning our future policy were drawn. You were informed of it by Circular # 1390a. Ever since then the Government has been and is devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of that policy.
2. The China incident has already extended over a period of four years, and the Imperial Government's general trend, particularly its military trend, has hitherto been to expend the greater part of its energies in an endeavor to bring a conclusion to the incident, and now a new situation faces us from the north and from the south. In order to meet it, there is more reason than ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war.
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a See II, 103, 104.
Trans. 8-4-41
No. 205
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 31, 1941
TO: Washington # 433.
(Part 2 of 4)
(Message to Berlin # 708)
It seems that Germany also understands this position of ours fairly well. The German Embassy people here in Tokyo are already quite aware of it. And yet I fear that their homeland is not yet as well informed as they are on our position.
3. Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly
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asleep. That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory.
That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia, quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States.
Trans. 8-4-41
No. 206
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 31, 1941
TO: Washington # 433.
(Part 3 of 4) (Message to Berlin # 708)
Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. Not only will we have to prepare, however, but we must choose well our chance. In view of the real situation facing our Empire, this should be easily understood. If the Russo-German war proceeds too swiftly, our Empire would inevitably not have time to take any effective symmetrical action.
5. I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into the war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident. We were working toward those objectives. Let him who will gainsay the fact that as a result we have indelibly impressed upon the United States the profoundness of the determination of the Empire of Japan and restrained her from plunging into the conflict against Germany.
It should be understood that we started these talks at a time which seemed opportune to us, and on the assumption that there was complete trust between Japan and Germany. For that matter, did not Germany start a war with Russia because of her military expediency when it was least desirable on our part? Now we have not only to settle the Chinese incident but have to meet a new challenge in the north as well as in the south, and this is quite inconvenient.
Trans. 8-4-41
No. 207
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 31, 1941
TO: Washington # 433.
(Part 4 of 4) (Message to Berlin # 708)
We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to understand our action.
6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should trust each
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other and while striving toward one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.
Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action.
Please send to Rome. Have sent to Washington.
Trans. 8-4-41
No. 208.
FROM: Tokyo August 2, 1941
TO: Washington # 438.
Re your # 566a. Secret outside the department.
(Part 1 of 3)
We are now considering the proposal very carefully, although as you may well imagine, it would require considerable amount of time before the Japanese Government will be able to express its opinion regarding it because of the fact that the political situation at home and abroad is critical and the matter under consideration is of great importance. However, I would like to have you tell the President that we, realizing the seriousness of the present situation, are giving consideration to our reply and tell him so by covering the following points:
1. The method of disposal referred to in my #434b is an unusual one. It goes to show, in part at least, how eager the Japanese Government is to bring about an equitable adjustment of Japanese-American relations. (This method of disposal excludes the area outside of the Chungking city limits and, therefore, does not apply to military establishments, airfields, etc., in the suburbs. Furthermore, it goes without saying that it is a temporary measure.
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a Conversation between NOMURA and ROOSEVELT regarding HITLER's war aims and Japanese-German cooperation, see II, 172.
b Informing ROOSEVELT that Chungking bombing will be temporarily suspended in view of Japanese-American relations, see II, 199.
Trans. 8-4-41
No. 209
FROM: Tokyo August 2, 1941
TO: Washington # 438.
(Part 2 of 3)
2. As soon as I received the report of damage having been done to the American gunboat by our bombing, I sent to the American Ambassador the memorandum prepared by the former Vice Minister YAMAMOTO, and immediately upon receiving official wire, I personally met the American Ambassador. I have already wired you this fact. In addition
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to doing these things, I arranged to offer every facility to American newspaper correspondents and at the same time I had the report banned here so as not to unnecessarily excite public opinion. All this was done simply because we wish to deal with Japanese-American relations in as calm an atmosphere as possible.
Furthermore, in order to avoid the recurrence of such unpleasant incidents as the one in question, it is my earnest desire that the United States would free herself from mere legal theories and cooperate with Japan to eliminate by means of friendly conversation those matters which constitute the cause of disputes between the two countries. For example, inasmuch as the removal of Tutuilia to safe waters at this time would have a beneficent effect on future Japanese-American relations, will you suitably inform the American authorities to take this opportunity to do so.
Trans. 8-4-41
No. 210
FROM: Tokyo August 2, 1941
TO: Washington # 438.
(Part 3 of 3)
If we are to avoid disruption of Japanese-American relations, it would be necessary to mutually exercise a high degree of statesmanship. It is in consideration of this fact that we are taking the aforementioned attitude. However, if the Japanese Government is to continue to maintain such a cool-headed attitude and if the public opinion in Japan is to follow the Government more perfectly with a view to improving Japanese-American relations, I believe firmly that it is necessary that the United States Government reciprocate our attitude by refraining strictly from behavior of fault-finding and maintain instead an intelligent and constructive attitude. Will you therefore persuade the President to consider this point carefully. As I have already told you in successive telegrams, it is my intention to have the Japanese-American diplomatic negotiations continue in the future. Will you, therefore, take every opportunity to enlighten the American authorities, along the lines set forth in my telegrams, on the French Indo-China question as well.
Trans. 8-4-41
No. 211
FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 649.
(Strictly Secret)
In view of the fact that Japanese-American relations are constantly growing worse with prohibitive limits set on export of oil, today, the 1st, during the forenoon, I secretly called on a member of the cabinet and asked him for the latest news. At the same time I told him the reasons for our having occupied French Indo-China. It appeared that he had already heard of Japan's arguments from IWAKURO. I said, "It seems that it was clearly stated in the Japanese-French agreement regarding French Indo-China that the occupation was made necessary by the present general situation. It is not of a permanent nature. Do you not think
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it a good plan to conclude an agreement which promises to uphold the integrity of the adjacent countries, waters, colonies, and the Dutch East Indies and to continue the negotiations that have been carried on and thus to facilitate supply of material?" Then he asked the question: "Is not Japan preparing to occupy Siberia?" showing that his interest had not been aroused to any extent. Incidentally, he said "Since Hull was so intensely interested in adjusting Japanese-American relations, he is greatly disappointed. Although he is expected to return on Monday, he is 'very sick'." Then he said, "We are now being ridiculed by our colleagues as having been 'easy men' for having played into the hands of the Japanese, but there will come a time when we will be quite active."
He spoke further, saying, "You are well aware of the fact that the President does not want war."
Now this is the way I look at the matter: The United States is trying to restrain Japan, first of all, by waging an economic war, although the government authorities claim that they are merely taking counter-measures against Japan's policy. But, that the United States is at the same time making military preparations against the possible eventuality of a clash of arms is a fact with which you are already familiar .Furthermore, it seems that in order to attain her object, the United States is endeavoring to get Soviet Russia and China, to say nothing of Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies, to fall in line and cooperate with her . That the Russo-German war is lasting longer than expected has proved to be an advantage to the United States.
However, the aforementioned cabinet member did not speak so optimistically as the President, in a newspaper interview yesterday, is reported to have alleged his confidant HOPKINS to have spoken (sic). The cabinet member believes firmly in the necessity of this war lasting for several years for the reason that due to destruction of her man (sic) and materials, and due to the shortage of oil, Germany would not be able to do anything on a great scale even after the fighting on the Eastern Front has come to an end, and that since the United States will be able in the meantime to rapidly increase her production, the trend will be in favor of her.
Trans. 8-7-41
No. 212
FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 2, 1941
TO: Rio, Bogota, Mexico # 221.
(Circular)
(Message to Tokyo # 643)
1. The recent petroleum embargo exercised by the United States is attracting attention as the first measure taken to back up the freezing of funds. Its motive has not the slightest connection with the bombing of the Tutuila and is taken to be a warning to Japan against further penetration southwards. It is reported that the United States will not relax this sort of economic pressure until it become clear that Japan is going to put an end to her policy of aggression. All the newspapers print a London report that Japan is continuing to make new demands including military bases in Thai and the press contains comments to the effect that Japan is further increasing her military forces.
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Simultaneously with the petroleum embargo the Chief of Production and Management stopped the sale of silk to the public at large; consequently, stocking manufacturing throughout the whole of the United States, depending upon whether or not they can use substitute materials, can employ but 20 % of their former workers. Great unemployment will be the result, in fact, it is said that 175,000 people are out of jobs.
2. On the 2nd, the Government of the United States issued a statement to the people that the fact that Japanese aggression in French Indo-China was not stopped constitutes a threat to the security of the United States, whose attitude towards France will be determined hereafter by whether or not Vichy surrenders her territory to the Axis. On the same day, WELLES, the British Ambassador; the Australian Minister; and the South African Minister, (doubtless concerning Dakar) held a conference on measures to be taken in the worst eventualities.
The activities of HARRY HOPKINS in Moscow are receiving notice and these activities are being referred to in connection with Russo-American cooperation in case Japan strikes northwards.
Relayed to -----, Mexico, Panama, Rio. Relay from Rio to -----, Buenos Aires.
Trans. 8-15-41
No. 213
FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi) August 4, 1941
TO: Washington Circular # 15.
(Part 1 of 2)
(Message to Tokyo # 142)
Re my # 132a.
a. Since then, the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Sumitomo Bank have continued to be under surveillance by two Treasury Department inspectors each. Incoming and outgoing wires and mail have to have their details "checked" by these inspectors. Insofar as the Yokohama Specie Bank is concerned, though the account books and bank balances are "checked" daily, domestic business is allowed to proceed much as usual.
1. Since the freezing legislation went into effect, all individuals must present affidavits of continued residence since June 17th of last year before they can make first withdrawals from deposits. (There have been occasions when the inspectors have demanded that passports be submitted as evidence.)
2. Though statements are made that these measures are not as a result of the freezing legislation, when withdrawals are in excess of $500., the Treasury Department inspectors make investigations as to what purpose these funds are to be used.
3. When drafts are requested for dispatch to dependents in Japan, actual proof must be submitted that drafts have been sent to these same dependents within the last six months.
The Treasury inspectors see to it that Treasury Department watchmen are sent to both banks to stand guard each night.
_______________
a Not available.
Trans. 10-6-41
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No. 214
FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi) August 4, 1941
TO: Washington Circular # 15.
(Part 2 of 2)
(Message to Tokyo # 142)
b. NYK, Mitsui and Mitsubishi branch offices are now making applications for general licenses through their respective branch offices in San Francisco. (Temporary licenses have already been issued. Routine office expenses can be paid;) However, Mitsui and NYK branch offices were visited by Treasury Department inspectors for the three days of August 2 to 4, inclusive, at which time their disbursement account books were thoroughly investigated. Though the Osaka Chosen maintains a branch office, since it is an American agency with an American manager, it has no direct bearing in the present situation. The Asano branch office is making application for a general license.
c. Permanently established Japanese firms, maintaining partners in Japan, and to whom money is sent regularly, because of the freezing legislation, may not be able to send funds accumulated since June 1st to their respective sponsoring organizations in Japan. All of these firms are now making applications for general licenses. However, none of these licenses, as yet, have been issued.
Trans. 10-6-41
No. 215
FROM: Tokyo August 5, 1941
TO: Washington # 445.
Re your # 621a.
1. There are no objections to your negotiating regarding the three points you mentioned. The British Ambassador has already made a proposal regarding their foreign diplomatic establishments and consulates in Japan, in harmony with the principle of reciprocity, to the effect that these be exempted from the rules recently pu