Naval History and Heritage Command

PDF Version [129.3MB]

The Battle
of
Savo Island

August 9th, 1942

Strategical
and
Tactical Analysis.

U. S. Naval War College
1950

NAVPERS 91187

Prepared By
Department of Analysis
Naval War College

Commodore Richard W. Bates, USN (Ret)
Commander Walter D. Innis, USN

Table of Contents

iv

- v -

vi

vii

viii

viii

x

xi

xii 

xiii

xiv

xv

xvi

xvii 

xviii 

xix 

xx

xxi 

xxii 

Foreword

This analysis of the Battle of Savo Island was prepared by the Naval War College. It is based on information from both Allied and Japanese sources which is wider and more complete than that available to writers on this subject up to this time. It endeavors to maintain, at all times, the viewpoint of the Commanders of the units involved on both sides.

Complete information from all sources was not available to this analysis. This was especially true concerning Japanese information. Unfortunately, sufficient translators were not available to provide all of the additional translations which the progress of the analysis indicated were desirable. New facts and circumstances, therefore, may come to light, from time to time, which may change some of the analyses produced herein.

In view of the critical nature of this analysis an effort has been made in certain important situations to place the critic in the position of the Commander in order to obtain the latter's point of view. In employing this system it is realized that although the critic can often succeed in placing himself sufficiently near the position of the Commander for any practical purposes, in many instances he may not succeed in doing so.

Because of the nature of this Allied defeat and the numerous controversies which have arisen concerning it, a complete background has been provided. In addition, when the time comes to analyze the other battles in the struggle for Guadalcanal, this material will be available.

The Battle of Savo Island was a real test of existing Allied and Japanese night tactical concepts as well as of the combat ability in night action of the various Commanders on both sides. The pages of history have invariably revealed defects in command in similar situations, and it would have been surprising had such defects not appeared in this action.

As a result of battle lessons learned, and ass quickly applied, the ability of the Navy to conduct warfare steadily improved during the course of the war. As time went on the lesson so often forgotten - that the test of battle is the only test which proves the combat ability of Commanders - was relearned. The ability or the lack of ability of the various Commanders in the art of war became apparent. Valor alone was shown to be insufficient, for valor is not an attribute of only one race, but is an attribute and a heritage of many races. The indispensable qualification for command, the art of war, was shown to be the ability in combat to apply the science of war to active military situations.

The present senior officers of the Navy are well aware of the reasons for changes in established doctrines and in the development of new ones. But this cannot necessarily be said of the Commanders of the future, who very probably will be inexperience in command in war.

--i--

Finally, all comments and criticisms are designed to be constructive. By indicating what appear to be sound and unsound decisions, and the apparent reasons for arriving at them, it is hoped to provide earnest thought among prospective commanders and thus to improve professional judgment in command.

--ii--

[Note: Table of Contents moved to beginning of project, pages iii - xxii.] 

ALL TIMES IN THIS ANALYSIS, EXCEPT DISPATCH TIMES

ARE ZONE TIME (- 11)

DISPATCH TIMES ARE GREENWICH CIVIL TIME

--xxiii--

Principal Commanders

--xxiv--

--xxv--

Introduction

The Battle of Savo Island is an action of singular interest to students of naval history for several reasons: It was the first occasion in which Japanese and Allied naval forces had engaged in night battle since the Allies had assumed the offensive; it was a serious tactical defeat to the Allied forces, and finally it was a classic example of a powerful night raid by surface forces with the attendant features of surprise and withdrawal. During the early operations of 1942 Japanese and Allied surface forces had clashed in several minor night actions but no night surface actions had occurred between cruiser forces of approximately equal strength.

The battle resulted from the seizure by the Allies of the Tulagi-Guadalcanal area of the lower Solomon Island sin order to protect the Allied lines of communications to Australia and New Zealand. These lines were being menaced by the expansion of the Japanese in that direction.¹

In order to check this expansion and to contain the Japanese within the already occupied area, limited countering moves had been undertaken by the Allies. In the Battle of the Coral Sea, May 7th, the Allies had prevented entirely by carrier air action, the capture of Port Moresby by sea. In the Battle of Midway, June 3rd-6th, the Allies had inflicted, almost entirely by air action, such losses on the Japanese in aircraft carriers as to force the abandonment by them of planned advances into New Caledonia and the Fijis. However, within the Solomon Islands, the Japanese had continued to advance.²

On May 2nd they had overrun the island of Tulagi where they were attacked by an Allied carrier task force on May 4th, just before the Battle of the Coral Sea. On July 4th they had commenced building an airfield at Lunga Point, Guadalcanal Island. Actually, they were building this airfield, as well as others in the Solomon Island chain, primarily for the protection of Rabaul which was to be one of the strong points of the Japanese southern perimeter.²

With the Allied seizure of Tulagi-Guadalcanal, the Japanese realized that failure to dislodge the Allies might seriously affect Japanese strategy in that area. They, therefore, put into force energetic counter-measures designed to dislodge the Allies form their precarious foothold. These counter-measures which began on August 7th were highlighted on the early morning of August 9th, by the night action known as the Battle of Savo Island.

______________

1. U.S. Navy at War 1941-1945, Official Report by Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, page 49.
2. Campaigns of the Pacific War, USSBS 1946, page 105.

--xxvi--