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Interrogations of Japanese Officials - Vols. I & II

United States Strategic Bombing Survey [Pacific]

Interrogations of Japanese Officials - Vol. I cover image.

United States
Strategic Bombing Survey

[Pacific]

Naval Analysis Division

Interrogations of Japanese Officials
Volume 1

Foreword

The interrogations in this volume were conducted in TOKYO during the months of October, November, and December 1945 by officers of the Naval Analysis Division of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. While the original purpose of the interrogations was to gain evidence for an assessment of the role of airpower in the war with JAPAN, in the absence of any other body concerned with the conduct of this naval war, this purpose was broadened to include as wide a survey of wartime events as time and other restrictions would permit. The specific purpose of individual interrogations varied between that of obtaining comment and opinion from those very senior officers who were in a position to view the war as a whole, the discussion of specific operations and engagements with responsible commanders or other eyewitnesses and the elaboration and clarification of documentary material.

Although the Imperial Japanese Navy was abolished shortly after the surrender, and its personnel retired and dispersed, permission was obtained from General MacArthur to retain a nucleus of experienced officers at the Naval War College at HIYOSHI. In addition to being interrogated on their particular specialties and experiences, these officers performed research at the direction of the Naval Analysis Division and, together with the Japanese Naval Liaison Office, gave useful assistance in identifying and procuring other officers for interrogation.

Despite the cooperation of the Japanese, a number of unavoidable difficulties hindered the investigation. It was often a considerable problem to identify the proper individual for interrogation on a given subject, in many instances the most desirable candidates were dead, and in almost every case the selected officers had to be brought especially to TOKYO from all parts of JAPAN and even, in one case, from as far as SINGAPORE. All work was conducted by a small staff under pressure of time, without an adequate library, and in the face of an almost complete lack of original Japanese documents which had been either burned in air raids, or destroyed or hidden on surrender. Towards the end of the stay in JAPAN a quantity of hidden records were discovered; these have been returned to the United States and are now in process of translation, a work which will require a period of years to complete. In many instances, therefore, questions had to be explored entirely by interrogation with only partial or inaccurate war-time information as the starting point, with resultant delay and repetition.

So far as the question of veracity is concerned, it should be stated that almost without exception the Japanese naval officers interrogated were cooperative to the highest degree, and that no important attempt consciously to mislead the interrogator was ever noted. Accuracy on fine points was inevitably affected by the language problem which necessitated in most cases translation of both question and answer, by the specialized nature of the naval vocabulary which in some instances troubled the interpreters, and by the somewhat imprecise nature of the Japanese language itself. Allowance must also be made for the normal fallibility of human memory and in particular the memory of events months or years in the past which were witnessed under the intense strain of combat. Despite all these considerations it is felt that the interrogations provide an accurate picture of the war from the Japanese viewpoint, subject only to the qualifications that on important or disputed points of documentary confirmation should where possible be obtained.

The planned use of this material was, as has been noted above, as evidence for an evaluation of the role of airpower in the Pacific war. These interrogations, together with other material accumulated by the Naval Analysis Division, form the basis of reports to be submitted to the chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. In view, however, of the wide range of subject matter covered, the important and in some cases unique qualifications of the Japanese officers interrogated, and the improbability that such an investigation will ever or could ever be repeated, it is believed that these interrogations form a body of source material indispensable to any future study of the war with Japan.

R A Ofstie

Rear Admiral, USN,
Senior Navy Member,
U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

--III--

[Blank]

--IV--

Contents

Volume I: Page
        Foreword III
        List of Interrogations arranged numerically VI
        List of Interrogations arranged according to subject matter IX
        List of Illustrations XIII
        Index of Major Battles and Operations and Japanese Officials XV
        Interrogations 1-70 1
          
Volume II:  
        Interrogations 71-118 287
        Japanese Notes of Battles 541
        Biographies of Interrogated Japanese Officials 548
--V--

List of Interrogations
(Arranged Numerically)

Nav
No.
USSBS
No.
Subject page
1 6 Battle of Midway 1
2 11 HIRYU (CV) at the Battle of Midway 4
3 32 Battle of Philippine Sea (19-20 June 1944) 7
4 23 Battle of Midway 13
5 34 Allied Offensive Mining Campaigns 16
6 40 The Attack on Pearl Harbor; The Kamikaze Corps in Philippines and Okinawa 23
7 33 Occupation of Philippines and Dutch East Indies 25
8 46 Coral Sea Battle, 7-8 May 1942; Battle of Eastern Solomons 29
9 47 Battle of the Philippine Sea; Battle of Leyte Gulf 32
10 53 Solomon Islands Occupations and Battle of Coral Sea 53
11 61 Japanese Naval Escort of Shipping and Shipping Losses 56
12 62 Kamikaze Corps 60
13 65 Pearl Harbor - Midway - Solomons 65
14 67 Occupation of the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies 71
15 74 Operations of Japanese Naval Aircraft during Invasion of Philippines and Netherland East Indies 74
16 75 Battle of Eastern Solomons, 23-25 August 1942; Battle of Santa Cruz, 26 October 1942; Solomons Campaign, 1942-43 77
17 90 Invasion of the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies 83
18 93 Gilbert-Marshall Islands Operations 86
19 94 Operation of Main Body of Second Fleet 90
20 97 Aleutian Campaign, Carrier Aircraft Attack on Dutch Harbor 92
21 98 Aleutian Campaign, Seaplane Operations, the Naval Battle of the Komandorski Islands, and the Defense of the Kuriles 97
22 99 Aleutian Campaign, Japanese Occupation of Kiska, the Kiska Garrison, and Operations in the Kuriles 102
23 100 Aleutian Campaign, Japanese Flying Boat Operations in the Aleutians 106
24 101 Aleutian Campaign, Planning and Operations through November 1942 108
25 102 Aleutian Campaign and Defense of the Kuriles - Planning and Operations from November 1942 to August 1945 110
26 103 Mine Warfare 116
27 104 Note:Interrogation Nav. No. 27 (USSBS No. 104) is omitted from this series as it contains limited information which amplifies and clarifies the answers to questionnaire contained in Nav. Memorandum-6 which was submitted to the Japanese Government.  
28 112 Tokyo Air Defense 118
29 113 Pearl Harbor - Battle of Philippine Sea - Battle for Leyte Gulf 122
30 123 Air Defense Gilbert, Marshall and Marianas Islands 132
31 129 Aircraft Ferrying and Pilot Attrition JNAF 135
32 133 The Attack on the Yamato Group, 7 April 1945 136
33 138 Guadalcanal - Midway - Villa 141
34 139 Gilberts - Marshalls Operation Naval Strategic Planning 143
35 149 Battle off Samar, 25 October 1944 147
--VI--
Nav
No.
USSBS
No.
Subject page
36 150 Battle off Cape Engano, 24-25 October 1944 153
37 159 Attacks on Japanese Shipping 161
38 160 Japanese Plans for Defense of Central Pacific 165
39 165 Battle of Midway, Damage to Aircraft Carrier, Soryu 167
40 169 Non-Combat Losses of Aircraft 170
41 170 Battle of Samar, October 1944 171
42 181 Note: Interrogation Nav No. 42 (USSBS No. 181) is omitted from this series as it contains limited information which amplifies and clarifies the answers to questionnaire contained in Nav MEMORANDUM-7 which was submitted to the Japanese Government.  
43 192 Japanese Naval Planning 176
44 193 Defense of the Philippines, 1944 178
45 194 Escort and Protection of Shipping 184
46 195 Guadalcanal - Midway - Munda and Rabaul 191
47 199 Convoy Escort and Protection of Shipping - South China Sea Area 194
48 200 Japanese Airborne Magnetic Detector 197
49 201 Convoy Protection of Shipping Netherlands East Indies - New Guinea Area 201
50 202 Aircraft Availability and Loss Report 204
51 205 Aleutian Campaign, Transports at the Battle of the Komandorskis, 26 March 1943 207
52 224 Rabaul 209
53 225 Escort and Protection of Shipping 212
54 226 Mine Counter-measures 217
55 227 Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 1944 219
56 228 Aircraft escort of convoys and Anti-Submarine Operations 228
57 229 Escort and Defense of Shipping 230
58 233 Battle of Surigao Strait 235
59 251 Mine Counter-measures and Shipping Losses in Osaka and Soerabaja Areas 245
60 252 Transports at Midway; Transports at Battle of Eastern Solomons, 25 August 1942; Battle of Tassafaronga, 30 November 1942 249
61 225 Battle of Savo Island, 9 August 1942 255
62 256 Mine Warfare - Shimonoseki Straits and Formosa Areas 257
63 257 Anti-Submarine Training and Equipment 259
64 258 Japanese Naval Planning after Midway 262
65 285 Mine Warfare 267
66 295 Midway - Eastern Solomons - Philippines 269
67 311 Aleutian Campaign - Japanese Twelfth Air Fleet in the Kuriles and North Pacific 272
68 331 Japanese Invasion of the Philippines 275
69 345 Battle off Cape Engano 277
70 359 Observations on the Course of the War 284
71 360 Japanese Naval Land-Based Air Operations in Western New Guinea 287
72 366 Submarine Warfare 291
73 367 Aleutian Campaign, Operations of the Japanese First Destroyer Squadron 299
74 371 Anti-Submarine Warfare 309
75 378 Japanese War Plans and Peace Moves 313
76 379 Japanese War Planning 327
77 387 Operations of 22d Air Flotilla in Malaya 333
78 389 Empress Augusta Bay, 2 November 1943 337
79 390 Battle of Surigao Strait 341
80 392 Japanese Naval Plans 352
81 395 Occupation of the Philippines and Dutch East Indies 357
--VII--
Nav
No.
USSBS
No.
Subject page
82 396 Movements of Japanese Second Fleet in Central Pacific 359
83 407 Savo Island - Midway - Solomons - Leyte Gulf 361
84 408 Aleutian Campaign, Japanese Army Garrisons on Attu and Kiska 365
85 413 Japanese Capture of Wake Island 370
86 414 Production Wastage and Strength - Japanese Naval Air Force 374
87 420 First Air Fleet - Spring 1944 376
88 424 21st Air Flotilla 379
89 427 Carrier Aircraft Strikes on Saigon and Formosa 383
90 429 Observations on Japan at War 384
91 434 Shore-based Aircraft in the Marianas Campaign 396
92 435 Ship Operations - Rabaul Area 397
93 438 Aleutian Campaign, the Japanese Historical Account of the Naval Battle fought off the Komandorski Islands, March 1943 399
94 440 Japanese Army Air Force - New Guinea Area 404
95 441 Japanese Naval Operations - New Guinea Area 409
96 445 Marshalls-Gilberts Operations 411
97 446 Air Operations by Japanese Naval Air Forces based at Rabaul 413
98 447 Overall Planning and Policies 422
99 448 Shore-based Air in the Marianas 428
100 454 Palau Strikes - Marianas 432
101 459 Sinking of the USS Houston and HMAS Perth - 1 March 1942, First Transportation Corps in defense of the Philippines - 1944 436
102 460 Organization and Development of Japanese Convoy Escort 440
103 461 Aleutian Campaign, Deployment of Japanese Army Forces in the Kuriles, 1942 to 1945 443
104 462 The KON Operation for the Reinforcement of Biak 450
105 463 Escort of Shipping 455
106 464 Cape Esperance and Coral Sea Battles. Midway and Santa Cruz Battles 456
107 465 Submarine Attacks on Japanese Convoys 465
108 466 Japanese Submarine Operations 467
109 467 Solomon Islands Actions, 1942-43 470
110 468 Escort of Shipping 487
111 469 Escort of Shipping 491
112 473 The Air War, General Observations 497
113 484 Bismark Sea Convoy, 3 March 1943 500
114 485 Japanese Army Air Forces in Solomons Campaign 501
115 503 The Naval War in the Pacific 502
116 601 Japanese Land-Based Air Operations - Celebes and Rabaul Area 533
117 602 Japanese Naval Air Force Training 535
118 606 Aleutian Campaign, Information on Japanese Second Mobile Force and the Kiska Garrison from U.S. Prisoners of War 536
--VIII--

List of Interrogations
(Arranged by Subject Matter)

The Aleutian Campaign: page   Attrition, Training, Kamikaze - Con. Page
   Attu and Kiska, Japanese Army gar-        Kamikaze Corps 60
    sons on 365      Nav No. 12 - USSBS No. 62.  
   Nav No. 84 - USSBS No. 408.        Kamikaze Corps, Philippines and Oki-  
   Dutch Harbor, Carrier Aircraft Attack         nawa. Pearl Harbor, Attack on 23
    on 92      Nav No. 6 - USSBS No. 40.  
   Nav No. 20 - USSBS No. 97.        Non-Combat Losses of Aircraft 170
   First Destroyer Squadron, Japanese,        Nav No. 40 - USSBS No. 169.  
    Operations of 299      Production, Wastage and Strength,  
   Nav No. 73 - USSBS No.367.         IJNAF 374
   Flying Boat Operation, Japanese, in the 106      Nav No. 86 - USSBS No. 414.  
    Aleutians        Training, IJNAF 535
   Nav No. 23 - USSBS No. 100.        Nav No. 117 - USSBS No. 602.  
   Japanese Second Mobile Force and the        
    Kiska Garrison from U.S. Prisoners of 536   Central Pacific, Marshalls, Gilberts,  
    War, Information on       Wake Island:  
   Nav No. 118 - USSBS No. 606.        Central Pacific, Japanese plans for  
   Japanese Twelfth Air Fleet in the Kuriles 272       Defense of 165
    and North Pacific 102      Nav No. 38 - USSBS No. 160.  
   Nav No. 67 - USSBS No. 311        Central Pacific, Movements of Japanese  
   Kiska Garrison, Japanese Occupation of         Second Fleet in 359
   Kuriles Operations.        Nav No. 82 - USSBS No. 396.  
   Nav No. 22 - USSBS No. 99.        Gilbert-Marshall Islands Operations 86
   Komandorskis, Transports at the Battle 207      Nav No. 18 - USSBS No. 93.  
    of, 26 March 1943        Gilberts-Marshalls Operations 411
   Nav No. 51 - USSBS No. 205. 97      Nav No. 96 - USSBS No. 445.  
   Komandorski Islands, Battle of        Gilbert-Marshall-Marianas, Air Defense  
   Seaplane Operations.         of 132
   Kurile Defense.        Nav No. 30 - USSBS No. 123.  
   Nav No. 21 - USSBS No. 98.        Gilbert-Marshalls Operation Naval  
   Komandorski Islands, Japanese Histori- 399       Strategic Planning 143
    cal Account of, March 1943        Nav No. 34 - USSBS No. 139.  
   Nav No. 93 - USSBS No. 438.        Wake Island, Japanese Capture of 370
   Kuriles, Deployment of Japanese Army 443      Nav No. 85 - USSBS No. 413.  
    Forces in the        
   Nav No. 103 - USSBS No. 461.        
   Planning and Operations through No-     Convoy Protection - Escort Shipping:  
    vember 1942 108      Convoys, Aircraft Escort of 228
   Nav No. 24 - USSBS No. 101.        Anti-Submarine Operations  
   Planning and Operations and Defense of        Nav No. 56 - USSBS No. 228.  
    the Kuriles, November 1942 - August        Convoy Escort and Protection of Ship-  
    1945 110       ping - South China Sea Area 194
    Nav No. 25 - USSBS No. 102.        Nav No. 47 - USSBS No. 199.  
         Convoy Protection of Shipping - Nether-  
Attrition, Training, Kamikaze:         lands East Indies - New Guinea Area 201
   Aircraft Availability and Loss Reports 204      Nav No. 49 - USSBS No. 201.  
   Nav No. 50 - USSBS No. 202.        Escort and Protection of Shipping 184
   Aircraft Ferrying & Pilot Attrition        Nav No. 45 - USSBS No. 194.  
    JNAF 135      Escort and Protection of Shipping 212
   Nav No. 31 - USSBS No. 129.        Nav No. 53 - USSBS No. 225.  
--IX--
Convoy Protection - Escort Shipping - page   Midway - Continued Page
 Continued        Midway - Eastern Solomons - Philip-  
   Escort and Defense of Shipping 230       pines 269
   Nav No. 57 - USSBS No. 229.        Nav No. 66 - USSBS No. 295.  
   Escort of Shipping 455      Midway - Savo Island - Solomons -  
   Nav No. 105 - USSBS No. 463.         Leyte Gulf 361
   Escort of Shipping 487      Nav No. 83 - USSBS No. 407.  
   Nav No. 110 - USSBS No. 468.        Midway and Santa Cruz, Battle of;  
   Escort of Shipping 491       Cape Esperance and Coral Sea, Battles  
   Nav No. 111 - USSBS No. 469.         of 456
   Japanese Convoy Escort, Organization        Nav No. 106 - USSBS No. 464.  
    and Development of 440      Midway, Solomons, Pearl Harbor 65
   Nav No. 102 - USSBS No. 460.        Nav No. 13 - USSBS No. 65.  
   Japanese Naval Escort of Shipping 56      
   Shipping Losses.     Mine Warfare and Countermeasures:  
   Nav No. 11 - USSBS No. 61.        Allied Offensive Mining Campaigns 16
   Japanese Shipping Attacks on 161      Nav No. 5 - USSBS No. 34.  
   Nav No. 37 - USSBS No. 159.        Mine Counter-measures 217
         Nav No. 54 - USSBS No. 226.  
Marianas, Palau, Formosa, Okinawa, Iwo        Mine Counter-measures and Shipping  
 Jima:         Losses - Osaka and Soerabaja Areas 245
   Marianas Campaign, Shore-based Air-        Nav No. 59 - USSBS No. 251.  
    craft in 396      Mine Warfare 116
   Nav No. 91 - USSBS No. 434.        Nav No. 26 - USSBS No. 103.  
   Marianas, Shore-based Air in the 428      Mine Warfare in Shimonoseki Straits  
   Nav No. 99 - USSBS No. 448.         and Formosa Areas 257
   Palau Strikes - Marianas 432      Nav No. 62 - USSBS No. 256.  
   Nav No. 100 - USSBS No. 454.        Mine Warfare 267
   Philippine Sea, Battle of, 19-20 June        Nav No. 65 - USSBS No. 285.  
    1944 7      
   Nav No. 3 - USSBS No. 32.     Pearl Harbor, Attack On:  
   Philippine Sea, Battle of; Battle for Leyte        Pearl Harbor - Battle of Philippine  
    Gulf 32      Sea - Battle for Leyte Gulf 122
   Nav No. 9 - USSBS No. 47.        Nav No. 29 - USSBS No. 113.  
   Philippine Sea, Battle of - Pearl Har-        Pearl Harbor - Midway - Solomons 65
    bor - Leyte Gulf, Battle for 122      Nav No. 13 - USSBS No. 65.  
   Saigon and Formosa. Carrier Aircraft        Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Kamikaze  
    Strikes on 383       operations in Philippines, Okinawa 23
   Nav No. 89 - USSBS No. 427.        Nav No. 6 - USSBS No. 40.  
   Yamato Group, The Attack on, 7 April        
    1945 136   Philippine Islands, Japanese Occupation  
   Nav No. 32 - USSBS No. 133.      of  
         Philippines and Dutch East Indies,  
Midway         Operations of Japanese Naval Air-  
   Hiryu (CV) At the Battle of Midway 4       craft during Invasion of 74
   Nav No. 2 - USSBS No. 11.        Nav No. 15 - USSBS No. 74.  
   Midway, Battle of 1      Philippines and Dutch East Indies, Oc-  
   Nav No. 1 - USSBS No. 6.         cupation of 25
   Midway, Battle of 13      Nav No. 7 - USSBS No. 33.  
   Nav No. 4 - USSBS No. 23.        Philippines and Dutch East Indies, Oc-  
   Midway, Battle of - Damage to Aircraft         cupation of 71
    Carrier Soryu 167      Nav No. 14 - USSBS No. 67.  
   Nav No. 39 - USSBS no. 165.        Philippines and Dutch East Indies, Occu-  
   Midway and Eastern Solomons, Trans-         pation of 357
    ports at; Battle of Tassafaronga 249      Nav No. 81 - USSBS No. 395.  
   Nav No. 60 - USSBS No. 252.        Philippines and Dutch East Indies, In-  
          vasion of 83
         Nav No. 17 - USSBS No. 90.  
--X--
Philippine Islands, Japanese Occupation Page   Planning and Policies, Japanese - Con. Page
 of - Continued        Japanese War Planning 327
   Philippines, Invasion of 275      Nav No. 76 - USSBS No. 379.  
   Nav No. 68 - USSBS No. 331.        The Naval War in the Pacific 502
   Second Fleet, Operation of Main Body of 90      Nav No. 115 - USSBS No. 503.  
   Nav No. 19 - USSBS No. 94.        Observations on the Course of the War 284
         Nav No. 70 - USSBS No. 359.  
Philippine Islands, United States Re-        Observations on Japan at War 384
 Occupation of:        Nav No. 90 - USSBS No. 429.  
   Cape Engano, Battle off, 24-25 October        Overall Planning and Policies 422
    1944 153      Nav No. 98 - USSBS No. 447.  
   Nav No. 36 - USSBS No. 150.        Tokyo Air Defense 118
   Cape Engano, Battle off 277      Nav No. 28 - USSBS No. 112.  
   Nav No. 69 - USSBS No. 345.        
   First Air Fleet - Spring 1944 376   Rabaul, New Guinea, Malaya Areas:  
   Nav No. 87 - USSBS No. 420.        Bismark Sea Convoy - 3 March 1943 500
   Leyte Gulf, Battle for, October 1944 219      Nav No. 113 - USSBS No. 484.  
   Nav No. 55 - USSBS No. 227.        Celebes and Rabaul Area, Japanese Land-  
   Leyte Gulf, Battle for; Battle of Philip-         Based Air Operations in 533
    pine Sea 32      Nav No. 116 - USSBS No. 601.  
   Nav No. 9 - USSBS No. 47.        Guadalcanal - Midway - Munda and Ra-  
   Leyte Gulf, Battle for - Battle of Philip-         baul 191
    pine Sea - Pearl Harbor 122      Nav No. 46 - USSBS No. 195.  
   Nav No. 29 - USSBS No. 113.        KON Operation for Reinforcement of  
   Leyte Gulf - Savo Island - Midway -         Biak 450
    Solomons 361      Nav No. 104 - USSBS No. 462.  
   Nav No. 83 - USSBS No. 407.        Malaya, Operation of 22d Air Flotilla  
   Philippines, Defense of, 1944 178       in 333
   Nav No. 44 - USSBS No. 193.        Nav No. 77 - USSBS No. 387.  
   Philippines, First Transportation Corps        New Guinea, Western, Japanese Naval  
    in Defense of - USS Houston and         Land-Based Air Operations in 287
    HMAS Perth, Sinking of, March        Nav No. 71 - USSBS No. 360.  
    1942 436      New Guinea Area, Japanese Naval Opera-  
   Nav No. 101 - USSBS No. 459.         tions in 409
   Philippines, Midway, Eastern Solomons 269      Nav No. 95 - USSBS No. 441.  
   Nav No. 66 - USSBS No. 295.        New Guinea Area, Japanese Army Air  
   Samar, Battle off, 25 October 1944 147       Force in 404
   Nav No. 35 - USSBS No. 149.        Nav No. 94 - USSBS No. 440.  
   Samar, Battle off, 23-26 October 1944 171      Rabaul 209
   Nav No. 41 - USSBS No. 170.        Nav No. 52 - USSBS No. 224.  
   Surigao Strait, Battle of 235      Rabaul Area, Ship Operations in 397
   Nav No. 58 - USSBS No. 233.        Nav No. 92 - USSBS No. 435.  
   Surigao Strait, Battle of 341      Rabaul, Air Operations by Japanese  
   Nav No. 79 - USSBS No. 390.         Naval Air Forces Based at 413
         Nav No. 97 - USSBS No. 446.  
Panning and Policies, Japanese:        21st Air Flotilla 379
   The Air War - General Observations 497      Nav No. 88 - USSBS No. 424.  
   Nav No. 112 - USSBS No. 473.        
   Japanese Naval Planning 176   Solomon Islands:  
   Nav No. 43 - USSBS No. 192.        Coral Sea Battle, 7-8 May 1942; Battle  
   Japanese Naval Planning After Midway 262       of Eastern Solomons 29
   Nav No. 64 - USSBS No. 258.        Nav No. 8 - USSBS No. 46.  
   Japanese Naval Plans 352      Coral Sea, Battle of, and Solomon Islands  
   Nav No. 80 - USSBS No. 392.         Operations 53
   Japanese War Plans and Peace Moves 313      Nav No. 10 - USSBS No. 53.  
   Nav No. 75 - USSBS No. 378.        Coral Sea and Cape Esperance Battles;  
          Midway and Santa Cruz Battles 456
         Nav No. 106 - USSBS No. 464.  
--XI--
Solomon Islands - Continued page   Solomon Islands - Continued page
   Empress Augusta Bay - 2 November        Solomons, Transports at Eastern; Battle  
    1943 337       of Tassafaronga, 30 November 1942;  
   Nav No. 78 - USSBS No. 389.         Transports at Midway 249
   Guadalcanal- Midway - Villa 141      Nav No. 60 - USSBS No. 252.  
   Nav No. 33 - USSBS No. 138.        Solomons Campaign, Japanese Army  
   Guadalcanal - Midway - Munda -         Air Forces in 501
    Rabaul 191      Nav No. 114 - USSBS No. 485.  
   Nav No. 46 - USSBS No. 195.        
   Midway - Eastern Solomons - Philip-     Submarine and Anti-Submarine Operations:  
    pines 269      Anti-Submarine Operations, Aircraft  
   Nav No. 66 - USSBS No. 295.         Escort of Convoys and 228
   Savo Island, Battle of, 9 August 1942 255      Nav No. 56 - USSBS No. 228.  
   Nav No. 61 - USSBS No. 255.        Anti-Submarine Equipment and Train-  
   Savo Island - Midway - Solomons -         ing 259
    Leyte Gulf 361      Nav No. 63 - USSBS No. 257.  
   Nav No. 83 - USSBS 407.        Anti-Submarine Warfare 309
   Solomons Campaign, 1942-43; Battle of        Nav No. 74 - USSBS No. 371.  
    Eastern Solomons, 23-25 August 1942;        Submarine Attacks on Japanese Con-  
    Battle of Santa Cruz, 26 October 1942 77       voys 465
   Nav No. 16 - USSBS No. 75.        Nav No. 107 - USSBS No. 465.  
   Solomons, Midway, Pearl Harbor 65      Japanese Submarine Operations 467
   Nav No. 13 - USSBS No. 65.        Nav No. 108 - USSBS No. 466.  
   Solomon Islands Actions 1942-43 470      Submarine Warfare 291
   Nav No. 109 - USSBS No. 467.        Nav No. 72 - USSBS No. 336.  
         Japanese Airborne Magnetic Detector 197
         Nav No. 48 - USSBS No. 200.  
--XII--

List of Illustrations

Note. - Plates for illustrations are numbered according to the Nav No. of the interrogation in which they appear; i. e. Annexes A, B, and C for Nav No. 9 are numbered Plate 9-1, 9-2, and 9-3.

Plate Title Page
9-1 Command Organization - Battle for Leyte Gulf 35
9-2 Submarine Attack on Second Fleet, 23 October 1944 37
9-3 Disposition of Second Fleet on Contact with U.S. Forces, 25 October 1944 40
10-1 Track Chart, Battle of Coral Sea, 4-8 May 1942 facing p. 54
13-1 Track Chart, Battle of Midway, 4-6 June 1942 facing p. 68
13-2 Action of the Battle of Midway, 5 June 1942 69
16-1 Track Chart Japanese Forces, Battle of Santa Cruz, 25-16 October 1944 78
29-1 Attack on Pearl Harbor 123
29-2 Retirement Plans after Pearl Harbor 125
29-3 Command Organization, Defense of the Philippines, 1 October 1944 129
32-1 Track Chart of Yamato 137
32-2 Bomb and Torpedo Hits on Yamato 138
35-1 First Diversion Attack Force at Time of Submarine Attack, 23 October 1944 148
36-1 Cruising Disposition of Third Fleet Striking Force, Battle of Leyte Gulf 155
45-1 Submarine Attack on Convoy 7 miles off Lingayen Gulf, 10 April 1944 185
45-2 Submarine Attacks on Convoys off Borneo and Indo-China Coast, 4 or 5 and 10 November 1944 187
45-3 Bombing and Strafing Attack on Japanese Convoy 20 miles South of Formosa, 30 January 1945 188
45-4 Standard Disposition for Convoy Escorts 189
48-1 Use of MAD Equipped Planes in Convoy Escort 198
48-2 Track Flown by MAD Equipped Plane after Initial Submarine Contact 199
50-1 Japanese Naval Aircraft Production and Wastage, December 1941 - August 1945 206
50-2 Japanese Naval Aircraft Losses, December 1941 to August 1945 facing p. 206
53-1 Approximate Track of South Bound Convoy to Saipan, June 1944 213
53-2 Carrier Aircraft Attack on Convoy North of Quinhon Bay, 12 January 1944 215
57-1 Submarine Attack on Convoy between Kasho-To and Formosa, June 1944 231
57-2 Submarine Attack on Convoy between Formosa and Manila, September 1944 232
58-1 Fifth Fleet Disposition and Command Relationship, Battle of Surigao Strait 239
58-2 Track of Fifth Fleet - Surigao Strait 241
60-1 B-17 Attack on Midway Transports, 3 June 1942; PBY Torpedo Attack on Midway Transports, 4 June 1942 251
60-2 Track Chart of Japanese Forces, Battle of Eastern Solomons, 23-25 August 1942 253
69-1 Air Defense Formation, Battle of Leyte Gulf 280
73-1 Rough Sketch of Komandorski Action, 27 March 1943 308
78-1 Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, 2 November 1943 339
79-1 "C" Force Dispositions, Battle of Surigao Strait 343
79-2 Track of "C" Force Enroute Leyte 345
79-3 Track of "C" Force, Battle of Surigao Strait 348
85-1 Japanese Invasion of Wake Island, 10-23 December 1941 373
86-1 Strength of Japanese Air Force, 1 December 1941 375
86-2 Japanese Naval Air Strength, Production and Wastage facing p. 374
87-1 Diagrams of Night Torpedo Attacks employed by Japanese Naval Aircraft, February 1944 378
--XIII--
Plate Title Page
93-1 Diagram of Bomb Hits on Nachi and Tama, Aleutian Campaign 403
93-2 Track Chart of Komandorski Engagement, 27 March 1943 facing p. 402
94-1 Japanese Army Air Force - Fourth Air Army 405
97-1 Effective Air Strength - Eleventh Air Fleet - Rabaul 415
97-2 Combat Losses - Japanese Naval Aircraft - Solomon Campaign 421
101-1 Track of Forces, Banten Bay, Java 438
103-1 Deployment of Troops (Kuriles), First Half 1943 444
103-2 Deployment of Troops (Kuriles), about November 1943 445
103-3 Deployment of Troops (Kuriles), Mid 1944 446
103-4 Deployment of Troops (Kuriles), about November 1944 447
103-5 Deployment of Troops (Kuriles), August 1945 448
103-6 Army Shipping Losses in the Kuriles 449
104-1 "KON" Operation Track Chart, 2-11 June 1944 453
106-1 Track of Japanese Force, Battle of Cape Esperance 457
106-2 Track Chart of Shoho (CV), "MO" Operations (Port Moresby) 458
106-3 Torpedo and Bomb Hits on Shoho (CV), Battle of Coral Sea 459
107-1 Submarine Attack on Convoy North and West of Luzon, June-July 1944 466
108-1 Track of Japanese Submarines - Battle of Midway 468
109-1 Battle of Guadalcanal, 12 November 1942 477
109-2 Battle of Guadalcanal, 12 November 1942 478
109-3 Battle of Guadalcanal, 12 November 1942 479
109-4 Battle of Guadalcanal, 12 November 1942 480
109-5 Battle of Guadalcanal, 12 November 1942 481
109-6 Battle of Guadalcanal, 14 November 1942 482
109-7 Battle of Guadalcanal, 14 November 1942 483
109-8 Battle of Guadalcanal, 14 November 1942 484
109-9 Battle of Guadalcanal, 14 November 1942 485
109-10 Battle of Savo Island, 8-9 August 1942 486
110-1 Submarine Torpedo Attacks on Convoy off Padarang, 18 February 1945 489
111-1 Carrier Aircraft Attacks on Convoys, 4 August 1944 493
111-2 Submarine Torpedo Attacks on Convoy Northeast of Palau, 1-2 May 1944 494
111-3 U.S. Submarine Attack on Convoy, January 1945 495
--XIV--

>Index
(By Nav Interrogation Number)

Aleutians - 20, 24, 25, 73, 118   Marshall Islands - 13, 18, 30, 34, 38, 43, 96, 109, 115
"A" Operation - 9   Midway (MI Operations) - 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16,
AGO Plan - 3, 43, 71, 75, 95, 99, 104      20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 39, 43, 46, 52,
Attu - 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 51, 73, 84      60, 64, 66, 69, 70, 73, 75, 76, 83, 90, 98, 106, 109,
Bombing Dive - 1, 2, 3 , 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 28, 30,      112, 115
   32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 46, 52, 53, 60, 66, 82, 83, 89, 106,   Mines - 5, 11, 16, 26, 45, 46, 52, 54, 59, 62, 65, 92,
   109, 111, 115      95, 100, 105, 110, 115
Bombing Torpedo - 2, 4, 8, 10, 11, 16, 32, 33, 35, 36,   Nagano, Osami, Admiral - 13, 80
   39, 40, 41, 46, 53, 60, 82, 83, 106, 109, 111, 115   Netherlands East Indies - 5, 7, 11, 14, 15, 17
Bombing Horizontal - 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23,   New Guinea - 57, 71, 94, 95, 97, 104, 115
   25, 29, 30, 33, 34, 37, 39, 40, 45, 46, 49, 52, 53   Nishimura, Shoji, Vice-Admiral - 9, 29, 35, 36, 41,
   56, 57, 60, 66, 83, 84, 94, 96, 104, 105, 106, 109, 110, 111, 112,      44, 55, 58, 64, 69, 75, 79, 115
   115, 118   Nomura, Kichisaburo, Admiral - 90
Cape Engano Battle - 36, 55   Okinawa - 3, 5, 6, 12, 13, 115, 116
Cape Esperance - 106   Ozawa, Jisaburo, Vice Admiral - 3, 9, 12, 29, 36, 41,
Coral Sea - 3, 8, 10, 13, 35, 36, 43, 106      44, 55, 58, 64, 69, 75, 79, 99, 115
Dutch Harbor - 1, 2, 7, 13, 20, 23, 24, 73, 118   Palau - 5, 11, 29, 72, 100, 115
Eastern Solomons (Battle of) - 8, 97, 106   Philippine Sea (Battle of) - 9, 29, 55, 58, 69
Emperor - 12, 43, 76, 90   Philippines - 3, 6, 7, 9, 12, 14, 15, 17, 29, 34, 36,
Escort Shipping - 5, 11, 37, 45, 47, 49, 53, 56, 57, 74,      37, 44, 55, 64, 72, 75, 90, 99, 101, 102, 112, 115
   102, 110, 111   Port Moresby (MO Operation) - 8, 10, 95, 98, 106
Formosa - 9, 16, 29, 44, 55, 64, 69, 112, 115   Rabaul - 3, 13, 16, 34, 38, 46, 52, 78, 82, 97, 115,
French Indo China (Air Attacks on) - 53      116
Fuel Oil and Gasoline (Tankers) - 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13,   Radar - 1, 2, 3-4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 20, 22, 25, 30, 32, 33,
   28, 29, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 44, 47, 48, 55, 58, 59, 64,      35, 36, 37, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 69, 72, 73, 74, 78,
   66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, 76, 80, 90, 97, 110, 112, 115, 117      79, 84, 87, 97, 108, 110
Fukudome, Shigeru, Vice Admiral - 41, 44, 115   Saigon - 89, 102, 115
Germany - 5, 8, 10, 12, 26, 65, 70, 72, 74, 80, 90,115   Samar - 9, 35, 36, 41, 44, 66, 69
Gilberts - 8, 18, 30, 34, 38, 96, 109, 115   San Bernardino Strait - 3, 9, 66, 75
Guadalcanal - 3, 13, 16, 31, 33, 43, 46, 70, 75, 76, 80,   Santa Cruz - 8, 16, 34, 97, 106
   83, 90, 97, 98, 106, 109   Savo Island - 8, 16, 61, 83, 109
Hong Kong - 37   Sho Operation - 3, 9, 12, 29, 36, 55, 64, 69, 72, 75,
Houston - 7, 14, 17, 101      79, 99, 101, 112, 115
Iwo Jima - 28, 29   Solomons - 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40,
Japan, Air Attacks on - 28      52, 60, 66, 69, 78, 82, 83, 89, 92, 97, 98, 114, 115, 116
Java Sea - 7, 14, 17, 68, 81   Submarines (American) - 2, 3-4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 17, 21,
Kamikaze - 6, 9, 12, 16, 36, 44, 55, 56, 75, 112, 115,      22, 25, 34, 37, 39, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 53, 56, 57, 63,
   116      67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 90, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 115
Ketsu Operations - 6, 12   Surigao Strait (Battle of) - 9, 41, 75, 79
Kiska - 13, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 51, 73, 84, 118   Ta Operations - 37
Koga, Mineichi, Admiral - 34, 99, 100, 115   Tassafaronga - 60
Komandorskis - 21, 25, 51, 73, 84, 93   Ten Operation - 29
Kon Plan - 71, 94, 95, 104   Toyoda, Soemu, Admiral - 3, 5, 9, 12, 29, 35, 36,
Kula Gulf - 16      41, 55, 58, 64, 69, 75, 79, 99, 115
Kuriles - 21, 22, 25   Truk - 3, 11, 16, 30, 34, 40, 87, 97, 110, 115
Kurita, Takeo, Vice Admiral - 9, 12, 29, 35, 36, 41,   Vella Gulf - 33
   44, 55, 58, 64, 69, 75, 79, 82, 115   Vella La Vella - 16, 46, 109
Leyte Gulf - 9, 29, 35, 36, 41, 44, 55, 58, 64, 66, 70,   wake - 10, 30, 85
   72, 75, 76, 79, 83, 90, 101, 115   Yamamoto, Isoroku, Admiral - 4, 10, 13, 20, 24, 55,
Makassar Straits - 7      75, 90, 100
Manila - 11   Yonai, Mitsumasa, Admiral - 43, 76, 90
   91, 95, 98, 99, 100, 115   "Z" Operations - 43
--XV--

Interrogations
1-70

685287 O - 46 - 2

*****

Interrogation NAV No.1
USSBS No. 6

The Battle of Midway

TOKYO

6 October 1945

Interrogation of: Captain AMAGI, Takahisa, IJN, Naval Aviator, Air Commander (observer) on CV HIRYU at PEARL HARBOR, Air Officer on CV KAGA at Battle of MIDWAY, 3, 4, 5 June 42.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Captain S. Teller, USN; Captain J.S. Russel, USN; Lt. Col. Parry, USA; Comdr. J.T. Hayward, USN; Comdr. T.H. Moorer, USN; Lt. Comdr. J.A. Field, Jr., USNR.

SUMMARY

The KAGA (CV) in company with the CV's HIRYU, SORYU and AKAGI, and BB's KIRISHIMA and HARUNA and DD's composed the Air Striking Force approaching MIDWAY ISLAND from the West in support of an occupation force. This force had expected contact and attack by long range United States aircraft when between 500-1000 miles of MIDWAY and attack by short range aircraft from MIDWAY when within 300 miles. No attacks were made on the Carrier Force prior to the dive bombing attack the morning of 4 June. The presence of the United States Carrier was not known to this officer. Dive bombing attacks were most feared.

Several hours after sunrise on 4 June (Plus 12) dive bombers attacked that Japanese Carrier Group. Four direct hits were received by the KAGA from the dive bombers just prior to turning into the wind to launch the KAGA's air group (6 VF had been launched two hours before as CAP). The fires as a result of the attack ignited planes and ammunition which resulted in the sinking of the KAGA during the afternoon with the loss of 800, saving 1000 personnel. No other bomb hits were made on the KAGA. No horizontal bomb hits were received or observed on other ships of the formation, but it was reported the HARUNA (BB) just astern of the KAGA had also been hit by dive bombers. Captain Amagai stated that as a result of the damage to the aircraft carriers with consequent loss of air power, the decision was made to abandon the attempt to seize MIDWAY. The remainder of the Task Force returned to JAPAN.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What aircraft carrier divisions were present at MIDWAY?
A. The Third Fleet or Third Task Force, commanded by Vice Admiral NAGUMO. Rear Admiral KUSAKA was Chief of Staff.

Q. Who were Captains of the Carriers at MIDWAY?
A. Captain Okada of the KAGA, Captain Kaka of the HIIRYU, Captain Yanagimoto of the SORYU and Captain Aoki of AKAGI. The first three were killed at MIDWAY.

Q. Were there any other forces such as Support Force or Occupation Force?
A. Believe there were two other forces for occupation, but am not sure of composition or relative location.

Q. Do you know what Force made simultaneous attack in ALEUTIANS?
A. JUNYO Aircraft Carrier No. 4 Squadron.

Q. What was purpose of ALEUTIAN attack?
A. It was a feint.

Q. Draw a diagram of the cruising disposition of the Aircraft Carriers.

( ) KIRISHIMA (BB)

HIRYU (F)
( )

AKAGI (F)
( )

SORYU
( )

KAGA
( )

( ) HARUNA (BB)

NAV-1

--1--

In daytime a circular formation was used, but at night a column was formed. Believe the Task Force Commander was on the SORYU.

Q. What was the composition of the KAGA's Air Group?
A. It was composed of 21 fighters (0) Type: 27 VB (99 Type); 18 VT (97 Type); same as all other carriers.

Q. What was the mission of the Carrier Task Group?
A. To attack MIDWAY, to help occupation.

Q. During your approach to MIDWAY did you expect to be attacked by American planes?
A. We had expected an attack by scouting planes at 1000 miles, and by bombing planes at 700 miles and by small planes at 300 miles.

Q. Did you see any planes during the approach to MIDWAY prior to the battle of 4 June?
A. No, but it was reported that an American plane was heard over the carrier formation at night, one or two days before the battle.

Q. Was the carrier formation attacked by long range bombers about 600 miles from MIDWAY, or were any air attacks made on the carrier force prior to the day of the battle (4 June, plus 12; 5 June, TOKYO time)?
A. No.

Q. Were any submarine attacks made on the carrier force during the approach?
A. No.

Q. When was the KAGA first hit?
A. It was hit by dive bombers two or three hours after sunrise, 4 June (5 June Tokyo time).

Q. How many bombs hit the KAGA?
A. There were four hits on the KAGA. The first bomb hit the forward elevator. The second bomb went through the deck at the starboard side of the after elevator. The third bomb went through the deck on the port side abreast of the island. The fourth bomb hit the port side aft. When the bombs hit, big fires started. Unable to see much because of smoke.

Q. Did any of the American bombers dive into the deck?
A. No, not on KAGA. Did not hear that any had dived on other carriers.

Q. Were any other ships hit by bombs at same time?
A. It was hard to see because of smoke, but I believe that the Battleship HYEI just astern of the KAGA was hit by dive bombers and a fire started on the stern of the HYEI.

Q. Was the KAGA attacked by horizontal bombers?
A. No.

Q. Was the KAGA attacked by torpedo planes?
A. I saw torpedo planes but do not think KAGA was attacked. No torpedo hits were made. However, while swimming in water several hours after attack saw a torpedo apparently fired from submarine strike side of ship at angle and bounce off. Didn't explode. Torpedo went bad.

Q. Were any other ships attacked by horizontal bombers?
A. Did not see any hit. Saw some pattern of bombs fall in water during day.

Q. Which type of attack most feared - torpedo plane, dive bomber, or horizontal bomber?
A. Dive bomber, cannot dodge.

Q. Were planes on board when ship was hit?
A. Yes, about 30 planes in hangar loaded and fueled, remainder on deck, six VF in air.

Q. Did bombs sink the ship?
A. Yes, gasoline and bombs caught fire. Ship sank itself, Japanese no need sink with torpedo.

Q. Was KAGA strafed by planes?
A. Was done during diving, one or two personnel and planes on deck were injured.

Q. When did it sink?
A. Same afternoon.

Q. What kind of planes made the attack - torpedo planes, dive bombers or horizontal bombers?
A. Dive bombers.

--2--

Q. In what order was attack made?
A. I think first high horizontal bombers, no hits. Then torpedo attack. Was dodged, no hits. Then dive bombers, 4 hits. Then more horizontal bombing about 400 meters away. No hits. Most attack all the same time.

Q. How many personnel lost when ship sunk?
A. About 800 lost. About 1000 saved.

Q. How many pilots saved?
A. About 40 pilots. About 50% pilots saved.

Q. How were the personnel rescued?
A. By cruisers and destroyers.

Q. How many airplanes did you expect to lose in the attack on MIDWAY?
A. It all depends upon Captain of ship. He expects about 1/3 do not come back.

Q. Were any KAGA planes launched to attack MIDWAY?
A. No, all planes on board except six fighters overhead. I heard that they landed on other ships. Other ships had launched planes to attack MIDWAY but KAGA planes were waiting for orders to launch and attack.

Q. How many protective fighters (CAP) were over carrier formation?
A. Normally 28. Two carriers supplied eight each, the other two carriers provided six each. This was normal patrol. If attacked, other planes rose to meet opposition.

Q. How long did fighters stay in air, and how were planes in air relieved?
A. Two hours. When the waiting planes get in air up high, then the former patrolling plane comes down and lands.

Q. When the carrier launched the patrol did it turn into the wind alone, or did all ships turn?
A. All turn in same formation. We use 14 meters wind over deck for landing and launching. If only few planes launched individual carrier turns into wind. If many planes launched or landed entire formation turns. When over 300 miles from target, carriers operate independently. When within 300 miles of target, all ships maneuver together.

Q. About how far apart were the ships in the formation?
A. A square formation about 4000 meters apart. When need much speed and wind, distance large. When wind and sea strong, the distance diminishes.

Q. Did the formation zigzag?
A. Yes.

Q. Were destroyers employed with the carriers when operating the planes?
A. Yes, sometimes, one, sometimes two destroyers would come from outside circular screen. They take station about 700 meters astern.

Q. How are fighter planes controlled in the air?
A. By wireless. A special officer controls the planes. He is a pilot, in his absence the anti-aircraft commander takes his place.

Q. How did the control officer know where to send the fighters?
A. By radar. It was an experiment at MIDWAY. Not too good.

Q. Did the KAGA have it?
A. No, island too small.

Q. What ships in the formation had radar?
A. HIRYU, maybe SORYU. Not sure of AKAGI, it is rather old ship. (JUNYO did not have it because it was a small converted merchant ship.)

Q. What did the radar look like?
A. It was a big wire grid. Kept rotating. Didn't work very well. Destroyers act as pickets and advise by voice radio if planes are coming. More radars put on ships middle of 1942 and used in SOLOMON ISLANDS operations.

--3--

NAV-1

Interrogation NAV No.2
USSBS No. 11

HIRYU (CV) at the Battle of Midway

TOKYO

10 October 1945

Interrogation of: Captain KAWAGUCHI, Susumu, IJN, Air Officer on the HIRYU (CV) at MIDWAY.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Brig. Gen. G. Gardner, USA; Lt. Paine Paul, USNR.

SUMMARY

The HIRYU was one of four aircraft carriers in the Japanese Striking Force supporting the planned occupation of MIDWAY Island, June 1942. When about 600 miles from MIDWAY a U.S. plane passed overhead but did not observe ships due to high fog. No aircraft attacks were made on the carrier group until about an hour after sunrise on 4 June when the formation was attacked by torpedo planes (B-26’s and TBF’s). No hits were made since the long dropping range permitted torpedoes to be easily avoided. A little later, the formation was attacked by high (approximately 18000’) horizontal bombers but no hits were made. The HIRYU launched planes against MIDWAY about sunrise then later against the U.S. Carrier Force. Although the KAGA, AKAGI, and SORYU had received damage during the day, the HIRYU was not hit until late afternoon when she received six hits from dive bombers setting her afire. Still later the same afternoon an unsuccessful bombing attack was made on the HIRYU by horizontal bombers at medium altitude. The fires resulting from the dive-bombing attack spread to the engine room during the night, rendering the ship helpless. She was sunk by torpedoes from a Japanese destroyer the next morning.

About sixty pilots were lost in the battle. About 500 out of the 1500 men on the ship were lost. This group of ships was not attacked during retirement, although search planes were seen. Visibility was poor. Surviving pilots of the battle were distributed between the ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU, and SOLOMON Islands. These pilots later participated in the battle of SANTA CRUZ, 26 October 1945. As the war progressed the quality of pilots deteriorated due to insufficient training facilities, great attrition, and a shortage of fuel for training with the consequent necessity of using inadequately trained replacements.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What was the number of the air fleet at MIDWAY?
A. It was of the Second Air Attack Force of the First Air Fleet.

Q. What ships were present in Carrier Force at MIDWAY?
A.

1st Div (CV) 2nd Div (CV)  
AKAGI (F) HIRYU (F)  
KAGA SORYU  
     
BB CA CL
KIRISHIMA TONE NAGARA
HARUNA CHIKUMA  
About ten DD’s.    
Disposition
      ( ) Kirishima      
  ( )       ( ) Nagara  
  ( ) Hiryu (F)
( )
  Akagi (FF)
( )
( )  
( )           ( )
Tone ( )   Soryu
( )
  Kaga
( )
  ( ) Chikuma
  ( )   ( ) Haruna   ( )  
         

( )

 
    ( )   ( )    

NAV-2

--4--

Q. When you left JAPAN what was the mission of the air fleet at MIDWAY?
A. It was to seize MIDWAY.

Q. What plans were made for the employment of MIDWAY following the seizure? Did they expect to run searches, go to PEARL HARBOR and the ALEUTIANS or to stop at MIDWAY?
A. Just to defend Midway. Heard of no other plans other than to seize and protect MIDWAY.

Q. What carriers were in the ALEUTIANS?
A. RYUHO and JUNYO; there was no 3rd division, the first and second divisions are in the attack body, the 4th at DUTCH HARBOR, the third did not exist.

Q. During the approach to MIDWAY did you expect an attack; if so, about how far out?
A. Think a two-engined scout plane looked us over once about 500-600 miles from MIDWAY the day before the battle; but the weather was so bad, we still didn’t expect an attack.

Q. Was your formation attacked by submarines at any time during the approach?
A. No, the first submarine attack was on the KAGA after the battle opened.

Q. When was the HIRYU first attacked?
A. On the 4th of June, two hours before sunset. (5 June Tokyo time.)

Q. Were you attacked by a B-17 formation (Four engined bombers) the day before the battle?
A. No, we didn’t get anything the day before but we were attacked by Boeings on the day of big battle and didn’t get hit. There was no attack on 3rd of June.

Q. Do you know of any ships that may have been hit by torpedoes from B-26’ or PBY’s?
A. Not a hit in those days of the battle on the carrier formation.

Q. Were you attacked with torpedoes in the morning of the battle of 4 June?
A. About an hour after sunrise, we were attacked by torpedo bombers.

Q. Were they single or twin-engined?
A. Mostly they were twin-engine, none of them hit. They were dropped at very great range and we were able to avoid them.

Q. Do you know if one of the twin-engined planes, after dropping the torpedo, flew into the deck of one of the carriers?
A. No, I was observing and know that did not happen.

Q. In the early morning of the 4th of June (5 June Tokyo time) did you receive an attack from high level horizontal bombers?
A. About two hours after sunrise some very high four engine planes attacked, maybe 5,000-6,000 meters, but did not hit anything.

Q. How and when was the HIRYU hit?
A. The HIRYU was hit six times during the fourth attack by dive bombers. One on forward elevator. Two just forward aft elevator. Lifts damaged. Fire. Many engineering personnel killed. The floor of the lift flopped against the bridge. We were unable to navigate.

Q. When the HIRYU was hit were any planes on board?
A. Very few about 20 planes had come back. They had been launched to attack American carriers after they returned from MIDWAY.

Q. Will you confirm the position of the island in relation to bow of ship?
A. AKAGI – port, SORYU – starboard, KAGA - starboard.

Q. Did any planes deliver an attack on the ENTERPRISE?
A. Yes, they did attack.

Q. How did they locate the ENTERPRISE?
A. From scout planes about 200 miles off to the east.

Q. Were you attacked by horizontal- bombers later that day?
A. It was about sunset the same day after the dive-bombers gave us six hits that we got about ten misses from Boeings. I think it was B-17’s or something else. It was medium altitude horizontal–bombing. I don’t think they were very high and was astonished at the distance away from the ship when they released bombs.

Q. How many bombs dropped?
A. About ten bunches.

Q. Where did they hit?
A. They didn’t hit – bombs landed about 500 meters away.

NAV-2

--5--

Q. Were any of the battleships hit at that time?
A. I think that something touched the KIRISHIMA or HARUNA in the stern, didn’t do much, no difficulty in navigation as a result.

Q. Was that a result of the horizontal-bombers?
A. No, this was the dive-bombing attack. One of them dived and dropped a bomb on the KIRISHIMA but horizontal bombs didn’t hit the KIRISHIMA.

Q. How were the other carriers hit?
A. All got hit from the dive-bombers.

Q. How were our torpedo planes shot down?
A. I think it was fighter planes in the main.

Q. How was your ship finally sunk?
A. The fire got to the engine rooms by the next morning and stopped the ship, whereupon a Japanese destroyer was called to sink it with torpedoes.

Q. How many men and pilots were lost on the HIRYU?
A. About sixty pilots and a total of 500 men of the crew of 1500.

Q. Why didn’t the occupation force and Grand Fleet continue on to MIDWAY?
A. Because we could not occupy the island having lost our air attack force.

Q. During your retreat did you sight any of our reconnaissance planes?
A. We saw five or six of your planes, on the morning of the 5th, but they didn’t attack us.

Q. Did the HIRYU or any of the other carriers or ships have radar?
A. No, not any. As soon as we got back they put them on the carriers. July 1942 both battleships and carriers received them.

Q. How did you control your fighters in the air?
A. At first at MIDWAY we set the courses on the ships and turned them loose on the first attack. No radio.

Q. Which kind of attack did you most fear, dive-bombing, torpedo or horizontal-bombing?
A. The worst is dive-bombing.

Q. Why?
A. You can’t avoid it, but you can avoid torpedoes at long range.

Q. Do you know if they intended to attack MIDWAY again?
A. All hands thought it was no use.

Q. Do you know if the attack on MIDWAY was instigated by the Army or Navy Command?
A. I believe it was a combined general staff decision.

Q. Did the loss of these carriers result in sending their pilots and aircraft into the SOLOMONS as land based planes?
A. Some of the pilots went back to JAPAN, some went to bases in the SOLOMONS, and some were assigned to the SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU in the SOLOMONS Area.

Q. Do you know why they continued to send troops, planes and ships into the SOLOMONS in little groups instead of one big group?
A. There were not enough personnel and equipment at home to throw a big bunch in there, therefore they had to go in small increments.

Q. Do you know what influenced the decision to withdraw from the SOLOMONS?
A. I heard it was because we couldn’t supply them. I got very little on plans. Personally thought that Americans were landing too much around us and we should have to give up what we had and go on the defensive. I thought that because we had insufficient number of planes, we couldn’t hope to take offensive action. I thought it was defensive holding from that time on.

Q. Do you know if the Navy had planned for a short war or a long war?
A. We all thought that if it was a long war, the Navy would be finished, and we thought it would be a long war.

Q. What did you consider a long war?
A. If it was short it would be less than two years, something over five years if it were long.

Q. Was there any improvements in aircraft material or personnel during the war?
A. The pilots got worse but the planes got better.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 3
USSBS NO. 32

THE BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA, 19-20 JUNE 1944

TOKYO

16 October 1945

Interrogation of: Vice Admiral OZAWA, Jisaburo, IJN, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Task Force in subject battle.

Interrogated by: Rear Admiral R. A. Ofstie, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Captain T.J. Hedding, USN; Captain D.J. McCallum, USN; Lieut. Comdr. J.A. Field, jr., USNR.

SUMMARY

The Battle of the PHILIPPINE SEA occurred on 19-20 June 1944 in the sea area west of the MARIANAS, and during the U.S. landing operations on SAIPAN. Major units of the opposing fleets were engaged. On the first day, Japanese carrier aircraft, coordinated with shore based Naval aircraft, carried out a large scale attack on U.S. Task Force 58. Approximately 400 enemy aircraft were shot down, with only moderate U.S. air losses and minor damage to our surface vessels. U.S. submarines sank two Japanese aircraft carriers on this day. On 20 June, at about sunset, U.S. carrier aircraft attacked the Japanese Fleet, sinking one carrier, seriously damaging a second, and sinking two and damaging one of the accompanying tankers.

Admiral OZAWA, who commanded the Japanese Fleet in this action, discusses Naval planning for this operation and movement of forces to the battle area, and gives details of the engagement on both days and subsequent retirement to home waters. He touches briefly on later planning, and offers miscellaneous comment and opinion on various features of the war.

TRANSCRIPT

Plans and Early Movements

Q. Admiral Ozawa, today we propose to discuss the First Battle of the Philippine Sea, 19-20 June 1944. At the beginning of this operation, say about the 10th of June, where were you based, and when did you start on the ensuing operation?
A. The entire fleet was at TAWI TAWI. Left there on or about 10th June (not sure of exact date), fueled in GUIMARAS STRAIT, and then south of MASBATE on to SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT, the due east refueling at sea at about Long. 130°. After refueling started battle here (referring to chart) at about long. 135°. Details are uncertain and approximate.

Q. Why was TAWI TAWI your base?
A. Because the original plan was to get out south of MINDANAO to approach either the Western CAROLINES or the MARIANAS. If this was impossible or inadvisable we meant to go through SURIGAO STRAIT. TAWI TAWI was the best location to meet these arrangements.

Q. What was the information on which this plan was based; why did the task force leave on the 10th of June?
A. The first possibility was that the American Fleet would come up from NEW GUINEA to attack PALAU; the second possibility was that the fleet would come to the MARIANAS. A radio from SAIPAN stated that your force was coming to the MARIANAS, so the task force left TAWI TAWI on receipt of that information.

Q. At that time were SAN BERNARDINO and SURIGAO STRAITS mined?
A. There were Japanese mines in both passages in certain places.

Q. What was the status of training of the Air Groups when you left TAWI TAWI; do you feel that they were well trained, completely trained, or what was your view?
A. The training was very insufficient because the airfield at TAWI TAWI was still under construction.

Q. Had the air groups done some training at SINGAPORE previous to that?
A. The First Squadron only had trained at SINGAPORE; the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons were trained in JAPAN.

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Q. All pilots, however, could land on board in the daytime?
A. Yes, they were capable, but not at night.

Q. What were the basic plans for defense against American landings in the MARIANAS, and by whom were they prepared?
A. There were land-based planes at PALAU, YAP, and GUAM. They were here under direct command of the Combined Fleet, and not under Admiral OZAWA. These air forces, coordinating and cooperating with the task force, were to conduct operations against the American Task Force. This was the original plan of the Combined Fleet Headquarters.

Q. This was the AGO Plan, issued by Admiral Toyoda?
A. Yes, and Toyoda made the plan.

Q. Did you have a conference with Admiral Toyoda before the operation, regarding the plan?
A. The two Admirals had had no conference; Admiral Toyoda was in JAPAN, Admiral OZAWA was in SINGAPORE when the plan was originally received. It was an order from Admiral Toyoda.

Q. About when did the order come out?
A. Perhaps the end of April or beginning of May.

Q. You mentioned that the shore-based air force was under C-in-C Combined Fleet. Were they all Navy, or Army and Navy?
A. All Navy planes.

Q. There were no Army planes in the Islands?
A. There were no Army planes.

Q. What was Admiral OZAWA'S command status relative to these planes; could he give direct orders to them himself or did he have to go back to Admiral Toyoda?
A. They were under command of Admiral Toyoda.

Q. What was the means of arranging coordinated action once the operation started? Did Admiral OZAWA have to go to Admiral TOYODA to direct them?
A. The command was issued by Admiral TOYODA, and I was trying to work along the line of that command. As to the details of how the cooperation was done, I do not remember.

Q. What I meant was, could you, Admiral OZAWA, make decisions effecting shore-based air without reference to Admiral TOYODA?
A. That was done. The First Air Fleet Headquarters was at TINIAN, and the C-in-C of the First Air Fleet had the direction of the air force of all land-based planes.

Q. What was the approximate strength of the aircraft of the First Air Fleet in all those islands?
A. Altogether the land-based planes totaled about 500.

Q. Was that part of the AGO Plan?
A. Yes.

Q. Admiral, will you outline your initial plan; how you intended to strike at the beginning, and what you intended to accomplish here?
A. The first purpose was to attack the American Task Force in cooperation with land-based planes. The second consideration was to attack the landing force with the Second Fleet.

Q. What information did you have as to the strength of the American Task Force?
A. I received information that one task force was around here, about 200 miles south, and another task force was northwest of SAIPAN. These were reports from land-based scout planes.

Q. To go back; when you sortied from TAWI TAWI what did you think the total American strength was?
A. I did not receive any detailed information of the American Task Force but was inclined to think that the whole American Task Force was coming, complete, with about 12 or 13 carriers.

First Day, 19 June 1944

Q. What losses did you have on the first day and when did they occur relative to the time of initiating your attack?
A. Two carriers were sunk that day, the TAIHO and SHOKAKU.

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Q. Give me details about the sinking of the SHOKAKU.
A. She was sunk by a submarine at one o'clock in the afternoon (not quite sure of details; was far from the scene). The first wave of planes had left the ship, and the submarine attack occurred before the second wave was launched. The first wave had not yet returned. I received a report that the carrier was afloat 2 or 3 hours after the hit.

Q. As for the TAIHO, what happened there?
A. It was a submarine torpedo at 0900 on the 19th. All the gasoline spread around in the hanger deck exploded, and because of this explosion the TAIHO sunk at perhaps 1100.

Q. Before launching the first wave?
A. After the first wave left and before the second wave was launched.

Q. You then transferred to what ship?
A. I transferred to the ZUIKAKU by means of a destroyer.

Q. During this period, when ships were lost and the 1st and 2nd waves of planes were sent out for the attacks, was the whole disposition fairly close together, say within 50 miles?
A. Within a range of 100 miles, the entire formation.

Q. What were the first reports you had of the results of the air attack on the American Task Force; when did you get reports and what were they?
A. I did not know until this operation ended and the planes returned. In other words, during the action I received no report of American damage, and never did receive full information.

Q. About how many planes did you send out; how many waves and how many planes?
A. The 1st wave was 300 planes altogether (not quite sure); the 2nd wave a very few planes on account of the two carriers being sunk, perhaps about 100.

Q. The other planes sank with the carriers?
A. Yes.

Q. About what total of planes did you have in all the ships before you came up there?
A. We brought altogether about 400 or 450 planes.

Q. And of those planes how many returned from the 1st and 2nd waves?
A. I do not recollect; but very few returned.

Q. Did you know whether a considerable number had gone in and landed at GUAM and TINIAN?
A. I received a report to that effect. I think they landed at GUAM and TINIAN.

Q. How were plans changed as a result of first days action?
A. The plan was changed to such an extent that the next day the ships were to go back west to refuel and then try to attack again. There were no changes in basic plan but a necessitated change in Japanese movements.

Q. Did you receive any new directive or intelligence from Admiral TOYODA as a result of the first day?
A. I received no report from Admiral Toyoda directly as a result of the first days action.

Q. When the 1st and 2nd waves were sent out, what were the flight commanders orders; what were they to attack, first priority - what was the plan?
A. The main order was to attack the carriers in conjunction with land-based planes; only to attack the carriers. Also the land-based planes were to attack carriers.

Q. This is the point, if attacks from all the planes were to be coordinated, was an effort made to strike at the same time?
A. The planes made formation (rendezvous) in individual squadrons, and every squadron was to take its individual target.

Second Day, 20 June 1944

Q. The next day you had very few planes; about how many left?
A. Perhaps a little less than 60, perhaps about 40 planes left on the ZUIKAKU of the entire First Air Squadron. About the same number of planes left in the 1st and 3rd squadrons.

Q. What was your plan to employ these planes on the 20th?
A. The day of the 20th was occupied by refueling, and keeping watch against submarines. Next attack was intended to be made on the 21st.

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Q. During the day of the 20th while refueling, etc., and until late in the day, what information did you have on movements of the U.S. Task Force?
A. American scout planes interfered with the fueling operations, and the force had to go still further west. Fueling never was accomplished, and about evening the American bombing attack was received and resulted in the loss of one carrier in the 2nd Air Squadron.

Q. That was the HIYO?
A. Yes, and the JUNYO received serious damage. By result of that attack we had to change the refueling and attacking plan altogether. We abandoned original plans and retired to OKINAWA, and at the same time I received a dispatch from Admiral TOYODA that we should abandon the attack and return.

Q. That night you received the dispatch?
A. In the evening of the 20th I received orders to similar effect from Admiral TOYODA.

Q. With respect to the HIYO, can you tell me the details of the damage; did you sink her or did she sink from torpedo or bombing attack?
A. She sank on account of damage, mostly by bombing.

Q. How soon did she sink?
A. Perhaps 1-1/2 hours; she had very insufficient defense equipment because it was a converted carrier and had insufficient compartmentation and protection.

Q. Now with regard to the JUNYO. How much damage was done to her, and did you tow her or could she get away herself?
A. She received a bomb to right of the bridge aft. She received another bomb in some part, but even though damaged it did not affect the speed of movement or affect maneuvering. On account of the damage on the flight deck she could not use the airplanes.

Q. Were there any other ships damaged in that attack, that you know of?
A. I am certain there was no other damage on other ships.

Q. That applies only to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Air Squadrons; or does it include the support force?
A. I remember clearly there was no other damage.

Q. Did you have reports on the tankers, which were near you then? Any damage to them?
A. Yes, I received a report on the tankers; 2 or 3 tankers were damaged.

Q. The entire fleet moved then to OKINAWA?
A. Yes, all the fleet retired to OKINAWA.

Miscellaneous Battle Comment

Q. What was the first time you thought you knew that the American Fleet had you located?
A. After 5 or 6 hours after we left SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS, I thought we were found by an American submarine or shore watchers.

Q. You had radar in all your ships then?
A. All ships were equipped with radar, but I was very doubtful whether or not our men had mastered the use of radar.

Q. In other words you had no reports by your own radars of any of our aircraft coming over and picking you up?
A. We got it not from radar but from interceptions of dispatches.

Q. That was the day before?
A. Five hours out of SAN BERNARDINO.

Q. About midnight of the 18th-19th, the night before the engagement, one of our patrol planes picked up your force. Did you know that?
A. No, I did not know that.

Q. Did you observe radio silence from the time you sortied until the time the action was initiated on the 19th?
A. Yes, but I think I did send out some radio message on the night of the 18th.

Q. For what reason did you break radio silence; was there an important message to be sent?
A. We sent a radio to instruct the land-based airplanes where to attack the American Task Force.

NAV-3

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Q. Asking them where, or telling them the location of our task force?
A. Telling them mainly the place. It was already understood that the attack would be made in early morning. These instructions were sent to coordinate the action of land-based planes.

Later Plans, Movements, and General Comments

Q. After retirement to OKINAWA, what steps were taken to make new plans as a result of this action?
A. The force refueled at OKINAWA and received order from Admiral TOYODA to return to the INLAND SEA.

Q. Did you then have a conference with Admiral TOYODA, or what was done to prepare new plans as a result of the Marianas battle?
A. I reported verbally to Admiral TOYODA.

Q. And Admiral TOYODA then issued new plans?
A. Admiral TOYODA issued a new order. I didn't have any conference with him on this plan, and had no voice in framing the new plan.

Q. When you first approached the MARIANAS the night of the 18th-19th with your plan of attacking by air and then bringing the fleet in during the final approach, was the intention to come in straight toward SAIPAN, or to come from the south or from the north in a flanking approach? In other words, were you going to go in straight, or come from the side to get the transports?
A. The plan was to go in direct. It would take too much fuel to take the longer route, which had been considered, but we planned to go in straight and we did not change that plan during the approach. Perhaps a little southerly sag in the line of approach for the sake of air cover, but in the main plans agreed to were straight approach.

Q. What date did you get back to the INLAND SEA from OKINAWA?
A. We reached OKINAWA the 22nd or 23rd, immediately refueled and both the 3rd and 2nd Fleets departed either that night or the next morning for the INLAND SEA.

Q. How long did the fleets stay there in the INLAND SEA?
A. The 2nd Fleet and 3rd Fleet, excepting the carriers, stayed there about ten days and then all the able ships except the carriers of the 3rd Fleet joined the 2nd Fleet and departed for SINGAPORE. The 3rd Fleet carriers stayed in the INLAND SEA.

Q. The 2nd Fleet stayed in SINGAPORE until about time for the sortie for the Philippine landings?
A. They stayed in SINGAPORE and LINGGA and BRUNEI BAY.

Q. How long did the fleet stay at SINGAPORE?
A. The Fleet went to SINGAPORE area where damage was repaired for the ships requiring it, and training was undertaken at LINGGA by the balance of the fleet.

Q. The new plan put out by C-in-C Combined Fleet - Admiral TOYODA; what was the substance of that plan?
A. There was a new plan, dependent on the location of American operations. I think the plan was divided into three possibilities: An attack on the PHILIPPINES at LEYTE or around MINDANAO, FORMOSA or OKINAWA.

Q. That was the "SHO" Plan of operation?
A. It was the "SHO GO" operation.

Q. Will you express briefly what, in your opinion, was the effect of the Battle of the CORAL SEA in May 1942? What was the effect on planning; did it cause JAPAN to go on the defensive?
A. I was in SINGAPORE at the time so I do not know exactly what kind of effect that battle had on the plans. I do not think that the Battle of the CORAL SEA affected future main planning.

Q. Now the same thing with respect to the Battle of MIDWAY in which four carriers were lost; how do you feel about that?
A. I think that on account of the result of the MIDWAY battle the planning for future operations was very difficult on the side of JAPAN.

Q. Do you mean that at that point it had changed to the defensive?
A. Thereafter it became necessary to consider the naval operations as mainly defensive on account of loss of 4 carriers.

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Q. Down in the South Pacific in the SOLOMONS, in the RABAUL-GUADALCANAL Area, there was a long period of fighting night actions in which we lost many ships and JAPAN lost many ships. Did that long period of attrition have some predominant effect on operations?
A. JAPAN lost quite a few ships, also damaged air force which made future planning more difficult.

Q. What is your personal opinion as to the relative importance to the whole war of the loss of Japanese Naval strength in ships, the loss of Naval air strength, loss of merchant shipping, and loss of oil?
A. First is the air force - the damage to air force means damage to all the rest. The other three are all dependent on damage to the air force.

Q. Now again down in the SOLOMONS, in the RABAUL-GUADALCANAL Area; you had heavy air losses there and for that reason that was an important campaign, is that correct?
A. Due to the damage of air forces they could not very well replace air force, therefore they could not replace anything else successfully to keep up the strength of RABAUL.

Q. Aircraft or pilots?
A. Same thing with pilots.

Q. Throughout the PACIFIC side of the operations, excluding CHINA; what was the approximate percentage of Japanese Naval aviation as against Japanese Army aviation that was employed?
A. If you include CHINA, then the forces of Army and Navy are about equal; but if CHINA is excluded I do not know.

Q. Wasn't there a predominance of Naval aircraft in the TRUK-RABAUL Area?
A. After MIDWAY there were very few carrier pilots who were assigned land bases in the SOLOMON Area; nearly all of them were reserved for other carrier duty. Excluding CHINA but including BURMA, JAVA and MALAYA, the Navy and Army were about equal. But if you mean the Pacific Ocean Area without the MALAY ARCHIPELAGO, it was almost exclusively Navy. There was some Army air strength in the NEW GUINEA Area, toward the end of the SOLOMONS operations.

Q. After the occupation of the MARIANAS did you feel there was any reasonable chance of defeating our fleet, or of destroying our airforces?
A. I did not know much about the replacement of airplanes, but I thought if the land-based airplanes were prepared to such an extent that they could counter American attack, then I thought there was a fair chance of defeating the American forces.

Q. To go further then. After the 2nd Philippine Operation in October 1944, when you had lost four carriers, then you had no strength to defeat our fleet except with shore-based aircraft. That was the plan then, to use shore-based aircraft?
A. That was then the only way to attack the American forces, with shore-based planes.

Q. In your personal opinion was there any particular outstanding weakness or strength, one way or the other, in the American Fast Carrier Forces? In other words, what were the weakest and the strongest features of the American fast carriers?
A. The particular strength of your task force is the use of radar, interception of radio messages, and intercepting by radar of Japanese air attacks which they can catch and destroy ("eat up") whenever they want to. That is the strength. The weakness we noticed in the beginning of the campaign was the slowness, the lack of maneuverability in case of torpedo attack. Towards the end maneuvering ability improved and we could not successfully deliver a torpedo attack in strength enough to sink anything.

Q. When was construction work on new Japanese carriers discontinued?
A. I do not know the exact date of the discontinuance of building new carriers but think that up to the very end of the war a very high priority was given to this construction.

Q. When did the Naval Air Force shift from carriers to shore bases; at approximately what time?
A. Right after the second Philippines campaign they shifted to a defensive plan, with carrier planes shore based.

(Note: Interrogation of Admiral OZAWA to be continued on Tuesday, 30 October 1945, at 0930)

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Interrogation NAV No.4
USSBS No. 23

Battle of Midway

TOKYO

9 October 1945

Interrogation of: Captain AOKI, Taijiro, IJN. Commanding Officer of AKAGI (CV) at Battle of MIDWAY. He was not a pilot.

Interrogated by: Captain C. SHANDS, USN.

Allied Officers present: Brig. Gen. G. GARDNER, USA; Cmdr. T. H. MOORER, USN; Lt. Cmdr. J. A. FIELD, Jr., USNR.

SUMMARY

The AKAGI was one of four aircraft carriers comprising the Eleventh Air Fleet, in the striking force at the planned occupation of MIDWAY ISLAND, June 1942. The CV’s were first attacked about 200 miles from MIDWAY, 2 hours after sunrise, 4 June by many planes carrying torpedoes, all of which were avoided. The first indication of the presence of the United States carriers was the dive bombing attack which scored two hits on the AKAGI. The AKAGI had launched half of her planes to bomb MIDWAY but forty were still being serviced when hit. No more were launched. 200 were lost and 100 wounded, out of a total complement of 1400. On the morning of the 5th a Japanese DD torpedoed and sank the AKAGI. The KAGA, SORYU, and HIRYU were sunk due to damage inflicted by dive bombers. No other damage was sustained from air attack by ships in the striking force except possible damage to one battleship’s superstructure. No planes seen on the 5th or later during retirement.

The loss of the CV’s caused plans for the occupation to be abandoned.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What ships were present in the carrier force at MIDWAY?
A. AKAGI, KAGA, HIRYU and SORYU (all CV’s) HIYEI or HARUNA and KIRISHIMA (BB), TONE and CHIKUMA (CA), NAGARA (CL), about ten or twelve destroyers. AKAGI was in the Eleventh Air Fleet.

Disposition

        ( )        
    ( ) DD       ( ) DD    
        ( ) Kirishima (BB)        
( ) DD     ( ) Hiryu (CV)   ( ) Akagi (CV)     ( ) DD
( ) (DD)     ( ) Soryu (CV)   ( ) Kaga (CV)     ( ) (DD)
        ( ) Hiyei (BB)        
  ( ) (DD)     (Haruna)     ( ) (DD)  
    ( ) (DD)       ( ) (DD)    

Q. What were the other three units?
A. The Grand Fleet was there to act as support, commanded by Admiral YAMAMOTO.

Q. What was the mission of the Eleventh Air Fleet?
A. Simply to bombard MIDWAY by planes.

Q. What was the mission of the entire fleet?
A. That was to help. Entirely separate from this was the occupation force.

Q. Was the Air Fleet separate from the Grand Fleet?
A. Yes, of course it was under the Grand Fleet, but was a separate force.

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Q. During the approach to MIDWAY when did you expect the first air attack?
A. About 500 miles from MIDWAY, but our carriers were first attacked in the morning about two hours after sunrise, about 200 miles from MIDWAY.

Q. What type planes made the first attack?
A. Torpedo planes, then dive bombers. First a great many torpedoes were dropped from planes, then dive bombers hit.

Q. Were any attacks made on the carrier force during the approach by B-17’s or PBY’s?
A. There were none. Torpedo planes in the morning of attack but no four engine bombers.

Q. Were any planes seen or heard during the approach the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of June?
A. There was a high fog and the day before the action opened they heard one above the clouds in the day time.

Q. Was the AKAGI hit by any four-engined or horizontal bombers?
A. Not once.

Q. Were any ships hit by horizontal bombers?
A. I think all ships were hit by dive bombers.

Q. Did you lose any ships to submarines during approach?
A. No, none at all.

Q. On the day before the main action about 600 miles from MIDWAY, was the formation attacked by long range planes?
A. No.

Q. How was the AKAGI damaged?
A. Fire; two bombs by dive bombing about two hours after sunrise, (one started a fire at after elevator). Planes were loaded up with bombs inside the hanger and caught fire.

Q. Did you see any horizontal bombers over the formation at the time?
A. KIRISHIMA was under attack by horizontal bombing. It was not hit. Near misses.

Q. Were the AKAGI’s planes in the air?
A. About half of them were up attacking MIDWAY. We were servicing others in the hanger, about forty on board. We had high cover of 6 Zero Type fighters in addition.

Q. Was this the first group launched from AKAGI?
A. This was the first group launched from all the ships.

Q. Were any other planes launched from AKAGI to attack our carriers?
A. There was no second flight from the AKAGI.

Q. Which type of attack was most feared – horizontal, dive bombing or torpedo?
A. Diving, you can swing away from torpedoes, but the worst is dive bombing.

Q. Was AKAGI sunk as a result of those two bomb hits or was she sunk later by Japanese destroyers?
A. It did not sink by bombs. She was sunk by a Japanese destroyer’s torpedoes during the next morning. Engines were helpless, fire damage, could not navigate so gave up the ship; many engineers were killed. 200 were lost, 100 were wounded out of 1400 on board.

Q. How many pilots were saved; how many lost?
A. Six pilots were lost. Others landed and were picked up by destroyers.

Q. Why didn’t the task force continue to MIDWAY?
A. Too much damage to aircraft carriers, lost control of air.

Q. What other carriers or ships were lost?
A. KAGA, SORYU, HIRYU. No damage to battleships or serious damage to any other ships in our group.

Q. In what other operations was the AKAGI?
A. PERAL HARBOR was the first, she attacked at CEYLON and TRIMCOMALEE, next MIDWAY. MIDWAY was the only action in which I was aboard.

NAV-4

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Q. Did our aircraft carrier raids on JAPAN affect the training of pilots during the war?
A. When your planes were attacking we had to stop training and so lost time besides training planes. However, we didn’t suffer much from the loss of training planes.

Q. Had the Navy planned on a war of long duration?
A. They were all talking that it would be long, but nobody hazarded a guess as to duration. As soon as it began we thought it would be a long war.

Q. About how many planes or pilots did you expect to lose at MIDWAY, that is from anti-aircraft and attack?
A. Because we had suffered so little at PEARL HARBOR at the beginning of the war, we thought we would get away with the same thing at MIDWAY. I think that other ships in the task force lost a good many pilots, but as far as my ship was concerned, we got off very easily.

Q. Did you have radar on the AKAGI?
A. No.

Q. Did any ships at MIDWAY have radar?
A. YAMATO, MUTSU and NAGATO in the Grand Fleet may have had it. There was no ship at MIDWAY or carrier which had it.

Q. Do you know when they were first installed and first used?
A. I don’t know but when I went to the arsenal at KURE, I saw the grids on the ISE and HYUGA. It was August 1942 after MIDWAY. I supposed that they must have been installed on better ships by then.

Q. While cruising to MIDWAY was radio silence observed?
A. There was radio silence.

Q. Was an interpreter radio guard stood on CW or voice frequency?
A. There was nothing but curiosity, but there was not a real guard.

Q. During passage to MIDWAY, were flight operations conducted or carried out?
A. Training flights for about two days (Weather bad); anti-submarine patrols every day. No combat air patrols.

Q. What number and types of planes were used for anti-submarine patrols?
A. 97 Type attack planes. Four planes were used for anti-submarine patrol, searching out at a distance of about 40,000 meters.

Q. In the operations at night did the carriers form a column?
A. At night it was the same ring formation.

Q. Were the destroyers stationed astern of the carriers in cruising formation?
A. All outside the circle.

Q. When landing and launching planes also?
A. They were 500 or 600 meters astern at time of recovery of planes.

Q. When you launched or recovered planes did all ships turn into the wind or just the carrier that was landing planes?
A. It was all at the same time if it was a long operation. Otherwise in short operation the single carrier maneuvered.

Q. Did it make any difference how far they were from the enemy?
A. It had nothing to do with that distance.

Q. How did the planes find their way back to the ship, did you have radio homing device?
A. Only radio. As soon as the planes made their attack, they were to come back without radio help. Only on request from the pilot would ship send message.

685287 O - 46 - 3

NAV-4

--15--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 5
USSBS NO. 34

Allied Offensive Mining Campaign

TOKYO

10, 12, 16 October 1945

Interrogation of: Captain TAMURA, Kyuzo, IJN. War time duties were devoted to Mine construction and mine sweeping.
Commander SUGITA, Binfo, IJN. Mining officer on staff of First Escort Fleet.

Interrogated by: Comdr. T.H. Moorer, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Captain T.J. Hedding, USN; Comdr J.H. Hayward, USN; Lieut. Comdr. J.A. Field, jr., USNR.

SUMMARY

The Japanese first discovered mines in home waters in 1942. These were presumably laid by submarine. A few ships were sunk and normal sweeping operations were conducted.

Additional mines were discovered in the South Pacific but losses sustained, though substantial, did not seriously affect the line of supply. A complete record of such losses is not available at this time.

As the B-29 mining campaign progressed, the mines changed from a nuisance to a major problem. Subsequent to 1 April 1945, the largest shipping losses were caused by mines lain in Japanese waters. The Japanese were not prepared for such air attacks, and although the defense against mining was given top priority over all defense matters, countermeasures, particularly against the pressure type mine, were neither effective nor available in sufficient quantity. Finally the mines were present in such quantity and supplies were so urgently required that the Japanese were forced to sail their vessels through dangerous waters, regardless of loss.

Shipping control, defense measures, and sweeping techniques are also discussed in this interrogation. Certain technical information was furnished under separate cover.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. When did the Japanese actually suspect mine laying from submarines?
A. The first ones were discovered at CHOSHI and shortly after that at the entrance of OSAKA BAY.

Q. Did you detect mines in THAILAND or INDO-CHINA in October and November 1942?
A. Mines were discovered off the coast of JAPAN in January of 1943, at end of February or the beginning of March 1943. From the beginning to the end of the war the only submarine mines we knew about were the ones at CHOSHI and OSAKA.

Q. What countermeasures did you take against these mines?
A. At OSAKA, one of the mines rose to the surface, of course we simply removed it. One countermeasure in any event was ordinary minesweeping operations. The mines recovered in CHOSHI and OSAKA were in quantity of about 10 or 15.

Q. Were any ships sunk or damaged by these mines?
A. At CHOSHI, one 2-3,000 ton cargo ship; at OSAKA, about two 1,000 ton cargo ships were sunk as well as one 3,000 ton cargo ship.

Q. Was merchant ship routing changed as a result of this mine laying?
A. Yes, we simply changed the route by changing the channel; also went further off-shore and avoided points close to land.

Q. Did the Japanese encounter any mines in the SOLOMON's Campaign?
A. As far as we were concerned the definite information about moored mines was only in these two areas mentioned. We agreed that submarines were laying floating mines, but definite place of moored mines laid by submarines was unknown to us.

Q. Were any provisions made for minesweeping gear for the SOLOMON's Campaign?
A. There were no minesweeping operations in the SOLOMONS Area.

Q. Is there a list of the losses which you incurred from mines alone, (merchant ships and naval vessels)?
A. I can get the information. Our statistics are not very good because we were not positively informed as to whether or not the ships were sunk by mines, torpedoes, storms or other reasons. I have the list for seas around JAPAN and I have the total figures. But the big problem is that all the records were burned and I must go around asking for information; the figures will not be complete.

NAV-5

--16--

Q. At what time in the war did the mines change from a nuisance to a problem?
A. About 1 April 1945. The reason this chart was made was that, at the point the chart starts, losses from mines started to increase, (terrifically). The losses from submarines decreased.

Q. Before April 1945, did you anticipate this problem and make any preparations in the way of countermeasures?
A. Yes, but on a small scale. We found a lot of magnetic bars at SINGAPORE, we brought them back and manufactured sweeping gear copied from the English type.

Q. Did the use of these various ships (the disposing ships), the vessels to tow the sweeps and the men to man them, seriously interfere with merchant shipping?
A. The whole program was not conducted as efficiently as we would have liked. First of all we used as disposing vessels those in poor state of repair; we realized we would have to have a certain program with a certain number of vessels and personnel for security of safety for other shipping, so we did the best we could and used as many vessels as possible; but it wasn't nearly as successful as we hoped.

Q. Were you prepared in any way for our speeded up B-29 offensive mining operations in April?
A. We were not prepared. The only way we realized B-29s were dropping mines by parachute, had no advance notice, was by visual detection. We knew you would probably do it, expected to make some preparation, but we were not satisfied.

Q. I would like to know if this intensive mine program affected the morale of the crews of the merchant ships?
A. The crews of Japanese merchant ships and Naval vessels were very worried and frightened by this mining, but they were all under orders and had to work through it.

Q. What effect did this have on the routing of ships, particularly after SHIMONOSEKI STRAIT was mined so heavily?
A. The materials were brought by railroad to points in MANCHURIA and then shipped to INLAND SEA ports.

Q. When did you actually close the SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS?
A. I admit that it was closed.

Q. Was the shipping situation so critical that it was necessary to send ships through the minefields regardless of the fact that the minefields were not properly swept?
A. We forced shipping through regardless of the knowledge that it was dangerous. If we suspected mines were in certain areas, we stopped shipping for one day, pending sweeping operations; but then started in again, realizing full well that ships would be lost.

Q. Will you make an estimate as to what loss the Japanese were willing to accept? For instance, if ten ships passed through the minefields, were you willing to accept the loss of one to get nine through?
A. Around June and July this year conditions were so bad that, regardless of the losses, we pushed the ships through. We never worked out a plan of percentage, I think a certain percentage of losses are expected. We place a certain area under a Commanding Officer with the responsibility of seeing that the area is clear. Then if he says it is clear, we send the ships through; if he says not, we send them somewhere else. We leave it up to the Area Commander or Port Director to route the ships. The Commanders weren't relieved of their commands if too many ships were lost in their area. We realized big losses would result and we blamed no one. In the beginning, we had half regular Navy and half reserves; the losses were terrific so we replaced them (the reserves) with regulars. But even the regulars had difficulty and there were many changes in Commanding Officers. The situation was very bad and we used the most competent personnel available.

Q. After you swept and marked the channel did you have any difficulty keeping ships in the channels? Were there many ships lost who attempted to take short cuts and who didn't follow the channel?
A. The obedience to orders in regards to channels was very good; but even so, mines cropped up in supposedly swept channels and there were losses.

Q. What was the width of the swept channels?
A. The widest channel was 500 meters. Our plans were to sweep channels from 600-800 meters, but due to shortage of sweeps the best average width of a channel we were able to produce was 200 meters.

NAV-5

--17--

Q. What was the procedure used in the passage of a convoy through a channel?
A. We used a lead ship and followed in column.

Q. How was the routing of shipping controlled? In other words, how was the presence of these various minefields made known to ships and on whose authority were they routed to the different ports?
A. Each naval District or Area Commander was in complete charge of convoy and routing, and had control of all shipping.

Q. Do you have a publication similar to this which traces development of your various sweeps and which shows how you made improvements as the types of mines were changed?
A. (Referred to booklets).
The magnetic pressure mine was the most difficult to sweep. This list is put out by the Navy Ministry and is a compilation by the scientists all over Japan who were put to work on developing countermeasures against mines, particularly the magnetic pressure mine.

Q. What system did you use in plotting mines dropped by B-29s and how successful were you in actually determining where these mines were in order to know where to sweep?
A. In the KYUSHU area we had a lot of radar as well as sweeps and survey crews; in the INLAND SEA Coast we had some people watching but these were not very effective methods of plotting.

Q. Was it very often that mines fell on the beach and if so do you have a list of the mines which were recovered from the ground?
A. This is the list of these found (Referred to list). This is a chart for March, April, May and June showing the different types of mines which were recovered, swept up, etc. If we didn't get the mines by the third time, we quit sweeping; only three tries to sweep. During May, June and July period the total number was 636 mines (328-209-99 added), this is the total number of all mines recovered on land in each month. All types were recovered on land.

Q. How many mines did you estimate were laid by B-29s in Japanese Waters?
A. March 450; April 117; May 414; June 1509; July 1200. Total mines estimated by Japanese to have been dropped on Japan home waters - 3690.

Q. What information did you obtain from the Germans?
A. This type mine (refer charts) was brought by submarine from GERMANY in summer of 1942. We thought it was very funny because it was the same type as a captured American mine (Shortland Area). The Navy has a Department of Research on countermeasures against mines at Tokyo Imperial University. In my opinion the main reason for the war's ending unsuccessfully for JAPAN was the lack of cooperation between the scientists and the military. They (the scientists) got no cooperation. I feel that if they had been placed in the same level as a soldier in a civilian uniform they would have been much better; I think they didn't care or didn't try. The Navy made no attempt to put pressure on them. The following professors were engaged in mine countermeasure work:
Professors Shimizu, Kaya, Tsuboi, Hagiwara, Nigata, all at Tokyo Imperial University.
These men cooperated to a limited extent, but no real effort was made on their part.

Q. Did you ever attempt any minesweeping with airplanes?
A. We tried but were unsuccessful and stopped. We attempted to sweep the magnetic mine fields (Moored mines). The other mines were too small to find by plane.

Q. Can anyone tell us what ships were lost as a result of mines in the SOLOMONS?
A. 1942, 2 or 3 DD's, large type. I can give you some approximate figures but we wouldn't know what sunk these ships - carriers, submarines, torpedo, or what. I only know approximate figures, the man who would know is dead.

Q. In your opinion did the mining affect the Naval strategy in any way?
A. In my opinion and according to what I have heard the only affect your mining operations had in the SOLOMONS area was to force our shipping to exercise a greater degrees of caution. It did not necessitate an overall change in strategy.

Q. Does this apply to the BALIKPAPAN, DUTCH EAST INDIES, and SINGAPORE Area?
A. Plans were not changed in the CELEBES, DUTCH EAST INDIES, SOERBAJA Areas, although losses were high, (highest in April 1945).

Q. Were all these operations furnished with very latest minesweeping equipment (Captain shows sketch of sweeping operations). Do you know what ships were sunk at PALAU by mines laid by aircraft?
A. Two or three merchant ships were sunk there by mines.

NAV-5

--18--

Q. Do you know how many mines were recovered or swept at PALAU?
A. I think about 15 or 16 were swept, the mooring type were at PALAU (the Mark 10).

Q. How long was the anchorage actually closed as a result of mining?
A. For four or five days.

Q. Did you continue to use PALAU as a fleet anchorage after it was mined?
A. Sweeping was very effective at PALAU against the moored type. We weren't able to enter the anchorage, but used the narrow channel as an anchorage; but were unable to get into the regular anchorage after the mining operation.

(Captain Hedding then drew plan of PALAU HARBOR and TAMURA indicated the channel which was closed - North Channel).

Statement in regard to list of sinkings: All vessels that were sunk are on this list. (Given to Comdr. Moorer). Captain TAMURA tried to determine what ships were sunk by mines, alone, but information at the Navy Ministry is not complete enough to clearly determine the exact cause of the sinkings of a given vessel. (Refer to list turned over to Comdr. Moorer). All sinkings are listed by areas, but it is impossible to determine exactly whether vessel sunk by mines or submarines.

Q. Are the merchant vessels on this list 500 tons or larger?
A. All are over 500 tons, nothing smaller than 500 tons was navigable over such large areas.

Q. Were the SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS actually closed for any period of time; if so for how long?
A. They were closed from March 1945 up to the end of the war, during each month approximately 15 days represented complete closure due to the necessity for sweeping operations. In spite of supposedly safe periods, the danger of navigation was still existent which explains the high loss.

Q. Explain again the exact manner in which the shipping was controlled?
A. The officers of the MAIZURU Naval Base controlled shipping in the area from NIIGATA to HAGI. In the beginning of the war the Commander of KURE Naval Base controlled all shipping in the INLAND SEA, but due to severe losses in the SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS Area a separate command was set up called the 7th Fleet to oversee routing in this specific area. OSAKA Naval Base Chief controlled the KYUSHU Area and the CHINKAI Naval Base controlled the KOREAN Area. The YOKOSUKA Naval Base controlled the entire TOKYO Area. The OMINATO Naval Base controlled the HOKKAIDO Area, but the mine problem was never important in this particular area. A special command was set up under a full admiral to oversee routing over the whole EMPIRE with headquarters at TOKYO called the "General Headquarters Surface Escort Units."

Q. What is the name of the admiral and when was this command set up?
A. This command was set up in November 1943; the first admiral in charge of that was OYOBIKAWA, former Navy Minister. Approximately June 1944 he was succeeded by Admiral NOMURA, former Naval Attache to Germany.

Q. After 1942, representatives from all departments in the Japanese Navy such as gunnery, electronics, mines, etc., went to GERMANY to obtain all the information they could on what the Germans knew about your mines as well as the English mines. Those reports were brought back but the reports themselves were burned. However, I (Captain TAMURA) remember quite well the details on mines, (refers here to booklet) all of which are in a booklet awaiting translation.

Q. Did you learn anything subsequent to that time? Was there continuous liaison up to the end of the war?
A. There were occasional small bits of information from the German Attache here but nothing after the receipt of this booklet. The German Attache was not a specialist, and merely acted as a go between. For that reason when you used magnetic pressure mines, we were caught flat-footed. We immediately began to experiment with countermeasures. We had no advance notice from GERMANY.

Q. Do you think you would eventually have been able to solve the problem presented by the pressure mine? What success did you have up to the end of the war?
A. When we first discovered the mine in SHIMONOSEKI, after great difficulty, we were even able to determine it was a pressure mine. The success we had with solving the problem was very small and all details are in the chart I gave you. I think there are a great many still sunk and which we were not able to recover.

Q. Did the Japanese have sweeping equipment at all places indicated on this chart?
A. At the beginning of the war we had equipment only in areas around manor Naval bases and some equipment in secondary Naval bases; but as mines were discovered, equipment was transferred from Naval bases to cope with the mines.

NAV-5

--19--

Q. Did you have enough for all bases?
A. It was not sufficient. I think that the lack of equipment was due to the fact that the Japanese in charge were little prepared for mines; we didn't commence preparations until after the mining began. In general this showed that the Japanese People were very quick to make preparations for offensive campaigns but not for defensive campaigns. (Off the record opinion of Captain TAMURA.)

Q. In general, do you think that the mining effort we put forth in areas other than the homeland created a problem or changed any military plans?
A. In general, the prevalent opinion was that your mining measures as such would not appreciably alter our operation plans; but in explanation of that, the main reason for not thinking too well of it was that we didn't know whether or not a ship was sunk by a submarine or any other weapon. We possibly didn't give mines enough credit. To us the big danger was submarines. It was simply because we had sufficient information to chart the effectiveness of your mine warfare. In other words, the submarines were, in my opinion, given too much credit and not enough credit to mine warfare. I would give more importance to your mine warfare than my superiors, who didn't make a particular distinction as to whether or not a ship was sunk by submarine or mine.

Q. Why isn't this information available; is it because the high command in the forward areas didn't furnish the information to TOKYO or because it wasn't furnished by the masters of individual vessels?
A. The captain of a ship simply assumes that his ship was sunk by a submarine, it does not occur to him that it may have been a mine. They knew you had an electrically propelled torpedo which leaves no wake, and even if they didn't see a periscope they still assumed it was sunk by a submarine and didn't specify that it was a mine. Unless for some reason they happened to see the ship hit a mine, they assumed it was a submarine. That is why we don't have accurate figures on mine sinkings.

Q. Tell me a little more about the methods you used to discover where the mines were dropped?
A. The B-29s were picked up by radar and position communicated to coast watchers. Coast watchers picked up the B-29s as soon as they came within vision. At night they used searchlights and simply watched the mines dropped by parachute. They then reported the approximate position to the Naval Base who then dispatched minesweepers.

Q. Were you able to follow the mines down to the water by radar?
A. It's not that good, but we were working on the idea.

Q. Did you consider the B-29 mine attacks sufficiently effective to warrant redeployment of fighters and anti-aircraft even if it decreased the defense of the cities against the fire bomb?
A. We increased the aircraft units and searchlight units attached to certain areas such as NIIGATA and SHIMONOSEKI at the expense of the cities. There was still a shortage of equipment even with the increasing of aircraft units at those stated points, but as the war in the South Pacific went against the Japanese, we were able to send more anti-aircraft units to the protection of the homeland. However, the Japanese felt that the use of aircraft units as protection against dropping of mines by B-29s was more important than the actual protection of the cities, because the life lines from the continent which furnished food and supplies were of first priority. The reason why so many mines exploded by natural or unknown reasons was being investigated by several men. However, it is my opinion that most of the mines so exploded were acoustic mines and that they were sensitive enough to have been set off by natural causes such as fishes, waves and smaller vessels. I think the quantity given on this graph is grossly exaggerated because the same mine may be seen by 4 or 5 different watchers; each one is given credit for seeing a mine.

Q. Verify these numbers on this chart. It is amazing that they were only able to sweep 328.
A. I admit it is a very small quantity and feel the reason for that was inferiority of equipment and lack of ships, personnel, and sweeping equipment.

Q. Here I have some charts. Will you indicate to the best of your knowledge the shipping trend prior to and during the B-29 mining raids? Tell me if this is substantially accurate. Who can verify these charts?
A. In my opinion the charts in regard to effects of B-29 mining operations on convoy routes were substantially correct, but Admiral NOMURA's Chief of Staff will give you accurate information.

Q. Did you feel that the mines would damage the MOJI tunnel?
A. We were very concerned about the possibility of damage to the MOJI tunnel, but it escaped damage.

Q. I would like to give you a list of the areas where we put down mines and I would like to have you use that list and find out for me (1) whether or not you knew the mines were there and (2) what damage the mines did.

NAV-5

--20--

Captain TAMURA brought a list (as per request) of vessels sunk by mines, submarines, and aircraft in the PACIFIC OCEAN Area. He was accompanied by Commander SUGITA, Binzo, formerly a member of the Staff of the Headquarters combined Surface Escort Fleet.
Captain TAMURA delivered the information and documents previously requested as follows:

  1. List of personnel and equipment engaged in mine countermeasures, including those engaged in technical studies. 349 vessels and 20,000 men were engaged in minesweeping.
  2. Names of additional officers who can give information concerning mine countermeasures.
  3. A list of ships sunk in the various mine fields prior to 1945. (This list is an estimate but is a compilation of all available information).

Captain TAMURA corrected a statement made in previous interrogation. "The Combined Surface Escort Command was set up in the fall of 1943 instead of spring as previously stated."

Q. In the list of minefields which I previously gave you, did you find places in which you never discovered mines?
A. That is quite true; however, I was able to get the information on the list from people who are in the EMPIRE at the moment, so information as to other areas is very doubtful because the people who know are not available. Commander SUGITA, who was in the 8th Fleet (RABAUL), states that ships were sunk in the KOLOMBANGARA Area. Three ships were sunk by mines, other ships were assumed to be sunk by submarines.

Q. Was mine countermeasure research accelerated during the war?
A. At the beginning of the war, studies on mine countermeasures were relatively small, but it was accelerated greatly at the inception of B-29 mine laying campaign. Personnel and equipment were increased about 100 percent at that time.

Q. Up until April 1945, approximately how many scientists were engaged in mine research?
A. Up until April 1945 my department contained only 13 technicians and 50 general employees, but this was increased to 40 and 95 respectively in April 1945.

Q. When a new type of mine was discovered at outlying base was special assistance requested from your department in TOKYO?
A. In such cases the Area Commander would attempt to sweep the mines with what facilities he had. However, if any difficulty was encountered, they requested assistance from the Mine Sweeping Department of the Navy Office; and they also had access to manufacturing facilities at SOERABAJA, which maintained a maintenance shop and warehouse for mine sweeping equipment.

Q. During the closing months of the war when so much effort was expended on mine sweeping in Japanese waters, did the use of additional technicians seriously interfere with other research and development?
A. The mine countermeasure research was given first priority. We were commanded to provide results as quickly as possible; therefore, in general, it is my opinion that research on other (electronic) devices was interfered with to a certain extent.

Q. Do you feel that military campaigns outside the EMPIRE were affected by mining campaigns?
A. Planning was outside of my province, but I believe that JAPAN'S operation plans outside EMPIRE waters were not interfered in any way by ordinary mine-laying, but only by aircraft mine-laying. I wish to specify mines by airplanes because that is the only type of mine-laying about which we have definite information.

Q. Can you give me a list of ships sunk in Japanese waters, listed by mine fields?
A. All the records were destroyed by fire. I am still trying to get this information.

Q. Will you make the general statement that ships were sunk in every mine field around JAPAN?
A. Yes, at all places with mine fields (as shown on chart) ships were sunk.

Q. Did the mines interfere with the activities of the Japanese Fleet in the OKINAWA Operation?
A. Yes, there was some interference in the operation.

Q. Did the fleet ever use SHIMONOSEKI after the campaign got underway?
A. They still used it even after mines were there.

Q. Do you know how many minesweepers were sunk?
A. Twenty were damaged and practically none were sunk because setting off of the mines usually occurred after the sweepers passed over the mine. I estimate that about three of four sweepers were sunk.

NAV-5

--21--

INTERROGATION of Commander SUGITA, Binzo,
(Mining Officer, Staff Combined Escort Fleet)

Transcript

Q. When was the Combined Escort Fleet organized?
A. It was organized in November 15, 1943 and Admiral OIKAWA was in command until Admiral NOMURA relieved Admiral OIKAWA in July 1944.

Q. What forces were assigned to the Escort Fleet?
A. About 100 - 600 ton escort vessels, about 15 old destroyers, about 15 sub-chasers, 2 training ships, four 10,000 ton converted aircraft carriers. Each auxiliary carrier had about 12 planes (land base fighters, Type 97).
The Combined Escort Fleet, with headquarters at TOKYO, was subdivided into Naval Bases, and the First Escort Fleet, with headquarters at TAKAO. The Naval Bases included all major bases controlled by the Japanese, each of which was supplied with escort aircraft. The First Escort Fleet was composed of surface vessels and the air group which included 4 CVE's and land-based squadrons. The land-based squadrons operated at various bases along the convoy routes in the Pacific Area.

Q. Who was next in line? Did the Commander of the Combined Escort Fleet report to Admiral TOYODA, or to the Navy Ministry?
A. From November 1943 until April 1945, the Combined Escort Fleet was an independent command operating directly under the Imperial General Headquarters. Subsequent to April 1945, it was under the command of the Commander in Chief (Admiral TOYODA).

Q. How were the four converted aircraft carriers employed in convoy escort work?
A. The four converted carriers of about 10,000 tons each, carried 12 Type planes. The aircraft carriers were used to escort convoys which were larger than 20 ships. These carriers stayed with the convoy during the entire voyage to and from JAPAN. In the cases where the convoy was too small to warrant the use of carriers, air cover was furnished by approximately 175 aircraft stationed at strategic points along the route.

Q. Explain how a convoy was assembled and how it was controlled between JAPAN and outlying bases?
A. At the beginning of war, the command of the Naval District, where the convoy assembled, laid out the course and controlled the convoy until it reached the next Naval District Command on route to the destination, where they were given another set of sailing instructions. After the Grand Escort Fleet was established the Command Headquarters laid out the entire route with all sailing instructions from start to finish. When a convoy passed through the next succeeding Naval District they received all the assistance that they required but no further instructions. Air escort was furnished by the Commander of the Escort Fleet.

Q. How were merchant ships kept informed of the location of mine fields?
A. TOKYO Headquarters despatched a signal to the captain of the ship informing him of mine areas and sweeping operations. In areas outside of the home waters, Naval District Commanders informed TOKYO Headquarters and all ships of all known mines.

Q. Were MANILA and SINGAPORE ever closed by mines?
A. No, MANILA never was closed, but SINGAPORE was closed for a week.

NAV-5

--22--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 6
USSBS NO. 40

THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
THE KAMIKAZE CORPS IN PHILIPPINES AND OKINAWA

TOKYO

18 October 1945

Interrogation of: Captain FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, IJN, a naval aviator since 1928. As air group commander of the AKAGI he led the attacks on PEARL HARBOR, DARWIN and CEYLON. In April 1944 he became Air Staff Officer to CinC Combined Fleet and held that post for the duration of the war.

Interrogated by: Lt. Comdr. R.P. Aiken, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: Col. Philip Cole, AUS; Captain W. Pardae, AUS; Lt. Robert Garred, USNR.

SUMMARY

Captain FUCHIDA discussed the attack on PEARL HARBOR, and the organization of the Kamikaze Corps during the PHILIPPINE Campaign. He also furnished information relating to suicide attacks during the OKINAWA Campaign, and Japanese Naval and Army Air Forces plans to resist an invasion of JAPAN proper.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What was your status during the PEARL HARBOR attack?
A. I was an air observer.

Q. How many and what types of aircraft were used in the attack?
A. A total of 350. In the first wave:

50 High level       KATES
40 VTB       KATES
50 Dive-Bombers       VALS
50 VF       ZEKES

In the second wave:

50 High level       KATES
80 Dive-Bombers       VALS
40 VF       ZEKES

Q. How many aircraft were lost; failed to return to their carriers?
A. 29 in all. 9 VF in the first wave and 15 dive-bombers and 5 VTB in the second wave.

Q. Which units of the fleet participated in the PEARL HARBOR attack?
A.

BBs HIEI, KIRISHIMA.
CVs AKAGI, KAGA, SORYU, HIRYU, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU.
CAs TONE, CHIKUMA.
CL NAGARA.
DDs 20 (large type).

Q. How many aircraft were employed as Combat Air Patrol over the PEARL HARBOR attack force?
A. 50 VF from CVs plus 12 float planes from the BBs, CAs and CL. These were in addition to the 350 planes used in the actual attack at PEARL HARBOR.

Q. How many CAP were on station at a time?
A. about 1/3 of the 50 aircraft were airborne at a time.

Q. Any losses from CAP, either VF or float planes?
A. None.

Q. Any additional planes employed as ASP?
A. None, VF served as ASP as well as CAP.

Q. How many pilots were lost in the attack?
A. A total of 29 - none were recovered from the 29 aircraft that failed to return.

NAV-6

--23--

Philippine Kamikaze Operations

Q. Were the CV Air Groups, that left the EMPIRE in October, 1944 being sent to the PHILIPPINES for Kamikaze action?
A. No. Part of the 601 Air Group was embarked in October 1944. From the remainder of the Air Group pilot personnel, 30 VF pilots were selected in November 1944 for Kamikaze operations and were sent to LUZON, to join the 201 Air Group.

Q. Were any of the 601 Air Group, embarked on carriers in October 1944, being sent to the PHILIPPINES defense as Kamikaze pilots?
A. No.

Q. How were the 30 fighter pilots selected for Kamikaze operations?
A. They were all volunteers.

Q. How did they rank in flying experience with the other pilots in the Air Group?
A. They were the best.

Q. Regarding Japanese plans for the defense of the homeland against Allied landings, how were Kamikaze aircraft to be employed?
A. According to plans, all Kamikaze planes were to be expended when Allied forced attempted landings on KYUSHU.

Q. Were any kamikaze planes to be held back for the defense of the KANTO PLAIN area?
A. On paper, all aircraft (both Army and Navy combat and trainer types) were to be used to resist Allied operations against KYUSHU. Actually, I believe that some Army Air Units would have been held back to repel an invasion of the KANTO PLAIN.

Q. At OKINAWA, what was the ratio of ships hit to aircraft expended in kamikaze attacks?
A. I think about 1/6 of the total aircraft used hit their target.

Q. How many Kamikaze aircraft were expended during the OKINAWA operations?
A. About 900 in all.

500 Navy Aircraft from JAPAN
300 Army Aircraft from JAPAN
50 Navy Aircraft from FORMOSA
50 Army Aircraft from FORMOSA

These figures are approximations.

Q. Of the 900 that were expended in the OKINAWA Area, how many hit their target?
A. Although it was widely publicized that 400 had been successful, I think that 200 would be more accurate figure.

Q. What percentage of hits did the JNAF expect in the KETSU Operation?
A. We expected about the same percentage as during the OKINAWA operation.

Q. How many Kamikaze aircraft were to be used during KETSU Operations by JNAF?
A. 2500, of which 500 were combat aircraft and 2000 were trainers. We had about 2500 remaining combat aircraft which would be used during KETSU Operations for search, night torpedo, and air cover.

Q. What were the plans for the use of Kamikaze aircraft during KETSU Operations?
A. 500 suicide planes were to be expended during the initial Allied landing attempt. This force would be supplemented by other kamikaze units brought in from SHIKOKU, SW HONSHU, Central HONSHU, TOKYO Area, and HOKKAIDO.

Q. How were JNAF Kamikaze aircraft deployed throughout the Empire?
A.

500 in KYUSHU
500 in SW HONSHU
500 in TOKYO Area
300 in HOKKAIDO
200 in SHIKOKU.

Q. What was the size and deployment of the JAAF Kamikaze Force?
A. Approximately the same as the JNAF. 2500 aircraft deployed similarly.

NAV-6

--24--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 7
USSBS NO. 33

OCCUPATION OF PHILIPPINES AND DUTCH EAST INDIES

TOKYO

15 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Vice Admiral SHIRAICHI, Kzutaka, IJN, retired, was Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet from December 1941 to March 1943, operating in the Southwest Pacific.

Interrogated by: Comdr. T.H. MOORER, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Brig. Gen. Grandison Gardner, USA; Lt. Comdr. J.A. Field, Jr., USNR.

SUMMARY

The Second Fleet (Vice Admiral Kondo) was assigned the mission of supporting the invasion of the PHILIPPINES, NETHERLAND EAST INDIES and BRITISH MALAYA. The fleet rendezvoused in the INLAND SEA about the middle of November 1941. About 23 November the fleet sortied from the INLAND SEA and proceeded south towards FORMOSA. There a dispatch was received establishing "D" day and the move on the PHILIPPINES was initiated.

During the approach to the PHILIPPINES, no attack was expected and none received. Probable attack by B-17s was expected within the 600 mile circle. To reduce the weight of these attacks, land-based planes from FORMOSA were assigned the mission of destroying American Air Power on the ground. This they succeeded in doing and consequently no major unit of the fleet was damaged in the PHILIPPINES operation.

The Second Fleet was divided into various task forces as the move southward into the EAST INDIES progressed. Although the Battle of the JAVA SEA was a victory for the Japanese, Admiral SHIRAICHI considered that the Japanese used poor tactics and were unnecessarily delayed by the battle.

The entire campaign went exactly according to plan except for a few small delays caused by submarine attacks and fuel oil shortage. Total losses suffered by the Japanese were less than expected.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Were you actively engaged in the general planning, prior to the out-break of the war, for the campaign of the PHILIPPINES and EAST INDIES?
A. As the Second Fleet was under the Grand Fleet all the plans were made by the Grand Fleet. I merely carried out orders according to the plans provided. I did not take part in the overall planning.

Q. Were you familiar with the general plans for the entire Pacific operations? Were you aware of the PEARL HARBOR strike?
A. I had complete instructions sent from headquarters.

Q. Will you give me a brief summary of the various forces into which the Japanese Fleet was divided?
A. The Grand Fleet was divided into five fleets as follows: 1st Flt. - BB's; 2nd Flt. - BB's, CA's, CL's, DD's; 3rd Flt. - CV's; 4th Flt. - CL's, DD's; 6th Flt. - SS. Forces were reassigned as necessary to various Fleets.

Q. What were the five rendezvous points of the various forces prior to commencement of hostilities?
A. Fleet One and Two assembled in the INLAND SEA. The other two rendezvous were kept secret but I believe that the Third Fleet rendezvoused at HOKKAIDO. The Fourth Fleet consisted of small ships in the GUAM-WAKE Area. I am not sure about the Sixth Fleet.

Q. When did the Second Fleet assemble in the INLAND SEA preparatory to leaving Japan?
A. The approximate date of the rendezvous was about a month before the start of the war, and I think the fleet left the INLAND SEA about two weeks before the start of the war.

Q. Where was the Second Fleet when the orders were received establishing "D" Day?
A. Right after we left BAKO, PESCADORES, we received the orders establishing "D" Day.

Q. Do you know who thought of the attack on PEARL HARBOR and who worked out the plans?
A. I haven't the slightest idea who devised the plan.

NAV-7

--25--

Q. Do you know if any thought was given to the possibility of the Japanese moving into the DUTCH EAST INDIES without attacking PEARL HARBOR at all?
A. I did not know that the war was going to break out at all and did not know the actual plans. I thought that the differences would be settled by negotiations and that there must have been a way out for JAPAN rather than to go into war.

Q. Were you surprised at the outbreak of the war?
A. I thought war should have been avoided, but once the war started I did my utmost to carry out the orders I received. I was not surprised at the start of war. I realized that the situation had deteriorated.

Q. Were Army and Navy planes engaged in the PHILIPPINES and DUTCH EAST INDIES campaign?
A. Yes.

Q. In general was the Japanese Navy pilot considered superior to the Army pilot?
A. Yes, the Navy pilots are better.

Q. Describe the movements of the fleet from BAKO down to the PHILIPPINES. What reaction was expected from the U.S. Fleet?
A. I didn't think the American Fleet would attack the Second Fleet. Strong opposition from American planes based in NICHOLS FIELD was expected.

Q. After receiving news of the success of PEARL HARBOR, was the plan for the occupation of the PHILIPPINES changed?
A. There was no change in the plan.

Q. During the PHILIPPINE operation, did you expect the U.S. Fleet to be reinforced?
A. Yes, I expected reinforcements from the States but I thought it would take about one month for reinforcements to come to the PHILIPPINES.

Q. At what time during the approach to the PHILIPPINES did you expect the attack by aircraft?
A. The fleet was alerted when 600 miles away. Attack by B-17 was expected but I didn't think it would be severe.

Q. During the approach did you have air coverage from FORMOSA?
A. I didn't expect any direct reinforcement from the Japanese land-based air, but expected indirect coverage. That is, destruction of B-17's on the ground before they could take off.

Q. Did the planes which attacked NICHOLS FIELD take off from FORMOSA?
A. They all came from FORMOSA.

Q. Army or Navy planes?
A. Both. I knew nothing of the air operations but knew that the fleet was going to get a certain amount of air force assistance which was used.

Q. On December 10th there were about 200,000 tons of allied shipping at MANILA HARBOR. Why was this 200,000 tons of vital shipping allowed to escape?
A. Reasons were:

  1. The duty of the airplanes was to attack American planes.
  2. Poor intelligence regarding the fact that the shipping was there.
  3. The attack was not in the plans, this is the first news that I have of such shipping. The general plan was to knock out only those offensive weapons which might be used against the Japanese.

Q. In what ship were you?
A. ATAGO (CA).

Q. Did the American seaplanes attack the Japanese Fleet?
A. The main body of the fleet was not attacked by air.

Q. Was the Second Fleet attacked by B-17's?
A. As far as I know there was no attack by B-17's.

Q. Was any damage at all suffered by the Second Fleet?
A. The destroyers were damaged by airplanes as they went so close to the shore to transport troops. Big ships didn't go near the shore. One light cruiser was damaged however.

NAV-7

--26--

Q. And the heavy cruiser and battleships weren't damaged?
A. No.

Q. Why did not the movement from the PHILIPPINES south proceed at faster pace?
A. Mostly due to the fuel supply. The shortage of fuel made the movement very slow. The supply fleet had to go around FORMOSA in order to deliver the fuel.

Q. Do you feel that the occupation of the PHILIPPINES and DUTCH EAST INDIES went exactly according to plan as far as time was concerned?
A. There was a delay about one week but no more, otherwise it went according to plan.

Q. Was the loss of ships and personnel more or less than expected?
A. Less than expected.

Q. Do you know what type of airplanes attacked the REPULSE and PRINCE of WALES?
A. Navy planes, land-based.

Q. Did the destruction of these two battleships change the plans for the occupation of SINGAPORE?
A. Did not change the plans but the effect on Japanese morale was very great.

Q. Did you expect the British to replace those ships?
A. No.

Q. Where were the planes that attacked the PRINCE of WALES based?
A. SAIGON.

Q. At what time during the over-all campaign did the carriers take part? When did they join the fleet?
A. I don't remember the actual date when the CV aircraft participated, but it was not until the fleet was actually in the SULU SEA Area.

Q. What places did the carrier airplanes attack?
A. The planes from the Task Force attacked TRINCOMALEE, DARWIN, and others that I cannot recall.

Q. Did the Dutch react as expected during the invasion of the PHILIPPINES and N.E.I.?
A. I thought the combination of the American and Dutch forces would furnish stronger resistance.

Q. Did the action at MAKASSAR STRAITS delay the Japanese advance?
A. Yes, but do not know how long.

Q. Do you consider that the American and Dutch submarines delayed the campaign in anyway?
A. To a great extent. One time I received a report that the planes saw 12 to 13 submarines but the fact was that they were whales. It took 2 or 3 days to make sure, which caused a certain amount of delay.

Q. Did you expect that additional aircraft would be flown into JAVA from AUSTRALIA?
A. Yes.

Q. Did the Japanese know that the American heavy cruiser HOUSTON was damaged and only had 2/3 of their 8" guns in operation?
A. No.

Q. Did you know that the other American cruiser BOISE ran aground and had to be sent from the area?
A. No.

Q. After the Japanese had occupied BALI there was a night action with the Dutch and American ships. Two Allied destroyers were sunk and two cruisers damaged. Do you know what damage was sustained by the Japanese?
A. Four Japanese destroyers took part and the damage was one destroyer sunk and one damaged. No Japanese cruisers were involved.

Q. Did the Commander of the Second Fleet know that the LANGLEY was coming from AUSTRALIA to JAVA with aircraft reinforcements?
A. No.

Q. How was it discovered?
A. By search planes.

NAV-7

--27--

Q. What is your estimate of the damage suffered by the combined Dutch, American and British Fleet in the battle of JAVA SEA?
A. I was not on the scene. I heard the result of the battle and thought that the battle should not have lasted so long. Japanese strategy was unskillful.

Q. What damage was suffered by the Japanese Fleet?
A. Several ships damaged but no ships sunk.

Q. Do you know how the British ships ENCOUNTER, EXTER and the American destroyer POPE were sunk while en route to SOEMBA STRAITS?
A. I know of it, but don't know whether it was by land-based planes or submarines. I think that they were sunk by submarines before they got to the Straits.

Q. After the occupation of the DUTCH EAST INDIES was completed, many of the merchant vessels retired to FREEMANTLE. There were several thousand tons of shipping without fuel. Why didn't the Japanese send a striking force to attack those ships?
A. It was thought that there might be women and children on the ships so we were afraid of attacking the ships, and also our plans took care of immobilizing your offensive weapons only.

Q. Did you realize that the entire western coast of AUSTRALIA was defenseless?
A. Yes.

Q. Was any consideration given to the possibility of invading the western coast of AUSTRALIA?
A. There weren't enough forces available to make an invasion without over expansion of limited forces.

Q. Were Army troops used at JAVA?
A. Yes.

Q. Were there any lessons learned in this entire campaign which caused the Japanese to change their plans for future operations?
A. Nothing changed the over-all plan.

Q. After the occupation of the EAST INDIES did you move into the SOLOMONS and NEW GUINEA?
A. After the campaign I returned to JAPAN with the Second Fleet. The entire fleet was sent into dry dock in April, just prior to General Doolittle's attack.

NAV-7

--28--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 8
USSBS NO. 46

CORAL SEA BATTLE, 7-8 MAY 1942
BATTLE OF EASTERN SOLOMONS

TOKYO

17 October 1945

Interrogation of: Commander SEKINO, H., IJN, 20 years in Navy. Communication Officer, Staff 6th Cruiser Squadron at CORAL SEA.
Commander OKUMIYA, Masatake, IJN, Staff, Second Flying Squadron. Both officers currently members of General Staff.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

SUMMARY

7 May 1942, a Japanese convoy proceeding through CORAL SEA to attack and occupy PORT MORESBY was turned back by a U.S. Carrier Force. Japanese SHOHO (CV) was sunk by U.S. carrier planes. SHOKAKU was damaged and unable to reinforce CV Task Group at MIDWAY. Due to damage received in this battle, plans for occupation of PORT MORESBY by sea were abandoned, resulting in forcing Jap Army to attempt occupation over OWEN STANLEY Mountains from BUNA. Composition of Jap Task Force at CORAL SEA.

RUYUJO (CV) sunk in the Battle of EASTERN SOLOMONS, 23 August, by U.S. carrier planes, removing air protection for convoy for reinforcement of Japanese Forces on GUADALCANAL. B-17 sank destroyer.

The HYEI and HARUNA exchanged positions at MIDWAY the day before the main battle. HARUNA, with carrier force, received no damage until 1945 at KURE by Navy dive-bombers.

TRANSCRIPT

Coral Sea

Q. What was the mission of the SHOHO's Task Force in the CORAL SEA Area, 7-8 May 1942?
A. To support the force that planned to capture PORT MORESBY. The SHOHO's mission in the Japanese formation was exclusively to guard transports in the Occupation Force against submarines and air raids and not to deliver attack. The SHOHO was in the Fourth Carrier Division.

Q. Why didn't that force continue to PORT MORESBY?
A. Because we couldn't completely destroy the American Task Force. Our carrier-based planes were of little use because of the shortage of fuel on board. Although most of your carriers were all sunk or badly damaged, the remaining surface craft were not damaged. We were not strong enough to try occupation. The main force of our fleet had just completed an operation in the INDIAN OCEAN at CEYLON and returned to JAPAN. Just a small group was left in the CORAL SEA Area.

Q. What ships were present in the CORAL SEA Battle?
A.

MORESBY TASK FORCE   DIRECT SUPPORT FORCE
  SHOKAKU (CV)     SHOHO (CVE)
  ZUIKAKU (CV)   AOBA (CA)
  MYOKO (CV)   KINUGASA
  HAGURO and about seven destroyers   KAKO (CA)
MORESBY OCCUPATION FORCE  
  YUBARI, about 6 destroyers and 5 transports    
SEAPLANE TENDER GROUP  
  KOKOKAWA-MARU    
  TENRYU    
  TATSUTA    

On 7 May, the day when SHOHO came under American attack, Japan's scout planes made wrong identification and directed the attack of the SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU planes to American tankers instead of American carriers, thereby seriously up-setting the entire succeeding battle tactics of the Japanese Task Force. After dropping their bombs on the American tankers, the ZUIKAKU and SHOHO planes were returning to their carriers when they saw the American Carrier Force. Unfortunately they didn't have any bombs to attack. Some planes mistook the American carriers and attempted to land on board. This was at night. It was then reported American Task Force about 30 miles south of Japanese Task Force.

NAV-8

--29--

Q. Why didn't you make a night attack?
A. I am not sure. There was some talk but we received orders to go north.

Q. Do you know how many hits were made on the SHOHO?
A. I think about nine bombs and about four torpedoes. The first bombs broke the steering gear and she couldn't navigate.

Q. Were torpedo hits made with the first attack group?
A. No, only the second group made any hits. When the second wave attacked they made about 9 bomb and 4 torpedo hits.

Q. Did the SHOHO sink as a result of the bombs and torpedoes?
A. About five minutes after the first hit was made she capsized. It was not necessary for destroyer to sink it.

Q. About how many personnel were lost?
A. About 500 lost out of 1200.

Q. Were the planes aboard the SHOHO when it was hit?
A. No, very few. Most landed on other carriers, some landed on a small island in the LOUISIADE Group near a seaplane tender.

Q. Were those pilots recovered?
A. Yes, they were recovered by the seaplane tender.

Q. How many planes were lost?
A. About 21 planes.

Q. Was the SHOKAKU hit?
A. Hit by two bombs only. No torpedoes hit. Dropped too far away, easily dodged.

Q. Was the ZUIKAKU hit?
A. No, no damage received.

Q. How much time was required to repair the SHOKAKU?
A. Somewhere between one and a half to two months.

Q. Were any planes aboard the SHOKAKU when it was hit?
A. About a dozen. No damage. Only bow of flight deck damaged. Some damage to repair room in stern but some planes landed after bombs hit.

Q. What effect did the battle have on the current plan of attacking PORT MORESBY and on future plans?
A. The damage to the SHOKAKU prevented her from being used in the Battle of MIDWAY operation as was planned. The damage to the two carriers SHOHO and SHOKAKU was a serious setback to the operations for the occupation of PORT MORESBY. Due to the delay of operations in that area and American occupation of GUADALCANAL, it was finally necessary to give up the plan for the occupation of PORT MORESBY by sea, forcing the Army to try to occupy by land from BUIN.

Q. Were any light cruisers damaged there, or large destroyers?
A. No.

Battle of the Eastern Solomons

Q. In the Battle of the EASTERN SOLOMONS on the 23 August 1942, what was the position of the RYUJO?
A. It was near BRADLEY REEFS, lat. 7°S, 161°E. The ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU were there too, but separated into different units about 90 or 100 miles to the north and east.

Q. Was the RYUJO sunk, and how?
A. Yes, very quickly on the 24th. She was hit by at least ten bombs and torpedoes. Bombs came from dive-bombers.

Q. Were any hits made by horizontal-bombers?
A. Not a single hit.

NAV-8

--30--

Q. Were other ships hit there?
A. No battleships or cruisers were hit. However, on the 25th in mid-morning a destroyer which was escorting transports to GUADALCANAL from RABAUL in a separate force north of GUADALCANAL was hit and sunk in the forenoon by B-17s. This was an old type destroyer which was standing by the KIKOKAWA-MARU. The transport had been attacked by dive-bombers from GUADALCANAL and was damaged. The escort was standing by. The escort saw the high bombers coming but did not worry and did not get underway. I talked to the Commanding Officer, Commander HATANO, afterward. He was surprised that he was hit, because this was the first ship known to have been hit by horizontal-bombers in the war. Commander HATANO was my classmate at ETAJIMA and said, "Even the B-17s could make a hit once in awhile."

Q. Were any ME-109s employed in the SOLOMON Area?
A. No. Only one Messerschmitt Fighter 109 was brought from GERMANY. It was used for test. It may be confused with carrier borne 2-seater reconnaissance bomber.

Confirmation of Previous Interrogations

Q. Did you have radar at CORAL SEA Battle?
A. Not on cruisers. Maybe carriers had it, but do not think so.

Q. What battleships were present with the First Air Fleet on the day of the Battle of MIDWAY?
A. KIRISHIMA and HARUNA. The HIEI started out with this fleet, but exchanged position with the HARUNA just before the day of the battle. The HIEI joined the Main Body and the HARUNA joined the carrier force.

Q. Has the HARUNA been damaged?
A. It was damaged at KURE by dive-bombers this year. It has never been damaged before.

Q. What was the plan of action for the cruisers the night of June 4 at MIDWAY?
A. On the evening of 4 June, Japanese carrier group had been heavily damaged. The Seventh Cruiser Squadron was ordered at full speed to bombard the airfield at MIDWAY. On the way, appearance of submarines was reported, so they made emergency evasive turn resulting in collision between MIKIMA and MOGAMI. The MOGAMI bow was most seriously damaged and was difficult to steer, but it followed the MIKUMA for protection. Due to loss of speed and ability to steer, the next morning the MOGAMI was attacked and damaged by American dive-bomber planes. The MIKUMA was sunk at the same time.

Q. Was the MOGAMI attacked also?
A. Yes, but received no great damage.

Q. Were any radars used at the Battle of MIDWAY?
A. Not sure. The battleships ISE and HYUGA had them about that time.

Q. In the night battle of SAVO ISLAND, did you have radar that night?
A. No, visual fire control was used on that night - 8 August.

Q. In the Battle of SANTA CRUZ, 26 October 1942, how early did you have information of our carrier force?
A. TONE and TERUTSUKI were scouting from position approximately 167.5°E and 7°S. The patrol planes from the GILBERTS discovered American ships from HEBRIDES and sent word to Japanese cruisers by radio about 4 or 5 days before the battle. When these ships received word, they returned to Main Body north of the SOLOMONS.

685287 O - 48 - 4

NAV-8

--31--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 9
USSBS NO. 47

BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA
BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF

TOKYO

16, 17 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Vice Admiral KURITA, Takeo, who was CinC Second Fleet during the battles of June and October 1944.

Interrogated by: Rear Admiral R.A. Ofstie, USN; Lt. Comdr,. J.A. Field, Jr., USNR.

Allied Officers Present: Brig. Gen. Grandison Gardiner, USA; Capt. T.J. Hedding, USN; Comdr. T.H. Moorer, USN.

SUMMARY

When U.S. forces landed in the MARIANAS in June 1944, the Japanese Fleet offered battle for the first time since the GUADALCANAL Campaign. In the Battle of the PHILIPPINE SEA, the Japanese suffered the loss of three carriers sunk and one seriously damaged, plus the virtual annihilation of the air groups of three carrier divisions.

In October 1944, the landing of U.S. Forces on LEYTE caused the Japanese to commit their entire remaining Navy to a desperate three-pronged attack on our forces in the hope of repelling the landings and, by holding the PHILIPPINES, of being able to continue the war. Admiral KURITA commanded the Center Force of battleships and cruisers which, under heavy attack, succeeded in penetrating the PHILIPPINES, engaged our escort carriers, and reached almost to the entrance to LEYTE GULF only to withdraw at the moment when success seemed within his grasp.

Admiral KURITA briefly discusses the planning for these operations and his part in the Battle of the PHILIPPINE SEA. The role of the Japanese Center Force in the Battle for LEYTE GULF is analyzed in considerable detail, with the reasons for the failure of the Japanese plan and his own reasons for withdrawing without entering the Gulf. He also offers miscellaneous comments on various features of the Pacific War.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. (Admiral Ofstie) Admiral KURITA, before the Battle of the PHILIPPINE SEA in June 1944, where was your fleet based?
A. The Second Fleet had been basing at LINGGA, but had recently moved to TAWITAWI so as to be closer to expected operations.

Q. When you left TAWITAWI, about the 10th of June, did you have full knowledge of the plan for that operation?
A. I received instructions concerning the plan and orders for action from Admiral OZAWA.

Q. What was the plan of the operation?
A. Through SAN BERNARDINO Strait, to refuel about 130°E and attack the enemy about 136° or 137° E and retire to refuel a little north of the original position. The fleet under Admiral OZAWA proceeded towards GUIMARAS Strait, upon receipt of the intelligence that the American Force had made an attack on the MARIANAS ISLANDS; the operation at that time was to change base in order to be nearer to any succeeding action. On the way to GUIMARAS Strait orders were received to proceed to attack operation on the American Task Force. The fleet fueled in GUIMARAS Strait and proceeded through the SULU SEA. They proceeded out of TAWITAWI on the 12th.

Q. What was the principal difference in the attack plan if American Force had gone to PALAU instead of to the MARIANAS ISLANDS?
A. If the American Task Force had not gone to the MARIANAS but further south, the plan was for the fleet to abandon the SULU route for a southerly one around MINDANAO.

Q. On 19 June what was your flagship?
A. The flagship was the cruiser ATAGO.

Q. Where were you personally relative to TAIHO and SHOKAKU on 19 June?
A. I do not know; communication was not maintained successfully and I learned of the damage the following day.

NAV-9

--32--

Q. When did you first hear the report of the result of the air attack on the American Fleet on the 19th, and what was the substance of that report?
A. I got only unreliable reports from the returning fliers.

Q. When did you get the report, and what was contained in it?
A. We received running reports of all planes damaged from radio reports from own fighters at the scene.

Q. Were the losses reported such that the plans were changed that night, and if so what were the changes?
A. Because the damage report consisted of only planes of the Second Fleet, I did not have knowledge of losses in the Main Body; the main plan, however, was not changed because of the losses of which I had knowledge, which were confined to the Second Fleet. The 3rd Air Squadron, assigned to my force, consisted of the ZUIHO and CHITOSE, which were carriers converted from tankers, and the CHIYODA which was the TAIGEI (AS) before conversion.

Q. Of the three carriers that you had in your command, what were the total number of planes that went on the attack and how many came back - approximately?
A. The most of the wave that we sent out were fighters. Those which went to cover came back, but the attacking fighters did not. Something like 100 were in the total that took off. The attacking fighters came under American attack, apparently some 20 miles before reaching the target, and more than half were destroyed at that time.

Q. On the next day did you continue to have control of these three carriers?
A. Yes.

Q. How did you operate those planes on the 20th?
A. I had only three or four torpedo places, no body of fighters, and used six or seven for scouting.

Q. Did you lose any more planes on the 20th of June?
A. We made no offensive operations on the following day, but when taking aboard the scouting planes we received bombing attacks from the American Task Force which damaged some of them.

Q. On the 20th during that bombing attack, were any of your ships damaged - that is, in the Second Fleet?
A. The ZUIHO and battleship HARUNA were slightly damaged. The HARUNA apparently slight damage at first. The shaft brackets were loosened but it was not known that it was so serious until they did 27 knots.

Q. The ZUIHO, what damage to her?
A. Just a hole in the after end of the flight deck.

Q. Do you know what damage was done to the tankers and their escorts?
A. One tanker was sunk, no damage to the tanker's escort.

Q. Where did the fleet retire after this operation?
A. To OKINAWA to fuel, and then to the INLAND SEA for training of pilots; the Second Fleet returned to SINGAPORE Area.

Q. When the Second Fleet left the INLAND SEA, begin there and please tell us what your movements were.
A. All ships of the Second Fleet and the 10th Squadron of destroyers from the Third Fleet left KURE the 12th of July.

Q. Describe the movements of the Second Fleet from then on.
A. They departed through BUNGO SUIDO to OKINAWA and then to LINGGA. Some ships brought troop reinforcements to OKINAWA and MANILA and all rendezvoused at LINGGA.

Q. What was the purpose of going to LINGGA?
A. For training. The shortage of fuel in the home area required training operations in LINGGA.

Q. How long did you stay at LINGGA?
A. Until October 1944.

Q. During this period between June and October, what new plans did you receive for operations against the American Fleet or against American operations?
A. Planning was done according to whether the next American operation was directed against the PHILLIPINES, or secondarily OKINAWA, or possibly FORMOSA, and finally the home islands.

NAV-9

--33--

Q. How much did you yourself enter into the planning; that is, did you receive a plan from the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, or did you do some planning at LINGGA?
A. Orders and directions from Admiral TOYODA only.

Q. (Lt. Comdr. Field) These new plans you speak of, were they known as the SHO plans?
A. SHO-GO, that is correct.

Q. Did you see or have a conference with Admiral OZAWA between the time you left the INLAND SEA and your departure from LINGGA?
A. Staff of OZAWA came to LINGGA for a conference in the middle of August, but I had no meeting.

Q. Was the command organization originally the same as for "A" Operation (Defense of MARIANAS)?
A. The command originally was not the same as in the "A" Operation; Admiral OZAWA had command of the carrier force only and then I had command, independent command, of the remaining force.

Q. Admiral NISHIMURA was responsible to you; and you in turn were directly responsible to Admiral TOYODA, is that correct? Who was responsible for the coordination of the movement of the three forces with each other and with the land-based aircraft?
A. That is correct. (Annex A) The only coordination command rested with TOYODA, otherwise coordination was by communication among the units concerned and that was by radio message.

Q. What was the coordination with Army land-based planes?
A. I do not know under what command such coordination was executed, whether under the Army or the Navy.

Q. What training was emphasized at LINGGA?
A. The first point is that if you seized the PHILIPPINES it would cut off fuel supply to the EMPIRE and that all supply of fuel being severed, the war in all areas south of the EMPIRE must end. The PHILIPPINES were vital to the continuation of the war. The training was therefore so conducted as to prevent landing operations - coast defense landing parties and then in radar and AA defense, and especially night action.

Q. From the 12th to 14th of October, our Task Force was heavily attacked off FORMOSA by your aircraft. Did you receive reports of the damage done to our forces and if so, did the report influence the operation plans?
A. We got the report, but don't think that the intelligence affected future plans too seriously.

Q. When was the Second Fleet alerted for the operation?
A. I am not sure, but I think that the alert was received on the 15th.

Q. Do you remember what information led to this alert?
A. Your mine sweeping activity. Based upon the intelligence report of your mine sweeping activity in the vicinity of LEYTE, I received orders from CinC Combined Fleet to shift base of operation nearer to the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. Although BRUNEI was not specified in the orders, it was the best, and had been so considered in the planning.

Q. When did the Second Fleet leave LINGGA for BRUNEI, and was Admiral NISHIMURA's Force in company?
A. I do not remember the date; we departed LINGGA together and from BRUNEI separately.

Q. Were refueling facilities available anywhere other than at BRUNEI, in the PHILIPPINE Area?
A. There was no shore facilities at BRUNEI, but there were tankers there and at CORON Bay.

Q. Were these tankers awaiting you at BRUNEI and CORON, or did they travel in company?
A. There was one tanker waiting at CORON and two tankers came from SINGAPORE to the SULU SEA.

Q. Who did you believe commanded our Invasion Forces?
A. We had believed that General MACARTHUR would come from the south to here (indicating PHILIPPINES on chart).

Q. Did you know who commanded our Task Forces?
A. No, I did not know.

Q. What was the mission of your force?
A. It was to attack and destroy the landing forces at LEYTE at day-break of the 25th of October

NAV-9

--34--

Chart: Command Organization, Battle for Leyte Gulf, from interrogation of Vice Admiral Kurita, Annex (A).
Chart: Command Organization, Battle for Leyte Gulf, from interrogation of Vice Admiral Kurita, Annex (A).

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--35--

Q. Does that apply to Admiral NISHIMURA's Force also?
A. The same orders applied to Admiral NISHIMURA's Force also.

Q. Were they intended to be simultaneous attacks by both forces - attacks at the same moment?
A. We planned for a two hour interval between, the two hours because of the great movement of ships in confined waters. Admiral NISHIMURA was to proceed first and then my force.

Q. How were both forces to approach?
A. Admiral NISHIMURA was to approach through SURIGAO Strait from the south and my force through the SAN BERNARDINO Strait from the north.

Q. What was the mission of Admiral OZAWA's Force?
A. He was to divert your Task Force and bring it under attack from the north.

Q. When you left BRUNEI to launch your attack, what information did you have of our force inside of LEYTE Gulf?
A. I thought you had about 200 transports, about seven battleships and appropriate accompanying cruisers and destroyers.

Q. Was that estimate modified in any way from further information received on the 24th?
A. Because of the bad weather, we did not receive any further intelligence. I requested them to send seaplanes from SAN JOSE (MINDORO) to scout, but because of the weather they found nothing.

Q. Did you have no information from land-based planes in the PHILIPPINES?
A. Nothing whatsoever.

Q. What losses were expected inside of the Gulf from our battleships?
A. We expected more than half of our ships to be lost.

Q. Was it expected that Admiral NISHIMURA, by his early arrival at LEYTE, would draw our force to the south and facilitate the entrance of the SAN BERNARDINO force?
A. No; in fact it was thought that knowledge of the larger body coming from the north might draw the American ships out from the Gulf and thus leave NISHIMURA free to enter.

Q. On the morning of the 24th, our planes sighted Admiral NISHIMURA's force off NEGROS and your force off MINDORO; at about what speed were you proceeding at this time?
A. About 22 knots.

Q. What was the originally planned time of entry into the Gulf?
A. Admiral NISHIMURA's force about five - the Second Fleet about six in the morning.

Q. Did you plan to steam at 22 knots all day?
A. 22 or 24 knots. The point was that the tankers could not supply the ships enough fuel for long distance voyages at high speed and they had to save their fuel for the trip back to BRUNEI.

Q. Where were you embarked on leaving BRUNEI?
A. In ATAGO.

Q. Was ATAGO attacked by our submarines?
A. Yes.

Q. Had you had any warning of the attack?
A. We knew that submarines were there and there were three possible routes planned. First the most southerly route which would bring our forces under land-based plane attacks from MOROTAI; second, the most northerly route which would take too long; and third, the route adopted which was known to contain patrol submarines; but considering the time and other factors, it was decided to proceed on the middle route.

Q. Did the fact that you were forced to change flagships inconvenience the rest of this operation?
A. It did not interfere with the plan; in fact, it rather improved control. The shift to the YAMATO improved the command possible because she was designed as a flagship and communications were therefore better and the AA defense was also better.

Q. What was the total loss and damage sustained because of our submarines on the 23rd?
A. ATAGO and MAYA were sunk; TAKAO engine damaged and stopped and could not navigate.

Q. Did TAKAO return safely to port?
A. Returned to BRUNEI and then to SINGAPORE.

NAV-9

--36--

Diagram showing the Submarine Attack on Second Fleet, 23 October 1944.
Diagram showing the Submarine Attack on Second Fleet, 23 October 1944, from a sketch by V. ADM. Kurita, Annex B, Plate 9-2.

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--37--

Q. Will you sketch the disposition of your ships at the time of the submarine attack?
A. (See Annex B) At 0643 when the attack was made, the fleet was zigzagging and had just completed a turn to the left when both ATAGO and TAKAO were hit. The second in column was TAKAO; there were two hits in her stern which interfered with navigation. The right-hand column turned to starboard because of the submarine attack on the left-hand column; the right-hand column gave way to starboard but within ten minutes had resumed course when the second attack opened. A second submarine attack on the right-hand column occurred immediately after resuming course, interval between the two attacks about ten minutes. MAYA belonged to the 4th Squadron; she sank almost immediately; I do not know the location and number of hits. ATAGO took half an hour to sink.

Q. On the 24th when you were passing through the Central PHILIPPINES did you expect air attacks?
A. Yes.

Q. Were there plans to have protective fighters overhead?
A. I requested that they send fighters from land base, but they did not send any.

Q. Was fighter cover provided for in the Operation Plan or was it merely requested at that moment?
A. Both. The plan was, first the planes from land bases were to attack the American Task Force and then to shift south to act as cover for our force; but the size of the American Task Force made it necessary for all land-based plane activity to center on that part, namely the American Task Force, leaving the Second Fleet without the expected cover.

Q. And that was in the Operation Plan?
A. Yes, also provision for the Carrier Division 3 to accompany the fleet; but that plan was not carried out because the American Task Force arrived earlier than expected. CarDiv 3 plus ZUIKAKU was included in the plan. The plan was for CarDiv 3 plus the ZUIKAKU to join the Second Fleet at LINGGA and accompany it on the succeeding operation; but the early arrival of the American Task Force prevented the junction.

Q. When had CarDiv 3 been expected to reach LINGGA?
A. It was expected to leave Japan waters on 15 October. That delay was due to the training of the flight personnel. The training of new personnel for CarDiv 3 was because all skilled flight personnel had been lost in the June engagement.

Q. When you requested fighters from LUZON, to whom did you address the request?
A. To Admiral ONISHI, who was in command of the First Air Fleet in the PHILIPPINES.

Q. Were there any Army aircraft in the PHILIPPINES that could be requested?
A. No.

Q. Do you mean that there were none in the PHILIPPINES, or that no arrangements had been made to obtain their help?
A. No request was made of the Army; I do not know whether there were any Army planes there or not. When called upon for planes, the Navy would send planes if they had them; if not, the Navy would request them locally from the Army. That was my opinion.

Q. What warning of our air attack on the morning of the 24th did you have?
A. First received intelligence that your planes had been over MANILA; then from own radar.

Q. At what distance did your radar warn you?
A. About 100 or 120 km.

Q. How many attacks did you receive on the 24th?
A. It differed according to the ship, but I think that my own ship received six large attacks with 40 to 50 planes in each attack.

Q. What damage was incurred by the ships of your force?
A. The MYOKO received damage to two shafts and returned to SINGAPORE, and towards the evening the MUSASHI sank. All other battleships received one or two hits, but were able to continue to fight. No battleships torpedoed, nor cruisers. They were in ring formation and because American attack was directed at major units, the cruisers and destroyers suffered less.

Q. Did any cruiser receive bomb hits but still continue with the operation?
A. With the exception of MYOKO, the cruisers were not damaged.

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--38--

Q. In the course of the afternoon under the attack, did you reverse course and retire for a time?
A. About four I reversed course to the westward and because your bombing attack ceased, I again resumed the advance.

Q. Did you report the damage received to Admiral TOYODA?
A. Yes.

Q. Was your change of course to the westward your own decision or on instruction from Admiral TOYODA?
A. I informed Admiral TOYODA that I was retiring temporarily to the westward to avoid attacks and would return to the action later, and then Admiral TOYODA sent a response with an order to continue the operation.

Q. During the day had you received any report from Admiral NISHIMURA that he was under attack?
A. About ten o'clock in the morning I got, not a detailed report, but a short message from Admiral NISHIMURA that his part of the operation was not going successfully.

Q. Do you know if Admiral NISHIMURA's Force was damaged by that air attack?
A. Yes, I assumed that it was serious damage.

Q. As a result of the air attack on the Second Fleet, did you order Admiral NISHIMURA to delay his advance?
A. No change in the plans.

Q. On the afternoon of the 24th, where did you believe our Task Force was located?
A. Northeast of SAN BERNARDINO Strait about 80-100 miles.

Q. What speed was maintained during the night?
A. 20 knots.

Q. How did you navigate through the narrow channel at 20 knots?
A. We navigated in single column through the narrow places and as it was very clear, I could determine the position visually.

Q. What was the condition of the battleships that had been damaged? What type of damage had been received?
A. The NAGATO had received some damage to her communication system, but all guns were able to shoot, nothing important on other ships.

Q. Any damage to fire control?
A. No.

Q. What time, did you sortie from SAN BERNAARDINO Strait?
A. At midnight. The plan was to come through SAN BERNARDINO Strait at 6 p.m., but the delay was six hours. We were at the exit at midnight.

Q. Did you expect to have to fight your way out of the Straits?
A. Yes.

Q. Did you have any further information in the course of the night on the position of our Task Force?
A. No.

Q. When you came out at midnight were your ships at General Quarters?
A. Yes, all of them were ready to fight.

Q. What conclusion did you draw when you found no force there?
A. Since there was no force there, there was no conclusion and I continued the operation.

Q. What was your first contact with American forces?
A. First contacts were with the planes. They were fighters, I think. I did not see them, but there was one or two fighters; and then I saw the masts and I then was able to see the shape of the aircraft carriers to the southeast.

Q. Was the first contact with aircraft carriers made visually or by radar?
A. The first was by eyes.

(Interrogation adjourned 1646; resumed 17 October, 0930).

NAV-9

--39--

Diagram showing the Disposition of Second Fleet on Contact with US Forces.
Diagram showing the Disposition of Second Fleet on Contact with US Forces - 0650 25 October 1944, from a sketch by V. ADM. Kurita, Annex C, Plate 9-3.

NAV-9

--40--

Q. Admiral KURITA, would you sketch the disposition of your force on the morning of the 25th as you came down the coast of SAMAR?
A. (See Annex C) The engagement off SAMAR opened about 0700, not at 0650 as suggested yesterday. On the right flank was the 5th Squadron plus HAGURO, MYOKO having been disabled the previous day; in the center the 1st Squadron, less MUSASHI which had been sunk, and the 3rd Squadron; on the left flank the 7th Squadron; on the starboard bow Desron 2 and on the port bow Desron 10. About four kilometers interval between columns.

Q. How many destroyers were in this right-hand group, roughly?
A. We had had to assign several destroyers to take back the ships that had been damaged on the 23rd and 24th. Therefore, we were greatly reduced in the number of destroyers we had with us. There were six or eight on the right and four on the other.

Q. You said yesterday that you thought we had six or seven battleships inside the Gulf along with our transports. Did you believe there were any battleships with the Task Force in this region (north-east of SAN BERNARDINO Strait)?
A. I didn't think there were many. I thought there might be one with the carriers.

Q. In the course of the 24th or during the night before the battle opened here, did you have any reports from Admiral OZAWA as to the events in the north?
A. No reports except that Admiral OZAWA's planes had attacked and some had landed in the water and the able ones were landing in LUZON.

Q. Up to the time of beginning the action here, had you had any report from Admiral NISHIMURA subsequent to the first one in the morning which said that operations were not going too well? I remember you said that on the 24th you heard from Admiral NISHIMURA that he had been attacked from the air. Did you have any later information from Admiral NISHIMURA before 7 o'clock?
A. I don't know exactly where he was when he sent the first message but he was somewhere around in there. (Indicating south of NEGROS). I think I had a report in this area, that is due south of LEYTE, that he had been brought under attack by torpedo boats.

Q. And that was the only report before the battle began here?
A. That was followed by one more report to estimate the time of arrival at the target.

Q. In the course of the night, did you receive any messages from Admiral TOYODA giving further information or additional instructions?
A. I don't remember for certain but I think the last message I got from Admiral TOYODA was the order to proceed with the action which I mentioned yesterday. I certainly remember no other messages.

Q. Late on the night of the 24th when your force was passing through this area by MASBATE Island, were you aware that you were being followed by our aircraft?
A. I did not know it.

Q. Had you considered the possibility that our forces might have mined SAN BERNARDINO Strait?
A. There were certain Japanese fields but I did not consider your having mined any of the area.

Q. Just before 7 o'clock in the morning, you sighted the masts of carriers. What happened then?
A. It was just at the time when we were changing formation so that these two cruiser divisions came back. We were preparing to change formation but had not changed formation when the masts of your ships were sighted.

Q. Changing formation for entry into the Gulf?
A. No, going to change formation into the ring formation. On a course of 200 degrees masts were sighted to the southeast. All ships altered course to 110 degrees. The wind was in the northeast. I altered course to 110 degrees in order to come up-wind of your formation. The resultant formation was with squadrons in column. The first sighting was at a range of about 35,000 meters. The intention was to reduce the range, keeping to windward of the American forces. At the time of the sighting, though I do not know the precise course of the American forces, I think it was an opposing and meeting course but it soon changed to right-turnabout. I thought it was a right-turnabout because the flight decks being full of planes, all planes were visible at the time of the turn. I opened fire from the YAMATO. I am uncertain of the range but I think it was between 32,000 and 33,000 meters. At the same time American cruisers and destroyers commenced laying a smoke screen.

NAV-9

--41--

Q. What did you do then as our ships turned, reversed course and proceeded to the southwest? What was your speed?
A. The speed of my ships varied at that time. They were all on full speed. The HARUNA could do no better than 25 at the outside, the NAGATO no better than 24. Also, because your planes were coming over in groups of three, for more adequate defense the ships were separating and scattering.

Q. What speed was the YAMATO making?
A. The YAMATO was doing full speed at 26. On the 24th the YAMATO had three bombs on the deck, forward. She was heavy by the bow, having taken water forward as a result of the bombing.

Q. Then all ships were going at their individual top speeds, not at a uniform speed?
A. That is correct.

Q. Well then, as our ships reversed course and headed southwest -?
A. As your ships altered course, I continued individual full speed on course 110 degrees until I got up-wind and then bore down on your ships.

Q. Did you believe that our carriers immediately changed course like that (indicating) or that they went in a larger circle. Or, in other words, could you draw what the track of our carriers appeared to be?
A. I believed this course: that you were coming into the wind to send off planes and then retiring and coming into the wind again and retiring. Coming into the wind only to send off the planes but in general it was a zig-zagging wide curve. The Japanese course gradually curved as it approached position up-wind.

Q. When did our air attacks begin that morning?
A. The attacks were in small formations. As the battle opened, small formations of your planes attacked my ships and about half past eight, thinking that there would be a concerted attack, I altered my plans, partly because the small formations had ceased to come for awhile. In preparation for a concerted attack by American bombers, I ordered the closing of the formation. I thought that the American formation was retiring rapidly to the southeast and at about 0830 the small formation attacks ceased. I therefore thought that there would be later on - perhaps an hour later - a large formation attack. Therefore, I ordered the formation to close.

Q. Did you at that time, break off the battle with these carriers?
A. The 10th Destroyer Squadron having finished its torpedo attack upon your formation, thinking that this engagement was over and that we would come under attack from your northern carrier force, I ordered the formation closed. It was about ten minutes past nine o'clock. I then intended to enter LEYTE Gulf, and passed through the damaged or sinking ships of your formation, aircraft carriers and cruisers of your formation. I came under, air attack just as I had given the order to the destroyers to pick up survivors the water.

Q. Now in the course of this first battle with the carriers, what damage had you inflicted on our forces and. what damage had your force received from any cause?
A. Because of the smoke, I could see very little but we felt certain on the YAMATO that one of your carriers, which had a bridge, was listing seriously and we therefore concluded that we had hit it, and one cruiser was down by the head. That is all I saw. Perhaps one more of your cruisers and perhaps two or three of your destroyers. I am not certain of my memory on this. The 10th Destroyer Squadron having launched its torpedo attack in the smoke, reported to me that three or four of your carriers were seriously damaged or sinking.

Q. By the torpedo attack?
A. The destroyers and cruisers from gunfire and the aircraft carriers, after the first one that I mentioned, from torpedo attack.

Q. What damage had your force received?
A. One torpedo in the KUMANO, which reduce the speed to about 16 knots.

Q. Aerial torpedo?
A. Destroyer torpedo. After the fast torpedoes had passed and missed a slow-speed one got it near the stern. Now the SUZUYA received a hit or near miss or misses which caused damage near the bridge to such an extent that later, after the battle was over, her own torpedoes exploded.

Q. Fire?
A. Yes. The fire extended to the torpedo-tube chamber and there exploded.

NAV-9

--42--

Q. That was from aircraft bombing?
A. Yes, it was aircraft bombing.

Q. What was the result of that?
A. It sank, after the battle. The CHOKAI and the CHIKUMA couldn't maneuver. I couldn't tell whether it was because the engines had given out or because they had been under attack but they were unmaneuverable. They were sunk by our own destroyers after they had removed their personnel, by torpedoes from destroyers. I do not know whether the engines had simply been overtaxed or from bombing or gunfire. From gunfire or any other cause, there was no further damage to my force.

Q. You know of no damage specifically from gunfire?
A. No damage except that I later received a report that the YAMATO had received one 15-cm shell that had damaged a motor.

Q. What kind of a motor?
A. Above the engine room, starboard side. It was a dud.

Q. What type of aircraft carriers were the American carriers present? Were they the ESSEX or ENTERPRISE class? Did you recognize them?
A. I don't remember. Starboard bridge structure was all I could tell. There wasn't enough visibility nor adequate reports from the scouting planes.

Q. Was the use of smoke by the U.S. forces a serious trouble to you?
A. It was very serious trouble for us. It was exceedingly well used tactically.

Q. Did you fire by visual control or by radar control in aiming the guns?
A. Both. Commenced visually when we could see anything. Thereafter we tried to work it with radar.

Q. Did you assign specific targets to your ships or merely tell them to fire on all ships they could see?
A. Because I concluded that it would not be possible to make a formation attack, I left it to each individual ship to fight on its own.

Q. From the YAMATO or from reports from other ships, did you feel that the gunfire was hitting? Was it effective?
A. In the beginning the gunfire was effective; toward the end it was very bad.

Q. Do you know why?
A. We were making a stern chase on your ships which were zig-zagging and that made it difficult to get the range. That is what I think was the cause. Also, the major units were separating further all the time because of your destroyer torpedo attacks. The second or third salvo of the YAMATO was followed by a very great explosion from the middle of the smoke. I do not know what ship.

Q. Did your ships fire continuously as long as they had a target?
A. I saw only that one high explosion. So long as they had a target they all kept on shooting.

Q. What speed were the American carriers making?
A. I didn't know.

Q. Was it difficult to close the range? Was it fast enough so that you had trouble closing?
A. At first the range closed quickly. At first, even after we had altered course, the range narrowed rapidly. After that your ships were making good time away and my ships were becoming more and more separated and we didn't consider that the range was closing.

Q. Did you expect to have protective air cover that morning from land-based planes?
A. I did not think so. I did not expect it.

Q. Did you expect assistance from land-based planes on the attacks on our ships?
A. No, I did not. I thought that I would have no assistance or cover from land-based planes because most of the Japanese land-based planes were in LUZON, assigned for action that might occur in the north. The southern sector was my own responsibility.

Q. Did you have any information later that day, in the middle of the day, of attacks by Japanese planes on our forces in this area here where the battle was and inside the Gulf?
A. No, no information of such attacks.

NAV-9

--43--

Q. Could you describe the attacks made on your ships by torpedo, by our cruisers and destroyers?
A. The torpedo attacks were launched from inside the smoke screen; the paths of the torpedoes were almost parallel and very obvious. The speed of the torpedoes was so slow that it was possible to avoid them by turning away from them, which however resulted in the separation of the formation.

Q. Did you see any of the ships at the time they were launching torpedoes?
A. I could see that the ships were there occasionally but did not see them launch any torpedoes.

Q. During this action you mentioned being attacked several times by small groups of torpedo planes and bombers. Did you maneuver to avoid all those attacks?
A. Yes. We received no torpedo attack I know about. Each vessel turned course and avoided that bombing. Each ship undertook evasive action in attempting to avoid the bombing action but I know of no torpedo attacks.

Q. How far off course did a ship usually turn?
A. When there were few bombers, as much as 45 degrees.

Q. Were these maneuvers done by the individual ships and not on signal from you?
A. That is right, individual ships maneuvered on their own.

Q. And that led to further scattering of the formation?
A. It led to gradual separation, breaking up the formation.

Q. Did these attacks by scattered groups continue up until 0830 when they stopped entirely?
A. I am not certain of the time the attacks ceased; it was about 0830.

Q. Did they stop suddenly or did they just taper off - less frequent, less strong?
A. It diminished gradually.

Q. When you first sighted our disposition, why did you maneuver around to get to windward rather than closing directly upon it?
A. To prevent launching and retaking of your planes, I intended to intercept to windward as much as possible.

Q. Did you consider sending part of your force to do that and to continue towards the Gulf with the rest?
A. No, I did not consider that. The idea was that I would make a concerted action of the fleet.

Q. After this attack, however, you still intended to enter the Gulf?
A. I held to that intention until I received the second bombing attack.

Q. At what time was that?
A. I can't remember.

Q. How long after you broke off the action with the carriers was this second bombing attack?
A. At about 10 our ships had made a formation, at which time they received the first bombing attack. The first attack came when I had hoisted the signal for ring formation after they had assembled.

Q. Was this a heavy attack?
A. The attack was big but the damage was small.

Q. What type of damage, specifically?
A. The extent of damage was not such as to interfere with ability of the ships. I did not receive details of damage at that time. Now the sort of information I did receive when damage was great was breaking of oil tanks, gasoline, rudder control and that sort of thing; but I did not receive any of that on the first attack.

Q. Were you still on a course west or southwest towards the Gulf when this attack was delivered?
A. I was on a course for LEYTE Bay. The conclusion from our gunfire and anti-aircraft fire during the day had led me to believe in my uselessness, my ineffectual position, if I proceeded into LEYTE Bay where I would come under even heavier aircraft attack. I therefore concluded to go north and join Admiral OZAWA for coordinated action against your northern Task Forces.

Q. About what time did you make this decision and start north?
A. I think about 10 or 11 o'clock. From that time on I steamed north.

Q. You think, then, that it was about two hours after you broke off the attack on our carriers there that you finally turned north? Is that correct?
A. About two hours; anyway less than three hours. I am not sure about the exact hour.

NAV-9

--44--

Q. You said you expected very heavy air attacks inside the Gulf. From what source?
A. From land-based planes, on LEYTE.

Q. You believed at that time that we had planes operating from LEYTE?
A. I was convinced that your aircraft planes had gone to LEYTE after the attacks upon my fleet. I therefore expected that they would bring us under heavy attack if we entered the Bay. I did not know whether there were normally land-based planes situated there but I knew there were fields there and there might be.

Q. Did you have knowledge of any other American aircraft carriers in this neighborhood, that is, except those with whom you had had a battle already?
A. I thought I had seen a mast or masts to the east, which was the only guess I had that there might be other carriers in the vicinity. I knew of nothing to the south. We were listening in on your Communications at that time, at the opening of the original battle. We intercepted a message which said "We are under attack by Japanese ships, hasten with aid," and for two hours, we heard the message that it was useless. From the assistance that had been called, we heard the reply that it would take two hours to render aid.

Q. What type of aid did you think was referred to?
A. I didn't know where any other aid was but understood from the message that it was air aid.

>Q. Was it this aid promised in two hours which you expected to hit you inside the Gulf - was that part of the reason you did not enter the Gulf?
A. Yes, that is one reason. It had gotten very late too; that is, the schedule was very much delayed because of the engagement.

Q. As far as fuel and ammunition went, were you in satisfactory condition to enter the Gulf?
A. There was no consideration for fuel. There was no consideration for how to get home. We had enough ammunition.

Q. You had enough to take on these battleships you expected inside?
A. Yes.

Q. In the course of that morning's engagement, had you received any information from either Admiral NISHIMURA or Admiral OZAWA?
A. No information.

Q. Then at the time you turned north you did not know what had happened in SURIGAO Strait the night before?
A. No. I had no wireless information or intelligence of any sort. I therefore sent up two planes from the YAMATO, one to go over the SURIGAO Strait area, the other to scout to the north. Neither brought any information.

Q. Did the planes return?
A. They landed ashore and never came back to the ship. Not a word. There was a message from the one that went to the north saying that he had seen nothing. There was no message from the one that went through the SURIGAO Strait area.

Q. Did you have any information as to Admiral OZAWA's operations in the north from anyone else?
A. Sometime during the day - I do not remember when - I received word from Admiral OZAWA. The message did not come from OZAWA but I received intelligence by wireless - I do not know the source - that Admiral OZAWA had become engaged and damaged and was intending a night torpedo attack upon your formation; that he was going to change his flagship but he did not name the ship. The extent of damage that OZAWA's fleet had sustained was not known to me.

Q. Do you remember if you received this information decision, I concluded it was best to go north or afterwards?
A. After I changed the course to north.

Q. So that the reason for changing course to the north was the threat of a heavy air attack if you entered the Gulf, is that correct?
A. It wasn't a question of destruction that was neither here nor there. It was a question of what good I could do in the Bay. I concluded that under the heavy attack from ship and shore-based planes, I could not be effective. Therefore, on my own decision, I concluded it was best to go north and join Admiral OZAWA.

NAV-9

--45--

Q. Was this alternative plan provided for in the original plans, or was it a decision of the moment only?
A. The decision was a momentary one. I sent a report to Admiral OZAWA that I had turned north and would be able to coordinate my attack with the night destroyer torpedo attack which I learned Admiral OZAWA was going to make, which I had learned from other sources.

Q. You are sure that Admiral OZAWA did intend to make such an attack?
A. I did not get that from Admiral OZAWA. I got the news of it that such an attack was intended. I had the distinct impression that Admiral OZAWA was going to launch that night attack and I myself, coming north, was determined to help and if I didn't find anything up in here, I would withdraw through SAN BERNARDINO Strait.

Q. Did you not feel on this northern trip that you would be brought under heavy attack there from our task force in that region?
A. I concluded to do it, no matter what come from the north.

Q. Well, I wanted to get the distinction between an air attack here and an air attack there. Why did you prefer this one?
A. It is the same under attack in either case; but I would be no good here while I might by coordination assist up there in the north.

Q. Do you mean that you felt it more profitable to attack our Task Force than to attack our transport invasion shipping in the Gulf?
A. In the narrow confines of LEYTE Gulf I couldn't use the advantage that ships have of maneuvering, whereas I would be a more useful force under the same attack with the advantage of maneuver in the open sea.

Q. Yes, but was there a choice of targets involved?
A. By the time the question arose, your landing had been confirmed and I therefor considered it not so important as it would have been before.

Q. (Admiral Ofstie), Admiral KURITA, when you came through SAN BERNARDINO, why did you attack the carriers and delay your movement rather than going on down the coast of SAMAR directly to LEYTE Gulf?
A. I thought that the course I actually took was the best course for LEYTE and I encountered your force in the way. That is, closer to shore was not the best course for LEYTE.

Q. (Lt. Comdr. Field). What speed did you take when you started north?
A. 20 when we saw no enemy planes - 24 whenever we saw enemy planes.

Q. Did you receive other air attacks while moving north?
A. I think it is about 11 times that I was under attack from the air on the way north.

Q. On what scale were the attacks?
A. 40 or 50 plane attacks, both bombing and torpedo.

Q. Did these attacks inflict serious damage?
A. It was at that time that the bulges got perforated and all the major ships were trailing oil. The ability of the ships wasn't seriously interfered with but they left a long conspicuous trail of oil in the water. There was no vital damage to any ship. They could maintain speed and they were able for battle all the way through it.

Q. What course did you take going north? Did you sweep around here? Could you draw the course on the chart.
A. I do not remember the precise course.

Q. Well, approximately. Were you headed for Admiral OZAWA or were you headed for SAN BERNARDINO?
A. My intention was not primarily to join Admiral OZAWA but to go north and seek out the enemy. If I failed to find the enemy, having reached here (indicating about 13°20'N) my intention was to go north and seek out the enemy but to be able to retire through SAN BERNARDINO Strait at dark.

Q. You did not then plan to coordinate with Admiral OZAWA in a night battle?
A. I considered my mission to go north and seek out your carrier Task Force and bring it under engagement with the assumption that Admiral OZAWA to the north would thereby be assisted by it. But it was not to join forces with Admiral OZAWA. Secondarily or overall, I wanted to be at SAN BERNARDINO at sunset to get through and as far to the west as possible during the night.

NAV-9

--46--

Q. If you planned to be there by dark, surely you could not get very far north?
A. No, I didn't know how far. I thought perhaps Admiral OZAWA's action might lead them to be in my path if we went through quickly that afternoon.

Q. Did you have any information as to their location?
A. I had no information.

Q. Did you expect American forces in this area to come south in answer to the calls for help which you mentioned earlier?
A. Yes, that is right. I also thought that the engagement with Admiral OZAWA might produce them in my path.

Q. When you turned north at eleven or twelve o'clock, was the governing consideration to reach there by dark or to attack our forces? Which was the more important?
A. The point was the immediate objective to hit the enemy. I won't say which was more important; because if I did not get into the Straits by night, the next day was hopeless for me because I could be brought under attack by land planes and by this force. When I got about this area, (indicating about 12°30'N) I found Japanese airplane flying over this area so I thought that the American forces might be located about this area and I tried to seek out the American forces but couldn't find them.

Q. If you found American forces, you then would have stayed to fight and not bothered about being here by dark, is that correct?
A. Yes. If I could attack American forces about this area, I would abandon that decision to get to the Straits by dark.

Q. While traveling north did you receive any instruction from Admiral TOYODA?
A. No instructions.

Q. No intelligence from Admiral NISHIMURA?
A. No instructions. I did receive, during that northward course, information as to what had happened to NISHIMURA; that it was not good; but no instructions from TOYODA.

Q. Is it correct then to say that the decision to proceed north here and the decision to proceed west here (indicating) were both dictated by fear of air attack; in the first case, air attack inside the narrow gulf, in the second case, air attack the next day? Is that correct?
A. Going north with the hope of encountering the enemy and keeping touch, but with the intention of making this by sunset if I did not encounter the enemy, in order to withdraw clear back to my base because I was low on fuel.

Q. Was the decision to pass through SAN BERNARDINO Strait by dark due to shortage of fuel for further operations or due to fear of air attack while in this area (indicating SIBUYAN SEA) the next day? Which was the governing consideration?
A. It was primarily fuel. Furthermore, if and when brought under air attack on the following day in the passage through the islands, I would have to use extra fuel in dodging and maneuvering. Therefore, the fuel was very important consideration; the basic one.

Q. Did you have any knowledge of a plan to use Kamikaze attacks by land-based aircraft in the LEYTE Area on that day?
A. I had no connection with Kamikaze; neither had I heard anything about the Kamikaze method; but I now believe that after I had left my base, the Kamikaze first came under planning. As I understood it, my operation was without regard to land-based planes and that developments separate from my activities governed the beginning of the Kamikaze sort of operation. The Kamikaze method was used because the fleet was attacking here with few planes. So to aid this operation, they planned for Kamikaze. Fundamentally, because the fleet action was not a success.

Q. At the time you were fighting off SAMAR you had no knowledge of Kamikaze?
A. I did not know anything of that. It was developed from the shore-based plane units, the Kamikaze; as assistance to a situation which as far as the fleet was concerned, had not been a success.

Q. Did you receive any communication from Admiral TOYODA during the late afternoon, while passing through here?
A. No communication from TOYODA.

(Interrogation adjourned 1200; upon reconvening at 1330, Admiral KURITA was joined by Captain OHMAE.)

685287 O - 46 - 5

NAV-9

--47--

Q. Captain OHMAE, this morning we discussed the battle down here on the 25th, and when we stopped for lunch, we had just gotten the Admiral back to SAN BERNARDINO Straits. Were you in this action?
A. Yes, I was on the flagship of Admiral OZAWA's forces. There was no coordination intended on the afternoon of the 25th.

Q. Admiral, on the next day, on the 26th, did you receive more air attacks while retiring through the SIBUYAN SEA?
A. From about 8 o'clock on, received three attacks.

Q. Where were you at that time, near TABLAS?
A. Southeast of MINDORO. B-24s were the third attack: the first two attacks were search planes, carrier planes.

Q. What damage was done in each attack?
A. In the first attack, one torpedo hit on the NOSHIRO. The NOSHIRO was stopped dead in the water from the first attack, torpedo, and was therefore bombed and sunk in the second attack.

Q. Was there any other damage in the first attack?
A. Something happened to the stern of one of the destroyers, but I don't know what. That is the entire damage from all three attacks.

Q. In the first attack, the NOSHIRO had a torpedo hit which stopped her, and that is all that happened in the first attack?
A. That is correct.

Q. In the second attack, the NOSHIRO was hit by bombs and sunk, and that is all that happened, in the second attack?
A. Yes.

Q. The third attack was by B-24s; no hits at all?
A. They were using very large bombs and there were no hits.

Q. Was it a heavy attack, many planes, the third one?
A. 24 planes.

Q. Were there any damaging near misses?
A. There were some very near misses but not to do any appreciable damage to the ships.

Q. Where did your force then retire, to what port?
A. The destroyers fueled north at CORON; the ether ships without fueling went on around to BRUNEI where the destroyer joined them later. The tankers and destroyers came under air attack later on and some of the destroyers were sunk in the area of CORON and one tanker, having received one hit, fled away to the northwest. One tanker was sunk. in BALABAC Passage and the other escaped in PAITAN Bay. The first was sunk by submarine torpedo; the other was damaged by one submarine torpedo.

Q. These were the tankers that had followed your force and were in the SULU SEA during the action, is that correct?
A. Yes. When the fleet went up, the order was issued to return to BRUNEI. When passing the BALABAC Passage, each was torpedoed by submarine.

Q. Would you tell us very briefly what were the subsequent movements of your fleet? Where did you go? What did you do?
A. Fueling, loading ammunition, and repairing in BRUNEI. The orders for that came from Headquarters; also that would be hospitalized.

Q. Did the fleet stay at BRUNEI or did it go to SINGAPORE?
A. Most of the ships returned to the INLAND SEA.

Q. Reaching there about what time?
A. About the end of November, arriving in the INLAND SEA.

Q. Now, in general, covering this whole operation, do you feel that your communications were satisfactory?
A. I thought that the communications were not entirely adequate partly because, when I switched my flag from the ATAGO to the YAMATO, communications personnel were divided between two destroyers, one of which had to accompany the TAKAO back to BRUNEI, and for that reason I consider that the communications were not adequate.

NAV-9

--48--

Q. Did you receive as much information about our forces throughout this operation as you expected?
A. From the first, I did not think I was getting enough.

Q. To what do you attribute that failure of information?
A. I thought it was not a matter of communications but of scouting.

Q. Had there been any planned arrangements for you to receive information gathered by land-based planes in the PHILIPPINES?
A. There had been a plan, but no specific orders providing for it at that time.

Q. Now did you receive any?
A. I received information from the land-based planes, but I don't remember in detail which communication received or when.

Q. Was it of importance or value to you?
A. Yes, it was very important. All the information received about the location of your carrier forces came from land-based stations.

Q. Was it precise, or did you at that time think it precise?
A. I thought it was. That was on the 24th.

Q. Do you remember where our carrier forces were reported?
A. The information that I had from land-based planes on the 24th indicated that American carriers were east of LUZON and about 18 degrees north.

Q. You spoke of using your battleship scout planes to provide you with information. Was that your intention from the beginning of the operation, or was it a last resort due to failure of other methods?
A. The commanding officer of this detachment (indicating SAN JOSE, MINDORO) made a plan to search this area but I didn't know the plan precisely; but anyway I received no information about the American fleet, only that force east of LUZON.

Q. So you used the planes from the YAMATO. But did you expect to have to use battleship planes?
A. Because they were observation planes, I did not send them out on scouting until at this point when I turned. I sent out in three directions at that time. I had about 12 planes for search purposes which I might have used out here going north except that they had been damaged in previous action from air bombing and gunfire. I had also sent them off in order to avoid own gun blast.

Q. Did the original plan for this operation contemplate that you would use your own scout planes that way or was information to be gained from land-based planes?
A. The plan was to receive information from the Air Forces and if I wanted to search on my own, I would, send my own airplanes.

Q. Did you send your own to search or just for spotting gunfire?
A. All scouting was sent from land but for a suspicious place I would send my own planes for limited scouting.

Q. From what you said this morning we gathered that you received no early report from Admiral OZAWA or Admiral NISHIMURA about their actions. Did you expect more ample reports? Did you expect full, prompt reports?
A. (Capt. OHMAE) This northern fleet sent three or four reports to TOKYO and to the 2nd Fleet but for some reason they were not received, at TOKYO or by the 2nd Fleet on the 24th. I think that these important reports were the reason for the unsuccessful operation. Four messages were sent on the 24th from the Japanese 3rd Fleet to TOKYO and to the 2nd Fleet. They were not received and I think the lack of success of the entire operation depended upon that failure of communication.

Q. Admiral KURITA, in relation to Admiral NISHIMURA's force, apparently you received no good reporting from them. Do you know why?
A. I don't know. The 2nd Fleet did not receive that.

Q. Did you receive any information from Admiral NISHIMURA?
A. As I said this morning he was under air attack. He sent three messages; one that he was under air attack, that he was under torpedo boat attack, and one saying that he will be delayed getting into LEYTE GULF. Perhaps I received some other messages thereafter but I don't remember.

NAV-9

--49--

Q. Do you remember when you heard the results of the battle in the Strait? When did you receive news of what happened in the battle there?
A. About 11 o'clock. I did not receive any direct report but got word which made me think that it had been a failure, about 11 o'clock of the following day.

Q. And from whom did that message come and what was the substance?
A. I think it was from a destroyer with Admiral NISHIMURA.

Q. Did it give specific details of the action, of damage suffered and damage inflicted?
A. It was very serious; that there were very serious fires, but no details. They were very short messages. It seems that the source had not actually seen the action or the results.

Q. Did this report of the action of Admiral NISHIMURA have any influence on your decision not to enter the Gulf?
A. I did know, when I made that decision at, 11 o'clock on the following day, that the NISHIMURA action was a failure.

Q. Was that a reason contributing to your decision?
A. I did not know where the NISHIMURA fleet had met disaster, whether it was in LEYTE Bay, in the passage, or where. Therefore, it did not influence my decision.

Q. How often in the course of the engagement did you send reports to Admiral TOYODA? That is, did you send a regular series at 'stated' times or only when something important happened? About how many reports did you send?
A. Not at a fixed time. For example, when we were brought under observation, air attack or gunfire I instantly reported to the Combined Fleet. When in sight of enemy forces I used radio but when not located by enemy forces, I did not use radio.

Q. Why did not Admiral NISHIMURA make further reports when he was in this action in the south?
A. Thinking about it afterwards, I cannot say why he didn't. I don't think that Admiral NISHIMURA knew the extent of damage to his fleet because the sea is very narrow. The area was confined so he, didn't send any message, I supposed.

Q. Admiral NISHIMURA was under your direction; should he have reported what was happening?
A. I think that Admiral NISHIMURA could not observe the condition because of the confined waters in which he was maneuvering. I don't know why he did not report more, other than that guess now.

Q. Captain OHMAE, did you have a special communication channel between the three admirals and Admiral TOYODA, a special channel for important messages, a special frequency?
A. Yes, I think there was a high command channel.

Q. Admiral, do you remember about how long it took to send a message to Admiral TOYODA and to receive a reply?
A. About 30 minutes. Sometimes long and sometimes very short, but when I passed here (indicating 250000 sortie from SAN BERNARDINO Strait) he returned the answer in a minimum of about 30 minutes.

Q. That message was in code naturally, wasn't it?
A. Yes.

Q. If 30 minutes was the minimum, what was the longest delay? Was 30 minutes exceptionally good?
A. It was very good.

Q. What did you usually expect?
A. The messages were sometimes long in the number of words but anyway I didn't expect to receive answers so quickly. The exact time I don't remember. In my opinion it takes usually about three hours for an urgent message to get a reply.

Q. Admiral, in your opinion, was the general plan for this operation, the Japanese plan, the best that could have been made at that time with the forces available?
A. I think that was the best plan which we could apply but not the best theoretical plan. According to your question, I think it was the best plan under the conditions.

NAV-9

--50--

Q. You said this morning that in this operation you were prepared to accept 50% losses in ships. What did you expect to gain in exchange for that 50%?
A. About the intention in my mind was, for that price, to succeed in damaging one-half of all your ships in LEYTE Bay.

Q. Did you expect to stop the landings before they could be completed or to destroy the supply of shipping and thus isolate the troops ashore, or to destroy our fighting ships?
A. Only to delay the landing for two or three days. It was to achieve a temporary delay of landing progress.

Q. How were you going to exploit this delay?
A. It was then a limited objective, to delay that particular landing for two or three days. We could do nothing about succeeding landings, not having enough strength.

Q. Your purpose was to attack the landing ships and the transports and cargo ships rather than the fighting ships?
A. Both.

Q. Any choice?
A. Combatant ships; if both were present I would engage the battleships.

Q. What particular thing or event do you believe caused this operation to fail? What was the main cause of the failure of the operation?
A. The lack of planes, either for search or for attack, overall.

Q. Was that lack known in advance when you set out on the operation, or did you then believe you had sufficient planes?
A. It was understood from the beginning, before the plan was put into operation, that we did not have enough.

Q. What chance of success did you believe there was in beginning the operation?
A. I thought that it would be useful only if the land-based troops had a piece of luck.
(Captain OHMAE) When this whole plan was in TOKYO at that time, we thought that there wasn't such a good chance but if we did nothing, the whole PHILIPPINES would be seized. So we had to do something and we did our best. It was the last chance we had, although not a very good one.

Q. Admiral, you said you had knowledge that there were not enough planes in advance. From whom did you receive that information? Was it in the Operation Plan or did you receive a message from Admiral TOYODA, or what was the source of that knowledge?
A. I knew it from my own knowledge that there weren't enough for such an operation. I did not receive any word from headquarters to that effect.

Q. What do you think was the cause of that lack of planes?
A. Considering it after the war, I think perhaps it was failure of production, transportation, and lack of pilots.

Q. Did you have an opinion at that time which was different?
A. Nothing, except to try to do my best with the supplies that we could get.

Q. (Admiral Ofstie) What was the principal agent for the loss of Japanese air power?
A. Sudden attacks from your carrier task forces everywhere prevented or injured our air operations; and second, submarine attacks on our transportation system (of aeroplanes and fuels), including the transportation of supplies to manufacturing plants.

Q. Referring to the Battle of the CORAL SEA in May 1942, do you have an opinion as to what effect that had on subsequent Japanese strategy or strength?
A. I have not given it specific study but I think it had no great effect.

Q. The same thing with respect to the Battle of MIDWAY?
A. The Battle of MIDWAY had effect precisely to the extent of the loss of new carriers. That was the effect on future operations.

Q. The same question referring to the long period down in the SOUTH PACIFIC, the RABAUL-GUADALCANAL Area; the naval losses there for a period of 6 months perhaps.
A. Because of the attrition and loss of planes and destroyers having effect upon escorting supply ships, all operations therefore suffered.

NAV-9

--51--

Q. What was the relative effect, in order of their importance, of the loss of naval vessels, loss of naval air strength, and the loss of merchant shipping?
A. Loss of air strength was the worst. There is a great gap between that and the next. It is by far the most important. It depends upon the circumstances, without saying which is the more important, the loss of merchant shipping or naval vessels.

Q. Admiral KURITA, do you believe that you were kept well informed of the American strength and the losses as the war went along?
A. I received a great deal of official information about American losses but I myself reduced that to about a half.

Q. In your opinion, was the information you received any more accurate from either the Japanese Army or the Japanese Navy?
A. At the beginning of the war I thought that naval intelligence about your losses was the better but as the war continued I thought the two services were about equal in the inaccuracy of information, particularly from air, in that there was repetition on the same item. Therefore, I added up the reports and divided them by two for total damage.

Q. Did you have specific information on the loss in 1942 of the LEXINGTON, WASP, HORNET and the YORKTOWN at that time?
A. I did not have precise information. I saw the burning and sinking of one of them and thought it might be the HORNET, off GUADALCANAL, SANTA CRUZ, at night.

Q. Were you able to put any people on board the HORNET? Did you board the HORNET or did you fire any torpedoes into it?
A. Two American destroyers were shooting at the HORNET. I was on the KONGO at the time. My own ship did nothing. I don't know whether somebody put a torpedo in her or not.

Q. About how long after the destroyers finished shooting did she sink?
A. I don't know how long afterwards. It was still at night that she sank. I heard the noise, the sound of her destroyers firing, as I thought, into the HQRNET, and we approached indirectly and they fled. That was my impression.

Q. What is your personal opinion of the basic planning of the Japanese Naval General Staff?
A. I didn't know very much about it but I thought that there wasn't a sure touch, a sure treatment of plan making. The planning lacked a sureness of touch.

Q. At what stage in the war did you feel that the balance had swung over against you?
A. GUADALCANAL.

Q. What was the actual bore of the YAMATO guns?
A. I never knew, it was very secret, about 45 centimeters I think. Neither did I know the maximum speed of the YAMATO. But in formation she was going 26 knots.

NAV-9

--52--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 10
USSBS NO. 53

SOLOMON ISLAND OPERATIONS AND BATTLE OF CORAL SEA

TOKYO

19 October 1945

Interrogation of: Captain YAMAOKA, M., IJN, Operations Officer, Staff 5th Air Flotilla at Battle of CORAL SEA, 7-8 May 1942.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

SUMMARY

  1. Two task units were in CORAL SEA, 7-8 May. SHOHO (sunk) Unit consisted of transports to occupy PORT MORESBY. SHOKAKU (damaged) and ZUIKAKU were to support operations, intercept American ships and to attack TOWNSVILLE, AUSTRALIA, where U.S. planes and Army were being disembarked. Interception by U.S. Carrier Task Force thwarted plans which were later abandoned. The resultant damage to Japanese CV's weakened air strength at MIDWAY, contributing to annihilation of Japanese Carrier Force and failure to capture MIDWAY, 4-6 June 1942.
  2. Tribute to Marines at WAKE, December 1942.
  3. Admiral YAMAMOTO shot down and killed in airplane enroute BUIN.
  4. Japanese started night carrier operations about 1933.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Were you in the SOLOMON Area during the Battle of CORAL SEA, 7-8 May 1942?
A. Yes, I was on the ZUIKAKU, which was the flagship, serving as staff officer of the Fifth Air Flotilla.

Q. What was the mission of the SHOHO?
A. The mission of the SHOHO was: first, to defend the transport ships in its task force going to PORT MORESBY; and secondly, to scout for submarines.

Q. At what distance were the anti-submarine patrols maintained, and what type planes used?
A. About 15 miles. Fighters were used. Torpedo planes were used for scouting at the same time.

Q. How many planes did the SHOHO carry?
A. 12 Zero fighters and about 9 to 12 torpedo planes. The SHOHO isn't a main aircraft carrier.

Q. Were any land-based planes employed in this action?
A. Yes, RABAUL based planes. It was the 25th Land-Based Air Flotilla; 50 to 60 fighters, Zero Type, 30 to 40 bomber planes. They attacked cruisers.

Q. Were any planes operated from TULAGI?
A. Yes, TULAGI was prepared as a seaplane base for operation against PORT MORESBY. DEBOINE and TULAGI are the seaplane bases which were used against PORT MORESBY.

Q. What was the mission of the SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU and their task force?
A. The mission of those two aircraft carriers was first to defend the PORT MORESBY attacking group. The second mission was to attack the American Fleet which was expected to appear on the scene; and the third, to make and air raid on TOWNSVILLE and to destroy American and Australian planes and ships that were being delivered there.

Q. When did you first receive information regarding the location of our American force?
A. On the 4th of May, TULAGI was attacked by your planes. I was to the north of TULAGI at the time with the 6th Squadron, which was composed of SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU, NAKA, HAGURO, seven destroyers and one tanker.

Q. Do you know what damage was incurred at TULAGI?
A. I am not certain. I heard that several small torpedo boats were damaged and sunk; one destroyer and one minelayer received mediocre damage. No seaplane tender present. The damaged destroyer was beached and then later swept out by the tide and sank. (Name: KIKUZUKI)

Q. What planes were destroyed?
A. Two or three seaplanes were damaged.

Q. Was the minelayer sunk or damaged?
A. It was damaged by near misses and one hit. It sailed to SHORTLAND where it was repaired.

NAV-10

--53--

Q. How did you first know the location of the American force?
A. Following the attack on TULAGI we knew the force was in the general area. The exact location wasn't known, but it was expected that American carriers, battleships and possibly some British forces were in the CORAL SEA. After our attack on the tanker and destroyer the morning of the 7th of June and your attack on SHOHO about 4 p.m., we sent out a dusk attack of about 27 bombers and torpedo planes to attack the American carrier force. They did not find it although searched for almost 300 miles. Finally they jettisoned their bombs and torpedoes and returned to their own carriers. While returning they passed over the American carrier at night. Some planes mistook the American force for the Japanese carriers, turned on their lights and tried to land before they realized their mistake. Then all planes returned to the Japanese carriers. About ten planes were lost during this flight.

Q. Why did you attack our tanker (NEOSHO) and destroyer (SIMS) instead of our carrier force during the morning of 7 May?
A. Our scouting planes from the SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU erroneously reported the tanker group as the American carrier group; therefore, the Japanese carrier planes attacked them instead of the American carriers.

Q. Did you have radar at that time?
A. No.

Q. Do you know how close the two forces were that night?
A. We thought that they were about 40 miles south of our force and did not want to have a night action; therefore retired to the north, intending to attack your force in the morning. I wanted to attack your force that night' but we did not know how many ships you had, so it was decided not to attack until morning.

Q. Had your pilots been trained to land on the carriers at night?
A. Yes, about 2/3 of all pilots were thoroughly trained at night.

Q. When did you first start night carrier operations?
A. About 1933.

Q. Was one carrier used for night operation or did you have pilots on each carrier?
A. Each carrier had a few night pilots at first, then increased. About 2/3 of all pilots on each carrier were thoroughly trained in night carrier operation. About 1/3 were familiar but not so well trained.

Q. How did you land at night?
A. We used a green and red light which were lined up for a flight path to come aboard. We also used a signalman.

Q. Did he control the speed during the landing?
A. No, after a night battle, only signal used was O.K. and should land, or that he was not O.K. and should be waved off; in which case he made another approach. During the training more signals were used to indicate speed and altitude. These signals were given by blinker guns at night.

Q. What accidents incurred in training?
A. Thorough basic training was given at night on land; therefore, we had very few accidents in night landings aboard ship.

Q. How was the SHOHO sunk?
A. Damaged by dive-bombers but sunk by torpedoes. It capsized. More than five torpedoes hit and many bombs.

Q. Were many personnel lost?
A. About 200 out of 800 were rescued by destroyers. If they had more destroyers more personnel would have been saved.

Q. How was the SHOKAKU damaged?
A. About mid-morning on the 8th two bombs hit - one, well forward on the port bow; second, well aft on the starboard quarter. The first bomb forward set the gasoline afire and destroyed anchor windlass room. The second bomb destroyed the airplane motor repair room. As result of the first hit, the flight deck was badly damaged and we were unable to launch planes; however, we were able to land them aboard; following the bomb hits, four planes landed aboard and later the fire was put out. In the torpedo attack on both the ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU, the torpedoes were launched at too great a range permitting both carriers to avoid them. Slow torpedoes and long range. We could turn and run away from them.

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Plate 10-1: Map of the Battle of Coral Sea.
Plate 10-1: Map of the Battle of Coral Sea.

Q. Where did the remaining planes go?
A. Some of them went to ZUIKAKU. Two landed at seaplane bases and the pilots recovered. Five or six planes made a forced landing in the water near carriers. The pilots were recovered by destroyers.

Q. Was the ZUIKAKU attacked?
A. Yes, but no damage. Bombs missed, torpedoes launched far away, easily avoided.

Q. Following the damage, where did the carriers go for repairs?
A. SHOKAKU went to KURE for repairs. The ZUIKAKU went to TRUK.

Q. About how many planes were lost in the entire operation?
A. 30 planes and 30 pilots and plane crew.

Q. What effect did the losses in this battle have on current and future plans?
A. We gave up the plan to attack PORT MORESBY by sea. The army desired to take PORT MORESBY so attempted to capture by land from BUNA Area. These carriers were to take part in MIDWAY occupation, but due to damage were unable to participate. This weakened our air striking force at MIDWAY.

Q. Were any ME-109's in that battle?
A. No. No Messerschmitt planes in Japanese Navy.

Q. Did you know how much damage was done to our carriers?
A. More than six torpedoes hit on the LEXINGTON, more than eight bombs hit; two torpedoes hit the YORKTOWN.

Q. Which type of attack did you most fear?
A. Dive-bombing; because it is difficult to avoid.

Q. Were you present when the Japanese captured WAKE in December 1941?
A. Not at the island. I was returning from PEARL HARBOR attack. On the way home from HAWAII, 2 carriers were ordered to assist in the attack on WAKE Island. I don't know what specific forces were in the WAKE Island attack group. Our planes did not see them. We just bombed the island while enroute to JAPAN.

Q. What ships were lost at WAKE?
A. Two destroyers hit the reef and were subsequently dive-bombed and shelled from the beach.

Q. What military personnel were lost during the landing at WAKE Island?
A. None of the Navy, but severe losses were suffered in the Navy Special Landing Force. Our Navy admires the ability and courage of the pilots and fighters that defended WAKE in the operation. The airplane pilots were very brave and skillful.

Q. What was the purpose of capturing WAKE?
A. One, to seize it because it was held by the Americans; and the other reason, to use it for a base from which to scout and search that area.

Q. Did the American raids on WAKE Island do any damage?
A. On the 6th and 7th October 1943 between 500 and 600 planes bombed WAKE. At the same time 10 cruisers and destroyers bombarded the island, resulting in losses of more than 300 personnel. The installations above the ground were almost completely destroyed. That I learned from a person who came back from WAKE.

Q. How was Admiral YAMAMOTO killed?
A. Shot down while flying in a two-engine bomber to BUIN. Five or six of his staff officers, including the Chief of Staff and the Chief Medical Officer of the fleet, were killed at the same time.

Q. In the opinion of the Japanese pilots was there any difference in the American Army and Navy pilots or planes?
A. Both good. Generally, carrier pilots are more skillful. Army planes a little faster.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 11
USSBS NO. 61

JAPANESE NAVAL ESCORT OF SHIPPING AND SHIPPING LOSSES

TOKYO

18 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Captain OI, Atsushi, IJN, a permanent officer of the Japanese Navy who has had staff college training. He served as a Staff Officer of the Combined Escort Fleet from its organization in November 1943 until the war's end.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman Teller, USN.

SUMMARY

Control of Japanese shipping was divided among the Army, Navy and the Transportation and Munitions Departments. Organized naval control of escort and routing was first undertaken seriously with the creation of the independent Combined Escort Fleet in November 1943, following serious losses to submarines and aircraft in the BISMARK ISLANDS and approaches there to. The Combined Escort Fleet was placed under the command of the Combined Fleet in August 1944 when U.S. submarines and air attacks threatened to completely disrupt Japanese shipping in the SOUTH and EAST CHINA SEAS. This reorganization, however, did little to improve the situation which continued to deteriorate steadily.

During the first years of the war, submarine attacks caused most of the losses. In 1944, carrier aircraft raids on shipping concentrations took heavy toll, particularly in tankers. Air and submarine attacks in the SOUTH and EAST CHINA SEAS during early 1945 forced abandonment of convoys between the EMPIRE and Southwest Area in February and the complete stopping of shipping on this route in March. Mining caused some losses at BALIKPAPEN, SOERABAJA, SINGAPORE and SAIGON. Mining by B-29s closed SHIMONOSEKI Strait for two weeks in May 1945.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Who was responsible for directing the routing of Japanese merchant shipping between the homeland and the Southern PACIFIC?
A. I think no definite person was responsible for shipping. The Navy, the Army, and the Transportation and Communication Department were each responsible, and since the Munitions Department was initiated it also has had a strong voice in the matter. These, together in conference when necessary, decided how to arrange the shipping. Our headquarters, the Combined Escort Fleet, were solely responsible for protection. Under, the supervision of the Transportation Department there is an organization - half civil, half governmental - called the Shipping Control Board.

Q. Did the Shipping Control Board exist throughout the entire war?
A. I don't think so; I think from sometime since 1942 or 1943.

Q. The Shipping Control Board and the various other agencies which you mentioned decided where the ships were to be used, is that correct?
A. Yes, I think so.

Q. After they had decided where the ships were to be employed, who gave the sailing orders from port to port?
A. In the case of Army shipping which was principally transport or transport cargo, the local Army headquarters gave the sailing orders. There was an Army headquarters for shipping at UJINA and several sub-headquarters in various outlying areas.

Q. In the case of shipping controlled by the Navy, who gave the sailing orders to individual ships or groups of ships?
A. We have in the Navy Department a bureau called Naval Transportation Headquarters, which issues shipping orders for all naval supply shipping except ships of the fleet train and naval auxiliaries which are under control of the Combined Fleet.

Q. Did the Combined Fleet have sub-headquarters at various important ports?
A. In the South Sea Area shipping sub-headquarters were located under the various area fleet headquarters. The Combined Fleet ordered shipping through these headquarters only for fleet operational purposes. The Navy Department Transportation Office exercised control over the shipping sub-headquarters for normal shipping. For the most part this was done directly, but it was also done through the area fleet headquarters.

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Q. When did the Combined Escort Fleet cease to be independent and become subordinate to the Combined Fleet, and why was that change made?
A. It was the 3rd of August 1944. Because your attack was getting so severe that the entire area even in SOUTH or EAST CHINA SEAS was dangerous. Without assistance of the Combined Fleet we could not protect sea lanes any more.

Q. Prior to August 3, 1944, what resources in escort vessels did the Combined Escort Fleet have?
A. The Combined Escort Fleet had under its command at naval bases and subnaval bases in JAPAN a certain number of old destroyers, PT boats, and sub-chasers for use as escorts. The First Escort Fleet had a certain number of old destroyers and sea defense vessels. Also under the command of the Combined Escort Fleet there were a number of aircraft which were based at TATEYAMA, OKINAWA, TAKAO, MANILA and for a time at SAIGON. The aircraft were largely medium bombers engaged in anti-submarine patrols.

Q. After 3 August 1944, what additions were made to the force available for escorting ships?
A. The area of responsibility of the First Escort Fleet had been the area from JAPAN to SINGAPORE, including the PHILIPPINES and CHINA Coast. Prior to being placed under the Combined Fleet, the Combined Escort Fleet cooperated with the area and expeditionary fleets in the South Seas for escort work, but this cooperation took place only on the highest echelon between the Combined Escort Fleet headquarters and the Combined Fleet headquarters. Each office was able to issue orders only to fleets specifically under their command. After the third of August 1944, the Combined Escort Fleet issued orders directly to the area and expeditionary fleets in the South Seas as well as to the First Escort Fleet, in matters of convoy escorting.

Q. Were the vessels of the expeditionary fleets and area fleets assigned permanently to escort duty or were different ships used from time to time.
A. After August 1944, escort vessels belonging to the area and expeditionary fleets were practically always used on orders from the First Escort Fleet. However, they remained attached to units to which they had been previously attached and were serviced and supplied by those same units. The reason for their availability to the First Escort Fleet was largely that other than escort there was no real need for them at all.

Q. In Western NEW GUINEA and the CELEBES Area, between March 1944 and October 1944, what was the most effective United States form of attack against shipping?
A. I thing [sic] submarines were the worst. Anyway up to the end of last year (1944) subs were the most terrible attack force; after that time the air force was. However, the Task Force air raids on TRUK in February and PALAU at the end of March 1944 did terrible damage.

Q. What effect did the Carrier Task Force raid on TRUK on February 17, 1944 have on merchant shipping?
A. At that time we lost several big tankers, some of them over 20,000 tons. Merchant ship losses at TRUK and in the SOUTH CHINA SEA during February 1944 were the greatest losses for any month of the war, and the loss in the TRUK raid amounted to approximately half of the total for the month.

Q. What effect on shipping did the carrier raids on PALAU at the end of March 1944 have?
A. This time also, tankers were chief victims. Not so many were lost as at TRUK, but it was most vital damage. So far as movement or operation of the Combined Fleet was concerned, the loss of tankers in these two raids was very serious. It also influenced the transportation of oil from the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES to the EMPIRE.

Q. When was the Combined Escort Fleet created?
A. The Combined Escort Fleet was originally organized on the 15th of November 1943 because of the very heavy losses which occurred to shipping in the general area of the BISMARKS where escorts had not been adequate or well organized.

Q. What caused those losses? Submarines, air or surface action?
A. These losses were largely due to submarines. Of course I can't remember exactly. I think, also, air force attacks were most terrible.

Q. In the area of the MOLUCCAS and CELEBES in the summer of 1944, were night air attacks against shipping troublesome? If so, what effect did they have on shipping and escort?
A. Of course they were troublesome, but we did not have so much shipping there. We very quickly abandoned that area. We transported many troops from MANILA to HALMAHERA passing south of MINDANAO, and lost many ships in the CELEBES SEA. Submarines were most dangerous.

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Q. After August 1944 did you have enough escort shipping to move your vessels as fast as you wanted to?
A. The supply of the escort vessels available to the Combined Escort Fleet after 3 August 1944 was less than prior to that date. The change in organization at that time was initiated by the Combined Fleet, and the Combined Escort Fleet did not think at that time that from their point of view it was a good change. It meant that their vessels could be used by the Combined Fleet for offensive and defensive operations. We had insufficient force of escort throughout the war and the organizational change of 3 August 1944 did not improve the situation. Furthermore, during the carrier attacks on FORMOSA in October 1944, aircraft suitable for scouting and anti-submarine patrol were practically eliminated. Prior to the organizational change in August 1944, these aircraft for anti-submarine patrol were for the exclusive use of Combined Escort Fleet and could not be used in offensive operations by the Combined Fleet.

Q. When did the aircraft attacks against your shipping in the SOUTH CHINA SEA first become very serious?
A. As I recall, the first time was the carrier attack on January 12, 1945 off CAMRANH Bay.

Q. What form of air attack was considered most dangerous to shipping?
A. I think the carrier air force attack was most dangerous; torpedo attack was most vital, next dive-bombing and strafing was most dangerous. But single plane attacks against our anti-submarine planes had a very serious effect, because we depended very much on those anti-submarine planes and those planes were shot down and gradually diminish in strength.

Q. In the SOUTH CHINA SEA, carrier attacks occurred only in January 1945. Those carrier attacks were made on SAIGON, HONGKONG, and TOURANE. Do you know how many ships were lost to those carrier attacks?
A. I am not certain but I think more than ten tankers were lost at TOURANE and SAIGON on the same day, and about five or six tankers were lost in HONGKONG a few days later. The first day in HONGKONG there wasn't very serious damage but on the second day all shipping (mostly tankers) was annihilated.

Q. When air attacks along the CHINA Coast drove the shipping to the channels inside of the small islands, did that increase losses due to grounding or have other serious effect on shipping?
A. There was not very much increase in losses due to accident, but we were more easily caught by submarines and airplanes. At that time in March 1945, we thought passing through CHINA SEA extremely difficult, and on the 15th of March abandoned all shipping between the EMPIRE and Southwest Areas. About the end of February 1945, attacks by single planes on shipping in the SOUTH CHINA SEA became very effective in addition to submarine attacks, because we had decided to abandon the use of convoys after your force came to LINGAYAN, and ships were sailing singly.

Q. Are you acquainted with the damage done to merchant shipping by carrier raids in the MANILA Area in September 1944?
A. If I remember correctly we had anchorages in CORON Bay and all along the west coast of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; for instance off SANTA CRUZ and other places on the west coast of LUZON. We thought at first that CORON Bay was safe from your carrier attacks. If we took the convoys far into sea we were attacked by submarines, so we took ships into CORON Bay believing it was safe. But your force reached there and I think we received great damage.

Q. Was there a major portion of your shipping in the PHILIPPINES at that time?
A. Those ships were mostly used for supplying and reinforcements of Army garrisons. Our convoys usually took the coast route. Before the carrier raids on MANILA in September 1944, we considered the route FORMOSA, LUZON, PALAWAN, West BORNEO, SINGAPORE was safest because we could protect shipping with aircraft stationed at points along this route. Therefore we had some tankers and ships loaded with bauxite in MANILA Bay. We lost those precious ships as well as Army transports in those carrier raids.

Q. Of the tankers which were repaired in SINGAPORE and sent north to the EMPIRE in early 1945, how many were lost on the way?
A. We lost about 15 percent in February 1945, and beginning of March we lost 30 percent.

Q. During the war, what changes in the armament of escort vessels and merchant ships were made to improve their defense?
A. The most important change was the fall of 1944 when the best Army transport ships were equipped with radar. At the end of January 1945, 25 mm machine guns were drawn from every possible place on shore and even off merchant ships to increase the armament of tankers running

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from SINGAPORE to the homeland. The plan to increase the armament of merchant ships had been in existence from the beginning of the war, but production was not sufficient to make it possible to carry out the plan. Escort vessels were equipped with radar as much as possible beginning about September 1944. Previous to that only a few escort ships had radar and radar production was mostly for combatant ships.

Q. Did the radar installation include receiving equipment for our radar signals?
A. Radar intercept receivers were on most escort vessels by about April 1944, but this was not very effective because there was no way of locating in bearing and distance. This was principally a warning device. Due to rapid improvement and research, there was sufficient radar for most escort vessels by December 1944.

Q. What did you consider the most effective weapon against the submarine - aircraft or escort vessel?
A. Planes equipped with radar; especially those equipped with MAD.

Q. How many American submarines did you estimate were sunk?
A. It was very difficult to determine, but the Navy's estimate was 16 per month.

Q. Were your communications adequate for conducting the business of escort, routing and protection of ships? If not adequate, in what way?
A. Communications caused a great deal of trouble. There was great delay due to lack of facilities on most merchant ships, inadequate facilities on escort vessels, and no direct communications between escort vessels and aircraft. Communication among headquarters and commands were also frequently delayed. This was considered a weak point.

Q. Before the B-29's dropped the mines in JAPAN waters in the beginning of April 1946, did the mines we laid in BORNEO, PHILIPPINES and along CHINA Coast affect merchant ship planning?
A. I think we hadn't been affected very much in the SOUTH CHINA SEA. We suffered very much at BALIKPAPAN and we abandoned the route from BALIKPAPAN to SINGAPORE.

Q. Because of mines only?
A. It was abandoned chiefly because of mines, but also because of planes attacking from MOROTAI. This was about December 1944.

Q. Do you know how many ships were lost by mines at BALIKPAPAN? Were the losses so great you were forced to abandon the port?
A. We didn't abandon the port just because of mines, because BALIKPAPAN was very important to us. In December 1944, however, due to the combined effect of mines, subs and air attack, BALIKPAPAN was officially abandoned.

Q. What losses were suffered at SOERABAJA?
A. I can't remember the number of vessels lost. Anyway our transportation from SOERABAJA was suspended for a long time. We would sweep the channel and one or two ships could get out or go in and then your forces would mine it again. Finally I think only very few small ships could use this port.

Q. Were the major losses suffered from mines in the South Area at SOERABAJA and BALIPAPAN?
A. Major losses suffered in the Southern Area were at SOERABAJA, SAIGON, and SINGAPORE and along the east coast of MALAYA.

Q. After the mining campaign was under way in JAPAN, did conditions get so bad that it was necessary to pass ships through the minefields knowing full well they would be lost?
A. Yes. We took this chance, especially in SHIMONOSEKI Strait.

Q. Do you know whether or not the mining in the INLAND SEA affected the movement of the YAMATO when it reinforced operations at OKINAWA?
A. It didn't affect it very much.

Q. How long was SHIMONOSEKI Strait closed?
A. SHIMONOSEKI Strait was closed for a period of two weeks in the middle of May and only wooden vessels less than 100 tons were able to pass through.

Q. Did you fear the possibility of damage to the tunnel by mines?
A. Yes, we feared that very much. It was not actually damaged, but we were afraid.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 12
USSBS NO. 62

KAMIKAZE CORPS

TOKYO

15 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Captain INOGUCHI, Rikibei, IJN, Chief of Staff of First Air Fleet throughout the PHILIPPINE Campaign.

Interrogated by: Lt. Comdr. J.A. Field Jr., USNR, and Lt. Comdr. R.P. Aikin, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: Captain S. Teller, USN, Lt. R. Garred, USNR.

SUMMARY

Captain INOGUCHI discusses the origin, philosophy, and history of the Kamikaze Corps, with particular reference to the PHILIPPINE Campaign. The interrogation contains some specific facts on Japanese air strength in the PHILIPPINE and OKINAWA operations, and on Japanese air order of battle, but in general is of most interest as a picture of the state of mind that gave rise to Kamikaze.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What was your position in the Philippines in 1944-1945?
A. Operations and Plans, Staff of First Air Fleet.

Q. Was the First Air Fleet combined with the Second Air Fleet during the time of our attacks there?
A. At the beginning they were separate. 22 October they combined with the Second Air Fleet. They had a single staff but remained under separate operation. Kamikaze was begun by the First Air Fleet.

Q. Were the plans of the First Air Fleet and surface forces combined in the SHO Operations?
A. They were.

Q. Who made the plans for coordination?
A. The Imperial Headquarters (Daihonei). Admiral TOYODA was the Senior Navy Member of Imperial Headquarters.

Q. Does the plan cover the complete SHO Operation?
A. The entire study of the SHO Operation is not in the plan. It is divided into three phases (3 plans), but the whole plan was directed at the same objective.

Q. I am not so much interested in the Kamikaze, but in the air cover for Admiral KURITA's fleet. Is this covered in the plan?
A. Yes, it is covered in the plan. Due to bad weather they never received cover and the Air Fleet was not able to get into the air. There was a very bad cloud bank between LUZON and BATANGAS. U.S. planes of your Task Force were able to escape through this cloud bank.

Q. Where were your planes on LUZON?
A. NICHOLS Field - and we had an insufficient number of aircraft in the command to complete the mission.

I would like to read you the history of Kamikaze which I have prepared and perhaps you will find the answer to your questions in it.

Admiral ONISHI ordered the organization of the Kamikaze on 19 October 1944. They were ready to go on 20 October, but no opportunity presented itself. On 25 October the first Kamikaze attack was made, having a great morale-raising effect. Although the attacks were ordered by the Commander in Chief (1st Air Fleet), in fact it was originated by the feeling of all combatants in the PHILIPPINE Area. All were beginning to think that there was no way but suicide to save the situation; there were many volunteers.

For example, on 15 October, Admiral ARIMA, Commander of the 26th Air Squadron, himself dove into an aircraft carrier. Admiral ARIMA lit the fuse of the ardent wishes of his men in order to bring their wishes into reality. At this time we in the PHILIPPINES thought about the approach of the crisis, owing to the odds. So we felt as follows: we must give our lives to the Emperor and Country, this is our inborn feeling. I am afraid you cannot understand it well, or you may call it desperate or foolish. We Japanese base our lives on obedience to Emperor and Country. On the other hand, we wish for the best place in death, according to Bushido. Kamikaze originates from these feelings.

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It was the incarnation of these feelings. We believe in absolute obedience to the supreme authority who is unselfish, and whose concern is the welfare and peace of mankind. By this means we can accomplish peace. In view of this - from this standpoint, the Kamikaze deserved the consideration of the whole world.

The center of Kamikaze is morale. To achieve Kamikaze, the ordinary technique of the pilot is sufficient, no special training methods are necessary. Certain points about special attack are given. But to pilots who have had short training and least flight experience we give the essence of Kamikaze attack in the shortest period possible. Later on we gave them training in Kamikaze night attack.

As soon as our reconnaissance flight consisting of several planes ascertained the location of the enemy, then the Kamikaze units would start. Our Kamikaze units tried to make their operations secret so they did not start to attack until preparation was completed and the location of the enemy fleet ascertained. Each unit consisted of five planes; one unit after another would take off in the usual method. The method of attack changed in accordance with the attacks of the Task Force.

Later the method of attack was changed. Small number of planes were deployed to many bases. The other method was to deploy a large number of planes at only a few bases. This method has the advantage of providing many supporting planes. It was useful when defense of your carriers was very effective. This method was also used when we were going to attack the enemy at the landing point.

It is to be regretted that the number of bombers we had were insufficient and cruising radius of planes inadequate.

Q. Were any of the men refused permission to make Kamikaze attacks because they were considered valuable for other missions?
A. Anybody who felt that he wanted to, could do so, and he was pledged to carry out his feelings for the Emperor. The only trouble with the U.S. way of looking at it is if you start out on a mission with the idea of coming back you won't proceed to carry out the mission with 100% efficiency. The main point of failure was the short cruising radius of the planes. When we dispersed a small number of Kamikaze planes to a large number of bases it confused the enemy but lacked cover. When a large number of planes were based at a small number of bases it gave more opportunity for cover but lessened their opportunity to attack objects from many angles.

Q. Were you cognizant of overall air and fleet plans of the PHILIPPINE Campaign.
A. Only with air operations plans of my base.

Q. Were those plans made up by your staff or made up by GHQ?
A. From GHQ. The details and execution of over-all plans were left up to us.

Q. Was the use of Kamikaze envisaged by GHQ?
A. No, they were purely and simply a policy of that base.

Q. First Air Fleet started Kamikaze?
A. Yes.

Q. But the Domei News Agency announced that they were training Kamikaze pilots in August 1944?
A. There is absolutely no basis for such a statement and possibly what they meant was that the Japanese war was going badly and that the nation would use suicide as a policy, not that the Kamikaze was a definite plan.

Q. Were Army and Navy pilots in the first Kamikaze attack?
A. Navy only. Members of the 201st Air Group. This sort of thing has to come up from the bottom and you can't order such a thing. At no time were Kamikaze tactics ordered.

Q. Do you know whether the carrier force under Admiral OZAWA took part in this campaign?
A. A Task Force under his command participated in the attack.

Q. Was it intended that the pilots from the carriers should carry out Kamikaze attacks?
A. There was no plan as to whether carrier-based pilots would take part in the action and it depended on the unit in the area and the responsibility for carrying out the Operations Plan. In the PHILIPPINE Campaign it was the First Air Fleet's responsibility. Because of lack of personnel and planes they felt that it was their responsibility to evolve some tactics that would cope with the situation. Later on when the Second Air Fleet came into the picture in the PHILIPPINE action they, too, had some Kamikaze flyers. But the main point is that initially the Kamikaze concept was a method of coping with local situations and not the result of an overall policy handed down from GHQ.

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Q. Did any of the carrier pilots join your forces on shore or take part in the operations?
A. The carrier-based planes were actively engaged between the period 24th and 26th, after which they joined our land-based forces.

Q. Did any of them carry out Kamikaze attacks from carriers or from your base?
A. Generally it was from a land base that the Kamikaze attacks were started.

Q. When was the Baka (Oka) bomb invented?
A. Approximately August 1944. The name was given to the bomb by a Navy petty officer.

Q. Did it come from GERMANY originally?
A. Maybe; my opinion is absolutely no. It has no connection with the German plan.

Q. Doesn't the fact that construction of Oka was begun in August 1944 indicate a general plan for the use of Kamikaze attacks?
A. The Oka did not precede the Kamikaze plan.

Q. How do you reconcile the two dates, August for Oka and October for Kamikaze?
A. While there may have been overall conceptions of the Kamikaze idea outside the PHILIPPINES, there was no connection. The Kamikaze spirit is uniformly Japanese. They may have very well been thinking about it at Imperial Headquarters but the first were put into practice in the PHILIPPINES. I do not know of any Kamikaze ideas in the Imperial Headquarters.

Q. Did they have Special Attack Units training in Japan?
A. There was no connection; that is, in the plans and policies. The Special Attack is a submarine attack. The common thing with all these attacks is the Kamikaze idea.

Q. In carrying out Kamikaze attacks in the PHILIPPINES was any special method of approach used to avoid radar detection?
A. The main method was to have planes, of course, drop window etc., in order to detract, while the other planes made the main attack.

Q. But as to the altitude of approach, was there any specific instructions?
A. Altitude policy was to fly as high as possible; about 18,000 feet (6000 meters). We tried various altitudes. Came in at 18,000 feet and as soon as they realized that the radar had picked them up they would go down to as low as 80 or 90 meters. After they became accustomed to your defense tactics they found that the easiest altitude was about 3000 meters.

Q. What was the best type for dive attack?
A. Tactics changed with the type of planes. A fighter would come in at 3000 or 4000 meters and then when sighting the enemy would go down to 500 meters and perform a 45° dive.

Q. Did they prefer to attack from astern, ahead, or on the beam?
A. Preferred to aim at the forward elevator from astern. We found that diving from astern and aiming for forward elevators reduced the efficiency of the target's evasive action.

Q. Did they have priority on targets, were they specifically instructed as to what targets to attack, and who issued those instructions?
A. It depended; on certain days, aircraft carriers; on other days, destroyers, etc. It was usually embodied in the Operations Plan handed down by the Commander of the Air Fleet.

Q. Why was it that Kamikaze pilots, when attacked by our fighters, did not attempt evasive tactics?
A. In such cases, if they were quite far off from their main objective, they would take evasive tactics. Sometimes it was too late.

Q. Which service, Army or Navy, conceived the idea first?
A. Navy.

Q. During the PHILIPPINE Campaign what types of aircraft ware used for Special Attack Units?
A. ZEKE, JUDY and FRANCES.

Q. What types of planes were used in the OKINAWA Campaign?
A. Same types of planes were used by the Fifth Air Fleet (KYUSHU) in their suicide attacks at OKINAWA as the First Air Fleet did in the PHILIPPINES, but as the supply of bombers and fighters became insufficient, training planes were used.

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Q. What types of training planes?
A. SHIRAGIKU was used. Also Type 93 (WILLOW) from FORMOSA only. No other type that we could use.

Q. What about float planes?
A. We did use float planes - ALF, PETE and DAVE.

Q. When did you get short of combat type planes?
A. Beginning approximately 10 April 1945.

Q. When was the Tenth Air Fleet formed?
A. 1 March 1945. Fifth, Third, and Tenth Air Fleets cooperated in attacks against OKINAWA.

Q. Was the First Mobile Base (tactical title of Fifth Air Fleet) Air Force Commander in charge of the Fifth, Third, and Tenth Air Fleets?
A. The commander of the First Mobile Base Air Force commanded the Third, and Tenth Air Fleets.

Q. Did the Commander of the Third Air Fleet move from KISARAZU to KYUSHU during the OKINAWA Campaign?
A. The Commander of the Third Air Fleet went from KISARAZU to KANOYA. The Commander of the Tenth Air Fleet went from KASUMIGAURA to KANOYA as soon as the OKINAWA operations began. The Commander of the Tenth Air Fleet stayed in KANOYA a month and went back to KASUMIGAURA. The Fifth Air Fleet Headquarters was at KANOYA. The Commander at KANOYA was Vice Admiral UGAKI, CinC of the Fifth Air Fleet for tactical operation.

Q. Was there any trouble with those three senior commanders being at KANOYA at the same time? Who commanded?
A. There was no trouble at KANOYA. As a matter of fact, the Commanders of the Third and Fifth Air Fleets were classmates at the Naval Academy. The Commander of the Third Air Fleet was a jolly fellow. The Sixth Air Army was under command of the Fifth Air Fleet during the OKINAWA Campaign. The 29th Air Flotilla in FORMOSA was an individual command.

Q. What percentage of hits were obtained in relation to the number of Kamikaze planes employed in the PHILIPPINE Campaign and at OKINAWA?
A. Approximately one-sixth of all Kamikaze planes used in the PHILIPPINES hit their target. My estimate of the OKINAWA figure was approximately one-ninth.

Q. To defend the homeland what percentage of Kamikaze planes were expected to hit targets?
A. I think that it would have depended a lot on the point at which you would have landed. We probably would have used inexperienced pilots and the figure would be probably only one-ninth or one-tenth successful. Another factor in the low score was that we had no defense against fighters.

Q. Were they going to make Kamikaze attacks at night or day, and what type of planes?
A. The plan was to use them primarily at twilight or on bright moonlight nights. SHIRAGIKU, ZERO fighters and WILLOW.

Q. Did you plan to use pathfinder planes equipped with radar during KETSU Operations (Defense of Japan)?
A. There were too few radar equipped planes to plan any considerable use of them in the KETSU Operation. Certain reconnaissance planes were equipped with radar such as FRANCES and MYRT. In my opinion, if it came to KETSU Operations, there would be no need for pathfinder planes for Kamikaze.

Q. Was it planned to use Kamikaze planes after the landings on the beaches?
A. The plan was to wait until the very last moment, until the American forces were dispersed as little as possible and thus inflict a greater amount of damage.

Q. Do the figures or results in the PHILIPPINE and OKINAWA Campaigns include joint Army and Navy Kamikaze units?
A. The figures are for the Navy only. If the Army were involved the figure would probably be less. (i.e. smaller percentage of hits).

Q. Did the Army use Kamikaze attacks in the PHILIPPINES or just the Navy?
A. Both Army and Navy.

Q. Did the Navy plan to use all training planes (Kamikaze) and all combat planes to resist an invasion of KYUSHU or did they plan to hold back some planes for the defense of HONSHU?
A. About 2/3 of the planes would be thrown into an attack on KYUSHU.

685287 O - 46 - 6

NAV-12

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Q. How many flying hours did the Navy Kamikaze pilots have in (a) the PHILIPPINE Campaign (b) the OKINAWA Campaign?
A. Most of the men in the PHILIPPINE Campaign had about 300 hrs., but in the OKINAWA Campaign we had Kamikaze pilots with as little as 100 hours.

Q. Were Kamikaze pilots during the PHILIPPINE Campaign limited to those having 300 hours or less in order to conserve the more experienced flying personnel?
A. Every one of the pilots hoped to get into the Kamikaze Corps but several of them, with the most flight time, were prevented by order of the Commanding Officer from doing so as he wanted them for torpedo bombing.

Q. Why did he limit it to torpedo bombing attack?
A. We felt that torpedo bombing took a greater amount of accuracy.

Q. In the middle of September our carrier force attacked in the PHILIPPINES. Do you know the total loss from those attacks?
A. We lost 200 planes in one attack in one day. About 60 fighters in one day. The total loss in September from the carrier strikes was about 1000.

Q. When the Second Air Fleet came down from FORMOSA. How many did they bring?
A. 300 from FORMOSA on the 22nd of October.

Q. On the 24th of October Admiral KURITA was attacked while passing through the SIBUYAN Sea. Did he have any Navy land-based plane protection?
A. They did not get through because of weather. They planned to but there was no cover.

Q. What did Admiral KURITA have scheduled for the 25th?
A. He depended on indirect support, our planes attacking your ships.

Q. Did Admiral KURITA call for fighters on the 24th when he was attacked?
A. Admiral KURITA did not request air cover. If you haven't got enough planes, there is no sense sending them.

Q. In your opinion, what was the cause of failure of the plan to defend the PHILIPPINES?
A. First, lack of planes; second, lack of experienced pilots; third, the superiority of the U.S. GRUMMAN fighter over the ZERO and the fact that the P-38 could get such good altitude.

Q. Do you feel that the shortages of planes was due to production at home or our attacks?
A. First important reason was production failure. Second was attrition of planes before they reached the scene of combat.

Q. At the start of the war did you expect a long war?
A. I thought it would last more than two years.

Q. At what stage of the war did you realize that victory was not possible for Japan?
A. Battle of MIDWAY.

Q. Were you at MIDWAY?
A. No. After GUADALCANAL, U.S. pressure became irresistible. With a Task Force you still have mobility and you can still operate, but with land-based aircraft you have to have air bases which you must hold or else your air force is neutralized; and when pressure became so strong after GUADALCANAL, we couldn't use our air forces effectively from the bases that we had left. Another factor was that we had no long range planes like U.S. B-29s and B-17s.

NAV-12

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 13
USSBS NO. 96

PEARL HARBOR-MIDWAY-SOLOMONS

TOKYO

15 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Captain WATANABE, Y., IJN, Gunnery Officer on Admiral YAMAMOTO'S Staff, Commander in Chief 2nd Fleet at MIDWAY Battle June 1942. Member of Military Affairs and Naval Headquarters Staff 1945. Very good command of English language.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

SUMMARY

PEARL HARBOR: Training commenced about August 1941 with special shallow water torpedoes for attack upon PEARL HARBOR. Photo intelligence used at PEARL HARBOR to assess damage.

MIDWAY: Occupation of MIDWAY planned subsequent to the Doolittle raid on TOKYO. Necessary to eliminate that point as a base for air attack upon JAPAN. Four carriers, one heavy cruiser and 4500 personnel lost, resulting in retirement of occupation force. Loss of battle blamed on Jap carrier force which did not maintain sufficient caution and search of area. Same lack of caution resulted in CORAL SEA loss and failure to occupy PORT MORESBY.

GENERAL: Some feeling evident against Japanese Air Force and Army. Think Army too much in politics, not enough in fighting. Loss of war due decline of air force and supporting fuel supply. Opinion JAPAN would have been forced to quit due to lack of fuel and food in 1946 whether cities bombed or not. No territorial aspiration other than CHINA and that part of the world to the west of a line between SINGAPORE, EAST INDIES, SOLOMONS and KISKA. This was to be a protective wall for ASIA.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Do you know the track of the approach to PEARL HARBOR?
A. The start was from SAEKI, the training harbor, about 17 November 1941; then north and across the PACIFIC, just south of the ALEUTIANS, then south to PEARL HARBOR. We had studied the weather on this route for a long time. Upon returning we suffered from heavy seas and strong winds. Several men were killed by the storm on the way back.

Q. How many planes were in the attack and how many lost?
A. About 450 planes. Half of them were defensive and half of them offensive. The loss was not so great. Not over 30 to 40.

Q. What was the objective of the attack upon PEARL HARBOR?
A. In Japanese tactics we are told when we have two enemies, one in front and one in the back, first we must cut in front by sword. Only cut and not kill but make it hard. Then we attack the back enemy and kill him. Then we come back to the front enemy and kill him. This time we took that tactic, having no aim to capture PEARL HARBOR but just to cripple it. We might have returned to capture later.

Q. What were your designated targets?
A. The first aim was at aircraft carriers, but they were out at sea, so attacked other ships.

Q. Did you have any special equipment such as shallow water torpedoes?
A. Yes, we had studied and trained to attack in shallow water with torpedoes. They were special torpedoes to run shallow. We had trained four months, since August 1941, at SAEKI.

Q. Was the purpose of this training to attack PEARL HARBOR or other areas?
A. Only PEARL HARBOR.

Q. Were your midget submarines at PEARL HARBOR considered of any value?
A. It was a morale factor. Young naval officers very much admire bravery of Italian officers in torpedo boats and small submarines. Because of their admiration of Italian officers, they also want to show bravery in submarines.

Q. Did you know the damage that had been done to the American Fleet at PEARL HARBOR?
A. Yes, we knew by photographs. About three weeks after the squadron came back to JAPAN, the fleet received photographs taken during the attack.

NAV-13

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Midway Battle

Q. Were you present in the Battle of MIDWAY, 4 June 1942?
A. Yes, I was Gunnery Officer on Admiral YAMAMOTO's Staff on the battleship YAMATO.

Q. What was the disposition of your fleet relative to MIDWAY?
A. During the approach the transports were to the southwest, carrier forces to the northwest, main body, (battleships, cruisers) to the west. One force, in ALEUTIAN ISLANDS.

Q. What was the command arrangement?
A. Admiral YAMAMOTO, in YAMATO, was in command of entire operation, including the occupation forces. Admiral NAGANO commanded carrier forces.

Q. How did the force retire after the battle?
A. The main body went west, carrier group ordered to join main body to return to JAPAN, some to SINGAPORE. Cruiser Division Seven broke off from the transport group and continued on toward MIDWAY. During the night, the MOGAMI and MIKUMA collided. MOGAMI received great damage from the collision. Due to the damage to this cruiser, the cruiser division also retired. The MIKUMA was sunk by dive-bombers the next day.

Q. What were the plans leading up to the attack?
A. We intended to capture MIDWAY because on 18 April we were attacked in TOKYO for the first time. We thought the planes came from MIDWAY.

Q. Did you believe, that by taking MIDWAY there would be no more raids on TOKYO?
A. Yes.

Q. Did you intend to go beyond MIDWAY?
A. If we could, we wanted to go to PEARL HARBOR; but it was not authorized, because it was too far. We intended to capture small islands between MIDWAY and PEARL HARBOR. If we captured these islands, the land-based planes could attack PEARL HARBOR. We wanted to capture PEARL HARBOR later.

Q. What was your plan of employment of MIDWAY after capture?
A. We planned to use it as a base for long-range search planes and for submarines. The attack on the ALEUTIANS ISLANDS was part of the same plan. We planned only air raids, but we wanted to capture KISKA a little later.

Q. Did you plan to hold KISKA and, DUTCH HARBOR and then move down to the UNITED STATES?
A. Not that far. Only to protect JAPAN from air raids.

Q. How much military force was in the convoy at MIDWAY?
A. Not quite sure, but we had one marine regiment, about 1500; and one military regiment, about 1000. We expected to land 6 June.

Q. What ships were lost at MIDWAY?
A. Five ships sunk: AKAGI, KAGA, SORYU, HIRYU, MIKUMA. I think all sunk by dive-bomber action.

Q. Did this operation have any number or name?
A. MI, which stood for MIDWAY ISLAND action.

Q. Do you know how many personnel were lost in the MIDWAY Battle?
A. I think 700 on each of the carriers went down and about 1000 on the MIKUMA; a few others may have been lost. The total lost was about 4,500. Admiral YAMAGUCHI was killed. If Admiral YAMAGUCHI had been saved, he would have eventually been made Commander of the Grand Fleet.

Q. How was the operation order to attack given to the fleet?
A. In early May we gathered at the Naval Station HASHIRAJIMA, a port near KURE, and were told in a conference. Afterwards the transports went to SAIPAN. They then received sailing orders by letter, carried by plane. Beginning-to-sail orders went by wireless but after sailing they used no wireless.

Q. How long did you expect to be able to hold MIDWAY?
A. We expected to be able to hold MIDWAY about three months without reinforcements.

NAV-13

--66--

Q. Did you lack any special equipment for the landing force?
A. There was sufficient forces to capture and hold MIDWAY with adequate equipment; but due to lack of precaution on the part of the air force, it was lost. The people of JAPAN are not trained to keep secrets and the important information of the cabinet was spread by the members. JAPAN was successful in the early part of the war because its moves were secret. Before the war started, members of the air forces and naval officers aboard ship sometimes quarreled about ships against airplanes. During the early time of the war, the air force attacked the battleships REPULSE and PRINCE OF WALES and sunk them off SINGAPORE. After attacking PEARL HARBOR, the air force believed the aircraft carriers were very strong and could inflict a great deal of damage on enemy surface ships. This attitude continued up to the Battle of MIDWAY. The failure of the air force to maintain an adequate search for the American carrier fleet at MIDWAY, plus the fact that the JAPANESE submarine line running north and south between 165W and 170W, was too far east to locate the American fleet, are the reasons given for the loss of the Battle of MIDWAY.

Q. At what point was the decision made to discontinue the campaign?
A. After carriers were sunk the order to retire was sent out at ten o'clock in the night. At that time only the remaining ships of the air force and transports turned around. Cruisers and main body went ahead.

Q. What was the plan of employment of this main body and cruisers?
A. The cruisers were going to proceed and shell MIDWAY and the main body was to proceed towards carrier forces to give protection and rescue survivors. The main body advanced to within the range of American long-range planes and then joined up with destroyers and cruisers from carrier forces.

Q. What factor determined the cancellation of the plan to bombard MIDWAY?
A. The collision of the two heavy cruisers during the night.

Q. Were any battleships sunk or damaged?
A. May have been damaged slightly by bombs, not sure.

Q. Do you know if HARUNA was damaged at MANILA on 8 December or at MIDWAY?
A. She did not receive damage at either place. No damage to battleships or cruisers at MANILA.

Q. Were any transports damaged at MIDWAY?
A. They turned back before attacked. One may have been damaged by torpedo but not sunk. I am not sure of damage.

Q. When was first contact made with American bombers?
A. About three hours after sunrise on 4 June.

Q. Did you receive any reports of our long-range bombers over your main body?
A. Next day your long-range bombers came, but no damage. That was on 5 June.

Q. During the afternoon of 8 June, was your formation attacked by long-range bombers?
A. Yes, but there was no damage to battleships or cruisers. The same afternoon long-range bombers also attacked transports to southwest, possibly inflicting slight damage to one transport. I heard that about midnight, before the main battle, the force was attacked by seaplanes with torpedoes. One transport hit but not seriously. Damaged the bottom.

Q. Was your formation or transport formation attacked early the next morning on 4 June?
A. No, neither main body nor transports were attacked.

Q. On 5 June, were you attacked by long-range bombers?
A. No, transports perhaps, but we received no report of having been attacked or damaged.

Q. How near did your main body approach MIDWAY before returning?
A. About 500 miles. The remaining ships from the carrier force were scheduled to join the main body of ships after sunrise on 5 June. Upon completion of the rendezvous all ships retired.

Q. Were the MOGAMI and MIKUMA attacked by long-range bombers on the 5th June?
A. Yes, very high but no hits. I think it was morning.

Q. When was the MIKUMA sunk?
A. I think the MIKUMA sank in the afternoon; but was damaged in the morning by dive-bombers, couldn't navigate very well. The MOGAMI damaged at the same time but not too badly.

NAV-13

--67--

Q. Just before sunset on the 5th, were those cruisers attacked by long-range bombers?
A. I don't think so. It was not reported.

Q. Were any other ships attacked by long-range bombers?
A. Some were attacked but no hits. One destroyer damaged by carrier planes in the afternoon. The KUMA was damaged and I think the KINUGASA. I don't know what type of planes.

Q. On the 6th of June during the retreat, did our carrier planes attack battleships of the main body?
A. No bombers seen by the main body during retirement.

Q. When the main body retired, did your submarines also retire?
A. Yes, but couldn't find any American ships. They fired on MIDWAY while passing.

Q. What effect did the loss of the carriers have on your later plans?
A. Many planes and a number of pilots were lost in the action, which, weakened the Navy Air Force, requiring training to replace them. The Army refused to take their pilots from MANCHURIA and CHINA during the SOLOMONS Campaign, therefore the Navy was required to furnish pilots in that area. Some went to ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU.

Q. Did the army provide pilots in the SOLOMONS also?
A. Yes, second class Army pilots were put ashore in SOLOMONS.

Q. Did the Japanese Navy then plan to operate within range of the shore-base planes?
A. Yes, until they got more carriers. In the movement of the squadrons, the pilots flew from island to island. Only Navy pilots took part. The Army pilots remained on a single base due to lack of navigational training.

Q. Did you have radar installed on your ships at the Battle of MIDWAY?
A. No, about August 1942 it was installed.

Solomons

Q. At the Battle of the BISMARK SEA, March 1943, what damage was inflicted on your convoy?
A. Am not quite sure, but think that a few transports and two escorts were sunk.

Q. What was the plan for your task forces in the CORAL SEA in May 1942.
A. In the Battle of the CORAL SEA, the SHOHO had started down with a small task group to attack PORT MORESBY from sea. In passing through the CORAL SEA, the air force on the SHOHO failed to maintain proper precaution and were attacked by the American air force and sunk. The ZUIKAKU and the SHOKAKU were sent down at the same time to support the SHOHO force and intercept the American carrier. Later the SHOKAKU was very badly damaged, the ZUIKAKU received minor damages and many people killed. The SHOKAKU nearly capsized. Admiral YAMAMOTO sent me to investigate damage of SHOKAKU.

Q. How long was it required to repair the SHOKAKU?
A. About three months. About one month for ZUIKAKU.

Q. Did the damage to those carriers effect [sic] your plans in the SOLOMONS?
A. It delayed our plans to capture GUADALCANAL and occupy the SOLOMONS.

Q. Why were the troops and ships that were sent down to the SOLOMON ISLANDS sent down in small numbers instead of large numbers?
A. The original plan didn't call for capturing GUADALCANAL. However, a local commander from TULAGI went over to GUADALCANAL for pleasure and then decided to make an airfield. We had only about 1,000 men, mostly laborers for building airfields. We received information that only about 800 to 1,000 American troops had landed, so we sent down about 1,000 to assist our troops then on shore, to drive out the Americans. They were defeated. This was the first time that the Japanese Army had been defeated, and then we sent 5,000 down but they weren't strong enough to drive out the Americans and recapture the island. Then we tried to send more, but we lost both ships and men. The Army had been used to fighting the Chinese Army.

General

Q. Was the Navy prepared to conduct a long war?
A. Two or three years. It is the opinion of most Navy officers that the tide was turning with the loss of SAIPAN. It was pretty definite that the war was lost following the loss of LEYTE and OKINAWA, but we were not sure.

NAV-13

--68--

Plate 13-1: Map of Battle of Midway.
Plate 13-1: Map of Battle of Midway.
Map of Action Chart of the Battle of Midway.
Map of Action Chart of the Battle of Midway.

NAV-13

--69--

Q. About how long did you think the war would last?
A. About three years. When MARSHALL ISLANDS, RABAUL and KISKA were occupied, I felt that that should be the extent of our operation and it should be made a line of defense in order to preserve that territory for the defense of the EMPIRE.

Q. Why wasn't the Japanese submarine used for more offensive work?
A. Since we did not have air or sea control, owing to the Army's eager request for supplies, we had to supply them by submarines. It then became a habit to supply them in that manner. Poor tactics.

Q. Do you know what caused the decrease in Japanese air power? Was it the loss of planes, loss of pilots, lack of fuel to train pilots, or due to the results in the SOLOMONS?
A. The reason this war was a failure was due to the decrease of our air force. After you captured LEYTE, the fuel became less and less. Then we endeavored to produce fuel from sugar. The sugar was obtained from FORMOSA, but this was not enough.

Q. What caused your greatest loss in shipping?
A. In the case of shipping, the cause was by submarines in the area, and later it was principally mines. Along the CHINA Coast it was airplanes.

Q. Along the southern islands of JAPAN were many ships sunk by our planes?
A. Many fishing boats. Near the end of the war, the number of ships sunk by aircraft was about the same as those sunk by submarines.

Q. Do you feel that the attack on shipping was sufficient to bring about the close of the war?
A. Yes. I think if you didn't bomb the cities your attacks on shipping would have brought the same results by next Spring (1946).

Q. What would have been the cause of the close of war?
A. The great cause for the close of the war would have been lack of fuel and food which is shipped in.

Q. Did you plan to occupy AUSTRALIA?
A. We didn't want to go to AUSTRALIA. The Navy was very rich with ships so we only planned to set up a protective wall extending from SINGAPORE through EAST INDIES, SOLOMONS, and the MARSHALL Group to KISKA. The Japanese Army was supposed to capture CHINA, but CHINA was so big that they were unable to completely do so. We didn't think that the Japanese Army did very well. We think that the Japanese Navy did better.

Q. Was the Navy ready for this war or did the Army force the Navy into it?
A. After the Army captured MANCHURIA, they had great power in politics. The officers instead of studying war began to study politics. In the SOLOMONS they should have studied war instead of politics. That is my experience in this war.

NAV-13

--70--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 14
USSBS NO. 67

OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

TOKYO

20 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Captain FUJITA, Masamichi, IJN. Staff Officer of 2nd Fleet from 1941 to 1942; and Staff Member of Bureau of Military Affairs, N.D., Tokyo from 1942 to 1945.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, USN.

SUMMARY

The Japanese advance into the PHILIPPINES, DUTCH EAST INDIES and BRITISH MALAYA involved the defeat of the principal enemy forces encountered plus the seizure and occupation of strategic points. It was planned to accomplish this by surprise air attacks combined with simultaneous thrusts extending over a wide area. Speed was the keynote of the operation since it was anticipated that the Japanese Fleet would be required to meet a counter-attack by the bulk of the United States Fleet. The critical factor in the timing of the operation was the destruction of American air strength in the PHILIPPINES. This was successfully accomplished.

Captain FUJITA explains the organization of the Southern Force, the general plans, and certain details concerning the operation.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What was the specific objective of the operation in the SOUTH PACIFIC?
A. The objective of the Southern Operations was to overcome the principal forces of the American, British and Dutch Forces in the Southern Area and to seize and occupy the following places in order named: PHILIPPINES, BRITISH MALAYA, BURMA, CELEBES, SUMATRA, TIMOR and other Dutch islands. It was planned to occupy these areas after surprise attacks and to make every effort to complete this operation as soon as possible in order to release the Southern Force for other planned operations.

Q. Did the operation go according to plan?
A. Yes, the operation was to be carried out in the following manner:

  1. Attack and occupation of BRITISH MALAYA.
  2. Surprise air attack on the PHILIPPINES, weather might delay the operation, but in spite of the delay the raids would still be carried out. We planned to utilize air attack to the extreme in order to destroy all American aircraft in the PHILIPPINES. After which the areas would be occupied in the following order:
PHILIPPINES TIMOR
BORNEO BALI
CELEBES SUMATRA
AMBON JAVA

Q. Was the destruction of the American air force in the PHILIPPINES the critical factor in the timing of the operation?
A. Yes, if we could take care of the enemy air force then the invasion could be conducted on schedule.

Q. What was the specific mission of Admiral KONDO's Force (Southern Force)?
A. (1) To destroy the enemy air force and (2) to support the landing force.

Q. Draw a diagram indicating the organization of the Southern Force during occupation of the PHILIPPINES and DUTCH EAST INDIES.

V. Admiral KONDO
(Second Fleet)
SOUTHERN FORCE

MAIN BODY
(2 Battleships, 2 Heavy Cruisers, 4 Destroyers)

PHILIPPINE ISLAND GROUP
1 (3 Heavy Cruisers, 10 Destroyers, Auxiliary craft)
2 (3 Heavy Cruisers, 1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers)
3 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers)
4 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers)

ELEVENTH AIR FLEET
(21 Flot - 150 planes) (22 Flot - 100 planes)
(23 Flot - 150 planes)

SUBMARINE GROUP
(4th Squad - 5 Subs) (5th Squad - 6 Subs)
(6th Squad - 4 Subs)

MINELAYER GROUP
(2 minelayers)

MALAYA GROUP
(4 Heavy Cruisers, 1 Light Cruiser, 10 Destroyers)

NAV-14

--71--

Q. What was the general plan for the PHILIPPINE Attack?
A. The first objective was to destroy the American air force by an air attack launched from FORMOSA, mostly Navy planes. To assist in this we planned to occupy APARRI and BATAN Islands 120 miles north of LUZON and establish an emergency airfield there. This was necessary because of the comparative short range of the Army planes. A few days later, about 12 December, we were scheduled to attack DAVAO and LEGASPI. These attacks were staged from PALAU. Ten days later, about 22 December, we were to land at LAMON Bay and LINGAYAN Gulf. After the landings were effected, it was the duty of the Army to complete the occupation. If the situation in BRITISH MALAYA and THAILAND permitted, we would make a sudden landing. Plans were also to attack MIRI (BORNEO) by air and simultaneously to make a landing with a small force. MIRA and KUCHING, valuable because of oil, were actually occupied on 16 and 29 December respectively. During the occupation of the PHILIPPINES, it was planned to launch simultaneously an invasion against BORNEO, TARAKAN, BALIKPAPAN and BANDJERMASIN. These landings were staged from PALAU. At the same time MENADO, KENDARI, MAKASSAR in the CELEBES and AMBON and DUTCH TIMOR were to be occupied. Parachute troops were used at MENADO, KOEPANG and PALEMBANG. After the neutralization of SINGAPORE, it was planned to occupy JAVA.

Q. Were the forces used in the JAVA occupation part of the forces used in the PHILIPPINES?
A. Not entirely. This force was staged from CHINA and JAPAN and the PHILIPPINES. It was planned to land at three places, BATAVIA, SOERABAJA and the center north coast of JAVA. The fleet supporting the landing in the PHILIPPINES combined with the forces at MIRI and proceeded to JAVA. The entire operation was a joint operation between the Army and Navy. The total number of Navy land-based aircraft employed in the entire operation was 300 in the PHILIPPINES - 100 at SAIGON. The 300 planes in the PHILIPPINES were moved in to the EAST INDIES as the operation progressed. The entire operation went according to plan and only minor changes were necessary. The Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet was in direct command of the MALAYA operation. In the middle of January, we rendezvoused at PALAU with a carrier force from JAPAN and proceeded to KENDARI and then to the area south of JAVA where we remained until the operation for the occupation of JAVA was completed.

Q. Were you familiar with the general over all plans?
A. Yes, all plans in general.

Q. Did the success of PEARL HARBOR alter these plans in any way?
A. The operation plans were made up with the fact in mind the PEARL HARBOR operation was going to be a success.

Q. What action did you expect the American Fleet to take after the war started?
A. I thought the American submarine forces would cause trouble, but didn't expect strong forces of surface craft.

Q. Did you expect reinforcements to come from the UNITED STATES after the war started?
A. We didn't think that reinforcements would come direct but we had in mind that the American Fleet would be assembled in the PACIFIC for a counterattack and that is the reason why we hurried with the operation.

Q. During the approach of the PHILIPPINE Group to LUZON, were air attacks expected?
A. Yes, they were, and we took the necessary precautions. All A.A. guns were manned and all units were kept out of range as much as possible. (600 miles).

Q. Do you know why CLARK and NICHOLS Fields were not attacked at daylight or shortly thereafter on 8 December?
A. The plan was to attack at dawn, but because of the bad weather, the attack was delayed until 1230.

NAV-14

--72--

Q. Can you tell me the total number of ships the Japanese Force lost, both combat and merchant ships in this operation?
A. Two or three mine sweepers were lost. I believe two destroyers were lost to submarine attack. No other major damage was encountered by our ships. I do not know about merchant ships.

Q. Were there any Japanese ships sunk in the JAVA SEA BATTLE?
A. No, only damaged. There were no battleships present.

Q. After the battle, some of our ships attempted to escape through the Straits. Do you know anything about them?
A. I knew they were sunk, but no detail. I believe that the destroyer FUBUKI sank the HOUSTON.

Q. Did the large Japanese force operating south of JAVA have any action at all?
A. A Dutch destroyer was sunk, but it was thought to be the American cruiser MARBLEHEAD at the time.

Q. In the LINGAYAN operations, were the ships supporting the landing in the Gulf attacked by aircraft?
A. Yes, I think by land-based planes.

Q. Do you know what damage the ships received?
A. I think that one light cruiser was slightly damaged.

NAV-14

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 15
USSBS NO. 74

OPERATIONS OF JAPANESE NAVAL AIRCRAFT DURING INVASION OF PHILIPPINES AND NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

TOKYO

20 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Captain TAKAHASHI, Chihaya; on the Staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet in the PHILIPPINES and DUTCH EAST INDIES from May 1941 to December 1942; from January 1943 until June 1945 he was Senior Member of the Navy Aeronautic Bureau, TOKYO; from July '45 to August '45 he was Senior Staff of Fifth Air Fleet and Senior Staff of Third Air Fleet.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, USN.

SUMMARY

On 8 December 1941, Eleventh Air Fleet was based in FORMOSA and FRENCH INDO-CHINA in preparation for the invasion of the PHILIPPINES, DUTCH INDIES and BRITISH MALAYA. The primary mission of the Japanese force in FORMOSA, composed of about 300 fighters and bombers, was the annihilation of the American air force in the PHILIPPINES. In this it was successful, partly because complete information relative to the American air force was obtained by aerial reconnaissance prior to commencement of hostilities. Captain TAKAHASHI discusses the general plans as well as certain details of the operations during the Japanese development of their Southern Empire.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Make a chart showing the disposition of forces of the Eleventh Air Fleet on 8 December 1941. Show number of aircraft by type as well as location?
A. As of 8 December 1941, the Eleventh Air Fleet under Vice Admiral TSUKAHARA, headquarters at TAKAO, was organized as indicated:

Eleventh Air Fleet
Vice Admiral TSUKAHARA  
Headquarters-TAKAO

21st Air Flotilla
Rear Admiral TADA
Headquarters-TAINAN

FIRST GROUP (TAKAO)
72 VF (Zeke)
24 VF (Reserve)
6-9 VS (Recon.)

KANOYA GROUP (TAIGHU)
54 VB (2) (Betty)
18 VB (2) (Reserve)

TOKO GROUP (PALAU)
12 VP (4) (Mavis)
4 VP (4) (Reserve)

23rd Air Flotilla
Rear Admiral TAKENAKA
Headquarters-TAKAO

TAKAO GROUP (TAKAO)
54VB (2) (Betty)
18 VB (2) (Reserve)

THIRD GROUP (TAKAO)
72 VF (Zeke)
18 VF (Reserve)
6-9 VS (Recon.)

22nd Air Flotilla
Rear Admiral MATSUNAGA
Headquarters-SAIGON

GENZAN GROUP (SAIGON)
27 VB (2) (Nell)
9 VB (2) (Reserve)

MIHORA GROUP (SAIGON)
27 VB (2) (Nell)
9 VB (2) (Reserve)

NOTE: Parts of the First and Third Air Group of the Eleventh Air Fleet were also located in South FRENCH INDO-CHINA and had 18 Zekes and Claudes. A part of the KANOYA Air Group was also located in FRENCH INDO-CHINA composed of 27 Bettys and 9 reserve planes.

Q. What Army air forces were deployed in the same areas in which the Eleventh Air Fleet operated?
A. In FORMOSA, the Army had about 160 planes and the Navy had 300. In FRENCH INDO-CHINA the Army had 200 planes and the Navy 100. The Fifth Air Army was in FORMOSA and the Third Air Army was in FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

NAV-15

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Q. What was the general plan for the use of the air forces in FORMOSA during the invasion of the PHILIPPINES?
A. The first purpose was to annihilate the U.S. air force in the PHILIPPINES and the secondary purpose was to attack U.S. naval forces in the same area. However, because of the insufficient number of Japanese planes, the attack was made solely against U.S. air power. Also the American cruisers, destroyers and submarines withdrew, left the PHILIPPINE Area before the campaign began.

Q. Did you expect your surprise attack on the morning of 8th December to destroy the entire American air force?
A. Japanese intelligence indicated that there were approximately 300 American planes in the LUZON Area and it was believed that within a week's time we could annihilate all American planes in the PHILIPPINES. We did not expect to destroy all of them because it was thought that many of them would seek refuge in southern areas. The Japanese feared mostly that, at the time of the first attack, the American planes would take refuge in the southern area, therefore making the campaign very difficult.

Q. How many planes were employed in the first attack on LUZON? Include Army planes.
A. In the first attack on the 8th of December, Navy planes participating were 72 fighters and 100 bombers. This number was small because in order to make a dawn attack the planes had to leave FORMOSA during the night and experienced pilots were required. Army planes were not long range enough to operate any further down than the northern tip of LUZON and then only a very few attacked there on the eighth. Air forces attacking south of the PHILIPPINES during remainder of the campaign were all Navy.

Q. What time did this first wave attack CLARK and NICHOLS Fields?
A. The planes arrived at NICHOLS and CLARK Fields between 12 and 1. The intention had been for the first wave to arrive at 7:30 in the morning; but because of bad weather, it was impossible.

Q. Were provisions made to replace losses of Japanese aircraft?
A. There was plan to use the reserves.

Q. Were there plans to bring additional squadrons from JAPAN in case they were needed?
A. Within the first month if we had 25% to 40% losses, as we more or less expected, they had made plans to replace such losses from planes in JAPAN.

Q. How many planes did they lose in December 1941?
A. I don't remember the figure for December, but the losses for the first week were 30 planes and pilots. This was considerable less than expected.

Q. Did you expect serious opposition from the American air forces?
A. Yes, we did; but they were destroyed on ground.

Q. List the airfields used in this campaign.
A. BATAN Island, APARRI, LEGASPI, DAVAO, JOLO, MENADO, TARAKAN, BALIKPAPAN, MACASSAR, BANDJERMASIN, BALI, KENDARI, AMBON and KOEPANG.

Q. Indicate the seaplane bases used by the Japanese.
A. PALAU, DAVAO, KEMO and AMBON.

Q. Did you use Zero fighters on floats?
A. No, not until the SOLOMONS Operations.

Q. Did the Army air force move from FORMOSA to the PHILIPPINES ISLANDS after they were occupied?
A. The Army air force moved from FORMOSA to LAOAG and VIGAN. However, these fields were unusable and the Army air units moved to CLARK and NICHOLS Fields.

Q. Did the Army air units operate south of the PHILIPPINES?
A. The Army aircraft didn't operate south of the PHILIPPINES during the invasion.

Q. Do you know of the attack on JOLO by the American flying boats?
A. Yes, ships unloading received considerable damage at the time.

Q. Did the large flying boats operate from bases other than KEMO and AMBON?
A. From PALAU, seaplanes attacked ships in the AMBON Area at night.

NAV-15

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Q. Were these planes supplied from shore bases or from seaplane tenders?
A. Shore bases, no mother ships were used.

Q. Where were the aircraft based which attacked American cruisers on 4 February?
A. KENDARI.

Q. What bases were used by the aircraft which bombed SOERABAJA?
A. KENDARI. That was the field that was best for bombers.

Q. What type of aircraft sank the American carrier LANGLEY on 26 February?
A. LANGLEY was found by search planes, was sunk by five to nine planes, BETTY Type One.

Q. What was the normal range which the land-based bombers operated?
A. About 500 to 600 miles or in case of necessity 700 miles.

Q. Why didn't the Japanese include the use of aircraft carriers in the plans for the occupation of the PHILIPPINES and DUTCH EAST INDIES?
A. They didn't think that they were needed to use them. Partly because of the action in the Central PACIFIC and the need to reserve them for later action which was expected south of the DUTCH EAST INDIES.

Q. Can you list by date the general progress of the Eleventh Air Fleet as it moved south?
A. The main strength of the Eleventh Air Fleet was based at TAKAO at the beginning of the war. On 5 January 1942 it moved to DAVAO and about the beginning of February it was moved to KENDARI. The campaign in that area ended in March.

Q. Did the Commander Eleventh Air Fleet provide air support for the invasion force at LINGAYAN Gulf?
A. Yes, they did.

Q. What gave the Japanese the impression that there were 900 planes in the area and how did you discover that there were 300 instead of 900?
A. The Navy received, on 20 November 1941, a report from the Foreign Affairs Department that there were about 900 planes in the LUZON Area. A photographic reconnaissance plane conducted a search on the 24th or 25th of November over that area and discovered that there were only 300 planes. One reconnaissance plane made flights at that time, basing at TAKAO, FORMOSA.

Q. Did the Japanese consider the American Army and Navy pilots equal?
A. I don't know speaking generally, but the naval aircraft fighters are the best.

Q. Was the Eleventh Air Fleet able at all time to carry out their assigned mission during this campaign?
A. Yes, the entire campaign went according to schedule.

Q. Did you learn any lessons from this campaign of value for future operations?
A. I learned that supplies were the most important factor to operate planes. I thought that the movement into the SOLOMONS Area would make this problem more serious and was of the opinion that Japan shouldn't move into that direction but hold what we had.

Q. At what time was the naval air force in FORMOSA strengthened in preparation for attack on PHILIPPINES?
A. 1 October to 16 November.

Q. When did you receive orders stating that the war was to begin?
A. On 2 December we heard war was to start unless negotiations were successful.

Q. Did you expect JAVA to receive any reinforcements from AUSTRALIA?
A. Yes, that is why we captured KOEPANG as soon as possible.

NAV-15

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 16
USSBS NO. 75

BATTLE OF EASTERN SOLOMONS, 23-25 AUGUST 1945
BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ, 26 OCTOBER 1942
SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN, 1942-1943

TOKYO

12 October 1945

Interrogation of: Commander OKUMIYA, Masatake, IJN, Class 1927, I.J.N.A. On Air Staff and Commander RABAUL Air Group 1942 - 1943.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Commander T.H. Moorer, USN.

SUMMARY

SANTA CRUZ: Composition of Japanese Second and Third Fleets, which were operating just north of the SOLOMONS to (1) support Japanese landing on GUADALCANAL, 13-23 October 1942, and (2) to intercept U.S. troop convoys to GUADALCANAL and U.S. Carrier Task Force. In carrier duel on 26 October, SHOKAKU, ZUIHO and CHIKUMA were damaged. Heavy Japanese air losses contributed to weakening defense of SOLOMONS.

SOLOMONS: GUADALCANAL an intermediate step in southern movement. Main action in SOLOMONS Campaign considered (1) GUADALCANAL (2) MUNDA (3) VELLA LAVELLA (4) EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY. Inability to hold SOLOMONS attributed to U.S. Navy sea and air action in SOLOMONS Area and lack of landing barges. Heavy-bomber raid on airfield more effective than carrier raid. Carrier raid most effective on aircraft and shipping. RABAUL and TRUK neutralized due to inability to supply. Employment of submarines to supply isolated garrisons considered poor policy. Mining of RABAUL a deterrent to submarine supply operation. Aircraft pilot reports of damage inflicted on enemy always optimistic and only used for newspaper publicity. Staff planning used pessimistic estimate.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Do you know how the RYUJO was sunk in the battle of 23-25 August 1942?
A. It was by carrier dive-bomber and torpedo planes about 25 August. The SHOKOKU, ZUIKAKU and RYUJO were in the SOLOMONS at this time. About the 24th, the carrier RYUJO, the heavy cruiser TONE, and 3 DDs were attacked near GUADALCANAL. They didn't know the source of the dive-bombers and torpedo planes but they were carrier type and came from the direction of GUADALCANAL. Perhaps one destroyer was also sunk.

Q. Are you familiar with the Battle off SANTA CRUZ, 25-26 October 1942?
A. I was there and am familiar with it. I was on the Air Staff of the 2nd Flying Squadron.

Q. What ships were involved?
A. Composition of Japanese Fleet at SANTA CRUZ, 25-26 October 1942 -

Second Fleet Vice Admiral KONDO, N., Commander in Chief
1 (CV) JUNYO 2nd Flying Squadron
2 (BB) KONGO, HARUNA 3rd Flying Squadron
4 (CA) ATAGO, TAKAO, CHOKAI, MAYA 4th Flying Squadron
2 (CA) MYOKO, HAGURO  
1 (CL) JINTSU (?)  
12 (DDs)  
   
Third Fleet Vice Admiral NAGUMO, C., Commander in Chief, and commanding whole fleet.
3 (CVs) SHOKAKU (F), ZUIKAKU, ZUIHO 1st Flying Squadron
2 (BBs) HIEI, KIRISHIMA 11th Squadron
2 (CAs) SUZUYA, KUMANO 7th Squadron
2 (CAs) TONE, CHIKUMA 8th Squadron
1 (CL)  
12(DDs)  
Some tankers in addition.  

NAV-16

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Plate 16-1: Track Chart Japanese Forces, Battle of Santa Cruz, 25-26 Oct 1942.
Plate 16-1: Track Chart Japanese Forces, Battle of Santa Cruz, 25-26 Oct 1942, submitted by I. J. Naval Staff College, Annex A.

NAV-16

--78--

Q. Was the HIYO in the action?
A. No. HIYO had engine trouble at TRUK. The JUNYO was alone in Second Fleet, but I don't believe it was near enough to get in any action.

Q. Did any of the pilots and planes that survived the Battle of MIDWAY come down into the SOLOMONS?
A. In the MIDWAY Battle there were a great many survivors. Because our pilots were in the air when carrier sank, they were rescued by destroyers. Most of the MIDWAY flyers were put on the carriers SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU and RYUJO. The pilots left from MIDWAY were familiar with carrier operations so put them on these carriers.

Q. What was the mission of the Task Force that was operating in that area?
A. It was a support for the landing operations on GUADALCANAL, scheduled for between 13th and 23rd October.

Q. Did the action of the SANTA CRUZ Battle have any effect upon the landing date?
A. I heard landing was completed on the 25th but that the results were not as successful as expected.

Q. Did that action have any effect on the 14 November night battle?
A. No. The Task Force went back to TRUK on 30 October after SANTA CRUZ Battle, reorganized, then came the 14 November action. Do not know if it affected the plans. Only the 2nd Flying Squadron's planes engaged at SANTA CRUZ, so they had planes during the time of the November action.

Q. What carriers were damaged at SANTA CRUZ?
A. SHOKAKU received four bomb hits on port side amidships and two at the after elevator. The ZUIHO received one bomb hit near the after elevator. The cruiser GHIKUMA got five bomb hits. The destroyer TERUTSUKI got a near miss by a United States flying boat about midnight after the battle. When TERUTSUKI was bombed, the Japanese knew American planes were near the fleet so the Japanese carriers continued to retire northward. Some cruisers and battleships stayed near scene of battle and saw your carrier burning. I saw it from the air. They proceeded to Truk.

Q. Do you know how long after sunrise the first hits were made?
A. The ZUIKAKU was hit about two hours after daylight, about 0830. The SHOKAKU was hit later, about 40 minutes after the raid of Japanese airplanes had departed.

Q. Were any airplanes aboard the carrier when hit?
A. No, all off in attack group except about 16 planes in the fighter cover.

Q. Did those planes come back to the SHOKAKU later?
A. No, they couldn't land on board. They went to the ZUIKAKU and ZUIHO.

Q. How many planes did the aircraft carrier normally carry?
A.

  SHOKAKU ZUIKAKU ZUIHO JUNYO
VF 27 27 21 18
VB 27 18   18
VT 18 18 6 9
  72 63 27 45

About 2/3 were lost. Total lost about 100.

Q. How many planes were involved in the operation from the carriers?
A. About 176. There were three waves. They all went out in the first wave; fewer planes in the second raid, about 60; then in the third wave about 30.

Q. Was the MYOKO or TONE hit by bombs?
A. I think not, but there were near misses. I am not certain. An awful lot of torpedoes came but no hits. In my opinion it was a heavy attack.

Q. Were any horizontal-bombers involved in this attack?
A. About ten B-24s, but the Japanese fighters drove them away so were not attacked. Late at night we received a torpedo attack from possibly, a B-24, but we were able to avoid it by evasive action.

Q. Where did the damaged ships go?
A. All went to TRUK. Then the SHOKAKU, ZUIHO and CHIKUMA returned to JAPAN for repair. It took about 3-4 months to repair the SHOKAKU.

Q. Were any other cruisers or battleships hit?
A. I didn't hear that they were.

NAV-16

--79--

Q. When did you receive first information of our carrier Task Force?
A. When south of the GILBERTS, north of HEBRIDES. The Japanese headquarters at TRUK knew of a convoy of transports and battleships approaching GUADALCANAL from the southeast about the middle of October. They believed United States Navy convoy would be about lat. 14°S, 191°E on chart, south of GUADALCANAL. The Japanese carrier force didn't think so since they knew our search planes from GILBERTS had sighted an American carrier approaching from the east. Japanese carrier force was supposed to attack south convoy but hesitated to do so. Because of radio silence this information was not sent to TRUK. Communication difficulties. TRUK did not know of American carriers. So the Second and Third Fleets waited north of GUADALCANAL while your carriers approached. Our carriers were familiar with position of your carrier force the entire time although TRUK did not have the information regarding position of our carrier force. Our force hesitated about how far south to go. The thing that decided it was your approach. One of our scout planes, scouting on bearing 098°T, saw your carrier force in the morning of the 26th. He was supposed to scout 260 miles southeast and 100 miles north.

Q. Did you have submarines in the vicinity?
A. I think they were farther south.

Q. Did you have any report that your planes had damaged or sunk our carriers?
A. There was a report from the planes that an ENTERPRISE class carrier was hit, maybe two. The reports did not come in clearly. We were sure that one was sunk because we saw it, but we didn't get complete reports on the second carrier. Became less certain while waiting for reports that did not come in.

Q. Were any of your pilots instructed to carry out suicide attacks on our carriers?
A. No orders were given; but two of them, on their own initiative, did so. The commander of one wing was one of those that made a suicide dive-bombing attack.

Q. You say a large formation of bombers attacked in the afternoon of the 26th, but no hits were made; is that correct?
A. The statement is correct.

Q. Did the Second and Third Flying Fleets come down the night of the 26th to pursue our ships?
A. Some of our fast ships approached scene of battle but turned back when your burning carrier was sighted.

Q. What were the plans for establishing bases in the SOLOMONS? Where were your principal bases to be located?
A. RABAUL was principal base. GUADALCANAL was an intermediate step for going south.

Q. What interrupted the completion of that plan?
A. I think that sea and air force of the United States Navy. The fact that Americans landed and were able to hold at GUADALCANAL.

Q. While the Americans held GUADALCANAL, were Japanese naval pilots or Army pilots employed in the raids at GUADALCANAL?
A. Almost entirely naval. Few scout planes of the Army. Attacking was done by Navy planes. Navy personnel came first and were land-based. After the sinking of the RYUJO, they added more Navy to them. They also came to BUKA in September.

Q. Why were the reinforcements of GUADALCANAL sent down in small units instead of one mass attack?
A. Didn't have enough landing barges to make a landing. The main point of difficulty in our landing operations was the lack of landing barges. Boats and destroyers were used for landings. But we didn't have enough barges to begin with. Had plenty of big ships but not enough landing craft. Damage from American planes made it worse.

Q. What battles did you consider the principal action in that SOLOMONS Campaign?
A. We considered it all the same thing, but most important was GUADALCANAL, MUNDA, VELLA LAVELLA, EMPRESS AUGUSTA Bay.

Q. Did the bombing of the SOLOMONS airfield effect operations?
A. They got our field completely at MUNDA. We had about 20 planes there which did a very good job in the first battle; but when they landed one day to refuel, they were done in by American fighters. Because of bombing and strafing we couldn't repair or develop the field afterwards. We had only one site at MUNDA. We could only use KOLOMBANGARA for communication. I was at BUIN the toughest part of the time. At BUIN, at the beginning, the Americans used too small bombs. Even at the worst we were still able in the early days to continue to use the field because the bombs used were too small.

NAV-16

--80--

Q. What type planes dropped the bombs?
A. B-24, B-25, B-17, and dive-bombers. From August 1943 the big bombers came over from RUSSEL Island. Some times we received five attacks in one day. Because of the damage of BUIN at the end of August 1943, we alternated between BALLALE and BUKA; and by September despite building of an auxiliary field, at BUIN, the BOUGANVILLE Area became impractical for air operations. All planes and personnel retired to RABAUL. After the fighter planes had left BUIN, all resupply was practically impossible.

Q. Did the ground troops remain on BOUGAINVILLE?
A. Yes, the troops brought from GUADALCANAL went up to BOUGAINVILLE Island from all the SOLOMON ISLANDS. Remaining infantry troops gathered at BUIN.

Q. How did they travel between the islands?
A. January 1943 by destroyer. They evacuated GUADALCANAL with 20 destroyers. MUNDA, RENDOVA and VELLA LAVELLA troops were also evacuated by destroyer. The closer islands were evacuated by submarine and very small boats.

Q. Do you know about any losses of any ships; for instance, KINUGASA and KIRISHIMA?
A. In November the HIEI (BB) received a PT boat torpedo, damaged rudder and after completing circumnavigation of SAVO Island, was bombarded by an American destroyer or cruiser. A Japanese destroyer contributed to sinking the HIEI. Also she received damage from American destroyer and cruiser bombardment and by bombing from American planes. KIRISHIMA also sunk.

Q. Did the HIEI go on to GUADALCANAL to continue bombardment even though damaged?
A. Before she sank she was still shooting. The KIRISHIMA was sunk due west of SAVO Island. Due to no air support the cruiser YURA was also sunk about 25 October. It was near RABAUL, I think.

Q. Following the loss of the SOLOMONS Chain what were your new plans?
A. After the loss of the SOLOMON ISLANDS, the Americans were able to attack RABAUL with all types of planes. Because we had difficulty in supplying RABAUL, we took all the planes out of RABAUL to TRUK, about 21 February 1944. Following the first carrier Task Force attack upon TRUK, about 17 February 1944 by the Americans, the airplane losses were heavy; so we flew all but six planes to TRUK for reinforcements. Later about June or July, five or six planes at a time were flown from TRUK to KAVIENG and the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS. In August and September 1943 I was engaged in flight training near SINGAPORE, therefore I did not know what happened in the SOLOMONS at that time. I am not sure of any other plans but I think we were looking for some other area in which to make a defense.

Q. What happened to ground personnel at RABAUL and TRUK?
A. A good many had to stay. As many as possible were taken out by planes, flying boats and submarines to PALAU and DAVAO. A lot of them were killed by American bombing operations at RABAUL. Many aircraft maintenance personnel killed from that reason. Later operations were hampered because too many skilled personnel stuck at RABAUL unable to get out.

Q. What type of bombing do you consider the most effective?
A. B-24s were most effective on land bases. Because our fields were few, it was the size of bombs that did the harm. Little ones didn't do much harm. The number of crashes attempting to land on damaged fields was very great after B-24 raids. In a place like RABAUL where there were many fields, big bombs were not such a determining factor because we could land on an auxiliary field. Bombing effectiveness depends upon the target. The main thing that bothered us in operation was having several fields hit at the same time, leaving nothing to be used as auxiliary. Carrier planes on a small island with small targets or against ships were most dangerous. In an isolated place like TRUK with its many fields, carrier planes were most feared due to accuracy and repeated attacks. Whereas the heavy-bombers could only come one flight a day, carrier planes would keep coming all day for several days. Carrier planes always destroyed many of our planes and shipping which could not be easily replaced, whereas heavy-bombers mostly damaged airfields which were repairable. Also some supplies.

NAV-16

--81--

Q. Was the shipping in RABAUL Harbor damaged by bombing?
A. The big bombers did very little damage but the dive-bombers did whatever damage was done to the shipping. There were many ships sunk in the harbor by dive-bombers.

Q. Were we wise in attacking the RABAUL airfields?
A. Most distressing thing for us in a place like RABAUL was to have the shipping bombed. However, that depends on the target. The worst was attacking the shipping approaching RABAUL full of supplies.

Q. Were the American night bombing attacks effective on your shore bases?
A. The men became fatigued. Cut down fighting power. Didn't hit much.

Q. Were you present at any ports where American planes mined the harbors?
A. I was at RABAUL when that was done. At first they were not much of a nuisance and damage was minor. Later they were serious because they interfered with the supply submarines coming in.

Q. Do you know why submarines were used to supply instead of attack?
A. The use of submarines was not well done. Due to the loss of air control and shipping, the great length of supply lines committed our submarines to a policy of supply. The point is that there was no area fully consolidated enough to take care of itself. None of the points were self dependent. The use of submarines came from high authority, but I think the Army insisted upon their use.

Q. Do you know if airplanes were scouting for submarines which sank the WASP in September 1942?
A. I don't know much about that. I was on my way home, but plans were for that. In practice, communication between them was very bad.

Q. In early March 1943, our air forces pressed an attack on a large Japanese convoy in the BISMARK SEA. Do you know what losses the Japanese sustained?
A. It is being made upon FEAF report. If you will excuse me I would rather not talk about it until later.

Q. In the two battles of KULA Gulf, 6 and 13 July 1943, what were the losses?
A. Four destroyers were sunk, but I was at RABAUL. Didn't hear full details. The main thing that showed up for us was our bad radar.

Q. When was the radar first used on the airplanes?
A. First on planes at the beginning of 1943. After MIDWAY first on ships.

Q. When was the first on shore?
A. Little before July 1942. They were experimenting with it before the war.

Q. Did you have any plans to go back to BOUGAINVILLE after withdrawing?
A. No, We couldn't supply it.

Q. What were your duties in September-October 1945?
A. Came back to the Navy General Staff on 20 August last year, on action reports, current operations.

Q. What damage was thought inflicted on the United States Third Fleet off FORMOSA, on 14, 15 October?
A. Not very accurate reports. Most of the reports were from flight personnel who couldn't see very well. They said they thought they had caused damage to or sunk ten carriers. We thought back in the office that they probably had done serious damage to only four. Pilots report optimistically. We put that stuff in the paper. We thought in the office, and made plans accordingly, that the damage inflicted was less and that they had only seriously damaged four or five carriers.

Q. Did you feel that you had seriously affected American strength?
A. We took the pessimistic view when making plans, but made public the optimistic reports.

Q. Did you receive any information about American damage through radio despatches?
A. Yes. During operations, some of the ships we thought had been sunk began sending out radio, signals, so we knew they were not sunk.

Q. Was this done by traffic analysis, breakdown of code signs, or breakdown of the message?
A. We figured that certain very valuable ships have a particular wave length, and therefore we learned what the wave lengths were. When communicating with your own planes, we figured out what carrier it was.

NAV-16

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 17
USSBS NO. 90

INVASION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

TOKYO

22 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Captain ISHIHARA, Kawakita; on the Staff of the Third Fleet where he was stationed on the ASHIGARA from June 1940 to April 1941. Since April 1941 he has been with the Military Affairs Bureau of Navy Ministry (Gummukyoku).

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, USN.

SUMMARY

The general plan for the invasion of the PHILIPPINES and the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES was simple in concept, but the execution was very complex. This interrogation covers the movements of the Japanese Third Fleet which actually conducted the innumerable small invasions from LUZON to JAVA. Captain ISHIHARA furnishes general information on Allied air attacks on Japanese invasion forces, and the action at LUZON, MAKASSAR Straits, BALI and the JAVA SEA. Of special interest is the description of the destruction of the United States ships HOUSTON and POPE and the British ships EXETER and ENCOUNTER.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. List the Japanese forces which were assigned the mission of invading LUZON?
A. The forces were as follows:

  1. First Base Force.
  2. Second Base Force.
  3. Sixty Submarine Squadron.
  4. Two Mine Layers.
  5. One Seaplane Carrier (15 planes).

The Base Forces were composed of troop transports and ships loaded with shore defense guns and ammunition. The above forces were supported by three heavy cruisers (ASHIGARA, flagship), one light cruiser and four or five destroyers.

Q. What time during the approach from FORMOSA to LUZON did the force receive the first air attack?
A. We were not attacked at any time during the approach, but were attacked after the landing operation commenced on 22 December. We were attacked during the course of the entire day, 22 December.

Q. Were Japanese fighters available to protect the Japanese landing force?
A. No fighters were available.

Q. Did any of the Japanese ships receive damage from air attacks?
A. One mine layer was sunk by strafing at VIGAN.

Q. Was the cruiser ASHIGARA damaged by air attacks?
A. The ASHIGARA was bombed about 100 miles northwest of LINGAYEN by five American four-engine bombers, but no damage was received. After the attack, the Japanese intercepted a radio message from the Americans, claiming that the battleship HARUNA had been sunk; but the HARUNA was not present and no damage was received by any ship.

Q. Were any large ships with the ASHIGARA at the time?
A. Yes, she was accompanied by two heavy cruisers.

Q. What did the ASHIGARA do after the attack?
A. We intercepted a radio message ordering the American aircraft to attack again. The ASHIGARA moved to the northwest into a rain squall and wasn't attacked again.

Q. What ships were to bombard the beach prior to the landing?
A. One light cruiser and about five destroyers gave fire support to the landing.

Q. Did the ships supporting the landing suffer any damage from air attacks?
A. Yes, the light cruiser received several strafing holes from a close bomb.

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Q. Were the destroyers damaged by air attacks?
A. The destroyers also received some kind of damage, but no way interfered with the operation and did not interfere with the battle efficiency.

Q. After the LUZON landing was completed, describe the movements of the Third Fleet.
A. The Third Fleet returned to FORMOSA for services and then proceeded to DAVAO.

Q. When the Third Fleet arrived at DAVAO, was the invasion by the Japanese landing force underway?
A. Yes, the invasion was completed.

Q. What was the next move made by the Third Fleet?
A. The Third Fleet was split up and proceeded to JOLO - 6 January, TARAKAN - 11 January, MENADO - 11 January.

Q. Were the forces in DAVAO attacked by air?
A. Yes, one of the cruisers was hit in the bow with a bomb and forced to return to JAPAN for repair. I think this attack was made by B-17's.

Q. Are you familiar with the attack on shipping at JOLO by American flying boats?
A. No. However, a tanker proceeding to TARAKAN about the same time was attacked from the air and was seriously damaged.

Q. Was the Third Fleet attacked by surface ships or submarine during the operation in the PHILIPPINES?
A. The seaplane carrier at APARRI was attacked by a submarine ten or eleven times, but all were misses except one torpedo which did not explode. No damage was received. In addition, one destroyer, was sunk by submarine south of MAKASSAR and I think one at MIRI, but not sure.

Q. Do you know of the attack on Japanese transports by the American destroyers at BALIKPAPAN on 24 January?
A. Yes, I will tell you all I know. The American destroyers slipped through the Japanese screen and commenced an attack, maneuvering very fast. The Japanese were unable to identify the ships and couldn't fire at them because they were so close to the Japanese transports. Heavy damage was received by two or three transports, but I don't think any were actually sunk. These transports did not have troops aboard, since they had unloaded them the afternoon before. The attack caused much confusion. The Japanese thought that these American ships were cruisers, and Japanese cruisers north of BALIKPAPAN steamed south to support the force; but did not arrive until after the American cruisers left. The attack by the American destroyers did not delay the Japanese movement to the south in any way.

Q. Describe the movements of the Third Fleet as the Japanese moved further to the south?
A. On 26 January we occupied KENDARI and on 31 January we occupied AMBON. On 4 February the Japanese naval air force conducted a very successful attack on the American and Dutch cruisers.

Q. Do you know of the action south of BALI on 19-20 February, at night?
A. Yes, a Japanese force of two troop transports and six destroyers occupied BALI in order to procure the airfield for use against JAVA. When returning from this operation on the night of 19 February, they encountered a force of American ships, estimated to be four or five destroyers or possibly cruisers. It was very dark and identification was difficult. The Japanese attempted to use search lights, but they were not very effective. We also had difficulty with the torpedoes which exploded prematurely and in some cases were mistaken for hits on the enemy. We received major damage to two destroyers which were forced to return to MAKASSAR. One of the destroyers was towed and the other could only proceed at eight knots. We estimated that one Allied destroyer was sunk and there was probability that another was damaged.

Q. What forces were available in the JAVA SEA for the invasion of JAVA?
A. In the SOEMBA Strait was a part of the force that had supported the invasion of BRITISH MALAYA. Just north of SOERABAJA was located another force of three heavy cruisers and about 2 destroyers. A third force composed of 2 heavy cruisers and 4 destroyers was stationed to the eastward of SOERABAJA force as a support force. This included ASHIGARA, which was the flagship of the Commander of the Third Fleet, Vice Admiral TAKAHASHI. He was in command of the entire operation. The troops for the invasion of JAVA were sailed from JAPAN, FORMOSA, and the PHILIPPINES. The transports carrying the troops which invaded western JAVA assembled in LINGGA with the 7th Squadron of the MALAYA force and proceeded to vicinity of BATAVIA. The transports carrying the

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troops which invaded the SOERABAJA Area assembled at JOLO and proceeded through the MAKASSAR Strait to JAVA. At the same time all combatant ships of the Third Fleet, which had participated in the various invasions I told of before, rendezvoused in the vicinity of MAKASSAR and proceeded into the JAVA SEA on 27 February.

Q. Tell me about the Battle of JAVA SEA.
A. When the Japanese force moved towards JAVA, we didn't expect to fight the Battle of the JAVA SEA, because we thought the air attacks on the Allied ships on 4 February had seriously damaged most of them. Although ships were seen in SOERABAJA, it was considered that they were too badly damaged to fight. We were taken aback when the Allied forces were discovered. The transport force was immediately ordered to retire to the north and the eastern support force, composed of two cruisers and four destroyers, steamed at full speed to support the SOERABAJA force. This was necessary since it was thought that the enemy out numbered us in cruiser strength. First attack was in the late afternoon and the Japanese destroyers made a torpedo attack. We thought that two or three allied cruisers were sunk, but again the Japanese torpedoes exploded prematurely and gave false indication of the damage. No damage was received by Japanese ships in the first part of the battle. Later in the night another battle was fought. Two Japanese destroyers were heavily damaged and temporarily put out of action and retired to MAKASSAR. The actual damage to the Allied force wasn't known, but what was left of the Allied fleet withdrew and the invasion of JAVA was completed according to plans.

Q. Are you familiar with the action in which the EXETER, ENCOUNTER and POPE were sunk when they attempted to escape after the Battle of the JAVA SEA?
A. Yes, I witnessed the entire action. Two Japanese forces were maneuvering north of BAWEAN Islands in support of the invasion. One force composed of two cruisers and four destroyers was 20 miles north of an additional force composed of three cruisers and ten destroyers. It was about noon time on 1 March that a destroyer in the north force was suddenly hit by gun fire from the EXETER which was proceeding on a westerly course accompanied by two destroyers. This was the first knowledge that the Japanese received that enemy ships were present. The EXETER steamed between the two Japanese groups which promptly destroyed the two ships, EXETER and ENCOUNTER, by gun fire and torpedoes. The American destroyer POPE turned away, but was hit on the stern by a bomb from an ASHIGARA seaplane and slowed down to such an extent that it was destroyed by surface ships. I think survivors were recovered from all ships.

Q. Also after the Battle of the JAVA SEA, the cruiser HOUSTON attempted to escape. What happened to it?
A. While attempting to pass through the, SOEMBA Strait, the HOUSTON steamed directly into the invasion force operating on the western tip of JAVA. The HOUSTON steamed between two groups of cruisers and destroyers. The southern group was supporting troop transports. A violent battle was fought at close quarters during which the two transports loaded with troops were sunk. The HOUSTON was sunk at very short range by gun fire and torpedoes. The range was so short that the ships exchanged machine gun fire. It is estimated that the location of the sinking of the HOUSTON was in the immediate vicinity of DUIZEND Islands. Survivors were recovered.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 18
USSBS NO. 93

GILBERT-MARSHALL ISLANDS OPERATIONS

TOKYO

19 October 1945

Interrogation of: Lt. Comdr. TOKUNO, Hiroshi, a regular officer of the Japanese Navy, was executive officer of the island garrison at MILLE between 20 July 1943 and 14 August 1945.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman Teller, USN.

SUMMARY

Lt. Comdr. TOKUNO had his share of the bitter experiences of defeat, having been in the battleship KIRISHIMA and the destroyer MINEGUMO when they were sunk in the SOLOMON ISLANDS and spending the last two years of the war on the by-passed and very much bombed island of MILLE. However, the officer was in good physical condition and in fair spirits as he described the effects of the U.S. invasion in the GILBERT-MARSHALL Area on the forces and equipment available to his command.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What was your Station and duty at MILLE from July 1943 to the end of the war?
A. I was executive officer to Captain SHIGA, Masanari, who was commander of the unit based there during the same period. Captain SHIGA was senior officer on MILLE Atoll and commanded the following units: 66th Garrison Unit and also the Number One South Seas Detachment (Army Garrison Unit). Also the 552nd Air Unit and the 252nd Air Unit. Captain SHIGA was in charge of all the land units while he was senior officer present. Operational orders for the two air units was not his province, but came from the commander of the 24th Air Flotilla who was based either on ROI Atoll or MALOELAP Atoll. Neither I nor Captain SHIGA had any connection with the air operations of the units based there.

Q. On 1 November 1943, what was the size of the garrison forces on MILLE?
A. Strength of the 66th Naval Garrison Unit was 1200 men and strength of the Number One South Seas Detachment was about 850 men.

Q. Were they special naval landing troops?
A. They were all what is called Naval Garrison Troops which are quite similar to the SNLP troops but considered a separate body. Both air units had a total strength of about 500 men, maintenance and pilots included. The approximate strength of the two air units was 300 in Unit 552, 200 in Unit 252; but they worked in such close conjunction it was hard to distinguish their respective strengths. In addition there was No. 4 Naval Construction Unit of approximately 1200 strength. Approximate strength therefore as of 1 November 1943 was 3800 men.

Q. What was the date of the last reinforcement to the garrison troops?
A. 22 December 1943. On this day total strength on the Atoll was approximately 5100 men. To reach this figure approximately 1500 reinforcements were added to the Army garrison unit, but approximately 400 members of the air units were transferred to WOTJE. Reinforcements mentioned came from KWAJALEIN.

Q. Do you know if reinforcements were brought into GILBERT or MARSHALL ISLANDS from outside during the period from November to December 1943?
A. I believe that in addition to the reinforcement of MILLE during November and December 1943, reinforcements from TRUK, PHILIPPINES, possibly JAPAN were sent to JALUIT, WOTJE, and MALOELAP. I think that the total number of reinforcements from the PHILIPPINES came to 2600 troops, of which 1600 were sent to MILLE.

Q. When did your last surface ship arrive at MILLE?
A. Last convoy to reach MILLE arrived December 21st or 22nd, consisted of seven ships, the largest one being No. 2 NANKAI MARU. Cargo was supplies.

Q. Was there any damage done to the ships by attacks while they were at MILLE?
A. The No. 2 NANKAI MARU was sunk by air attack on 22 December and sank without having unloaded her cargo. The attack was made by 30 single-engine bombers which I think were SBD types escorted by 12 P-39 or P-40. On that attack, the sinking of the NANKAI MARU was the only damage suffered; no shore installations damaged or any of the other ships.

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Q. Did you observe other damage to shipping from air attack at any other time?
A. On 20 November there was an attack by approximately 300 fighters and bombers from an American Task Force. The naval damage to the base was three small landing craft. Shore damage consisted of damage to the runway, which was shortly afterwards repaired, destruction of ten barracks (none repairable), and the main communication shack destroyed. Casualties - one killed, one or two injured. Except for other minor damage such as a few automobiles and water tanks about the camp, that is the total damage suffered during the entire series of attacks. On November 20, 1943 total strength of airplanes was approximately 10 single-engine bombers - Type 97. On 15 December planes increased to about 20 Type 97. After December 15th the bombers were sent to RABAUL and ten to twenty Zeros were sent to MILLE from MALOELAP. This was the best strength in planes we had until the end of December. This was the first time Zeros were on MILLE. All Zeros had left approximately by the end of December.

Q. Did the bombers from other islands pass through MILLE on their way to attack our forces?
A. During November and December on ten different occasions such stops were made. Altogether during November and December, about 100 planes stopped. The most that stopped at any one time were 41 planes, on which occasion they were all fighters. On other occasions bombers stopped; specifically those which took part in the night action in the GILBERTS staged at MILLE. These were Type One twin-engine bombers (Betty's).

Q. How many and what kind of AA guns did you have on MILLE?
A. 8x12.7 cm AA guns, about 12x25 MM machine guns, about 12x20 mm, about 30x13 mm, and more than 100x7.7 machine guns.

Q. What kind of fire control did the heavy guns have?
A. Type 95 fire control mechanism. We had no radar fire control.

Q. During the period immediately before our landing on TARAWA, did you receive night attacks from our planes between approximately 13 November and 19 November?
A. No, positive of that.

Q. Did you receive any day attacks during that period from land-based planes? That is multi-engined planes?
A. Yes. First attack occurred on 15 November by B-24s, possibly only ten, recollection not very good. Ten dead, ten wounded, two air unit barracks burned, bomb fuse warehouse destroyed. About 16 November, 10 B-24s participated; no damage or casualties in this raid as far as I know. Installations or personnel in area bombed in next raid was 18 November with 19 B-24s participating. Small house was only damage, no casualties and no installations touched. On 19 November approximately 10 B-24s, no damage.

Q. Were these raids intercepted by your fighter planes? Was there any air opposition?
A. The only planes based on MILLE at that time were the Type 97 bombers which became airborne more to avoid destruction on the ground than to intercept your planes, although two or three did attempt interception with no results. No losses on our side. During the entire series of four raids only one B-24 was hit and I don't know whether or not it crashed or was able to return to its base.

Q. Were your planes able to take off every time to avoid damage on the ground before the raid?
A. To the best of my memory on all occasions, except possibly once, were the Japanese planes able to take off safely before the arrival of the B-24s. On one occasion the attack came just as it was growing dark and possibly one Type 97 was unable to escape, but there was no damage.

Q. How did you receive warning of these raids?
A. Warning was received by our one radar installation. Distance from MILLE at which any American planes were recoverable on the radar screen varied with the altitude at which the attackers were flying. However, the best warning we were able to get was at a distance of 110 kilometers. Radar equipment was Type One, not sure of what mark. Our radar equipment was effective until the middle of August 1944 when it was put out of commission by air attack. It was a permanent installation on the northern extremity of the same island as the air strip. It was damaged many times but always repairable until then.

Q. After 19 November, to what extent was the airfield useable?
A. The field was first damaged November 20, 1943 but was not made inoperable until February 4, 1944. In the case of attack during this period, the field was always repairable in a matter of hours

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or overnight except on 20 November raid which took two days. The most effective plane for damaging the airfield was the small type bomber rather than the four-engine types like the B-24s. Accuracy was far better in the case of small bombers whereas the B-24s invariably missed the runway. The thing that was most effective in my opinion was actually damaging the runway rather than hitting other installations. My reason for feeling this way is that other installations such as gas, communications, supplies were placed in many different areas and dispersed so that some of each type of supply was always available, whereas we had only one runway. During the period of 20 November to the 25th the field was inoperable due to successive attacks during the raids on the GILBERTS. As soon as we fixed the runway, successive attacks would render it inoperable immediately.

Q. After about 24 December when our fields at TARAWA were useful for all types of planes, was there any difference in your situation at MILLE?
A. During the period of December 1st to 24th, one effect of your air operations from TARAWA was to force our bombers, formerly based on MILLE, to fly to other island bases in the vicinity. Second effect was the extreme difficulty of supply ships to make harbor. We were able to get our supply ships in but became very difficult. However, provisions and gas supply were held for six month period; so that, in spite of the difficulty of getting supply ships in, we were still able to continue. We were able to operate our fighters until February 24, 1944. We were able to provide gas to planes using MILLE as a staging point for the last time on 24 February 1944.

Q. What was the most effective weapon and form of air attack against anti-aircraft guns?
A. Against anti-aircraft emplacements, the small type single-engine bombers were most effective. Against machine gun emplacements, the bombs carried by fighters were most effective. The largest type demolition bombs as carried by the single-engine bomber was most effective. In general the use of bombs was more effective than strafing.

Q. What type of attack caused most personnel casualties?
A. When the personnel was protected by slit trenches, the large type bombs were most effective. If personnel do not have the advantage of such protection, the anti-personnel type bomb which explodes on the surface is most effective. Most of our casualties were caused by heavy type bomb.

Q. What were the total casualties in combat suffered by your garrison during the entire period you were there?
A. 1200 killed, 100 wounded. Out of 1200 persons actually hit by bombs, 100 recovered. The high percentage of deaths was due mainly to lack of medical supplies and proper food.

Q. How many do you estimate died from other causes than bomb wounds?
A. Another 1200 deaths resulted from other causes such as lack of food, eating poisonous fish, diseases such as beri-beri, dysentery. Nobody escaped.

Q. Can you say approximately how many airplanes were damaged or destroyed on the island so they couldn't leave?
A. 30 planes.

Q. What communications between MILLE and other islands did you have after 1 January 1944, radio or surface craft? How long?
A. The inter island radio communications were maintained until the end of war. We were unable to maintain communications by surface craft.

Q. How did you keep your men busy after the 1st of January 1944?
A. The main occupation was making gardens to provide food.

Q. Did you build up your protection more? Was that important?
A. We were very assiduous in building fortifications until June 1944 then we gave up the idea. We felt it was more worthwhile to grow food than to build fortifications.

Q. Do you know of any Japanese plan for defending these islands by using the fleet as well as the airplanes that were based on these islands?
A. At the time of the actual operations I know nothing. Only plans to assist the defense of the GILBERTS by surface forces after the operations were overheard from a fellow officer that there was a fleet assembled at KWAJALEIN which was supposed to have come to our assistance. But the plan, if it existed, was cancelled. Rumor had it, it was due to a lack of plane strength to cover such a force.

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Q. While you were at MILLE were you able to keep a good account of the way the war was going in other places?
A. Our only means of being aware of how the general battle situation was going was the regular DOMEI broadcast. Due to the fact the codes we held were antiquated and no longer in use, we no longer could receive official Army or Navy traffic. Occasional American and Australian broadcasts were heard so we got an idea of what was going on.

Q. Which of the two broadcasts did you believe?
A. I figured there was a medium point between the two types of broadcasts. When I came back, found out I was right.

Q. Were any American prisoners taken on MILLE?
A. Five American prisoners. Think they were crew of a B-24 which crashed in the sea shortly before the Americans landed on KWAJALEIN. These five were killed at the beginning of February 1944 and the case is being investigated by Americans at MAJURO Atoll.

Q. Did you have any particular experience during your duties on the battleship KIRISHIMA?
A. I was second in command of the secondary batteries and stationed in the top control point. The KIRISHIMA participated in the PEARL HARBOR attack. I was in the following actions: JAVA SEA in March 1942, operations in INDO-CHINA in support of landings in INDO-CHINA on March 1942, also CEYLON, TRINCOMALEE, MIDWAY, SANTA CRUZ, and GUADALCANAL where she was sunk.

Q. What was your experience on the destroyer MINEGUMO?
A. I made one supply trip on this ship to the island KOLUMBANGARA, during which operation the ship was sunk on March 5, 1943. My duties were senior gunnery officer.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 19
USSBS NO. 94

OPERATIONS OF MAIN BODY OF SECOND FLEET

TOKYO

12 October 1945

Interrogation of: Commander ISAWA, Yutaka, a regular officer of the Japanese Navy; was commanding gunnery for 15cm guns on the battleship HARUNA. From November 1942 to April 1943, attached to the 2nd Torpedo Flotilla in the South Pacific; student at the Naval Academy from May 1943 until March 1944; from September 1944 to March 1945 attached to the Navy Department; serving in the Navy Air Fleet at IZUMI and KYUSHU from April to August 1945.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, USN.

SUMMARY

Movement of the Main Body of the Japanese Second Fleet November 1941 to April 1942

The movement of the Main Body of the Japanese Second Fleet with reasons therefore are shown below. The Main Body was initially composed of the following capital ships:

Battleships

Heavy Cruisers

HARUNA
KONGO

TAKAO (Flagship of Vice Admiral KONDO)
ATAGO
CHOKAI
MAYA

Movements of the Japanese Fleet

Date

Location Mission
28 November 1941 INLAND SEA Fleet Rendezvous
28 November-5 December Enroute PESCADORES ISLANDS Preparation for war
5 December-8 December Enroute SAIGON Area  
8 December-18 December Off coast-vicinity SAIGON Support of BRITISH MALAYA Operations
18 December-20 December Enroute point 300 miles west of LUZON  
20 December-23 December Vicinity MACCLESFIELD BANK LUZON Invasion
23 December-25 December Enroute FORMOSA via CAMRANH Bay  
25 December-15 January TAKAO Service and Repairs
15 January-19 January Enroute PALAU Support of BRITISH MALAYA Operations
20 January-25 January PALAU Rendezvous with PEARL HARBOR Force which arrived from JAPAN. This increased the total force to: 4 Battleships, 4 carriers, 8 heavy cruisers, 20 destroyers
25 January-1 February Enroute KENDARI  
1 February-5 February KENDARI  
5 February-20 February BANDA SEA Support of Invasion Forces. 19 February attack on PORT DARWIN
20 February-25 February Enroute CHRISTMAS Island Area via OMBAI Strait  
25 February-1 March CHRISTMAS Island Area Support of JAVA and SUMATRA Invasion
1 March-1 April Operations in CELEBES--TIMOR--JAVA Area Bombardment of CHRISTMAS Island; Destruction of Allied Shipping

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Date Location Mission
1 April-5 April Enroute CEYLON  
5 April-13 April INDIAN OCEAN Area Operations against British, Attack on TRINCOMALEE
13 April-18 April Enroute INLAND SEA  

Note: The above dates are approximate.

No unit of the Main Body of the Second Fleet received damage during the operations. During the period covering the invasion of the PHILIPPINES and NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, the force was not attacked by air or surface craft.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 20
USSBS NO. 97

ALEUTIAN CAMPAIGN

CARRIER AIRCRAFT ATTACK ON DUTCH HARBOR

TOKYO

10 October 1945

Interrogation of: Commander OKUMIYA, Masatake, IJN, who served from March 1942 until July 1944 as Staff Officer with the Second Air Fleet.

Interrogated by: Captain J.S. RUSSELL, USN.

Allied Officer Present: Lieutenant H.L. McMASTERS, USNR.

SUMMARY

As a flanking operation and diversion for the main Japanese attack on MIDWAY, the carrier airplanes of the Second Mobile (or Task) Force attacked DUTCH HARBOR on 4 June, TOKYO date, one day before the scheduled attack on MIDWAY. Because more than half the planes were turned back by weather, this attack was not considered a success and was therefore repeated on the late afternoon of 5 June, 1942. The schedule of the two ALEUTIAN occupation forces was changed, meanwhile, eliminating ADAK as an objective, but going ahead with the occupation of KISKA and ATTU. The Second Mobile Force stood by from 7 to 17 June and from 2 to 7 July in an area about 600 miles south of KISKA. During the first period a scheduled interception of U.S. air raids on KISKA was cancelled at the last moment due to weather. Details of carrier operations are given.

NARRATIVE

(All times and dates are those of TOKYO, zone minus nine.)

On 30 May 1942 the Japanese Second Task Force sortied from OMINATO, North HONSHU, and set course for a point 20 miles south of ERIMO Point on the south coast of HOKKAIDO. The force was composes as follows:

   
2 CV - JUNYO, RYUJO (Flag of Rear Admiral KAKUDA, Kakuji, IJN., Task Force Commander*).  
2 CA - TAKAO, MAYA  
3 DD - USHIO, OBORO, AKEBONO  
1 AO - TEIYO MARU, and later TOHO MARU  
(*Rear Admiral KAKUDA was killed in action on TINIAN 1944)  

Departing from HOKKAIDO the Task Force took a great circle route to a position approximately 230 degrees 400 miles from DUTCH HARBOR. Enroute, the Task Force fueled twice. Once on 1 June and again on 3 June. Three cruising dispositions were used; one for fair weather, one for poor visibility, and one for very poor visibility.

The fair weather disposition consisted of the CV's in column, distance 1000 meters, RYUJO guide and at head of the column. Disposed around the RYUJO were the three DD's, 1500 meters on either beam and ahead. The two CA's were 5000 meters on either beam of the RYUJO. Zig-zagging was used in fair weather.

In poor visibility the same formation as above was used except the three DD's formed column ahead of the RYUJO, distance 500; interval from rear DD to RYUJO, 2000 meters. In very poor visibility the two CA's formed astern of the JUNYO, interval 2000 meters, distance 1000 meters. In thick weather, station was kept by position buoys, and maneuvering signals were given by very high frequency radio. No radar was installed at this time.

For air operations all heavy ships formed in line abreast with the two CA's outboard. One DD led the disposition at the center, 1500 meters ahead of the line of bearing of the heavy ships. The other two DD's took station astern of the two carriers to act as plane guards. Their distance from the CV's was varied with the speed of the CV's. At high speed the plane guard DD opened to 1000 meters and at slow speed closed to 700 meters.

The mission of the Japanese Second Task Force was to attack ships, planes, and shore installations at DUTCH HARBOR as a diversion to the attack on, and occupation of, MIDWAY, and then to support landing operations in the Western ALEUTIANS. (Commander OKUMIYA actually stated that the occupation of KISKA and ATTU was planned. However, in a later interview, Captain ITO, Taisuke,

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Fifth Fleet Staff Air Officer, who was concerned with the planning of the occupation, said that the occupation of ADAK, KISKA, and ATTU were considered, with the selection to depend on photo reconnaissance. After the Japanese reverse at MIDWAY, Admiral YAMAMOTO was greatly opposed to the occupation of any of the ALEUTIANS, but was persuaded by Vice Admiral HOSOGAYA, ComFifthFleet, to permit the occupation of ATTU and KISKA).

The attack on DUTCH HARBOR was scheduled for 4 June (TOKYO Time), one day earlier than the carrier air attack on MIDWAY. This schedule was met.

The second Task Force's speed of advance was limited to 10 to 11 knots due to the slow speed of the accompanying AO. On 30, 31 May and 1 June, they steamed in dense fog. The existence of a mild front was known and they attempted to stay in the thick weather ahead of it.

On the morning and afternoon of 2 June and on the morning of 3 June, two 2-plane sections scouted ahead to a distance of 120 miles. On the afternoon of 3 June, four 2-plane sections scouted an area 30 degrees on either side of the Task Force track to a distance of 250 miles.

As to intelligence of American Forces, the Japanese Second Task Force had various reports from submarine reconnaissance. From a position off the WASHINGTON State coast, a submarine had launched a reconnaissance seaplane which scouted SEATTLE Harbor and reported no heavy men-of-war, particularly CV's, there. About 30 May a similar plane launched from a submarine about 100 miles north of DUTCH HARBOR scouted that port and reported only a few small merchantmen present. This plane was damaged in landing due to the swells and could not make a scheduled reconnaissance on 3 June. Instead, DUTCH HARBOR was examined by periscope with a negative report made on that date. Two other submarines were patrolling on a line south of COLD BAY; these made no sightings. A periscope reconnaissance of KODIAK was made about the end of May with a negative report. A submarine plane scouted KISKA about 25 May and reported no ships present. The submarine borne planes maintained radio silence during their flights, with orders to break radio silence only if they were chased by American planes. All reports were made by the mother submarine. The submarine off SEATTLE and the one off KODIAK maintained station for some time. The only contact reported by the KODIAK submarine was that of sighting one large merchantman on a date which Commander OKUMIYA did not remember.

During fueling on 3 June, the second Task Force heard the engine of an American plane and thought they saw a flying boat. One of 2 VF, airborne on combat air patrol, gave chase but lost contact in the poor visibility.

The following air operations were planned for the attack against DUTCH HARBOR on 4 June: The first wave was to be launched at earliest light of dawn (2330, 3 June), and the second wave one-half hour thereafter:

         
1st Wave        
VF RYUJO - 6,   JUNYO - 9, Total 15
VB     JUNYO - 12, Total 12
VT RYUJO - 9,     Total  9
2nd wave        
VF RYUJO - 3,   JUNYO - 6, Total 9
VB RYUJO - 6,     Total 6
VT     JUNYO - 6, Total 6
  Attack Seaplanes TAKAO - 2, MAYA - 2, Total 4

The two 3-seat seaplanes, one each from TAKAO and MAYA, were to scout to the eastward.

The Second Task Force had the following operational planes available prior to launching the first attack on DUTCH HARBOR:

RYUJO - 12 Type 0 VF, 18 Type 97 attack bomber VT; JUNYO - 18 Type 0 VF, 18 Type 99 dive-bomber VB; TAKAO - 2 Type 95 two-seat reconnaissance seaplanes, 1 Type 94 three-seat reconnaissance seaplane; MAYA - 2 Type 95 two-seat reconnaissance seaplanes, 1 Type 0 three-seat reconnaissance seaplane.

Weather, that is fog and low clouds, interfered considerably with the execution of the air plan. The first wave was launched on time at a point about 210 degrees, 180 miles from DUTCH HARBOR. The visibility was from 2000 to 5000 meters. One VT from the RYUJO had a forced landing in the sea immediately after take-off. The crew of the plane was rescued. As the planes of the first wave

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flew towards DUTCH HARBOR they ran into increasing difficulties due to weather. All of the JUNYO's planes turned back, and, of the RYUJO's planes, only 6 VF and 6 VT got through to the target. The 6 VF found no U.S. fighters so strafed a Catalina flying boat on the water. The 6 VT attacked the radio station, warehouses, pier and shore installations. 2 of 3 RYUJO VF found a Catalina close to the shore and shot it down. A photo proved that this American plane crashed and burned. One of the 9 JUNYO VF, after being airborne for about one hour found a Catalina and after a chase shot it down in the vicinity of the carriers. Commander OKUMIYA stated that both Catalinas burned. Another of the first wave VF found a Catalina but it got away in the clouds. One VT from RYUJO found 5 to 6 U.S. DD's in MAKUSHIN BAY. Upon receipt of this information the second wave, which had been held on deck due to weather, was launched at about 0900 4 June. All the planes of the second wave turned back except the 4 seaplanes from the cruisers. Two of these were intercepted over the U.S. DD's where one was shot down and the other damaged. One of the RYUJO's VF failed to return after announcing it was making a forced landing on AKUTAN. (It was intended that the submarine lying to the north of DUTCH HARBOR would pick up any Japanese aviators forced down; the latter had been instructed that, in the event of forced landing, they were to endeavor to land on one of the small islands off UNALASKA Island.) The final casualty of the day occurred when a 3-seat seaplane, returning to its cruiser from a scouting mission to the east, cracked up on landing. The personnel were rescued. Of the second wave of carrier planes, all of which turned back due to weather, only three saw any action. Three fighters strafed a U.S. submarine off the south coast of UNALASKA Island. After the first two VF made strafing passes the third said the submarine submerged so that he could not make an attack. During the day the Task Force had moved toward shore, so that, when the second wave planes landed, their parent carriers were only 100 miles from DUTCH HARBOR. A combat air patrol of 2 VF was maintained over the force through the day. Patrols were of 2 hours duration and were launched alternately by RYUJO and JUNYO. All planes were aboard by about 1500, 4 June, at which time the Task Force began a retirement on approximately the reverse of their approach course.

Visibility continued to be poor and the Japanese weather forecast indicated that the weather at DUTCH HARBOR would probably be worse on the following day. After refueling DD's from the carriers in partial darkness beginning at about 0000, 5 June, they laid a course to the westward with the idea of making an air reconnaissance of ADAK and ATKA. At sunrise ADAK bore 300 degrees distance 250 miles; however, the wind velocity was from 25 to 30 knots and the sea high, hence no planes were launched. They continued to the westward hoping the weather would improve, but returned to their sunrise position at about 0300 or 0400. At this time the TOKYO weather report indicated that the weather might be improving at DUTCH HARBOR. They therefore headed towards that place. They sighted one or two PBYs fairly early in the morning and one about two hours later. At 0900 they launched 2 VT from RYUJO for a weather reconnaissance of DUTCH HARBOR. These planes found 1 U.S. DD south of UNALASKA Island. They reported that the weather in the vicinity of DUTCH HARBOR was not good, but a little better than the preceding day. It was therefore decided to launch a second attack against DUTCH HARBOR. Meanwhile, various air attacks were developing against the force. The visibility was poor and the recognition of enemy planes as to type was uncertain. Commander OKUMIYA thought only PBYs and B-17s were involved. Four protective fighters were launched. They chased and shot down one PBY and believed they damaged a second one. Various planes were taken under fire by the ships of the Task Force. The TAKAO, well out on the left flank of the formation, shot down a B-17 and took one prisoner. One DD had two bombs dropped on her, but these missed by about 500 meters. One bomb hit well clear of the JUNYO. Some planes, which Commander OKUMIYA thought were B-17s, but which could have been B-26s, he said, made torpedo runs although no torpedoes ran close to the ships. One plane after making a torpedo run passed diagonally over the deck and dropped an object which he thought to be a torpedo. The object passed over the RYUJO, but struck the water about 200 meters on her port quarter and did not detonate.

Between these various attacks against them, and at about 1100, the second day's attack against DUTCH HARBOR was launched. Because of the poor weather, only the most skilled pilots were allowed to participate. Only one wave was launched. It was comprised as follows:

         
VF RYUJO - 6,   JUNYO - 9, Total 15
VB     JUNYO - 11, Total 11
VT RYUJO - 6,     Total  6

All planes reached the target, but reported that enroute they dodged considerable cloud masses. No U.S. fighters were encountered at the target so the Japanese VF strafed ground targets. The VB and

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VT bombed the aircraft hanger, oil tanks, one transport alongside a pier, and warehouses. Photographs showed a large fire which they believed to be the hanger burning.

The attack group from the JUNYO had a rallying and rendezvous point the west end of UNALASKA Island. When they arrived at this rendezvous point they were attacked by about 10 U.S. fighters. In the ensuing dogfights 2 VF and 2 VB from the JUNYO were shot down. It was estimated that 5 or 6 U.S. fighters were shot down. The JUNYO planes reported a large U.S. flying field on the east end of UNMAK Island, the location of which was hitherto unknown to the Japanese.

The RYUJO recovered all of her planes about one hour before sunset, none were lost. Due to the delay involved in the dogfight over UNMAK Pass, the JUNYO's planes were late returning and did not land aboard until sunset. Her losses were the 2 VF and 2 VB shot down by U.S. fighters over UNMAK Pass, and one VB which, during the fight, had its radio receiver knocked out and became separated from the flight. Its transmitter, however, was working, and it called in several times reporting fuel remaining and requesting navigational assistance which JUNYO could not give because the plane could not receive. It is presumed that this plane went down at sea. Total losses for the day's attack were 2 VF and 3 VB, all from JUNYO. No surface ship of the Second Task Force was damaged either day of attacks against DUTCH HARBOR.

After the second attack against DUTCH HARBOR on 5 June the Second Task Force retired to a point about 600 miles south of KISKA where the ZUIHO, together with two ships (sister ships which Commander OKUMIYA thought may have been the KONGO and HARUNA) and 4 DDs joined. The ZUIHO had been with a detached group of ships at the Battle of MIDWAY and had survived that action. This augmented task force cruised between 7 and 17 June in an area south of KISKA with the object of cutting off any U.S. carrier force which might be sent up from the MIDWAY force to interfere with the Japanese landing operations on KISKA and ATTU.

No vessel from the Second Task Force went into KISKA, nor was air cover provided over KISKA by carrier planes, although an interception of U.S. planes attacking KISKA was planned and the force moved up to a point 250 miles south of KISKA for that purpose. Weather, however, prevented the launching of any fighters for the planned interception. When weather permitted, two training flights were launched daily, four planes in the morning and four in the afternoon. Air searches were also made when practicable. One of the latter extended into the BERING SEA to a distance of 100 miles north of KISKA about the time the interception was being planned.

The Second Task Force exchanged recognition signals with the seaplane carrier KIMIKAWA when she was enroute to KISKA. When the ship arrived in KISKA on 15 June and had discharged her seaplane fighters, seaplane fighter reconnaissance planes, their fuel and other logistic materials, the Second Task Force returned to OMINATO where they arrived on about 23 June.

They sortied again on about 30 June reinforced by the addition of the aircraft carrier ZUIKAKU, a survivor of the CORAL SEA action in which the SHOHO was lost. (Cv's now with Second Task Force were RYUJO, JUNYO, ZUIHO, and ZUIKAKU).
This force patrolled south of KISKA, and a little west of their former patrol area, between the approximate dates of 30 June and 7 July.

Miscellaneous Information from Commander Okumiya

Arming and Fuzing
For the attack against DUTCH HARBOR planes were armed as follows:

   
VF - No bombs
VB - one 250 kg bomb, fused nose and tail, half the bombs with 0.05 sec, and half with 0.1 sec fuzes
VT - one 250 kg and four 60 kg bombs, the former with nose and tail fuses of 0.05 sec delay, the latter with nose fuzes only of 0.05 sec delay
Two-Seat Seaplanes - two 60 kg bombs, with 0.05 sec delay nose fuze only

Weather
Weather forecasting was done in TOKYO and was excellent so far as wind and general weather were concerned, but the forecasting of fog was poor. The carrier force made use of a weather front in their approach on DUTCH HARBOR. This front did not exist at first but a low pressure area developed which was used to their advantage so far as concealment was concerned but it made scouting difficult.

685287 O - 46 - 8

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Weather limitations for carrier operation:

   
Max. true Surface Wind: for RYUJO - 15 meters per second (29 knots)
  for JUNYO - 18 meters per second (35 knots)

Visibility: 5000 meters, but desired better visibility in a quadrant or semi-circle of bearing from the carrier. (At the DUTCH HARBOR action the visibility went down to 1000 meters, but operations were conducted because of the importance attached to them, - i.e. timing with MIDWAY and the occupation force.)

   
Ceiling: 500 meters desired (200 meters was accepted at DUTCH HARBOR).
Sea: Pitching not so important as rolling
  Limiting Roll: 10 degrees.
  Limiting Pitch: 5 degrees.

Intelligence

Second Task Force estimated 30 large landplanes at KODIAK, some large planes at NOME, no landplanes but about 12 patrol-bomber seaplanes at DUTCH HARBOR.

They thought a small landplane field existed at DUTCH HARBOR, but had no knowledge of fields on UNMAK or on the ALASKAN peninsula.
They believed, without specific intelligence, that seaplanes could base at ATKA and ADAK, and that, at both these places, terrain could be found upon which an airfield could be built.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 21
USSBS NO. 98

ALEUTIAN CAMPAIGN SEAPLANE OPERATIONS, THE NAVAL BATTLE OF THE KOMANDORSKI ISLANDS, AND THE DEFENSE OF THE KURILES

TOKYO 20 and 23 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Commander MIURA, Kintaro, was senior air officer on board the seaplane tender KAMIKAWA MARU from the outbreak of war until December 1942. He then served in the northern KURILES, first as the Air Officer on the staff of Commander Fifth Fleet until August 1943, then on the staff of the Twelfth Air Fleet until March 1944.

Interrogated by: Captain J.S. RUSSELL, USN

Allied Officers Present: Captain S.B. SPANGLER, USN (first interrogation only); Captain PEYTON HARRISON, USNR, Chief of staff of U.S. Naval Force of Battle of KOMANDORSKI, (second interrogation only.).

SUMMARY

The seaplane carrier KAMIKAWA MARU was diverted from the MIDWAY forces after the Battle of MIDWAY, and went to KISKA to aid in the air defense of the occupying garrison and its shipping. Due to U.S. air attacks, KISKA became too hazardous for the seaplane carriers and they moved to AGATTU and finally operated at sea to the southwest of KISKA.

Commander MIURA returned to the North PACIFIC as a member of the staff of Commander Fifth Fleet. He describes the naval battle fought south of the KOMANDORSKI ISLANDS on 27 March 1943, TOKYO date, as he witnessed it from the flagship NACHI. His impression that there were no 8 inch shell hits on the NACHI is not borne out by the fact that blue dye marked certain of the hits he describes; his impression is probably gained by the small explosive charge in the 8 inch armor piercing shells of the SALT LAKE CITY. This battle ended surface ship supply to the beleaguered ATTU and KISKA garrisons.

He describes the evacuation of the KISKA garrison after the fall of ATTU, and gives some details of the succeeding operations in the KURILES.

NARRATIVE

(Note: All dates and times are those of TOKYO, zone minus nine.)

The KAMIKAWA MARU, Captain SHINODA, Tarohachi, carried 14 single float, two-seat spotting biplanes - Type Zero, and four single float, two-seat reconnaissance biplanes - Type 95. She was detached at sea and ordered north from a group of auxiliary vessels which were in the ill-fated MIDWAY expedition. She arrived in KISKA Harbor on 15 June 1942.

The ships present upon the arrival of the KAMIKAWA MARU were, to the best of Commander MIURA's memory, the light cruiser KISO, four to six destroyers, and a few auxiliaries, including the KIMIKAWA MARU which had arrived four or five days earlier with six twin float, three-seat reconnaissance monoplanes - Type Zero. The Commanding Officer of the KISO, Captain ONO, was in command of forces afloat; Lieutenant Commander MUKAI was in command of the landing force ashore. Personnel were highly nervous due to bombings. No great damage had been caused, but the attacks were persistent.

The KAMIKAWA hoisted out her planes and sent them to the beach where a base was set up. Gasoline was put ashore in 200 liter drums. A row of buoys was laid just off-shore for the use of the small planes. The planes moored at the buoys in fine weather, but were dragged ashore, using bamboo mats and hand power to get them through the surf, during bad weather and for servicing. Sometimes the planes were flown over and landed in the calm waters of SALMON Lagoon for engineering work. SALMON Lagoon was also used for operations when the wind was high. The planes flew three hour anti-submarine and reconnaisance [sic] patrols.

About 19 June the KAMIKAWA MARU withdrew from Kiska Harbor because of the U.S. bombing attacks and went to AGATTU. While there she made frequent short visits, or sent a destroyer, to KISKA with supplies and fuel, while the seaplane base was building. She usually went in under cover of darkness.

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At AGATTU there were no air attacks until about 10 July, when about seven B-24s attacked for about 90 minutes from an altitude estimated to be 6000 meters (19,500 feet). Present at the time were the KAMIKAMA and KIMIKAWA MARU's, an oil tanker and six destroyers. The KIMIKAWA MARU received a near miss which killed a few and injured several of her bridge personnel, but no material damage was done to any of the ships present.

After the attack by B-24s, the KAMIKAMA MARU tried to use an anchorage off ATTU, but found the fog conditions too severe. Instead, she lay in an area about 100 miles southwest of KISKA. While operating in this area and about the end of July one destroyer, the TODOROKI, was sent to reconnoiter AGATTU for shelter. While at AGATTU this destroyer was blown in two by a submarine torpedo. About 30 of her personnel survived by swimming ashore.

About the last of July the KAMIKAWA was ordered to return to Japan. She passed through the KURILES just south of PARAMUSHIRO, through LA PEROUSE Strait, and down the west coast of JAPAN to SASEBO. Thereafter she went to the SHORTLAND ISLANDS.

Commander MIURA said that of the 24 float seaplanes from the two tenders, only two or three were operational at the end of two months. The losses in the surf and otherwise due to weather comprised about 60% of the total loss. The other 40% was shot down by B-17s and B-24s, or damaged beyond repair as a result of enemy action. Six of the seaplanes operated from the KIMIKAWA MARU, staying with her during her cruises around the other islands as well as at KISKA. The four Type 95 float planes operated similarly from the KAMIKAWA MARU. The remainder, 14 Type Zero float planes, were shore-based in KISKA Harbor. Flight crews for the latter totalled 40 pilots and 20 men, and the planes were supported by a shore party of almost 70 men.

Commander MIURA returned to the northern area in December 1942, when he relieved (then) Lieutenant Commander ITO, Taisuke, as Air Officer on the staff of Commander Fifth Fleet, embarked on the heavy cruiser NACHI. The flagship based at OMINATO, but made several cruises to PARAMUSHIRO during the winter. The Fifth Fleet engaged primarily in training operations, both ship and air, in the OMINATO Area. When Commander MIURA relieved as Fifth Fleet Staff Air Officer, KISKA had six Type Zero, twin-float, reconnaissance monoplanes supported by the KIMIKAWA MARU. Of these six, he said, about four on the average were kept operational. Of Japanese Army troops in the ALEUTIANS he had been informed that the Army occupying force originally on ATTU had been moved to KISKA, reinforced, and placed under the command of Brigadier General MINEKI. The Army troops which left ATTU were replaced by a troop movement from PARAMUSHIRO. These latter troops were commanded by Colonel YAMAZAKI who remained on ATTU until the end. (Commander MIURA's estimate of troops on ATTU, as of 12 May, was 2600; his estimate for those on KISKA at the same time was 6000).

The Battle of the KOMANDORSKIS

Commander MIURA's first cruise to the ALEUTIANS as a staff officer was on board the flagship NACHI. All the forces then available to the Fifth Fleet were to accompany a three transport convoy to ATTU, in order to get this convoy through the growing interference which U.S. surface forces were causing the Japanese line of communications with the Western ALEUTIANS. The convoy was comprised of two 10,000 ton, 15 knot ships, the AWATA MARU and the ASAKA MARU, and a smaller (3000 to 4000 ton) slower ship, whose name he did not remember. All transports carried supplies and ammunition. The escort force was comprised of 2 CA's, NACHI and MAYA; 2 CL's TAMA and ABUKUMA (Flagship of the First Destroyer Squadron); and six DD's. Commander Fifth Fleet, Vice Admiral HOSOGOYA, Moshiro, with his flag in NACHI, was in command.

The one slow transport was sent on ahead with orders to rendezvous with the main convoy at a point about 160 miles west of ATTU, at 0500*, 22 May. The escort force with the two large, fast transports sortied from PARAMUSHIRO, about 25 March, in unpleasant weather - high wind and scud clouds. The weather improved, and on the early morning of 27 March became calm with a broken overcast sky. Commander MIURA had the morning staff watch and was keeping a sharp lookout for the small transport, since the main convoy was approaching the rendezvous point. The ships were in a single column on a northerly heading, order in column: NACHI, MAYA, TAMA, ABUKUMA, the six destroyers, and the two large merchantmen. The masts of a ship were sighted on the

___________

*Note: The error of two hours in Commander MIURA's recollection of time. This is consistent throughout his account and was checked by his statement that sunrise was about 0530 (actually 0330 TOKYO Time).

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horizon to the south, and thinking this to be the small transport, Commander MIURA so reported it to his admiral. A column right through approximately 180 degrees was executed and the masts of additional ships were sighted to the south. The range closed rapidly and a U.S force, consisting of one 10,000 ton heavy cruiser, an OMAHA class light cruiser, and five destroyers, was made out. It was realized that the Japanese force was superior so the range was closed with the intention of destroying the American force. The NACHI was the only ship carrying aircraft, and she was ordered to launch planes. She was very slow in complying and the order to open fire was given before she had her planes off. The Japanese opened fire at about 0540, slightly ahead of the Americans. The first salvo of the NACHI ruined the two single float, two-seat Type Zero spotting planes on the starboard catapult. These were jettisoned. The plane on the port catapult, however, was undamaged and was launched. This was a twin float, three-seat Type Zero reconnaissance seaplane. It was the only Japanese plane airborne in the battle area, served as a spotting plane throughout the engagement, and landed at ATTU.

After opening fire at about 20,000 meters the leading American ship turned left approximately 90 degrees and it appeared that the American force was fleeing.

After the first salvo was fired, the main battery of the NACHI was made inoperative because of loss of electric power due to low steam pressure at the generators. (The generator steam supply was shifted too early to a boiler which was just getting up steam.) For thirty minutes the main battery guns were at maximum elevation and could not be laid. The confusion caused by this casualty was added to by 15 cm (6 inch) shell hits from the first American salvoes. One 15 cm (6 inch) shell severed the leads between the director in the top and the guns of the main battery. When electric power was restored, this casualty had to be discovered and corrected before the main battery guns resumed firing. The other 15 cm (6 inch) shell hits were all "high" and located as follows: One pierced the bridge structure, forward and below the first hit (that which severed the fire control leads to the foretop); two amidship through the base of the catapult structure, a short distance above the main deck; and one which severed one leg of the mainmast tripod.

(Note: Commander MIURA was questioned closely about the caliber of the shells which hit the NACHI. He was very positive that all the hits enumerated above, which pierced the ship's superstructure, were 15 cm (6 inch), and was quite sure that the one which severed the leg of the tripod was of the same caliber. He stated repeatedly that there were no 20 cm (8 inch) hits. These heavy shells made many close misses, but the vast majority landed just forward of the ship's bow, drenching the bridge with water. He complained of smarting eyes, which he attributed to the dye in these shell splashes. He was eloquent on the subject of the American destroyers' gunnery, saying that their 13cm (5 inch) shells landed aboard like rain.)

During the 30 minutes in which the NACHI's main battery was inoperative, she continued to lead, but maneuvered to avoid interference with the MAYA'S shooting. The Japanese cruisers fired torpedoes, soon after opening fire with their main batteries, while the range was still closing. All torpedoes missed. The ABUKUMA and her six destroyers were ordered to close and carry out a torpedo attack. However, the NACHI steamed at speeds up to 33 knots and the destroyers had a difficult time making over 28; hence, although they "cut corners" trying to catch up, they could not execute their mission. The destroyers did fire their torpedoes about an hour after the action started, but the range was extreme and no hits were made.

About an hour and a half after action begun the American destroyers laid smoke. The American ships zig-zagged and fired between smoke columns. About 0700 a 13 cm (6 inch) shell from the U.S. destroyers passed through the gun port of No. 1 turret on the NACHI, exploded inside, and killed the entire turret crew. The American destroyers' fire was very heavy. Many 13 cm shells burst above and showered the main deck with fragments; about 40 of the NACHI's topside personnel were killed this way. Fairly early in the action a 13 cm shell struck the after end of the flag bridge and detonated against the deck house. At this time the Admiral was standing at the forward center of the flag bridge with his two principal staff officers on either side and slightly behind him. The other staff officers were standing in a single rank to the rear. Commander MIURA was second from the right in this rank and in a relatively exposed position. Miraculously, all shell fragments missed the officers, but killed three communication personnel whose stations were further aft, and set fire to the after end of the bridge. This fire burned briskly for a short while, but was rapidly extinguished.

During the maneuvering to westerly and northwesterly courses, the light cruiser TAMA ended up in the van of the cruiser column. When the American destroyers began an attack the anti-aircraft guns put out a barrage as a deterrent to their advance. Commander MIURA expressed admiration

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for the skill and daring of this attack and the volume of 13 cm fire which the destroyers delivered. He said he did not know how a ship could live through the concentration of fire which was brought to bear on the leading destroyer. There were no torpedo hits as a result of this American attack, and he stated that he was not aware that any torpedoes had actually been fired.

For three hours the action see-sawed back and forth across the surface of the ocean. The Japanese registered few hits; the Americans many, although the main battery salvoes from the heavy cruiser were consistently close misses ahead. The Japanese ran short of ammunition. Vice Admiral H0SOGAYA calculated that American planes from ADAK would join action in three hours from the start of the battle. He therefore broke off the action by continuing to the west, while the American ships went south.

The NACHI sustained the heaviest damage of any of the Japanese ships. In addition to the hits mentioned above, Commander MIURA said there were 13 cm (6 inch) hits too numerous to record. The next most damaged ship was the light cruiser TAMA, although her damage was all "topside" with none of the vitals of the ship deranged. The heavy cruiser MAYA got off almost "Scot-free", with only light superficial damage. He knew of no damage to the ABUKUMA and her destroyers.

As for damage done to the enemy, Commander MIURA said it was claimed that one destroyer was very seriously damaged, and one major caliber hit had been made on the American heavy cruiser.

Commander MIURA stated, positively, that there were no troops embarked in any of the Japanese combatant ships, and none to his knowledge in any of the three merchant transports. The latter ships continued to the northwest to an area about thirty miles south of BERING Island where they awaited orders; thence they returned to PARAMUSHIRO. While standing by awaiting orders, the transports sighted two to four PBY's.

After breaking off action the combatant ships went west to the coast of KAMCHATKA, then down the coast to PARAMUSHIRO. One American aircraft was sighted by the combatant ships during the day of the battle. This aircraft was not definitely identified, but it was reported as, and thought to be, a flying boat. No Japanese aircraft support from PARAMUSHIRO was planned or given. Fog was not encountered on the return voyage.

The NACHI was sent from PARAMUSHIRO to OMINATO for repairs. Since the heavy repairs could not be effected there, she went on down to the Navy Yard at SASEBO.

The Assault and Retaking of ATTU

Commander MIURA had little to say of the Japanese own operations to assist the ATTU garrison in the defense of that island. He said many plans were made, but cancelled due to weather and that the operations were generally unsuccessful. When an attack group was sent they were preceded by a weather plane. The Japanese weather forecasting, he said, was rather good. This he attributed to the fact that they had broken the Russian weather code and hence could include a considerable area in their weather analysis. He said that prior to the American bombardment of ATTU there had been a plan to send 48 land-based Type Zero fighters to operate from the strip at HOLTZ Bay.

The Evacuation of KISKA

At the time of the evacuation of KISKA, Commander MIURA was at PARAMUSHIRO. Most of the other members of the staff were with Commander Fifth Fleet, Vice Admiral KAWASE, embarked in the TAMA which was at sea southwest of KISKA. Commander First Destroyer Squadron, Rear Admiral KIMURA, embarked in the ABUKUMA, was in direct charge of the evacuation force.

Because the supply routes were cut, KISKA could not be maintained. The evacuation was effected by one light cruiser and thirteen destroyers. (Note: See summary of interrogation of Commander MUKAI, Nifumi, Nav No. 22, who was one of the evacuees. He stated that two light cruisers, ABUKUMA and KISO, and eight destroyers participated.) The approach was made from the south because the fog was thickest in that direction. The evacuation was successful only on the third attempt. On the second attempt, when very near KISKA, the entire force was exposed by a complete lifting of the fog, and had to retire. On the third attempt, the fog persisted until the force was close to the south end of KISKA Island; then it thinned enough to permit navigation along the coastline. With the shoreline close aboard, the force passed up the west coast of the island, around the north end, and down the east coast into the harbor. The fog lifted in the harbor. During the approach arrangements with the shore party were completed by radio. The force anchored just before sunset.

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Within 30 minutes (Commander MUKAI said one hour) upwards of 5000 personnel were embarked. No equipment or supplies were taken aboard, just personnel. After loading, the ships departed, and again followed the shoreline close aboard, north around the island. They took departure from the southern end of the island. Returning to PARAMUSHIRO, the force followed a track not quite so far south as the outbound track. They refueled enroute at a point about half way to PARAMUSHIRO from an oiler which had accompanied them part way out.

Defense of the KURILES

The air defense of the KURILES in the period June to September 1942, was provided by 18 Army fighter planes based at KASHIWABARA on the west side of PARAMUSHIRO Strait, and by 36 Navy fighters and 36 Navy land-based attack planes (BETTYS) based at HOROMUSHIRO at the south end of PARAMUSHIRO Island. The operational radius of the land-based attack planes was considered to be 700 nautical miles. At the SHIMUSHU Navy Seaplane Base were approximately four three-seat, twin float reconnaissance seaplanes, twelve single-seat, single float, seaplane fighters, and four two-seat, single float spotting seaplanes.

There was a Navy strip on a small area of flat land on the southeast end of MATSUWA Island. In this location the weather was very bad. There was an Army strip on the north end of URUPPU Island. There was a Navy airfield at TENNEI in the vicinity of HITOKAPPU WAN on ETOROFU Island, where there was normally based a six-plane unit of carrier attack bombers.

All personnel evacuated from KISKA were taken to SHIMUSHU and PARAMUSHIRO. There were three Army divisions in the KURILES; about half of these troops were on PARAMUSHIRO, the remainder divided between MATSUWA, URUPPU, and ETOROFU. The heaviest anti-aircraft and coast defense was located on both sides of PARAMUSHIRO Strait. From about August 1942 onward, there were approximately 60x13 cm guns and 15x7 cm guns installed there. The American air effort against the KURILES accounted for the sinking of three or four cargo ships off KASHIWABARA; however, little damage was done to the airfields. Ship bombardments caused considerable damage at airfields by the destruction of buildings and the pocketing of runways. After a bombardment at HOROMUSHIRO it took one week to repair the runway. There was lighter damage at SURIBACHI. The hangar and beach installations were heavily damaged at MATSUWA.

During the period between the Summer of 1944 and the Spring of 1945, all Navy personnel and about one Army division were withdrawn from the KURILES, principally because American submarines had rendered supply too difficult. Navy personnel went into training in the OMINATO Area with a view toward defense against landing operations in North JAPAN. Army personnel went to HOKKAIDO to principal Army bases to train for the same purpose. As to the sinking of supply ships, Commander MIURA could no give concrete figures, but he said there were many, in his opinion from ten to twenty. Of these a few were 10,000 ton ships, but most were in the 3000 to 4000 ton category. The heaviest rate of sinkings occurred in the area east of KARAFUTO (SAKHALIN), and off the straits of LA PEROUSE and TSUGARU. At the end of the war the submarines were sinking ships in ISHIKARI Bay on the west coast of HOKKAIDO. The submarines did much more harm than airplanes. He considered airplanes ineffective due to weather.

When the Navy personnel were withdrawn from the KURILES, all Navy airplanes were withdrawn also. The Army withdrew all airplanes except for about eighteen fighters on PARAMUSHIRO. The last Navy air units to be withdrawn were a six plane carrier type attack plane unit at KATAOKA and a similar unit at TENNEI, ETOROFU.

Commander MIURA gave the following random items of information:

During the night bombardment of PARAMUSHIRO in January 1944, there were some small ships in harbor at HOROMUSHIRO, but none were sunk. In the February 1943 bombardment of ATTU, no ships were sunk. In the April 1943 bombardment of ATTU he had heard that one 5000 ton ship was sunk. He had been ashore once at HOLTZ Bay, ATTU, once on the south side of AGATTU Island, and once at KISKA Harbor. The ALEUTS from the village on ATTU were removed to a point near SAPPORO, HOKKAIDO, where they were in the hands of the Army.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 22
USSBS NO. 99

ALEUTIAN CAMPAIGN

JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF KISKA, THE KISKA GARRISON,
AND OPERATION IN THE KURILES

TOKYO 22 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Commander MUKAI, Nifumi, a regular officer with twenty years of service in the Japanese Navy. He is not an aviator. From 1 May to 30 June 1942, he was the commanding officer of the Special Naval Landing Force which occupied KISKA. From 1 July 1942 to 30 July 1943 he was Senior Officer of the KISKA Defense Force. He occupied a similar position at KATAOKA on PARAMUSHIRO until the end of February 1944, when he went to MUSASHI on the same island.

Interrogated by: Captain J.S. RUSSELL, USN.

 

SUMMARY

 

A Japanese Special Naval Landing Force went ashore at REYNARD COVE on KISKA Island at 1000, 7 June 1942 (TOKYO time and date). The force advanced south along the island to the north west shore of KISKA Harbor, where the main camp was set up. The men of the small U.S. Navy weather station were made prisoners-of-war, although one man held out for a long time until forced by hunger and cold to surrender.

On 1 July 1942, the original landing party of 1260 men was reinforced by an additional 1200 men and became the Fifth Garrison Force. In September the Japanese Army troops on ATTU were moved to KISKA, and developed defensive installations in the GERTRUDE Cove Area. About the end of September, Rear Admiral AKIYAMA took command of the island and the garrison became the 61st Base Force. Late in November, the Army garrison was increased and placed under the command of General MINEKI. An air strip was started during the winter, but never completed. The continuous U.S. air raids stopped all surface ship supply to KISKA in February 1943.

After the fall of ATTU at the end of May 1943, it was decided to evacuate the personnel from KISKA. Submarines were tried first unsuccessfully, then, after several unsuccessful attempts, two light cruisers and several destroyers were run in under cover of fog and the entire garrison embarked in a little less than one hour and safely returned to PARAMUSHIRO. Details are given of the defensive installations on the island, and considerable information on damage caused by air raids, surface bombardment and submarine attack.

NARRATIVE

(Note: All dates and times are those of TOKYO, zone minus 9).

According to Commander MUKAI, the first plan of action in the ALEUTIANS was to take the island of ADAK by joint landing on the part of both the Japanese Army and Navy. Then, after a period of about one week, to land on KISKA and ATTU, using the same forces which had taken part in the occupation of ADAK. The object of taking ADAK was to provide a temporary defense in depth, the Army falling back to ATTU and the Navy to KISKA. Commander MUKAI thought the ADAK venture unwise, since he, with his force, would be required to make two landings, and he did not enjoy the prospect, due to the difficult terrain and weather conditions. He was of the opinion that the whole operation was one of reconnaissance. He expected to evacuate KISKA in September of 1942. He learned that the plan was changed, and that he would be required to land only on KISKA, two weeks before the Battle of MIDWAY; and hence, he emphasized, the change in plan could have been in no way connected with the outcome of that battle.

The force with which Commander MUKAI landed on KISKA at 1000 on 7 June 1942, was comprised of one battalion of Special Naval Landing Force of 660 men and a party of labor troops of 700 men. The Landing Force was embarked on the HAKUSAN MARU and the labor troops on the H.......... MARU, both transports of 10,000 tons. (Commander MUKAI could not remember the name of the second transport other than that he thought it began with an "H"). He went ashore with the Landing Force at REYNARD COVE. The Landing Force was divided into three parts; the main body proceeded directly overland to the head of KISKA Harbor, skirting the inshore end of SALMON Lagoon, a second group moved along the crest of the ridge down the center of the island, and a third group moved along the shore. Four landing barges proceeded along the shore toward KISKA Harbor. These stood by to assist the third group of the shore party to cross the entrance

NAV-22

--102--

to SALMON Lagoon, then moved on down to the entrance to KISKA Harbor, where they awaited a call from the force ashore in the event that the evacuation of casualties might be required.

Three prisoners of war were taken a short distance inshore from the U.S. Weather Station. These were a pharmacist's mate, a cook and a weather observer. No one else was met, but the three P.O.W.'s said that there were four more men from the weather station who had gone into the hills to the south.

The three landing force groups assembled at 0230 the next morning on the northwest shore of KISKA Harbor. The two armed transports then moved in and landed the labor troops, equipment and supplies. Present in KISKA Harbor at various times during the first few days of the occupation, in addition to the two armed transports, were the light cruisers KISO and TAMA, the converted light cruiser ASAKA MARU four destroyers of the 21st Destroyer Division, three auxiliaries carrying gasoline, fuel oil and supplies - the HINO MARU, NISSAN MARU and AMAGI MARU - and the KAMITSU MARU. The latter brought in gasoline, equipment and supplies for six flying boats which had landed on 8 June.

As soon as the labor troops and supplies were landed from the two transports the development of the base was started. Four 13 mm AA guns were emplaced on the high ground just east of the U.S. Weather Station. Four 7 cm AA guns were emplaced to the northwest on the slope of the mountains. Four 12 cm coast defense guns were installed on NORTH HEAD. Radar was located below the crest of the ridge to the west. One 40 KVA power unit and one 80 KVA power unit were set up along the stream just east of the Weather Station, and a 15 KVA power unit near the pond. A communication center was established with a receiver in the Weather Station building and transmitter southeast of the pond. Mechanical equipment was lacking, so all this took up the remainder of the month of June.

U.S. air attacks began on about 10 June with B-24's, B-17's, and PBY's taking part. It was considered that the latter were on reconnaissance missions. These air attacks interfered with the work of developing the base considerably.

Remembering the four Americans who were reported to be in the hills to the south, the KISO sent a boat with an armed party aboard around to the south shore of the island. This was not done immediately, however, and was unsuccessful. After the search was discontinued, and on about 22 June, three (Commander MUKAI said this possibly could have been four) gave themselves up. Those were thought to be civilians - one "weatherman" and two "lookouts." On about 30 June the last man was found behind the main camp. None of the Americans had identifying tags or papers. The disposition of the prisoners of war was as follows: the three taken on the first day were questioned as to weather and sent to YOKOSUKA on the, ASAKA MARU, which left on 15 June. The second three (four?) after being given whiskey, water and bread, and being briefly questioned, were rushed out to the KISO which was on the point of departing for OMINATO. The seventh (eighth?) prisoner was kept for some time since no ships were sailing for JAPAN. This prisoner was quartered in the building which housed the U.S. Diesel generator. (This power unit was not used by the Japanese because of the voltage and frequency). The prisoner was tall, slender, had brown hair and blue eyes. He had a pleasant disposition and was well liked by the Japanese. He was finally placed aboard a destroyer sailing for YOKOSUKA in October 1942.

The flying boat camp and the beach from which these and the float planes operated was located a short distance around the shore to the southwest of the main camp.

On 19 June the NISSAN MARU was sunk in the harbor by a bomb from a B-17. The hit was registered on the third attack.

On 1 July the landing force became a garrison force, the "Fifth Garrison Force." The ARGENTINA MARU and the CHIYODA (built as a Navy seaplane carrier) augmented the force at this time with about 1200 men. The AA defense was augmented and six midget submarines were brought in. The 18th Destroyer Division (three DD's) escorted this force. The next day the three destroyers, after standing out, ran into fog, and anchored off SALMON Lagoon. There they were subjected to a torpedo attack by a U.S. submarine. One was sunk and the other two seriously damaged.

The AA defenses were augmented as follows: four 12 cm high angle guns were installed midway between NORTH HEAD and SALMON Lagoon, four 7 cm high angle guns on a hill on the south shore of KISKA Harbor, three 12 cm coast defense guns on the west end of LITTLE KISKA, four 25 mm AA machine guns on a hill behind the main camp, and batteries of four 13 mm AA machine guns were installed, one on NORTH HEAD, one by the submarine base, one on LITTLE KISKA and one near the radar station west of the main camp. The 13 mm battery in the last location was very difficult to install due to the terrain.

NAV-22

--103--

About 200 moored mines were placed off the west shore of KISKA Island in the bight of the shoreline directly west of KISKA Harbor.

The labor battalion was supposed to build a pier at the Main Camp, but were hampered by the lack of equipment, and each time the construction was started it was destroyed by wind and sea.

Observation float biplanes were moved in within a few days of the arrival of the occupation force for short range reconnaissance and anti-submarine work. The day after the landing, six flying boats were brought in. (These, he said, were moved out about 17 August, due to the difficulties of using them in the prevailing foggy weather and the swell in KISKA Harbor). About 10 July the spotting planes were augmented by float fighters. Near the end of June some of the float planes, which were under repair in SALMON Lagoon, were damaged by bombs. He heard (but cautioned that it was second-hand information) that the destroyer OBORO, on about 20 June, was damaged sufficiently by a near miss to be sent back to the EMPIRE for repairs. There were much interference with work, but no great damage by U.S. air raids until about mid-September when the air attacks became very severe.

The installations were subjected to a U.S. surface ship bombardment on 8 August 1942. The day was foggy. Two spotting planes, probably cruiser-borne, appeared. One was shot down by a float fighter and the other hid in the fog. At about 1300, 15 minutes after the spotting planes appeared, an intense bombardment began. It was impossible to be sure in the fog, but the U.S. force was thought to consist of ten ships, including CA's, CL's and DD's. Shells came like rain for thirty minutes. Only two Japanese were killed, because the personnel had taken to the bomb shelters. The north end of the barracks area was destroyed, although most of the shells directed at the main camp fell beyond it. At the end of about thirty minutes the U.S. force withdrew to the south. The Japanese batteries did not fire one round because they had no fire control radar and the fog was too thick for visual control.

After mid-September U.S. bombing occurred twice daily and the damage was severe. The Japanese radar picked up the attackers imperfectly, owing to the U.S. tactic of low-level approach. The results of these raids, as he saw them, were:

(1) Ships had to leave harbor, although none, he said, were sunk there. (n.b.: see later list of ship losses).
(2) Great damage to all buildings ashore.
(3) Radar damaged, but quickly repaired.
(4) Many wounded, but few killed. (In the first big raid of 15 September, ten were killed and many more wounded).
(5) All planes damaged.
(6) Material damage by fire great.

After the big raid of 15 September, all of Captain MUKAI's personnel devoted themselves to antiaircraft drill, digging in and repairing damage.

On 1 July Captain SATO, Toshimi, assumed command of the garrison which was then designated the Fifth Garrison Force. About the end of September 1942, Rear Admiral AKIYAMA came in with about 200 communication personnel and the name of the garrison was changed to the 51st Base Force.

In September, on orders from Imperial General Headquarters, the infantry battalion and company of engineers which had occupied ATTU came to KISKA - a total of about 1200 men under Major HOZUMI. Those troops landed at and developed the GERTRUDE Cove Area. At the same time, and on similar orders, the YAMAZAKI Regiment landed on ATTU and became the occupying force there. Late in November the Army troops were put under the command of Brigadier General MINEKI, who brought with him to KISKA two companies of anti-aircraft artillery and a very small battalion of infantry. A road had been built through the mountains, the Army working on the GERTRUDE Cove end and the Navy on the KISKA end. The small battalion of infantry which General MINEKI brought with him took up a position on the west side of the island between KISKA Harbor and KISKA Volcano. One anti-aircraft company set up positions at GERTRUDE Cove, and one in the area west of KISKA Harbor.

Winter, spring and early summer were spent in improving defense, anti-aircraft drills, and repairing bomb damage. Food and ammunition ran short. The last surface transport reached KISKA in about February 1943. Supply by submarine was attempted, but was not adequate. The only supplies run in from ATTU were small quantities of anti-aircraft ammunition, this by submarine; no other craft attempted this hazardous run.

NAV-22

--104--

During the winter the garrison started building an air strip, mostly by hand. There was much blasting to be done, and this was occasionally assisted by American bombs. The strip was originally planned to be 1000 meters long, but this had to be reduced to 800 meters. The air strip was intended for the use of land based fighters.

The Evacuation of KISKA

Beginning early in May some personnel were removed from KISKA. About forty men, mostly hospital cases, were taken off in each submarine. Due to U.S. bombing it took about three days to load each submarine. Possibly a total of about 700 men were taken off this way. This operation was finally stopped due to the lengthy process.

Total evacuation was eventually accomplished in one surface ship operation. On 28 July 1943, two cruisers, the KISO and ABUKUMA, and eight destroyers entered the harbor in the fog. The sighting of LITTLE KISKA HEAD, which was mistaken for an American ship in the fog, caused the launching of two torpedoes by one of the destroyers. One torpedo struck the Head while the other missed and ran on into the harbor where it struck the cliff east of the Submarine Base. Both torpedoes detonated, which led the garrison to believe that they were being bombed. One hour elapsed between the entry and the departure of the evacuation force. All personnel of both Army and Navy were waiting on the two beaches in KISKA Harbor. All landing boats which remained with the garrison, plus those which the destroyers brought, were used to bring personnel out to the ships. Approximately 3100 Navy and 3000 Army were evacuated, using eighteen landing boats. Commander MUKAI was the last to leave the beach and boarded the closest destroyer, Commander Yoshida's ship, the name of which he could not remember. When the landing boats had completed their service they were sunk. Timed explosives were left to destroy shore installations, eight to twelve hours after the evacuation. The guns were immobilized by the removal and destruction of important parts.

KURILE Operations

The evacuation force went to SHIMUSHU-PARAMUSHIRU, arriving 1 August 1943. Commander MUKAI landed with the entire Navy party at KATAOKA, while the Army troops landed at the well-developed harbor and airfield at KASHIWABARA. With about 2400 Navy personnel, Commander MUKAI worked on building an airstrip and gun emplacements. SHIMUSHU was attacked on about 14 August 1943 by six B-24s which bombed from very high altitude on a track from northeast to southwest. Their bombs caused no damage. These were followed by B-25s, coming from north to south. These severely damaged one transport and burned 500 drums of heavy oil on SHIMUSHU. One B-25 was shot down by ship's anti-aircraft fire. No more B-25s came for a long time but B-24s continued. Winter came. Some casualties occurred to personnel building the air strip. B-34s (PVs) came sporadically on nuisance raids, but caused very little damage. He left KATAOKA the end of February 1944, and went to MUSASHI on the south end of PARAMUSHIRO. He returned to SASEBO in April of 1945.

Japanese Losses at KISKA

Commander MUKAI could remember the following losses in ships at KISKA:

KANO MARU - torpedoed by submarine outside and beached just east of Submarine Base, 12 July 1942
NOJIMA MARU - damaged by bombs in two different attacks, 25 August and 3 September 1942, and beached near TROUT Lagoon in the harbor.
1 Army Transport - damaged by bombing in December 1942, and beached just east of the main camp.
2 SC's - were torpedoed by submarine and sunk about five miles north of KISKA Harbor end of July 1942.
1 DD - sunk by bombing four miles northeast of KISKA Volcano, 11 February 1943, by persistent attacks by B-25s and B-26s as the DD was attempting to run up the west coast of KISKA and north around into the harbor.
1 Army Transport - crashed by a B-26, November, 1942, burned and beached at GERTRUDE Cove.

He estimated Navy shore personnel losses to be about 200 killed and 600 or more wounded. Army losses were unknown to him, but he estimated that they were as many or more than those of the Navy.

Commander MUKAI stated that there were no more U.S. prisoners-of-war taken after the original round-up of weather personnel. However, he said the body of a man from a B-24 fell on NORTH HEAD during the winter. It was buried near the 12 cm HA guns there. One P-40 was shot down, April 1943, near SALMON Lagoon, and the pilot's body was buried there.

NAV-22

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 23
USSBS NO. 100

ALEUTIAN CAMPAIGN

JAPANESE FLYING BOAT OPERATION IN THE ALEUTIANS

TOKYO 9 October 1945

Interrogation of: Captain ITO, Sukemitsu, I.J.N.; from February 1942 to March 1943, commanding Officer of the TOKO Seaplane Squadron at YOKOHAMA.

Interrogated by: Captain J.S. RUSSELL, USN.

SUMMARY

The operations of a six plane Japanese flying boat unit from KISKA Harbor, during the period 8 June to 17 August 1942, are given. Operational and combat losses and damage suffered by the unit are enumerated, and some of the early U.S. air raids against KISKA are described.

NARRATIVE

(Note: All dates and times are those of TOKYO, zone minus nine.)

Captain ITO, as commanding officer of a six-plane detachment of TOKO KOKUTAI Type, 97 Flying Boat (MAVIS) Squadron, flew to KISKA from PARAMUSHIRO, landing at KISKA on 8 June, the day after the initial occupation. His unit remained at KISKA until 17 August 1942. He stated that from the latter part of May to the first part of June 1942, a 300 to 400 miles search was made in the direction of KISKA from PARAMUSHIRO by naval land-based attack planes (BETTYS). The fuel, provisions and supplies for use by his six-plane unit were brought to KISKA on board the KAMITSU MARU. This ship carried 500 two hundred liter drums of gasoline. Captain ITO's group moved ashore in a camp on the northwest shore of KISKA Harbor and were supported by repeated trips of the KAMITSU MARU between KISKA and PARAMUSHIRO. The gasoline drums were dispersed behind the seaplane beach and in the surrounding hills. The six plane unit immediately engaged in reconnaissance flights searching to the east and southeast to a distance of 250 to 300 nautical miles. Captain ITO stated that the reconnaissance was very poor due to the prevalence of fog. Beginning on about 10 June, U.S. navy flying boats attacked KISKA. These attacks continued for two or three days and then stopped, he believed, due to fog. In his opinion, these U.S. flying boats came from DUTCH HARBOR.

When Captain ITO's unit arrived in KISKA, the Japanese cruiser KISO and four or five miscellaneous ships, including a few destroyers, were present.

The first large attack against KISKA occurred, to the best of Captain ITO's memory, on 10 June. This was made by a formation of six Liberators. They came through the pass to the west of KISKA Harbor under an overcast which was at about 1500 feet. The leading plane of this attack was struck by anti-aircraft fire from the ships in the harbor and disintegrated in the air. The wreckage fell in the mountains just to the north of the pass. This attack came as a surprise and worried the Japanese considerably. No particular damage was done.

Captain ITO stated that the cruiser KISO, which was present at KISKA on his arrival, was undamaged.

Captain ITO did not remember when his flying boats first bombed NAZAN Bay, but thought it was about the middle of July. Their mission was to bomb a seaplane tender, but she was absent and the village was bombed instead. Clouds interfered with the observation of the results of this bombing. On one bombing of NAZAN Bay, U.S. fighters, of an unidentified type, attacked the Japanese flying boats. No damage was done to the Jap planes except for 50 caliber bullet holes in the tail surfaces of one plane. The Jap plane under attack escaped into the clouds. Three planes of Captain ITO's unit bombed a U.S. seaplane tender in KULUK Bay, ADAK, about 20 July. One plane, of three outbound on daily search, sighted the tender. When each had finished his sector search, all concentrated on KULUK BAY, joined in section formation and bombed. Each plane carried two 250 kg. bombs. Planes were not sure but thought no damage was done to the tender. One plane had one small shrapnel hole in its tail surfaces as a result of AA fire.

When Captain ITO was based at KISKA the Japanese seaplane tender KAMIKAWA brought in some float seaplanes.

NAV-23

--106--

The total losses to Captain ITO's six-plane MAVIS unit were: (a) two operationally, and (b) three as a result of U.S. surface gunfire on about 8 August. Of the two planes lost operationally, one disappeared in the fog between OMINATO and PARAMUSHIRO; the other was weathered out after a reconnaissance flight to the eastward of KISKA. The latter plane eventually landed in the open sea off ATTU, and, although the plane sank, the crew were rescued by the Japanese Army forces on ATTU. Replacements were received for the two planes lost operationally. Of the three planes lost due to enemy action, i.e., bombardment on 8 August, one plane sank and the other two were damaged beyond repair and were left in KISKA. Captain ITO departed from KISKA on 17 August and returned to Japan with the three remaining planes.

Captain ITO considered seaplane operations from KISKA very difficult due to weather. Their searches were greatly reduced in radius, 250-300 nautical miles, due to the extreme uncertainty of weather at their base. Searches over the sea were flown "contact", those along the island chain were flown "on top". The ocean swell which set into KISKA Harbor from the northeast caused them considerable trouble, but, in spite of many close calls, no damage was caused to his planes due to rough landings on the swells. He stated that the four U.S. seaplane moorings found in the lee of NORTH HEAD were of excellent quality. During reconnaissance missions, Captain ITO's planes navigated by dead-reckoning and celestial navigation. Although they had radio direction finders in their planes, and radio beacons were in operation on KISKA and ATTU, reliance was not placed in radio bearings. Japanese forces were on only four islands: KISKA, ATTU, LITTLE KISKA, and AGATTU. Commander [sic] ITO's flying boat unit operated under orders of Commander Fifth Fleet whose headquarters were at OMINATO or PARAMUSHIRO. The officer in command ashore at KISKA was the Commanding Officer of No. 3 Special Naval Landing Force, Lieutenant Commander MUKAI.

NAV-23

--107--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 24
USSBS NO. 101

ALEUTIAN CAMPAIGN

PLANNING AND OPERATIONS THROUGH NOVEMBER 1942

TOKYO 11 October 1945

Interrogation of: Captain ITO, Taisuke, IJN, from August 1941 until November 1942, an air officer on the staff of Commander Fifth Fleet, who based variously at AKKESHI, OMINATO, and PARAMUSHIRO.

Interrogated by: Captain J.S. RUSSELL, USN.

Allied Officer Present: Lieutenant H.L. McMASTERS, USNR.

SUMMARY

The Japanese planning for, and operations in, their campaign in the Western ALEUTIANS, during the period May to November 1942, are discussed from the viewpoint of an air officer attached to the staff of the fleet commander assigned to the area.

NARRATIVE

(All dates and times are those of TOKYO, zone minus nine.)

Captain ITO spoke entirely from memory. He stated that all records had been destroyed on 15 August 1945. The following summary is based, therefore, on the best recollections of one officer.

The primary objective of the ALEUTIAN Operation was to occupy ADAK as a northern base for patrol planes, which, in conjunction with MIDWAY, could cover the northern approach across the PACIFIC to JAPAN. When the Battle of MIDWAY went unfavorably, Admiral YAMAMOTO was against occupying any of the ALEUTIAN ISLANDS. However, Vice Admiral HOSOGAYA, Commander Fifth Fleet, argued strongly for the occupation of KISKA as a position from which to neutralize DUTCH HARBOR and prevent an advance toward JAPAN via the ALEUTIAN ISLANDS. He was granted permission to land on KISKA on 7 June. Since it was known that Aleutian weather in the winter was very bad, it was the original plan to hold KISKA only until fall. ADAK was selected as the original westernmost target, since it was considered to afford the best anchorage in the Western ALEUTIANS. ATTU, KISKA, and AMCHITKA were scouted by submarine plane a week to ten days before KISKA was occupied.

About a month after the occupation of KISKA, the landing upon which was effected on 7 June, 1942, airfields were planned for the ALEUTIANS, based on reconnaissance. One airfield was planned for ATTU. The site was originally chosen on SARANA Bay but was shifted to HOLTZ Bay (the latter was considered a better location for weather and supply). Two airfields were planned for KISKA; one just north of KISKA Harbor, and another in the GERTRUDE Cove area. The GERTRUDE Cove site could not be agreed upon and the project was eventually dropped. AMCHITKA was reconnoitered once by the Navy and once, more extensively, by the Army. The party from the latter service stayed on the island three days and made test diggings in the soil.

The initial landings on KISKA, Captain ITO believed, was made by No. 5 Special Naval Landing Force, plus construction troops totaling upward of 1000 persons. The initial landing was made in the vicinity of SALMON Lagoon, and the landing party moved overland to KISKA Harbor, while their ships moved around by sea to meet them. All the personnel of the U.S. Navy Weather Station were rounded up in a few days, except for one who held out for a long time before coming into camp and giving himself up.

The following forces took part in the initial occupation:

     
  2 CL KISO, TAMA
  2 AP HAKUSAN MARU, KUMAGA MARU
  2 DD  
  3 SC  
  Troops: No. 5 SNLF and a Construction Battalion
  1 AV KIMIKAWA MARU
  6 VPB KAWANISHI Type 94 flying boats of TOKO Air Group
  10 (approx.) VO-VS Float reconnaissance seaplanes.

NAV-24

--108--

Both the KISKA and ATTU occupation forces were under the command of Commander Fifth Fleet, Vice Admiral HOSOGAYA, who remained in PARAMUSHIRO. ATTU was occupied on 8 June by one battalion of Army troops under Major HOZUMI. At KISKA there were three forces without a unified local command. The ground troops were commanded by Lieutenant Commander MUKAI; the air force was in two parts - the flying boats under Captain ITO and the float planes under Captain TAKAHASHI. All three of these commands were responsible directly to Vice Admiral HOSOGAYA.

American air attacks commenced within a few days after the initial landing on KISKA. These were more harassing than damaging although he believed that one transport was sunk within the first twenty days. The Japanese seaplane operations were not very satisfactory. Losses were high, principally due to weather, but also to enemy action. He remembered that the flying boats were sent on a mission to bomb American flying boats at ATKA. Photo reconnaissance, which they desired for intelligence and planning, was extremely poor, due to weather. In about September 1942, an RO Type submarine reported making one torpedo hit on an ASTORIA Type cruiser in NAZAN BAY. This submarine failed to return from its patrol.

Captain ITO made one trip to the ALEUTIANS - in a flying boat. The plane landed at CHICAGOF Harbor, ATTU, the location of the headquarters of the Army garrison. Then on the next day, he flew on to KISKA. He was in the main camp at the site of the former U.S. Navy Weather Station in late afternoon of 8 August when an American surface ship shelling took place. The bombardment lasted about 30 to 40 minutes. There were two destroyers, two to three subchasers, four to six midget submarines, one or two transports in the harbor at the time. Some landing barges were destroyed. On the next day he flew directly from KISKA to PARAMUSHIRO. At both of his stops there was a considerable stock of drummed gasoline. His flying boat was refueled at its mooring from drums brought out in a landing boat.

Captain ITO stated that their information on the topography of the ALEUTIAN ISLANDS was poor, and this hampered their planning. They knew the winter weather was bad, and some of their planners thought that KISKA Harbor would freeze over in winter and be unnavigable. There was a general lack of information and considerable misinformation. Aerial photography was extremely difficult to obtain, and none was done east of SEGUAM PASS. He knew of an American flying field on ADAK, which was made by draining a swamp. This information was obtained by aerial photographs, and to the best of his memory, he first learned of it in early OCTOBER 1942.

The Japanese losses in the ALEUTIAN Campaign through November 1942, totaled: two destroyers, three subchasers, one transport, two or three submarines, sunk; and three destroyers heavily damaged.

Captain ITO said that, by and large, the ALEUTIAN Campaign served as a stop to any American advance down the ALEUTIAN ISLANDS, that it was planned in coordination with the taking of MIDWAY, and, had they a base in the ALEUTIANS and one in MIDWAY, a barrier patrol could have been set up between the two. This was considered a prerequisite to operations against HAWAII. They did not intend to go into ALASKA. He thought that the general results of the campaign did not amount to very much, and that when they did not take MIDWAY, it would have been better not to go into the ALEUTIANS.

In the defense of their positions in an area of prevailing poor visibility and long winter nights, he said the fact was considered that the Americans were advanced in the art of night flying and radar bombing. These forms of attack had considerable nuisance value and acted adversely against morale; however, their actual value in destruction was much less than they had anticipated.

NAV-24

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 25
USSBS NO. 102

ALEUTIAN CAMPAIGN AND DEFENSE OF THE KURILES

PLANNING AND OPERATIONS FROM NOVEMBER 1942 TO AUGUST 1945

TOKYO 22 October and 7 November

Interrogation of Commander HASHIMOTO, Shigefuso, IJN. Attached to the Navy headquarters in TOKYO from November 1942. His particular duty during this time was Russian intelligence. He served as navigation and communication officer on the staff of Commander Fifth Fleet from November 1942 until June 1944. He was again in the Navy headquarters in TOKYO from June until November 1944, when he went to the NE Area Air Fleet Staff. From February 1945 until August 1945 he served on the OMINATO Naval Garrison Staff and with the Twelfth Air Fleet Staff.

Interrogated by: Captain J.S. Russell, USN.

SUMMARY

The Japanese operations in the ALEUTIANS from November 1942 until July 1943, and their later defense of the KURILES, is described from the viewpoint of navigation and communication officer attached to the staff of the fleet commander assigned to the area.

The naval battle fought off the KOMANDORSKI ISLANDS is described in detail with an account of the damaged [sic] received by Japanese ships. The evacuation of the KISKA garrison is described, but the date given from memory is two days early. The use of radar intercept for avoiding U.S. ships is described. Considerable information on shipping losses in the North Pacific is given from memory.

NARRATIVE

All dates and times are those of TOKYO, zone minus 9.)

In Commander HASHIMOTO's opinion the Japanese move into the ALEUTIANS was conceived as a flanking operation to the occupation of MIDWAY. Once KISKA and ATTU were occupied it was decided to hold them for the purpose of blocking a U.S. amphibious advance toward the EMPIRE via the ALEUTIAN chain, and also to deny the use of the Western ALEUTIANS as bases from which long-range bombers might operate. He said that the Japanese were aware in the latter part of 1942 that the U.S. had plans for a high altitude, long range bomber, and, in about February 1943, had information concerning the B-29. This information was later confirmed in a radio broadcast by an American general. He went on to say that the B-29 appeared in operation eight months later than the Japanese had estimated it might appear. When ATTU was retaken by U.S., Japanese expected long-range bomber operations from MASSACRE Bay.

Prior to the ALEUTIAN Operations Japanese intelligence was to the effect that the U.S. had extremely light forces in the Aleutians, possibly a few planes as far west as ADAK and KISKA. As of November 1942 their information indicated that in North PACIFIC waters the U.S. had four cruisers, six or seven destroyers, and that one or two aircraft carriers might be in that area from time to time. There was also a rumor that two battleships might be operating there, but this he personally discounted.

Commander HASHIMOTO stated that, to the best of his recollection, the Japanese forces in the North PACIFIC as of November 1942 were:

Fifth Fleet - Commander in Chief: Vice Admiral HOSOGAYA

21st Cruiser Squadron  -  Vice Admiral HOSOGAYA
two CA  -  NACHI (FF), MAYA (on loan from Second Fleet)
two CL  -  TAMA, KISO
1st Destroyer Squadron  -  Rear Admiral MORI
one CL  -  ABUKUMA (F)
21st Destroyer Division    
three DD  -  HATSUSHIMO, WAKABA, HATSUHARU
7th Destroyer Division    
three DD  -  INAZUMA (or DEN), IKAZUCHI (or RAI), HIBIKI (or KYO)

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Air Afloat  -  C.O. of KIMIKAWA MARU
1 AV  -  KIMIKAWA MARU
8 VO  -  three-seat, twin float, seaplanes
Air Ashore at KISKA  -  Captain TAKAHASHI
4 VS  -  two seat, single float, seaplanes
8 VF  -  single-seat, single float, seaplanes
51st Base Forces  -  Rear Admiral AKIYAMA
5th Garrison Force, SNLF    
51st Communication Unit, Navy    
    Total Naval Personnel ashore estimated to be 4000.
Independent Army Force on Kiska  -  Brigadier General MINEKI
    Total Army Personnel ashore estimated to be 5000.
Army garrison forces on Attu    

The primary mission of these forces was to defend against any U.S. westward movement through the ALEUTIANS.

Prior to the time that Commander HASHIMOTO joined the Fifth Fleet Staff, and in about late September, a convoy of three transports and three destroyers brought troops and equipment to ATTU. This was at the time when the original ATTU garrison was moved forward to KISKA. A second convoy of three transports escorted by 1 CL (ABUKUMA) and three DD's carried personnel to ATTU and ammunition and other supplies to KISKA. This was for and consummated during the period October to December 1942. A third convoy was planned for during the period January to March, 1943. The weather was very bad in January. As time passed it became clearly evident that U.S. forces were preparing to intercept the movement of transports, hence in March the entire surface force available to the Fifth Fleet was employed as escorts. The tactical plan was to attract and destroy the U.S. forces. This operation resulted in the sea battle of 27 March 1943.

The Battle of the KOMANDORSKIS

The transports departed from KATAOKA (PARAMUSHIRO-SHIMUSHU) in two groups. On 23 March the 4000 ton SANKO MARU left, escorted by the destroyer USUGUMO. On 24 or 25 March the converted light cruiser ASAKA MARU and the Army transport SAKITO MARU left escorted by the First Destroyer Squadron: 1 CL - ABUKUMA, and 4 DD's - WAKABA, HATSUSHIMO, IKAZUCHI, and INAZUMA. Shortly thereafter the main body of the Fifth Fleet sortied, comprised as follows: 2 CA's - NACHI, Vice Admiral HOSOGAYA, Commander Fifth Fleet embarked; MAYA, "Loaned" from the Second Fleet; 1 CL - TAMA.

The transports were loaded as follows:
   SANKO MARU - supplies and ammunition, possibly some troops.
   SAKITO MARU - troops, equipment, ammunition, and supplies.
   ASAKA MARU - a staff and headquarters outfit, (Commander HASHIMOTO was not sure whether Colonel YAMAZAKI was on SAKITO MARU, but knew he was embarked, also COMMANDER YASUNAMI of the Navy and Lieutenant Colonel ANDO of the Army), some supplies and equipment.

The second group was delayed because of a storm. The weather was bad the first two days of the voyage. They reached the rendezvous position late on 26 March and they spent the night of 26-27 March running approximately 60 miles north and south through the rendezvous point waiting for the SANKO MARU and USUGUMO to join. The rendezvous point was selected at about the latitude of ATTU and just outside the 600 mile radius from ADAK - the latter to avoid detection by U.S. air search.

Commander HASHIMOTO was below decks when the contact with the American force was made. When he arrived on the bridge the NACHI had just turned to the right, he believed, from a northerly heading to a southerly one in order to engage the enemy. He understood that the ASAKA MARU to the rear of the column had first made out and reported the enemy ships to the south. The guns were trained in the direction of the enemy, and the MARUs cleared to the northwest as all other ships closed up and prepared for action.

The NACHI normally carried three planes, but one of these had been left behind for overhaul. The MAYA also could carry three planes, but had with her. upon making contact with the enemy the NACHI's two planes were ordered to be launched; however, it took a long time to warm up the engines and they had not been catapulted when the NACHI opened fire with her main battery. Gun

685287 O - 48 - 9

NAV-25

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blast damaged the two-seater plane on the starboard catapult and it was subsequently jettisoned. The three-seater on the port catapult was launched and carried out reconnaissance and spotting duties throughout the action. Thereafter it landed at ATTU, but crashed on landing. The three-man crew were returned to the Fifth Fleet about a month later by submarine.

The Americans opened fire almost simultaneously with the NACHI. The MAYA opened fire shortly thereafter. A loss of electric power prevented the NACHI from firing a second salvo for about thirty minutes. in the last five to ten minutes of action the NACHI received a hit at the after end of the bridge by a 15 cm. (6 in.) blue dye loaded shell, which killed five or six communication personnel and wounded twelve or thirteen others. A small fire, which broke out in the vicinity of the hit, was soon extinguished.

The American force was identified as follows: two destroyers with an OMAHA class light cruiser, followed by a PENSACOLA class heavy cruiser and two more destroyers. It appeared to Commander HASHIMOTO that the destroyers were stationed one to port and one to starboard of each of the heavy ships.

The action developed into a chase with the American ships making off to the westward. The TAMA did not fire for about thirty minutes because of the range. However, she worked up speed rapidly, and, to reduce the range in the pursuit, she cut inside and went to the van as the Japanese heavy cruisers came around to a southwesterly course. The First Destroyer Squadron was ordered to open out to port to encircle the American force and make a torpedo attack. This plan failed due to failure in communications. The cruisers went from 24 to 28 knots and the First Destroyer Squadron failed to get the change of speed signal. By the time the signal was gotten through to them they had lost considerable distance. They found it very difficult to close. As a result they did very little in the action except to follow in column. As a result of the delay of the First Destroyer Squadron the Americans were able to escape.

The action continued on generally southwesterly and westerly courses. The Japanese tried to keep the action running away from ADAK. Air support for the Americans was expected to reach the battle area at 0700. The action was broken off at 0820 for several reasons. First, the air attack was overdue and considered imminent. Second, by this time the ammunition remaining was below the minimum prescribed by doctrine, and, if air attack developed, they would be without ammunition for defense against a coordinated surface ship attack. Third, the fuel consumption was high and there would not be sufficient remaining to return to base from chase. Even the chance of sinking an American ship did not warrant continuing the action.

Torpedoes were used by the Japanese during the action, but under unfavorable conditions. The NACHI and MAYA carried twelve torpedoes; the TAMA, eight. NACHI AND MAYA fired their starboard torpedoes, that is, six from each ship, about ten minutes after the action commenced. The TAMA fired none. The ABUKUMA carried eight torpedoes; each of her three destroyers, nine. ABUKUMA fired all her torpedoes at about two hours after the action commenced, while one destroyer, WAKABA, fired all hers about two and one-half hours after the beginning of action. The other destroyers did not get close enough to fire even at long range.

In main battery fire NACHI and MAYA each expended about 900 rounds of the 1100 rounds of 20 cm. ammunition carried. TAMA expended about 45 rounds of the possibly 500 rounds of 14 cm. ammunition carried. ABUKUMA and the destroyers expended very little ammunition. The ships' anti-aircraft guns were used very little because there was no aircraft attack, and it was desired to save ammunition for that expected event; however, they may have been used briefly for anti-destroyer effect.

At about the end of the action the TAMA, under Commander Fifth Fleet's order, executed a reversal of course and again took stations at the rear of the cruiser colum [sic].

The weather, although very bad on the preceding two days, was good on the day of the battle. The wind was from the northwest, he believed - velocity five to six meters per second (10-12 knots). The sea was almost calm with visibility 30,000 to 35,000 meters (16-19 miles). The sky was solidly overcast at 2500 meters (8200 feet), although it cleared later in the day. Sunrise on the day of battle was at 0320.

The Japanese estimated that the damage to the American force was as follows:

(a) Two hits observed on the heavy cruiser which reduced her speed. The NACHI plane reported that the heavy cruiser was at one time stopped, and was trailing oil. The plane shadowed the American force until 0900.
(b) Medium damage to one destroyer.

NAV-25

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Commander HASHIMOTO was aware that the American destroyers had attempted a torpedo attack and he himself counted two torpedo wakes. There was no torpedo hits.

The Japanese thought highly of the American defense tactics. The smoke screen was well laid. They could make few hits because of the erratic courses taken by the targets and because of the smoke. They had no fire control radar. The salvoes from the American heavy cruiser landed close aboard all around the NACHI with a preponderance of close misses ahead. The pattern of the fall of shot appeared to Commander HASHIMOTO to be encompassed by two superimposed ellipses with their major axes at right angles to each other. He said the dispersion was very small - about 50 meters (55 yards) - and, had it been greater, hits would have been made.

Damage to Japanese ships was all above the waterline. No ships suffered underwater flooding, and no machinery darangement [sic] resulted from enemy action.

The Japanese neither planned nor had air support. Beside a shortage of suitable airplanes, the airfields within possible range were covered with snow and unserviceable. At this time there were airfields at MATSUWA Island, and at MUSASHI, at the south end of PARAMUSHIRO. A field was under construction, but not yet serviceable, at SURIBACHI. The field at KATAOKA was not yet begun.

After the sea battle there were insufficient facilities at PARAMUSHIRO for repairs and supplies, so the force was withdrawn to the EMPIRE, using the ports of YOKOSUKA, SASEBO and MAIZURU. While plans were being developed for a fourth supply operation, ATTU was taken by the U.S.

There were many plans laid to bring aid to ATTU, but the American control of the air prevented any hope of success, so the idea was finally abandoned. During this time the 24th Air Flotilla, Rear Admiral YAMADA, was based at PARAMUSHIRO with 36 fighter planes and 36 land-based attack planes (BETTYS). The fighters remained as cover for PARAMUSHIRO, but the land-based attack planes made two sorties against the U.S. forces which were attacking ATTU. (May 1943). Owing to fog and the fatigue of flight personnel, such operations were not very successful. Commander HASHIMOTO was not very familiar with the air missions against ATTU. Of the two missions, one on 23 May and one on 24 May, he believed each was a flight of nine land-based attack planes (BETTYS). The first flight attacked two American destroyers off ATTU and believed they sank one. Three of the nine planes were lost, two to anti-aircraft fire and one landed in the sea before reaching base on the return flight. The second mission, he believed, also lost three planes, but he did not know how. The second mission may have been participated in by more than nine planes, since there was a possibility that the flight was augmented by planes from a second 18-plane squadron.

The question then arose as to what to do with KISKA. During the ALEUTIAN operations the defense of PARAMUSHIRO had not been adequately prepared, and this was a factor in plans concerning KISKA. Accordingly, an operation was envisaged for the evacuation of KISKA in order to reinforce PARAMUSHIRO. It was understood that the evacuation of KISKA must be effected unobserved. The plan therefore called for a display of activity which would lead the U.S. forces to believe the preparations were being made for a strong defense of the island, in order to cover the true intention of withdrawing.

The first plan for the evacuation of KISKA was to employ submarines. For this purpose the First Submarine Squadron was attached to the Fifth Fleet with about 15 submarines of the I-78 class. Between the end of May and 10 June 1943, about 700 persons were removed by submarine, but this proved to be a lengthy and hazardous operation. The combination of radar and air cover exposed the submarines whenever they surfaced and about four were sunk (I-7, I-21, I-24, I-35, or 36).

Since the operation became too costly in submarines the plan was changed to one which would effect the evacuation by a dash by surface ships, DD's or CL's. Twelve destroyers and three light cruisers took part in the operation. Three attempts were made. The first two were unsuccessful. At the conclusion of each attempt the ships returned to PARAMUSHIRO. The dates of departure for the first two attempts, to the best of Commander HASHIMOTO's memory, was 20 June and 30 June.

The third attempt was successful. Commander HASHIMOTO participated as a staff officer on board the TAMA in which Commander Fifth Fleet, Vice Admiral KAWASE, flew his flag. The force sortied from PARAMUSHIRO KAIKYO on 22 July. The track out was roughly SW to 48°N, 160°:E, thence along the 48th parallel of latitude to 175°E, thence directly to the SW tip of KISKA Island.

NAV-25

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The route was chosen as one through areas of highest probability of fog, and reasonably secure from U.S. air search. (The track was given from memory and Commander HASHIMOTO stated that he might be in error as much as 60 miles.) Two destroyers collided enroute and had to be sent back to PARAMUSHIRO. On 25 July a radar intercept was made on 110 megacycles bearing 105 degrees, true, from TAMA, the leading ship in column. This was thought to be an American submarine's search radar. It swept past them three times, closed down for 30 minutes, when it swept thrice and closed down again - this cycle continuing. Avoiding action was taken and no contact was made. The Japanese cruisers had surface search radar, but it was not used successfully, due largely to the poor training of personnel with resulting poor operating technique, and to the difficulties of maintenance. Radio silence was maintained by the force except for two brief communications which TAMA exchanged with the garrison to request weather and to give information of the time of embarkation. For these a Japanese submarine frequency and code were used.

On the afternoon of 27 July the TAMA stood by alone about 30 miles SW of KISKA Island, while the remainder of the force under Commander, First Destroyer Squadron, Rear Admiral KIMURA, went in to take off the garrison. These ships were the two light cruisers, ABUKUMA (F) and KISO, and nine destroyers: KAZAGUMO, MAKIGUMO, YUGUMO, AKIGUMO, HIBIKI, SAMIDARE, NAGANAMI, WAKABA and HATSUSHIMO. The ships made a landfall on Cape ST. STEPHEN, the southwest tip of KISKA Island, and followed the coastline up the west side of the island around the north end and down the east coast into KISKA Harbor. The embarkation was completed in about one hour. On coming out the ships followed the reverse of the track going in. Rendezvous with the TAMA was effected and the return to PARAMUSHIRO was made over essentially the same route as that followed on the outbound voyage. There were no enemy contacts on the return voyage. The Japanese had the impression that the withdrawal of the KISKA garrison had been made without detection.

Following the successful evacuation of personnel from KISKA, the reinforcing of the PARAMUSHIRO-SHIMUSHU Area went forward. Leaving a defense force in this area all remaining available personnel were taken to the EMPIRE for training. Training aimed at the defense of the Northern KURILES. During this period (July to October, 1943) no cruisers nor destroyers were lost; however, three or four transports or cargo ships were sunk.

During the closing months of 1943 and the early months of 1944, the Japanese were confident that they had a sufficient garrison in the North to defend PARAMUSHIRO. This together with the fact that the Americans did not make a determined attack in the North, caused the Japanese to look to the defense of the Southern KURILES. Hence, during the period February to July 1944, the entire KURILE chain was reinforced with about two divisions of army troops.

In these reinforcing operations a severe shipping loss was incurred, ten or more ships being sunk by U.S. submarines. Because of the growing hazard of supply and apprehension over the possibility of an American landing in HOKKAIDO or North HONSHU the troops were brought to the south. The removal of the Army troops to HOKKAIDO, and the Navy to OMINATO, occupied the Fifth Fleet during the period February through June 1945. Defenses were being prepared in these areas when the war ended.

U.S. air raids from ATTU and the ALEUTIANS were not severe, and, by the number of sorties, were considered to be in the nature of training flights on the part of the Americans. Damage ashore was minimized by the fact that tunnel defenses were highly developed. Flare illumination night bombing targets were believed to be generally ineffective due to haze and the prevalence of clouds and fog. Commander HASHIMOTO said that he respected greatly that the Americans flew and attacked in weather which the Japanese considered impossible for air operations.

Random Comments

Commander HASHIMOTO did not think highly of Japanese submarines. They obtained very little intelligence, were not aggressive in making attacks, were poor in evasive tactics, and the boats themselves were large and unwieldly [sic]. In general they were not a successful arm of the fleet.

Two to three Japanese submarines operated in the Battle of ATTU, May 1943. Two were stationed to the north, and one to the south. The one to the south was reported by the troops ashore to have sunk one U.S. ship. The crew of the submarine did not make the claim, nor did they confirm the sinking.

NAV-25

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Shipping casualties in the Aleutian Campaign

Commander HASHIMOTO gave from memory the following casualties to ships:

KASUMI - DD (1500 ton HATSUHARU Class)
   Heavily damaged off shore at KISKA
  Sept. '42. Bomb
HATSUHARU - DD
   Very heavily damaged off shore at KISKA
  Sept. '42. Bomb
NENOHI - DD
   Sunk off AGATTU
  June (?) '42. Sub.
USUGUMO - DD
   Sunk off ATSUKESHI, HOKKAIDO
  May '44. Sub.
SHIRAKUMO - DD
   Sunk at ATSUKESHI, HOKKAIDO
  April '44. Sub.
ISHIGAKI - PG
   Sunk off MATSUWA, KURILES
  May '44. Sub.
KASADO - PG
   Seriously damaged near OTARU,    Western HOKKAIDO
  May '45. Sub.
RO-68 or 65 - SS
   Sunk off KISKA
  Oct. '42. ?
I-21 - SS
   Sunk near KISKA (?)
  May '43. ?
I-24 - SS
   Sunk off ATTU
  May '43. ?
I-35 or 36 - SS
   Sunk off ATTU
  May '43. ?
I-7 - SS
   Sunk off KISKA
  June '43. ?
CHERIBON (CHELBOURNE?) MARU, 3500 ton
   Sunk at ATTU
  Dec. '42. Bomb.
AKAGANE MARU, 4500 ton
   Missing 60-100 miles west of ATTU, Coast De-
   fense ship from PARAMUSHIRO had just com-
pleted escorting, and heard gunfire over the hori-
zon after leaving this ship.
  Jan.-Feb. '43. Gunfire(?)
JIMMU MARU
   Sunk off PARAMUSHIRO
  April '43. Sub
NICHIRAN MARU
   Sunk off ATSUKESHI, HOKKAIDO
  March '44. Sub.
AKASHIZAN MARU
   Sunk off ETOROFU Island
  March '44. Sub.
MATSUJI MARU
   Sunk near RASHOWA, KURILES
  April '44. Sub.
TAKASHIMA MARU
   Sunk off ARAITO Island
  May '44. Sub.
FUSHIMI MARU
   Sunk off ETOROFU Island
  June '44. Sub.
KURETAKE MARU
   Sunk off NAKA SHIRETOKO, KARAFUTO
  May '45. Sub.
TENRYO MARU
   Sunk off NAKA SHIRETOKO, KARAFUTO
  May '45. Sub.
CHOWA MARU
   Sunk off ERIMO ZAKI, HOKKAIDO
  May '45. Sub.
KAIHO MARU
   Sunk off ERIMO ZAKI, HOKKAIDO
  May '45. Sub.
HAKUAI MARU
   Sunk off ARAITO Island
  June '45. Sub.
ZAOZAN MARU
   Sunk off ARAITO Island
  June '45. Sub.

NAV-25

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 26
USSBS NO. 103

MINE WARFARE

TOKYO 22 October 1945

Interrogation of: Captain TAMURA, Kyugo, IJN. Wartime duties were devoted to mine construction and mine sweeping.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, USN.

SUMMARY

This interrogation is a continuation of NAV 5.

Captain TAMURA discusses the mining of Japanese waters and furnishes additional facts and opinions relative to the various phases of mine warfare.

Captain TAMURA submitted the following information which was requested at a previous interrogation:

  1. List of vessels sunk or damaged in minefields on West Coast of JAPAN north of SAKAI.
  2. A complete list of vessels sunk in SHIMONOSEKI Area.
  3. A complete chart showing all channels in the SHIMONOSEKI Area and location of mined vessels.
  4. Table showing passage control through SHIMONOSEKI Strait in July 1945. Records for April, May, June and August were burned but are stated to be similar.
  5. Number of passages through SHIMONOSEKI Strait during July, showing number of vessels hit by mines.
  6. Estimated number of B-29s laying mines in SHIMONOSEKI area by date.
  7. Results of minesweeping in SHIMONOSEKI Area, including number of mines swept.
  8. A brief description of Japanese minesweeping equipment showing area where employed.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Captain TAMURA, in addition to the information furnished by you at previous interrogations, do you have further statements to make in regard to the offensive mining campaign by the U.S. Forces?
A. If you had been able to disguise the places and times of the dropping of mines by your planes our counter-measure research would have been delayed and losses would consequently have been greater. Even though we had a difficult time in working up counter-measures against mines, it would have been much more difficult if we hadn't been able to watch planes drop mines and recover them immediately. The important thing is not to let the Japanese know you were dropping mines. Another weak thing was so many dropping on land, making recovery easy. Also when you dropped mines by parachute it would have been better to drop from a lower altitude in which case you wouldn't have taken them in to land. It was very effective when you dropped mines with a new device in it. During the period after a mine with something new is used, there is a period of recovering it, taking it apart, finding a counter-measure, then constructing the machinery and educating personnel in using the equipment. There was a one or two month lag during this particular period when we didn't know what the solution is and took big losses. Then you should drop more of these mines because we do not have a counter-measure for that particular mine. One thing that caused us much trouble was the combination of two types of mines, combination of magnetic-acoustic and the magnetic-pressure mine. By the end of the war we were left with a lot of research being done but no real effective counter-measure being produced in quantity. I think that you should have tried to develop something to prevent those spontaneous explosions and sympathetic explosions. I tried to work on it but couldn't find out why so many of your mines exploded for no apparent reason. It is something worth studying. It might have helped if your mines had been dispersed more.

Q. What features of American mines were you unable to solve? What particular feature of the American mines did you know the least about?
A. No part gave us particular trouble because our engineers were able to take the mines apart, and to understand it. The pressure mine was a big puzzle to us because we couldn't figure out what set it off. The fact that it was a pressure mine caused us trouble. The magnetic mine caused us trouble but we knew it was a magnetic mine and could understand it. We could take each one apart but the

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parts didn't add up to anything. We picked up the first magnetic pressure mine in May 1945 and by the end of June were able to sweep it. We were successful in completing the major portion of the research and knew the story by that time. We were able to sweep two or three at NIIGATA in August but the war ended before we had any more experience in sweeping.

Q. How did you sweep the magnetic pressure mine?
A. The mines at NIIGATA were swept in very calm water with a hydro-bar. The big disadvantage of dropping mines by plane is that the planes are easily seen and the mines are marked. A combination of submarine and airplane in placing the mines is an idea. An airplane to drop the mines far enough off shore so that the coast watchers are not advised and submarines to pick them up somehow and pull them in to shallow water in some manner. Mines well laid by submarines are more of a surprise. The submarine could very successfully lay the moored mine a lot easier because it doesn't have to be laid at such shallow depth. According to information from the Germans this was very effective.

Q. Do you think that the mine fields laid by the B-29s were effectively placed?
A. Your campaign was very well conceived.

Q. Did the mining of any of the distant ports, such as RASHIN, take you by surprise?
A. No, we weren't surprised because it was keeping with your policy of mining busy ports. During the early part of this month the storms around JAPAN caused many mines all over to explode. Not only acoustic, also pressure mines.

Q. Are you familiar with the low frequency acoustic mine?
A. Yes. We tried many different methods of countering it but were not successful.

Q. Were you able to successfully sweep the low frequency acoustic mine?
A. No. I think there is still no effective counter-measure in any country for the low frequency acoustic mine and the magnetic-pressure mine.

Q. Did you attempt to sweep pressure mines by towing a large canvas sea anchor?
A. That is one of the methods. We tried thousands of ways. The use of the bag was one of them; the closest thing to success was the hydraulic plate.

Q. What in your opinion was the best method for mining by airplane? Is it best to drop a great number of mines at intervals, or to drop a few every day?
A. In my opinion continuous mining is more effective than occasional large scale mining. Of course the large scale attacks at intervals also cause a lot of trouble, but when you continually dropped them it meant that we were using equipment 24 hours per day. They were always on the lookout. Whereas, a big load dropped at intervals, we had a respite for a few days. A continuous defense is hard to keep up. From the point of view of a long war, it is far better to continuously feed mines to a given area because we never are confident of a swept channel. With a big load in one place we know it is clean when swept.

Q. In your opinion, Captain TAMURA, do you think the UNITED STATES divided their mining and bombing effort properly? In other words do you think we should have increased our mining effort and possibly commenced mining operations sooner?
A. The result of B-29 mining was so effective against the shipping that it eventually starved the country. I think you probably could have shortened the war by beginning earlier.

Q. Do you think that the planes used in mining were more effective than an equal number of bombing planes?
A. Yes, I do.

Q. Was the SHIMONOSEKI channel ever fouled by sunken ships?
A. No, because it was too wide for that.

Note: Interrogation NAV No. 27 (USSBS No. 104) is omitted from this series as it contains limited information which amplifies and clarifies answers to questionnaire contained in NAV MEMORANDUM - 6 which was submitted to the Japanese Government.

NAV-26

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 28
USSBS NO. 112

TOKYO AIR DEFENSE

TOKYO 23 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Major TOGA, Hiroshi, IJA; staff officer of the 10th Air Division from July 1944 to present date.

Interrogated by: Captain T.J. Hedding, USN.

SUMMARY

Major TOGA was interrogated to obtain information on the Japanese Army air defense of the TOKYO Area, particularly against carrier-based air attacks. The 10th Flying Division of the Japanese Army Air Force was responsible for the air defense of the TOKYO Area. Its organizational strength was 210 fighters and 12 observation fighters, with a claimed operational strength of about 90%. Defense tactics called for a fixed defense in depth with two outer lines of defense with a final defense over TOKYO proper. During alerts reinforcements were ordered to TOKYO by the Air Defense Commander of the EMPIRE Area, General Prince HIGASHI-KUNI. The number of reinforcing planes being determined by this command.

From February 1945 on, the number of aircraft available for defense decreased rapidly due to losses, conversion of aircraft types and shortages of aviation gas. Towards the last of the war emphasis was placed on dispersal and conservation with consequent reduction in effectiveness.

Report of losses are very unreliable due to reported destruction of records.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What Japanese Army Air Force organization was responsible for the air defense of the TOKYO Area?
A. The responsibility for the air defense of TOKYO was left up to the East District (TOBU). Direct Army command was under General TANAKA'S.

Q. Was the 10th Flying Division, which you joined in July 1944, part of this organization?
A. They received their orders from TANAKA. In February of this year they became independent.

Q. Was the 10th Flying Division actually engaged in the defense of TOKYO Area?
A. The Division actually participated in the defense of the TOKYO Area. Up until April of this year, the Commanding Officer of the 10th Flying Division was Lt. General YOSHIDA, K. In April of this year the command changed to Lt. General KONDO, K.

Q. Are you familiar with the Operation Plans of the Japanese Army Air Force air defense organization from the period of 15 February until end of hostilities?
A. I know only that with which my own command is concerned, that is the 10th Flying Division.

Q. What other Flying divisions were included in the defense organization of the TOKYO Area?
A. There was no other air division in the TOKYO Area. There was a naval organization, however.

Q. What were the defense plans set-up by the air force organization for the defense of the TOKYO Area against carrier-based plane attacks?
A. Up until February of this year, when the command was under Lt. General YOSHIDA, the plan or the defense of the TOKYO Area against carrier-based aircraft was to meet the enemy in the air and shoot them down. However, in April when KONDO became the Commanding Officer, the plan was that they should not expend aircraft unnecessarily in defense against carrier-based raids, but should set up a defense by using the AA guns to the fullest extent as possible, and at the same time disperse their aircraft on the ground to minimize their losses.

Q. Where did they intend to seek air combat, over the TOKYO Area or attempt to intercept raids prior to the arrival of the attacking planes?
A. Expect to have air battle within the TOKYO Area. The first line of defense was built around CHOSHI, KATSUURA and SHIRAHANA, the second line of defense was at KISARAZU and CHIBA and the third line of defense was the air coverage of TOKYO proper.

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Q. Did the plan contemplate attacks on the American Carrier Force from which these air strikes were being launched?
A. My organization had no plans for attacking American carriers and I think that it was the responsibility of the First Air Army; also, the Navy had plans to attack the American carriers, but I don't know anything about that. Until July of this year, the First Air Army had no real plans for attacking the American carriers.

Q. What means were provided for coordination with the Navy Air Defense Force?
A. The cooperation and coordination with the Navy Air Defense was in actuality that the Navy defend beyond the first line of defense setup by the Army and that the Army would carry out the air defense over the land. The Navy, based at YOKOSUKA, KISARAZU and ATSUGI, was responsible for direct coverage of its own immediate area only. Liaison with the Army, between the Army Headquarters East District (TOBUGUN) and YOKOSUKA, existed in the eventuality of an attack. Until February of this year, both Army and Navy took to the air when attacks were made. However, in July these plans, as I have already stated, differed. It is believed, however, that the Navy carried out attacks in the air against the American Fleet.

Q. Was there a common Fighter Director Center for the employment of both air forces?
A. They operated independently, but there was liaison.

Q. What were the actual aerial tactics employed in intercepting attacking aircraft?
A. The aerial tactics employed in intercepting attacking planes were that when planes approached one or between two Army bases in the first defense line, the planes at those two bases would attack in full force against the incoming planes. The planes in the secondary defense line were in the air, but would not attack unless planes got through the outer defense line. The same can be said of the direct air coverage of the TOKYO Area, that American planes which penetrated the secondary defense line were to be attacked by the planes performing air coverage over TOKYO.

Q. Was their primary target bomber planes or escort fighters?
A. Bomber planes were the primary target.

Q. What was the actual operational strength of the 10th Flying Division on 15 February 1945?
A. In the 10th Flying Division there were about 200 fighters and 12 observation planes.

Q. Was that authorized strength or operational strength?
A. The organization strength called for about 210 planes, I don't know about the other.

Q. What was the normal availability, in percentage, of operational planes?
A. Generally 200 planes.

Q. You stated previously that the 10th Flying Division was the only defense air division in the TOKYO Area with an authorized strength of approximately 210 fighters. By this, do you mean that there were only 210 fighter planes (Army) available for the air defense of the TOKYO Area?
A. Yes.

Q. Were other air divisions ordered to reinforce the 10th Flying Division during air attacks; from where and in what strength?
A. Assistance in repelling incoming attacks was to be received from the Fighter Pilot School at MITO, TOKOROZAWA and TAMA. These did not include, necessarily, whole air divisions, but only certain flying units there. They came to help us in February.

Q. Who determined the strength of reinforcement ordered in this particular area?
A. The Air Defense Commander of JAPAN who was His Majesty Prince HIGASHI-KUNI.

Q. Was the 10th Flying Division able to maintain its operational strength throughout the remainder of the war?
A. No, they were not able to maintain 200 operating planes. In about July, the number of available planes was 100. The reasons for the decrease of availability was due to installation of armament in planes as well as some losses.

Q. Were you able to maintain the required number of pilots?
A. We were able to maintain sufficient number of pilots for the number of planes available, but we could not use all of the pilots because of the shortage of aviation gasoline.

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Q. The lack of operational planes then was due to two reasons, actual lack of modern combat type planes and lack of gasoline. Is that right?
A. Yes.

Q. Was the combat efficiency or calibre of the pilots maintained during this period? Were available spares and maintenance adequate?
A. The combat efficiency of the pilots decreased because of the lack of fuel for training purposes. The spares were inadequate, particularly as far as engines were concerned.

Q. How about maintenance facilities?
A. In comparison with the lack of engine parts for the planes, repair and maintenance facilities were considered sufficient. However, the repair and maintenance crews which were sufficient in number had been hurriedly trained and were not too skillful in their work.

Q. Referring to American carrier attacks on the TOKYO Area on the 16 and 17 February, what combat losses were sustained by the 10th Flying Division?
A. I am not sure just what the combat losses during these two days were, but I think that it was about 30 planes.

Q. Were records kept of losses by the division?
A. Yes, but they have been destroyed.

Q. Who ordered their destruction, and where are the copies of these records?
A. The order for their destruction came from Lt. General KAWABE, Shozo, who was the Commanding Officer of the Air Army. Duplicates of these records might be obtained at the Bureau of Investigation for Commendations and Awards (KOSEKI CHOSABU).

Q. During the carrier attacks, 16-17 February, how many planes were destroyed on the ground and what damage was done to the installations at the fields?
A. Approximately 10. Minor damage at the fields.

Q. What did the 10th Flying Division consider was the relative effectiveness of carrier-based fighter planes and American Army P-51 planes from IWO JIMA?
A. The P-51 were jeopardized by the distance they had to travel and return, therefore couldn't stay over the target very long; whereas the carrier planes could stay longer over the target.

Q. Which type of planes did the most damage to the Japanese Air Force and to their field installations?
A. Damage done by P-51 minor, both in the air and on the ground; whereas damage by carrier-based planes was greater.

Q. Which planes or type of planes did the Japanese fighter pilots consider the most effective combat fighters in air combat?
A. They considered the F-6-F carrier-based planes as most effective.

Q. That is in comparison with P-51 and F-4-U?
A. I think that is true.

Q. What type of planes did the 10th Flying Division have?
A. Type Three fighters, Type Two fighters (one with a one-engine and one with a two-engine). The two-engine fighters are night fighters, TORYU; single engine fighters were SHOKI. The Type Three above was called HIEN. The Type One was called HAYABUSA.

Q. Was any revision of defense tactics made as a result of the initiation of carrier attacks on the home islands?
A. The Air Defense Plan for the TOKYO Area was not changed from February on.

Q. Did they attempt any dispersal of planes to prevent damage on ground by air attacks?
A. Yes, in one particular case they moved them four or five kilometers away from the field.

Q. What effect did this dispersal have on the operating efficiency as a fighting force?
A. It prevented their planes from getting into the air. The principal object was to hide them and keep them from receiving any damage.

Q. Then late in the war you tried to avoid combat?
A. Because of previous damage we were forced to hide our planes. It was not that we didn't want to go in to fight, but we had been ordered to hide our planes.

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Q. Then losses were not acceptable?
A. That is correct.

Q. During the latter period of the war were your pilots trained for the Special Attack Corps?
A. Yes, but not all of them.

Q. Who decided which group of pilots would be trained for that type of operation?
A. They volunteered for it in the 10th Flying Division and training was carried out for this Special Attack Corps.

Q. What did this training consist of?
A. They practiced landings and take-offs with their bomb load and a bit of navigation in case they had to go out to sea. The only special equipment they had was to attach bombs to fighters.

Q. What was the normal number of night fighters attached to your organization?
A. The organization plan called for one SENTAI or 42 night fighters. However, they actually had only 25 or 26 night fighters.

Q. Did you consider them to be effective?
A. They operated satisfactorily against the B-29s. They shot them down.

Q. In the total loss of airplanes, what percentage were operational losses?
A. About two-thirds were lost in combat.

NAV-28

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 29
USSBS NO. 113

PEARL HARBOR - BATTLE OF PHILIPPINE SEA - BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF

TOKYO 10 October 1945

Interrogation of: Captain FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, IJN, Air Group Commander of the AKAGI and strike leader at PEARL HARBOR, DARWIN, and CEYLON; subsequently Senior Staff Officer of First Air Fleet in the MARIANAS, and from April 1944 Air Staff Officer to CinC Combined Fleet.

Interrogated by: Lieut. Comdr. James A. Field, Jr., USNR.

Allied Officers Present: Commander T.H. Moorer, USN.

SUMMARY

Captain FUCHIDA discusses the attack on PEARL HARBOR, the planning for defense of the MARIANAS in the spring of 1944, the planning for the defense of the PHILIPPINES in the summer of that year, and the reasons for the Japanese failures in these operations.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Captain FUCHIDA, how long have you been in aviation?
A. My first duty as an aircraft pilot was at KASUMIGAURA in 1928 where I was a pilot under instruction. I was an attack-bomber pilot on KAGA back in 1931, and from August 1941 I was on AKAGI as Air Group Commander.

Q. Did you participate in the attack on PEARL HARBOR?
A. Yes, I was in that attack. I was in a 97 Type horizontal-bomber as observer. I was senior officer of the Attack Group.

Q. Were you with the horizontal-bombers that attacked the ARIZONA?
A. The last ship in line? Yes, I led that flight.

Q. Describe the approach to PEARL HARBOR?
A. The carriers were in two columns of three with 10 kilometers between ships. There were about four cruisers, two battleships, and about 17 destroyers screening outside the entire formation.

Q. What route did the planes take that attacked PEARL HARBOR? Did they all cross over the island or did some come around?
A. (See Annex A).

Q. Were there the same number of planes in the two waves?
A. First one about 220, second wave about 180.

Q. How were the 400 planes divided, as between types?
A. In the first attack, 40 torpedo planes, 60 horizontal-bombers, and 80 fighters; in the second attack, 40 horizontal-bombers, 60 dive-bombers, and 80 fighters.

Q. Were targets assigned by location, or by the type of ship?
A. We did not know exactly where specific ships were when we came in. First in importance were aircraft carriers, second battleships; but we did not know their exact location. We knew they were in FORD Island Passage, but did not know where. There was a priority on targets. I knew that there would be planes, but did not know they would be as closely packed as at WHEELER.

Q. Did you have any special torpedoes for this operation?
A. Nothing special but vanes in the torpedoes to cut the depth of original sounding.

Q. How many planes did you lose total?
A. 30.

Q. How many did you expect to lose?
A. About half, and thought we would lose half our ships. In order to keep down these losses a principle object was to destroy your planes.

NAV-29

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Plate 29-1: Diagram - Attack on Pearl Harbor from interrogation of Capt. M. Fuchida, IJN, Annex A.
Plate 29-1: Diagram - Attack on Pearl Harbor from interrogation of Capt. M. Fuchida, IJN, Annex A.

NAV-29

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Q. Why, if it was so successful, did you not repeat the attack.
A. We did not realize we had destroyed planes to such an extent. We knew we had done in four battleships, but did not know the extent of damage to American planes, and of course the carriers were not there. We figured if we could sink four battleships, then it was a success. About three days afterwards when the intelligence was gathered, it was realized what had been done; but we thought that you would be re-supplied with planes from the other islands in the HAWAIIAN Group, so it wouldn't pay to return.

Q. Did you have a specially built plane just for photographing?
A. We used a training plane for that.

Q. What did you do after PEARL HARBOR?
A. In February or March, I went to RABAUL on the AKAGI and went on the attack on PORT DAWRIN, after that CEYLON and TRINCOMALEE, after that the MIDWAY action.

Q. What was the size of the force that attacked DARWIN?
A. The same force and formation as at MIDWAY, except that only four carriers were present.

Q. How many strikes did you make on DARWIN?
A. One. The total number of planes used was about 290.

Q. When were you told you were going to attack PEARL HARBOR?
A. We left on the 26th of November from CHISHIMA. I expected that we would be going to SINGAPORE; some thought we were going home at first. On the 3rd we were told certainly that we were to bomb PEARL HARBOR but did not know the date. The plan was to return from PEARL south of MIDWAY on the way, but that plan was changed. Two carriers went down to WAKE and four of them went back to the EMPIRE. If the weather had been good, we would have attacked MIDWAY. One plan was to go back to the MARSHALLS.

Q. Why didn't you go back to the MARSHALLS?
A. That was the original plan but it was changed. There were three alternative plans. First plan to hit MIDWAY, second plan to hit WAKE, third plan to retire to the MARSHALLS (See Annex B).

Q. Were the midget submarines of any assistance to supplying intelligence to the force?
A. Not worth a damn.

Q. You were at the Battle of MIDWAY. Were you still flying at MIDWAY?
A. I got appendicitis on the way to MIDWAY and was thus prevented from flying. I was in the sick bay aboard ship at MIDWAY. The AKAGI received damage and went down. Then I went back to YOKOSUKA and entered the hospital there, I was in the hospital at YOKOSUKA four months until September.

Q. What was your next active duty?
A. On the staff of the First Air Fleet (May 1943); and then in September of 1943 I went to TINIAN and SAIPAN. I was Flight Officer on the staff.

Q. How long were you in the MARIANAS?
A. Until the end of April. At PALAU at the time, the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet died; in fact at that time, the entire staff of the Combined Fleet perished. Therefore I went as Air Staff Officer to the Combined Fleet Staff.

Q. When was the Combined Fleet Staff assembled?
A. After the staff was killed on the 31st of March, the new staff was organized about the 20th of April.

Q. Admiral TOYODA was the new CinC Combined Fleet?
A. Yes.

Q. Where were his headquarters?
A. In TOKYO Bay, at YOKOSUKA; the cruiser OYODO was his flagship but in September of last year (1944) he moved to the Staff College at HIYOSHI and thereafter remained ashore.

Q. We would like to talk about the planning in the spring and summer of 1944. Was it expected in April or May, when you first joined the Staff of the Combined Fleet, that the next U.S. move would be the MARIANAS?
A. We thought you were going into the MARIANAS.

NAV-29

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Plate 29-2: Diagram of Retirement Plans After Pearl Harbor, from interrogation of Capt. M. Fuchida, IJN, Annex B.
Plate 29-2: Diagram of Retirement Plans After Pearl Harbor, from interrogation of Capt. M. Fuchida, IJN, Annex B.

NAV-29

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Q. Had you planned to commit the fleet to the defense of the MARIANAS?
A. Yes, if your Task Force approached PALAU, our fleet being at SINGAPORE intended to sortie through the PHLIPPINES to meet you. Our land-based Air Force was in the MARIANAS and we intended that our land-based MARIANAS Air Force should also intercept your Task Force as it moved west. If you approached the MARIANAS, our first plan had been to move the Combined Fleet from OKINAWA on to the MARIANAS to prevent the operation of your fleet in the MARIANAS, and at that time to use our land-based planes in conjunction with the Combined Fleet from OKINAWA to prevent a landing in the MARIANAS. There were two obstacles to that plan; one was the threat of attack from CHINA-based planes, the other was an insufficiency of fuel supply in OKINAWA to mount the MARIANAS Operation.

Q. You are speaking of the fleet of ships, not the Air Fleet?
A. That is the Combined Fleet.

Q. At the time of our attack on the MARIANAS was the Combined Fleet based at LINGGA?
A. Originally it was at LINGGA, however we did not have sufficient intelligence on your operation. Having insufficient intelligence of your operations they went from LINGGA to TAWITAWI to be near enough to operate close to the scene of your operations.

Q. Did you expect an attack in the South PACIFIC around NEW GUINEA at this time?
A. We had an idea you were going to attack WEWAK. We got intelligence from RABAUL to that effect, and because of this intelligence we moved to TAWITAWI.

Q. Do you remember if the intelligence from RABAUL was based on radio interceptions or ship sightings, or what?
A. It came from radio intelligence and from observation of U.S. planes, so we assumed when you did not land at WEWAK that there would be direct engagement south of PALAU or northwest of PALAU.

Q. When you knew we were committed to the MARIANAS, what force did you think we had present?
A. We thought you had four groups. We didn't know names or classes but figured you had four groups, totaling about 15 carriers.

Q. How many carriers did you have in that operation?
A. About eight.

Q. When we landed in the MARIANAS, were your carriers all in the southern region at SINGAPORE or TAWITAWI?
A. They were at TAWITAWI at the time.

Q. Had a plan of fleet action been drawn up in advance in the event we landed in the MARIANAS to counter our operation? Was a specific Operation Plan ready for this contingency?
A. There was a specific plan for the attack.

Q. Was it drawn up by Admiral TOYODA?
A. That was Admiral TOYODA's responsibility. There were different commanders. You see, Admiral OZAWA had command of the carrier forces and Vice Admiral KAKUTA, at TINIAN, commanded the land-based planes. There were no Army planes involved.

Q. Admiral TOYODA's plan covered the coordination of both land and ship based planes, is that right?
A. Yes, the coordination was Admiral TOYODA's.

Q. Was Admiral OZAWA consulted regarding this Operation Plan?
A. Yes, that is, the staffs had a conference at TINIAN, all three of them, from the 8th to the 11th of May.

Q. Did the plan envisage a fleet carrier action between the two fleets; in other words were you prepared to take on our fleet with your fleet?
A. Yes, the second plan, which was put into action, was that they should destroy your Task Force. They weren't to bother with the MARIANAS, just destroy the fleet.

Q. What was the state of training of the carrier air groups at that time?
A. It was my task to take care of the training of the land-based groups up to April before I went back to the TOKYO Area. There were about 800 planes. They had been training about ten months in the EMPIRE and two months in the MARIANAS Area. There was insufficient time for adequate training for the carrier-based planes, they had only a month after they got intelligence from RABAUL.

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Q. Were the carrier pilots able to land aboard?
A. They could not at night. They could land and take off all right by day, but beyond that it was not what I could call adequate training.

Q. Was it part of the original plan of the second operation to fly carrier pilots to the fields in the MARIANAS after attacking?
A. The original plan was to return to the ships within 300 mile radius, but as the radius became 400 miles they shifted to the plan of landing at bases in the MARIANAS.

Q. Why didn't they close to less than 400 miles from our fleet?
A. They lost time because they were under your submarine attack. That was an inprovisation [sic] caused by the submarine attack.

Q. Was that a decision of Admiral OZAWA's?
A. It was, and it was Admiral OZAWA's mistake that the submarines were allowed to delay the operation.

Q. Did they have adequate destroyers to screen their heavy ships?
A. They had thirty.

Q. Do you think that was enough?
A. Three groups, I think it is a little short of what they should have had.

Q. What damage did you think you had inflicted on our fleet?
A. We thought that two of your carriers had received some small damage.

Q. How many carrier planes did you lose?
A. 280.

Q. How long did you expect it to take to replace those 280?
A. About five months.

Q. Where did your fleet retire after the MARIANAS?
A. All the carriers and other ships that had received damage went back to the EMPIRE, the rest all went to LINGGA; and following these two retirements, the able ships and the repaired ships which had gone to the EMPIRE were obliged to proceed to LINGGA for fueling. All, that is, except the carriers who remained because pilots needed training in the EMPIRE.

Q. Was there a serious fuel shortage in the EMPIRE?
A. Yes.

Q. Why did you not fight when we invaded PALAU? Was it because of the loss of the carrier air groups?
A. We abandoned the PALAUS because we did not have carrier air strength and planned to make the PHILIPPINES the next defensive point. The situation forced us to abandon both PALAU and HALMAHERA and the areas of past operations for the defense of the PHILIPPINES.

Q. Had we attacked PALAU before we attacked the MARIANAS, however, would you have fought for it?
A. Yes, we would have.

Q. Now returning to the plan for the defense of the PHILIPPINES, were you also prepared to fight for FORMOSA, OKINAWA and IWO JIMA?
A. The first plan was for the defense of the PHILIPPINES. We did not include OKINAWA and IWO JIMA in this defense.

Q. However, had we attacked IWO before the PHILIPPINES, would you have defended IWO JIMA?
A. Four plans were made for the defense: first of the PHILIPPINES, second for FORMOSA and the NANSE SHOTO, third of HONSHU-KYUSHU and the BONINS, and fourth of HOKKAIDO. Now the numbering of these plans was not necessarily in order of expected events - they were either alternative or successive operations, but we rather thought the order of events would follow the numbering of these plans.

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Q. Therefore you expected our next move to be against the PHILIPPINES?
A. We thought you were going to land on the PHILIPPINES. If your Task Force attacked the mainland or FORMOSA we would come out and do battle; but we assumed there was to be a landing in the PHILIPPINES; therefore, that must be the main effort. The task of attacking your Task Force from either the EMPIRE or FORMOSA was assigned to both land-based Army and Navy planes. The Combined Fleet was assigned to prevent landing in the PHILIPPINES.

Q. This plan was made by Admiral TOYODA?
A. Yes.

Q. Was Admiral OZAWA consulted this time?
A. The plan was made by the Combined General Staff; Admiral OZAWA was not in on the consultation. This was known as the "SHO" Operation.

Q. I would like to get a picture of the command set-up in this operation.
A. (See Annex C).

Q. What was the date of the combination of the First and Second Air Fleets in the PHILIPPINES?
A. The beginning of October. (NOTE: actually this combination was not effected until after 20 October).

Q. Was the Combined Air Fleet directly under Admiral TOYODA?
A. That is right.

Q. OZAWA had no control over it?
A. No, Admiral OZAWA was in charge of the Third Fleet which was the attack group; under him Admiral KURITA commanded the Second Fleet which was the support force of battleships and cruisers.

Q. Did Admiral KURITA control both the forces that came through SAN BERNARDINO Strait and the forces that came through SURIGAO Strait?
A. Both were under Admiral KURITA. Rear Admiral NISHIMURA was OTC of the Southern Force.

Q. How was the Army land-based air controlled?
A. This part of the defense of the PHILIPPINES was from General headquarters in the EMPIRE through General TERAUCHI at SAIGON, through YAMASHITA, Commanding General in the PHLIPPINES, to the Army Air Chief in the PHILIPPINES.

Q. If Admiral KURITA wanted air cover, how did he request it?
A. If Vice Admiral KURITA required air cover he requested it of the Navy Air Chief in charge of Second and First Air Fleet.

Q. In other words he could request it directly without going up and down the chain of commands?
A. There were orders from TOYODA to the land-based Navy Air Chief to give cover to KURITA, but if necessary Vice Admiral KURITA could communicate and make request directly of the land-based Naval Air Force. Admiral TOYODA and General TERAUCHI had arranged for Army air cover for KURITA where necessary, but KURITA could also directly request of the Army Air Chief if need arose.

Q. Did our carrier raids of early October on the RYUKUS, FORMOSA and LUZON affect the plans for the defense of the PHILIPPINES?
A. No.

Q. The losses that we inflicted were not serious?
A. No, we were able to re-supply enough to keep our original plan. (NOTE: This opinion is contradicted below; it's believed there may have been some confusion in translation here).

Q. Do you know roughly how many planes we destroyed in LUZON and FORMOSA?
A. Navy 300, Army 200, Total 500.

Q. What damage did you estimate you had inflicted on our fleet off FORMOSA, on 12-14 of October?
A. We thought we sank one aircraft carrier, and inflicted minor damage on two.

Q. But the loss of 500 planes was overcome without too much trouble?
A. Yes, we were gradually able to build up again by re-supply.

Q. And 500 was in fact the total number destroyed?
A. It is pretty close to the figure.

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Plate 29-3: Chart - Command Organization, Defense of the Philippines as of 1 October 1944, from the interrogation of Capt. M. Fuchida, IJN, Annex C.
Plate 29-3: Chart - Command Organization, Defense of the Philippines as of 1 October 1944, from the interrogation of Capt. M. Fuchida, IJN, Annex C.

Q. When was the fleet alerted or ordered out from these bases to defend the PHILIPPINES?
A. I don't remember the date of either the alerting or the ordering out.

Q. Do you know what information they acted upon? What intelligence?
A. It was the landing on LEYTE which was sufficient reason to cause the action. There was a small island in the approach to LEYTE, and there we had watchers, and from them the intelligence came on the landing.

Q. You had no report from aircraft of our approaching forces?
A. Two days before we did have airplane intelligence from DAVAO planes.

Q. Had you expected our landing to be on LEYTE, MINDANAO or where?
A. We thought originally it would be on MINDANAO, then when we got that information from LEYTE we knew for the first time where it was to be.

Q. Did you know who was in command of our invasion forces?
A. We did not know who was in charge. We thought Admiral HALSEY would be in charge of the fleet' we didn't know who would be in charge of the invasion.

Q. Did you believe that Admiral HALSEY was under General MACARTHUR?
A. We didn't think so. We thought there was an equal liaison between NIMITZ and MACARTHUR. We thought that HALSEY was not in charge of the attack force, just that he was in charge of the Naval Task Force; but we did not think that the landing operation was under HALSEY.

Q. Under whom was the landing operation?
A. We did know then but I don't remember.

Q. Do you think it was under NIMITZ's section or MACARTHUR's section?
A. We thought the landing operation was under NIMITZ.

Q. What was the mission of the carrier force that you sent down from the EMPIRE?
A. To attack the Task Force under HALSEY.

Q. Were the carrier pilots sufficiently trained by this time?
A. No, they were not. They were pilots of about 80 hours flight experience.

Q. Was it planned to have the pilots land ashore after the attack?
A. They were to land on the shore fields of LUZON.

Q. And later return to the carriers the next day perhaps?
A. No, they never intended to come back to the carriers.

Q. Once the carriers had launched their planes, what were they supposed to do, retire?
A. No. If the planes failed in their attacks, they would land ashore and then join the land-based planes in carrying out suicide attacks. They could not have landed back aboard. The carriers were to remain and help to direct the land-based air attacks on the Task Force. Knowing they were defenseless, they were to stay and assist the attack on the Task Force by land-based planes.

Q. Specifically, how were they to help?
A. The carriers were to stay there as a decoy. They were to draw off HALSEY's Task Force to the north even though defenseless under attack so that our own land-based planes could attack HALSEY, and also to draw him into range of FORMOSA land-based planes.

Q. What was the mission of Admiral KURITA's force?
A. It was to attack your transports.

Q. And the same for Admiral NISHIMURA?
A. Yes, we had also considered planning attack upon the Task Force, but they did not have that duty. Their mission was to attack only the transports. The Task Force was to be brought under attack by Admiral OZAWA and the land-based planes.

Q. Did Admiral OZAWA's planes deliver an attack on the 24th?
A. Yes, they did deliver one on the Task Force on the 24th.

Q. Are you familiar with the details of the battle?
A. I don't know very much about the Central and Southern Forces. Admiral OZAWA's Force came out from the INLAND SEA, sortied through BUNGO SUIDO, I think on the 21st, and went fairly directly down to the east of LUZON, made the attack and was sunk the next night or the next day.

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Q. In your opinion where did the operation as a whole break down? How far did it progress satisfactorily?
A. When we lost land airplanes in the Task Force attack on FORMOSA. Somewhere around the 13th when so many land-based planes were lost in the action around FORMOSA, I think now that the whole plan was doomed.

Q. That is not what you said earlier. You said the loss was not serious.
A. This action off FORMOSA ten days before is the action which cost the main action. It was lost when so many planes were lost in the FORMOSA action previously. It had originally been thought in the original plans that OZAWA and KURITA could take care of the Task Force and defeat it but had to change plans because of the loss of so many planes the ten days before.

Q. How many planes did they lose?
A. 500.

Q. You feel then, that the battle of the 24th and 25th was a vain effort form the start?
A. That is correct. I think the general action in the PHLIPPINES was doomed by the loss of 500 land-based planes ten days before. The reason for the OZAWA-KURITA sortie from their bases was that, should the PHLIPPINES be lost, the SINGAPORE Area would be no longer tenable or useful; so knowing that the action was unreasonable, it was still undertaken.

Q. After the LEYTE battle what plans did you have for further defense of the PHILIPPINES, particularly LUZON?
A. We abandoned the SHO Plans; after that it was TEN Operations, and OKINAWA, IWO JIMA and FORMOSA were the basis of defense. We thought you would come first to OKINAWA, second to South CHINA.

Q. Then the defense of LUZON in November and December was not a very serious matter?
A. The defense of LUZON in November and December of 1944 was no longer a great moment. We had no power.

Q. Did you attempt to reinforce the LUZON land-based aircraft, or didn't you bother?
A. Hardly any. We were waiting in OKINAWA and the EMPIRE, did hardly any reinforcing of LUZON aircraft. In the meantime the IWO JIMA action had absorbed our interest. One group only went to IWO JIMA.

Q. Then it is your opinion that the loss of the PHLIPPINES was due to the destruction of aircraft at FORMOSA?
A. In the main that is my opinion.

Q. Did you feel that the decrease of your air power was caused by attacks from our planes or due to a shortage of fuel?
A. Mainly it was the Task Force attacks, the fuel problem principally affected training but the air power was diminished mostly by your Carrier Task Force attacks.

Q. Did the Carrier Task Force destroy planes faster than you could build them?
A. It was about equal, plane for plane, the production and destruction; but they couldn't keep ahead, it was just about plane for plane.

Q. You felt that the Carrier Task Force were the main agency rather than land-based air?
A. Production was most affected later on by land-based planes, but the actual destruction of combat plane was accomplished by carrier-based planes.

Q. Was the critical problem the shortage of planes, or the shortage of pilots?
A. Fuel was the worst. We had plenty of pilots but couldn't train them because of lack of fuel.

Q. Did you expect a long war?
A. I thought it would be a long war, about three years. I didn't think we had naval power enough for more than two years either.

Q. As the course of the war went along when did you realize you could not win?
A. I thought after the MARSHALL Campaign, and there were others who thought the same when we gave up defending RABAUL.

Q. There is a difference between when you thought you could not win a decision and when you knew you would be completely defeated?
A. I think that the loss of the PHILIPPINES was the time when we knew we had lost.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 30
USSBS NO. 123

AIR DEFENSE: GILBERT, MARSHALL and MARIANAS ISLANDS

TOKYO 20 October 1945

Interrogation of: Commander MATSUURA, Goro, I.J.N.; a military pilot of 1800 hours flying experience and 17 years Naval experience, Staff officer of Flotilla No. 22 in the MARSHALLS, and MARIANAS, October 1943 to February 1944; and Staff officer of Central Pacific Fleet in the MARIANAS, March 1944 to May 1944.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman Teller, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Captain T.J. Hedding, USN.

SUMMARY

U.S. raids on GILBERT-MARSHALL Air Bases during the months preceding our invasion and the carrier aircraft raid on Wake, 5 October 1943, had so reduced the Japanese bomber strength in this area that daily air searches were drastically limited. Although reinforcements were brought in from other areas, including hard-pressed RABAUL, this situation was not materially improved and resulted in our carrier forces achieving surprise in many raids.

The first U.S. carrier attack on the MARIANAS, 22 February 1944, caught the Japanese with several important fields still under construction and with a large proportion of students among their pilots. The air strength in the MARIANAS was built up rapidly between February and the end of May 1944.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What was the distribution of aircraft in the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS, about 1 November 1943?
A. About 40 bombers, 30 fighters, 5 flying boats, total 75 aircraft. In TAROA 8 bombers, 20 fighters. At JALUIT only 5 flying boats; land maintenance, no seaplane tender. At MILLE, 18 dive bombers - half Type 99, half Type 96. The 22nd Flotilla was the only air organization in the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS.

Q. Was this level of aircraft strength maintained in November and December or was it increased or decreased?
A. 25th of November, 24th Air Flotilla (40 bombers, 30 fighters) arrived from HOKKAIDO and the KURILES. From RABAUL, 18 fighters. Also single engine bomber-torpedo planes arrive in last part of November.

Q. Where was your headquarters?
A. TRUK, No. 4 field.

Q. Was the 24th Air Flotilla under command of the 22nd while in the MARSHALLS?
A. Yes, 24th was under 22nd until the 5th of December, when the 22nd Air Flotilla left the MARSHALLS for the MARIANAS with nine bombers.

Q. What was the plan for defending the MARSHALL-GILBERT ISLANDS from U.S. attack in November?
A. The plan was fighters covering the area over the islands and to 50 miles out, and bombing planes going to attack your forces at dawn.

Q. Did you know of any plan for the fleet to come up from TRUK and defend these islands from U.S. Forces seeking to land there?
A. No. However, on 2 December a part of the fleet came from TRUK to the MARSHALLS, the main body to ENIWETOK. I saw them. Four cruisers at WOTJE and some destroyers.

Q. What type of ships and how many came to ENIWETOK? How long did they stay?
A. Four battleships, eight cruisers, 12 destroyers. On December 3, the above named ships arrived at KWAJALEIN but immediately departed for ENIWETOK again. I think the fleet stayed in ENIWETOK a very short time and soon left for TRUK.

Q. From where and to what distances did your scout planes fly?
A. Bombers were used. The scouting was limited to four planes daily in a sector between limiting bearings approximately 060 and 110 degrees from TAROA Island to a distance of 600 or 700 miles. They had no radar.

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Q. Was that the only daily scouting from any of the MARSHALL-GILBERT ISLANDS?
A. Yes, only TAROA.

Q. How and where did you discover the first American Force in the MARSHALL-GILBERT Action?
A. On the 16th of November, orders were received by an air unit based at WOTJE to proceed to NAURU and perform scouting operations to the usual 600 mile radius between limiting 135°-180°. At 0300 in the morning of the 19th, 3 planes found the American Fleet.

Q. Was that the day before the U.S. Force attacked NAURU?
A. The very day. Two carriers, one large and one small, and other surface escorts were sighted at this time. The information was radioed to RUOT (KWAJALEIN), which broadcast the report. This was the first American force sighted in the area.

Q. Did you lose any planes during the attack on NAURU?
A. During the carrier attack on NAURU on the 19th, two fighters and three bombers on the ground were damaged. The three bombers which had scouted that morning returned safely to NAURU.

Q. What attacks did you make then on this American force?
A. The attack on the U.S. Force, which had attacked NAURU, was made by eight torpedo planes on the afternoon of the day of the attack. One torpedo hit was claimed and three or four torpedo planes were lost in this attack.

Q. When did you sight the next American force in the MARSHALL-GILBERT ISLANDS?
A. The next force was sighted southeast of TARAWA between 7 and 8, morning of the 20th and was reported as four cargo ships at 20 knots steaming toward TARAWA.

Q. Did your planes attack an American force on 21 November, west of TARAWA?
A. Yes, about 16 planes. The time was sunset. We caught three carriers - one big, one medium, one small - with planes circling to land. We lost 8 planes in this attack.

Q. Did you stage your planes form northern bases, through islands like MILLE to the objective?
A. These came direct 600 miles from WOTJE.

Q. What was the effect on your bases of the carrier raids on 18, 19, and 20 November against MILLE, KWAJALEIN, JALUIT?
A. During the attack on JALUIT, 19 November three seaplanes (flying boats) damaged, one cargo vessel sunk.

Q. What was the most serious form of air attack against your planes and bases; high-level bombing, low-level bombing, strafing?
A. Low-level medium attack plane, B-25, was most effective particularly because the radar could not detect it in time. Its high speed prevented successful fighter interception.

Q. When did you discontinue full coverage by scouting planes of the approaches to the MARSHALL-GILBERT ISLANDS?
A. After WAKE was attacked on 5 October 1943. At that time aircraft strength became so low we had only 12 planes left and were forced to confine our scouting operations to one sector.

Q. How many aircraft did you lose on WAKE in the 5 October attack?
A. 12 bombers, 10 fighters.

Q. Did you know that there was going to be an attack on KWAJALEIN, 4 December?
A. We sighted one TBF airplane between KWAJALEIN and TARAWA and assumed attack was coming. Two or three bombers were dispatched on 3 December to find the American Task Force but were unsuccessful.

Q. Did our night fighters interfere with your night torpedo attacks?
A. At this time, the night fighters did not bother us very much because there weren't many fighters. Later, night torpedo attacks were made very difficult due to night fighters.

Q. How was tactical control exercised over night torpedo attack groups?
A. Tactical instructions were relayed from the base to the senior pilot. The senior pilot was allowed to adjust his tactics to the situation, if he saw that the orders received from the base did not provide the best means of attack in that particular situation.

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Q. When we attacked TRUK on 17 February 1944, you apparently were caught by surprise. Did you not have an effective air search?
A. Our scouting plane was shot down. That plane should have notified TRUK but by the very fact it didn't return, we figured a Task Force was on its way.

Q. Were you in the MARIANAS on 22 February 1944, when the U.S. Carrier Force attacked?
A. I was in TINIAN on 22 February with the 22nd Air Flotilla. We found an American Task Force at 1400 on the 21st about 300 miles east of TINIAN. We made a torpedo attack with 20 planes before you hit the MARIANAS and lost 15 of them.

Q. Why did your planes attack by one, two's, three's and not coordinated as in the MARSHALLS?
A. We were delayed in getting the planes off and had to send them in three waves of 8, 6 and 6.

Q. Was there any training in the MARIANAS at that time? If so, what were the proportions of experienced pilots and students?
A. Of the torpedo plane pilots in the MARIANAS at this time, the 22nd Air Squadron had 10 experienced pilots and 30 students. The First Air Fleet had just received 18 experienced pilots from SAIPAN. The 25th Air Squadron had 30 fighter pilots, 10 experienced and 20 students. TINIAN was being used as a training station for torpedo plane pilots.

Q. How many airplanes were damaged or destroyed in the MARIANAS, on the ground and in the air, during that Task Force attack?
A. On the ground, 20 fighters as SAIPAN, 10 bombers at TINIAN. There were no planes at GUAM because the field was still under construction and not usable.

Q. What method of night torpedo attack did you use that night?
A. They were given instructions prior to takeoff. The flight officer in charge of the flight issued directions on the spot but operational reports were passed directly back to the base.

Q. Why did you not disperse the planes on TINIAN and SAIPAN after sighting the U.S. Attack Force?
A. The runway was the only usable part of field and we weren't able to spread planes. The field was still in the process of construction.

Q. Did our attack on the MARIANAS at this time affect the building up your air force in those islands?
A. No. The 22nd Air Flotilla with 40 planes went to TRUK and 600 planes belonging to the First Air Fleet arrived between February and May and were divided between GUAM, TINIAN, and SAIPAN.

Q. What proportion of your planes were lost or damage in being flown from JAPAN south to the islands?
A. Not so many; between 20 and 30 planes between February and May.

Q. What was the average proportion of planes that were ready to fly on combat missions in your squadrons?
A. By May, 400 out of 600 planes; 60 per cent were ready to fly at any time. Fighters and twin-engine bombers averaged 70 per cent availability. Dive-bombers average only 50 per cent, principally because they were a new type just coming into use.

Q. Were the pilots you received from JAPAN in February, March, April 1944 well trained?
A. The bombing pilots had more training than the fighter pilots. The training at this time was not any worse but all the experienced pilots were lost at RABAUL. The best pilots had been sent to the Northern SOLOMONS or to new carrier groups forming. Consequently there wasn't sufficient number of experienced pilots for Island Air Commands.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 31
USSBS NO. 129

AIRCRAFT FERRYING AND PILOT ATTRITION, JNAF

TOKYO 25 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Rear Admiral KATSUMATA, Seizo, I.J.N. (Retired), was Head Instructor at the Naval Mechanical and Engineering School in YOKOSUKA, 8 December 1941 to September 30, 1942; Commander of SAGAMINO Flying Corps at KANAGAWA, 21 April 1943 to 31 March 1944; Commander of 18th Combined Flying Corps at KANAGAWA, 1 April 1944 to 28 February 1945; Commander of 22nd Combined Flying Corps at KYUSHU, 1 March 1945 to 20 July 1945; Commander of 101st Flying Squadron at MIE-KEN, 22 July 1945 to 10 October 1945.

Interrogated by: Lieut. Comdr. R.P. Aikin, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: Lieut. Robert Garred, USNR.

SUMMARY

1. Until the summer of 1944 when an air ferrying command (101 KOKUSENTAI) was organized, replacement aircraft for tactical units overseas were generally delivered by combat pilots who returned to the EMPIRE where they picked up new planes. The division of responsibility between maintenance and delivery crews (i.e. combat pilots) resulted in excessive ferrying losses. To centralize this responsibility and thereby reduce wastage, an air ferrying command was established.

2. Prior to 1943 planning was based on a flight personnel attrition rate of 20-30%. In 1943 this rate revised upward to 50% and the pilot training program accordingly accelerated.

3. Gasoline shortages necessitated abandoning the intermediate phase of the pilot training program late in 1943. This increased operational losses.

TRANSCRIPT

Said Rear Admiral KATSUMATA:
Before my entrance into the 101 KOKUSENTAI, I was attached to an educational maintenance unit. I am not familiar with the figures of aircraft losses. I remember hearing much on the subject, but do not feel qualified to estimate attrition rates. The main reason for the formation of the 101 KOKUSENTAI was to reduce the attrition rate by overcoming problems in poor maintenance, unskilled flight personnel and too close figuring on allowable gasoline consumption. We felt by forming the 101 KOKUSENTAI to reduce this figure by giving aircraft the proper maintenance before leaving for tactical units and by supplying properly trained flight crews for delivery of the aircraft to the units. Previously, delivery had been made by members of tactical units returning to the EMPIRE to ferry the planes to their units.

I believe the reason for the excessive attrition rate in delivery of aircraft, was the division of responsibility between maintenance and delivery crews - the lack of coordination between the two departments. It was the job of the 101 KOKUSENTAI to centralize this responsibility. We were successful in reducing losses.

I have heard that the attrition of aircraft in training units was excessive. I also heard that attrition in tactical units was much greater. Tactical losses were caused to a large degree by the gasoline shortage and the resultant lack of adequate training. It is true that we saw the gasoline shortage coming in 1943 and at the same time increased our pilot training program. We hoped that someway we could get adequate gasoline supplies. The necessity for obtaining trained pilots was so great that we increased our training program in the face of an impending fuel shortage.

Q. Had tactical losses during 1942 exceeded pre-war estimates?
A. As nearly as I know, 1942 losses were no greater than expected.

Q. Why was the training program accelerated in the spring of 1943?
A. In 1943 we operated on the assumption that 50 percent of our flight personnel would be necessarily expended. Before 1943, our estimate of the attrition rate had been 20 to 30 percent. I don't know what caused this upward revision. I believe the Battle of GUADALCANAL and the actions at RABAUL had more to do with the revision than the Battle of MIDWAY. Toward the end of 1943 our operational losses were aggravated by the discontinuance of the intermediate phase of the pilot's training program. Operational training was carried on with tactical units and in combat aircraft. This change in the training program was made because of the gasoline shortage and the need for pilot replacements. It resulted in heavy losses.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 32
USSBS NO. 133

THE ATTACK ON THE YAMATO GROUP, 7 APRIL 1945

TOKYO 25 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Commander MIYAMOTO, T., Staff Officer of Second Fleet during subject attack.

Interrogated by: Captain T.J. Hedding, USN.

SUMMARY

Commander MIYAMOTO was Staff Officer on the Staff of Rear Admiral ITO, the OTC of the YAMATO Group, during the abortive attempt of this group to attack American forces at OKINAWA during the OKINAWA Operation. Commander MIYAMOTO was an eye witness to this engagement.

The YAMATO Group consisted of the YAMATO (BB), the YAHAGI (CL), and eight destroyers. This group sortied from TOKUYAMA, in the INLAND SEA, on 6 April 1945, proceeded through BUNGO SUIDO, then south of KYUSHU with the intention of approaching OKINAWA from the northwest and attacking at dawn, the 8th of April.

The group was located and trailed, and starting about noon of the 7th was subjected to carrier-based air attack, during which the YAMATO, the YAHAGI and four destroyers were sunk. The remnants of this group retired to SASEBO.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What duties were you performing during this action of the YAMATO Group?
A. I was a Staff Gunnery Officer in the Second Fleet.

Q. Were you present during the actions to which I referred?
A. I was present.

Q. What ship were you aboard?
A. On the YAMATO.

Q. Who commanded the YAMATO Group?
A. Rear Admiral ITO, Seiichi.

Q. Was he lost in this battle?
A. Yes.

Q. What was the composition (Task Organization) of the YAMATO Group?

A. Flagship YAMATO.    
  DesDiv-YAHAGI    
  41st Destroyer Squadron - FUYUZUKI
      SUZUZUKI
  17th Destroyer Division - ISO-KAZE
      HAMA-KAZE
      YUKI-KAZE
  21st Destroyer Division - ASA SHIMO
      HATSU SHIMO
      KASUMI

Ring formation. The relative position of screen changed according to the course. One kilometer to 1½ kilometer radius.

Q. What Operation Orders were issued to this group?
A. Sortie from TOKUYAMA at 1500 on April 6, 1945. Proceed via BUNGO SUIDO south of KYUSHU and approach OKINAWA from the northwest. On the morning of the 8th attack American Forces in the vicinity of OKINAWA. Be prepared to withstand attack in the BUNGO SUIDO.

Q. When did initial air attacks occur?
A. About noon.

Q. What was your estimate of the number of attacking planes?
A. Between 1200 and 1430 when she sank, four or five attacks by forty or fifty planes each.

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Plate 32-1: Track Chart of Yamato Group, Annex A.
Plate 32-1: Track Chart of Yamato Group, Annex A.

NAV-32

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Plate 32-2: Diagram showing Bomb and Torpedo Hits, Yamato, Annex B.
Plate 32-2: Diagram showing Bomb and Torpedo Hits, Yamato, Annex B.

NAV-32

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Q. Give me in your own words your description of the attack on the YAMATO.
A. The YAMATO Group proceeded on various courses as indicated on chart. (See chart) About 1015 we sighted what I took to be an American scout plane crossing our course from port to starboard ahead; and their number increased until, from 1100 onward, 10 to 15 of these scout planes circled the formation at a range of approximately 20 to 30,000 meters until about noon. Until 1000 there were many squalls and the cloud formation was low, but the ceiling lifted and the weather was clearer by noon. By noon there were spaces of clear sky. At approximately noon, to the east an attack formation of forty to fifty American planes was discovered at 30 to 40,000 meters. I am not certain whether this was by radar or by visual means, because at that time there was opinion that visual recognition of attacking planes was quicker. The American formation circled the formation at about 30,000 meters; while circling, increasing their height. The Japanese formation was speeded up to full speed (26 knots). I believe there was three to five meter wind from the west. The formation turned into the wind to starboard in order to make evasive action from bombing easier. During the circling of the American air formation, it is my impression that another group joined the formation of originally 40 to 50 planes, coming from the south. It is my estimate that 15 or 20 minutes after noon the entire American formation attacked the YAMATO with dive-bombers. The second American formation shortly thereafter attacked with mixture of dive-bombers and torpedo planes with no appreciable interval between the two attacks. During this initial double attack, one destroyer, HAMA-KAZE, either from bombs or torpedoes, sank by the stern, and the light cruiser, YAHAGI, either from bombs or torpedoes, was issuing smoke and stopped. As a result of the first and second attacks there were 3 bomb hits immediately forward of No. 3 main turret, and three torpedo hits along the port side-one forward, one midships and one aft. (See chart of hits).

After the initial two attacks, at an interval of 30 to 40 minutes, a third group of planes attacked. In the third attack which followed the first pair by 30 to 40 minutes again, it was a mixture of dive-bombers and torpedo planes, and my impression was that the torpedo planes were the greater in number. In this attack the YAMATO received no bomb hits, but four to five torpedo hits-two by the stern on the port side, one forward on the starboard and one or two slightly forward of amidships on starboard side (See chart). From then on I didn't notice too much of what went on in other ships. At that time the Japanese formation was scattered and the YAHAGI was left behind with two destroyers, and the formation closed and proceeded on the same course. In approximately thirty minutes, the fourth attack was received. I am doubtful of the number of attacking planes but estimate it was the same as before. As the attacks progressed there seemed to be a greater proportion of torpedoes. By the end of the fourth attack the YAMATO had received the original three bombs; and on the port side 6 to 8 torpedoes, and on the starboard side 2 to 3 torpedoes; and there remained in the formation only the YAMATO and 2 or 3 destroyers of the original formation. The YAMATO was listing heavily to port and speed was reduced to 20 knots. As I was on the anti-aircraft guns I don't know much of what happened then, but with the reduction in speed and heavy list to port, and damage to screening destroyers, it was apparently concluded not to try to continue on course and course was reversed. It is my opinion that the reason for reversed course was they could not fulfill their mission at OKINAWA. There was a possibility of shifting the command to the burning YAHAGI, the flagship of the second in command. Although the YAHAGI was stopped, she had not received serious visable damage and there was at least consideration of the possibility of her being able to resume operations.

I think that in the fourth attack there was not more than one torpedo entering from starboard and I am less sure on the port side, but certainly no more than 2 or 3 and these were the last hits before she sank. No more bomb hits. My memory of the action is that the fourth attack was the last, but think possibly there might have been a fifth and sixth wave. With the turn to starboard, the port list increased greatly and she did not come back and ran 10 to 15 minutes on the reversed course. With the increasing list, there were efforts to right the ship which proved unavailing. It was extremely difficult to attempt any gunfire. Sometime between 1400 and 1430, the YAMATO listed heavily to port and sank. When the ship sank I was sucked below the surface and as I came up the first time there was great disturbance in the water which may have been fragments from explosions. I don't remember for several minutes after that because I was hit on the back of the head. I was picked up by the destroyer FUKUZUKI and from what I heard afterward on the FUKUZUKI, I learned that the YAMATO had turned or listed 120 degrees to port in the process of sinking and that there had been explosions coming out of the starboard side. From that time on I don't remember the course of the battle.

NAV-32

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Q. To your knowledge, were there any other ships sunk besides the YAMATO and HAMA-KAZE?
A. The destroyer HAMA-KAZE, the battleship YAMATO, the cruiser YAHAGI were sunk in the action. The ISO-KAZE and the destroyer KASUMI were out of control, unable to navigate and were later sunk by Japanese. Of the ASA SHIMO I am not certain, but I think it sank. The remaining four destroyers were able to return to SASEBO for repairs.

Q. Was there any air cover provided for the YAMATO group at any time?
A. There had been air cover up to 1000 from KYUSHU (land-based planes), 3 to 5 fighters.

Q. What reliance was placed on radar to pick up planes?
A. If it was a group, radar was expected to pick it up at 50 to 70,000 meters.

Q. What effect did the three bomb hits have on the anti-aircraft defense of the YAMATO?
A. About four high angle guns were destroyed and ten to fifteen of the battery of machine guns on the after port deckhouse were rendered unserviceble [sic]; in fact, every anti-aircraft gun abaft the beam on the port side for one reason or another was relatively useless after those three bomb hits.

Q. Was the fire control damaged to any extent by these hits?
A. No effect on the main battery fire control. I had the impression that because of the ineffectiveness of the after port batteries the YAMATO received more attacks on that quarter.

Q. As a gunnery officer what is your opinion as to the relative effectiveness of dive-bombers and torpedo planes in attacking a battleship of the YAMATO class?
A. Individually not very effective, but the mixture is effective because it is impossible to undertake evasive action. It is very difficult to coordinate the defense against that combination of torpedo planes and dive-bombers.

Q. Which type of attack did you fear most, torpedo attack or dive-bombing?
A. If the torpedo attack is done well, that is the worst.

Q. I would like to have you explain a little further the reasons for turning a formation into the wind in order to avoid the type of attack to which the YAMATO was subjected.
A. A single ship is headed into the wind for the reason that the ship can turn more rapidly under those conditions due to the effect of the wind on the side of the ship. If the attack be coming from starboard beam the ship should turn midway between the point of attack and the point of the wind, and by that means bring all guns to bear on the attack while turning away from it and she turns slowly into the wind. Attack was evaded by changing course and by gunfire.

Q. What was the doctrine for evading torpedo plane attacks?
A. According to the wind, turn away from it or into it.

Q. In combined dive-bombing and torpedo attack, which type of attack would govern the maneuvers or turning of the ship?
A. Torpedoes.

Q. What were the size of the YAMATO'S main battery?
A. I was not informed. It was a terrific secret. They were referred to as 45 cm. I wonder if they weren't bigger, certainly not smaller than 45 cm.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 33
USSBS NO. 138

GUADALCANAL - MIDWAY - VILLA

TOKYO 25 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Lieut.-Comdr. TOKUNO, Horishi, IJN, who was Assistant Gunnery Officer of the KIRISHIMA (BB) at GUADALCANAL, 12-14 November 1942 and at MIDWAY, 4-6 June 1942. He was Gunnery Officer of the MINEGUMO (DD) which was sunk in a night action at VILLA, 6 March 1943.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

SUMMARY

The HIEI (F) and the KIRISHIMA (BBs) bombarded the U.S. Airfield on GUADALCANAL on 13-14 November 1942 as support for the landing operations. Just before reaching the firing position, U.S. Cruisers opened fire on the HIEI, badly damaging it. Course was reversed and the Jap Task Force, less HIEI, retired. HIEI remained in the general area and sank the next night. On the night of 14 November, the KIRISHIMA returned to the GUADALCANAL Area. During the approach it engaged the SOUTH DAKOTA but was in turn engaged by the WASHINGTON which damaged the steering gear, causing the KIRISHIMA to turn in circles while being subjected to U.S. fire. About two hours after the battle commenced, the KIRISHIMA was scuttled and sank. The successful destruction of the heavy bombardment group prevented the night bombardment of HENDERSON Field which permitted the U.S. aircraft to attack and disperse the Transport Force destined for the recapture of GUADALCANAL.

No bomb hits on KIRISHIMA or HARUNA at MIDWAY, 6 June 1942. The DDs MINEGUMO and MURASAME sunk in night action near KOLOMBANGARA 6 March 1943.

TRANSCRIPT

Guadalcanal

Q. What ships were present in your force at GUADALCANAL, 12-14 November, 1942?

A. 2 (BB) HIEI and KIRISHIMA.
  2 (CA) TAKAO class.
  1 (CL) NATORI class.
  11 (DD) Class unknown.

Q. What was your mission?
A. We had planned to bombard the airfield on Guadalcanal while the transports unloaded military personnel.

Q. What was your navigation track during the approach?
A. We approached the SOLOMONS from the north, passing around the southeastern tip of SANTA ISABEL Island, then south around the southern side of SAVO Island towards GUADALCANAL. The HIEI was leading with the KIRISHIMA about 1500 meters astern.

Q. Give a description of the action during the night battle of 12 November.
A. It was our plan to steam southwest to a firing position on the airfield, then reverse course and retire. While steaming southwest, the battle commenced. The HIEI and KIRISHIM both turned to the left to reverse course. The HIEI, which was leading, was being hit and did not turn as fast as the KIRISHIMA. Although we were supposed to be in column, the KIRISHIMA was then on the port quarter of the HIEI, then soon ahead of it. I do not know how many times the HIEI was hit, but the KIRISHIMA was hit only once by a 15 cm shell. Many salvos landed around both battleships. We did not have radar fire control. It was always visual unless we received help from airplanes. I think that one cruiser had radar search control, but it was not very reliable. We thought that we badly damaged or sank the SOUTH DAKOTA.

Q. What ships were sunk that night?
A. The HIEI was badly damaged on the night of the 13th and sank the next day. The KINUGASA (CA) and the AYANAMI (DD) from another force were also sunk. The KIRISHIMA was lost the night of the 14th.

Q. Did the HIEI bombard the airfield before it sank?
A. No, it was very badly damaged and could not steer. I heard that it sank the next night after air attacks during the day. About 450 men were lost on the HIEI.

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Q. During your approach or retirement from GUADALCANAL were you attacked by aircraft?
A. No, we were never attacked by airplanes during the entire time that we were near GUADALCANAL.

Q. Give a description of the battle the night of the 14th.
A. The KIRISHIMA was again proceeding towards GUADALCANAL to support the transport landing by shelling the airfield. Our speed was about 28-30 knots. One of our destroyers turned its search light on the SOUTH DAKOTA and we opened fire. We think we hit the SOUTH DAKOTA many times, inflicting much damage. We received about 9x16" hits and about 40x5" hits. We didn't think that the SOUTH DAKOTA hit us at any time. However a second battleship was firing upon us. We couldn't see it because of the glare from the destroyers searchlights. Because we were hitting the SOUTH DAKOTA and couldn't see the second battleship, we did not shift fire. Two heavy cruisers were with us and were hit but not damaged badly. They were of the TAKAO class.

Q. Did the KIRISHIMA sink as a result of the gunfire?
A. No. Shortly after the American ships opened fire the steering of the KIRISHIMA was so badly damaged that we were unable to steer or repair it. We kept turning in a circle but couldn't get away. We slowed down to try to steer with the engines but it was no use. Our engines were not badly damaged, but we were receiving many hits from the WASHINGTON. Then the Captain decided that since we couldn't steer and the engines were damaged that it would be better to scuttle the ship. He then gave the order to open the Kingston valves. We did not receive any torpedo hits.

Q. How long did the ship remain afloat after receiving the first hit?
A. It took about two and one-half hours to sink. Destroyers came alongside and took off about one quarter of the men. The rest of the men jumped over the side and were later picked up by destroyers. We had about 1400 men on board and lost about 250. I stepped from the KIRISHIMA to a destroyer and did not even get wet.

Q. How do you know that the ship was not sunk by shell fire?
A. I heard the Captain give the order to scuttle the ship. Later; on the destroyer, one of the engineers told me that they had opened the Kingston valves. The Captain was also informed that the valves had been opened before he transferred to a destroyer.

Q. While you were retiring on the destroyers, were you attacked by airplanes?
A. While we were on the way back to TRUK one destroyer was attacked by two dive-bombers, but did not receive any damage.

Q. Did the loss of your ships in this action affect the plans for your SOLOMON Campaign?
A. It affected it to a certain extent, but not too much. It was decided not to try to recapture GUADALCANAL. About a month later it was decided to use destroyers to take Japanese troops out of GUADALCANAL.

Midway

Q. Did you receive any damage at MIDWAY?
A. No, no hits on either the KIRISHIMA or HARUNA. One dive-bomber attacked the KIRISHIMA and splashed water on the stern, but no damage. High horizontal-bombers dropped bombs about 100 meters from the HARUNA, but no damage. I was stationed in the mast in charge of all anti-aircraft weapons and small guns. Dive-bombers attacked the aircraft carriers and sank them. Torpedo planes attacked carriers in the morning but did not get very close to the battleships. We did not like the dive-bombers because they came in at such a high angle they were very hard to hit. We could dodge torpedoes and horizontal-bombers.

Villa

Q. Were you on the MINEGUMO (DD) when it was sunk?
A. Yes I was Gunnery Officer when it was sunk on 6 March 1943, at KOLOMBANGARA. The MURASAME (DD) was sunk at the same time.

Q. Give a description of the sinking.
A. We had carried supplies to VILLA. We had left BUIN in the late afternoon, passed between VELLA LAVELLA and KOLOMBANGARA Islands to VILLA. After leaving VILLA, we went to the north where about eight American ships commenced firing at us. It was very dark so we did not see them until they commenced firing. We were hit so quickly that we were able to return only a few shots. Both the MINEGUMO and MURARAME sank very quickly. Only 49 men saved. It took us seven hours to swim ashore.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 34
USSBS NO. 139

GILBERTS-MARSHALLS OPERATION.
NAVAL STRATEGIC PLANNING

TOKYO 21 October 1945

Interrogation of: Commander NAKAJIMA, Chikataka, I.J.N., who served on the Staffs of the Second, Third and Combined Fleets throughout the war.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman Teller, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Captain C. Shands, USN.

SUMMARY

Commander NAKAJIMA gives the Japanese estimate of the United States intentions and capabilities at various stages of the Central Pacific Campaign and describes the Japanese plans for countering these anticipated moves. Although not responsible for decisions in planning, he summarizes discussions among the Staff Planners of the Combined Fleet and explains certain changes in Japanese plans during the campaign.

The costly SOLOMONS Campaign reduced and absorbed Japanese naval air strength to the point that almost complete reliance was placed on the island garrisons of the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS to make our westward advance slow and costly. Our landing on KWAJALEIN was unexpected and our assault on the MARIANAS came before Japanese air strength in those islands had reached the planned level. Our swift movement into the PHILIPPINES following the PALAU and MOROTAI Operations again exploited the Japanese tendency to overestimate the defensive capabilities of their local ground and air forces.

Notes on the Battle of MIDWAY, 4-6 June 1942, and Battle of SANTA CRUZ, 26 October 1942.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What were the plans for the fleet in defending the MARSHALL ISLANDS?
A. Until April 1943, the overall plan for the Japanese Navy was to make every effort to hold NEW BRITAIN, RABAUL and probably the MARSHALLS. After April 1943, losses in aircraft and surface craft became so severe that a study was made of pushing back this defensive line to approximately the tip of North NEW GUINEA, TRUK and the MARIANAS and letting the other loosely held Japanese occupied islands go at a great cost to enemy and consuming as much time as possible. By July 1943, this plan was actually put into effect which possibly explains reason for half-hearted attempts to defend the GILBERTS and MARSHALLS. There was a lot of discussion at the time as to exactly how to handle the situation. The problem was complicated by lack of air strength and the fact the SOLOMONS Campaign was occupying a good deal of our fleet strength. A decision was made in October 1943 to commit strength as far as possible to SOLOMONS from RABAUL. However, tentative plans for fleet movements in connection with sending more troops to the GILBERTS Area were made at the beginning of November. Three of four cruisers and destroyers of the Second Fleet left TRUK about 24 November to rendezvous with the Fourth Fleet in the KWAJALEIN Area. This movement had been delayed due to previous action participated in the Second Fleet at RABAUL. By the time the fleet had assembled in KWAJALEIN, the GILBERT ISLANDS Campaign was already lost. At the end of November or beginning of December, a small unit composed mainly of two light cruisers believed to be NAKA and ISUFU, and 2 or 3 destroyers under command of the Fourth Fleet left KWAJALEIN with the intention of landing about one battalion of troops on TARAWA; but by that time the situation in the GILBERTS had so deteriorated that these troops were discharged at MAJURO. This operation actually was a normal reinforcement plan which went wrong due to delay. The Second Fleet was in the KWAJALEIN Area at the end of November or early December to assist the small force of the Fourth Fleet to land troops on TARAWA if the situation had permitted. Both Second and Fourth Fleets then returned from KWAJALEIN Area to TRUK. There were no battleships in these forces. The reason for retirements was that the reduction in airplane and surface strength did not warrant further immediate offensive action.

Q. What was the Japanese estimate of the United States probable intentions after we had taken the GILBERT ISLANDS?
A. Opinion in the Japanese Navy had it that you were advancing exactly in the track of the Japanese occupation scheme at the beginning of the war; in which case you would obtain control of the

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Central PACIFIC to insure your supply lines to AUSTRALIA and then proceed to take the MARSHALL, SOLOMON, NEW BRITAIN, NEW GUINEA and PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. We realized that you would not attempt to take very strong points such as RABAUL and TRUK. There was divided opinion as to whether you would land at JALUIT or MILLE. Some thought you would land on WOTJE but there were few who thought you would go right to the heart of the MARSHALLS and take KWAJALEIN. There were so many possible points of invasion in the MARSHALLS that we could not consider any one a strong point and consequently dispersed our strength.

Q. Why did you not put more air strength in the MARSHALLS knowing that we would probably land there?
A. To a certain extent we did increase the aircraft by sending in the 24th Air Flotilla, but other commitments such as RABAUL and the SOLOMONS where attrition of air strength was very severe made it [im]possible to send real air reinforcements to the MARSHALLS. Furthermore the decision had been made that we would make a supreme effort to hold the strong defensive line through the MARIANAS, PALAU and NEW GUINEA including TRUK, for the defense of which we were training and forming new air strength for the defense of obviously lost territory.

Q. Did you expect us to land at TRUK?
A. The opinion was pretty evenly divided; some staff people though you would land on TRUK, not in force, but to neutralize it. Other opinion was that you would circle TRUK and land on PULUWAT where there is a good air strip.

Q. Why did you not have effective search planes to warn you of our carrier strike on TRUK, 17 February 1944?
A. Due to the shortage of available aircraft there was simply insufficient scouting activity carried on.

Q. When did the Combined and Second Fleets abandon TRUK as a base and why?
A. One of your scouting planes was observed by the people of TRUK on 3 February and we thought we had better leave. The YAMATO and the NAGATO plus elements of the Second Fleet proceeded to PALAU on 4 or 5 February. On 10 February the group known as the Combined Fleet proceeded to JAPAN. It consisted of the MUSASHI (Admiral KOGA'S Flagship), one light cruiser, and two or three destroyers. The reason for the YAMATO, NAGATO and other units proceeding to PALAU was because of the danger of air attack at TRUK. The CinC Combed Fleet returned to JAPAN with MUSASHI and units directly under his command for the purpose of discussing defensive tactics with General Headquarters. By that time the plans for strong defense of the so-called Secondary Defense Line were made. Admiral KOGA took his unit back for the purpose of discussing actual tactical moves towards implementing this defense plan and to arrange for proper convoying and for transport of troops to this area, as well as to obtain an increase of ship and airplane construction.

Q. What fleet movements occurred between TRUK and the BISMARKS during November?
A. On 3 November 1943 the Second Fleet, consisting of the 4th, 5th, and 7th Squadrons and 2nd SUISEN, went down to assist in the BOUGAINVILLE Operations and staged at RABAUL. A part of this force received severe damage at RABAUL Harbor on 4 or 5 November from Carrier Task Force.

Q. What was the staff estimate of the UNITED STATES ability to conduct successive amphibious operations?
A. We couldn't estimate when you would be ready for operations after the MARSHALLS because we didn't know where you were going. We thought you would be ready to land in the MARSHALLS by January 1944.

Q. How many submarines were occupied in defending the GILBERTS?
A. About six submarines.

Q. Why were not submarines used more to oppose our advance through the PACIFIC?
A. The main reason was the lack of submarines. Many were used in the SOLOMONS Operation. It was also very important for them to supply even isolated and ineffective bases because the Army, which was also a partner in the planning, would have refused to send additional strength to the South PACIFIC if the Navy had left men to starve. The exact use of submarines was the point of much discussion at headquarters, but we were forced to let them be used for supply, actually, because of the shortage of warships and supply ships of all types. While opinion and advice were handed down freely from General Headquarters the decision as to use of submarines was made by Combined Fleet Headquarters. Another point was that this use of submarines as supply weapons fitted in with our overall strategic planning for fighting delaying actions on all islands.

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Q. What main fleet base was substituted for TRUK after 4 February 1944?
A. The next base to be used as such was PALAU. Even at that time the high command realized they would have to use bases even closer to JAPAN than PALAU in the near future. They realized that PALAU was not completely suitable as a main fleet anchorage for physical reasons, due to its shallowness, and also that they would soon be forced to move to either TAWITAWI or to GUIMARAS Strait in the PHILIPPINES on account of lack of tankers and shipping.

Q. What shipping losses did you sustain in the air strike on TRUK, 17 February 1944?
There were quite a few cargo and transport vessels sunk and one NAKA Class cruiser, and the KASHIMA (a converted light cruiser).

Q. What decisions were made at General Headquarters upon arrival of Admiral KOGA in February?
A. The decision was made to firmly defend, construct fortifications and build up personnel and material strength in the outlying bases which would form our secondary line of defense; namely: the MARIANAS, Western CAROLINES, PHILIPPINES and Northwest NEW GUINEA, with special emphasis on the MARIANAS and Western CAROLINES. In the MARIANAS and Western CAROLINES bases were to be constructed and all preparations were to have been completed by April. Actually they were ready in May.

Q. How was it planned to use the fleet in assisting the defense of this line?
A. Implementing this plan of defense, the fleet would be used mainly for convoy and transport work. We assumed that fleet support would not be absolutely necessary if we were able to build up strong enough bases and at the same time carry out the aircraft building program that was being put into effect.

Q. Why then did your fleet come out and fight in the first Battle of the PHILIPPINES, June 1944?
A. The fleet sortied at the time of the First PHILIPPINE Battle because you had approached and penetrated what we had decided was our last stand line, and we were forced to commit our ships.

Q. The Japanese Fleet lost quite a few tankers at TRUK and some more at PALAU. Did the loss of those tankers effect fleet movements?
A. The Japanese Fleet had serious difficulty, not only because of the oilers and freighters lost at TRUK and PALAU but because even before those losses there was a shortage of tankers.

Q. What was the estimate of American intentions and capabilities about 1 October 1944 after our occupation of PALAU and MOROTAI?
A. From the summer of 1944 general opinion was that you would land somewhere in vicinity of MINDANAO, SAMAR or LEYTE in the PHILIPPINES. At the time of your landings on PALAU and MOROTAI, staff opinion was that it would take you a month to land in the PHILIPPINES, but with the developments on both these islands we thought that your attack would not take place before November 1944. About 1 October we sighted large concentrations of shipping in MOROTAI and PALAU and realized that some new action was imminent. But most of us felt that it was too early for a landing in the PHILIPPINES and that possibly you were going to YAP or TALAUD Islands. The thing that bothered us was that preparations appeared too big for landings on the two above mentioned islands and too small for the PHILIPPINES. We couldn't make up our minds as to your most probably objective. We decided that in the event of a landing in the central or southern part of the PHILIPPINES, we would be able to take care of it with part of our SINGAPORE-based fleet assisting our strong forces in the PHILIPPINES. We had a fleet in JAPAN which was going to take care of any Task Force which might sortie toward the north.

Q. Did you think there was any chance of our landing at FORMOSA or points north?
A. Absolutely no chance. We felt that our forces in PHILIPPINES and FORMOSA would adequately defend such a move.

(Interrogation by Captain SHANDS)
Q. In order to confirm previous information, give a description of your activities at the Battle of MIDWAY, 4-6 June 1942.
A. I was Communication Officer on the ATAGO which was Admiral KONDO's Flagship in the force escorting a number of transports, which were carrying troops to capture MIDWAY. We approached MIDWAY from the west-southwest and were a little ahead of schedule, so countermarched for several hours waiting to get on a schedule that would coincide with that of the First Air Fleet which was to attack from the northwest. After returning to the base course to MIDWAY, during the afternoon of 3 June, speed about 10 knots, we were attacked by high-altitude long-range bombers. That was the day before the carriers were sunk. It was only a few planes. Not hits. About midnight that same night,

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we were attacked by several seaplanes. One transport hit but not sunk. No more attacks were made on the Transport Force. We did not see any dive-bombers.

The transports and some destroyers were ordered to retire the next night, but the cruisers continued towards MIDWAY until we were attacked by a submarine. When the submarine was sighted we were ordered to zig-zag, but the MIKUMA and MOGAMI collided so we were ordered to retire. I think that much damage was done to the bow of the MOGAMI. The MIKUMA was damaged at the same time and later sunk by dive-bombers.

Q. Give a description of the damage that you received at the Battle of SANTA CRUZ, 26 October 1942?
A. I was on the SHOKAKU. The ZUIKAKU and the ZUIHO were also there. The JUNYO was in the same place. The HIYO was in TRUK with engine trouble. The SHOKAKU received six bomb hits. The ZUIKAKU did not receive any. The ZUIHO received one or two. I do not know about the JUNYO. I think that the CHIKUMA received about four hits. I don't think that the TONE was hit. The night before the battle started, one plane attacked the ZUIHO about midnight, but no damage.

The night after the battle the aircraft carriers looked for the American ships but were unable to find them. However, some destroyers found the HORNET and saw some American destroyers shelling and sending torpedoes into her. One of our battleships, I think the KONGO, was in the area but not close enough to fire.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 35
USSBS NO. 149

BATTLE OFF SAMAR, 25 OCTOBER 1944

TOKYO 24 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Rear Admiral KOYANAGI, Tomiji, IJN, Chief of Staff to CinC Second Fleet during the MARIANAS and PHILIPPINES actions of 1944.

Interrogated by: Lt. Comdr. James A. Field Jr., USNR.

SUMMARY

Rear Admiral KOYANAGI discusses the operations of the Japanese Center Force of battleships and cruisers during the Battle for LEYTE Gulf on 24-26 October 1944. Admiral KOYANAGI was Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet at this time, and his information largely repeats and confirms that obtained from Vice Admiral KURITA who commanded this force (see Interrogation USSBS No. 47 No. 7). This testimony is of importance, however, in that it gives the clearest and fullest analysis thus far obtained of the reasons for the Japanese decision to go north rather than enter LEYTE Gulf on the morning of 25 October.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Admiral KURITA told us that after the battle in June the ships of the Second Fleet went to the LINGGA Area to train because of the shortage of fuel in the EMPIRE. What type of training did they emphasize between July and the time they left to attack the American Fleet?
A. The Fleet arrived at LINGGA about the 22nd of July. The main part of the training was to:

  1. Attack the enemy vessels at anchorage.
  2. Training for night battles.
  3. Anti-aircraft training.
  4. Radar fire control training.
  5. Use of starshell in night firing.

Q. Was there any emphasis placed on radar search and on anti-submarine measures?
A. We did not worry much about the submarine problem, concentrating on aircraft and surface vessels.

Q. Did you have a special radar set for fire control, a special radar used only for that purpose?
A. I think there was no special array for radar fire control because the radar fire control was yet not well developed; there was no particular confidence in it. They got up to the stage when they could barely use radar for firing, no further than that.

Q. Do you feel that having your flagship sunk by submarines and having to change flagships had serious consequences on the subsequent conduct of the operation?
A. First we transferred to two destroyers and by the time we passed PALAWAN Strait we had shifted the flag to YAMATO. It was fortunate that the accident or damage occurred before the battle started. We felt great inconvenience on the destroyer, communication was possible only by light flash.

Q. But once you got aboard the YAMATO did everything go smoothly, was everything all right or was there still trouble?
A. The most trouble we felt was communication. Half the personnel of the communication staff of the previous flagship was killed in the torpedoing, so lack of personnel caused communications trouble when we got aboard the YAMATO. It did not interfere seriously however.

Q. On the 24th while you were passing through the SIBUYAN Sea you were attacked by our aircraft. Was any fighter cover from shore bases scheduled in the operation plan?
A. We did not expect any protection from Japanese fighters because the plan was set that fighters were to be used primarily for attack not for protection of the battleships. To offset the shortage of fighters we had increased the number of machine-guns on the ships by about 120 machine-guns on each battleship on an average, 90 on heavy cruisers, 30 to 40 on destroyers. These were 25 mm guns.

Q. Was there any increase in the number of heavier anti-aircraft guns?
A. There was no increase.

Q. In the course of the attacks of the 24th, did you ever request fighter protection from shore units?
A. Once we sent request to send fighter protection, but no reply, no planes.

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Plate 35-1: Diagram of First Diversion Attack Force at Time of Submarine Attack.
Plate 35-1: Diagram of First Diversion Attack Force at Time of Submarine Attack, 0650 23 October 1944. Drawing by R. ADM. Koyanagi and CMDR. Otani, Annex A.

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Q. What damage was done to your ships on the 24th?
A. YAMATO got four bombs and quite a few near misses. The damage was not so great as to interfere with fighting or navigation. I saw one hit on the foredeck which exploded instantaneously and so did little damage. The other three hits were reported to me and having penetrated did some damage. MUSASHI, according to the report of the officers on board then, was hit by 18 torpedoes, 40 bombs, and could not navigate at all, had to stop. She stayed a few hours then steamed again very slow speed. About 8 o'clock she sank. The extent of damage to MYOKO is unknown - perhaps she was hit by bombing; she steamed back to SINGAPORE. I do not know about casualties.

Q. Were the other battleships and cruisers hit?
A. I have not heard anything to the effect that bombs hit any other battleships. Except MYOKO no cruisers were damaged, and I do not think there was any damage to destroyers.

Q. How many destroyers did you detach and send back accompanying those damaged cruisers?
A. One destroyer for each cruiser, but I think two for MUSASHI.

Q. Did the destroyers that were detached with MUSASHI rejoin your force after she sank?
A. I am not quite sure but think the two destroyers probably did not come back.

Q. After the air attacks had been completed on the 24th, were all remaining ships in good fighting condition?
A. They were in good condition.

Q. What particular type of damage on those ships which were hit, communication or fire control gear, or what?
A. There was no interference with fighting ability.

Q. On the day of the 24th, did you have satisfactory information on the location and movement of the American Forces?
A. Very unsatisfactory information. Judging from the direction of American planes they figured, two or three groups of your Task Force should be about 80 miles to the east off LUZON (indicating on the chart the area between 15°N and 16°N and between 123°E and 124°E). We had no information of presence of your task force east of SAMAR. We were quite taken aback when we met your force off SAMAR on the morning of the 25th and some people even said they were Japanese carriers.

Q. Didn't you have information passed from your planes on the 24th, from the planes attacking American forces?
A. We came to the conclusion that more than 100 troop transports and some cruisers and battleships were inside LEYTE Gulf. We could not figure out exactly how many there were and the planes did not bring any information.

Q. Why was there that lack of information about this area? Were there no planes for search of this area?
A. We took the fleet's seaplanes and based them at SAN JOSE (MINDORO) and they were sent to search the area east of the PHILIPPINES, but no information came back from these planes. That was due to the short range of the planes; they could not search well.

Q. Were these seaplanes from ships or your own force or some other?
A. From our own fleet. We put them all ashore at SAN JOSE except for two or three spotting planes of the First Battleship Squadron. Except those, they were all in SAN JOSE.

Q. Did you send them to SAN JOSE before your fleet came or as you passed by?
A. Before the fleet moved in, one or two days ahead of the time the fleet moved in, I think; but I am not sure.

Q. On the night of the 24th-25th, at what time did you pass through SAN BERNARDINO Strait?
A. At midnight. We had planned to pass through at six o'clock evening of the 24th, but we were delayed.

Q. Did you expect opposition from our forces as you came out of the Strait?
A. We expected submarines and attacks from carrier planes. We thought there probably would not be a battle of surface forces there.

Q. You said you thought there were battleships in LEYTE Gulf. Did you think there were battleships east of LUZON also or did you think it was a Carrier Force only?
A. When I mentioned three groups, I meant carriers, battleships, cruisers, complete.

Q. Did you not expect the battleships from this Carrier Force to oppose you here?
A. That was also a matter of concern, but not a primary concern.

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Q. Were you at battle stations when you came out; were all guns manned, ready for action?
A. The Commander of the Fleet did not order stations; it is given by each ship's Captain. The flagship had taken stations on warning of submarines.

Q. Had you been at stations most of the night?
A. No. Two or three shifts during the night. They were all split watches.

Q. Were the crews of the ships noticeably tired by this time after the events of the 23rd and 24th; was fatigue evident?
A. Fatigue was evident at this time, but their fighting spirit was very high; still they were very fatigued.

Q. About what time did you find our force off SAMAR and what was first contact?
A. 0640 TOKYO time on the 25th we sighted an American Task Force.

Q. Did you sight ships first of all or airplanes?
A. First we sighted one or two airplanes, then masts of ships, then saw the formation of ships.

Q. At the time you sighted our force, what were your intentions? Were you planning to enter the Gulf, or what?
A. Our first intention was to fight to the last with the ships; then if we won to go on into the Bay.

Q. What was the original mission assigned your force? Were you to attack the Task Force, the transports, or bombard the beach?
A. The original intention, by order of the Combined Fleet, was to come to the Bay and attack battleships and transports; but the order was also given if we met the American Task Force we should fight to the finish. The original intention was to attack battleships and whatever was in the Bay, also any intervening force would be engaged.

Q. If you had gotten into the Bay and met the battleships and the transports, which would have been engaged, the transports or the battleships?
A. Because the order originally said to interfere with your landing, stress would have been on the transports.

Q. When you sighted our force here, what was the estimate of the strength, disposition, what type?
A. We thought you were just one group of the Task Force composed of five or six carriers, a few battleships, and a few cruisers. That was taken by eyesight, we had no information from planes.

Q. Did you see battleships?
A. I did not see them. There were those who said they saw battleships, it may have been a mistake.

Q. When you went into battle formation to attack our ships were you acting on the assumption that battleships were present?
A. The principal target was carriers. We thought that even though there may be battleships there would be only two or three at the most, so therefore the formation was not based on the assumption of the presence of battleships.

Q. In the course of the engagement that morning, what damage did the Japanese Fleet receive from air attack?
A. CHOKAI became unnavigable by bombing and she sank; I do not know but I heard she was sunk deliberately by our forces. I heard this later. SUZUYA, I think again by bombing, became unnavigable and I was told she also was deliberately sunk. These reports were not from these ships but from other sources. When they are unnavigable they have no communication. CHIKUMA was sunk but I do not know how.

Q. Do you believe it was a result of air attack?
A. I suppose it was. I think there was no great damage by gunfire, evidently not many gunfire hits, very few if any.

Q. Were there any hits on YAMATO by gunfire?
A. No, only near misses. I think no gunfire was directed at YAMATO because the range was greatest.

Q. Did you have any destroyers damaged by air attack?
A. I don't think there were any.

Q. Was any damage inflicted on your force by the torpedo attack of our destroyers?
A. I saw the track of the torpedoes. Right after the beginning of the battle your force got into a heavy rain squall and we could not see. When the squall stopped, then your cruisers and destroyers put down the smoke screen and the interference was very effective. We couldn't see anything during

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most of the battle; we could not see from the YAMATO to the carriers. The smoke was very effective. I saw seven or eight tracks very clearly and maneuvering to avoid this attack greatly delayed our advance, it slowed us down.

Q. Was there any other damage of any sort done by our Air Force?
A. I don't think there was any damage.

Q. Was KUMANO damaged?
A. Oh yes, I remember - bombed. She steamed back to port and was later sunk. I was wounded and therefore knew very little about it. It was about one month later, I think.

Q. What damage did you believe you had inflicted on American Forces in the battle?
A. The damage we actually saw was one carrier sunk by either torpedoes or gunfire and one cruiser and destroyer also either by torpedo or gunfire. By gathering data and information, we estimated four carriers, two or three destroyers and two or three cruisers.

Q. But you yourself saw one of each sink?
A. I saw one carrier very distinctly; the other two I thought were in a sinking condition. I am sure about the carrier, the staff saw the other two.

Q. About 0930 in the morning, you broke off the attack and what was left of our disposition managed to escape. Why did you break off the attack?
A. We lost sight of your force. We could not close the range your speed was so high, so we gave up the chase.

Q. What speed did you estimate we were making?
A. I thought about 30 knots. NAGATO made 24 knots only and also the fuel shortage made it necessary to abandon the enterprise, particularly in the case of destroyers which consumed great quantities of fuel at high speeds.

Q. Then what was your force occupied in doing between the time when this action ceased and you were forced to turn north?
A. At first we turned toward LEYTE, and an interval of about two hours preceded the decision to turn north.

Q. In the course of that two hours, did you steam steadily toward LEYTE, reforming? What took up the two hours?
A. We were collecting, assessing our information and preparing to undertake the attack. All during this two hours we were assembling and assessing the information and taking account of the situation including fuel, etc., and because of the battle we concluded that we had delayed significantly in arriving at LEYTE. We were scheduled to arrive at 1100 and were still far out at that time. It would be afternoon before we could get into LEYTE.

Q. To go back to the action at the time when you broke off, why were the van cruisers recalled from the attack?
A. The order to rendezvous was given because we thought it useless to chase your force, due to reasons stated before - fuel short, your speed too great.

Q. Did you know at that time on the YAMATO that your two leading cruisers were within 10 kilometers of our surviving ships?
A. We did not know on account of the squall and smoke.

Q. You did not have reports from the cruisers by radio telephone?
A. I received a report from the 10th (destroyer) Squadron that they attacked the American Force, but I do not know exactly where the 10th Squadron was. This is the first time that I knew these cruisers were within 10 kilometers of the American ships.

Q. Why was the decision made to go north rather than enter LEYTE Gulf? What were the reasons and which were the most important ones?
A. One reason was that the Second Division Attack Force reported the almost complete destruction of Admiral NISHIMURA's force.

Q. What time was that report received? Did you receive it during the action with our carriers or during the two hours interval after the fight before they went north?
A. I do not remember the time. The second reason was that NISHIMURA's force meant to go into the Bay in the morning and our force was to have entered at 6 to coordinate; but the approach of our force was greatly delayed. After the battle off SAMAR we finally decided that the cooperation

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of the two forces would not be effected at all, and if we ever decided to go into the Bay, the interval would be too much. The third reason, we intercepted a telephone message sent by your carrier (we thought it was the carrier that sent the message by telephone) to get reinforcements. We also intercepted answer to the telephone call to the effect that it would be two hours before reinforcements of planes arrived; that is to say by the time we entered this Bay. We thought that planes would have come out and that warships would have come out and that the transports would have dispersed enough so that only a part would have been inside, they would escape from the danger zone. We figured by that time that the transports might have heard of the battle and started already in the morning. The fourth reason, we intercepted again a telephone message sent by carrier to the planes to the effect that all planes should go to LEYTE shore strips; and also we thought reinforcement of the American carriers might come along and so your force would be very big, carriers and land based planes, and it would not be advisable to go into this danger zone and be a target for attack by shore and reinforced carrier planes in narrow waters. The fifth reason, we surmised that your American Task Force might come down from the north; so after we failed to destroy this first American force, we thought that if we came back north now we might encounter another American Task Force, but we were very regretful that we had failed to destroy your first American force. The sixth reason, if we continued the battle here at LEYTE it would consume more fuel, that was another reason for cruising north instead of staying around. We had no tankers anywhere around.

Q. Did you ever consider the plan of entering the Gulf and fighting your way out the southern way through SURIGAO Strait?
A. The original plan had been after entering LEYTE Gulf to leave by way of SURIGAO Strait; however; after the battle off SAMAR the possibility of an approach of a Task Force from the north which we could engage seemed a more attractive alternative.

Q. So decision to go north was primarily to engage another force, not to retire?
A. That is correct; towards evening we were north of SAMAR and we saw no chance of meeting another Task Force. We did not meet and did not receive any information, so we changed the course.

Q. This decision to go north and not enter the Gulf was whose decision? Was anything received from TOYODA at that time?
A. No orders from TOYODA, it was orders of Admiral KURITA.

Q. Did Admiral KURITA discuss it with his staff or order it himself?
A. Of course we had a conference and decided on this plan.

Q. Was the staff generally united in support of this plan?
A. Almost unanimous - yes, the decision was unanimous.

Q. In general, considering the whole operation and all three forces, in your view what was the decisive factor which prevented carrying out the operation? Where did the operation break down?
A. The severeness of the American air attack is one of the chief factors, and there are those five reasons set forth before which played a big part in upsetting the plan, and very poor cooperation on the side of the land-based airplanes. It was very difficult to gain cooperation between the fleet and land-based planes.

Q. Did you make plans to attempt to work out cooperation between the fleet and land-based planes?
A. There was no special training for that cooperation, but we had exchanged messages.

Q. What influence on general Japanese planning and strategy do you feel the Battle of the CORAL Sea in the spring of 1942 had?
A. I was not in headquarters so am not familiar with it. However, I think as far as air campaign is concerned there, the results were about 50-50 even; though by that battle the planning of transporting troops to PORT MORESBY was upset, I thought the damage on both sides was about 50-50.

Q. What influence did the Battle of MIDWAY have?
A. I think it was a big failure on the Japanese side. I felt that due to fact we lost four carriers, the force of the fleet decreased to a great extent, and being of the opinion that a fleet without carriers was worthless, that it would make future operations very difficult. That is what I felt at the time of the battle.

Q. How about the campaign in the SOLOMONS, GUADALCANAL, RABAUL, etc.?
A. The pressure of the American air force was very heavy and the surface force of the Japanese Navy was always under pressure, we could not use it as we wished.

Q. Looking at the war as a whole, where do you think the tide of the war swung against the Japanese?
A. I think if I pick up one point, better it would be the occupation of SAIPAN - I consider MIDWAY as the background, SAIPAN as the turning point.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 36
USSBS NO. 150

BATTLE OFF CAPE ENGANO, 24-25 OCTOBER 1944

TOKYO 24 October 1945

Interrogation of: Captain OHMAE, Toshikazu, IJN, Chief of Staff to CinC Third Fleet during the MARIANAS and PHILIPPINES battles of 1944.

Interrogated by: Lieut. Comdr. James A. Field, Jr., USNR.

SUMMARY

Captain OHMAE discusses the planning for the defense of the PHILIPPINES in 1944 and the conduct of the battles of 24-26 October, with special emphasis on the operations of the Japanese Northern (carrier) Force, of which he was Chief of Staff.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Admiral OZAWA said that on 19 June a number of your carrier planes that attacked our fleet continued on after the attack and landed on GUAM and TINIAN. Did any of those planes return to your carriers the next day?
A. No.

Q. Did you get any reports sent from those pilots at GUAM and TINIAN?
A. We got information saying that planes, just before landing on GUAM, were attacked by your planes and were severely damaged and after landing they were also attacked; 50 per cent were damaged on the ground.

Q. Did you get any information from those pilots, any useful information on our Task Force?
A. We had a report saying they sighted three groups about 14-40N, 142E but on account of the clouds they were not able to see very clearly after attacking. They saw white smoke rising from a ship which appeared to be a carrier and black smoke from two other ships. Then another group of planes were intercepted about 50 miles from where they thought your forces were, and on account of interception, never did sight your ships. In conclusion, the attack of the day was a failure.

Q. When you got back to OKINAWA afterwards, about how many planes remained aboard your carriers and how many pilots?
A. About 40 planes, about 100 crews. The day after the attack, the 20th, we had 120 planes left.

Q. What was the command organization for the SHO Operation, the defense of the PHILIPPINES?
A. About ten days before the battle, Admiral OZAWA, not wishing to command KURITA's force because of the wide dispersion of the two forces, recommended to Admiral TOYODA that command organization be changed, which was done and Admiral KURITA's forces then came directly under Admiral TOYODA. At the end of the battle of June, it was Admiral OZAWA's opinion that the carrier force should be joined and operated together with Admiral KURITA's force. However, the American invasion came too soon for this to be done and since the carriers were still in the INLAND SEA they necessarily operated separately.

Q. If Admiral OZAWA desired to use the carriers in conjunction with Admiral KURITA's fleet, how soon would that have been possible?
A. The carriers could have sailed about 10 November. Your attack came about a month before it would have been possible for our fleets to join.

Q. By that time would the pilots have been fully trained again?
A. We expected so. At first we heard the training would be finished by early October, but in fact this proved impossible.

Q. Then, when it became necessary to use them in October before they had been fully retrained, was it expected that they would take off from the carriers and afterwards operate from shore bases?
A. At first there was no plan to use carriers. When the American Force Attacked the PHILIPPINES on the 10th of October, carrier planes were sent to FORMOSA and PHILIPPINES to reinforce. I remember that we had about 300 airplanes in training and 150 were sent at that time. The remaining airplanes were not so good and so we trained from 13 or 14 October how to run off and how to get on the carriers. Also I believe these airmen were very bad; but the orders did come to go with these bad airmen, so we decided only to lure American planes, to decoy your forces, and so help the Second Fleet to get into LEYTE Bay.

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Q. The use that was actually made of Admiral OZAWA's fleet was not planned in advance, it was not part of the SHO Plan?
A. No plan, I am sure; I myself telephoned to headquarters. By telephone we decided. It was planned on the spur of the moment.

Q. Was the original SHO Plan set up on the basis of having the carriers operate in company with Admiral KURITA?
A. The only plan was that OZAWA would command all these fleets, OZAWA's fleet after finish repair of ships would go to LINGGA, OZAWA would command all fleets and when American ships come to PHILIPPINES then all ships go together.

Q. That was on the basis of expecting the invasion in mid-November or December?
A. We thought that you were going to make the landing earlier, about the early part of October; but we couldn't train the pilots.

Q. If the SHO Plan was drawn up for the defense of the PHILIPPINES, FORMOSA, etc., and if you expected our attack before the carrier pilots were fully trained, then why did the plan call for Admiral OZAWA to command all three fleets and operate them together? If you expected our attack before the pilots were trained, how could you expect them all to operate together?
A. There was opinion that if you should land on IWO JIMA, then the Fifth and Third Fleets would go there; but that was deemed unwise, so it was ordered later to concentrate the force so the change was made. In actuality they wanted this Second Fleet to remain in JAPAN, but because there was not enough fuel they were compelled to go to LINGGA. It was necessary at that time for Third Fleet Headquarters to stay in JAPAN in order to get the requests for pilots and planes filled. If headquarters were not in JAPAN we would have had difficult time getting requests in for pilots and planes.

Q. The 4th Air Squadron (Carrier Division) was composed of ISE and HYUGA?
A. Yes, but they had no planes at the time of the battle; their planes had been sent to FORMOSA as reinforcement.

Q. Was there any advance planning for the use of KAMIKAZE tactics before the battle?
A. Unofficially only. Admiral OZAWA had not planned to set up his KAMIKAZE force. He got this idea after the battle in June. Right after the Battle of the PHILIPPINE SEA in June, the commander of one of the Air Squadrons sent his opinions to Commander Third Fleet, saying that he would become the commander to organize the KAMIKAZE attack, that he wanted to do this.

Q. Who was this commander that you speak of?
A. It was Rear Admiral OBAYASHI, Commander 3rd Air Squadron, who volunteered to organize KAMIKAZE units immediately after the Battle of the PHILIPPINE SEA and requested of Admiral OZAWA that he be allowed to do so.

Q. Did Admiral OZAWA take any action on this request?
A. He unofficially informed the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, Admiral TOYODA. They discussed the matter but there were no concrete results. In order to organize KAMIKAZE units it had to be on a volunteer basis, it could not be ordered from above.

Q. So that in the battle of October, there was no plan for the carrier pilots to use KAMIKAZE tactics?
A. No, it was not planned that carrier pilots should do it. It was done by Admiral ONISHI's group in the PHILIPPINES. After the land-based planes were hit by your carrier force, few planes were left and in order to meet your attack KAMIKAZE was necessary.

Q. Were any ships which had been scheduled to accompany Admiral OZAWA's fleet, prevented from doing so by our submarine attacks in the first part of October? We had a report that our submarines had attacked and damaged some of your ships.
A. The Fifth Fleet left the INLAND SEA on 10 October. It is possible they were then discovered by your submarines, but so far as I know no damage received. Six American submarines were concentrated off OKINAWA on the 16th but no damage.

Q. What was the first information that you received in the INLAND SEA about our landing in the PHILIPPINES? Do you remember what day?
A. 17th. We expect landing on the 17th, and we decided to go out and fight with the U.S. Fleet. On the 18th the U.S. Fleet was sweeping the DULAG area and we determined that it was sure American Fleet would land in LEYTE Bay. We heard telephone conversation at 1530 of the 18th. Your telephone told me your force landing south of TACLOBAN.

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Plate 36-1: Diagram showing Cruising Disposition of Third Fleet Striking Force, Battle of Leyte Gulf.
Plate 36-1: Diagram showing Cruising Disposition of Third Fleet Striking Force, Battle of Leyte Gulf, from interrogation of Captain Ohmae, Annex A.

Q. Do you remember who was telephoning? Was it ship to ship, or plane to ship?
A. Ship to ship.

Q. When did your force leave the INLAND SEA?
A. The 20th about 12 o'clock. We started out the BUNGO Channel, passed through the channel and about 1730 in the evening we find submarine in our path. We heard also from your telephone that another submarine was waiting further off shore, and so we went eastward close to shore for a time to avoid him, and about midnight turned south.

Q. In what ship were you and Admiral OZAWA embarked?
A. ZUIKAKU.

Q. When you left the INLAND SEA, did you have good information on the disposition of our forces? You knew we were landing in LEYTE Bay. Did you know where the Task Force was?
A. (Referring to note book) The morning of the 20th in the LEYTE Bay, 14 battleships and cruisers and seven carriers, and 50 small combatant ships; near SAMAR Island 80 transports, 20 small combatant ships. We thought that about three divisions of Army forces were landing and at 1640 we found other forces, five battleships, about ten cruisers and about 20 transports were approaching. At 1330 we found four converted carriers, two battleships, two cruisers, six destroyers 80 miles from TACLOBAN. Bearing was 080 degrees and course was south, speed was 20.

Q. Did you know where our large carriers were?
A. The morning of the 20th, seven carriers, maybe large types, were off LEYTE.

Q. These reports were from pilots or from your people on shore?
A. The information received in the morning was from shore, the rest by plane.

Q. Did you continue to receive good information as you came south?
A. Good information we had, but sometimes there were too many informations so it made confusions.

Q. Could you draw the cruising formation of your ships as you went south?
A. (See Annex A).

Q. Were ISE and HYUGA with you all the time?
A. Almost all the time. We made this formation, but on the evening of the 24th they went south of main body, and next morning rejoined.

Q. What was your first contact with U.S. forces?
A. By airplane on the 24th at 7 a.m. Our airplane found the carrier group.

Q. Did you launch planes for search on the 24th?
A. On the 22nd.

Q. Launched planes from carriers on the 22nd.
A. Yes.

Q. Did they return to the carriers?
A. Because of lack of training and poor communications, nine planes take off, about six return. Every day after the 22nd, nine planes were sent out on search. Due to poor communications, lack of training, usually about six returned. Some of these which did not return reached DAITO Island. We have about 80 fighters, about 40 of them were equipped for bombing, and about 30 bombers and torpedo planes.

Q. On the 24th when you made this sighting, did you immediately launch an attack?
A. The distance was about 250 at that time, and so we approached until about 11 or 1130. We started planes at that time, the distance was about 130 or 150.

Q. How many planes did you launch?
A. About 90. About ten were not satisfactory when turned up on deck, and had to be struck below.

Q. Did you keep protective fighters overhead on the 24th?
A. Just a little, about six of them.

Q. And so about eighty planes went out on the attack?
A. Yes.

Q. Did you have reports on them? Did some go to the beach or return to the ships?
A. We planned that planes go to the American fleet, bomb and torpedo, and then go to land because our ship would be sunk because we went too near on purpose to lure your ships to the north. Surely we would be sunk, that was our duty.

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Q. So all the planes were instructed to go ashore after attack?
A. Yes.

Q. Did you have a report how many reached shore?
A. About forty planes attacked your fleet, report was that two carriers were seriously damaged, and then continued to LUZON. About 30 or 40 got ashore.

Q. Did you know whether or not our force had sighted you on the 24th?
A. I know. About four o'clock in the evening we had radar contact on an American plane. We thought it was very strange that no American planes attacked us on the 24th. We thought you were attacking the Second Fleet.

Q. What course did you take after you had been sighted by the American planes?
A. West nearing PHILIPPINES. After sunset we turned southeast.

Q. How many planes did you still have aboard your ship?
A. 15 or 20 about, divided among the various ships.

Q. Did you have any information that day from Admiral KURITA or Admiral NISHIMURA?
A. Yes, we heard in the morning and afternoon the Second Fleet was attacked by American air force and NISHIMURA's fleet was supposed to be going smoothly.

Q. In the course of the night what did you do, cruise back and forth and wait?
A. About 1600, ISE and HYUGA and the cruiser OYODO, with destroyers, were dispatched to the south to engage the American force in night action. About 1100 in the evening of 24th, these forces sighted what appeared to be your carrier force; but they saw our planes were attacking your force, so didn't have a chance to close.

Q. This was night and your planes were attacking?
A. Yes, air forces from land were attacking by torpedoes, so it was thought very dangerous to get near. So the Commanding Officer of the squadron departed from American fleet and after the planes finished attacking he closed again but couldn't find your force.

Q. Was this sighting by eye or by radar?
A. By eye, they saw the anti-aircraft gun fire.

Q. Then did they come back and reinforce you towards morning?
A. They were ordered to, to lure your force.

Q. In general the movement of your carriers during the night was back and forth staying in the same place waiting for the next day?
A. First went west, after sunset on course of southeast. We used about 14 knots. The training of destroyers very bad. We couldn't see and some destroyers separated so we had hard time trying to rendezvous.

Q. Did you have any information during the night or early morning of Admiral NISHIMURA's force?
A. Yes, on the morning of the 25th we heard something - NISHIMURA's fleet was seriously damaged.

Q. Did you know from whom that message came?
A. From a destroyer or MOGAMI, only a very brief message. The contact made by the ISE and HYUGA with the U.S. carrier forces was not radioed back to Admiral OZAWA. He was only informed later when they rejoined and was very much put out by the news and reprimanded the commander of the squadron. Had he known that contact had been made he would have not given orders to rejoin.

Q. Was radio silence observed at this time?
A. At no time. We kept sending messages in the hope of decoying your Task Force.

Q. Did you have any information during the course of the night regarding movements of our main carrier Task Force? Did you know what their night movements were?
A. No reports.

Q. So when morning came you didn't know what to expect? What was your plan in the morning? What were you to do?
A. We were about 100 miles from American force. We thought probably we will be attacked, but that was our mission.

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Q. You knew in the morning you were 100 miles from the American force?
A. Yes, we knew. It was knowing they always took off on reconnaissance about one-half hour before sunrise; we judged from that how far the American Fleet would be. Actually we didn't know exactly how many miles. We sent out search planes but got no reports and we really did not expect to be that close.

Q. You sent out search planes on the morning of the 25th?
A. Yes, three or four only in a narrow radius.

Q. On the morning of the 25th did you have any information from Admiral KURITA on his success in getting through the Straits?
A. In the afternoon we received a report from TOKYO.

Q. In general on the morning of the 25th before you were attacked, did you feel the operation as a whole was going well, or badly, or couldn't you tell?
A. We were not able to judge at that time, we had insufficient information.

Q. About what time were you first attacked in the morning?
A. Maybe nine o'clock.

Q. Did you have radar warning?
A. Yes, we know by radar.

Q. Did you start north again then?
A. Yes, to draw your force. We thought we could lure them 100 miles.

Q. How many attacks did you have made on you that day?
A. Big attack once. Three times we had small ones.

Q. Can you tell me what damage was inflicted by various attacks?
A. One torpedo hit on ZUIKUAKU first attack. The initial phases of the first attack we were able to avoid very well, but toward the end the ships sustained their damage. One destroyer was sunk instantaneously, one bomb each on CHITOSE and CHIYODA with slight damage. About ten o'clock we changed flagships from ZUIKAKU to OYODO, after the first attack. ZUIKAKU could still navigate at 20 knots but the rudder was damaged so she was difficult to steer so no good to command all ships. We transferred by small boat. There were no American planes around then.

Q. The second attack was about ten o'clock?
A. About eleven o'clock. In this attack we received the heaviest damage. ZUIKAKU received from two to four hits. I think she was torpedoed too, and other carriers were unnavigable, but as yet no sinkings. The carriers sank about three or four in the afternoon when the water came in on one side and they capsized, all sank about the same time. The carriers were stopped then and we rescued about 60 or 70%. Sometimes American planes came to bomb, so it was hard to rescue them. We finished the work about 1700 or 1730, and then went north at about 20 or 22 knots.

Q. Was that as fast as the ISE and HYUGA could go?
A. It was as fast as we could go. The ISE and HYUGA were the slowest.

Q. Was ISE or HYUGA damaged that day?
A. Very slight damage by near misses which didn't hamper navigation; there were no hits on either of them. OYODO had one bomb hit. I was witnessing the bombing. I thought that the bombing of the afternoon wasn't so efficient.

Q. Was TAMA damaged?
A. TAMA was rescuing and did not rendezvous. We never had any report and never knew whether she was lost to submarines or to planes. No report at all.

Q. Were any of your surface ships attacked by submarines that night?
A. No attack from submarines that I know of. We had no information about submarines that night.

Q. How many ships survived the battle?
A. OYODO, ISE, HYUGA, and five destroyers out of eight. When we returned I changed flagships and saw by my own eyes there was no damage to the ISE or HYUGA. Over 100 planes bombed these ships, every time they missed. I saw all this bombing and thought the American pilot is not so good.

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Q. During the morning of the attack, our forces which were attacking you saw on their radar large groups of your planes approaching from the PHILIPPINES, which never closed to attack but went away again. Were they meant to attack, or to return to land on your carriers?
A. We sent our remaining 20 planes to land bases so that perhaps your radar detected those planes; otherwise I do not know.

Q. They were not coming to land on your ships?
A. No.

Q. At the time of the first attack did you launch fighter planes to repel it?
A. We launched about six planes to attack your aircraft, that was all we had. After bombing, the carriers couldn't steer into the wind so that they could not return to the carriers. They landed in the water and we rescued the pilots.

Q. The other day when we were talking to Admiral KURITA, you mentioned some important messages which you sent and he failed to receive. What messages were these?
A. These messages were not received by Admiral KURITA: (1) The plans for attacking your forces on the morning of the 24th from east of LUZON. The result of that operation was also sent and was not received. (2) The separation in preparation for the night attack of the ISE and HYUGA on your fleet wasn't received either. (3) News of your attacks on our force on the 25th wasn't received. It was later known that the transmission of the ZUIKAKU had something wrong with it, out of order. Receiving station in FORMOSA got part of the messages but TOKYO never received the messages and KURITA never received them either.

Q. Do you feel that the fact those messages were not received had an influence on the course of the battle?
A. Yes. The influence of these lost messages was: first, that since Admiral KURITA did not receive word of our attacking your carrier force east of LUZON, he turned back on the afternoon of the 24th for a time and thus lost time; secondly, had he known, that your forces were attacking us on the morning of the 25th, he could have continued on into LEYTE Gulf.

Q. Admiral KURITA spoke of a message from you on the morning of the 25th announcing that you would make a torpedo attack that night on our Task Force; do you recall such a message?
A. Admiral KURITA has confused the times. At about 1730 on the afternoon of the 25th, one of our destroyers was attacked by torpedoes and gunfire by your surface force and, on receiving this information Admiral OZAWA made plans to counter-attack your surface force by night. This must be the message of which Admiral KURITA speaks, but as he would not have received it until he was again approaching SAN BERNARDINO, it could not have influenced his decisions.

Q. You had no plan for attacking the night of the 25th, no advance plan made in the morning?
A. No, only this afternoon plan I spoke of, and after we sighted American forces we changed our minds.

Q. Did you receive Admiral KURITA's message saying he was coming north to help you?
A. No. Admiral KURITA was fighting off SAMAR. We heard he had sunk three or four carriers, we received this report in the afternoon of the 25th. We had no other information.

Q. Do you know why Admiral KURITA turned back? Why he did not enter the Gulf?
A. From officers who were present, we know that Admiral KURITA thought the American Task Force was northeast of SAN BERNARDINO Strait and that he turned back hoping to engage this force. However he did not find the force in that area. The second reason was shortage of fuel.

Q. Was Admiral KURITA's mission as outlined in the plans for the operation to attack our task force or transports and landing forces?
A. Either. It was his choice. He expected to meet your fleet and so made up his mind.

Q. But the decision was left up to him?
A. Yes. After attacking your carrier force, he was to go on to LEYTE and attack the transports. But many of his ships were sunk and he supposed it was impossible to go into this very narrow place to attack the transports. It was not good - he should have been braver and gone on to LEYTE. He heard your forces say on the radio-telephone that they would come to their aid in two hours, so he judged your other force was in a very near area.

Q. How close a supervision or control did Admiral TOYODA exercise over an operation like this?
A. Gave the general orders to attack and return.

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Q. He did not attempt to direct the operation while it was in progress in any way?
A. No, because he didn't know the situation.

Q. In your opinion how far did this operation proceed as planned, where did it break down seriously, what was the decisive or immediate cause for failure of the operation?
A. We did not have enough support from the shore-based aircraft; and also one of the greatest reasons was that reconnaissance was not good enough.

Q. Was the shortage of aircraft on shore due to our Task Force attacks previously?
A. Yes.

Q. Which were the more important, the attacks on FORMOSA or on LUZON?
A. Both, especially LUZON, we were very seriously damaged. With so few airplanes in this area they could not search and attack. Also Admiral KURITA demanded air escort but did not get any planes for escort.

Q. Was it in the plans that he get air escort or was it just his request?
A. I think there was a plan for air support.

Q. Did you have any satisfactory liaison with Army aircraft in the PHILIPPINES? Could you call on them for assistance and get it?
A. No.

Q. Were they entirely independent?
A. The commanding side were independent. They were to cooperate as much as possible but cooperation between Army and Navy was very poor. This had a great effect on operations.

Q. Was the fact cooperation was poor a matter of personalities in the area, or insufficiency of planning? Was it always this way?
A. On the technical side, Army pilots couldn't navigate. Secondly, the Army insisted on being a defensive machine and wouldn't fight offensively. The Army and Navy always quarrelled with each other. In theory they were supposed to cooperate and on the higher levels it would work, but personalities were the trouble. Third, the Army didn't have much ability in repairing their planes. Their maintenance was very poor, they had a low percentage of operational planes.

Q. When you were off LUZON on the 24th and 25th, did you send any messages to Admiral ONISHI directing or requesting cooperation with you or his forces?
A. No attempt was made to request cooperation from land based air and there was no thought given to requesting protection. The land based air was to be used only to attack the American forces.

Q. Was the Fifth Fleet to follow Admiral NISHIMURA's force into the Gulf?
A. They came from CORON. They started the morning of the 23rd. They passed south of NEGROS and there met Admiral NISHIMURA's fleet and the plan was to follow him into the Gulf about an hour later. Their mission was the same as his.

Q. When did you stop work on carrier new construction?
A. In May of this year (1945).

Q. Were you attempting up until May, the training of carrier pilots?
A. They kept training for carrier duty, but they were always taken away before they finished. After that they concentrated on training for new type plane, something like OKA but which took off by itself. It was called KIKA. We expected to use them by July of this year. We expected much from KIKA had it been put in effect. It was jet propelled and carried about 800 kilogram in the head.

Q. Did OKA live up to your expectations?
A. It was weak. The weak point was in the mother plane; that was why we developed KIKA.

Q. Do you know when the design and construction of OKA was begun?
A. About January of this year it started to be used. I don't know when plans were made for its use. The OKA was planned before KAMIKAZE tactics were begun, however.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 37
USSBS NO. 159

ATTACKS ON JAPANESE SHIPPING

TOKYO 26 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Lt. Comdr. YATSUI, Noriteru, IJN; a naval officer of 8 years service. He was Navigation Officer of the cruiser OI when she was sunk in July 1944 and served on the staff of the 7th Escort Convoy from that time until the end of the war.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman Teller, USN.

SUMMARY

Lt. Comdr. YATSUI describes air attacks upon the resupply convoys to ORMOC in November 1944. He was present in the convoy which arrived at ORMOC on 31 October and lost one ship at anchor to U.S. Army horizontal-bombers the next day. He also was in the convoy arriving at ORMOC on 9 November. This convoy was attacked by U.S. Army B-25's and P-38's on entry, sustaining sufficient topside damage to interfere with unloading. The next day two cargo ships and one escort vessel were destroyed by a similar attack during the convoy's retirement. The complete destruction of a convoy and escorts by U.S. carrier-based aircraft off northwest LEYTE on 11 November is verified. An eye witness account is given of the U.S. carrier air attacks which destroyed most of an important tanker convoy at HONGKONG on 15-16 January 1945.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Who was responsible for directing routing of Japanese merchant ships?
A. The commander of each individual Escort Convoy determined routes.

Q. Did he also determine the organization of convoy?
A. No, the commander of each individual Escort Convoy carried out his duties with ships assigned him. The organization of convoy was determined by the Commander in Chief, Grand Surface Escort Force (GEB).

Q. On what was the emphasis placed in your defense of convoys?
A. Some thought was given to AA, but the major factor was anti-submarine defense.

Q. What were the principal defense features? How were aircraft used? Were they used for cover and screening or for offensive search? Was radar used at night?
A. In general aircraft was used in two ways: first, as direct cover for the convoy; and second to carry out regular daily patrols over the entire route of the convoy. The former was carried out with carrier-based planes if carriers were included among the escort vessels, and by shore-based air whenever this was practicable. Carrier aircraft were used very infrequently. We never had more than four carriers which could be used in convoy operations. Therefore, this employment was very limited. An effort was made to use radar against submarines as widely as possible; but due to poor technical ability and poor equipment, it proved to be very ineffective. We had equipment to detect your radar, but none to interfere with it. Our direction finding equipment gave us bearing, accurate to about 10 degrees.

Q. Where was the most emphasis placed in convoy defenses?
A. I, personally, looked upon maneuverability of the convoy as the most important single item. I always tried to organize my convoys in formations which would permit the maximum evasion tactics.

Q. How much information did you receive of the position of our submarines?
A. We had pretty good statistical information. We were able to foretell from statistical data, where to expect enemy subs and could even foretell the characteristics of such submarine groups - that is, whether they would be aggressive, daring, or otherwise. Prior to departure from port, we were given intelligence bulletins concerning submarines. We had much confidence in these, and relied heavily on them.

Q. From your recollection of your records and reports of ships sunk, what were the most serious losses during the period September 1944 to January 1945?
A. In my own opinion, the loss of fuel was the greatest blow to the country as a whole. I cannot say whether attacks against tankers or ships carrying oil in drums was more damaging, but the loss of aviation gasoline shipped in drums during the emergency transportation of November and December 1944 was a severe blow to us.

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Q. What experience did you have in escort of convoy?
A. I made two trips out of the homeland. First one from MOJI to SHANGHAI, MANILA and ORMOC on LEYTE. I made two round trips from MANILA to ORMOC. The second trip from MOJI destined for SINGAPORE ended in your carrier attack on HONGKONG 15-16 January 1945.

Q. What was the organization of the First Escort Fleet between September 1944 and January 1945?
A. The First Escort Force or Fleet had headquarters at TAKAO and consisted principally of four groups of escort vessels called the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Escort Convoys. There were no escort convoys numbers one to four. There were other escort vessels assigned to the First Escort Force or Fleet; but all important convoys were sailed in charge of one of the four Escort Convoys. I was Staff Officer of the Seventh Escort Convoy. The Escort Convoys are tactical units and have no particular area of responsibility.

Q. Describe the attack which you received at HONGKONG from U.S. Carrier-based planes.
A. The convoy was en route south and had reached a position east of HAINAN Island. At this point a message was received from Headquarters at TAKAO that another convoy had been attacked near SAIGON. This influenced the Headquarters of the First Escort Fleet at TAKAO to order my convoy to take shelter. The convoy was first anchored inside some islands to the south of HONGKONG, but later moved into HONGKONG Harbor arriving there the 13th. On the 14th, information was received that the U.S. Carrier Force was about 200 miles south of HONGKONG. I believe this information was obtained from radio direction finders. In preparation for the carrier air attack, by the 15th the convoy was disposed as follows: In HONGKONG Harbor, three large tankers moored to buoys in a small group south of HONGKONG Island and surrounded by nine escort vessels in a circle around the tankers. The tankers were moored in a position of a triangle, 300 meters on the side, and the escort vessels circle was about 300 meters outside the tankers. I was in the KANJU, flagship of the Seventh Escort Convoy, anchored in the eastern part of the circle. A fourth large tanker was moored east alongside dock of the ship-building yard at HONGKONG and was protected by two escorts off shore. The fifth tanker, which was the smallest, was moored at a KOWLOON dock approximately north of the main group of tankers and was unprotected. No air cover was available. All tankers were in water ballast hence there were no serious fires. Damage in the three or four attacks on 15 January was not serious. I estimate 4 or 5 planes were shot down. Thirty or forty casualties were suffered. There were no night attacks. On 16th the naval tanker KAMOI (northernmost of three tankers in the group) received 3 or 4 direct dive-bombing hits. She did not sink but was made useless. One other of this group received several hits and settled to bottom with deck above water. The third of this group also was hit heavily and became inoperative. The tanker alongside HONGKONG shipyard dock received several hits which though failing to sink her, completely disabled her. The SARAWAK MARU, alongside KOWLOON wharf was not believed to have been attacked. Planes approached from a direction which possibly made her difficult to see. Although no escort vessels were sunk or put completely out of commission, casualties were high on them and some extensive material damage was sustained. I was hit by strafing at about 1430 and have been in hospital since. This was the heaviest attack and was sustained for about 15 minutes. I witnessed shooting down of about 12 or 13 planes. Later reports stated that about 20 total were shot down. The ships involved in this were:

KAMOI - special Navy tanker 10,000 G. T. (disabled).
TENEI MARU - tanker 10,000 G. T. (disabled or sunk).
MATSUSHIMA - tanker 10,000 G. T. (disabled or sunk).
(name unknown) - tanker 10,000 G. T. (disabled or sunk).
SARAWAK MARU - tanker 4,500 G. T. (undamaged).
HATSUHARU (DD) and 10 coast defense vessels-heavy casualties and some serious damage topside.

Q. When was first resupply convoy sent to ORMOC?
A. Don't know. But my convoy on 1 November was the second.

Q. Describe your experience in convoy which arrived ORMOC 31 October.
A. We arrived ORMOC in evening of 31 October and departed evening of 1 November. The convoy consisted of the KASHII MARU, KINKA MARU, NOTO MARU and KOZU MARU - all 10,000 tons plus. Was escorted by forces of Escort Convoy Fleet and DesRonOne. ComDesRonOne was in command. Total escort was 6 DDs, 4 coast defense ships. I had accompanied this convoy from JAPAN where it had loaded the crack First Division from the TOKYO Area. This division and its supplies was originally destined for MANILA but as the decision had been made to use every resource to defend LEYTE, the convoy proceeded to ORMOC. As this was a very important convoy we were supposed to have 10 fighters over head during daylight in PHILIPPINE waters and could call for 10

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more if needed. However, at times, there were none and never more than 15. The official arrangement for requesting air cover required that it be made by the convoy commander to the CinC Southwest Area Fleet (at MANILA). However, in sending the request by radio, it was intercepted by commanders of the local Naval Air Fleets who then used their judgment as to sending help. Army air units were not on this circuit and had to be reached through headquarters. I observed a number of engagements between Japanese Army fighters and P-38s. The Japanese fighters appeared to be badly outclassed. Route from MANILA was via VERDE Passage, SIBUYAN Sea, between BURIAS and TICAO Islands, TISAO Pass, then to the CAMOTES Sea and into ORMOC Bay, passing north of the CAMOTES Islands. A B-24 shadowed for 20 minutes off BURIAS Island. Off PALOMPON, LEYTE, about 30 sorties by P-38s were made about 2½ hours before sunset on the 31st. Planes strafed and dropped some small bombs. No serious damage was done to our ships. A few casualties and superficial damages to decks and guns were incurred. We arrived ORMOC just before sundown and had no further attacks that night. We anchored near and to west of ORMOC pier, about 1000 meters between ships. On 1 November shortly after dawn, P-38s commenced attacking and continued all day, both strafing and dive-bombing. No serious damage but quite a number of casualties to men on deck and material damage to guns and equipment on deck was sustained. At about 1400, three groups of 8 each of B-24s bombed from high level concentrating on the NATO MARU which was sunk at anchor. 90% of her cargo had been unloaded. No other ship was hit. All cargo was unloaded from other ships. U.S. plane losses consisted of 1 or 2 P-38s shot down by convoy guns on 31st and some additional shot down by Japanese fighters. No B-24s were observed shot down. The 3 remaining ships of the convoy and escort sailed from ORMOC at sunset 1 November and returned to MANILA without further incident.

Q. Describe your experience in the convoy to ORMOC on 10 November 1944.
A. I believe there were a total of nine ORMOC resupply convoys called TA operations. Number One occurred prior to 31 October; Number Two, which I accompanied, reached ORMOC on 31 October; Number Four, which I also accompanied, reached ORMOC 10 November; Number Three, however, occurred later than Number Four and was completely destroyed just before arriving ORMOC about 11 November. This convoy (Number Three) consisted of approximately 3 medium sized transports of 4,000/5,000 tons and 6 DDs. Its speed was 6½ to 7 knots. This convoy was destroyed by carrier-type planes. A message was received from this convoy stating that they were being attacked by 100 carrier-based planes. Possibly 1 DD survived. Number Four convoy consisting of KASHII MARU, KINKA MARU, KOZU MARU, DesRonOne and 4 coast defense vessels left MANILA on 7 November. It passed through TAYABAS Bay, MOMPOG Pass, MASBATE Pass, BLACK ROCK Pass, to the CAMOTES Sea and hugged the west coast of LEYTE very close. On the evening of the 9th as convoy rounded the southern tip of peninsula west of ORMOC, it was attacked and surprised by 20 or 30 B-25s and 15 or 16 P-38s which came out of hills from the north. The KASHII MARU had all loading tackle destroyed and landing barges on deck destroyed. The KINKA MARU suffered slight damage to engines and also suffered some damage to deck equipment. The KOZU MARU also suffered temporary engine trouble and deck damage. No important damage was done to escorts, but considerable casualties occurred. The main damage was done by bombs. Those bombs which struck the hull did not do enough damage to sink the ships - the sea being calm at that time.

Arriving at ORMOC at dusk on the 9th, the convoy anchored just west of ORMOC Pier. There were no further attacks that night. At dawn on the 10th, P-38s arrived and harassed convoy all day, mostly strafing. It had been planned to discharge all cargo and personnel during the night and to leave at sunrise. Nothing could be unloaded at night and no cargo was unloaded because of the condition of deck equipment and lack of landing boats. An air raid two days before had destroyed landing barges on the beaches. However, all the Army troops, approximately 1 brigade, were put ashore by means of the coast defense vessels. The convoy departed about 3 hours after sunrise. About noon at southern tip of ORMOC Peninsula the convoy received same types of attack from 40 B-25s and 16 P-38s that was experienced on the 9th except this time we expected the attack. The KOZU MARU blew up and sank. The KASHII MARU received a bomb hit in bow which started a fire which finally stopped ship and caused it to sink several hours later. The KINKA MARU received minor damage and casualties and returned to MANILA. Coast Defense Ship No. 11 was beached at ORMOC Peninsula as result of bomb hit and fire. Four DDs and 1 coast defense ship stayed with KASHII MARU which was slowed and burning. Two DDs and two coast defense vessels accompanied KINKA MARU. About 1400 the KINKA MARU group, which stayed well out from shore, was attacked by 5 or more P-38s. One DD had bow blown off by bomb but was able to return to MANILA. Personnel casualties were suffered and very minor damages were incurred by other ships. The 4 DDs and 1 coast defense vessel, after KASHII MARU sank, followed and rejoined off MASBATE. The following returned to MANILA: KINKA MARU, 3 or 4 DDs and 3 coast defense vessels. In MASBATE Pass

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on night of 10 November, convoy Number Three passed them en route south. Two or three of DDs from DesRonOne left the KINKA MARU and joined convoy Number Three. This convoy, as stated before, was sunk by carrier air off northwest LEYTE on 11 November.

Q. Were you attacked by motor torpedo boats in the PHILIPPINES?
A. On night of 31 October while anchored at ORMOC, motor torpedo boats were sighted near the easternmost COMOTE Island, but the defending destroyers prevented an attack.

Q. What was your experience in the cruiser OI?
A. I was navigator on her when she was sunk at latitude 13°N; longitude 114°E, 19 July 1944. She was hit at 1230 Japan Central Time by one submarine torpedo on port side in after engine room. The ship sank in five hours due to flooding and the breaking of the ship at the point of damage in the high seas. The OI had one DD in company which saved about 65% of her personnel.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 38
USSBS NO. 160

Japanese Plans for Defense of Central Pacific

TOKYO 22 October 1945

Interrogation of: Capt. OHMAE, Toshikazu, I.J.N., a naval officer of 25 years service, who was on the Staff of the Southeast Area Fleet from June 1942 to December 1943. From December 1943 he was on the Staff of the First Mobile Fleet and took part in the planning and execution of the operations for the defense of the MARIANAS and of the PHILIPPINES.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman Teller, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Lt. Comdr. D.P. Aiken, USNR.

SUMMARY

Captain OHMAE summarizes the plans for defense of the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS and explains reasons for changes in plans. He also provides information on a few interesting points in connection with the reinforcement of Japanese Air in the SOLOMONS Campaign.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What plans were made for defense of the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS?
A. In May 1943, there was a conference at TRUK between the CinC of the Southeast Area, Vice Admiral KUSAKA, and the CinC Second Fleet, Vice Admiral KONDO. At this conference it was decided: first, to bring out as many reinforcements as possible from JAPAN; and second, to hold the SOLOMONS and the DAMPIER Strait Area in the BISMARKS. The emphasis on aircraft reinforcements was in the SOLOMONS and reinforcements to the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS were to be principally in the form of troops. The possibility of U.S. attack in any of the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS, SOLOMONS and Eastern NEW GUINEA Areas was realized; therefore, the Second Fleet was to be concentrated at TRUK to meet any eventuality. Japanese aircraft were concentrated in the SOLOMONS, but there were relatively few in the Central PACIFIC due to shortage.

The specific plan to counter an American invasion of the GILBERTS was as follows: Long-range aircraft from the BISMARKS would attack the U.S. invasion forces and then land at fields in the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS. Short range aircraft would start from or stage through TRUK and proceed to MARSHALLS-GILBERTS fields and from there attack the U.S. forces. It was expected to require four days for the short range aircraft to reach the attack position from the BISMARKS. Warships at TRUK would sortie and move to the GILBERT Islands where they would attack American surface and invasion forces. Six or seven submarines, which were employed in supply service in the BISMARKS, also would be ordered to assist in repelling the invasion.

Two factors radically changed these plans. The first was the serious damage received by several Second Fleet cruisers at RABAUL by carrier air attack on 5 November 1943. These ships and other units had just arrived from TRUK to assist in the serious situation at BOUGAINVILLE. The second factor was the intensified air war in the SOLOMONS related to further landings at MUNDA which absorbed our air forces already in the Western SOLOMONS and also required employment of the short range planes which were being held at TRUK for defense of the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS. Consequently the original plans for defense of those islands could not be carried out when American forces invaded in November, because there was insufficient surface and air strength available to make effective resistance.

Q. How were the Second Fleet aircraft carriers employed during the summer and fall of 1943?
A. They were principally employed in transporting aircraft material and personnel from the EMPIRE to the Central and South PACIFIC. The air groups of these carriers (JUNYO, RYUHO, HIYO) had been sent to the North SOLOMONS in July to meet the serious situation created by the American landings.

Q. What losses were sustained during ferrying operations from the EMPIRE to outlying bases?
A. Until the summer of 1943, we averaged about 6 or 7 percent, but the percentage increased rapidly after that. The greatest loss in any one operation was 30 percent. The loss in this type operation was heavier in the case of Army planes. For example 24 Army planes took off from TRUK in June 1943 and only two arrived in RABAUL. This was the first TRUK to RABAUL flight by Army planes

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without a Navy plane leading. The first group of Army planes arrived in April 1943. The largest number of Army planes to be in the SOLOMONS Area at one time was believed to have been 100. This averaged about one third of the naval air strength in the SOLOMONS.

Q. How was the planning done for participation of Army and Navy aircraft in a joint operation?
A. The planning was done in the Imperial Headquarters, TOKYO. In the SOLOMONS Campaign, it was planned that Army and Navy strength available would be about equal. This was not realized, although the allocations of Army aircraft and numbers actually taking off from JAPAN for the campaign area were approximately those of the planned proportion. However, the number to arrive at destination was far below that because of troubles such as poor maintenance en route, and the long route followed by the comparatively short ranged Army planes, also poor overwater navigation. The route followed by the small Army planes was usually RYUKYUS, FORMOSA, PHILIPPINES and NEW GUINEA. Some, however, were transported by ship to TRUK and then flown to RABAUL. The larger and long range Army planes flew the more direct route from IWO, SAIPAN, TINIAN, TRUK, and to RABAUL.

Q. Were Army aircraft able to use naval radio facilities for navigation?
A. The Army aircraft radio equipment was not such design as to make good use of naval radio facilities along the ferry route.

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Interrogation NAV No.39
USSBS No. 165

Battle of Midway

TOKYO 25 October 1945

Interrogation of: Capt. OHARA, H., Executive Officer of SORYU (CV) at Battle of MIDWAY, 4-6 June 1942.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

SUMMARY

The First Air Fleet, CinC Vice Admiral NAGUMO, departed HIROSHIMA Bay on 27 May 1942 for MIDWAY Island to provide air support during the planned Japanese occupation about 6 June 1942. The loss of all aircraft carriers forced the plan to be abandoned. This deficiency was also felt in the subsequent SOLOMON Campaign. The SORYU received three hits from dive-bombers during the morning, 4 June, which set planes and fuel tanks afire. While trying to escape at reduced speed later in the morning, it was sunk by torpedoes from a submarine. No aircraft torpedo or horizontal-bomb hits received. Dive-bombers considered most effective attack against ships, horizontal-bombers against land areas. Definite turning point of the war considered SAIPAN.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What ships were present in your force?
A. Flagship AKAGI with Vice Admiral NAGUMO, Rear Admiral YAMAGUCHI was on the HIRYU. KAGA and SORYU were the other two aircraft carriers. Battleships KIRISHIMA and HARUNA. Heavy cruisers CHIKUMA and TONE. The light cruiser NAGARA with about eleven destroyers. About four tankers were also present. Admiral YAMAGUCHI was killed. He was so outstanding from the time he was a captain that many thought he would have succeeded Admiral YAMAMOTO.

Composition of Force

      ( ) NAGARA      
      ( ) KIRISHIMA      
      ( ) HARUNA      
( )           ( )
  ( ) ASAGI (F)
CinC Flag Ship
      ( ) HIRYU,
Squadron Flag Ship
 
  ( )       ( )  
  ( ) NAGA       ( ) SORYU  
  ( )       ( )  
      ( )      
      ( ) Tankers      
    ( ) ( ) ( )    
      ( )      

Q. What was your navigational track?
A. The First Air Fleet left HASHIRA anchorage in HIROSHIMA Bay on 27 May passing through the BUNGO Straits towards MARCUS Island, then easterly to about 32°N 179°E, then southeast towards MIDWAY until the day of the battle. We refueled every third day from the tankers. Anti-submarine aircraft patrols were maintained, but that was all due to the bad weather.

Q. What was the mission of your air fleet?
A. We were to bomb MIDWAY in preparation for a landing operation to be made by transports approaching from the southwest. The JUNYO and maybe the HIYO were to bomb and maybe occupy KISKA and DUTCH HARBOR. The ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU were being repaired in JAPAN.

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Q. What effect did the loss of your carriers have upon the completion of your future plans?
A. The loss of the carriers meant loss of control of the air. We did not think that we could capture MIDWAY after we lost air control, so returned to JAPAN. The loss of the carriers also slowed up the occupation of the SOLOMONS. If we had been stronger in the air, maybe we could have stopped some of your convoys to the SOLOMONS.

Q. When did you receive your first attack?
A. About two hours after sunrise, we were attacked by torpedo planes. They looked like small twin engine flying boats and single-engine carrier planes. No hits were made. The torpedoes were dropped too far away and were slow enough for us to avoid them.

Q. Did you know of the American carriers.
A. No, we had no information until we were attacked by dive-bombers. Then we thought that they had come from MIDWAY. It was about two hours after sunrise. About the middle of the morning, we were attacked by everything. Our planes returning from the attack on MIDWAY reported carrier air groups in the area so we knew your carriers were there. A little later one of our scout planes gave a definite location.

Q. How many hits did you receive?
A. About twelve planes divided into three groups dove upon us at the same time. One group on each bow and one from astern. We received three hits. The first hit in the middle of the flight deck between the two elevators. It went through and exploded in the lower hanger deck, setting planes on fire which had returned from MIDWAY and were refueled and rearmed. The second hit in the center just forward of the forward elevator, starting a fire on the flight deck and hanger deck. The third hit was near the after elevator.

Q. Did you receive any torpedo hits or hits from high horizontal-bombers?
A. No torpedo hits from airplanes. In the middle of the afternoon, we had a big explosion which set more gasoline tanks afire and sank the ship. It was torpedoes from a submarine. We did not receive any hits from horizontal-bombers. The formation was very high. It was just after we had been attacked the first time by dive-bombers. The bombs fell someplace near the battleships, but I do not think that they were hit. In the afternoon late, we were also attacked by horizontal-bombers but no hits. We were already sinking.

Q. Did any of the American planes dive into the decks of the carriers?
A. None on the SORYU. I did not hear of any on the other carriers.

Q. Where were you standing during the battle?
A. I was on the bridge all day. After we left the ship, I was picked up by a destroyer. Two or three destroyers rescued about 600 men. About 700 were lost including about 30 pilots.

Q. When the U.S. torpedo planes attacked, how were they shot down?
A. The fighter plane patrol from the AKAGI and the HIRYU shot down most of them down. Guns may have hit some. They came in very low and straight and were easy for our planes to hit. Most were hit before they dropped the torpedoes, but a few were able to drop before being hit.

Q. Were the battleships KIRISHIMA and HARUNA attacked?
A. They may have been attacked but they were not hit.

Q. Were any other ships attacked?
A. No other ships in our force were hit. The MOGAMI and MIKUMA were attacked and the MIKUMA sunk. They were in the main body.

Q. Were any transports attacked?
A. I heard that the transports were attacked, but none were sunk.

Q. How many planes did you lose at MIDWAY?
A. About 250 planes were lost. Some were lost in the attack on the island, some at the American carriers, the remainder were lost on the Japanese carriers.

Q. As a result of your experience in this war, what type of aircraft attack did you consider the most effective?
A. In the Navy against ships, the dive-bomber was most effective because it was much more accurate and hard to hit by gun fire because of the speed and high angle of fire. Because they came very low,

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it was difficult to avoid the bombs. We did not fear the high horizontal-bombers because we could watch the bombs fall and avoid them. They never hit targets except against the land. The fire raids were very bad. They also made landing strips useless for one or two days. We feared the torpedo attacks though they did not do much damage, but we had to maneuver to miss them.

Q. Did the planes from the SORYU attack the U.S. carriers?
A. No, they attacked MIDWAY. Then while they were being refueled to attack the American carriers, the SORYU was attacked and damaged so the flight of planes could not be launched. The planes were delayed while changing bombs to attack the carriers.

Q. When did you think that the turning point of the war occurred?
A. It was the opinion of most of the officers that the loss of the aircraft carriers during the summer of 1942 stopped the expansion because we did not have air cover. However, we thought that we could hold the area that we had occupied. When we lost SAIPAN, we felt very bad because we did not expect to lose it. I think that was the main turning point.

Q. Were you present during any of the carrier attacks against land targets?
A. Yes, I was present at YOKOSUKA on 18 July. Not much damage done. One bomb hit the battleship FUJI. One or two hangers caught fire. Most damage was to airplanes. They were all shot down or landed someplace else, because they did not come back.

Q. Were you in any other battles?
A. I was in the INDIAN OCEAN when the HERMES and the CORNWALL were sunk by our dive-bombers using 250kg. bombs, but that is all. I was in TOKYO when the REPULSE and the PRINCE OF WALES were sunk.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 40
USSBS NO. 169

NON-COMBAT LOSSES OF AIRCRAFT

TOKYO 26 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Captain KANAI, K., IJN, head of the first section of the first department of the KOKU HOMBU from 1941 to 1943, and head of general affairs of the Southeast Air Depot of the 11th Air Fleet, RABAUL from 1943 to 1944; head of the supply department of the KISARAZU Depot from 1944 to 1945.

Interrogated by: Lieut. Robert C. Garred, USNR.

SUMMARY

Replacement aircraft to tactical units in the RABAUL Area were first allocated by KOKU HOMBU and then either air ferried or surface transported, depending upon the range of the aircraft involved. Aircraft losses in supplying the southeast area were from 2 to 5 percent during 1942 and increased considerably during 1943 due to a lack of experienced pilots. On the route between the EMPIRE and RABAUL, most losses were incurred between TRUK and RABAUL.

The air ferry route between HONSHU and RABAUL was kept open until the U.S. carrier attack on TRUK, 16-17 February 1944. After that time, no attempts were made to supply RABAUL with replacement aircraft.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. In 1942, was it your job to arrange for the transfer of naval aircraft from depots to tactical units?
A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Can you estimate the losses incurred of aircraft being ferried to tactical units overseas?
A. About 2 to 5 percent of the aircraft were lost.

Q. What caused these losses?
A. Crash landings, bad weather, navigation errors and mechanical failures.

Q. Were CVs used to transport aircraft to the PACIFIC Area?
A. Toward the end of 1942 a few of the older carriers were used to transport aircraft from the EMPIRE to TRUK. I can remember the names of a few of the carriers, the KASUGA MARU (50 A/C), the CHUYO (50-60 A/C) and the UNYO (50-60 A/C).

Q. Was the lack of range of the smaller planes the reason for using carriers for the transportation of aircraft to TRUK?
A. No, the principle reason was the lack of experienced pilots for ferrying purposes. We had enough pilots available to fly the planes from TRUK to RABAUL, but not enough to air ferry replacement aircraft from YOKOSUKA to TRUK.

Q. Did the percentage of losses in the transportation of aircraft increase or decrease in 1943?
A. Our losses increased due to the depreciation in our pilot's flying ability.

Q. What caused this depreciation?
A. Our training program was accelerated to the extent that our pilots were not adequately trained.

Q. What was the reason for accelerating the training program?
A. We needed more pilots. It is my opinion that combat losses in the SOLOMONS plus losses from malaria were the main reason for speeding up the program.

Q. In general, what were the problems that you encountered in supplying tactical units with replacement aircraft?
A. Our single-engine aircraft had a limited range and it was difficult to route them over long overwater stretches. Carriers were satisfactory, but we didn't have enough available to carry all our replacements. I think the main trouble I had was in finding ferry pilots. We did not have enough in the EMPIRE.

Q. What percentage of aircraft were air ferried and what percentage carrier transported?
A. 50% each way. The carriers carried fighter aircraft.

Q. You were in RABAUL in 1944, what is your estimate of the losses in ferrying aircraft to RABAUL from TRUK during your tour of duty there?
A. About 5% due to navigation errors, crash landings and bad weather.

Q. In early 1944, after Allied forces had advanced along the SOLOMONS chain to BOUGAINVILLE, were aircraft re-routed, or still ferried direct from TRUK to RABAUL?
A. As a result of the American carrier attack on TRUK, all air ferrying to RABAUL from TRUK ceased on the 20th of February. Up until then, we flew direct from YOKOSUKA to RABAUL, via SAIPAN.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 41
USSBS NO. 170

BATTLE OFF SAMAR, OCTOBER 1944

TOKYO 26 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Commander OTANI, Tonosuke, IJN, Operations Officer on the Staff of CinC Second Fleet during the battles of October 1944.

Interrogated by: Lt. Cmdr. James A. Field Jr., USNR.

SUMMARY

The interrogation of Commander OTANI supplements and confirms those of Vice Admiral KURITA and Rear Admiral KOYANAGI. Little new material is brought forth in this interrogation which is of interest primarily to those concerned with the details of the Battle of LEYTE Gulf.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What was your position and duty on Admiral KURITA's Staff?
A. I was Staff Operation Officer. I would originally make the Operations Plans and submit them to the Senior Staff Officer and then to the Chief of Staff; we three made up the plans and submitted them to the Admiral for his approval.

Q. What type of duty did you have with the Twelfth and Fifth Air Fleets?
A. I specialized in communication while I was with the Fifth Air Fleet, I was Staff Communication Officer, and same when I was with the Twelfth.

Q. Did you have any connection with communications while with Admiral KURITA?
A. No, but naturally I was generally familiar with the communication plans.

Q. Do you feel that the torpedoing of ATAGO and the fact that you had to change flagships inconvenienced the operation?
A. It did not interfere much with the operation because the transfer was completed before the battle. It had been my opinion that flagships should be battleships; so we had made some preparation on YAMATO beforehand. The Second Fleet in this operation had planned to conduct a night battle and it was my view that a modern battleship is preferable as a flagship for such operations. It had satisfactory speed, gun power, communications, etc. The opinion of senior officers, based largely on tradition, was that cruisers should be used for flagships, and although I did not agree I was unable to change their minds until it happened that the ATAGO was sunk.

Q. In the transfer of the staff from the ATAGO were any personnel lost, or any papers lost which interfered with the operation?
A. The YAMATO already had the important papers before they started. As for personnel, the main body of the staff was almost all saved and on the YAMATO; furthermore they had already the second in command, the Commander of the First (Battleship) Squadron, and his staff aboard; so it went on very satisfactorily.

Q. On the 24th of October, you were attacked several times by our aircraft. What damage was inflicted on the various ships?
A. We expected that in the beginning of the combat about 50% would be lost; but actually it was less than 50% on the 24th, so we could proceed with the mission to LEYTE. YAMATO received two bomb hits and two near misses. The two near misses made a big hole in the bow. The hole was much larger then we thought at the time. The two hits were forward on deck and not much damage to speak of, only the anchor windlass was put out of commission. MUSASHI received 18 torpedo hits which exploded and three which did not, and 40 dive bombs. I did not see, but that is according to reports. Casualties were as follows: The Captain was killed and about one half or one third of the crew lost. The speed dropped to 12 knots, she had to fall out of formation and received continuous attacks. As for MYOKO the extent of the damage is still unknown to me, but they had to return to BRUNEI. Most of her damage was caused by bombs, I think.

Q. Were any of the other battleships hit at all?
A. I am not quite certain. At some time during the operation I think NAGATO, KONGO, and HARUNA each received one bomb hit. NAGATO was hit in the communications room, I think this was on the 24th, and they had some trouble with communications thereafter. I am quite sure this damage to NAGATO occurred on the 24th, but I do not know about the damage to other ships, nor the dates when they were damaged.

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Q. Were any cruisers aside from MYOKO or any destroyer damaged on the 24th?
A. I do not think so.

Q. On the 24th did you expect to have protective fighter cover furnished from shore bases?
A. We did not plan to have any protection from fighters because we never thought we would need any. There were no plans, therefore there was no protection from the fighters. However, we heard that your attacks on the MANILA Area were intermittent and not very severe; therefore, we sent a message requesting fighter coverage. However, none appeared.

Q. Did you have a special radio channel for the purpose of requesting fighter cover?
A. We had two or three radio channels set up especially for communication between ourselves and MANILA and the Task Force (Admiral OZAWA) and the shore based planes, and also Combined Fleet Headquarters. The communication plan was very carefully made at the start of the operation, since we were aware of the importance of maintaining accurate coordination.

Q. Did you ever see any Japanese planes on the 24th?
A. No planes were sighted.

Q. What information did you receive on the 24th from Admirals OZAWA, NISHIMURA, and SHIMA?
A. No information from OZAWA's force and we thought their force was doing what they should have done. We received a message from NISHIMURA's force to the effect that they had been attacked by 20 airplanes, but we thought that this force was also proceeding according to plans. We received no report from SHIMA's force and never paid much attention to him. We received a message from Admiral NISHIMURA that they were going to make their approach about 2 o'clock on the morning on the 25th although the plan was carefully set up in the beginning of the operation that they would approach one hour before daybreak on the 25th at the earliest, and from this we thought that Admiral NISHIMURA was taking the matter too lightly. We received this message late, in the afternoon on the 24th at which time it was too late to order him to conform to the original plan.

Q. On the 24th, in the afternoon, your force turned west and then again east; what time did you turn west?
A. We turned west about five, although we had considered it first at about one or two o'clock and it was less than 30 minutes before we again turned to the eastward. The message was sent to Admiral TOYODA that we were reversing course temporarily a little after five. Before Admiral TOYODA could have received the message that Admiral KURITA was moving westward temporarily, we received a message from Admiral TOYODA to proceed with the eastward operation. We on the staff were sure at that time that Admiral TOYODA could not have our original message.

Q. Did you turn eastward in response to the order?
A. We turned eastward immediately upon receipt of TOYODA's message.

Q. Before this message arrived from TOYODA, what had been your plans?
A. Admiral KURITA's intention was not to abandon the battle, but just to avoid the immediate action. The land-based airplanes would not give much protection and, by sending that message to the effect that it was necessary to avoid the attack by turning to the westward, we thought that this message might bring protection from land-based planes. The same message that was sent to Admiral TOYODA was also sent to Admirals FUKUDOME and OMISHI at MANILA.

Q. What information did you have of the location of our forces on the afternoon of the 24th?
A. No intelligence came in through the land-based planes because, as we thought, the weather east of LUZON was poor. We thought that there were a total strength of one large Task Force distributed in three groups, with two very close to shore off LAMON Bay (LUZON) and one off the entrance of SAN BERNARDINO Strait. This information, I remember, did not come from the land-based planes on LUZON, since we suggested to the land-based air headquarters that the enemy might be in the position just described and that they should attack.

Q. No information from Admiral ONISHI?
A. No.

Q. By the time the force reached SAN BERNARDINO Strait was fatigue becoming evident among your personnel?
A. They were very tired, but they were excited by the anticipation of the battle against the American force, and overcame their fatigue.

Q. Did you expect to have to fight your way out of the Straits?
A. We expected it and it was a matter of grave concern.

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Q. What forces were expected there?
A. We feared before we made any formation that there would be submarines, and also we might be caught by U.S. surface force which would give us a hard time in night action. To make it worse, we had no information on this area from scout planes.

Q. What conclusion did you draw from the fact that you came through unopposed; from the lack of American forces?
A. We thought we would meet your forces before we reached the southern end of SAMAR.

Q. What size or type of force did you expect to meet?
A. We could not judge. We thought that all your carriers would withdraw to the eastward and support your surface force; and so we thought that we would meet your surface strength but not so much superior to ours.

Q. What was your own opinion of your chances of success when you were off SAMAR heading south to enter the Gulf?
A. My personnel opinion was that we would be completely destroyed before finishing with LEYTE Gulf, but would do some damage.

Q. Was the original plan, after the battle inside of the Gulf, to retire the way you came or by SURIGAO Strait?
A. Through SURIGAO.

Q. When did you first sight U.S. forces?
A. It was about 0645. It was before we had completed the execution of order to change from night formation to ring formation, that the sighting occurred. The order to change the formation had been given at 0530. At first, we thought it was a Task Force of five or, six carriers, four or five heavy cruisers, and appropriate screen and that there were no battleships; but we received a report from the look-outs that there was one battleship in the disposition.

Q. What type of carriers did you believe they were?
A. We gave that question much consideration, but never fully made up our minds. We found ourselves perplexed by your carriers because they did not correspond to their photographs, and first we thought that they were regular carriers; but after the battle, we decided that they were auxiliary or converted carriers. Also we received word from the tops that there was another formation, and at that time we wondered if we were not confronted by 12 or 13 carriers in all; but this was not ascertained on the bridge.

Q. Was there any attempt to engage in battle with the second group?
A. First, we would encounter the first group, and then take on the second.

Q. What damage did you inflict upon the first group you engaged?
A. One carrier sunk, one light cruiser, one heavy cruiser and one destroyer. There was some confusion between the high gunnery control platform and the bridge. There may have been a repeat report which was understood as two carriers sunk; the bridge concluded that one carrier was sunk. Again from later reports which may have contained duplication, we concluded that we had sunk four carriers, two or three cruisers and two or three destroyers. That was the total result of the day. I now think this is rather accurate, and from a report of search planes at about 1100, we received information that one battleship was severely damaged and dead in the water.

Q. In this action against the first Task Force, did you have any assistance from land-based planes?
A. Nothing.

Q. Did you know that your shore-based planes attacked the surviving units of that force shortly after you broke off the action?
A. No, I never knew that.

Q. Why did you let any of that Task Force escape?
A. First, fuel; second, we had poor communication with our cruisers and couldn't see what they were doing; third, we intercepted a message which called for reinforcements and the reply indicating reinforcement of planes not before one or two hours.

Q. What speed did you estimate our Task Force was making in retirement?
A. 30 knots or more, and we could not close the range.

Q. Did they find the use of smoke by our force a serious hindrance?
A. Yes, very effective. The smoke was made very quickly and the use of smoke was skillful.

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Q. Did the Japanese Force sustain serious damage from our counter attack that morning?
A. Nothing serious from surface ships, 102 mm dud in the rice locker of YAMATO.

Q. Were any of your ships hit by torpedoes from our destroyers?
A. No, but the attack was very effective in that it caused confusion in our disposition and delayed our advance.

Q. What damage from aircraft attack?
A. One aerial torpedo in the SUZUYA and one bomb in her torpedo mount. She was heavily damaged all ever and became unable to navigate and was sunk by JAPANESE torpedoes. The cruiser CHOKAI was so damaged from air attack and perhaps also by gunfire as to be stopped and I believe that it was later sunk by Japanese torpedo. The CHIKUMA was also sunk, her maneuvering ability having been damaged by bombs or torpedoes during the battle. The KUMANO, I remember, was the first to be damaged. She reported that she could navigate, but could not fire, and was early detached from the formation and sent to MANILA in company with one destroyer.

Q. Were any of the battleships damaged by air attacks?
A. I don't remember whether it was this day of not, but I remember seeing one issuing a great deal of smoke. The ship that received the least damage was HAGURO; all others received more or less damage.

Q. What is your opinion of our air attack that morning, well executed or otherwise?
A. The attack was almost incessant, but the number of planes at any one instant was few. The bombers and torpedo planes were very aggressive and skillful and the coordination was impressive; even in comparison with the great experience of American attack that we already had, this was the most skillful work of your planes.

Q. About 0930 this engagement was ended. What did you do between this time and the time you started north?
A. Right after the battle we proceeded west for 30 minutes while discussing whether to go into the Gulf as planned or what to do. After the discussion we decided to go north and engage the other force.

Q. What time did you start north?
A. About one hour after breaking off the battle, about 11 o'clock.

Q. What were your reasons for deciding to go north rather then enter the Gulf?
A. We had intercepted your message concerning reinforcement. We judged that your ships should have largely gotten out from the Bay, and we had heard at three or four in the morning that the supporting body of Admiral NISHIMURA had been about wiped out - the source of this message is not certain, it may have been from a surviving destroyer or from Admiral SHIMA's Force, so that the plan of cooperation had to be abandoned.

Q. Are you sure you heard that news as early as 0400?
A. It was before the meeting and battle and I am quite sure that it was about 0400. When we sighted your force off SAMAR, some of the men thought that it was our force; however, I knew that it could not be so because I had received the information about what had happened to Admiral NISHIMURA. Our main mission was to attack your Task Force and so there was no purpose to go into the Bay where we would be exposed to air attack in narrow waters and there was never a part of the plan which contemplated bombardment of the shore in the Bay.

Q. Was it more important to attack the Task Force or the Transport Force?
A. The targets for this operation were in the following order of importance: First, carriers; second, transports; and third, surface ships of war.

Q. Did you believe at that time that all transports had left the Bay?
A. We thought that only small landing boats remained inside and that the main body of transports had left the Bay. The fact that this was four or five days after the landing, reinforced this conclusion. We had no information on the status of shipping in the Bay from any aircraft. We had word that one of your forces was in about 17-30N 125-30E and we expected this force to come south to help; therefore, if we went north we would meet in the open sea. Also, in order to deceive you since you expected us to enter LEYTE Gulf, we concluded that this northern movement would surprise you and prevent a junction of your forces. Up to this point, fuel had not been a serious consideration, and since the distance to our tankers in the SULA Sea from a point east of LEYTE was about the same by whichever route we returned, it had no bearing on the decision to go north.

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Q. Was the whole staff agreed that this decision was the best one?
A. There was no opposition.

Q. In the early afternoon while you went north, you were again attacked by our aircraft. What damage was done in these attacks.
A. I know of no specific damage that occurred in the afternoon - it is possible that some of the damage previously mentioned occurred in the afternoon, but I do not think so.

Q. When you reached the point east of SAN BERNARDINO Strait, what determined the decision to turn west through the Strait?
A. A dispatch request from OZAWA for assistance against your Task Force in the north was received but nevertheless we concluded to enter because our fuel was running low, and secondly we did not consider the SAN BERNARDINO Force ready for night action owing to damage received during the day. This request from Admiral OZAWA was received about 1700.

Q. On the next day you were again attacked by air in the SIBUYAN Sea. What damage was received?
A. The cruiser NOSHIRO received one torpedo and she became unnavigable, and shortly after she received a bomb attack and sunk. I am not certain of the remainder, but it may be that a destroyer was also sunk then.

Q. These attacks that hit the NOSHIRO were from what type of planes?
A. Torpedo from carrier planes and bombs from carrier planes, we believed that this attack was delivered at maximum range from your Task Force.

Q. Later in that day you were also attacked by four-engine bombers. What damage was done by them?
A. Only two very near misses at the bridge on both sides of the YAMATO which caused several casualties. No damage to any other ships.

Q. How many four-engine bombers attacked you?
A. Twenty four in all: six the first time, six planes the second time and I think there were 12 in a group that were near by; those two near misses were done by the first six planes.

Q. Where do you think this whole operation broke down? Why did it fail?
A. I feel that from the very beginning that the cooperation between the Task Force (OZAWA) and the Surface Force (KURITA) and the land-based Air Force was bad from the beginning.

Q. What do you feel caused this poor coordination?
A. Coordination between the Surface Force and the (carrier) Task Force was almost impossible due to the restrictions on communication and the need for radio silence; therefore, the plans for cooperation were not carried out. This lack of information from OZAWA was one of the main factors in the failure of the operation, but perhaps the biggest factor was the lack of protection from our land-based air against your (carrier) Task Force. I feel also that the original plan was too complex and inflexible to work properly.

Note: Interrogation NAV No. 42 (USSBS No. 181) is omitted from this series as it contains limited information which amplifies and clarifies the answers to questionaire contained in NAV MEMORANDUM-7 which was submitted to the Japanese Government.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 43
USSBS NO. 192

JAPANESE NAVAL PLANNING

TOKYO 30 October 1945

Interrogation of: Captain OHMAE, Toshikazu, I.J.N.; an officer of 25 years service. In June 1942 he was transferred from the Bureau of Military Affairs to the Staff of the Southeast Area Fleet, in which capacity he planned and directed the First Battle of SAVO ISLAND. From December 1943 he was on the Staff of the First Mobile Fleet and took part in the planning and execution of the operations for the defense of the MARIANAS and of the PHILIPPINES as Chief of Staff to Vice Admiral OZAWA, CinC First Mobile Fleet and Third Fleet. From January 1945 he has been attached to the Naval General Staff. He was also Staff Officer 11th Air Fleet and 3rd Mobile Fleet.

Interrogated by: Captain T.J. Hedding, USN.

SUMMARY

The chief objective of this interrogation was to clarify and amplify the answers to NAV MEMORANDUM O on Japanese Naval Planning. Captain OHMAE is probably the most intelligent and well informed Japanese Naval Officer that has been interrogated by this section. His background of assignments in this war have given him exceptional qualifications on this subject. He participated in many of the important campaigns and completed his duties as Chief of the First Section of the Naval General Staff. It is considered that the opinions expressed by Captain OHMAE are indicative of the opinions of responsible and informed Naval Officers.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. In regard to the answers submitted by the Historical Research Department of the Naval General Staff on the subject of Japanese Naval Planning, is the basis factual, are the opinions expressed your own and do you consider these opinions represent the opinions of the Naval General Staff?
A. That pertaining to specific operational plans and the descriptions of these plans are factual; they are based on records. The opinions expressed are my own, and I feel that they do represent in general the opinions of the members of the Naval General Staff.

Q. You have stated that there was a plan to attack HAWAII in March 1942 by shore-based aircraft. From what bases were these attacks to be launched?
A. After the occupation of MIDWAY, attacks would be launched from there.

Q. I would like you to amplify the remarks on the effects of the air raid on TOKYO on 19 April 1942.
A. This raid, though in itself not very destructive, caused considerable discussion and confirmed the need for eastward expansion to acquire bases to protect the home island, the mainland.

Q. When was the original plan for the Greater East ASIA war conceived?
A. I believe about 1938. It was revised and modified from time to time.

Q. In the "Z" Operation Plan, it was planned for the fleet to participate. When U.S. Forces attacked the MARSHALLS in January 1944, why did the fleet not participate in accordance with the plan?
A. At MIDWAY, although we lost some of our carriers, a large percentage of the pilots were recovered. As there were no carriers for these pilots, the air groups were reorganized and sent to RABAUL where these groups sustained very heavy losses. At the time of the MARSHALLS Campaign there were no qualified air groups for our carriers, and we could not commit the fleet without carriers.

Q. Did the "AGO" Plan supercede the "Z" Plan?
A. As a result of the RABAUL Operations in which the Japanese Naval Air Force was depleted, the "AGO" Operation Plan was evolved.

Q. In your opinion what were the basic causes for the failure of JAPAN to carry out her views in the Greater East ASIA war?
A. First, the Japanese were short on spirit, the military spirit was weak, our people were too concerned with their individual problems. The military were too concerned in their own spheres. The Japanese really did not have the true "Bushido." Secondly, the leadership was weak. The Army was weak. The Army was the true leader, and theirs was a selfish attitude. This was also true to some extent of the Navy. Specific causes were: first the defeat of the Japanese Air Force, the lack of materials, the lack of mechanical skills and the lack of transportation. They were in that order.

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Q. Was the failure military or economic?
A. I believe the economic failure was more important. The failure of air power was the reason for the military failure. I believe too much emphasis was put on the offensive in our naval thinking and in our War College training.

Q. At what point in the war did it become evident to the Naval General Staff that failure was inevitable?
A. As for myself, after CORAL SEA and MIDWAY, I still had hope; and after GUADALCANAL in the later part of 1942, I felt we could not win, only we would not lose. After the MARIANAS, we had little chance. After OKINAWA, it was all over.

Q. Do you think that JAPAN was decisively defeated?
A. We lost.

Q. Was the Japanese Navy as a group, the responsible officers, eager to start this war?
A. The Navy was not very eager, but the Army was. The Navy had no voice in the formulation of national policies, the Army had the most influence. I believe that was due to their previous successes in MANCHUKUO and CHINA. The Navy was opposed to the TRI-PARTE PACT.

Q. What influence did the Navy have in the prosecution of the war; on the termination of the war?
A. The Army influence was always the stronger; however, at the end, I believe the Navy had more influence. The Emperor trusted the Navy more than the Army at the end. He trusted Admiral SUZUKI and Admiral YONAI.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 44
USSBS NO. 193

DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1944

TOKYO 26 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Commander YAMAGUCHI, Moriyoshi; from August 1944 to January 1945 Operations Officer on the Staff of Vice Admiral FUKUDOME, CinC Second Air Fleet (FORMOSA), and after 23 October CinC First Combined Base Air Force (LUZON).

Interrogated by: Lt. Comdr. James A. Field, Jr., USNR.

SUMMARY

Commander YAMAGUCHI discusses the PHILIPPINE Campaign of 1944 from the point of view of the naval land-based air forces. So far as the general aspects of the campaign are concerned, his descriptions and statements are considered accurate; many of the statistics offered, particularly as regards losses and replacements of aircraft, are believed to be in error and should be accepted only with considerable reservation. In one sense, however, this very inaccuracy is important evidence of the deterioration of the Japanese position and of the disorganization of Japanese forces in the PHILIPPINES.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. When did you reach the PHILIPPINES in 1944?
A. October 20, I arrived from FORMOSA with the staff of Admiral FUKUDOME, CinC Second Air Fleet. I was Operations Officer.

Q. When were the First and Second Air Fleets combined?
A. About the 23rd of October.

Q. What was the strength of the Second Air Fleet when it arrived in the PHILIPPINES?
A. The Second Air Fleet, on arrival in the PHILIPPINES, was composed as follows:

202 Air Group   (VF-Zeke) 200
341 Air Group (VF-George) 100
763 Air Group (VMB-Betty) 55
  (VMB-Frances) 50
141 Air Group (VB-Judy) 15
  (VS-Myrt) 10
  (VFN-Irving) 20

This gives a total of 450 aircraft not including 15 transport planes of 1081 Air Group, and 150 training planes which remained in FORMOSA. Of these 450 aircraft we could count on at least a half being operational at any one time. Note: Inasmuch as exception is later taken to some of Commander YAMAGUCHI's statistics, it should perhaps be stated here that these figures on the strength of the Second Air Fleet are considered substantially correct).

Q. When the Second Air Fleet moved to the PHILIPPINES did it move entirely or did some of its components remain in OKINAWA, FORMOSA, or KYUSHU?
A. They all moved to the PHILIPPINES; although for some reason a few planes were left in FORMOSA or KYUSHU, actually the entire Air Fleet moved to the PHILIPPINES. Two thirds of the total number given above went to the PHILIPPINES.

Q. Then is it a fair estimate to say that when the Second Air Fleet arrived in the PHILIPPINES it brought about 300 planes total?
A. About 300.

Q. What was the strength of the First Air Fleet about that time when you arrived in the PHILIPPINES?
A. The First Air Fleet had about 100 planes, that was after the damage caused by your Task Force. It was all told 400 in the First and Second Air Fleets.

Q. Now these 400 in both First and Second Air Fleet, how many were operational at any one time?
A. Two-thirds were operational.

Q. Do you know roughly what number of planes the Army had in the PHILIPPINES at that time?
A. The Army had about 200 planes operational, perhaps they might have 300-400 total.

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Q. That was the Fourth Air Army commanded by General TOMINAGA?
A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. About ten days before you came to LUZON, on about 12-14 October, our Carrier Task Force attacked FORMOSA; about how many planes did you lose in that attack?
A. Forty fighters, because most of them had remained at KYUSHU at that time and were safe. Damage was mostly to fighters, also about 50 medium-bombers which flew from KYUSHU were lost. This total of 90 planes was lost in the three days action.

Q. Were these losses of planes in FORMOSA principally lost on the ground or in air combat?
A. Majority of planes lost were in the air.

Q. Did you know if the Army lost any planes in FORMOSA during those three days?
A. I think about 30 losses on Army side.

Q. The losses suffered in these raids on 12 and 14 October, were they serious when it came time to move to LUZON or had they been made up by reinforcements from JAPAN?
A. The damage was very heavy, we had to have reinforcements from JAPAN, and they were replaced. Up to that time we could manage well as far as reinforcements were concerned because they had plenty of planes at home. That was the last time that losses were fully made up, after that reinforcements were not so good.

Q. Do you think it is correct to say that the total losses in FORMOSA were only about 90 Navy and 40 or 50 Army planes?
A. I think these figures approximately correct. Some of the planes were hidden and avoided attack from Task Force. (Note: The figures of losses given here are believed to be far below those actually suffered. Attention is invited to the statement above that "the damage was very heavy", an assertion which is confirmed by a number of other interrogations, and to Commander YAMAGUCHI's willingness to revise his figures upward later in the interrogation.)

Q. What damage did you believe you had inflicted on our Task Force off FORMOSA in those raids?
A. About 30 Army bombers cooperated in this action from KYUSHU. Five carriers, it was estimated, received heavy damage or perhaps sunk. Including other damage, altogether 30 vessels was the result of this attack, the General Headquarters issued results of the action. I have my own opinion which is, I didn't see it myself, I heard crew report, but they like to boost it up. To sum up, the public number would be larger than actually. The published number about 30, the actual number I thought was one-third of that or about ten including the five carriers.

Q. When you arrived in the PHILIPPINES, what mission was assigned the Second Air Fleet?
A. The first mission was to attack the Task Force and to wipe out the American landing force in LEYTE Gulf; second mission would be to fight back the Army landing force.

Q. Was there any plan for giving fighter protection to the Japanese Fleets, to Admiral KURITA, Admiral OZAWA or Admiral NISHIMURA? Did you plan to give them fighter protection?
A. There was no plan like that because of the shortage of planes, but some protection was given to KURITA's force.

Q. What type of protection was given to KURITA's force as it came through, and on what day?
A. More or less, ten fighters were above fleet movements; ten airplanes was standard to be above a fleet. Anti-submarine work ahead of this fleet course, it was done until time the fleet comes off LEYTE. This protection was begun at two hundred miles from CLARK Field and then continued all the way through. Our main force was at CLARK Field.

Q. Was this what was planned or was it later ordered?
A. It was planned.

Q. How much of it was actually performed?
A. 24 and 25th, it was carried out exactly according to plan. On the 26th they could not very well do that on account of the shortage of planes.

Q. Admiral KURITA the other day said he did not get any planes at any time.
A. Actually ten planes were above the fleet but they could not make effective protection on account your Task Force was very strong; cooperation between the Air Force and Kurita's force was not very good, they did their best.

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Q. Why was the cooperation not good, bad communications, visibility or what?
A. It was true communications weren't good; the main reason for bad cooperation was caused by fact they were fully occupied by your Task Force.

Q. We have also been told that there were not enough planes to spare to protect KURITA and that they concentrated on our Task Force to give "indirect protection" rather than give him protection by being over him. Is that correct?
A. That is true in that our object was to attack your Task Force and by doing that we would have given KURITA indirect protection. But it was true there were always ten planes above the fleet; your Task Force was so strong, it wasn't very good.

Q. Was that ten planes all day?
A. There were big intervals between ten planes refueling and coming back, I am afraid these intervals of planes were too long. Admiral KURITA was very unsatisfied with the fact protection was not satisfactory or good enough.

Q. Did he send messages telling you he was not satisfied?
A. Yes, but we couldn't do anything else.

Q. In addition to these planes for cover of Admiral KURITA and for attack on our Task Force, did you have planes for search?
A. Search was a principal duty.

Q. To search and then attack or to search and bring back information?
A. If they searched and found enemy force they would send a message by telephone and then attacking force would come to the scene.

Q. On the 24th, did you feel that you had good information about the position of all our forces?
A. I think the information was not so very good; the work of patrolling was not good particularly at that time and they could not figure out total strength of your Task Force. Generally speaking, the fact that the patrolling work of Japanese Navy was very poor was main reason for final defeat.

Q. Why was it poor, what difficulties did it have?
A. Due to shortage of planes, all they could do was attack and could not spare planes for patrol and reconnaissance. A second reason for this inefficient reconnaissance may have been the poor radar work, also the reconnaissance was not sufficiently appreciated by the personnel assigned to reconnaissance duty who preferred to attack, and had little training in reconnaissance.

Q. What force did you estimate we had and where were they located on the 24th?
A. (Referring to chart). In the afternoon of the 24th, we figured that your Task Force was located east of SAMAR. As to the strength of your force, we were not sure, but we thought a very strong force was there.

Q. Did you feel that was the main Task Force at that place?
A. There was some information to the effect a Task Force was around 130°E; we had an RDF fix on a radio message sent from about 10°N, 130°E.

Q. On the 24th, had your planes attacked this force off SAMAR or any other force?
A. Only the force off SAMAR.

Q. No attacks on any force east of LUZON?
A. No attacks. (Note: Commander YAMAGUCHI was subsequently re-interrogated on this point, and admitted to error, stating that attacks had been made on a force off LAMON Bay, LUZON. He insisted, however, that this was only a light attack, and that the main effort had been directed against the force east of SAMAR.)

Q. Do you know what types of combatant ships, and how many we had inside LEYTE Gulf?
A. We knew transports and battleships were there, but we had no intention to make attack on force in Gulf, simply concentrate on Task Force outside; and KURITA's force was supposed to take care of the transports inside the Bay.

Q. On the 24th, did any planes from Admiral OZAWA's carriers land on your shore bases?
A. Yes.

Q. Had they attacked any of our forces before coming ashore?
A. We received a report that OZAWA planes did attack one carrier.

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Q. Did you know where that carrier was located?
A. It was known later that that carrier group was proceeding north about 14°N 127°E, but it was not known at that time where they were.

Q. How many planes from OZAWA's force landed ashore?
A. About 15 or 20 airplanes, they came in separately and made emergency landings. They landed mostly at CLARK Field; total about 15 or 20 planes landed everywhere between APARRI and CLARK.

Q. Was the information you received from your planes, Admiral OZAWA's planes and other sources, was that information sent out to Admiral OZAWA as soon as you collected it? Did they continue to send out what information they had to the Admiral?
A. They sent all communications whenever they received any information, but I think communication to OZAWA not so good; communication to KURITA was good.

Q. So Admiral KURITA had all the information that was available to you?
A. Yes, all the information we had was transmitted to KURITA.

Q. On this same day on the 24th, were the Army aircraft in LUZON performing the same mission?
A. Army planes were taking care of the land attack. That was because of the fact that Army planes were incapable of adequate sea combat, as they were not trained that way. It is originally planned that Army should take care of land campaign, Navy sea campaign; but the Army personnel training was not rounded enough for sea campaign.

Q. The Army was then attacking ships and landing boats in the Gulf?
A. Yes.

Q. When did the Second Air Fleet begin to use Kamikaze tactics?
A. It started from the 25th, the same day that the First Air Fleet also began.

Q. Had those tactics been planned in advance or planned on spur of the moment?
A. It was planned by Vice Admiral ONISHI (CinC First Air Fleet) about a month previously to our arrival at MANILA, it was planned at the end of September.

Q. How about the plans for planes from OZAWA's aircraft carriers, did they carry out Kamikaze attacks?
A. They did not at that time.

Q. After the battle of the 24th and 25th about what was the naval air strength remaining in LUZON? What losses did you suffer?
A. We lost about one-third of total strength, and later some reinforcements were made, but very little and very slow. We never again came back to the original strength, always going down.

Q. After this battle, what particular missions did the combined First and Second Air Force have? What were their duties?
A. The mission was not changed, it was to continue to attack your forces in LEYTE and they did this. Of course they did not forget your Task Force coming; whenever they saw your force they would fight. The final objective was to cooperate with Army planes in LEYTE Gulf. Additional mission was to protect the Japanese reinforcements of LEYTE.

Q. Who was in charge of protecting the convoys for reinforcement of LEYTE?
A. That was the cooperative effort of First and Second Air Force and the Army; it was done by cooperation of Admiral FUKUDOME and General TOMINAGA.

Q. Was the cooperation successful in this instance; did they work well together?
A. With the very small strength they had, the cooperation went smoothly; it resulted unsuccessfully because of the lack of strength.

Q. When was the reinforcement and defense of LEYTE given up?
A. This reinforcement and defense work was continued until time you occupied SAN JOSE (MINDORO).

Q. When we sent a force and landed at SAN JOSE (MINDORO), were you able to offer effective air opposition to that operation?
A. Our position was very weak because of the shortage of planes. A scattered attack was made.

Q. At that time roughly how many operational planes did you have?
A. About 100 planes, both Army and Navy together, and only 50 could be used freely and effectively.

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Q. Why was that?
A. We could not use most of the planes because of the fact we could not receive any parts.

Q. Was there any interference that day of our aircraft or was it merely shortage of parts?
A. Your interference was very great and all we could do was hide the small numbers of our planes. They were concentrated on defense work; very few of them did take off.

Q. When did you stop receiving reinforcements of new planes and pilots from the north?
A. In December.

Q. You speak in December of having a large number of planes which could not fly for lack of parts. Was it because there were no parts in LUZON, because the parts were at other fields and could not be distributed, or what was the trouble?
A. They had trouble in production, were unable to produce in JAPAN because of lack of raw materials which could not be imported; principally because of submarine attacks and secondly by interference from China-based airplanes. It is also true that there were many spare parts around CLARK but mostly for different type planes than what we were receiving. Also, there was some disorganization, bad automobile transport, and the telephone wires were cut down.

Q. What particular raw materials do you feel were critical or missing?
A. Bauxite.

Q. Was there ever any shortage of aviation gasoline in the PHILIPPINES?
A. Although we did not have plenty of gasoline, we had enough to take care of the planes on hand.

Q. How about gasoline for motor transport?
A. We received a supply from the Army; there was enough - of that too.

Q. On the 1st of January, roughly, what was the air strength of operational planes in LUZON?
A. Both Army and Navy included 50 or less fighters and 20 or less bombers.

Q. Were all pilots at that time Kamikaze pilots?
A. Yes, they were all Kamikaze.

Q. On the way to our landing at LINGAYEN, our convoys were attacked by your Kamikaze planes. What instructions were given to the pilots as to what type of ship they were to attack?
A. Principally transports.

Q. No carriers any more?
A. Not on carriers any more because PHILIPPINES didn't have enough planes to spare; secondly battleships, cruisers, etc.

Q. How many transports did you estimate were hit?
A. I think about 10 or 15 among 200 transports, no great success.

Q. On 6 and 7 January our battleships and cruisers were in the Gulf and were heavily attacked by Kamikaze. Were those your planes or did they come from FORMOSA?
A. All from CLARK Field, no planes from FORMOSA.

Q. Insofar as you know, no attacks were made in the LINGAYEN Area by planes from FORMOSA?
A. As to the combat on or after 12, the planes from FORMOSA participated, but not before.

Q. On the approach to LINGAYEN, we noticed that some pilots still preferred to attack carriers rather than transports.
A. Although orders were definite that they should attack transports first and always, sometimes temptation was too great when the pilot sighted a carrier and he would violate orders to the distress of his command. We tried to persuade them of the importance of attacking the transports again and again.

Q. Was a Kamikaze pilot given a greater promotion for successful attack on one type of ship over another?
A. There is no difference in merit given to the pilots according to the ships they attacked; they were treated the same.

Q. We understood at one time that for hitting an aircraft carrier the pilot would be promoted two grades, for another ship one grade; is that not correct?
A. There was a case like that in the beginning of the campaign, sometime in October. The pilot who sank a carrier got two grade promotion because that was main target at that time. That system of two grades promotion tempted them later on, even though situation had changed.

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Q. When did you leave LUZON?
A. January 8. I flew to FORMOSA during the night.

Q. How many planes got out of LUZON?
A. From 30 to 40 planes was the total evacuated to FORMOSA during January, February, March.

Q. What type of passengers did they take out?
A. The Commanders of the Headquarters, then preference given to pilots.

Q. Aside from staff and command personnel, pilots were most valuable people you had at that time?
A. Yes.

Q. What would be your estimate of the total number of Japanese planes lost in the PHILIPPINES between October and February?
A. I cannot answer very accurately, perhaps from 500 to 1000 both Army and Navy were lost there. (Note: these figures are believed to be considerably below the actual total).

Q. What do you estimate the total number of aircraft reinforcements received from October to December when they stopped?
A. About 200 planes each month, 100 Army, 100 Navy, total about 600.

Q. Did Admiral FUKUDOME request more planes than that; did he ask for a specific number or just all he could get?
A. Every day he sent request to send as many planes as possible.

Q. Did he ever send to headquarters his estimate of the number necessary to hold the PHILIPPINES?
A. He knew that the original strength would not be enough to hold the PHILIPPINES, but even the original strength could not be maintained.

Q. At the time of our LEYTE landings, were all Navy planes in LUZON?
A. Some ten or fifteen in DAVAO and in CEBU-LEGASPI about 50 planes of the First Air Fleet.

Q. Most of them however were in MANILA Area?
A. Yes.

Q. How about the Army?
A. Their main force was at BACOLOD, some at LIPA Airbase.

Q. To return to the FORMOSA attack of 12-14 October, you said total Japanese losses were about 140. Other officers have said they thought there were about 500.
A. That might be the figure which included Army and Navy. My figure is only Navy, particularly Second Air Fleet. If we include Army plane losses, then this figure might be increased, and the Japanese losses made public by headquarters was also 500 planes.

Q. Were there other Navy planes in Formosa at that time that did not belong to the Second Air Fleet?
A. As far as the Navy is concerned, besides the Second Air Fleet the only planes present were from the carriers, flown down from KYUSHU. If you add them in, the losses might come up to 500.

Q. What do you feel was the decisive factor in the failure to defend the PHILIPPINES?
A. First, I think that reinforcement for YAMASHITA's force was not carried out successfully; only one-fifth of the original plan was executed. Second, reinforcement of airplanes was not carried out successfully and control of the air was in your hands.

Q. Why was not this plan of reinforcing YAMASHITA's force carried out?
A. The submarine interference and planes from CHINA took a great loss. The third reason to previous question is shortage of oil for the fleet, the force in the INLAND SEA could not move from there to anywhere else because of the oil shortage. I think those three reasons are about equal in importance.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 45
USSBS NO. 194

ESCORT AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING

TOKYO 28 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Lieut. Comdr. YASUMOTO, Shisei, IJN; Commander of the escort vessel SHIOKAZE, March 1944 to June 1945; Staff Officer of 103rd Convoy Escort Squadron, Seventh Fleet, from June 1945 to end of war.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman Teller, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Brigadier General G. Gardner, USA.

SUMMARY

Submarine attacks on Japanese Shipping in the SOUTH CHINA SEA and adjacent waters became increasingly severe during early 1944 and brought about more strict convoy escort instructions and some uniformity of escort formations. However, the lack of escort vessels and the ability of American submarines to attack convoys in very restricted waters where escort formations could not be maintained, partially nullified these efforts to save the rapidly shrinking Japanese Merchant Marine.

Carrier air strikes on shipping in MANILA and CORON Bays in September 1944 disrupted the regularly traveled North-South shipping route which coasted the Western PHILIPPINES prior to that time. Other forms of air attack were of secondary importance until the last month or two of the war, when aircraft mining, low-level attacks by B-25s, and harassing attacks by day and night search planes contributed materially to the final destruction of Japanese shipping.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Describe the attacks made on convoys while under escort of your ship.
A. While captain of the SHIOKAZE, our convoys received one air attack and five submarine attacks. The air attack was delivered 30 miles west of BAKO in the PESCADORES, in November 1944 about midnight by one plane (probably a B-24). There was no hit and the closest bomb was 200 meters off from the TEIRITSU, a captured French vessel of 8,000 tons. The first submarine attack occurred about 0630 on 10 April 1944, about 7 miles off LINGAYEN Gulf. The convoy was southbound and in following formation. Apparently one submarine succeeded in sinking one destroyer and two of the convoy at a range of about 1500 meters, with three torpedoes apparently fired on the first attack. It is my opinion that six torpedoes were fired of which three sank one ship each, in the following order: destroyer, Army supply ship and an ammunition ship. This was the first casualty which I experienced since a new set of convoy plans and formations had been set up early in March 1944 to meet the increasing difficulty of supply.

The second submarine attack occurred in the middle of June while enroute to MIRI. The convoy was passing very near the southern end of PALAWAN Island on the east side. The time was about 0700. There was a reef to starboard which made it necessary to string the convoy out in column with the escorting vessels close aboard to starboard. In this attack there were no hits, the first of the torpedoes having been very clearly visable because of erratic behavior in the water. The convoy turned into the attack and avoided being hit by any of the others.

The third attack occurred in late June as I was convoying oil tankers north along the West Coast of BORNEO. We received a midnight submarine attack off JESSELTON. Again the convoy was strung out in line because of a narrow inside passage and I was confident that the narrowness of the inside passage would prevent any possible danger of attack. The channel was very narrow but the attack appeared to come from the inshore side and three of the convoy were sunk during a very heavy squall about midnight. This was the first convoy to receive damage in that inward passage off JESSELTON. One tanker and two bauxite cargoes were sunk. The bauxite ships were ships of 5,500 tons, the HIYORI and HIKANE. The tanker was 7,000 tons, it may have been KOKUSEI MARU.

Early in September 1944, I came out from MOJI to MANILA and succeeded in reaching MANILA all right in mid-September. I left MANILA just before the carrier plane attack and took my convoy to BATIKEO Bay in the northern end of PALAWAN. I spent about 20 days vacillating between that bay and ULUGUAN Bay, half-way down PALAWAN, because of the bad conditions in MANILA Bay and CORON which were under attack. In BATIKEO Bay there were many ships, some bound for the EMPIRE and some for the south. About the 1st of October I led my convoy south to MIRI, dropped

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Plate 45-1: Diagram of Submarine Attack on South-bound Convoy 7 miles off Lingayen Gulf about 0630 local time 10 April 1944, Annex A.
Plate 45-1: Diagram of Submarine Attack on South-bound Convoy 7 miles off Lingayen Gulf about 0630 local time 10 April 1944, Annex A.

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some Army personnel at JESSELTON. While at JESSELTON, the LEYTE SEA Battle occurred. We took on oil at MIRI. The original plan had been to return the convoy to the EMPIRE by way of MANILA, but owing to the disastrous conditions in the PHILIPPINEES, plans were changed and with a convoy of oilers escorted by one destroyer, one torpedo boat and one 150 ton submarine chaser, we went to Cape SAN JACQUES.

We left MIRI on the 3rd or 4th of November in the evening and at 0100 the next morning received a torpedo attack. This attack was delivered from an unknown range to port, and one ship of the convoy on the port side of the formation was sunk.

We left SAN JACQUES, hugging the coast in single line formation. At approximate latitude 12°-30°N, longitude 110°E, we received a submarine attack at three in the morning about the 10th of November, during a heavy squall. One ship, the tanker SHUNTEN and one torpedo boat were sunk. This attack appeared to come from the inshore side.

Q. Did you experience any air attack in water near FORMOSA?
A. The SHIOKAZE had a separate duty during January 1945 which was to carry Army and Navy aircraft pilots from APARRI to TAKAO in FORMOSA. The UME was the flagship, the other two ships were the KAIDE and the SHIOKAZE. We left TAKAO 30 January at 0700. An hour after leaving TAKAO we saw formation of B-24s which was proceeding to the attack of TAKAO, and although we were not then attacked, we considered that we had been discovered and therefore altered course to west rather than making straight south for APARRI. After three hours on the western course, we assumed a course direct for APARRI. At 1500 when 20 miles off the southern tip of FORMOSA, about 20 B-25s and P-38s attacked the three destroyers which were proceeding at 21 knots in a triangle formation. According to plan, ten planes from FORMOSA were to convoy us from the southern tip of FORMOSA south, and we therefore thought that the first few planes we saw at 10,000 meters were our own planes of the GINGA Type. It was only when they circled around ahead of our formation and made an attack did we realize it was B-25s making an attack from the sun. The plane formation divided into three groups, attacking one ship each. The UME received about four bombs delivered at low level (30 meters). The KAIKE received about three. The UME sank, her stern broke off. The KAIKE was damaged about the bridge and was able to return to TAKAO. The SHIOKAZE received no hits and was able to pick up survivors from the UME, and take them to TAKAO. The SHIOKAZE received no direct hits but was so shaken up by near misses that her shafts were shaken out of line and one of her turbines was put out of action. Personnel on the bridge of the flagship (UME) were nearly all killed by strafing.

Q. To what extent was shipping to and from TAKAO interfered with by air attacks?
A. It wasn't very much in formation or convoys, single ships were frequently hit.

Q. You spoke of a change in convoy plans and instructions in early March 1944. What were significant changes and why were they made?
A. The submarine attacks had been clearly increasing during January and February, particularly in the FORMOSA-PHILIPPINES Area, and until early in March no precision had been exacted with regard to convoy formations. There was a great variety of opinion with regard to convoy formations, particularly the position of the convoy commander's ship. Plans heretofore had been formulated by individual convoy commanders and because many of the coast defense ship captains were reserves from the Merchant Marine, indoctrination was considered necessary, and from the indoctrination plans came some uniformity.

Q. Sketch a diagram of what you considered to be the best protective formation?
A. At this time the Number One Coastal Convoy Unit issued a book of instructions called "Number One Coastal Escort Unit Operating Plans". There are a great many formations, more then ten formations according to the number of ships. When looking out for submarine torpedoes, the normal formation was a block protected by ring formation - the escort vessels standing off, one thousand or two thousand meters. If there were plenty of escort vessels a screen was sent forward but this situation seldom obtained. This screen was placed about 10,000 meters forward but always within visibility. Well before dawn it was advised that one escort vessel drop back to the limit of visibility and the same procedure at dusk. There was not any settled formation policy as defense against air attacks, but with regard to my own performance during air attacks I ordered the convoy to close formation in order to consolidate anti-aircraft fire.

Q. Under what conditions did convoys zig-zag?
A. Wherever there was room zig-zagging was normal procedure.

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Plate 45-2: Two plots - [top] Submarine attack on convoy off Miri, Borneo about 0100 local time 4 or 5 November 1944 and [bottom] Submarine attack on convoy in approximate position 12 degrees -30'N 100 degrees E at 0300 local time about 10 November 1944, Annex B.
Plate 45-2: Two plots - [top] Submarine attack on convoy off Miri, Borneo about 0100 local time 4 or 5 November 1944 and [bottom] Submarine attack on convoy in approximate position 12 degrees -30'N 100 degrees E at 0300 local time about 10 November 1944, Annex B.

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Plate 45-3: Bombing and strafing attack 20 miles South of Formosa at 1500 local time 30 January 1945, Annex C.
Plate 45-3: Bombing and strafing attack 20 miles South of Formosa at 1500 local time 30 January 1945, Annex C.

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Plate 45-4: Standard Disposition For Convoy Escorts showing screen formation, Annex D.
Plate 45-4: Standard Disposition For Convoy Escorts showing screen formation, Annex D.

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Q. What were the special instruction regarding taking shelter at night or taking particular routes to avoid submarine attacks?
A. Beginning about September 1944 special orders were issued for the coast of INDO-CHINA and the PALAWAN Passage to travel only by day and hide during the night. These orders also covered the waters between MANILA and APARRI and the chain of FORMOSA. From August 1944 our casualties had been especially high in area MANILA to FORMOSA.

Q. To what extent did the convoys escorting through the PHILIPPINES receive air assistance?
A. One escorting plane from MANILA used to come in the morning and met convoys going south off LINGAYEN Gulf and stay with them until they entered MANILA. There was another single plane for convoy searches north and west of APARRI; also a single plane per convoy escorted along the coast of INDO-CHINA and the northwest coast of BORNEO. Sometimes there were two planes, almost always one.

Q. Did the convoy commander have direct communications with the planes?
A. Only twice in my experience has any communications succeeded. We had radio sets especially intended for that communication but they never worked.

Q. To what extent was radar used for protection of convoys?
A. On my ship, the SHIOKAZE, there was no radar for surface search but my equipment would pick up planes at a maximum of 70 kilometers. In very good conditions, we could pick up one plane between 50 and 70 kilometers.

Q. What were the greatest problems of convoying between May and September 1945 in the EMPIRE-KOREA Area?
A. The main problem was getting ships across TSUSHIMA Straits and getting men and materials from the Asiatic Coast to JAPAN.

Q. What caused the principal ship losses during this period; mines, aircraft, or submarines?
A. During the month of June it was principally submarines within the YELLOW SEA and also in TSUSHIMA Straits. July it was mines in the waters along the south coast of KOREA, and along with the mines machine gunning by seaplanes. Mines continued to be, to the last, an extreme hazard to the approaches of FUSAN. Then the B-25s and P-38s added to the difficulty up to the end of August. At the end, the worst hazard was B-25s bombing and strafing.

Q. What forced shipping to take the circuitous route along KOREA and the west shores of the YELLOW SEA?
A. It was because of submarines.

Q. To what extent did single search planes flying in the YELLOW SEA interfere with the shipping?
A. They never were much trouble. I think there was some difficulty in the Western YELLOW SEA from four-motored search planes. There we were using nothing but small ships of about 1000 tons in order to use inward passages as much as possible, and on ships of this size strafing attacks were very serious factor.

Q. Were ships still moving principally in the day and hiding at night during this period?
A. The passage across the TSUSHIMA Straits was always night passage on account of planes. The passages along the coast of KOREA were daylight passages because of the closed waters and islands.

Q. To what extent did night attacks by planes interfere with passage of TSUSHIMA Straits?
A. There were few sinkings but they were a nuisance.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 46
USSBS NO. 195

GUADALCANAL - MIDWAY - MUNDA and RABAUL

TOKYO 27 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Lieut. Comdr. YUNOKI, S., IJN, main battery fire control director on HIEI (BB) at Battle of GUADALCANAL, 12-14 November 1942; gunnery officer on DD at Battle of MIDWAY, escorting transports; gunnery officer at MUNDA, February-June 1943.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

SUMMARY

Guadalcanal
   (a) HIEI received about 85 hits from cruisers during night battle at GUADALCANAL, 12-13 November 1942. Dive-bombed and torpedoed during next day. Sank from damage and scuttling, night 14 November.

Midway
   (b) Transports received one unsuccessful high horizontal-bomber attack late afternoon 3 June. No hits but possible minor superstructure damage from one near miss. Night attack from a seaplane. One transport damaged but not sunk. About 1000 Marines destined to occupy SAND Island and 1000 Army for EASTERN Island. Transports joined main body and returned JAPAN following carrier battle.

Munda
   (c) MUNDA and KOLOMBANGARA Field used for staging planes in attacks on GUADALCANAL. MUNDA under constant bombing attacks by dive and torpedo-bombers from GUADALCANAL. Food and ammunition dumps regularly destroyed. Runways damaged but repairable. KUROSHIO and OYASHIO (DDs) sunk by dive-bombers while assisting KAGERO (DD) which was sunk by mines. KIRIGAWA MARU sunk by dive-bombers off VELLA LAVELLA. MINEGUMO and MURASAME (DDs) sunk by cruisers in night action. Mines in vicinity of MUNDA seriously affected supply lines. Heavy-bombers damaged RABAUL landing strip; dive-bombers damaged supply ships.

TRANSCRIPT

Guadalcanal

Q. What was your mission at the Battle of GUADALCANAL, 12-14 November 1942?
A. I was fire control director for the main battery on the HIEI (BB), which was Vice Admiral ABE's flagship. We were leading the KIRISHIMA and were supposed to bombard the airfield, but when we saw your ships we bombarded them instead. We think we sank several, but we had special ammunition for the field so were not too sure.

Q. How many hits did you receive?
A. About 85 hits above the waterline from cruisers and destroyers during the night action. No torpedo hits until the next day. We were hit by a number of aircraft torpedoes, but only three exploded. We received dive-bomber hits several times during the day. About noon we were attacked by 9 Boeing bombers which were very high. There may have been two groups of bombers. No hits.

Q. Was the HIEI sunk as a result of these hits?
A. No, it was scuttled during the night. We lost about 300 men out of 1300.

Q. Were any ships sunk during the night of the 12th?
A. I don't think so. We did not have radar and when we turned on our search lights the American cruisers concentrated upon the HIEI, which was not lost until the next night.

Q. Before the HIEI sank, did it bombard GUADALCANAL?
A. No, the damage was too great. When it was dark we transferred to destroyers. We went to RABAUL, then to TRUK.

Midway

A. What was your mission at MIDWAY?
Q. I was gunnery officer on a destroyer. We escorted supply and troop transports to occupy MIDWAY. Second Destroyer Squadron, JINTSU flagship. 12 destroyers about 15 transports. About 1000 Marines were to land at SAND Island and about 1000 Army on EASTERN Island. There were also some engineers.

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Q. Was your force ever attacked?
A. Yes, it was attacked twice. The first time was the late afternoon on 3 June, the day before the main battle. The second time was about midnight the same night.

Q. What type of attack was it?
A. The first attack was from high horizontal Boeing bombers. It was a surprise attack. We were on a straight course about 10 kts. We did not know the bombers were there until the bombs exploded in the water. One bomb landed close to a transport and caused a little superstructure damage. I was severely punished because we did not open fire until the bombs splashed, but we did not have radar and they were too high to easily see. No other hits made on our ship.

Q. When was the second attack?
A. About midnight the same day, a seaplane attacked one of the transports. It was very low. We thought it dropped a torpedo. It hit one transport and damaged it, but did not sink. The plane strafed killing a few men.

Q. Who was in command of the occupation force?
A. Vice Admiral KONDO. Rear Admiral SHIRAISHI was Chief of Staff.

Q. Where did you go when you retired?
A. We joined the main body which returned to JAPAN. Later the troops returned to SAIPAN.

Munda-Rabaul

Q. How many fields did you have at MUNDA?
A. Two. One at MUNDA and one at KOLOMBANGARA. We had 24 fighters based there but they were all damaged a week after their arrival. After that, planes did not base there. It was used to service planes from RABAUL after attacking GUADALCANAL.

Q. How many anti-aircraft guns did you have there?
A. 18x75mm, 50x25mm, 20x40mm, single and twin mounts. A large number of the machine guns which gave better results against dive-bombers. We think we shot down about 300 planes during the 5 month period beginning February.

Q. Did you have any radar equipment?
A. We had none at MUNDA. We received notice of your airplanes by radio from our spotters on other islands.

Q. How much damage was caused by our bombing raids?
A. We were not often attacked by heavy-bombers at MUNDA, but the dive-bombers and torpedo bombers made very serious attacks. Food and ammunition dumps were also constantly destroyed. Runways were badly damaged by raids but were usually fixed again within 48 hours.

Q. Were you present at MUNDA when any of the ship bombardments occurred?
A. I left there 27 June 1943 and went to RABAUL, but I was present during some. Many did not do much damage except to runways. Much damage there, but was repaired in two or three days. Men became restless during shelling.

Q. Were any ships sunk by aircraft during that period?
A. Yes. In May 1943 the destroyer KAGERO was sunk by mines between KOLOMBANGARA and GIZO. The destroyers KUROSHIO and OYASHIO went to help it but dive-bombers came out of a rain squall and sank them at the same time. They didn't expect dive-bombers in such heavy rain. The MICHISHIO (DD) was badly damaged in the same attack.

A small cargo vessel was also sunk by dive-bombers off the northern coast of VELLA LAVELLA about the same time. The transport KIRIGAWA MARU was sunk by dive-bombers in early February 1943 off east coast of VELLA LAVELLA.

Q. Do you know of any ships sunk or damaged during the night surface action in that area?
A. In March 1943, the DDs MINEGUMO and MURASAM were sunk during a bombardment by your cruisers. That is all I know about.

Q. Did you sweep the mines after they were laid?
A. No, we had no mine sweepers in that area. Because it was near GUADALCANAL, it would not have been safe to operate them. We saw mines being laid by ships and planes but could do nothing about it. It made it very difficult to get supplies. I had to leave MUNDA in a small wooden cargo boat.

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Q. Did you have sufficient supplies to continue fighting?
A. When I left MUNDA in June 1943, we had about 3 months food supply but only about 1 months supply of anti-aircraft ammunition. We expected you to occupy MUNDA soon. We had about 12,000 men in the area but not much ammunition. We lost about 200 men on anti-aircraft guns from strafing between February and June 1943. It was difficult to maintain anti-aircraft gun crew discipline.

Q. How effective was the bombing upon RABAUL?
A. I was only there December 1943 to January 1944. The horizontal-bombers did damage to the runways because they carried more big bombs. We couldn't fire machine guns at them because they were too high. We just had to sit and watch. The dive-bombers did some damage to the landing strips but not as much as big bombers. The dive-bombers did much damage to shipping and supply dumps. Strafing planes did some damage to machine gun crews when they came in less than 1000 meters.

Q. How effective were the night attacks?
A. At RABAUL they did very little damage. At MUNDA food dumps were burned. Lost more sleep than supplies.

Q. Did you have any Japanese Army pilots operating in that area?
A. Except during the first week at MUNDA when we had only Navy pilots, there were no pilots there. Just landed and flew away again. Some Army pilots were on KOLOMBANGARA but they did not do much.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 47
USSBS NO. 199

CONVOY ESCORT AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING

TOKYO 30 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Rear Admiral HORUICHI, Shigetada, IJN, Chief of Staff, First Escort Fleet from May 1944 to December 1944; Commanding 901 Air Group, FORMOSA from January 1945 to September 1945.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman Teller, USN.

SUMMARY

Submarine attack was the greatest menace to Japanese shipping in the SOUTH CHINA SEA and adjacent waters throughout the war. Carrier-based air attacks became an important factor in September and October 1944 and caused a major change in shipping routes between the Japanese EMPIRE and N.E.I. and also forced a revision in convoy organization. Land-based air attacks became important after 1 January 1945, practically eliminating surface supply to FORMOSA and forcing abandonment of air cover to convoys by 1 April 1945.

Inefficient administration and control reduced the full employment of shipping. Lack of escort vessels also prevented its full employment.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. When you became Chief of Staff, to the First Escort Fleet in May 1944, what did you have in the Escort Fleet?
A. At the beginning the strength of ships consisted of approximately ten destroyers, eight coast defense ships, three mine sweepers, one or two chasers, and one or two armed transports. The armed transports carried very little freight and were called special gun boats. At that time the organization was called First Escort Squadron. In November 1944 the title was changed to First Escort Fleet.

Q. What was the area of responsibility of the First Escort Fleet?
A. The area included the supply line from MOJI to FORMOSA to the PHILIPPINES to SINGAPORE and North BORNEO and a line to PALAU. It did not include the MARIANAS.

Q. What other fleet, besides the First Escort Fleet, was carrying out convoy duty at that time?
A. The First Escort Fleet was the only organization responsible for convoying ships over long distances; such as, from the EMPIRE to the PHILIPPINES and EAST INDIES and PALAU. However, in each outlying area such as SINGAPORE, SOERABAJA, AMBON, MANILA and TRUK the Area Fleet of that locality was responsible for the escort duty. In the case of the MARIANAS, the Second Squadron was responsible. Escorting in the RYUKYU ISLANDS was under the control of the Commander of SASEBO Naval Station. This escort responsibility terminated at KIIRUN, FORMOSA.

Q. As your escort squadron increased in number, how did the organization change?
A. The escort ships were grouped in one, two or three ships to accompany an important convoy at first. The senior captain of the escorting vessel acted as convoy and escort commander. This however, proved too burdensome for the senior commander, and consequently about the summer of 1943, the practice was begun to assign a convoy commander with the rank of captain to each important convoy. By May 1944, there were 15 such captains assigned to the First Escort Fleet. About June 1944, further strengthening of the organization was made by adding four Rear Admirals as escort convoy commanders. These officers were placed in command of the more important convoys and commanded both the escort and the ships being convoyed. In these cases, the captains mentioned above were in charge of the convoy ships only. These groups sometimes convoyed ships to MANILA, but for the purpose of reinforcement of LEYTE, the commander of the fleet at MANILA (Southwest Area Fleet) took charge of the operation for this purpose. In July, an additional organization was set up called Coast Defense Group of which four were organized to augment convoy protection in particularly dangerous waters. These groups were composed of coast defense ships and were commanded by captains or commanders. By November 1944, the First Escort Squadron had a total of 60 vessels composed of approximately four destroyers, 45 coast defense ships, four sweepers, two sub-chasers and one or two special gun boats which were the converted transports. The First Escort Squadron was commanded by Vice Admiral NAKAJIMA, Torahiko, whose headquarters were at TAKAO. In

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November, the First Squadron became the First Escort Fleet and Vice Admiral KISHI, Fukuji took command. The Grand Escort Fleet Headquarters in TOKYO was responsible for escorting matters throughout all areas. The Commander of the Grand Escort Fleet issued general instructions to subordinates regarding matters of convoy, and exercised authority over Commandants of all Naval Stations with regard to escort matters.

Q. Did you convoy Army ships in your group?
A. Yes, the Grand Fleet Headquarters in TOKYO arranged for the make up of the convoys including Army ships which during the time of my duty, made a large proportion of the traffic. These Army transports were placed under the convoy commander and remained under his command until they arrived at their destination.

Q. Did you have adequate communications to conduct the operation of your various forces?
A. The communication between main escort fleet headquarters and outlying stations and ships en route between them was adequate. Communication to aircraft involved in convoy protection was mainly via the bases of the aircraft. Due to the limitation of equipment and training of communication personnel, the ship-to-plane communication was not very satisfactory. A training program on voice radio was undertaken and improvement was being made by January 1945.

Q. Was the full employment of ships prevented by any of the following causes and if it was, to what degree: Inadequate administration and control of shipping, lack of crews for the ships, or lack of escorts?
A. In administration, there was a certain amount of inefficiency due to the divided control of ships between the Navy, the Army and Ministry of Transport. This divided control led to inefficiency in distribution of material for repairs, of the proper assignment of facilities to effect the repair and in the distribution of crews. For example, at the point of repair the administration powers were actually under Navy control; but in the case of merchant vessels, the Ministry of Transport was responsible for initiating the repair. These deficiencies were important throughout the war. When submarines sinkings became very high, the inadequate number of escort vessels became an important factor in the reducing the usefulness of ships, as convoys would remain in port awaiting proper escorts.

Q. What was the most serious form of American attack on your ships during the time you were Chief of Staff of the Escort Fleet?
A. Throughout the war, submarines were the most important constant menace. In October 1944, Carrier Task Force attacks were most serious. The operation of land-based aircraft did not assume an important threat until about one month after I left my duty with the Chief Escort Fleet, in January 1945.

Q. What changes in your convoy procedure were caused by the carrier attack in September 1944?
A. In October 1944, as a result of the Carrier Task Force attacks along the PHILIPPINE and FORMOSA line, the convoy route to SINGAPORE was changed from the west coast of PHILIPPINES to the east coast of the ASIA Mainland. If we had intelligence of impending Task Force attacks, we would order the convoys to scatter.

Q. What effect did the Carrier Task Force attacks on SAIGON and HONGKONG have on convoy procedure?
A. Because the supply of petroleum production to JAPAN from the NETHERLAND EAST INDIES was most important, it was essential that convoys continue along the Asiatic Coast. These convoys were made smaller and the strength of the escorting vessels was greatly increased including destroyers and occasionally a cruiser. These convoys were organized for a fight until the finish.

Q. When you were commandant of the 901st Air Group at TAKAO, how many aircraft did you have for convoy protection?
A. When I took command of the First Escort Fleet Air Squadron, its authorized strength was 212. Actual strength was 170 aircraft of the following types: Flying boat - both Type 97 and Type 2, Zero Type land-based fighters, carrier type attack planes, land attack planes - Type One and Type 96, Zero Type seaplanes (three seats) and spotters (two seats). This air squadron was responsible for convoy coverage in the area south of Lat. 27°N and north of Lat. 8°N covering the entire SOUTH CHINA SEA and shore of PHILIPPINES and the Asiatic Coast. The most important bases for operation were in FORMOSA, TOKO (Seaplanes), BAKO (landplanes), TANSUI (seaplanes); in the PHILIPPINES, MANILA (landplanes and seaplanes), IBA (landplanes), SAN FERNANDO DEL NORTE (seaplanes), LAOAG (landplanes), and BASCO in the BATAN Islands (landplanes); on the Asiatic Mainland; AMOY (seaplanes), HONGKONG (landplanes and seaplanes); on HAINAN, SANGAH (landplanes and seaplanes). Most of my fighters were concentrated there - HAINAN. My headquarters were at TOKO, FORMOSA.

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Q. Did you not have twin-engine bombers specially equipped for anti-submarine work?
A. We had at the most 36, Type 96 bombers, divided between FORMOSA, LUZON and HAINAN. Half with radar and half with the magnetic device, which was very effective in detecting submarines.

Q. Did the aircraft which carried this magnetic device also attack the submarines, or did it merely discover them for your surface vessels to attack?
A. Both. It delivered air attack or called other planes and surface ships in to attack. Indication of submarines was made by visual method; planes would maneuver or signals would be dropped from planes.

Q. Was your aircraft strength kept at 170, or was it increased or decreased?
A. It decreased.

Q. What was the principal cause of the decrease?
A. A steady decrease was due mainly to the continuous daily attacks from the PHILIPPINES based landplanes on bases in FORMOSA. Losses at air bases along the Asiatic Coast were suffered from attacks by planes based in CHINA.

Q. To what extent did single search planes coming from PHILIPPINES interfere with your protection?
A. The attack by single search planes from the PHILIPPINES wasn't very important. Occasionally Carrier Task Force attacks would also damage our air strength. The end of March, because of the constant air attacks, the aircraft of the First Escort Fleet Air Squadron were forced to withdraw from the South CHINA Coast and FORMOSA Coast to SHANGHAI and KYUSHU.

Q. Did the Army fighters assist you in protection of convoys along the South CHINA Coast?
A. The Army group, Number Two Air Group, stationed at CANTON, assisted on calls and sometimes by flying over convoy ships. However, there were not many, airplanes available.

Q. To what extent did American aircraft interfere with surface supply of FORMOSA?
A. By the end of January, large ships could only come to KIIRUN, and coast traffic around FORMOSA was limited to very small craft moving at night. TAKAO was completely closed to large ships.

Q. To what extent did the night aircraft interfere with shipping to TAKAO?
A. The attacks on small boats plying between the PESCADORES and FORMOSA Area at night were very severe.

Q. What were your most important missions?
A. The most important missions in my area were: first, to protect the shipping of oil from the south to the EMPIRE; second, the supplying of the PHILIPPINES. I must confess that both missions failed. It is my opinion that although the officers assigned to convoy duty fully appreciated the vital strategic importance of maintaining supply lines to keep the Combined Fleet able to operate at all, the high command took the counsel, short sighted, of the Combined Fleet Staff in allocating insufficient strength to the maintenance of the vital supply lines. Convoy officers were only specialist auxiliaries of the Main Force and became therefore important.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 48
USSBS NO. 200

JAPANESE AIRBORNE MAGNETIC DETECTOR

TOKYO 31 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Lieutenant Commander OKAMOTO, T., IJN, a naval aviator. Staff Officer of First Escort Fleet Air Squadron and General Headquarters, Grand Escort Fleet.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman Teller, USN.

SUMMARY

The Japanese Navy first employed an Airborne Magnetic Detecting instrument in antisubmarine warfare during the middle of 1944. The instrument had an effective range of 150 meters under average conditions and 250 meters under ideal conditions. The best height for an aircraft employing MAD was considered to be 10 to 50 meters depending on pilot's skill. Aircraft equipped with MAD were employed principally to sweep ahead of convoys or to exploit a submarine contact made by other means. It was planned to use MAD equipped aircraft to sweep heavily travelled convoy routes, but lack of aircraft and equipment prevented this. It was considered sufficiently reliable to warrant calling in surface craft to an initial contact. (Note: The Naval Technical Mission in JAPAN and Technical Air Intelligence Groups have covered the technical features of this instrument.)

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Where have you had operational experience with the Magnetic Detector used in aircraft?
A. In November 1944, we began to employ our MAD between FORMOSA and the PHILIPPINES and at the beginning of 1945 we began to use it between JAPAN and SINGAPORE. The very first experience with the MAD was in March 1944. My experience began in November 1944 with the MAD. We called the instrument JIKITANCHIKI (Magnetic Detector). From November 1944 until March 1945, I was at the headquarters of the First Escort Fleet Air Squadron at TAKAO.

Q. What type of planes were equipped with the MAD?
A. Type 96 land attack planes and Type Zero three-seated, seaplane reconnaissance, Type 97 carrier attack plane and the Tenzan plane.

Q. Was the MAD used as search instrument or as a supplement to other instruments?
A. During the day time, we employed the MAD gear; at night we used radar and radar intercept. The MAD was used in direct support for convoy. We would use it in searching against submarines that might attack the convoy. However, after contact was made with submarine by radar we called in the planes and the MAD is used to plot the speed of the submarines. In addition to direct cover of convoy by this instrument, it was planned to use the MAD to sweep the convoy route from CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO (just south of SHANGHAI) to SAISHU Island and then to TSUSHIMA and then to SASEBO and SHIMONOSEKI Straits. This cover was to be a strip 30 miles wide.

Due to lack of fuel and planes we were unable to make regular magnetic sweeps; instead, the aircraft were called out if a submarine was found or suspected there and we would commence searching operation with the MAD for that particular submarine. However, at night this route was swept by one radar equipped plane leaving from each terminal and covering the 30 mile width. If planes and fuel had been available, it was planned to use 80 planes to cover this channel with MAD in one day. It was planned to use six simultaneously to patrol this channel. When American submarines forced the Japanese shipping to follow the route from CHUSAN around the shore of the YELLOW SEA, a radar search of the direct convoy route between CHUSAN and the EMPIRE was maintained; but also coverage by MAD planes was given to convoy route along the coast. For this purpose aircraft was stationed at SHANGHAI, CHUSAN, TANSUI (FORMOSA), SHINCHIKU (FORMOSA). The U.S. air attacks on the FORMOSA Area prevented the establishing of sweep routes between FORMOSA and the PHILIPPINES although it was planned to do so. After the U.S. attack practically eliminated shipping through the YELLOW SEA, there was still maintained sweeps in the channel between KYUSHU, SAISHU and TSUSHIMA.

Q. What was the best height for your aircraft to fly when using the MAD?
A. Expert pilots flew at 10 meters; ordinary pilots flew at 50 meters.

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Plate 48-1: Diagram showing 6 MAD-equipped aircraft required for proper sweep for convoy coverage, Annex A.
Plate 48-1: Diagram showing 6 MAD-equipped aircraft required for proper sweep for convoy coverage, Annex A.

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Plate 48-2: Diagram showing track flown by MAD equipped plane after initial submarine contact, Annex B.
Plate 48-2: Diagram showing track flown by MAD equipped plane after initial submarine contact, Annex B.

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Q. What was the range of detection from these heights?
A. Under average conditions trained personnel could detect submarines at the depth of 150 meters from a plane flying from 10 to 50 meters above the surface. The radius range of detection in other direction was approximately 150 meters. However, experienced pilots with equipment in excellent condition and good operating personnel could detect a submarine at a maximum depth of 250 meters.

Q. Describe by diagram the employment of MAD planes in convoy coverage?
A. See Annex A.

Q. What was the procedure when your MAD discovered a submarine?
A. See Annex B.

Q. Can you determine the course of the submarine by tracking with the MAD?
A. Yes.

Q. Was the MAD sufficiently reliable to justify calling in surface craft to develop each contact?
A. Yes. Some difficulty was experienced in contacts with sunken hulks, particularly around the EMPIRE Area. One method of determining that it was a hulk contact was the presence of dead fish which resulted from the depth charge. It was considered that fish would not be found in numbers around a submarine.

Q. Were certain squadrons equipped with and specially trained for the MAD?
A. Yes.

Q. How many aircraft were equipped with this device during the war?
A. The following air groups were assigned to work with convoys and for anti-submarine operations:

Group Area Number of Planes
903 JAPAN 120
951 JAPAN 120
901 FORMOSA 200
  MANILA  
  INDO-CHINA  
936 SINGAPORE 120
  INDO-CHINA  

1/3 of these aircraft were equipped with radar.
1/3 of these aircraft were equipped with MAD. (Of these some planes (Type 96 land attack) had both equipments).
1/3 of these aircraft were not equipped with either.

Q. How many sinkings were attributed to MAD?
A. Between August 1944 and July 1945, approximately one year, there were seven submarines sunk in the South Sea Area as a result of the MAD and four in the EMPIRE Area.

Q. How much training was required to produce a group to operate a MAD plane?
A. Three months special training with the equipment.

Q. Was this equipment used for automatic release of depth charges?
A. Just the markers were. The bombs were not.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 49
USSBS NO. 201

CONVOY PROTECTION OF SHIPPING
NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES - NEW GUINEA AREA

TOKYO 29 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Commander CHIHAYA, Masataka, IJN, who was attached to the Staff of Fourth Advanced Southern Fleet at AMBON from March 1944 to February 1945 and Staff of Combined Naval Fleet in TOKYO from February 1945 to September 1945. He was Anti-Aircraft Gunnery Officer while attached to the Staff of Combined Fleet.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman Teller, USN.

SUMMARY

The Fourth Advanced Fleet lacked adequate escort vessels to protect shipping in the NETHERLAND EAST INDIES - Western NEW GUINEA Area. Submarines and aircraft were approximately equal in damage inflicted. Aircraft attacks were largely responsible for stopping surface supply to the Japanese bases in Western NEW GUINEA. Night attacks by aircraft were very troublesome, daylight activities of our search aircraft took considerable toll of small craft.

The city of AMBON was completely destroyed by the Army B-24 raid on 25 August and adjacent airfields were made inoperative for about one month.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What were your experiences with protection of shipping in the Southern Areas in 1944?
A. I was Operations Staff Officer, Fourth Advanced Southern Fleet Headquarters at AMBON. My concern was more with convoy escorting than with direct tactical operation. Until May 1944, the main transport operation had been supplying BIAK from MANILA. After the fall of BIAK, there were many ships, cargo and miscellaneous special jobs in the MOLUCCAS Area. After May, chief operation was supply from SOERABAJA to AMBON and ship traffic between MANILA and the HALMAHERA Area. From July on, removal of personnel from KAI Islands to AMBON and from BIAK and SANGA on the western extremity of NEW GUINEA to AMBON. There was a heavy attack on AMBON on the 25th of August. Vice Admiral YAMAGATA, Commander of the Fourth Advanced Southern Fleet Headquarters, was killed in an airplane crash near SHANGHAI on the way home in March 1945.

Q. What was the organization of your escort vessels?
A. Our escort vessels at AMBON consisted of one torpedo boat, the KIJI, and 15 converted trawlers of less than 500 tons and a maximum of 10 knots speed. No regular convoy routines were possible owing to the scarcity of escort vessels and their slowness. During the bad months of May and June 1944, my unit borrowed seven or eight small ships from SOERABAJA. At no time were any large naval ships, such as DD's or DE's, used for escorting in my area. The ships escorted were carrying provisions and personnel belonging to both the Army and the Navy. The escorting duty was the Navy responsibility. The only craft going without escort in my area were sailing boats; vessels of 1,000 tons and up received escorts. The area of escort responsibility for the Fourth Advanced Southern Fleet was between the eastern limit of 140? East longitude and a line from PALAU to TALIABO Island in the NETHERLAND EAST INDIES and from that island a line running 160° True.

Q. Were submarines used in your area for supply?
A. On the first of August of 1944, one submarine made one trip to BIAK; but she came under attack from a chaser north of BIAK before reaching BIAK and, without completing her mission, returned to AMBON. She was carrying food and medicine.

Q. What do you know of the loss of Japanese shipping in this area?
A. About three 2,000 tons ships were sunk by submarines near MANOKWARI, in the spring before the BIAK attack. In the end of May of the BIAK Campaign, six destroyers went up from AMBON to bombard BIAK and one of them was sunk by a skip-bomb up to the northeast of MANOKWARI. They did not complete their mission of the bombardment, nor did they have a full scale surface battle.

Q. Did they lose any ships in the surface battle?
A. There was no other serious damage.

Q. How far east were you escorting?
A. We went twice to WAKDE in May.

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Q. When did you stop convoy into BIAK?
A. In the middle of May. That was the last surface group sent in to supply, and they received severe damage on that occasion from a group of B-24's bombing from 3000 meters.

Q. Which caused the most shipping losses in Western NEW GUINEA at that time - submarines or aircraft?
A. If you take the total, submarines. In my whole area, up until May of 1944, the losses to submarines and aircraft were about equal; after May 1944, the air losses increased in proportion.

Q. How much interference with the shipping in the NEW GUINEA Area was caused by night attacks?
A. From early May through July 1944, the night attacks caused greater interference. I thought that it was PBY's doing it, operating from PORT DARWIN. Our ships had no radar, speed was low, lookouts were very unreliable and fear of submarines had made us take a special route, traveling by day and hiding by night. Beginning in May 1944, the principal damage you did was to bomb our hideouts so we could not take shelter. Our hideouts were at: MANLEA, BOEROE Island, bays on the north and south coasts of MANGOLE Island, the strait between MANDIOLI and BATJAN Islands and the north coast of MISOOL Island. We had been using a route along the south side of MANGOLE Island but when we thought that route was discovered, we took the route to the north side. When the SEIA MARU first went into North MANGOLE for the night, she was sunk, and when we finally got word in AMBON it troubled us as to what to do next. It was the first time this harbor on the north side of MANGOLE had been used.

Q. When the night attack on these harbors became severe, what did you do?
A. Changed all the night rendezvous and selected new routes along side of the island. We had no night intercepting planes.

Q. How long after that did it take our night planes to find you?
A. Harbors were only used two or three time before changing to another harbor; in fact, there wasn't a safe way of avoiding an attack.

Q. When did you stop convoy of shipping to West NEW GUINEA?
A. They stopped supply to MANOKWARI just before the BIAK action. At the end of June or first of July, we sent one ship into MACCLUER Gulf. That was the last supply. The KIJI (?) went alone in August to TONGERAI Cape (perhaps SANGARA) for evacuating this area. The Navy felt that the area had to be abandoned. The airfield at BABO was abandoned and personnel and some material were removed by this ship which made the last trip.

Q. During the period, approximately March to August of 1944, which air attacks caused most damage to shipping, the day air attack or the night air attacks?
A. It had been night attacks from May to August; after which, with operations commencing from your BIAK base, B-24 daylight attacks became the worse.

Q. When did you stop supplying the AMBON Area by surface ships?
A. By the end of July. The last ship to go into it was ITSUKUSHIMA MARU. On the 30th of July she set mines in the entrance of the Gulf and withdrew to LEMBE, east of MENADO, where she received serious damage from one group of about nine B-25's which attacked her in port. She remained hidden, repairing at LEMBE, for one week and then started down to the JAVA SEA under tow, where she was sunk by a submarine approximately 6°S and 115°E.

Q. Were you forced by the threat of air attack to stop supplying the HALMAHERA Area or by shortage of ships?
A. We had stopped sending supplies in there because the troops that had been intended to go over to the NEW GUINEA Area from HALMAHERA could not make it; so we already had extra supplies at HALMAHERA.

Q. When did you stop convoying in your area to all intents and purposes?
A. Middle of October 1944, a 1,000 ton ship came over from SOERABAJA to AMBON. She made port safely; but on the return journey, she was sunk by three B-25's in position 5°S, 126°E. That was the last ship that came into AMBON. She had left port the evening before. At about 1000 the following day, was sighted by a B-24 (the daily four-engine search planes came over AMBON about 1000 or 1100 each day) and the attack occurred about 1700 that day. This attack consisted of strafing by two of the B-25's which silenced the AA batteries and immediately following, the third B-25 bombed from low level and sank her.

Q. To what extent did the single search planes, which covered your area daily, damage the shipping.
A. Many small craft and auxiliary ships were sunk by search planes, but not any big ships with names.

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Q. Were your large ships equipped with many guns?
A. Up to June 1944 a 1,000 ton supply ship would have four 25mm. machine guns; after June she would have about ten.

Q. After you stopped sending large ships in your area, did you use small ships to supply or evacuate from those islands?
A. We used small craft for supply to October 1944; after October 1944 it was completely stopped. Once a month, beginning December, a plane would come from SOERABAJA; then after the LUZON occupation by U.S. Forces, the number of planes was increased to three or four per month from SOERABAJA. In February 1945, I received orders and left AMBON by plane, proceeding to TOKYO via SOERABAJA. Admiral YAMAGATA and half of his naval staff left AMBON in March. The remainder of his staff remained there until the end of the war. In April 1945, a number of ships evacuated some of the Army and Navy from AMBON and islands in the vicinity.

Q. What type of naval AA weapons were being given the greatest emphasis in the beginning of 1945?
A. The most emphasis was placed on the 25mm. machine guns, next on the 12cm. high angle guns. This emphasis was placed on both production of guns and on installation on all types of naval vessels.

Q. Did you personally experience any air attacks at AMBON?
A. Yes, on the 25th of August 1944, about 50 B-24's attacked AMBON and almost completely destroyed the city, but not our headquarters or the harbor installations and ships. There were three attacks on AMBON by B-25's and B-24's mixed. The heaviest was an attack at the end of August by 100 to 120 planes which lasted all day, rendering the fields unserviceable for about a month and destroying buildings and facilities on the airfields. There was no damage to light material which could be hidden in safety tunnels. There were almost daily attacks during September amounting to a total of about 150 planes. At the end of October after the LEYTE Campaign had begun, the airfields were under frequent attacks, but we mended there quickly and what we could not mend we made look as if they were mended in order to draw the attack from LEYTE. We also had dummy planes installed. After August there were few attacks on the harbor and that perhaps was because we had installed a great many machine guns on the ships and shore. The city of AMBON was completely destroyed.

Q. Did those dummy planes draw the attacks of our planes?
A. Yes.

Q. How successful were your AA in shooting down our planes at AMBON?
A. Those of which I have sure knowledge on raids were: crashing on land - two P-38's, crew killed; two B-25s, crew killed. On the water, one B-25, crew saved by PBY from rubber boat; one P-38, crew saved.

Q. How many heavy AA guns did you have at AMBON?
A. 28 heavy AA guns at AMBON; 14x12cm. high angle guns and 14x8cm. high angle guns.

Q. During 1945 was the Navy able to obtain all the AA ammunition that was needed for the many new guns being built?
A. It was extremely short in JAPAN, but the fleet received all it needed.

Q. What do you consider the best type of ammunition to use in AA machine guns?
A. I considered the best ammunition loading to be three high explosive to two incendiaries; however, due to the shortage of incendiary, we were forced to use four to one.

Q. What was the size of the main battery guns on the battleship YAMATO?
A. 45 cm. and 45 caliber. Initial velocity less than 800 meters per second. Range 38,000 meters.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 50
USSBS NO. 202

AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY AND LOSS REPORTS

TOKYO 31 OCTOBER 1945 - 1 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Commander FUKAMIZU, IJN, who was in charge of the First Section of the First Department of the Koku Hombu, concerned with aircraft distribution records from January 1943 until the end of the war.

Interrogated by: Lt. Cmdr. R.P. Aikin, USNR.

Allied Officer Present: Lieut. R.C. Garred, USNR.

SUMMARY

Commander FUKAMIZU had prepared a graph on which were plotted: (1) Annual overall naval aircraft production and wastage totals from December 1941 to August 1945. (2) Annual naval aircraft production and wastage totals by plane type, i.e. fighters, bombers, (torpedo and dive), medium-bombers, Baka, float planes, flying boats, land-based reconnaissance planes, trainers and transports. (See Annex A)

Commander FUKAMIZU also had prepared a chart breaking down wastage totals by (1) Months from December 1941 to August 1945. (2) Cause, i.e. combat and non-combat losses and (3) Principal campaigns. The monthly totals coincide with those plotted on the graph. (See Annex B)

The attached interrogation conducted over a two day period established the basis on which the graph and chart were prepared.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Did you assemble the reports yourself?
A. Yes. An assistant helped me prepare the chart on monthly losses, but the production and loss graph I made myself.

Q. Is the monthly loss chart the official reply to Nav. Memo. No. 18 submitted through the Navy Liaison Office?
A. No. I understand that is being prepared by officers in the GUNREIBU.

Q. Are you familiar with aircraft production figures as well as losses?
A. No. I accepted Capt. TERAI's (GUNREIBU) figures on production. Note: Aircraft production totals graphed coincide exactly with data furnished FEAF by GUNREIBU officers and published in FEAF Intelligence Memorandum No. 22; the production totals also are the same as those furnished FEAF - see Intelligence Memorandum No. 28 - by General Endo, former head of Air Ordnance Bureau of the Ministry of Munitions. The latter figures are the same as those given to Comdr. Paul Johnson.)

Q. How did you prepare the loss reports?
A. On the basis of periodic plane availability reports received at least monthly and occasionally more often, from the Air Fleets and their subordinate commands.

Q. Do you have these reports?
A. No, they were burned.

Q. Then, how could you construct the graph and chart of losses?
A. I know the exact strength by plane types of the Japanese Naval Air Force at the beginning of each fiscal year (April) and also the exact monthly production as well as the approximate losses during each campaign and major action.

Q. What was the purpose of the Air Fleets and their subordinate commands sending by dispatch and mail-plane availability and loss reports to the First Section of the First Department of KOKU HOMBU?
A. They were sent to my department for two reasons: (1) To make the figures of losses available to the Minister of the Navy, and (2) in order to carry out my duties. When the GUNREIBU directed the General Affairs Department (SOMU BU) of the KOKU HOMBU to supply tactical and training units with aircraft, it was the function of my department to determine from what source

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such additional aircraft were to be obtained, i.e. civilian factories and/or naval arsenals, depots or other tactical or training commands. Accordingly, to accomplish its mission, my section was furnished with monthly and other periodic plane availability reports of all tactical and training commands. This was necessary so that we could know from what source aircraft would be available for supply to tactical commands.

Q. Regarding your loss and production chart, how were the exact loss figures, shown on the graph, obtained?
A. We know the exact annual production figures throughout the war and the exact strength of the IJNAF at the end of each fiscal year (31 March). By subtracting the total strength at the end of the fiscal year from the sum of the same figure for the start of the preceding year and the total years production, we arrive at an exact annual loss figure.

Q. Do the production figures represent actual acceptances by the Navy?
A. I don't know. However, it is my opinion that only planes actually accepted by the Navy are included in the production figures. During the first part of the war, all planes produced were considered Navy acceptances. This practice was found to be unsatisfactory and was abandoned in 1944 - August, I believe. From then on, only accepted aircraft are used in the production figures.

Q. Why did you change your system of figuring production totals?
A. There was approximately a 30-50 percent discrepancy between the monthly aircraft factory production figures and the actual number of aircraft the Navy accepted.

Q. What were the reasons for the rejections?
A. Aircraft were not accepted when they failed to meet Navy specifications. There were some minor defects, modifications, adjustments, additional equipment to be added (belly tanks for over-water ferrying) etc. Some of the aircraft had to be returned to the factory for as long as a month to correct these deficiencies.

Q. How were these rejections listed in your availability reports?
A. Such aircraft were not subsequently included in the following month's factory production figures. However, at the end of the fiscal year in March, rejected aircraft were deducted from that month's aircraft production figure in order to close the yearly records and carried over into the following fiscal year.

Q. Do production figures include both aircraft produced by Navy arsenals and civilian factories?
A. Yes, both are included.

Q. The 1944 production is graphed at 14,178 aircraft, whereas previous information obtained from the GUNREIBU and Munitions Ministry shows a total of 13,418. Which is correct?
A. The lower figure does not include the OKA. (BAKA Bomb).

Q. Were aircraft requirements, established by GUNREIBU, generally met?
A. In the majority of cases, the factory orders were not fulfilled in the specified time limit. After U.S. bombings became intensive, this situation worsened. Generally speaking, orders for standard aircraft models (ZEKES, KATES etc.) were more easily met. Orders for the newer types, (FRANCES, MYRT etc.) were often 30 to 50 percent incomplete by the time specified in the contract.

Q. What is your estimate of in-transit losses of aircraft being ferried from depots to tactical units?
A. Approximately 3 to 5 percent throughout the war. In the early part of the war, the great distances to outlying bases was the main factor in ferrying losses. Toward the end of the war the distances to bases were shortened but flight personnel were less experienced. The percentage of losses remained fairly constant.

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Plate 50-1: Japanese Naval A/C Production  and Wastage chart from December 1941 to August 1945, Annex A.
Plate 50-1: Japanese Naval A/C Production and Wastage chart from December 1941 to August 1945, Annex A.

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Annex "B"

Japanese Naval Aircraft Losses
Dec '41 to Aug '45

Aircraft Expended in Greater East Asia War

Plane Type Fiscal 1941 Fiscal 1942 Fiscal 1943 Fiscal 1944 Fiscal 1945 Grand Total
Dec Jan Feb Mar Total Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Total Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Total Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Total Apr May Jun Jul Aug Total
Fighters 44/32 35/34 31/38 26/60 136/164 36/35 57/47 137/70 103/05 104/61 36/54 120/57 84/66 48/70 47/64 25/73 25/76 822/768 65/95 40/101 73/114 93/132 108/113 134/125 112/184 149/155 124/130 80/183 102/154 90/187 1170/1673 50/123 60/206 370/165 46/86 34/190 70/220 210/275 295/297 110/340 95/230 85/200 148/245 1593/2577 335/260 175/220 140/230 180/320 160/400 990/1430 4691/6612
Torpedo & Dive Bombers 19/24 11/23 15/26 8/20 53/93 19/10 90/8 189/12 49/11 23/12 13/8 103/12 58/12 10/10 7/9 38/15 32/12 631/131 13/15 23/25 26/41 30/48 30/71 60/82 40/36 70/81 25/77 10/86 22/121 18/81 367/824 20/72 60/190 220/105 20/131 40/135 30/104 120/80 100/160 50/115 20/95 33/100 80/70 793/1357 105/95 35/100 81/110 40/120 50/200 311/625 2155/3030
Medium Bombers 25/11 11/21 40/25 5/37 81/101 11/14 21/16 9/18 42/10 46/16 24/14 25/13 30/17 18/15 23/13 21/16 21/12 291/174 8/27 26/36 28/57 20/51 15/51 30/41 24/78 52/58 20/64 23/81 4-/53 20/66 306/663 25/85 25/70 98/44 25/75 14/70 44/80 91/60 80/72 44/80 26/90 24/77 49/88 545/891 40/75 30/50 45/90 60/90 50/110 225/415 1448/2244
Recce                             1/0     1/0       1/3 0/2 0/0 1/3 0/2 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/10 2/3 5/6 12/8 4/9 4/6 6/8 19/9 16/8 8/6 7/8 5/6 9/7 97/84 18/11 13/16 8/14 11/15 15/29 65/85 165/179
Transports 0/4 0/5 0/5 0/6 0/20 3/2 0/2 2/4 1/3 2/3 1/4 1/4 3/3 1/4 1/3 3/3 2/2 20/37 4/3 1/2 0/3 2/4 3/1 2/4 2/3 4/4 3/3 2/4 2/5 0/3 25/39 4/8 8/8 5/9 4/10 6/7 3/8 14/7 10/4 16/6 7/5 8/5 9/7 94/84 12/7 11/6 14/7 7/10 8/10 52/40 191/220
Float Planes 2/11 15/9 13/15 13/15 43/50 6/10 38/13 11/14 34/17 32/17 39/14 39/17 26/13 7/12 10/13 13/16 20/14 275/10 15/19 25/21 9/17 15/32 17/24 16/22 12/36 15/32 5/32 8/27 15/32 12/34 164/328 15/16 32/67 70/28 15/32 20/31 21/47 35/59 76/47 25/27 28/32 15/58 22/52 374/496 20/76 24/76 35/80 56/90 64/89 199/411 1055/1455
Flying Boats 1/5 0/5 0/6 1/4 2/20 1/2 1/1 2/0 0/4 11/2 0/2 0/2 1/2 0/0 0/3 2/4 2/3 20/25 2/3 0/0 1/5 2/5 2/4 3/5 1/4 3/3 1/5 0/5 4/5 0/5 19/49 2/3 7/5 14/5 1/2 2/3 4/8 8/5 9/5 3/3 1/3 2/2 4/4 57/48 4/9 3/8 4/10 7/11 8/10 26/48 124/190
Trainers 0/18 0/21 0/27 0/26 0/92 0/24 0/20 0/21 0/22 0/27 0/27 0/30 0/30 0/36 0/36 2/34 2/39 4/340 1/30 3/45 1/50 0/40 0/33 0/60 0/55 0/61 0/67 0/72 0/80 0/97 5/690 0/70 0/80 0/85 0/82 0/100 0/100 25/110 15/105 10/87 7/100 15/95 50/124 122/1138 80/110 60/100 70/110 120/140 80/100 410/560 541/2820
Total 91/112 72/118 99/142 53/168 315/540 76/97 207/107 350/139 229/162 214/138 113/123 288/135 202/143 84/141 89/141 104/161 104/158 2064/1645 108/192 118/230 138/287 163/315 175/299 245/339 192/459 293/396 178/378 123/458 185/450 140/473 2058/4276 118/380 197/632 789/632 115/427 120/542 178/575 522/605 601/690 266/664 191/563 187/543 371/597 3655/6675 614/643 351/576 397/651 481/796 435/948 2278/3614 10,370/16,750
Note: 1 2 3 4   5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12   13 14 15   16   17 18 19 20 21 22 23   24         25 26   27 28 29 30     31   32   33      

NOTE: Number of Planes Expended = Combat Losses/Operational Losses

Notes:
1. Malaya, Philippines, Hawaii.
2. Malaya, Philippines.
3. Java, Singapore.
4. Ceylon, Surabaya, Batavia.
5. Port Darwin, Bataan.
6. Darwin, Coral Sea.
7. Midway, Aleutians.
8. Attack of Port Headland.
9. Guadalcanal, 1st & 2nd phase Solomons.
10. Guadalcanal Operation.
11. South Pacific Naval Battle.
12. 3rd phase Solomons
13. 1st phase Rennel.
14. Off Isabella, 2nd phase Rennel.
15. Attack on Oro Bay.
16. New Guinea, Oro Bay, Florida Islands.
17. Air battle off Lunga.
18. Kula GUlf, Kolombangara, Rendova.
19. Defense of Munda, Vella Lavella battles.
20. Attacks on Rabaul.
21. Attacks on Rabaul.
22. 1st to 4th attack on Gilberts, Rabaul and Bougainville air battles.
23. Attack on Marshalls, 6th air battle at Bougainville.
24. Landings on Kwajalein and RUDT attacks on Marshalls.
25. Saipan operations.
26. Attack by China-based planes, Tinian landing.
27. Landings on Peleliu and Morotai.
28. Air battles of Taiwan.
29. Defense of Leyte, Battle off Philippines.
30. Defense of Philippines.
31. Defense of Okinawa & Iwo Jima, attack on homeland by Task Force.
32. Defense of Okinawa.
33. Losses to B-29's and shipboard planes.

--INSERT--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 51
USSBS NO. 205

 

ALEUTIAN CAMPAIGN

TOKYO 1 NOVEMBER 1945

TRANSPORTS AT THE BATTLE OF THE KOMANDORSKIS

Interrogation of: Commander KUWAHARA, Tadao, IJNR (Retired), a wartime officer with three years, one month of service, Chief Navigator of the converted cruiser ASAKA MARU during KOMANDORSKI action.

Interrogated by: Captain J.S. RUSSELL, U.S.N.

SUMMARY

The ASAKA MARU was one of two armed transports at the naval battle fought off the KOMANDORSKI ISLANDS, 27 March 1943 (TOKYO date). The navigator of the ASAKA MARU describes the part played by the transports in that action.

NARRATIVE

(All dates and times are those of TOKYO, zone minus 9.)

The ASAKA MARU, of which Commander KUWAHARA was navigator, was a 7,100 ton, 17 knot, converted cruiser. She had four 14cm. main battery guns and an anti-aircraft battery of four 25mm.HA machine guns and six 7mm.HA machine guns. Aft on the starboard side she carried a deck torpedo tube and on the port side a catapult and two seaplanes: twin float, three-seat monoplanes, Type Zero. (Neither of her planes was launched during the KOMANDORSKI action.)

At KATAOKA, PARAMUSHIRO, the ASAKA MARU embarked Colonel YAMAZAKI, his staff of about 50 persons, some 10cm. army guns and ammunition. She carried no cargo in any amount because of her military conversion. Colonel YAMAZAKI was on his way to take command of the ATTU garrison. At the same time the SAKITO MARU, a 7800 ton, 18 knot, merchantman loaded six to eight 7.6cm. army AA guns, some four or more 25mm.AA machine guns, much ammunition, food stuffs, other supplies and equipment for ATTU. She carried also a few troops, about 200 to 300, and some lumber. They were to make their third attempt to get supplies to ATTU.

On 23 March a small cargo ship of about 3000 tons, and 10 knots speed (whose name Commander KUWAHARA could not remember) sailed in company with one destroyer, the USUGUMO. This ship was also loaded with supplies for ATTU, but, due to her slow speed, was sent on ahead to rendezvous with the main convoy at a point about 60 miles south of the KOMANDORSKI ISLANDS.

On 24 March the ASAKA MARU and SAKITO MARU sailed from KATAOKA, escorted by the First Destroyer Squadron (less the USUGUMO, assigned as above, and the HIBIKI, away on overhaul.) The escorting ships were: 1 CL - ABUKUMA, flagship of ComDesRon One; and four DD's - IKAZUCHI, INAZUMA, WAKABA, and one DD whose name Commander KUWAHARA could not remember.

On 25 March the cruiser force sortied, with ships as follows: two CA - NACHI, with Commander Fifth Fleet embarked, MAYA; one CL - TAMA.

All three of these groups were to rendezvous south of the KOMANDORSKIS, thence to proceed in force to ATTU with the objective of driving through any surface resistance the Americans might offer. The NACHI carried three seaplanes. The MAYA was equipped to carry three, but Commander KUWAHARA was not sure whether or not she carried any on this particular voyage. The MAYA was on loan to the Fifth Fleet from another fleet and was not too conversant with the doctrines extant in the Fifth Fleet, hence was not considered top-notch in readiness for the task in hand.

The second group, of which the ASAKA MARU was a part, ran into a violent storm on 25 March and had to slow down. It became apparent that they would not, therefore, make the appointed rendezvous on 26 March because they calculated that the cruisers would also have to slow. The second group, however, sighted the KOMANDORSKIS on the morning of 26 March, and turning south they made contact with the cruisers at about noon. The slow merchantman and the USUGUMO had not yet joined so the dash for ATTU was postponed until 27 March. Meanwhile they steamed north and south along a meridian through the southeast tip of BERING Island.

They were steaming south in column, order from the van NACHI, MAYA, TAMA, then ABUKUMA, WAKADA, 1 DD name unknown, IKAZUCHI, then ASAKA MARU, SAKITO MARU, and INAZUMA. At 0200 a column left through 180 degrees, to a true course of north, was begun. Sunrise was about 0350,

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although there was a long morning twilight. Just as the ASAKA MARU was executing her turn to the north, and the SAKITO MARU and INAZUMA had yet to turn, the mast of one ship was sighted on the horizon on the starboard quarter, range 25,000 meters, (about 13½ miles). (Commander KUWAHARA was a little confused on the true bearing of the contact. His sketch would put it about due west. The time, he could only estimate based on the four cruisers and three destroyers having already made their successive turns in column, ahead of him in the movement beginning at 0200.)

The sea and wind were almost calm, the visibility excellent. The initial contact was thought to be the slow merchantmen and the USUGUMO. However, when the ASAKA MARU could count the masts of more than two ships, she forthwith sent a "red Morse urgent" signal to the ABUKUMA saying that the enemy was in sight. (This was a spelled out red searchlight signal.) The ABUKUMA could not seem to understand the message and after several repetitions the ABUKUMA finally acknowledged for it after about 15 minutes. During this time the range closed rapidly. The NACHI meanwhile had intercepted the message and was the first to turn toward the enemy. (Commander KUWAHARA had the NACHI swinging southwest then south with the enemy bearing approximately southwest. In the enemy formation, on a southeasterly course, he had a DD leading, then in column a CA, two OMAHA CL's and a DD.)

The MAYA and TAMA seemed very late to turn. The leading American ship, a destroyer, opened fire with bursts directly above the NACHI. The NACHI opened fire simultaneously. There was damage to the NACHI in the first five minutes of action. Something set fire to the leading American cruiser (the CA) after about thirty minutes and just as the TAMA was getting into action. The smoke from this fire drifted off to the southwest. About this time the ASAKA MARU and the SAKITO MARU were ordered to get clear by withdrawing to the northeast. The DD, INAZUMA, which had been, following them in column, was directed to stay with the forces in action. After this the course of the battle was obscured by smoke. As they proceeded to the northeast in calm sea and wind, and a clear sky, the visibility was excellent. The KOMANDORSKIS were in sight after 0600. Smoke was made out on the starboard bow as they headed northeasterly. This turned out to be the USUGUMO, who had left her slow merchantman to the eastward and was coming in at maximum speed to determine if the ASAKA MARU might be enemy. The USUGUMO continued on to join the action, but was ordered by the NACHI by radio to return to the escort of her merchantman. The ASAKA and SAKITO MARUS altered course to the west and passed through an oil slick, which they later learned was from a damaged American cruiser.

They received word that two groups of bombing planes were on their way from ADAK. Three PB2Y's (he insisted on the type) shadowed the group. Once one came close enough for the ASAKA MARU to open with her anti-aircraft guns. After this the shadowers stayed at a greater distance.

Shortly after 1000 they received orders from the NACHI to return to PARAMUSHIRO and that the ABUKUMA and two DD's would be sent to join them. The fleet arrived at PARAMUSHIRO on the morning of 29 March, while the ASAKA MARU arrived on the evening of 29 March. There were no submarine contacts en route, although warnings of the presence of submarines were received. The slow merchantman and the USUGUMO arrived on 30 March.

In the battle, the NACHI had received much damage about her superstructure and weather decks, with many topside personnel killed. The TAMA had light damage, the MAYA no damage, while the ABUKUMA hardly even fired her guns. Commander KUWAHARA learned from discussions among the officers at the base that both the cruisers and destroyers had fired their torpedoes, set at slow speed, for maximum range, and had made no hits. He heard also that one American light cruiser (OMAHA class) had received some damage, was listing and trailing oil, but had managed to control her damage. He understood also that the Japanese shooting was not very successful due to the erratic courses of the targets and the thick smoke. The loss of power on the NACHI after the opening salvo was known to him; for the resulting confusion he blamed the engineer officer for cutting in a cold boiler, rather than the gunnery officer who failed to get the word to his guns to go into local control.

After the action on 27 March no cargo ships reached ATTU. However, many trips were made by submarine, and the destroyers KAMIKAZE and NUMAKASE each made about two trips. Colonel YAMAZAKI reached ATTU in April 1943, by submarine, and took over command of the Army defense force on that island from Lieutenant Colonel YONEYAMA, who had had command there up to this time.

There were two converted cruisers in ALEUTIAN service, his own ship, the ASAKA MARU, and also the AWATA MARU. Lately these had been assigned to running in cargo to ATTU and KISKA and to escorting fast merchantmen for the same purpose because of the shipping losses sustained in the Northern Area. The AWATA MARU left the Northern Area shortly after the evacuation of KISKA; the

ASAKA MARU stayed on until November 1943.

Commander KUWAHARA said that shortly before he reported to the ASAKA MARU in February 1943, an Army supply ship, the KOMPIRA (KOTOHIRA is the same name) MARU had left PARAMUSHIRO for ATTU and had not been heard from. She carried supplies and material for the garrison, possibly a few troops.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 52
USSBS NO. 224

RABAUL

TOKYO 27 OCTOBER 1945

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Interrogation of: Commander DOI, Yasumi, IJN ; Gunnery Officer, Staff South Eastern Fleet March 1943-1945, Based at RABAUL.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

SUMMARY

About 200 Japanese Navy planes and 60,000 troops operating from RABAUL against the American advance in the SOLOMONS. U.S. heavy-bombing raids seriously damaged landing strips but never put all strips out of commission at the same time. Harbor shipping severely damaged by dive-bombers. Mining of RABAUL not effective. Effective mining in MUNDA, BUIN and KAVIENG. Radar on Cape ST. GEORGE gave about one hour warning of approach of U.S. aircraft from the SOLOMONS but carrier raids came as a surprise. Bombardment of installations not very effective. Sufficient food and supplies but deficient in anti-aircraft ammunition. U.S. occupation of SOLOMONS stopped Japanese expansion to the southeast. Initial turn of the war considered occurred at MIDWAY forcing new naval tactics. Naval air losses in SOLOMON Campaign detrimental to later defense. Loss of shipping had severe economic effect upon end of war.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Who was in command at RABAUL while you were there?
A. Vice Admiral KUSAKA in charge of naval installations, General IMAMURA in charge of the Army. They had equal authority.

Q. How many airfields did you have in operation?
A. Three Navy fields: (1) East Airfield (2) West Airfield (UANARANAU) and TOBERA Airfield. There were also two Army air strips but they were not much good.

Q. How many planes were based there?
A. The Navy had a maximum of about 200 planes. The Army had hardly any. Only a few search planes, but they did not fly very much. Most of the Army planes were in BURMA. The tactical ideas of the Army and Navy were not the same so there was no good coordination between them. There were seaplane facilities but only a few operated there. Not over twelve. After they began to operate they found it was too difficult so they just dwindled away. After that they only came with supplies. All planes were fueled from 200 liter drums.

Q. What was the effect of our air raids upon RABAUL?
A. When the heavy-bombers came, the landing strips were seriously damaged but there were not very many casualties. The dive-bombers were very serious against ships and did practically all of that kind of damage. One day, about 11 November 1943, was a bad one. Dive-bombers sank four supply ships in the harbor. I don't remember the names. Against supply dumps, the damage was about the same between heavy-bombers and dive-bombers. After the planes left for TRUK in February 1944, your targets shifted to strafing of personnel. That was very distressing.

Q. How long did it take to repair the runways after a bombing raid?
A. Usually about 10 hours. Since all of the fields were never bombed at one time, the bombing of the fields was not too serious. However, if planes tried to land on the damaged fields or on the Army fields which were very rough, they usually were damaged. If all fields had been bombed at the same time it would have been serious.

Q. How effective were the mining operations?
A. The water at RABAUL was about 60 meters deep so it was not very effective. We did not even sweep. I do not think that any ships were sunk there from mines. In MUNDA, BUIN and KAVIENG the mines were very serious and there were many casualties. I do not remember how many.

Q. Did you have any radar installations at RABAUL?
A. Yes, we had a secret one, well hidden on Cape ST. GEORGE. It could pick up planes about 100 Kilometers away. We also had coast watchers with radio at BUIN and EMPRESS AUGUSTA Bay. We generally had about an hour's notice of the approach of your planes from GUADALCANAL. That was enough time to man our guns and put up fighters. Carrier attacks would sometimes surprise us.

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Q. Did you have any fire control radar?
A. The first anti-aircraft radar fire control equipment was brought down about September 1943. It was the first Japanese equipment of its kind. It did not work very well, and was broken completely in October 1943. We tried having fighters fly alongside bombing formations to give us the altitude and speed, but due to communication difficulties that did not work very well. The heavy-bombers always came over at the same altitude, so we thought we knew it pretty well; but we missed a little on speed. We think that we shot down several hundred American planes, including those that were damaged and did not get back to their base.

Q. Who manned your guns?
A. It was about half Army and half Navy. The Navy manned all guns over 12.7 cm. We had 12 x 12.7cm. guns, 8 x 12cm. guns and about 60 other AA guns. In addition we had about 200 x 20mm. machine guns.

Q. Did you have adequate ammunition?
A. No, we were always very short of anti-aircraft ammunition. It was normally brought in by transport, but as shipping conditions became more difficult, due to aircraft attack, it was brought in on destroyers. About October 1943 it was brought in twice by submarine.

Q. How many shore-based personnel did you have at RABAUL?
A. About 3300 Navy. About half of these were Navy labor battalions. The rest were garrison troops. There were no special landing troops there. Prior to April 1943 there were very few Army troops at RABAUL, but after that about 60,000 were drawn in from the western end of the island.

Q. Did you expect the Americans to land at RABAUL?
A. There was divided opinion. The Navy thought that it would not be profitable and unnecessary for you after you captured LAE and SALAMAUA and started through the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS. The Army thought that you would, so moved in all the troops. When you went into the MARIANAS we were sure that you would by-pass us. At that time it was not important that you capture RABAUL, since it was not contributing to our defense of the EMPIRE.

Q. How did you get your aircraft to RABAUL?
A. Most of the Navy planes flew in, either from the PHILIPPINES or from TRUK. The Army flew in a few, but they had navigation losses so later brought them in by ship. The ships generally passed around the northwest end of NEW IRELAND but sometimes to the south depending upon the intelligence we received about your patrolling submarines.

Q. What aircraft squadrons were based at RABAUL?
A. It was the Eleventh Air Fleet, 25th and 26th Squadrons, composed of fighters and bombers. Sometimes the squadrons varied.

Q. Were you present during any ship bombardments?
A. Yes, I was at MUNDA and VILLA. There was very little damage, but it was very fearsome. Not very accurate. Sometimes we couldn't even find where the shells landed. We were kept sleepless and fatigued. Sometimes fuel or supplies would be hit. Mostly just damaged airfield.

Q. Were any of the American planes that were shot down shipped back to JAPAN?
A. I do not think so, but the radio equipment was removed and shipped.

Q. Did you have any motor torpedo boats operating in that area?
A. At one time we had a few at the southern end of BOUGAINVILLE, but they were mechanically imperfect and we stopped using them. Some boats which were to be used against battleships were at SHORTLAND but they were not successful.

Q. How did you control your night fighters?
A. Only with searchlights. They did not have radar. Only two would be up at a time.

Q. How did you maintain supply lines to your bases in the SOLOMONS?
A. Early in 1943 we used destroyers. Later we used small boats. Boats entered a secret harbor on NEW GEORGIA opposite ARUNDEL Island. They operated at night and were hidden during the day. The ships were not over 500 tons.

Q. Did you expect us to land at MUNDA?
A. Yes. We planned to mine it by aircraft, but the mines did not arrive in time. Later we had trouble with them so did not use them. The weather was also bad for mining. Three days before you landed, we mined it by using destroyers.

Q. When you were on RABAUL did you receive information when other islands were occupied?
A. Yes, we received immediate radio notice from the SOLOMON ISLANDS. We also knew when KWAJALIEN, GUAM and SAIPAN were captured.

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Q. What effect did the loss of the SOLOMONS have upon your plans?
A. It stopped our expansion to the southeast. Our original plans did not call for expansion, but when we got to the SOLOMONS we thought that we should go further. We did not plan to capture AUSTRALIA, but we thought that we might go as far as the NEW HEBRIDES. When you captured the SOLOMONS, our orders at RABAUL were to hold there. It was very expensive to the Japanese Navy to try to recapture GUADALCANAL. We lost many pilots and planes which we needed later. Also lost ships. The Army lost many trained men.

Q. What factors caused you to lose the war?
A. I was a student in our Army-Navy Research Institute and Staff of the Bureau of Military Affairs. We were studying the total war, hoping that we might find some way to win. We felt that on the whole the Navy was placed in a situation which was under the general management of the Army. If the Army and Navy had studied it more widely, we would have done better. After our first success at PEARL HARBOR and CEYLON we received a severe setback at MIDWAY. I think that was the first turn of the tide. We had to change our naval plans but did not have many big carriers to do it with. We also studied economic and morale subjects like fuel, and iron. We thought that we could hold on for a long time, but in the end the destruction of our shipping was very bad for us.

Q. How large were the guns on the MUSASHI and YAMATO?
A. In the Navy College we were not permitted to talk about those ships. The guns were listed as "40 Special". I think that they were 46cm. (about 18 inches).

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 53
USSBS NO. 225

ESCORT AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING

TOKYO 1 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Commander KUWAHARA, Tadao, IJNR (retired), who was commander of an escort vessel engaged in convoy work between MOJI and SINGAPORE; civilian experience as master of N.Y.K. liners; while in Military Affairs Office, assisted in recruiting and training crews for Naval supply ships and civilian ships.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman Teller, USN

Personnel Present: Dr. J.V. Wehausen

SUMMARY

Three ex-NYK liners converted to the auxiliary aircraft carriers CHUYO, UNYO and TAIYO were employed in transporting aircraft from the EMPIRE to TRUK and RABAUL in 1942 and 1943. The carrier air strikes on shipping along the INDO-CHINA Coast, 12-16 January 1945, destroyed 11 tankers and freighters, a cruiser and four escorts of which Commander KUWAHARA has personal knowledge. In addition, 16 more freighters and 10 escorts were destroyed by carrier and other air strikes along the south INDO-CHINA Coast during the same period.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Tell me about your experience in the CHUYO between the EMPIRE and TRUK, while transporting airplanes.
A. I made three trips in CHUYO between the EMPIRE and South Sea. On the second trip, the ship carried about 54 planes of various types, including some heavy Army planes. About 30, including the Army planes were unloaded at TRUK and the ship then proceeded to a position about 200 miles north of RABAUL in early December 1942. At this point about 24 Navy fighters were launched for delivery to RABAUL.

Q. What was the normal number of planes taken each trip?
A. 50 to 60 planes.

Q. What was the largest plane you carried?
A. The largest planes carried were light-bombers, between six and seven tons of weight, twin-engines.

Q. What ships were used for this purpose of aircraft transport?
A. The CHUYO, TAIYO and UNYO. All were ex-NYK passenger boats and were 22 to 24 knot ships.

Q. Were you attacked by submarines during any of your trips from the EMPIRE to the Inner South Sea Area?
A. I left TATEYAMA for SAIPAN on 30 May 1944 at 0500 with a convoy of seven vessels and four escorts. Three of the ships were transporting 10,000 troops to SAIPAN. This was the last convoy to go to SAIPAN. The vessels were the following of which the first three carried troops

Name Approx. size Date sunk
TAKAOKA MARU 6,000 G.T. 5 June
HAVRE MARU 5,000 6 June
KATSUYA MARU 6,000 4 June
KASHIMAZAN MARU 4,000 6 June
TAMAHIME MARU 4,000 5 June
KATORI MARU 4,000  
SHOEI MARU 3,000  

The convoy was attacked by submarines on the 1st through the 6th of June, all attacks occurring at about 1500-1600. The submarines had been following another convoy bound for JAPAN. When the two convoys crossed, the submarines turned around and followed my convoy. During the first three days none of the attacks were successful. On 4 June, the convoy was attacked simultaneously from the two front quarters and the port aft quarter. KATSUYA MARU was sunk. On 5 June, we were attacked again from two sides and TAKAOKA MARU and TAMAHIME MARU were sunk. On 6 June, we were attacked once more on two sides, simultaneously. KASHIMAZAN MARU, carrying aviation gasoline, was hit during this attack and exploded. About an hour later another attack sank HAVRE MARU. Of the troops of the three troop transports noted above 80% were saved. During each attack the escorts depth charged the submarines, using sonar to locate them. Possible damage may have been inflicted on submarines on 1,2,4,5 June since, on each of these days oil appeared on the surface. However, no sinkings were claimed.

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Plate 53-1: Chart showing approximate track of South bound convoy to Saipan which lost 5 ships to submarine torpedo attack 1 to 6 June 1944, Annex A.
Plate 53-1: Chart showing approximate track of South bound convoy to Saipan which lost 5 ships to submarine torpedo attack 1 to 6 June 1944, Annex A.

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Q. During your duty in the UKURU, what was her employment?
A. The UKURU was a 1,000 ton escort vessel in the 101st Flotilla of the First Escort Fleet. The 101st Flotilla was composed of the flagship KASHII, light cruiser 4,500 tons, three escort vessels of 1,000 tons and three escorts, of 4,700 tons. While in UKURU, we made two round trips between MOJI and SINGAPORE, stopping at TAKAO.

Q. Describe the attacks which you received during those two trips.
A. On the first trip we had eight empty tankers bound for SINGAPORE and seven or eight escort ships. The only attack, either by submarines or aircraft, was delivered on the 2nd of November 1944 at 1432, just east of HAINAN by one B-24 aircraft, bombing from about 3,000 meters. No damage was done to the convoy.

Q. Did you make any attacks on submarines?
A. This convoy encountered no submarines and followed close to the coast, generally within 2,000 or 3,000 meters.

Q. What was your experience on your second trip?
A. I left MOJI late December 1944 with four Army troop ships: the SHISHU, KIBITSU, HYUGA, (10,000 tons each), the AOBASAN (7,000 tons), and one empty tanker (10,000 tons). We proceeded to TAKAO without incidents and there turned over the four troop ships to another escort for further convoy to the PHILIPPINES. A new convoy was made up approximately as follows: one or two 10,000 ton tankers, four 6,000 ton ships, and three 2,900 ton tankers; eight escort vessels, including the KASHII, accompanied the convoy. In the early morning of 3 January, while proceeding south at approximately the east entrance of HAINAN Straits, the convoy was attacked by one B-24 aircraft which approached from astern in a glide with motor cut and dropped bombs. One bomb hit was made on the cargo carrier TEIHOKU MARU, 6,000 tons, which was the last ship in the west column. The bomb damaged one of the after hatches. We sent this ship and one escort to YULIN for repair and, while en route to YULIN, another air attack was made. This one damaged the escort vessel TSUSHIMA (1,000 tons) with a near miss, so that it just barely got to YULIN. The convoy proceeded to SAIGON where the tankers were turned over to another escort group to take them to SINGAPORE. While at SAIGON, for three days, a single B-24 came over frequently; although some bombs were dropped, no damage was done to a group of about 20 cargo vessels and escorts which was anchored at SAIGON at the time.

This covered the period from 6 to 9 January; however, some of the bombs hit and started fires in the Army barracks at SAN JUAN.

We left SAIGON on 9 January at noon, with a convoy of two oil tankers, one 10,000 and one 7,000 ton, and six freighters, the largest of which was 7,000 ton. It also included two tankers of 600 tons. The convoy speed was 8 knots. The escorts were the same as before (six, including the KASHII). Before sunset of the 10th, the convoy was sighted by one B-24 which remained over it about half an hour. The convoy proceeded up the coast, spending one night each at VAN FONG Bay and QUINON Bay.

On the 12th the convoy left QUINON Bay at 0700. Three F6F's were sighted at 0855 and the one covering Zero fighter was shot down. At 0955 two more fighters appeared and at 1104 about 16, TBF's and SB2C's appeared. In the attack which lasted 30 minutes the heavily loaded 6,900 ton freighter EIMAN MARU was set afire by a bomb hit and sank. I believe one or two of the attacking planes were shot down by AA fire of the KASHII and other escort vessels. The UKURU was bracketed by four or five near misses, thirty or forty meters away, which shook up the ship and caused her to stop about 2 minutes; but no damage was sustained. About 1229 a single plane dove on the UKURU, but only obtained a near miss and did no damage. During the attack the convoy had become scattered due to evasive action and was now reformed. About 20 dive-bombers appeared and circled in the vicinity until 1355 when 50 more of the same type arrived from the north. At 1408 the dive-bombing and torpedo attack by all planes began. The KASHII was sunk almost immediately in an explosion. This was a well executed attack, bombers diving in succession and at the same time a torpedo attack was launched at the KASHII from her starboard side. One torpedo and two bombs hit the KASHII. One of the bombs exploded the after magazine. The ship sank stern first, the bow remained about 10 feet above the water which was shallow. Vice Admiral T. SHIBUYA, Convoy Commander, and his entire staff were killed. At 1416 escort No. 51 on the starboard quarter of the convoy received a hit or a very near miss by bomb, which I believed ignited the depth charges because of the white smoke. She sank very soon. The attack continued practically uninterrupted until dark during which time the following ships were sunk:

Ship Tonnage Description
YOSHU 5,711 Freighter
KYOKUUN 10,000 Tanker
EIMAN MARU 6,900 Freighter
KASHII 4,500 CL
#51 700 Escort vessel
#23 700 Escort vessel

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Plate 53-2: Chart showing carrier aircraft attack on convoy North of Quinhon Bay between 1000 and sunset 12 January 1945, Annex B.
Plate 53-2: Chart showing carrier aircraft attack on convoy North of Quinhon Bay between 1000 and sunset 12 January 1945, Annex B.

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The following ships were damaged severely and beached:

Ship Tonnage Description
OTSUYAMA 6,800 Freighter
SAN LUISE 7,628 Tanker
SHOEI 2,768 Freighter
TATSUHATO 6,600 Freighter
TATEBE 4,519 Freighter
#63 BANSHU 533 Tanker
USEI 500 Tanker

The large escort vessels UKURU and DAITO and the small escort vessel No. 27 all were severely damaged, but were able to reach SANGA, HAINAN at 1540 on the 13th. The UKURU escaped two torpedo attacks by maneuvering.

The UKURU attempted to rescue the crew of the sunken KASHII about 1430, but an attack developed at this time and prevented us from rescuing more than 19. Subsequently we escaped several attacks by maneuvering into nearby rain squalls. The total casualties of the UKURU were 12 killed and 29 injured. The three remaining escorts arrived at YULIN on 14 January where they joined TSUSHIMA, which had made that port after being damaged in the earlier attack on 3 January. At YULIN between 1100 and 1240 of the 15th we were attacked by carrier planes, it was believed fighters, during which the DAITO was damaged to some extent by strafing and the HARIMA, a 10,000 ton tanker, was sunk by dive-bombing. This tanker was empty and en route to the south with eight airplanes on deck. Two other freighters were damaged slightly. Two American fighters were shot down during strafing attacks by AA firing from escort. The escorts were closely grouped for protection along the shore near the mountains and we were able to shoot down the fighters because they had to pull up in recovering from the strafing attack. On the 16th, about 30 or 40 dive-bombers and fighters made another attack, but it appeared to be directed at shore objects; consequently no serious damage was done to the escorts or to the freighters. On the 17th three fighters again attacked, but did no serious damage. This was the last attack, which was fortunate, because we were almost out of machine gun ammunition at that time, having only 5000 rounds remaining in the UKURU. On 21 January the TEIHOKU MARU, 6,000 ton freighter, and the AKESHIMA, 2,000 ton freighter (the only ones out of four in port which could get under way) escorted by four escort vessels left YULIN. This convoy proceeded around the western side of HAINAN and hugged the coast going north. At latitude 21°N and longitude 111°E, at 0930 on the 23rd, the group was attacked by a single B-24 with no damage. A message was intercepted from this B-24 reporting the exact position and composition of the convoy in plain language. On 26 January, at 0130 in the morning in position 25°N and 119°E, a night attack was made by one four-engine plane on the leading escort TSUSHIMA. A bomb dropped close but no damage was sustained.

On 31 January, in position 34°N, 123°E, our sound gear detected a submarine trailing us and a message supposedly from the submarine was also heard. However, no attack developed.

At the time my convoy left SAIGON, on 9 January, there were many freighters and some escorts still remaining. I understand that on the 10th seven ships, of which two or three may have been oil tankers, and five escorts left SAIGON, north bound, and were attacked shortly after, just north of Cape ST JACQUES. All these vessels were sunk. I also know that three escort vessels of the First Flotilla, namely CHIBURI and No. 17 and No. 19 which had remained in SAIGON, and three or four freighters which were loading there were all sunk by air attack. In addition there was a southbound convoy of perhaps five or six empty tankers and two escorts which I believe were all sunk shortly after leaving SAIGON. Consequently, out of a total of 30 or 40 freighters and tankers and 20 escorts, the only ships I know of which escaped were the three escorts of my group which reached YULIN on the 14th.

Q. What were your duties in the Office of Military Affairs between February 1945 and August 1945?
A. I assisted in recruiting and training merchant crews for vessels under Navy control and for civilian ships. It was difficult to obtain crews towards the end of the war; but due to the fact that many ships were under repair, we were always able to provide a crew for ships which were to sail. However, the age of the crews was very low, most of them were in their 'teens. There was a great tendency for crews to jump ship at various ports. About forty percent of our merchant crews were lost during the war.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 54
USSBS NO. 226

MINE COUNTER-MEASURES

KURE 27 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Commander TADENUMA, Saburo, teacher at Yokosuka Mine School from 1938 to May 1945; Kure Mine Squadron Staff Officer (81 Sohai Sentai) from May until the end of the war where he was responsible for sweeping of INLAND SEA.

Interrogated by: Comdr. T.H. Moorer, USN.

SUMMARY

Commander TADENUMA presented a complete list of all vessels sunk and damaged in the central and western part of the INLAND SEA, the SHIMONOSEKI Straits and the SHIMONO District during the period from 27 March 1945 to August 1945. This indicated a total of 125 vessels seriously damaged and 123 vessels or 200,000 tons sunk.

Although no capital ship was damaged by a mine in the INLAND SEA, the mines seriously interfered with their movements and made it impossible to move units of the fleet without considerable difficulty. The effort to keep an escape channel open for use by the fleet led to an extravagant use of minesweepers which were sorely needed elsewhere to clear channels for merchantmen. Minesweepers were stationed along the channel to be used by the fleet as watchers and made every effort to sweep the mine immediately after it was laid. Nevertheless, there were many cases when the fleet was held up and rendezvous delayed. In April 1945 when the YAMATO and escorting vessels sortied from the INLAND SEA to move on OKINAWA, it was necessary to use all sweeping equipment available and sweep a channel of minimum width. There was no delay in this case but the fact that the YAMATO was not mined was considered mostly luck. Large warships did not attempt to use SHIMONOSEKI Straits after 27 March 1945 and were forced to use BUNGO Channel. Many destroyers, submarines, and escort vessels were damaged by mines in the INLAND SEA and SHIMONOSEKI Area. In passing, Comdr. TADENUMA stated that an entire division of 4 destroyers were sunk by mines in SHORTLAND Harbor during operations in that area.

Complete information is not available as to the effectiveness of Japanese degaussing equipment. The general policy was to use the British type of equipment on large vessels. When available in 1945 the American type was installed on submarines and destroyers. Degaussing equipment was never available in sufficient quantities. It is interesting to note that mine countermeasure personnel and material became so acute that it was necessary to delegate the responsibility for sweeping the BUNGO Channel to a Special Attack Torpedo Unit which was originally organized for suicide work in the RYUKYUS.

After a discussion of mining in general Comdr. TOENUMA submitted his views in writing. They are considered noteworthy and are quoted below.

I. What We Have Learned From American Mine Attack With Our Views Upon It.

A. Views from Strategic Standpoint.

1. From the standpoint of the blockade of our bases of operations, the isolation of chief resources supplying areas, the interception of supply routes and the blockade of important points on lines of communication etc., the mine attacks were quite effective especially in the following areas affecting our operations very much both materially and spiritually: BALIKPAPAN, SINGAPORE, SOERABAJA, PARAO, SHORTLAND, TAKAO, YANGTSE River, Southern KOREA, SETONAIKA (particularly KAN-MON area, HIROSHIMA-WAN, OSAKA-WAN), SASEBO.

2. In the following areas the attacks were not thorough-going. TOKYO-WAN, NIIGATA Port, TSURUGA Port, HAMADA Port, SENZAKI WAN, YUTANI-WAN, HAKATA-WAN, KHRUN Port, SINGAPORE.

3. In the following areas, if they had made intensive mine attacks, they would have been very effective: OTOMARI Port, WAKKANAI Port, HAKODATE Port, MURORAN Port, MUTSU-WAN, KARATSU Port, RASHIN Port, SEISHIN Port, DAIREN Port, PORT ARTHUR, TSINGTAO Port, AMOI, HONGKONG, SAN-A (KAINANTO).

4. Their influence upon the morale and general opinion of our people: Owing to the complete war-time control of communication and the loyalty of our men and officers, they had little influence upon the morale and general opinion of our people. From this standpoint we think mine attack will be very effective if made actively upon democratic nations.

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5. The mines were not effective enough to decide the war, but it cannot be denied that they were one of the main causes of our defeat.

B. Views from Tactical Standpoint.

1. Not only bombing attacks of B-29's, but also their mine attacks were quite threatening and effective. They have no rivals in their carrying capacity and accuracy of their attacks with mines. Surely B-29's as a minelaying weapon were quite a hit in this war.

2. It was quite effective that they used various kinds of mines, by which frustrating our mine-sweeping operations.

3. Sometimes they dropped mines in adjacent seas while they attracted our attention to their bombing raid which they made at the same time. For instance we did not notice their mine-laying operations which they carried on while bombing TOKUYUMA Area. In KAN-MON Area, there were many such instances.

4. Concerning mine-laying in the intended area: It would be most effective to cover the whole area with a great number of planes at the beginning of the attack and then to fill up with a few planes.

5. Upon important points, discontinuous attacks would be more advantageous than continuous ones.

6. Relation of the time of attack and weather conditions: When visibility is bad, e.g. in the night or when it is foggy or it snows, it is advisable to make an attack with a few planes; while when visibility is good, e.g. in the daytime or in the moonlight night, it is advisable to use a great number of planes.

7. No matter whether the attack is strategical or tactical, it should be completely arranged before hand not to drop mines on land. In connection with this matter, it will be advantageous to improve mines so that they may explode the instant they reach the land or after some definite time.

8. The mine attacks should be thorough-going and lasting.

C. Views from Technical Standpoint.

1. The ground mines are limited in their danger sphere. It is presumed that the danger radius of the present U.S. mines is less than about 40 meters. Outside this circle the danger has never been fatal.

2. The device to make the mine powerless after a limited time seems to be excellent for the purpose of advancing operations, but it is to be regretted that not all mines laid in our adjacent seas had such device.

3. Offensive mines will be most effective and significant when new mines are used one after another than the same mines used in a great number.

4. It should be given a consideration that most U.S. mines had no device to prevent dismemberment.

5. The flash which appears at the moment when the mine leaves a plane was so remarkable that we seldom failed to judge the point where it was dropped.

6. The present U.S. mines are limited in their utility depth, which should be improved.

7. It would be very effective to change the sensitivity and cycle of magnetic and acoustic mines.

II. Views Upon the Future of Aircraft Mines

As has been stated above, the mines do not play any decisive role in war, but they will be valuable in future, both strategically and tactically. The atomic bombs dropped on HIROSHIMA and NAGASAKI astonished the world by their tremendous destruction, but considering that the problem of their mass production is undecided yet and that there will be much discussion upon their employment all over the world, they will not lower the value of mines.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 55
USSBS NO. 227

BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF, OCTOBER 1944

TOKYO 30 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Vice Admiral OZAWA, Jisaburo, IJN, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Task Force in subject battle.

Interrogated by: Rear Admiral R.A. OFSTIE, U.S.N. Lt. Comdr. J.A. FIELD, Jr. USNR.

Allied Officer Present: Captain T.J. HEDDING, U.S.N.

SUMMARY

In this interrogation, which is a continuation of USSBS #32 (NAV #3), Admiral OZAWA discusses the naval planning for the defense of the PHILIPPINES, the mission assigned his carrier force, the progress of the operation, and the principal reasons for its failure. In conclusion, Admiral OZAWA offers some general observations on various aspects of the PACIFIC War.

Q. (Lt. Comdr. Field) When was the SHO Plan, the basic directive, made and by whom? Was it a joint Army-Navy plan; who was the original issuing authority?
A. I do not know the exact date but was right after the MARIANAS Campaign and it was planned at Imperial Headquarters after joint conference of Army and Navy.

Q. Was that plan issued by Imperial Headquarters specific as to the use of the fleets to resist an invasion in the PHILIPPINES?
A. The original plan was made at Imperial Headquarters; but when the Navy received these orders, the Navy made the specific plan.

Q. Was that triple movement in the PHILIPPINES a part of the Navy plan or was it derived from the main plan?
A. It was planned by the Navy. The Navy had those three fleets in mind from the very beginning and they fought under command of the Combined Fleet. The original SHO Operation was very general, that the PHILIPPINES were to be defended. The Combined Fleet decided later to use those three fleets, I do not recall the date.

Q. In the original SHO Plan or in the Combined Fleet plan derived from it, was a date of our invasion assumed; if so, what was assumed as a probable invasion date?
A. It was assumed that the American invasion could take place sometime in the middle of October.

Q. Was any specific location assumed?
A. Three specific locations were assumed; first, MINDANAO; second, LEYTE and SAN BERNARDINO Strait; third, the central part of LUZON.

Q. Was it intended at any time in the plan that the First Mobile Fleet should operate together as a unit?
A. Right after the MARIANAS Campaign, KURITA's fleet was separated from this unit; it was placed directly under the command of the Combined Fleet, and I had only my own fleet. For the PHILIPPINES Campaign it was not intended to operate as a single unit.

Q. Why was Admiral KURITA's fleet removed from your command, why was it done and what date?
A. The first reason - when we came back to the INLAND SEA, my carriers were not in good shape and we figured it would take about two months to repair and get ready for the next campaign, while KURITA's fleet was not so badly damaged; so ten days after going to the INLAND SEA, KURITA's fleet was dispatched to SINGAPORE without waiting for my fleet to get ready.

Q. I have been told that the separation was done at your suggestion, and also that the fleets were intended to reunite if possible before our invasion; is that correct?
A. I made suggestion to Admiral TOYODA that KURITA's force should be separated from mine. As for the second question, I had the intention to combine the two fleets, provided your invasion took place sometime in November. While I was re-shaping the fleet, your invasion came a little sooner than expected; so we had to operate separately instead of re-uniting. It was my intention to go to SINGAPORE as soon as the carrier force was repaired; but the invasion came, so it was not possible.

Q. If there had been time you would have operated together as in the MARIANAS; is that correct?
A. Yes, that is correct; it was my feeling that KURITA's fleet without support of carriers would not be very strong, so I desired that my fleet and KURITA's fleet be combined if possible.

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Q. At what date did you expect this combination would be possible, about what time?
A. I figured time of formation the beginning of November.

Q. In early October, did you expect that you would be able to make this combination; did you expect our invasion to come late enough to permit that?
A. We made every effort to try to get ready in time, but with every effort we couldn't do it before the 1 November; we were hoping that would be in time.

Q. Where was the preferred base for your fleets at this time?
A. I thought the INLAND SEA was the best base.

Q. If there had been no fuel shortage, both fleets would have been in the INLAND SEA?
A. Yes.

Q. In early October then, before our invasion began, what was the planned function of your fleet in defense of the PHILIPPINES; what was its mission as assigned in the plans?
A. In early October the repair of the carriers and also the replacement of the pilots was not progressing so smoothly. I thought if the American invasion came before the time of this preparation, that all the air force would be sent out to the land bases instead of using carriers; so evidently there was no particular mission at such an early date in October. After training had progressed satisfactorily and if the invasion came at a later date, they would later use the carriers.

Q. In the event the fleets would have been able to make this combination of which we speak, would you have used the carriers in Central PHILIPPINE waters to oppose our invasion force?
A. Either through the Central PHILIPPINES or around northern end of LUZON, we would use the whole Mobile Fleet.

Q. After the MARIANAS Operation in July, was there any discussion among the officers of your fleet regarding possible use of Kamikaze attacks?
A. I never heard of them among the officers under me. The first time I heard of Kamikaze attacks was when KURITA's fleet went through SAN BERNARDINO Strait. I knew that Kamikaze attack was coming from MANILA Area to oppose the LEYTE landing.

Q. As I heard the story, one of your carrier commanders volunteered in June or July to organize a Kamikaze unit, and you raised the question with Admiral TOYODA.
A. I recall now that such was the case; it was Captain JO of the CHIYODA who suggested to me that he would like to carry out such attacks, and it was recommended to TOYODA. TOYODA said that the time wasn't ripe yet, it was too early to use it.

Q. At the time when the operation came, about 24-25 October, was there any intention among your pilots to use Kamikaze tactics?
A. There was no case like that among my pilots.

Q. About 12-14 October our carriers attacked FORMOSA; roughly, what were the losses in planes there and what consequences did they have on the SHO Plan?
A. I do not know the details or extent of damage, but I know that your attack on FORMOSA, also on the PHILIPPINES, made the operation very hard. Furthermore about 150 planes from the carriers were sent to FORMOSA; consequently our carrier strength was greatly reduced, so the operation was changed to use land based planes more frequently instead of carrier planes. My force of carrier planes became very much weakened. Only 110 were left, so less than half remained; it was not my intention to send reinforcement to FORMOSA but it was by order of TOYODA.

Q. Do you feel that in sending this carrier strength to FORMOSA at that time, Admiral TOYODA did not believe we would soon attack the PHILIPPINES, but thought that the strength could have been made up before our invasion?
A. I think that Admiral TOYODA was convinced the American invasion would have come by the end of October but sacrificed the carriers to reinforce FORMOSA; this of course is only my opinion.

Q. Then when news of the invasion came and your fleet had been thus weakened by loss of planes, what mission did you have in the operation; what was your fleet to do in repelling the invasion?
A. I thought that possibly at sacrifice of my fleet which was very much weakened, KURITA's fleet could carry out their mission; I expected complete destruction of my fleet, but if KURITA's mission was carried out that was all I wished.

Q. How, principally were you to support KURITA's mission; by delivering an air attack with your remaining planes, or by acting as a target, or how?
A. Exactly those two ways, sending out what planes I had and also to be a target for your attack. A decoy, that

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was our first primary mission, to act as a decoy. My fleet could not very well give the direct protection to KURITA's force because we were very weak, so I tried to attack as many American carriers as possible and to be the decoy or target for your attack. I tried to let KURITA's fleet have little attack from you. The main mission was all sacrifice. An attack with a very weak force of planes comes under the heading of sacrifice of planes and ships.

Q. Did you know who commanded our invasion of LEYTE, who commanded the Task Force, who commanded the transports, etc?
A. I do not remember who I thought was your commander in chief at that time; there was at the time some estimate but I do not remember.

Q. Who was responsible for this idea of using the fleet as a lure; was that your plan or Admiral TOYODA's?
A. Basically it was TOYODA's idea.

Q. What made you feel that you could successfully lure our Task Force in this fashion? The only previous precedent was the battle of the MARIANAS, and in the MARIANAS our Task Force stayed very close to the Invasion Force and did not come forward to attack Japanese forces at an early time; therefore, what made you think you could successfully lure us?
A. I had not much confidence in being a lure, but there was no other way than to try.

Q. When you set forth, is it correct to say that you did not believe this lure would work very well, that you feared our force would concentrate on KURITA despite your presence to the northward?
A. I figured that you might concentrate and attack KURITA or you might concentrate the attack on my carriers, and let events take care of themselves; I just assumed it would be 50-50 chance. I knew that the decoy operation even using regular surface vessel is a very difficult operation, and also that using carriers for decoy would be more difficult than regular surface forces as a decoy.

Q. During the course of the war, did the Japanese make any effort to study the personal characteristics of our commanders and to vary their tactics in accordance with the commander they believed opposed them in any particular operation?
A. We always tried to adapt the operation plan according to the characteristics of the UNITED STATES commander.

Q. In this case however, you do not remember who the UNITED STATES commander was?
A. I think Captain OHMAE knows who was the American commander, but I do not myself remember.

Q. When your fleet left the INLAND SEA on this operation were ISE and HYUGA in company?
A. Yes, they were both along.

Q. They did not have aircraft operating from them at this time?
A. All their planes had been sent to FORMOSA, so at the time of sortie they had none on board.

Q. Were they along in this force for any particular purpose or just to get a little more strength of whatever nature?
A. They were there chiefly because of the protection to the carriers, chiefly for the protection against air attack.

Q. As your fleet came south from the INLAND SEA did you have a satisfactory flow of information on UNITED STATES forces; did you know where our forces were disposed?
A. I do not remember precisely, but I think not very great information on the American force.

Q. Did you fly searches with your own planes attempting to locate our force as you went south; do you know what day you started your search?
A. Yes. We started searching work on the second day out.

Q. Did you observe radio silence on the voyage south, did you send any messages by radio?
A. We observed radio silence until the 22nd or 23rd when we opened up on the radio for purpose of luring.

Q. Do you remember when you made your first contact with our force and where our forces were?
A. I do not recollect the time and location we first made contact.

Q. Was your first definite information from your own search planes or the LUZON planes?
A. The first information to the effect that they saw the American force was from the air forces on LUZON.

Q. Did you attack on that information, or did you delay the attack until your own search planes had sighted our force?
A. Upon receipt of this message from the land plane from LUZON we dispatched our own planes to search, and when we received the same information from our own planes the attack was sent out.

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Q. In what strength was their attack made; how many planes?
A. I think I sent about 80 planes.

Q. Did you retain any planes as protection for your fleet, fighter planes for cover?
A. Yes, we retained some numbers of planes for protection above the fleet, about twenty fighters.

Q. Were the planes that were sent on the attack to return to the carriers, or were they to proceed to shore after that attack?
A. Very few planes came back to the carriers, most of the planes landed on shore account of bad weather conditions.

Q. Was it intended originally that all would return to the carriers after the attack?
A. It was originally intended for the planes to come back to the carriers after the attacks.

Q. What reports of the result of the attack did you have, what damage inflicted, what number of planes lost?
A. I recall that no accurate information as to the result came. I think very little information to judge what kind of damage they inflicted.

Q. Why should that be the case? After the pilots making the attacks returned to the carriers you should surely have some information.
A. Those planes which came back to the carriers did not execute attack. On account of bad weather they were forced to come back; as to the planes which landed ashore, they could not send message on account of very bad communications.

Q. Was there ever any attempt, either in the planning of the operation or during the battle, to coordinate your planes with shore-based planes in their attack?
A. The land planes were intended to be used for search alone; in that respect the coordination was planned, but as far as attack was concerned this coordination was not planned.

Q. You spoke of not receiving information because of bad communications. Was that a trouble that occurred all through this operation; was it due to bad planning?
A. The bad communications were there all the time before the operation, during the course of the operation and after the operation; communications from land were very poor. It was due to poor technical ability. Generally speaking, naval shore communications were very poor from a standpoint of equipment, technical ability and so on.

Q. This attack that you made on our forces was made in the middle of the day on the 24th. Did you believe at that time that your location was known to our forces?
A. I knew that your searching plane came toward my force in the morning and we knew that they discovered our fleet.

Q. Before you sent the attack?
A. Yes, before.

Q. Did you sight the planes or have radar contact? How did you know they were there?
A. I sighted them myself.

Q. Before you launched your attack, are you sure?
A. Yes, quite certain.

Q. What course, then, did you take with your fleet after launching attack?
A. Immediately after launching the attacking force, I recall that the fleet moved northwest.

Q. Did you expect on attack from our forces that day?
A. Yes, we expected it.

Q. Did you have information that day of how Admiral KURITA's force was faring?
A. I received the information from KURITA's force that their fleet was taking reverse course in the SIDUYAN SEA.

Q. Do you remember if on this day you heard any information on Admiral NISHIMURA's force?
A. I knew the original plan of NISHIMURA's movements, but at the time of launching attack I did not have any particular information about NISHIMURA's fleet; so I thought he was progressing according to the schedule.

Q. After launching your attack you said you retired northwest, expecting our attack which did not come. What were your movements that night?
A. When KURITA's fleet took the reverse course, when I learned that, I thought the southward movement of my fleet would not alone be so effective; so when they started to reverse course I also started north. Then I heard the order from TOYODA to KURITA's fleet to go back again and continue the attack; so, again to coordinate our movements I started southeast.

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Q. In general then you continued on a southeast course during the night?
A. Yes.

Q. Did your forces remain united throughout the night?
A. I recall that during the night ISE and HYUGA and two or three other ships were apart from the main body, but at daybreak of the 25th all ships gathered again.

Q. Did you send ISE and HYUGA and their group apart with any purpose in view? Why did they separate?
A. Right after launching the attack I sent ISE and HYUGA down southeast of my course in the hopes of being of some assistance to KURITA's force in any engagement off SAMAR; then I heard that KURITA was reversing, so I ordered ISE and HYUGA to again rejoin.

Q. Did ISE and HYUGA sight any of our forces during the night? Did you have any such report from them?
A. I think there was no report to that effect.

Q. From another source I heard that during the night ISE and HYUGA saw at a distance an American force under Japanese air attack, but that fearing the danger of Japanese torpedoes they did not close with this force but joined your force. Do you recall anything about that?
A. I have no recollection of hearing such a story.

Q. Did you have any information on Admiral NISHIMURA's force during the night or during early morning while it was still dark?
A. I think there was no report.

Q. Up until the time when you were attacked by our planes the morning of the 25th, did you have any further information of Admiral KURITA or Admiral NISHIMURA, of what success they were achieving?
A. Evidently I did not receive any report up to the time of your attack.

Q. At the time of our attack what was your general opinion as to the progress of the whole operation? Did you believe it was going well or badly and in particular, did you know whether your decoy operations were working?
A. We felt that the operations were not going as well as could be expected. I felt that my luring operation was not succeeding, especially after hearing word that Admiral KURITA had to reverse his course. I heard no other information other than that Admiral KURITA had reversed course, and had later been ordered to resume the attack.

Q. It appears from what you have said that up until the time you received our attack, you did not have good information of Japanese progress, or of the location of our forces. Do you feel that the information was as good as could be expected?
A. From the fact that we did not receive so many detailed information from NISHIMURA and KURITA, we took it for granted that they were progressing smoothly, so didn't bother with that fact. Reports from land were rather satisfactory, so I thought they were going all right. Also I was satisfied with the reports from the planes as to the location of your forces.

Q. On the morning of the 25th, did you have good information as to the location of our force?
A. The force was northeast of CANTANDUANES Island.

Q. I would like to know very briefly what damage you received from our air attack.
A. I think that the first attack and second attack were strongest; they were about the same as far as the extent of damage was concerned, but I do not recall any details of the damage.

Q. When did you transfer from ZUIKAKU to OYODO: after the first attack or later in the day?
A. After the first combat the communications of ZUIKAKU became out of order, that was chief reason why I transferred flag to OYODO.

Q. Did you attempt to repel our aircraft attack with fighter planes?
A. We attempted to repel your attack by fighter planes; but owing to the small numbers and weakness of my force, this intention could not be carried out successfully.

Q. Was it planned to withdraw to the north as soon as you were attacked? Did you plan to start north as soon as our attack came, to decoy our force further north?
A. The northward movement was started before we received first attack.

Q. Why? Did you expect to save any of your carriers?
A. The chief concern was to lure your forces further north; we expected complete destruction.

Q. For what success by Admiral KURITA were you willing to sacrifice all your carriers?
A. I thought if KURITA's fleet ever succeeded in attacking your landing forces I would be satisfied, even though totally destroyed; if they destroyed the transports there in LEYTE Gulf I would have been satisfied.

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Q. Was Admiral KURITA's mission only to attack the transports and their escorts, or was he to attack any ship he met, or bombard our troops ashore? What was his specific mission?
A. In my opinion Admiral KURITA would doubtless expect to meet some of your covering force on his way to LEYTE. If he met them, of course, he would attack them; but if he did not meet them so much the better, and he would go into the Gulf and attack the transports, escorts and other ships. In this way it can be seen that bombardment of the beachhead was only a third or fourth alternative. This question should however be asked of KURITA as he may have a different opinion.

Q. I would like to have your opinion on why KURITA turned north rather than enter the Gulf that day. What caused the change of plan?
A. I do not know the details of the campaign there so I cannot form an opinion of what made them take the northern course.

Q. I was given some information to indicate that one of the reasons Admiral KURITA turned north was that he heard a message from you saying that you planned to attack our task force by torpedo and gunfire and that you requested assistance. Do you remember such a message?
A. I never sent such a message.

Q. We understood from Captain OHMAE that late in the afternoon you had some thought of a torpedo attack on an American surface force; that this message was sent about 5 in the afternoon, and that this afternoon message may be the source of the confusion.
A. I think there is no truth to the story.

Q. As I heard it, our air attacks had ceased but some of our cruisers and destroyers were pressing your force and were firing on one of your destroyers which had fallen behind. It was at that time that you were said to have planned a torpedo attack on our cruisers, late in the afternoon when our air attacks were finished.
A. I now recall the following: About dusk of the 25th I received a report from a destroyer a little behind the main body that it had sighted American forces and was being attacked by gunfire. When I received that report I determined to support this destroyer and came down to the location where the destroyer was; that destroyer was there making rescue work. When we came to the scene, we could not see the American force and so reversed again and went north. This may be the source of confusion of that story.

Q. You do not remember sending any message to Admiral KURITA at that time saying what you were planning to do?
A. I sent the message to the effect that the main force was going to reinforce the destroyer. I had no thought from the very beginning of reinforcement from KURITA's fleet. My mission was to do everything possible to assist KURITA's fleet, but I expected no help in return.

Q. Do you remember roughly what damage was done to ISE and HYUGA in this action?
A. ISE received fairly severe damage to the blisters below the water line from near misses; HYUGA had practically no damage.

Q. There were no direct bomb hits or torpedo hits on either?
A. None at that time.

Interrogation adjourned at 1145; reconvened at 1330.

Q. You mentioned this morning that you received a message from Admiral TOYODA to KURITA directing him to resume the attack after his turning back, and upon receipt of this message you yourself turned south. Was that addressed only to KURITA? Did you act on your own initiative?
A. It was addressed to Admiral KURITA, not to me, but I received the radio message just the same; information addressee.

Q. In the course of the operation did you at any time receive any message from TOYODA which in any changed or modified the plan or gave you any specific instructions?
A. I had no orders direct from TOYODA.

Q. Once the operation began you were entirely on your own, not concerned with order from above?
A. Yes, everything was done on my own.

Q. Considering the operations of all three forces, what is your judgment of the plan? Was it a good plan as considered as a whole?
A. I think that was the best possible plan considering the location of the three forces and also the condition of training of the three forces.

Q. Did you feel at the outset that it had a good chance of success; or perhaps that the plan was too complex to work well?
A. Although I thought it was very complex and difficult to carry out, I still believe it was the best possible plan under the circumstances.

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Q. Where do you feel that the plan broke down, at what point, and what were the reasons?
A. Before the plan worked out, I knew it was very hard and complicated plan so that I was not surprised by events; but under the circumstances, there was no other method of procedure. The lack of air power, I feel, was the weakest point. I knew in advance that lack of air power was the main drawback to the operation.

Q. Still, it was a very bold operation and came very close to success. Apart from the overall weakness in the air, is there a specific point where you feel the operation broke down?
A. I cannot mention any specific reason or point where I felt that the action broke down.

Q. Did you feel that in the course of the action the coordination of the land-based air with the various Naval forces was as good as could be expected?
A. I think the coordination was not so successful because of the bad weather and communications.

Q. If as you say the overall lack of air power was the decisive factor, would you say that the operation was doomed from the start owing to our attack on FORMOSA ten days before and the losses of air power there?
A. I do not think it was a foregone conclusion that this operation was doomed from the very beginning, although lack of air power was a decisive factor leading to the defeat. I think that if we had not sent reinforcement to FORMOSA from the carriers, the outcome of the operation would have been more successful.

Q. Would you agree that, insofar as it is possible to point to precise causes for such things, it could be said that the PHILIPPINES Operation was decided in FORMOSA ten days before?
A. That statement I think is a little strong.

Q. After this battle, what general plan for the use of the Navy was attempted for the next operation. Did you confer with Admiral TOYODA?
A. After the battle of October, due to the lack of carriers and their air forces, it was decided to proceed to future operations by using more land-based planes. That was the plan made by the Imperial Headquarters.

Q. Was there ever any plan for future operations using the remainder of the fleet?
A. With the exception of the few special surface ships, they were relying on the land forces, land-based air power, and special attacks; there was no further use assigned to surface vessels with exception of some special ships. Those exception were YAMATO and destroyers and submarines and a few cruisers.

Q. Was there a plan for the use of those vessels; did you expect to be able to use them?
A. We intended to use them, for example, on your attack on OKINAWA or the mainland; no specific plan however.

Q. Would you say that, to all intents and purposes, the naval war ended with the battle of October?
A. After this battle the surface force became strictly auxiliary, so that we relied on land forces, special attack, and air power.

Q. (Rear Admiral OFSTIE) In connection with the YAMATO, did you issue the orders for the YAMATO to sortie on the 6th of April this year, or did they come from TOYODA? What were those orders?
A. At the time when the order came from TOYODA for the YAMATO to sortie I had retired from the actual campaign so I do not know the details. I do recall it was TOYODA's order.

Q. What useful purpose, aside from preventing the installation of enemy airfields, did the Army campaign in CHINA have? Was it useful to the war or was it costly? Would you say it was useful war in CHINA?
A. I have not made any studies in that phase of the war at all, and do not want to make any statement with regard to it.

Q. When you were Vice Chief of Navy General Headquarters what sort of liaison did you have with the Army?
A. We always kept close contact with the Army exchanging information. The Army had their own headquarters, the Navy had their own headquarters; they sent liaison officers back and forth between these two bodies, and sometimes get together at a certain place to discuss plans and operations.

Q. Did you have a senior Army officer on your staff?
A. I had no Army officer under me.

Q. We have heard frequently suggestions of difficulty in cooperating with the Army and Navy; could you say whether or not you thought this was true?
A. I sometimes felt the difficulty in getting decisions was because the Army had their trend of thought which is different from the Navy, and we had quite a hard time to get over that discrepancy.

Q. At the beginning of the war we believed that the Japanese Navy pilots were appreciably better than the Japanese Army pilots; do you agree with that?
A. It was true that Navy pilots were appreciably superior to the Army and that was due to the training; the Navy training was much more severe and thorough than the Army.

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Q. In connection with your night surface operations, which were very successful in the early part of the war, what was the reason why you put so much emphasis on night operations? Was it some weakness of our force? What sort of reason?
A. Strategically speaking, I think the night battle is a very favorable method for the side which had the weaker force, and so we stressed training on that type of battle from before the war.

Q. Now with respect to Japanese submarines, we felt that they were relatively ineffective, much less effective than they could have been. What is your opinion of the basic trouble with the Japanese submarines?
A. It is because they did not develop their electrical equipment such as radar, sonic devices, and other equipment to the extent they should have. I think that is the basic reason for our poor showing.

Q. In the first year of the war, we had quite a bit of trouble with your submarines - a number of our ships were sunk, a good many damaged; but after the first year of the war, our ships were rarely attacked. We thought possibly in addition to these technical factors you mention, a change in the plans for using them might have been made, is that correct?
A. There was no change of plan in using the submarines; but as explained before, the electrical equipment on our submarines or surface vessels was very poor; while on your side the equipment on submarines or surface vessels advanced very quickly; so the difference was very great.

Q. In the early phases of the war, say through the MARIANAS Campaign, what was the principal agent for the loss of Japanese airpower? Was it carrier sweeps, general attrition, or what?
A. Carrier Task Force is the biggest cause of their fall, I would say off hand. Of our weaknesses, first was the inefficiency of radar; secondly, the training of the pilots was not enough; third, generally speaking, the total air force was anyway not sufficient. The agent for the actual destruction was the Carrier Task Forces. There was no change after the MARIANAS.

Q. Now concerning shipping losses and the blockade, what do you feel was the principal cause of losses of merchant shipping?
A. I think roughly estimated, the damage by submarine was the worst, and then comes airplane attacks both from carriers and land-based, then by mines. I have no records, but I think submarine damage is about half of the total damage.

Q. What was the principal thing which shut off the supply of oil from the south?
A. The chief cause of that cutting off of the fuel supply from the south was failure of PHILIPPINES Campaign.

Q. But before that, had there been considerable cutting off, primarily by submarines or what?
A. The biggest feature was submarines. After the PHILIPPINES Campaign, the supply was absolutely cut off; before that, there was some flow from the south although it was interfered with by submarines.

Q. About what time during the course of the war was the operation of the fleet or the use of planes for training or operations first seriously inconvenienced by shortage of fuel?
A. About two or three months before the MARIANAS Campaign we felt the shortage very keenly.

Q. Up to that time you had been able to operate the fleet in any area, and thoroughly train all pilots; is that correct?
A. Yes, up to that time we could manage to move the fleet freely or give the pilots enough training.

Q. With the experience of the war, looking back to the beginning of the war, what major changes would you make in basic plans as a result of your experiences if you were to start over again?
A. The major factors which caused defeat and which I would like to have corrected are the lack of reinforcement of airplanes or all war materials concerned, and improvement of electrical devices, for example radar. We didn't have any supplies with which to reinforce. Our production rate too small. I myself had no experience with the production end of things and couldn't say what should have been done; but as one using the finished product, I felt that production must be lacking. That to me was the biggest fault.

Q. Was there any feeling shortly after the war had started that you had gone too far, taken too much territory?
A. Undoubtedly if the matter were given study, the exact point could be determined as to how far we should have gone, but I have not given the matter any thought, I cannot give an answer. I believe, however, subjects such as this should be given thought hereafter.

Q. Was there ever considered a plan of expansion in the PACIFIC OCEAN which would avoid attack on the UNITED STATES territory?
A. I am fairly certain there were quite a few people who gave that subject consideration, but apparently their plans were not used.

Q. What do you think of it? Do you think such a plan might have been good?
A. I believe that it would have been impossible.

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Q. Then the attack on PEARL HARBOR and the PHILIPPINES was a military necessity? To execute your plans it was a military necessity to strike both PEARL and the PHILIPPINES?
A. If we tried to carry out an operation only against the Dutch and British; the chance the UNITED STATES would intervene was too great. From that standpoint I consider it was better to attack these major points.

Q. If there had been no early declaration for unconditional surrender, would there have been organized government efforts toward a negotiated peace; and if so when?
A. I understood there was a portion of the people who were considering surrender even before the POTSDAM Declaration; as far as I was concerned they were only rumors. I, myself, had understood that there was a movement afoot to recommend such an acceptance of a conditional peace; but since I am not interested in any way in formulating or having any part of the national policy except in carrying it out, I never officially heard of such a tendency.

Q. Was that before you were Vice Chief of the General Staff in November 1944?
A. Towards the very end of this period when I was Vice Chief, during April or May of this year I heard slight rumblings to that effect.

Q. I understood you were principal of the Naval War College in September 1941, remaining for one month. Were all the senior fleet commanders ordered there at the same time?
A. No, they were not. I served as principal from September to October 1941 and at that time the college had no students. They had absolutely no students in that period whatsoever, they were all at the front. It was about April 1941 that all the student undergraduates had been sent out to various posts.

Q. Had they ever had Army officers as students in the Navy War College?
A. No.

Q. And no Navy at the Army War College?
A. No. Instructors sometimes exchanged between the two but no students.

Q. Admiral, before we adjourn, is there any observation you would like to make on the course of events, any comment, any statement - anything at all about past, present, or future?
A. It is my opinion that this war should never have taken place. The present is greatly confused, spiritually as well as materially; and until things settle down a little more, I cannot make any kind of prediction or estimate as to the future.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 56
USSBS NO. 228

AIRCRAFT ESCORT OF CONVOYS AND ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

TOKYO 1 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Lieutenant (junior grade) OKUNO, Y., IJN; naval aviator in a squadron responsible for convoy escort and anti-submarine operations.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman TELLER, U.S.N.

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY

OKUNO received 70 to 80 hours flight training then was ordered to an operational squadron engaged in protecting convoys from submarine and air attack in FORMOSA vicinity and along the ASIATIC Coast. He had limited experience in the use of radar and magnetic detector. Increasing severity of air attacks by land based aircraft reduced the strength of his squadron and finally forced its withdrawal from the area in April 1945. In May 1945 all air crews of his squadron were incorporated in the Fifth Air Fleet and their aircraft were prepared for Kamikaze attacks.

Q. What was your experience in FORMOSA between December 1944 and February 1945?
A. There were many air raids particularly by B-24's. The most effective weapon used was the anti-personnel fragmentation cluster which caused many casualties among military and civilian personnel and damaged a number of aircraft at the TOKO Base. I was engaged in flying a seaplane for anti-submarine coverage for convoys between FORMOSA and PHILIPPINES. We would use both radar and the magnetic detector. Usually the radar plane was sent out first to search the area and if any indication of a submarine was found, the MAD plane would be called out. I think we had some success with the MAD and damaged two or three submarines in this area, but it was not my own personal experience. On one occasion at night time; the MAD in my plane indicated a submarine, I dropped the float light and on the second pass bombed the float light. On return to base I was told that a sunken hulk was bombed which must have been the one sunk by a U.S. submarine near the BATAN Islands.

Q. How were anti-submarine operations conducted by your squadron along the South CHINA and INDO-CHINA Coast?
A. The squadron was divided among bases stretching from TANSUI, FORMOSA to SAIGON, INDO-CHINA Coast. This coast line was divided into five areas of responsibility, each of which was covered from a base by one unit. The unit at TANSUI covered the area north of FORMOSA. Each day, the unit assigned an area of responsibility would patrol that area if a convoy was scheduled to move through. If no convoy was scheduled, no patrol was flown but training of flying was held. The procedure in searching was to use radar because after autumn of 1944 practically all Navy planes were so equipped. The MAD equipment was not normally used for search, but was used after radar or some other method had located a submarine. Furthermore the supply of MAD was limited and the installation in airplanes required the removal of all machine guns and other large steel objects. The MAD equipment was heavy and caused the plane to be overloaded. There were a few fighters, Type Zero, Navy, assigned to the First Escort Fleet Air Squadron. Five or six were stationed at HONGKONG and six or eight at SANA, HAINAN. Army fighters were not called on for help principally because communication between Army and Navy air units was poor and also because of poor cooperation between the services and the poor performance of Army fighters when flying on sea missions. There was, however, one principal method of cooperation between the armed forces and that was supplying fuel and some repair at each others' bases. By April 1945 all the fighters of this group were either lost or out of commission.

Q. What type of aircraft were you qualified to fly?
A. All single-engine Navy planes except fighters.

Q. What was your experience in aircraft losses in this convoy escort?
A. We lost quite a number of pilots, both on the ground and in the air, to B-24 attacks. Some of these B-24 attacks were formation attacks and others were single search planes from the PHILIPPINES. We could usually tell the time of day that the single plane would come over and would not fly at that time. The single B-24, however, if they caught us over the convoys was very dangerous because it was very maneuverable. We examined the B-24 search plane which was shot down at AMOY in March 1945 and rescued equipment, code books, emergency radio and supplies by diving for them.

We found none of the crew. We thought that the equipment in this B-24 was particularly fine and that the pilots had very good preparation for their work. We noticed that B-24 single planes would sometimes call for help from

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their fighters. Our voice radio set was not powerful enough to call for help from the base. We could talk direct by voice radio to the flagship of the convoy if preparation had been made, but only for a distance of five or six miles. Beyond that distance we would have to send by key.

Q. Do you know of air attacks on convoys in your area?
A. On about 4 April 1945 a convoy consisting of the KINE MARU a 5,000 ton transport, escorts vessels Nos. 1, 5, 36, 130 and 134 and two subchasers left HONGKONG for the north. This was called the 11th Convoy Group. Off SWATOW the convoy was attacked for a long time by many B-24's coming from the PHILIPPINES and protected by P-51's from CHINA. The KINE MARU which was carrying civilian personnel from SINGAPORE and military personnel from HONGKONG was sunk. 70 were saved and 240 military personnel lost. Escort vessels Nos. 1, 5, 130 and 134 and one subchaser were sunk at this time.

The most famous sinking in our area was the ASAMA MARU (large ex-NYK liner). She was sunk in January or February 1945 near PRATAS Reef by a submarine after two days chase. The weather was bad and none of our planes could be sent out in response to her calls for help.

On PRATAS Reef a 30-40 man communication and weather observation unit was maintained. In February or March 1945 a submarine shelled the station and killed the senior officer. Shortly afterward the station was abandoned and personnel evacuated.

Q. To what organization did you go when you returned to KYUSHU?
A. I went to the Fifth Air Fleet in May 1945 and was stationed at OMURA and FUKUOKA. I believe that all the pilots of the First Escort Squadron returned to KYUSHU about this time. This change was the result of an order by the General Headquarters of the Combined Navy Force, the Supreme Headquarters of the Navy. While at KYUSHU our planes and pilots were used on anti-submarine patrol between KYUSHU and KOREA, particularly to prevent American submarines from entering the JAPAN SEA. However, about June we knew that two of your submarines finally entered the JAPAN SEA. During this period, also, our planes were being converted to take 800 k.g. bombs for Special Attack Corps purposes. This was a difficult conversion and about 1/3 of the seaplanes had been completed in conversion at the time the war ended.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 57
USSBS NO. 229

ESCORT AND DEFENSE OF SHIPPING

TOKYO 31 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Rear Admiral MATSUYAMA, Mitsuharu, IJN (Retired); engaged in convoy escort in eastern New GUINEA, June to December 1942 and at ORMOC in November 1944.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman Teller, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Captain C. Shands, USN, Lieut. Comdr. J.A. Field, jr., USNR.

SUMMARY

Rear Admiral MATSUYAMA, had experience in escorting shipping in the BISMARK ARCHIPELAGO in the latter half of 1942, between the Japanese EMPIRE and NETHERLAND EAST INDIES in the summer of 1944 and between MANILA and ORMOC Bay in November 1944. Three successful submarine attacks on Japanese convoys are described and the air attacks against two reinforcing convoys to ORMOC are told in some detail.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Describe the organization of the Seventh Escort Group while under your command.
A. I commanded this group between April and December, 1944. The Seventh Escort Group was a tactical command whose mission was to escort and protect important convoys over long and dangerous routes. The group received its assignment to specific tasks and also general instructions from Grand Escort Fleet Headquarters, TOKYO. While carrying out an assignment the group was under the direct command of one of the eight Escort Group Headquarters or under the command of the Area Fleet Commander. For example, while convoying between MANILA and ORMOC my group acted under orders of the commander Southwestern. Area Fleet whose headquarters were in MANILA. There was no permanent assignment of ships to my command. Escort vessels were assigned to the group for specific convoy trips according to requirements of the occasion and availability of escorts.

Q. On what routes did you escort convoys?
A. In April and May 1944 I made one round trip to SAIPAN. This was the first convoy to SAIPAN for several months which had not received damage. During May and June, I escorted two convoys from the EMPIRE to SINGAPORE. During August, I made two trips between the EMPIRE and MANILA. After your landings on LEYTE my duties were to convoy between MANILA and ORMOC Bay.

Q. Describe the submarine attacks which were made on convoys under your escort.
A. At the end of May or the first of June 1944, I commanded a convoy proceeding south near FORMOSA. It was my desire to pass west of FORMOSA because I thought there were more submarines on the east. However, I was ordered by the First Convoy Escort Squadron (later First Escort Fleet) to pass east of FORMOSA. As the convoy passed south between FORMOSA and the island of KASHIO a submarine attack was made from the west, or FORMOSA side. The escort was sunk immediately and the second transport in right column was damaged by a torpedo. The torpedoed transport swung to port and in the confusion collided with one in the center column injuring the rudder of the latter. A large number of depth charges were dropped to discourage further attack. The KASHII, my flagship, took in tow the transport with damaged rudder and proceeded to KIIRUN. The transport which was hit by the torpedo and the undamaged vessels proceeded south around FORMOSA to TAKAO where I rejoined them with KASHII.

In early August 1944, 1 had a twenty five ship convoy protected by 4 or 5 vessels, heading south in latitude 31°30' North, longitude 130° East. Between 0400 and 0500 in the morning before dawn one collier of 2 to 3,000 tons was sunk by submarine torpedo attack.

In early September I was convoying 11 ships from FORMOSA to MANILA. A radio dispatch had been received from the headquarters of the First Escort Squadron at TAKAO giving the position of two enemy submarines about 80 miles apart across my track. I laid the course to go between them. At about 0330, after moonrise, in position approximately latitude 20° North, longitude 121° East, two ships of 3 to 4,000 tons were sunk by a torpedo attack believed to have been delivered by a submarine within the convoy between the center and right hand column.

Q. What order of accuracy was credited to various types of reports of enemy submarine positions?
A. Aircraft sightings were considered to be accurate within ten miles. Positions by radio direction finders were several times less accurate.

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Plate 57-1: Chart showing submarine attack on South bound convoy passing between KASHOTO and the East coast of FORMOSA about end of May - first of June 1944, Annex A.
Plate 57-1: Chart showing submarine attack on South bound convoy passing between KASHOTO and the East coast of FORMOSA about end of May - first of June 1944, Annex A.

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Plate 57-2: Chart showing submarine attack on South bound convoy between FORMOSA and MANILA in early September 1944 at approximately 0330 (after moonrise) in position Lat. 20 degrees North, Long. 121 degrees East, Annex B.
Plate 57-2: Chart showing submarine attack on South bound convoy between FORMOSA and MANILA in early September 1944 at approximately 0330 (after moonrise) in position Lat. 20 degrees North, Long. 121 degrees East, Annex B.

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Q. Did you have air cover over your convoys?
A. Yes we had anti-submarine search planes, some times four or five of them equipped with magnetic detecting devices and searching in a special manner.

Q. Did you send your escort vessels to make attacks when these planes reported a submarine contact?
A. Sometimes I did. These aircraft with the magnetic device made reports of submarines found on several occasions but when my escort vessels attacked they produced no results. I was uncertain as to the location of the submarines reported and whether or not they were friendly or enemy.

Q. What was your experience in NEW GUINEA between June 1942 and January 1943?
A. My experience was in convoying and our principal trouble was with airplanes. The convoys were principally from RABAUL carrying Army transports to BUNA, WEWAK and MADANG and carrying special Navy landing force parties to MILNE Bay.

Q. What was the most effective form of air attacks against your convoys in the BISMARK SEA Area?
A. B-17's were the worst. At BUNA on the first day of the landing one transport was sunk at anchor in the evening by 4 or 5 B-17's attacking at low level. However, I was some distance away and cannot be sure. In September 1942 the YAYOI was sunk east of MAMBY Island late in the afternoon. She was underway and I think one B-17 sank her. I was not present, and know nothing of altitude from which attack was delivered. Most of the bombers that I saw were B-17's. No twin-engine planes were seen in this area but later B-24's were seen. I know of one other sinking, a destroyer in September 1942 off LAE-SALUMAUA Area. After September the use of transports to Eastern NEW GUINEA Area was suspended, principally because the transports were slow and thus were unduly exposed to air attack. Submarine attacks south of NEW BRITAIN were not an important factor.

Q. Did you receive many air attacks west of the BISMARKS?
A. On the route from RABAUL via the ADMIRALTIES to MADANG we received frequent light attacks and one transport was hit but with no great damage. At that time no air attacks were being received at WEWAK. When I left the BISMARK Area in January 1943 air attacks had still not become very serious west of the BISMARKS and submarine attacks also were light.

Q. How many convoys did you accompany into ORMOC Bay?
A. Two, the first of which left MANILA about 29 October. This convoy took the First Army Division into ORMOC. I believe that before that date some troops had been sent from MINDANAO into ORMOC Bay.

Q. What were the losses in your first convoy?
A. The first convoy which I accompanied to ORMOC Bay approached ORMOC on the 1st of November, I believe it was first sighted off northwest tip of LEYTE and was later attacked near ORMOC. At this time we had Japanese fighters for cover and an air battle resulted. There was little damage to our formation at this time. Our convoy was composed of four transports and four coast defense ships, all of which were under my command. Also assisting in escort were 6 or 8 destroyers of DesRon ONE. In this operation the Commander of DesRon ONE was in command of the entire formation. The transports all started to unload the evening of the first and, except for one sunk, finished by the evening of the 2nd. At about 1300 in the afternoon of the 2nd while the ships were engaged in unloading close to ORMOC pier about 26 B-24's and a similar number of P-38's attacked. The B-24's hit the most westward anchored ship (NOTO an Army transport of 6-7,000 tons) from an altitude of about 5,000 meters damaging ship so that it capsized and sank. No other serious damage was incurred in this attack. The convoy left ORMOC the evening of the 2nd and returned to MANILA without further serious incident.

Q. What was your experience in your second trip to ORMOC?
A. My next convoy left MANILA about 7 November with part of the 26th Infantry Division consisting of about 10,000 troops divided among the three remaining ships of the previous convoy. This convoy was composed of the three transports, some coast defense ships and about 6 or 8 perhaps 9 destroyers. Three or four armed transports (APD) joined the convoy en route and entered ORMOC Bay in company. This trip was uneventful except for a possible submarine sighting off MANILA Bay and the convoy was sighted off northwest LEYTE by a P-38. The convoy arrived late on the day of the 9th in ORMOC Bay. As the convoy passed north of the CAMOTES Islands to enter ORMOC Bay we received an attack by B-25's which did considerable damage to the upper works including unloading tackle. Due to the damage to the unloading gear only a part of the equipment could be unloaded. Unloading was further hampered by failure of landing craft to appear as originally planned and coast defense ships were used in lieu of landing craft to unload personnel. On the morning of the 10th, P-38's attacked while unloading was in progress but defense smoke pots were lit and damage was very light. The convoy less the four armed transports sailed at 1000 on 10 November having unloaded only light baggage and personnel. While passing north of the CAMOTES Islands in column formation we were attacked from the north by about 70 B-25's and P-38's. Coastal Defense Ship No. 11 was hit, beached and burned. The 2nd and 3rd ships in column the KASHII MARU

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and KOZOMA MARU were hit by low-level bombing and sank. One of them, believed to be the KOZUMA MARU sank immediately the other, KASHII MARU remained afloat long enough to remove personnel. Although the remaining ships of the convoy were under continuous attack by P-38's until reaching northern tip of LEYTE the only serious damage was done to a destroyer which appeared down by the bow. The next convoy under the command of Admiral HAYAKAWA was proceeding south on the night of 10/11 November passed my convoy about BURIAS Passage. That convoy was attacked by carrier based planes in the latter part of the 11th near ORMOC and before reaching that port. I believe that all the transport vessels in this convoy were destroyed and that only one of the six destroyers forming the escort survived. This convoy was loaded with freight rather than personnel.

Q. Do you know of any convoys entering ORMOC Bay between your first convoy on 1 November and your second convoy on 9 November?
A. No. However, there may have been some individual ships such as small armed transports.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 58
USSBS NO. 233

BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT

TOKYO 3 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Commander MORI Kokichi, IJN ; Torpedo Officer on the staff of Vice Admiral SHIMA, CinC Fifth Fleet, in the night action in SURIGAO Strait in October 1944.

Interrogated by: Lt. Comdr, J.A. Field, Jr., USNR.

SUMMARY

Commander MORI discusses the composition of the Japanese Fifth Fleet in the latter part of 1944 and its planned assignment in the SHO Operation. He tells the story of its abortive sortie against the crippled United States Third Fleet and of its part in the Battle of SURIGAO Strait. The interrogation clarifies the hitherto puzzling question of why two apparently separate Japanese forces were present in that battle, and provides interesting information on the quality of Japanese operational planning at that period of the war.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What was your duty on the Staff of the Fifth Fleet?
A. I was Torpedo Officer, I was in charge of torpedo action.

Q. Were you on the same ship as Admiral SHIMA or were you on the destroyer flagship?
A. I was on the fleet flagship.

Q. I would like to know what the composition of the Fifth Fleet was in October 1944.
A. The Fifth Fleet was composed as follows:

  • 21st Squadron (first section)
    • NACHI (CA)
    • ASHIGARA (CA)
  • 1st Torpedo Squadron
    • ABUKUMA (CL)
    • SHIRANUHI (DD)
    • KASUMI (DD)
    • USHIO (DD)
    • AKEBONO (DD)

Q. Were TAMA and KISO in this fleet?
A. TAMA and KISO belonged to this fleet before this action. Just before this action, two of them went to other fleets, TAMA to OZAWA's fleet, I do not remember about the other. I think it was about October 10th; this Fifth Fleet was originally a part of OZAWA's fleet.

Q. Do you mean, for example, it was part of OZAWA's fleet in the MARIANAS action?
A. This Fifth Fleet was assigned to the defense of the northern part of JAPAN and stationed at OMINATO. In August of 1944 they were attached to OZAWA's fleet - to the First Mobile Fleet, that is, not to the Third Fleet.

Q. Was the 16th (cruiser) Squadron ever a part of the Fifth Fleet?
A. The 16th Squadron was for a time a part of the Fifth Fleet; these cruisers were attached to the Fifth Fleet for a very short period from October 20 to October 21. Just before the SURIGAO Battle they were separated from the Fifth Fleet.

Q. You left the INLAND SEA on 14 October, is that correct?
A. Left the INLAND SEA at midnight 14-15 October.

Q. For what purpose did you leave the INLAND SEA; what was the purpose of this sortie?
A. To attack the remainder of your fleet after the battle off FORMOSA, also to take care of Japanese survivors of the air crews which were shot down.

Q. Why did you not continue, why did you turn westward to AMAMI-O-SHIMA?
A. When we came down we found your Task Force very strong, so we changed course, intending to watch the development of the Japanese air attack from FORMOSA.

Q. Originally, however, had you been informed that our fleet was greatly weakened?
A. Although we knew the American Task Force was around we were not sure of the strength and location, we did not know the exact strength of the Task Force.

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On the other hand, Japanese strength was not strong enough to face American Task Force face to face; so our mission was to find a remnant of American force and center the attack on weak point. We expected that there must be quite a number of damaged vessels around here, so our intention was to give an attack on those ships, not touching the sound force.

Q. At the time of this sortie, was the Fifth Fleet composed only of the 21st (cruiser) Squadron and the 1st (destroyer) Squadron?
A. One or two destroyers of this 1st Squadron were delayed on account of repair, one or two destroyers were not there.

Q. However, there were no cruisers or other heavy ships except for NACHI, ASHIGARA, and ABUKUMA?
A. Those were all the cruisers, that is correct; no battleships.

Q. After your force retired to AMAMI-O-SHIMA, what was your next mission?
A. At the time when we left AMAMI-O-SHIMA, the operation of KURITA's fleet was not decided yet; so the order was for us to come to BAKO and await further instructions.

Q. Was it intended at that time that the Fifth Fleet should go to LINGGA and join KURITA's fleet there; was that ever intended?
A. There was not intention like that.

Q. For whose instructions were you to wait at BAKO: for instructions from OZAWA, TOYODA, or KURITA? How did your movement depend on KURITA?
A. We waited for instruction from TOYODA. It did not exactly depend on KURITA's movement but that is one factor. Headquarters did not know exactly for what purpose they should use this fleet because there were chances of joining it to KURITA's fleet or to OZAWA's fleet or using to reinforce the PHILIPPINES by transport of Army troops from FORMOSA; so we had to wait anyway until TOKYO Headquarters decided.

Q. Was it at BAKO that you were joined by the 16th Squadron?
A. 16th Squadron did not join us. They came under command of the Fifth Fleet, but however did not join with it in the action.

Q. Where was the 16th Squadron at this time when they reported to your command?
A. When we were at BAKO, the 16th Squadron was engaged in transport of troops into the Central PHILIPPINES.

Q. Then when you left BAKO, what was your mission?
A. We knew the movement of KURITA's fleet and the order was to cooperate with KURITA's fleet and attack LEYTE.

Q. You were instructed to attack LEYTE? You knew that when you left BAKO?
A. Yes, we knew that.

Q. Was it specified when you left BAKO where you should join and how you should cooperate with KURITA's fleet?
A. Not to join his fleet, we would not do that. The instruction was to cooperate with KURITA's fleet by coming from the south, the mission was to support or cooperate with KURITA's fleet coming from the south, and it consequently happened that we cooperated with NISHIMURA's fleet.

Q. When you left BAKO did you know that NISHIMURA's fleet was also intended to approach from the south?
A. I am not quite sure but am inclined to think that NISHIMURA's movement became known after we left BAKO. We did not know the exact course of NISHIMURA's fleet, but knew his fleet would come to LEYTE on the 25th.

Q. When you left BAKO did you believe you would have to force the entrance to SURIGAO Strait alone, or did you believe you would have the assistance of other ships?
A. We expected to make approach alone until we learned of NISHIMURA's movement.

Q. Could you say just when you learned of NISHIMURA's movements?
A. I cannot very well remember when we learned of NISHIMURA's movements, but I remember that when we were northwest of LINGAYEN we sent airplanes to MANILA to get information of the movements of NISHIMURA and KURITA. The airplane had the mission to get information; but before we received the information through this airplane, we received the information from somewhere to the south concerning KURITA's fleet by radio.

Q. For this operation did you hold all necessary plans and documents - communication plans, operation plans, etc.?
A. We had no documents for plans, just knew according to radio messages; but we had rather thorough documentary plan for the operation when the American Force comes to the PHILIPPINES.

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Q. Then you had the basic overall plan but not the later detailed plan for the operation?
A. No, because this was a deviation from the overall original plan.

Q. In the original plan, had you expected to form a part of OZAWA's force or did you expect to cooperate with him?
A. In the original plan SHIMA and OZAWA were supposed to cooperate. The deviation was that our force did not cooperate with OZAWA but went down to cooperate with KURITA.

Q. How long did you remain at CORON Bay; what did you do there?
A. I am not sure but believe that we arrived at CORON before the dusk of the 23rd and left there at two o'clock of the morning of the 24th. We refueled there, and as there was no tanker there we had to take fuel from cruisers to destroyers.

Q. Did you expect to find a tanker there?
A. We did not know the movement of the tankers, so really did not expect tanker should be there; but we had the feeling that there might be a tanker there.

Q. Did you receive any further instructions after the first radio message you spoke of, giving a detailed time, or route?
A. We received no further instructions.

Q. Your purpose in approaching through SURIGAO Strait was what? What were you to do when you entered LEYTE Gulf?
A. KURITA's fleet was supposed to attack first and the mission of our fleet was to attack the remainder after the confusion of KURITA's attack.

Q. Do you mean the part of KURITA's fleet that he himself commanded was to attack first, or that NISHIMURA's part of the fleet was to attack first?
A. Our fleet did not know the liaison between KURITA and NISHIMURA, but we knew the mission: we were supposed to attack after these combined forces attacked LEYTE.

Q. You approached then, following NISHIMURA, is that correct?
A. Yes.

Q. In what ship was Admiral SHIMA embarked?
A. The flag was in NACHI.

Q. When you approached south of NEGROS did you sight Admiral NISHIMURA's fleet? Did you travel in company?
A. No, we did not see it.

Q. Did you ever see it during the course of the operation?
A. Even though we did not sight the body of the fleet, we knew they were at SURIGAO Strait by the gun flash, and by that knew NISHIMURA was there.

Q. When you were passing NEGROS did you know how much distance separated the two forces?
A. I thought NISHIMURA's force was about forty miles ahead.

Q. How did you know NISHIMURA's fleet was ahead of you; when did you receive precise word so that you knew where he was?
A. I knew when we left CORON that NISHIMURA would go through SURIGAO at 0100 on the 25th, I think this is the case but I am not positive in my memory.

Q. What time did you expect to go through SURIGAO?
A. The plans were to go through SURIGAO at 0600 in the morning; I am not sure when, but while passing through SULU Sea we changed this time to 0500 in the morning because we knew KURITA's force had been delayed. We made this change of advancing the time by one hour in order to give more effective support to NISHIMURA in view of the delay to KURITA's force. Then, perhaps when south of NEGROS, we made the second change to make our entry at 0300 in the morning with the same purpose, because we knew KURITA's force took reverse course during the afternoon. NISHIMURA ought to have received some information from us and NISHIMURA should have made new time here. However, as NISHIMURA did not change his own entry time, his position would be even worse than before; so we changed our time to 0300 in the morning to give him appropriate support.

Q. What was your speed of advance while passing through the SULU Sea?
A. 20 knots.

NAV-58

--237--

Q. Then when you decided to advance the time, how fast did you go?
A. 22 knots, wanted to make more speed but couldn't do it because of lack of fuel.

Q. On the 24th while passing through the SULU Sea and the MINDORO Sea; were you attacked by our aircraft?
A. We received no attack at any time.

Q. Did you see any of our aircraft?
A. No. We worried that we would be discovered by your planes but did not see them.

Q. I would like to know what type of information you had on the 24th, on the progress of the other forces. You knew Admiral KURITA was under attack and reversed course for a time, is that correct?
A. That was the only information we got about KURITA's movements; as for the other fleets, we did not know.

Q. You heard no message from Admiral OZAWA concerning the operations of his carriers?
A. We intercepted a message from OZAWA's fleet that he was giving attack but we did not receive that message directly.

Q. Did you have any communication with NISHIMURA's force that day?
A. No information was received - radio silence. I am not sure when it was overheard but NISHIMURA sent over the telephone that he was receiving attack by your torpedo boats.

Q. Did you know that Admiral NISHIMURA had been attacked by our aircraft the morning of the 24th?
A. We did not receive any information like that and did not know that. We thought that both NISHIMURA's fleet and our fleet did not receive any air attack on the 24th. We thought NISHIMURA's fleet and SHIMA's fleet were progressing without any attacks.

Q. What information did you have of our force inside LEYTE Gulf? What force did you expect to meet when you entered?
A. I think we received the information from our planes of the result of the search on the 23rd saying that the force in the Gulf was very formidable, the main body in the Gulf and some torpedo boats at the entrance. As to the full details, the information did not tell anything further.

Q. You then did not know how many battleships, cruisers, etc.?
A. One information told us seven or eight battleships and one report said about forty transports in the Gulf.

Q. In your position on the staff of Admiral SHIMA you naturally had access to all the available information, did you not?
A. Yes, and in this operation I was standing on the bridge all the time; I think that I saw all information that was received.

Q. The purpose of the Fifth Fleet was to attack our ships, is that correct? We had some information that you were carrying troops as reinforcements.
A. Our only purpose was to attack your ships; we were not carrying troops.

Q. Would you sketch the disposition of your fleet, the cruising disposition as well as the attack disposition?
A. (See Annex A.) In the disposition assumed for entry, two destroyers were kept ahead as lookouts, but it was intended before making the attack to have them fall in astern and to have NACHI lead the entry into the Gulf.

Q. About what time did you receive the message from NISHIMURA that he was under attack by torpedo boats, and what was the location of SHIMA's force at the time you got the message?
A. That was at midnight. I think we were about 28 miles, bearing 030 from CAMIGUIN Island. (NOTE: the position given is the approximate 0100 position of the Fifth Fleet; at 2400 they bore 320° from CAMIGUIN Island.)

Q. Will you tell us briefly in your own words what followed?
A. From about 2200 we were followed by American torpedo boats; we did not see them but we heard inter-torpedo boat communications, the telephone. (NOTE: presumably the torpedo boats heard at this time were following NISHIMURA's force ahead.)

Q. Did you get any information of value from those communications?
A. We could guess from the communication that your main force was waiting off PANAON Island. We were caught in a very heavy storm after 2400.

Q. From 2200 you had been followed by our motor torpedo boats, is that correct?
A. I think your motor torpedo boats followed from perhaps 2000 but 2200 was the actual interception of the messages.

NAV-58

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Plate 58-1: Chart showing Fifth Fleet dispositions at Battle of Surigao Strait and the Command relationship of Japanese Forces,  Annex B.
Plate 58-1: Chart showing Fifth Fleet dispositions at Battle of Surigao Strait and the Command relationship of Japanese Forces, Annex B.

NAV-58

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Q. But you did not hear from NISHIMURA until 2400 that he was being attacked, is that correct?
A. I think that is about right.

Q. Was your force attacked by motor torpedo boats?
A. ABUKUMA was attacked by motor torpedo boats about 0300 on the 25th.

Q. Shortly after midnight you passed through a storm?
A. Yes.

Q. At what speed were you then travelling?
A. We were doing 22 knots, we were in the approach disposition.

Q. When did you begin to see the flash of gunfire from NISHIMURA that you spoke of earlier?
A. I am not sure about the time, think about 0100.

Q. What happened or what did you see from your force between the time you left this storm and 0300 when you were attacked by torpedo boats; did anything of importance occur?
A. We proceeded peacefully without any attacks.

Q. Did you receive any further information from NISHIMURA?
A. We overheard the telephone sent by NISHIMURA to his fleet to reverse course to avoid torpedo attack and take evasive action, that was the last message we had from him; I do not know whether or not it was destroyers or torpedo boats.

Q. Do you remember whether this telephone came before ABUKUMA had been attacked by torpedo boats or afterwards?
A. Before the attack.

Q. This was an instruction from NISHIMURA to SHIMA to reverse, or merely to his own force?
A. No, it was his own force.

Q. So you continued your approach, is that correct?
A. We proceeded regardless of this conversation and heard nothing further.

Q. What was your action after that?
A. (See Annex C.) The tide was running north so we were set too close to PANAON Island so we had to change course to the eastward; so we changed course by turn movement to the eastward and again resumed our original course, and then those two destroyers which had been in front fell in astern of the disposition; and right after taking the northerly course ABUKUMA received an attack from the port side, I remember it was about 0315.

Q. Did you see the torpedo boats or fire on them?
A. We knew by seeing the machine gun flashes on the torpedo boat.

Q. Did this attack damage ABUKUMA, any hits?
A. The wireless room which was under the bridge structure was hit and water came in and the crew in this room were all killed, and those above that room were suffocated by gas. She was down at the bow, reduced to about ten knots, about 30 were killed.

Q. What did the remainder of the disposition do at this time; did they continue?
A. The remainder of the fleet went on leaving ABUKUMA behind with no escort. On a course of 010° after the attack, we increased speed to 26 knots and very frequently received torpedo boat attacks from the vicinity of PANAON Island, but no damage was done. Later we changed course to 000°. Although the rain stopped, we could not determine our position, poor visibility, and then we sighted two fires. It was about 0330 when we saw two fires, two ships burning, very big ships, about 0330. We saw also a very dense smoke screen, we sighted on either side of these burning ships smoke screens laid by American ships.

Q. At what range were these burning ships at the time of sighting?
A. When we first saw that fire, I judged it was about 20,000 meters from their position. Although we knew they were Japanese vessels on fire we did not bother with them, just progressed. When we came to that place the smoke screen was very dense, as explained before, and the Japanese radar on our ships were not working effectively for search; we could detect no American ships on the radar. We knew however American forces were there because of the smoke screen and I judged from the situation that the American force was behind the smoke attacking NISHIMURA's force.

Q. Could you see other ships of NISHIMURA's force besides the two which were burning? Did you know where they were?

NAV-58

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Plate 58-2: Chart showing track of 5th Fleet - Surigao Strait, 25 October 1944, Annex C.
Plate 58-2: Chart showing track of 5th Fleet - Surigao Strait, 25 October 1944, Annex C.

NAV-58

241

A. We knew that other part of NISHIMURA's fleet was there behind the smoke; there were flashes from gunfire and we saw the trail of the shells, but we could not see the body of the vessels.

Q. You passed those burning ships and went on?
A. Yes, the cruisers swung to the right and fired their torpedoes and the destroyers advanced to deliver their torpedo attack. The intention was to have the cruisers change course in column and fall in astern of the destroyers which would in turn conduct their torpedo attack. When we reached the point for the cruisers to make their torpedo attack, we saw another ship afire. Later we found out this was the MOGAMI.

Q. Did you know which were the two burning ships when you passed them?
A. We thought it was two battleships, but when we arrived at MANILA we heard that it was one battleship (YAMASHIRO) and three destroyers close together instead of two battleships. About 0420 the radar picked up a group of American ships, but there was no more definite information than that. At that time we received no other information, so intended to center attack on that group. We ordered the destroyers to conduct attack, the cruisers turned and delivered their torpedo attack and then ordered destroyers to make their attack.

Q. What range were these American ships? How far?
A. About 12 kilometers; we thought at first that MOGAMI which was burning was stopped, but evidently it was not stopped but on a southward course; and after delivering their torpedo attack, NACHI, which was turning away, collided with MOGAMI on converging course about 10 degrees. We were all concentrating on the attack, so did not know the course of the MOGAMI until they collided. Although, we thought she was dead in the water, she was moving slightly and we simply overestimated our own speed, and the MOGAMI was moving faster than we thought, perhaps about eight knots, and in spite of hard rudder we collided. It was unavoidable; after all, her rudder was useless - MOGAMI did not have steering control.

NACHI's speed was reduced to 19 knots as a result of the collision. ASHIGARA turned safely outside MOGAMI and fell in astern. The original intention was that NACHI would fall in astern of the destroyers but it was necessary to investigate damage, so we took southward course for about 10 minutes. We went south and then turned north again. The destroyers went to full speed of about 30 knots and closed further. At this time NACHI could not make more than 20 knots which was insufficient to make the attack, and also by the smoke screen we could not guess exact position of your force, so Admiral SHIMA ordered to stop further attack of those cruisers at this time, called back destroyers, discontinuing the attack.

Q. Did the destroyers fire their torpedoes?
A. Destroyers made approach for about 30 minutes but they did not see the American force at all.

Q. For 30 minutes after the cruiser attack the destroyers closed?
A. After 0420 they made approach for 30 minutes at 30 knots but they did not fire any torpedoes because still hadn't picked up anything on radar.

Q. It was the cruisers who picked up the American convoy on the radar?
A. Yes, the NACHI's radar caught the group. The first destroyer SHIRANUCHI and the other destroyers closed until they could see HIBUSAN Island.

Q. But the destroyers did not see our ships?
A. No, and they fired no torpedoes; at about 0500 Admiral SHIMA gave order to retire and recalled his destroyers. A little after that we saw one destroyer taking southward course and it was later known that it was one of NISHIMURA's fleet. Knowing that American torpedo boats were near PANAON Island, we took a course close to the tip of MINDANAO. We received a torpedo attack again and also received machine gun fire from the torpedo boats and I believe that one American torpedo boat was sunk and one was set on fire; that attack was repelled by machine guns and also anti-aircraft guns.

Q. What was the last attack you had by our ships and torpedo boats? What time was that?
A. I think a little before 0600; it was the last attack.

Q. What course did you take to retire?
A. Our fleet met the ABUKUMA and MOGAMI and we proceeded together. When we encountered her, ABUKUMA was still headed north following original instructions to attack, but at reduced speed. We assigned one destroyer each to escort MOGAMI and ABUKUMA. While we were assembling all the ships, we received the first air attack. We saw the airplanes but the attack was not severe at all, and I do not think there was any damage. At 0900 we received the second attack. We were still trying to assemble the convoy and then the MOGAMI received a bomb hit. NACHI and ASHIGURA with two destroyers went ahead taking westward course leaving other ships with one destroyer, and ABUKUMA was ordered to proceed into BUTUAN Bay and effect repairs. MOGAMI received very heavy damage in that air attack, and while the main force was south of BOHOL we decided to abandon MOGAMI and began to shift personnel off MOGAMI to the destroyer,

NAV-58

--242--

perhaps the name of the destroyer was AKEBONO, and one hour later I believe MOGAMI sank. We lost sight of that destroyer which was part of NISHIMURA's fleet, we did not sight it again; but it was later learned it had gone to BRUNEI Bay. That destroyer was the only surviving ship of NISHIMURA's fleet. When the order was given for the ABUKUMA to go to BUTUAN Bay we knew it was not a suitable place for repairing, so we sent a second order to go to DAPITAN Bay for repairs. However she sank later that day after receiving further damage from air attack. NACHI and ASHIGARA with two destroyers continued westward and returned to CORON Bay. The destroyer squadron commander was changed from the ABUKUMA to the SHIRANUHI.

Q. Did the two destroyers that were sent to be with MOGAMI and ABUKUMA later return to CORON Bay?
A. The destroyer accompanying MOGAMI, after they shifted personnel this destroyer went to CORON Bay; the destroyer that accompanied ABUKUMA, this destroyer rescued personnel off ABUKUMA when she sank and proceeded to CORON Bay.

Q. Did your group receive any more air attacks after this time?
A. The main body of our fleet received the attack by carrier planes, which was about 70 carrier-based planes at about 124 E; it was about 1500 in the afternoon.

Q. What damage was done in that attack?
A. No damage, but we destroyed about ten planes.

Q. That was the last attack?
A. Yes.

Q. Your force was not at any time attacked by B-24's, by four-engine bombers?
A. I thought I saw about 20 big planes come close to the body, but did not attack.

Q. Were they going northwest?
A. I do not know. The only damage from all attacks on the 25th was to SHIRANUHI, by machine guns, but very light damage. At dawn of the 26th the destroyers received a bombing attack but no damage. I do not know what kind of planes.

Q. During the action in SURIGAO Strait, what reports did Admiral SHIMA send, what reports and when and to whom?
A. About 0500 on the 25th, we sent message to KURITA's fleet and also to TOKYO and probably to MANILA that we were going to reverse our course.

Q. In this message did you give any details of what you had seen during the night?
A. The message contained just our movement.

Q. Did it give reasons for your movements?
A. It gave the reason saying that after the collision the speed got very slow to make the attack and that we were going to take reverse course and later renew the attack, but no mention was made of when it would be renewed.

Q. Did you not include any information on NISHIMURA's force which might have been valuable to KURITA?
A. We thought that NISHIMURA's fleet had sent their own message to KURITA, so we did not send any details. We would not know about that message because we didn't have that wave length; the previous plans did not allow for that wave length. The arrangement was not made for communication between SHIMA's and KURITA's force, therefore we could not overhear message sent by NISHIMURA.

Q. However you said earlier that you had heard NISHIBURA telephone, saying to avoid torpedo attack.
A. Not being a wireless officer I am not sure, but I believe it was a telephone message.

Q. Did you have a telephone for short-wave communication between ships, did you have such a telephone and were all ships on the same wave length?
A. All ships have the telephone for the near communication and if the telephone of NISHIMURA's fleet was fixed to a certain length we could have overheard. I believe that is why we received that message.

Q. When you heard our torpedo boat telephone messages, was it due to the fact you had a special intercept telephone watch, or because by chance we were on the same wave length?
A. It was intentional.

Q. What was the effective range of your torpedoes?
A. With high-speed setting on torpedoes the effective maximum range would be 20,000 meters.

Q. What speed setting did you use that night?
A. 48 knots, high speed.

NAV-58

--243--

Q. Was the speed setting of torpedoes the same in all ships or do you speak just of the flagship?
A. Among our destroyers that speed is only applicable to the new large type, the KASUMI and SHIRANUHI.

Q. Did you send out a signal to all ships regarding setting and speed of torpedoes or did every ship decide for itself?
A. I did that.

Q. When you made this torpedo attack, why did you send the cruisers first and then the destroyers?
A. In night battle this is the most effective formation; also it is the tradition for the Japanese Navy that the Commander should be in the leading position. That is why we used this formation.

Q. What was your professional opinion, as Torpedo Officer, of the attacks by our torpedo boats? Were they effective?
A. I cannot give you a definite opinion because I did not know where the attack came from. NACHI did not receive any torpedo attack; I do not have an opinion.

Q. We are puzzled by the fact that there should have been two separate forces, SHIMA's force and NISHIMURA's force, sent to the same place at the same time to do the same thing, and yet be entirely independent as far as their command is concerned. I would like to know if such cooperative efforts were usual or frequent in Japanese practice - whether or not you think it best to unite two such forces under one command?
A. I think it is not right this way and it is necessary to have one commander on such occasions; but, as explained before, we could not make arrangements beforehand so SHIMA's fleet decided to get as close as possible to NISHIMURA, but it could not be carried out very effectively because of fuel shortage. On the 27th the SHIRANUHI went to PANAY to assist in the rescue of personnel of the KINU and was there sunk by aircraft attack. The other ships proceeded to MANILA subsequently. NACHI and the destroyer AKEBONO were later sunk off Manila; the others returned to BRUNEI and then to CAMRANH Bay.

Q. Was it your force that bombarded MINDORO on the night of 26th December?
A. Destroyers and cruisers which were part of the Fifth Fleet bombarded there, but I did not participate in the attack. That attack was made by OYODO, ASHIGARA and four or five destroyers. The attack was conducted by commander of the destroyer squadron; the headquarters of the Fleet remained at SAIGON.

Q. Concerning the operation in the PHILIPPINES in October, what do you think was the main reason for Japanese failure?
A. The lack of efficient air force, inefficiency in aircraft search, shortage of fuel, the strength of your force against which we were not strong enough and could not give any substantial attack; for the purpose of defense work our force was divided and we could not concentrate or assemble the defense very well.

NAV-58

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 59
USSBS NO. 251

MINE COUNTER-MEASURES AND SHIPPING LOSSES IN OSAKA AND SOERABAJA AREAS

OSAKA 30 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Rear Admiral MATSUZAKI, Akira, IJN, who served as Chief of Staff, Second Southern Expeditionary Fleet, April 1943 to February 1945 and Chief of Staff OSAKA Naval Station, February 1945 to August 1945.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, U.S.N.

 

SUMMARY

 

Rear Admiral MATSUZAKI discusses the effect of mining on the SOERABAJA, CELEBES, and BORNEO Areas as well as the organization and operation of mine defenses at OSAKA.

NARRATIVE

In response to questions submitted directly and by letter, Rear Admiral MATSUZAKI furnished the following information.

SOERABAJA

The Southwest Area Fleet was organized as shown below:

Southwest Area Fleet    First Expeditionary Force
(SINGAPORE)
1st Base Force   
2nd Base Force
3rd Base Force
Second Expeditionary Force
(SOERABAJA)   
1st Base Force
2nd Base Force
3rd Base Force
Third Expeditionary Force
(MANILA)
1st Base Force
2nd Base Force
3rd Base Force
Fourth Expeditionary Force
(AMBON)
1st Base Force
Air Force

The Second Expeditionary Force at SOERABAJA was responsible for mine counter-measures in the BORNEO, CELEBES, and JAVA Areas. In these areas mine sweeping was a continuous process. During the first part of 1943, the magnetic mine was difficult to sweep but the problem was solved when magnetic bars were procured from SINGAPORE in September and October. By the end of 1943, mines became of serious consequence. A radar warning net was established, as well as a system of watchers. By tracking planes with radar, an effort was made to establish dropping points. Night fighters were used but proved ineffective.

Beginning in 1944 mining had a considerable effect on the exploitation of the vast resources of the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. Not only were ships and cargoes destroyed but convoys were delayed, and unloading areas were jammed at SOERABAJA and BALIKPAPAN pending sweeping operations. The destruction of tankers and delay in oil shipments was particularly serious.

Due to use of small wooden ships, mining had little effect on the supply to garrisons. Mining countermeasures involved the use of 1500 men and 30 ships in the CELEBES, BORNEO, and JAVA Areas. Nevertheless about 40% of all vessels over 1000 tons which sailed into the BALI KPAPAN-SOERABAJA Area, were sunk or damaged by mines. In many cases ships were salvaged only to be sunk the second time. Even before the capture of the PHILIPPINES, the traffic to the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES was reduced to a trickle. After February 1945, no attempt was made to use large ships and only small schooners and wooden barges were operated.

Note: Quoted below is the exact report as submitted by Rear Admiral MATSUZAKI. It is considered important since it effectively illustrates how totally unprepared the Japanese were for large scale mine attacks.

NAV-59

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Counter-Measures Against Mines Laid By American Aircraft in Osaka Area

1.Counter-measures employed in view of the conditions of mine laying by the UNITED STATES aircraft in the KWANMON Area.

  1. Establishment of magnetic mine sweeping unit at KII Defense Garrison (YURA). Order was issued to establish magnetic mine sweeping unit on April 5, 1945. Launched immediately on preparations.
  2. Establishment of OSAKA Port Defense Garrison and KOBE Port Defense Garrison Order was issued on May 1, 1945 to establish newly the OSAKA and KOBE Port Defense Garrisons. However, the mine sweeping strength could not be mobilized until the early part of June.
  3. Preparation of mine sweeping by use of sound bombs from airplane at KOMATSUSHIMA and KUSHIMOTO Seaplane Bases.
  4. Established look-out posts for mines along seashores of OSAKA-WAN, HARIMANADA, and AWAJISHIMA in early part of April.
  5. Prepared a map as of 4 April 1945, showing the channels to be swept and so got ready for counter-measures against mine laying.
  6. The strength of each mine sweeping unit as of 4 May 1945 (U.S. planes laid mines in OSAKA-WAN for the first time).
    1. KII Defense Garrison
      Type 5 mine sweeper
      Mother boats (converted sub-chaser 3
      Side boats (fishing boat) 9
      Type 3 Model 2 mine sweeper (fishing boat) 10
    2. OSAKA Port Defense Garrison; KOBE Port Defense Garrison Strength: None
    3. KOMATSUSHIMA and KUSHIMOTO Seaplane Bases Scout seaplanes 6

2. Mine sweeping during the early period of mine laying in OSAKA-WAN by U.S. planes.

  1. Magnetic mine sweeping unit of the KII Defense Garrison was advanced to OSAKA-WAN and engaged in mine sweeping.
    Strength: Type 5 mine sweepers 2 units
      Type 3 model 2 mine sweepers 3 units
  2. Mine sweeping with sound bombs by planes of KOMATSUSHIMA and KUSHIMOTO Seaplane Bases. The mine sweeping was done by a total of 6 planes on 4, 5 and 6 May.
       Total number of mines disposed   .  .  .  .  .  .  . 15

3. Mine sweeping and counter-measures after the above period.

  1. The mine sweeping units of the KII Defense Garrison were stationed permanently at OSAKA and KOBE Harbors and became the main strength of mine sweeping. They were engaged in mine sweeping in channels where the mines were reported to have been laid.
  2. The status of the strength of mine sweeping units as of 11 June.
        (1) Mine sweeping equipment.
Name Drag net Type 5 mine sweeper Type 3 model 2 mine sweeper Reformed type 3 sweeping equipment Sound bombs
OSAKA Naval Munition Department   7 sets (no accessories) 11 sets Magnetic Bars 940   1,300
KII Defense Garrison 10 (length 10 cm. breath 70 cm. mesh. 6 sq. ft. Manila hemp 1 set (no accessories) 5 sets   130
OSAKA Port Defense Garrison     10 sets   300
KOBE Port Defense Garrison   All equipment lost by fire 22 sets (only 17 sets usable)

18

800

NAV-59

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(2) Mine sweeping vessels.

Name Type 5 Type 5 Model 2 Type F
KII Defense Garrison Mother boats (converted subchaser) 3
Side boats (fishing boats) 9
Fishing boats 10  
OSAKA Port Defense Garrison   Fishing boats 10
Schooner 1
 
KOBE Port Defense   Fishing boats 12
Garrison Schooners 1
 

c. Set up anti-mine lookout posts in early part of June at important points along the channels to be swept and endeavoured to collect accurate informations quickly.

d. Planned to set up search lights in the vicinity of AKASHI SETO in order to ascertain the positions of mines dropped. However, the plan did not materialize.

4. Navigation Control.

a. Put into effect the navigation control in accordance with the conditions of mine laying and mine sweeping.

Chief control station: OSAKA Minor Naval Station.
Other control stations: OSAKA Naval Office of Resident Officers.
KOBE Naval Officer of Resident Officers.
KII Defense Garrison.

When the bombing by U.S. planes became frequent, the time of incoming and outgoing vessels to and from ports was controlled.

b. As the damage due to bombing and mines grew larger and the navigation of vessels in general (steel) became actually impossible, impetus was given to the use of schooners instead and were actually used. In order to assure the safe-sailing of these vessels, connecting bases were established at six localities; SAKAGOSHI, IESHIMA, SHIMOTSU, TANABE, SUSAMI and URAQAMI.

c. In order to protect the sailing of vessels, fairway-buoys were planted 2,000 meters apart on one side (partly both sides) of important channels during middle of July.

Number of Dropped and Disposed Mines

1. Number of times of mine dropping:

May 5 Times
June 7   "
July 4   "
August 3   "     (Reported)
Total 19 Times
2. Estimated number of the dropped mines:

Approximately 500 to 600

3. Disposed Mines:

By Type 5 mine sweeping apparatus 24
By Type 3 improved style mine sweeping apparatus 13
By Acoustic (Sound Bomb) mine sweeping apparatus
  (Includes 15 by use of planes)
70
By self or induced explosion 56
Total 163

NAV-59

--247--

Status of Ship Movements and its Effect on the War

  1. Monthly data of the movements of the sea going vessels.

     

    Month Number of vessels
    OSAKA Port KOBE Port
    May
    June
    July
    August
    September
    October
    Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming
    100
    29
    53
    12
    20
    6
    77
    20
    41
    10
    19
    6
    60
    21
    15
    9
    1
    0
    54
    11
    16
    10
    2
    0

  2. Effects on the war.
    The ships' movements, as noticeable in the above data, were greatly hindered as the result of the magnetic mine laying by the American planes. As its counter-measure, the use of wooden schooners was adopted, but this, too, was threatened even before it could be put to practical use, by the American bombings carried out against our shipping since August.
    Simultaneously with the above measure, the strengthening of our railway transportation was also carried out, but the total capacity of land and sea transportations was so affected that it became a great obstacle in carrying on the war. Such was the general status of our transportation up to the conclusion of war.
    In addition to the above report the following information was submitted under separate cover.
    1. Detailed list showing location and methods used for each mine swept in OSAKA Area.
    2. Chart showing location of all vessels sunk in the OSAKA Area.
    3. List of all vessels sunk or damaged in OSAKA Area.
    4. Reports by individual ships of damage received from mines.

NAV-59

--248--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 60
USSBS NO. 252

TRANSPORTS AT MIDWAY
TRANSPORTS AT BATTLE OF EASTERN SOLOMONS, 25 AUGUST 1942
BATTLE OF TASSAFARONGA, 30 NOVEMBER 1942

TOKYO 1 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Captain TOYAMA, Yasumi, IJN; Chief of Staff Second Destroyer Squadron, flagship JINTSU (CL), at MIDWAY and Eastern SOLOMONS. OTC at TASSAFARONGA.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Colonel Cole, USA.

SUMMARY

MIDWAY. List of transport force at MIDWAY. Sketch showing fall of bombs from horizontal-bombing attack, 3 June. Also torpedo hit on AKEBONO MARU during night, 3-4 June. No other attacks on transports. Loss of carriers during May and June 1942 necessitated reorganization of striking forces. Diversion of seaplane tenders and battleships for reconversion to carriers further reduced available naval ships. Offensive war ended, defensive started.

EASTERN SOLOMONS. Transport KINRYU MARU (?) damaged and abandoned after dive-bombing attack. MUTSUKI (DD) sunk by B-17's in horizontal-bombing attack. Reinforcement of Japanese forces cancelled due loss of air support as a result of sinking RYUJO (CV) and damage sustained by SHOKAKU. JINTSU (CL) damaged by dive-bombers.

TASSAFARONGA. DesRon 2, while reinforcing Japanese forces on GUADALCANAL, engaged U.S. Cruiser Force. U.S. cruisers damaged by torpedoes. TAKANAMI (DD) sunk by shell fire from cruisers. NAGANAMI (DD) received superficial damage. Landing operations repulsed.

TRANSCRIPT

Midway

Q. What ships were present in the occupation force at MIDWAY?
A. The occupation force was divided into several smaller units as follows:

Indirect Escort

Second Fleet
Vice Admiral KONDO, N., CinC; Rear Admiral SHIRAISHI, Chief of Staff

BatDiv 3
Vice Admiral KONDO
KONGO (BB)
HIEI (BB)

CruDiv 4
Rear Admiral MIKAWA
ATAGO (CA)
CHOKAI (CA)

DesRon 4
Rear Admiral NISHIMURA
NAKA (CL)
4 DD's
Supply Group and Tankers

Fast Support
CruDiv 7 ; Rear Admiral KURITA

 

SUZUYA (CA)
KUMANO (CA)
MOGAMI (CA)
MIKUMA (CA)

1 Tanker

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Direct Escort and Occupation Force (Kuchiku Sentai)

DesRon 2
Rear Admiral TANAKA, R., OTC; Captain TOYAMA, Y., Chief of Staff
JINTSU (CL) (F)
DesDiv 15 (15 Kuchikutai) 3 DD's
DesDiv 16 (16 Kuchikutai) 4 DD's
DesDiv 18 (18 Kuchikutai) 4 DD's
CarDiv 11 (Koku Sentai)
Rear Admiral FUJITA, R.
CHITOSE
KAMIKAWA MARU
1 DD
4 Patrol Boats
3 Submarine Chasers
1 Tanker

Transports

KINRYU MARU
ARGENTINE MARU
KYOZUMI MARU
BRAZIL MARU
2 Army Transports
(Names unknown)

Special Navy Landing Force Troops.
About 1500 Marines for SAND Island.
1000 Army for EASTERN Island.
11th and 12th Construction Battalion (Setsueitai).
1 Survey Force.
1 Weather Group.
About 50 Marines and 11th Air Flotilla for KURE Island Seaplane Base.

(The MIZUHO was supposed to accompany the CHITOSE but was sunk by a U.S. submarine between OMIAZAKI and DAIOAZAKI May 1942, so the KAMIKAWA MARU was substituted.)

Q. What was your navigation track?
A. The Direct Escort led by the JINTSU departed SAIPAN, passed to the west of TINIAN, then proceeded to about 28° N, 165° W, then east to the rendezvous point 26° 15' N, 175° 40' E. Some of the slow transports started from ENIWETOK. We were given air coverage by the 24th Flying Squadron from the MARSHALLS and by the 26th from MARCUS. Due to a submarine report we did not quite reach the rendezvous point with the Second Fleet but changed course to the northeast. About two days before the carrier battle we joined the Second Fleet but operated as a separate force. We cruised several miles apart, at maximum speed ten knots due to slow transports.

Q. Did you zig-zag in formation?
A. Yes, the naval vessels zig-zagged day and night; but due to the slow speed, the transports did not zig-zag. If near a submarine they would avoid by independent action.

Q. In what direction were you intending to approach MIDWAY for the landing?
A. We were going to approach the south side, sending out landing boats as far as the reef. We had many different kinds of landing boats but did not think that many would be able to pass over the reefs. If they got stuck the personnel were supposed to transfer to rubber landing boats. We had plenty of equipment for a three month's occupation without help, but were not sure of our boats.

Q. Did you plan to send ships to PEARL and HERMES Reef?
A. No, only to KURE, EASTERN and SAND Islands.

Q. During your approach were you attacked?
A. About 0915, 3 June (+12), we saw one PBY circling formation about 600 miles west of MIDWAY, but no attack. About 1700 the same day, we were attacked by 9 B-17's. They were at different altitudes, between 5-6000 meters. They surprised us, but did not have time to open fire. The nearest bombs landed about 200 meters from a ship. No damage. (See Annex A). We saw PBY's later but they did not attack. About midnight that same night we were attacked by two or three more PBY's. One dropped a torpedo which hit the tanker AKEBONO MARU in the bow. Eleven men were killed and 13 wounded but it did not sink, only slowed down. The PBY's also strafed the column of ships killing a few men but did no damage.

Q. Were you maneuvering during these attacks?
A. The Naval vessels were steaming about 12 knots, zig-zagging. The transports did not zig-zag because both attacks surprised us. They held a steady course at about ten knots.

Q. Were there any battleships or heavy cruisers in your formation?
A. There were none in our formation Only the JINTSU. The battleships and heavy cruisers were several miles away.

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Plate 60-1: Chart showing B-17 and PBY attacks on MIDWAY transports, Annex A.
Plate 60-1: Chart showing B-17 and PBY attacks on MIDWAY transports, Annex A.

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Q. When did you retire?
A. During the night after the carrier battle we received orders for the transports to retire. The 15th Destroyer Group (3 DD) accompanied them. The JINTSU with the 16th and 18th Destroyer Group (8 DD) were directed to proceed to the carrier area and rendezvoused with the Main Body in that vicinity in case of a surface action. CruDiv 7 (SUZUYA, KUMANO, MOGAMI and MIKUMA) were ordered to proceed towards MIDWAY. During the night the MIKUMA collided so the entire division retired. The JINTSU and 8 DD's approached the battle area and saw one carrier burning. About the same time we received a report that the U.S. Task Force was coming, so we retired and joined the YAMATO and Main Body about 0855, 6 June (ZT-9). About 0900/7, CruDiv 7 (SUSUYA, KUMANO), 4th Squadron (ATAGO, CHOKAI), 8th Squadron (TONE, CHIKUMA) and 2nd Destroyer Squadron (JINTSU, 8 DD's) left the Main Body and went south to rendezvous with the MOGAMI in case fast units of the American Fleet were there. We rendezvoused with the MOGAMI at 0600, 8 June (ZT-), about 28° N, 171° E; then proceeded due west to rejoin the Main Body and transports, joining at 1300, 9 June (-9). The entire fleet rendezvoused and refueled all day 9 June (-9). The fleet then proceeded west. Later some ships went to JAPAN, some to TRUK and the transports to GUAM and SAIPAN.

Q. While you were retiring were you attacked?
A. No, but we expected it. The MOGAMI and MIKUMA to the southeast of us were attacked on 7 June (-) 9; MOGAMI damaged, MIKUMA sunk. We were trying to come between the MOGAMI group and the American force to help the MOGAMI. The destroyer ARASHIO rescued the survivors from the MIKUMA.

Q. Did the Battle of MIDWAY have any effect upon your planning?
A. The loss of five carriers in May and June with several others damaged made it necessary to reorganize our striking forces. We wanted to capture MIDWAY to prevent another air attack upon JAPAN similar to the attack on 18 April. We also wanted to use it for search as we did MARCUS and WAKE. We did not think the American forces were so strong as they were at MIDWAY. The loss of the carriers was later felt in our operations. We were unable to use seaplanes for long-range reconnaissance because we had to convert seaplane tenders like the CHITOSE to aircraft carriers. We also had to convert the ISE and HYUGA (BB's) to carriers so they were lost to us for a long time. After MIDWAY we were defensive trying to hold what we had instead of expanding.

Battle of the Eastern SOLOMONS, 25 August 1942.

Q. What was your mission in the SOLOMONS Area in August?
A. We were escorting special Army and Navy troops to Cape DABIT on GUADALCANAL. I was Chief of Staff to Rear Admiral TANAKA on the JINTSU (CL). We also had four destroyers and four transports with us. The RYUJO was operating to the east of us. Sometimes we would see it. The SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU were also operating to the east but we never saw them.

Q. Were you ever attacked?
A. Yes, the morning of 25 August we were attacked by dive-bombers. We were about 100 miles north of GUADALCANAL proceeding south at about 9 knots because of a slow transport. About 0700(-9), about 12 dive-bombers attacked us. The JINTSU was hit on the port side between number one and two turrets. The 2nd Destroyer Squadron Staff then transferred to the NAGANAMI (DD) and the JINTSU returned to the homeland for repair. One transport was also badly damaged at the same time. I think that it was the KINRYU MARU.

Q. Did you receive any other attacks?
A. The JINTSU was not attacked again, but the KINRYU MARU and the MUTSUKI (DD) were attacked by B-17's about two hours later. The transport had been abandoned and was sinking. The MUTSUKI had stopped and was preparing to torpedo the transport when 9 B-17's bombed and sank it. A number of men were rescued by other destroyers. The transport was not hit at that time but was torpedoed by another destroyer.

Q. Were those destroyers from your own force?
A. No, we had retired a few miles to the north. There were four destroyers, I think from the Eighth Fleet. They had bombarded GUADALCANAL the night before and were to join us on the 25th as additional escort. They had been attacked by dive-bombers during the night but not hit.

Q. Where did you go after the attack?
A. We escorted the remaining transports to the SHORTLAND ISLANDS. The 2nd Destroyer Staff then shifted to the KAGERO (DD).

Q. Why didn't you continue and land your troops at GUADALCANAL?
A. We were ordered back. I think that it may have been because of the loss of the RYUJO and damage to the SHOKAKU. We did not have air support for a landing.

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Plate 60-2: Chart showing track of Japanese forces at Battle of Eastern Solomons, 23-25 August 1942, Annex B.
Plate 60-2: Chart showing track of Japanese forces at Battle of Eastern Solomons, 23-25 August 1942, Annex B.

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Battle of TASSAFARONGA, 30 November 1942

Q. What ships were present during the Battle of TASSAFARONGA?
A. Flagship NAGANAMI (DD), Rear Admiral TANAKA, and the 2nd Destroyer Squadron which was composed of the 15th Destroyer Division (OYSSHIO, KURASHIO, KAGERO), the 24th Destroyer Division (KAWAKAZE, SUZUKAZE) and the 13th Destroyer Division (TAKANAMI, NAGANAMI and the MAKANAMI).

Q. Were there any heavy ships present?
A. No, just destroyers. The JINTSU was being repaired in JAPAN. No other cruisers or transports were there.

Q. What was your objective that night?
A. We had left BUIN on the night of the 29th, passed through BOUGAINVILLE Strait on course 090°, just past RONCADOR Reef; then south to RAMOS Island, passed west of RUA DIKA and BUENA VISTA Island, then south of SAVO Island. We were intending to land supplies and a few troops at TASSAFARONGA.

Q. Did you receive any air attacks during your passage?
A. No air attacks either going down or returning except flares which were dropped during the night action.

Q. Did you have radar search or fire control equipment?
A. No radar of any sort. Visual fire control only. We received a wireless report from RABAUL that some of your cruisers were present in the GUADALCANAL Area, but no details.

Q. Give a description of the battle.
A. We were proceeding on a southwesterly course between Cape ESPERANCE and SAVO Island, speed 15 knots. The ships were in column with the TAKANAMI on the port bow as a picket ship. Between Cape ESPERANCE and TASSAFARONGA we had slowed to 12 knots; getting ready to land our supplies, when your ships were sighted. Just after we had slowed down and just before we turned, we saw two torpedoes pass ahead of us. You also opened fire at the same time. That was the first time we saw your ships. We immediately increased speed to 24 knots and reversed course. The three divisions made a simultaneous column turn, with the division leaders in the lead. We had practiced this turn for about a year and one-half at night. I had sent out a signal not to open fire with guns unless necessary. The TAKANAMI fired about seventy rounds and was the only ship to open up. Because it opened fire, it was concentrated upon by the American ships and sunk. It was the only ship sunk during the action.

When we sighted your ships, I sent out a signal to turn and to execute a mass torpedo attack. The destroyers fired as fast as they could. We saw torpedoes hit the flagship of your force and also hit several destroyers which were burning. Because of your starshells and airplane flares, I was afraid that your ships would follow us. Our ships were again in column about five miles north of Cape ESPERANCE. I thought that your force would pass north of SAVO Island and try to intercept us if we retired the same direction that we came in; so we retired at full speed to the northwest between NEW GEORGIA and SANTA ISABEL Island.

Q. Did you return and land your supplies?
A. No, we returned to BUIN. We landed the troops and supplies later on 3, 7 and 10 December.

Q. Were any more of your ships hit by American torpedoes or gunfire?
A. The TAKANAMI (DD) was the only one sunk. The NAGANAMI received two shrapnel hits in the after stack. That was the only damage. Many near misses, no torpedo hits.

Q. Did your destroyers zig-zag during the battle?
A. We did not zig-zag, only increased speed.

Q. Did you have any ships present with just one stack?
A. No, only new type destroyers with two stacks.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 61
USSBS NO. 255

BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND, 9 AUGUST 1942

TOKYO 31 October 45

Interrogation of: Rear Admiral MATSUYAMA, M., IJN; guest passenger in TENRYU (CL) flagship of Cru-Div 18, during the First Battle of SAVO ISLAND.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

SUMMARY

CruDiv 6 (5CA) and CruDiv 18 (2CL and 1 DD) departed KAVIENG and RABAUL for GUADALCANAL, engaging U.S. cruiser force vicinity of SAVO Island the night of 9 August 1942. Japanese cruisers received minor damage from shell fire. U.S. cruisers damaged by torpedoes but turned back raid on U.S. transport force during initial SOLOMONS landing on TULAGI and GUADALCANAL.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Describe the Battle of SAVO ISLAND, 9 August 1942.
A. Cruiser Division 6 (5 CA - AOBA, FURUTAKA, KINUGASA, KAKO and CHOKAI) and Cruiser Division 18 (2CL - TENRYU and TATSUTA) (1 DD), came from KAVIENG and RABAUL and rendezvoused in the vicinity of GREEN Island. We then went southwest and passed through BOUGAINVILLE Strait, continuing southwest between NEW GEORGIA and SANTA ISABEL Islands, passing to the south of SAVO Island. One destroyer remained outside of SAVO Island.

Our mission was to attack the American transports unloading troops at TULAGI and GUADALCANAL. CruDiv 6 was to attack the transports at GUADALCANAL while CruDiv 18 was to attack the TULAGI transports. CruDiv 6 was leading the formation. We knew American cruisers were in the vicinity but did not know their exact position. We did not have radar, but we saw one destroyer north and one south of SAVO Island. One of our destroyers left the formation and remained outside of SAVO. I think that it was assigned one of your destroyers as a target. As we passed SAVO Island, we passed astern of one of your destroyers. At about the same time we received word from the flagship's plane that your cruisers were present. Also the position. Soon after we turned around SAVO Island, the force opened fire and split. It was the original plan for the FURUTAKA group to take the outer course, but they took the inner course. I do not know why. I was with the inner group on the TENRYU.

Both the inner and outer groups opened fire on your ships to the south of us. The signal was to open fire when the flagship opened fire. We used searchlights and torpedoes also.

After firing at the group of ships to the south, the FURUTAKA group attacked other ships to the north. We also fired but were too far away to fire torpedoes. We saw your ships by searchlights and by the silhouette of flares. We did not use starshells.

After the battle we returned to RABAUL the same way that we went down. The light cruisers went through ST. GEORGES Channel to RABAUL and the heavy cruisers to KAVIENG.

Q. Were you attacked by aircraft during your retirement?
A. We saw a few aircraft but we were not attacked.

Q. Did you have any aircraft present at SAVO other than the flagship's plane?
A. I think that other planes were to illuminate the transports with aircraft flares, but I do not know where they were from.

Q. Did you have any submarines or motor torpedo boats in the vicinity?
A. No, only cruisers and the two destroyers.

Q. Did you employ special ammunition for bombardment?
A. I do not know about the other ships, but the TENRYU was using a thin walled shell with high capacity gunpowder. It was not armor piercing. The heavy cruisers probably used different ammunition.

Q. Why did you retire instead of attacking the transports?
A. I do not know. Our orders were simply to pass around SAVO Island and bombard your ships, then go home. It was explicit and that is what we did.

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Q. Did you know how much damage was inflicted to the American ships?
A. We heard a great many stories but did not know which to believe. I saw one sink and three or four on fire.

Q. Were any of your ships damaged or sunk?
A. The FURUTAKA and, I think, the TATSUTA received minor damage from gun fire. None sunk.

Note: Rear Admiral MATSUYAMA was a guest passenger on the TENRYU (CL) during this battle. Although he referred to a diary, it appeared that a portion of his information was obtained from discussion with other officers after the battle. Most of it was from personal observation. He had not had access to the battle plans prior to this engagement.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 62
USSBS NO. 256

MINE WARFARE
SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS AND FORMOSA AREAS

KURE 1 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Captain MINAMI, Rokuemon, IJN; with the First Escort Fleet in TAKAO and MOJI, and on the Staff of the Seventh Fleet.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, USN.

SUMMARY

Captain MINAMI discusses the problems encountered by the Seventh Fleet during the mining attack against the SHIMONOSEKI Straits. Some information relative to the effect of mining attacks made against FORMOSAN and CHINESE ports is also included in the following narrative.

NARRATIVE

The Commander of the First Escort Fleet moved his headquarters from TAKAO, FORMOSA to MOJI in February 1945 and in April he was assigned the additional responsibility of defending the SHIMONOSEKI Straits against mine attack. In this capacity the First Escort Fleet was known as the Seventh Fleet although the same staff administered both activities.

Due to the fact that the UNITED STATES did not use mines extensively during the first years of the war, the Japanese allowed their research efforts to relax and consequently were in no way prepared for the saturation type of attack that was delivered in Japanese waters in the spring of 1945. The equipment available at SHIMONOSEKI was not only insufficient in quantity but was also improperly designed.

Frantic efforts were made to counter the mining of SHIMONOSEKI Straits which had a normal traffic of 1,250,000 tons per month, composed of 20 to 30 ships above 500 tons and 100 to 200 ships below 500 tons. An extensive system of mine watchers was immediately established by the Seventh Fleet. Watchers were stationed along coast, in adjacent hills, and in numerous fishing boats anchored in various channels. Radar, searchlights, and underwater sound equipment were employed to assist in spotting the mines. In addition a comprehensive research and counter-measure construction program was instituted and each major naval base in JAPAN was assigned a specific part of the counter-measure program.

After each mining attack it was the policy to sweep from dawn to dusk in the observed area. Since it was the practice of the U.S. Air Force to mine the eastern and western entrances alternately, the Japanese were able to anticipate the attack and concentrate all equipment in the threatened area. Captain MINAMI is of the opinion that both entrances should have been mined simultaneously, thus forcing the Japanese to divide the sweeping equipment available.

The mining of the Strait itself caused the Japanese considerable trouble because of the currents which complicated sweeping and moved the mines and because of the necessity of sweeping the entire Strait completely in order that ships could move to moorings along the beach.

When the Strait was mined, many mines were invariably recovered on the beach. On 27 May the Japanese recovered 30 such mines and it was at this time they discovered the magnetic pressure type. At times the traffic in the Straits became so jammed that it was necessary to force ships through regardless of losses. Occasionally destroyers and submarines passed through the Straits. On 25 May one light cruiser and six destroyers proceeded through the Straits although it was not considered safe. One destroyer was hit and heavily damaged. Two submarines were sunk at a later date and shortly after the war, two destroyers were sunk while en route to SASEBO.

The number of premature explosions of American mines puzzled the Japanese and they established a research section to investigate the possible causes. No definite answer was arrived at, although it was noted that the number were greatly reduced during the last weeks of the war.

Although night fighters were furnished by the Japanese Army for the defense of SHIMONOSEKI Straits, they were very ineffective. Anti-aircraft fire from escort vessels succeeded in destroying one B-29 on 27 May and one on 9 July.

Assisted by Lieutenant Commander MIBU, Masatake, who was also assigned to the Staff of the First Escort Fleet, Captain MINAMI furnished the following general information relative to mined areas outside of Japanese home waters.

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TAKAO, FORMOSA:

Mines were laid by CHINA-BURMA-INDIA aircraft in February 1944. One small vessel was damaged and one 500 ton vessel was sunk. The above sinking was the first indication of the presence of mines since mining was performed during a bombing raid. Immediately after the sinking, the port was closed for one week. The three channels in TAKAO were easily swept with the magnetic bar and net type sweepers.

KIIRUN, FORMOSA:

One large merchantman was damaged and beached. Number of mines were insufficient to cause serious trouble. Area between HONGKONG and HAINAN:

Many small ships mined and sunk. Considerable damage January and February 1945. One 10,000 ton tanker mined and heavily damaged. Shipping routes were continually changed in an effort to avoid mines.

SINGAPORE:

One tanker sunk in East Strait in January 1945.

YANGTZE River:

Many small ships sunk and damaged. Sweeping operations complicated by mud and river currents.

FUSAN, KOREA:

One coast defense ship and one 5,000 ton transport sunk.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 63
USSBS NO. 257

ANTI-SUBMARINE TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT

TOKYO 5 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Lieutenant Commander OKAMOTO, T.; Staff Officer of First Escort Fleet Air Squadron and (general Headquarters, Grand Escort Fleet.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, U.S.N.

SUMMARY

Lieutenant Commander OKAMOTO discusses briefly anti-submarine training, special equipment and search and attack doctrine as applied to Japanese aircraft. For additional information refer to Interrogation number USSBS 200, Nav No 48.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Did the Japanese have a specific development unit whose mission was to experiment with anti-submarine devices only?
A. Yes, at YOKOSUKA. Air Group Anti-Submarine Research Section (HAN) carried out experiments with anti-submarine detector devices and radar; and also the SAEKI Air Group at SAEKI carried out experiments. At SAEKI, training was given to pilots and crew who came from various units for training with the MAD and radar. Experienced pilots who had received training at YOKOSUKA were often sent to SAEKI to instruct others. This training began early last year in 1944 at YOKOSUKA.

Q. Were squadrons trained as units?
A. The squadrons seldom trained as a unit. The nearby bases, such as SAEKI and the other air bases, generally sent 1/3 of their pilots to YOKOSUKA. This 1/3 would receive their training and return to the base and another 1/3 would go. However, in instances of distant bases such as SINGAPORE, a part of the pilots and crew were sent to receive such training; but this part would be only about 1/10 of the unit and this 1/10 would return to base and instruct the others. This method was used due to the difficulty in transportation and scarcity of pilots and crews.

Q. Was this research and training conducted jointly with surface forces?
A. There was only one area where any practice was given in search with a convoy and that was in the BUNGO Straits. Joint training exercises were conducted with actual vessels using a tame submarine for a target. Experienced pilots from outlying bases were returned to JAPAN for this specialized training and later used as instructors at the outlying bases.

Q. Did pilots object to anti-submarine duty?
A. The pilots objected and much preferred active combat.

Q. Did you rotate pilots from one type duty to another?
A. At the beginning of the war when we didn't have radar and MAD devices, we rotated their duty; but later on, because of the specialization involved, the pilots and crew were fixed.

Q. When making an attack on a submarine, were pilots allowed to drop depth charges after the submarine disappeared below the surface?
A. Yes.

Q. How many seconds after the submarine disappeared from sight were they allowed to attack?
A. Within 30 seconds.

Q. What action did planes that were not equipped with MAD take after sighting a submarine that they were unable to attack?
A. The plane would drop a marker on the water and at the same time call for MAD equipped planes to come out to search. In the meantime, they would continue to circle to try and locate the submarine. The radius of the circle was approximately 20 miles.

Q. What speed did you assume that the U.S. submarine made submerged?
A. If a submarine knew that it had been discovered, we assumed that it was making 10 knots; if it was submerged at the time of discovery, it was making four knots.

Q. How long did you follow a contact before you abandoned it?
A. Three days and nights.

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Q. Did you use surface vessels to assist after making contact?
A. Yes. Surface vessels were always used to develop a contact.

Q. Were the surface vessels directed to the estimated position of the submarine by MAD planes?
A. Yes.

Q. What size of depth bombs did your aircraft use?
A. 250 kg.

Q. Did you use any other airborne weapon besides depth bombs?
A. We had nothing besides bombs. The bomb was a standard 250 kg bomb with a modified flat nose attachment and a special tail, a nose and tail fuse was used.

Q. What depth setting did you use?
A. We used 25 and 45 meters. If the submarine was discovered near a convoy at periscope depth and immediately submerged, we dropped the 25 meter; if time passed and gave the submarine time to go to a lower depth, we would drop the 45 meter bomb.

Q. Did you drop more than one depth bomb at a time?
A. Generally we dropped only one, but sometimes two.

Q. When you dropped two, what spacing was used?
A. None, the bombs were dropped simultaneously. Only experienced pilots were allowed to drop all bombs at once.

Q. At what distance from the submarine was it necessary to explode the depth charge in order to sink the submarine?
A. With the 250 kg bomb, it had to hit within 13 meters of the submarine in order to sink it. The smaller planes equipped with 60 kg bombs had to make a direct hit on the submarine to sink it.

Q. Estimate how many submarines were sunk by aircraft?
A. In the South Sea Area between FORMOSA, PHILIPPINES and SINGAPORE, seven sunk; in the JAPAN Area, we claimed four sunk. This is by joint use of MAD and surface vessels. I do not know how many were sunk by aircraft only.

Q. What method did the Japanese use in determining whether or not the submarine was destroyed?
A. One, by oil slick; second, bubbles; third, debris; and fourth, sound.

Q. Did the Japanese ever consider the use of rockets against submarines?
A. There was a time when we thought that we would like to put rockets on the planes to use against submarines, but we had to discard the plan because the planes we were using were few. Second, we were using "secondary" aircraft; i.e., old planes.

Q. Did you ever make an attack at night with flares?
A. We never used flares against submarines but we practiced night attacks by radar.

Q. What means of illumination did you use?
A. There were no actual attacks made against American submarines at night by Japanese planes; they only practiced maneuvers in that respect. However, they made patrols at night.

Q. Did you attempt to mark radar contacts with float lights?
A. We dropped an acetylene gas flare which made contact with the water and burned.

Q. How long did it burn?
A. The small one lasted thirty minutes and the large one five to six hours.

Q. How much did the large one weigh?
A. Four kilograms.

Q. In regard to MAD gear, assuming that the pilot was flying at 50 meters; what depth below the water could he expect to detect a submarine?
A. With good equipment, pilots and crew; 250 meters maximum.

Q. What is the normal radius of detection of the MAD?
A. 150 meters.

Q. When flying in formation making a MAD sweep, what was the distance between planes?
A. 50 to 100 meters.

NAV-63

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Q. When sweeping in advance of a convoy, did you keep station on the escort vessels?
A. Yes.

Q. Is the aluminum slick automatically dropped as soon as the aircraft is within detecting distance?
A. Yes, it is automatically dropped by the MAD gear. As soon as the contact is made, a red light is flashed on to warn the pilot and the aluminum slick is dropped immediately. The distance of the slick from the submarine depends upon the depth of the submarine and angle of approach of the aircraft. The free travelling of the slick between the aircraft and the water is computed; using a system of tables which incorporated speed and altitude.

Q. After making the second turn in the MAD pattern and reaching 90° to the original track, is an effort made to pass directly between No. 1 and No. 2 slick? (Note: For diagram of pattern see Interrogation NAV. 48)
A. Yes, this pattern can also be executed by two planes, in which case the second plane attempts to lead the first slick at a distance of about 150 meters while flying perpendicular to the track of the first plane.

Q. Using this system could you detect submarines at speeds above four knots?
A. A single plane can not track a submarine making more than four knots; however, two planes working together can track submarines at any speed that might be used. The size of the triangle formed by the slicks depends upon the speed of the submarine.

Q. How were the MAD markers distinguished as to pattern?
A. We used three separate colors of aluminum powder.

Q. Was any effort made to drop the bomb automatically with the MAD?
A. There was no effort made to drop the bomb automatically. It was impossible to achieve accurate bombing.

Q. Were anti-submarine aircraft fitted with radar search receivers?
A. Installation was made in some units beginning December 1944. Priority was given to carrier task force planes and the anti-submarine planes were not completely equipped. I do not know the performance obtained.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 64
USSBS NO. 258

JAPANESE NAVAL PLANNING AFTER MIDWAY

TOKYO 1 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Rear Admiral TAKATA, Toshitane, IJN; attached successively to the Staff of the Third Fleet, the Combined Fleet, and the Naval General Staff.

Interrogated by: Captain T.J. Hedding, USN, Lt. Comdr. J.A. Field, jr., USNR.

Allied Officers Present: Col. R. Potts, USAAF.

SUMMARY

Admiral TAKATA discusses the Japanese efforts to reorganize their Naval Air Force after the Battle of MIDWAY, the effects of the SOLOMONS Campaign and of the Battle of the PHILIPPINE Sea. The planning for the defense of the PHILIPPINES is considered, together with reasons for the Japanese failure. In conclusion, Admiral TAKATA offers some general comments on the origin and course of the PACIFIC War.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What specific duties did you perform when you reported to the Staff of the Combined Fleet in May 1943?
A. I was in charge of the general phase of the operation and was promoted at the time of the death of Admiral YAMAMOTO and Admiral KOGA. I was promoted to the position of Chief Staff Officer.

Q. When you reported to the Staff of the Third Fleet in July 1942, what duties did you perform on that Staff?
A. After the MIDWAY Campaign, as you know, the First Air Fleet was very heavily damaged and we had to reorganize the Third Fleet. I had the mission to reorganize the Third Fleet.

Q. Approximately what percentage of the pilots were recovered after the Battle of MIDWAY when your four carriers were sunk?
A. 30% of the pilots were killed and 40% were injured.

Q. What were your plans for the reorganization of the carrier air groups in training for use in the reorganization of the Third Fleet?
A. At the time of PEARL HARBOR the fleet was organized into fleets by types: the First Fleet - Carriers, Second Fleet - Battleships, the Third Fleet - Cruisers; and it was planned to reorganize the Third Fleet units into a combination of carriers, screening, and supporting ships.

Q. This change was brought about by an apparent weakness in the First Carrier Fleet as organized at that time?
A. It was a natural trend of the change from the battleship school to the aircraft carrier school. The trend was to give increased emphasis on carrier fleet rather than battleship fleet. A combined fleet was planned in which the Commander-in-Chief would be on a carrier and control the rest of the fleet, carriers being made the basis of strategy. It was difficult to break battleship tradition for a carrier fleet. Young Naval officers had long wanted change but senior officers were conservative and could not find means to make the change.

Q. What do you think was the cause of the failure at MIDWAY?
A. The main reason of the failure was the strategical inefficiency on the side of the Japanese Navy, careless mishandling of the Japanese Navy. I think the chief reason for the failure was the lack of training of the pilots in search. They also put too much emphasis on attack tactics only.

Q. Which do you think was of greater importance, the failure to conduct proper reconnaissance and obtain necessary tactical information on the location of the American Forces or the better deployment or better tactical operation of the American Forces in the Battle of MIDWAY?
A. I think that poor reconnaissance on the side of the Japanese was far more the cause than the tactics.

Q. To summarize the effect of the Battle of MIDWAY on the reorganization of the Japanese Fleet. It was particularly a tactical reorganization. I gather that as a direct result of this action, it was decided to place increased emphasis on the carriers and that this theory of placing increased emphasis on the carriers had long been held by the younger Japanese Naval officers and that as a result of this action the older officers were forced to change their way of thinking. Is that correct?
A. That is right.

Q. Did the Battle of MIDWAY cause increased emphasis on the research on radar or other warning devices for Naval vessels?
A. After the Battle of MIDWAY it was asked by some of the pilots that radar research be increased, but that voice could not reach far enough to the higher Naval officers.

NAV-64

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Q. Was there any revision in training standard as the result of this battle.
A. After this Battle of MIDWAY they put more emphasis on search training.

Q. To get back to the air groups of the First Air Fleet that were recovered after the Battle of MIDWAY, what disposition was made of these air groups?
A. 30% of the pilots came back to JAPAN to convalesce, and 40% were shifted to the Third Fleet, at KYUSHU, to go into further training.

Q. We have been told by certain people that some of them were sent to the RABAUL Area. Is that correct?
A. The Third Fleet was organized on 15 July and they figured two months were needed for their next operation; but before they had enough time to reorganize, the GUADALCANAL picture came up and they were forced to send these pilots prematurely to RABAUL.

Q. Do you remember what happened to the pilots in the RABAUL Area? What happened to these well-trained pilots?
A. When they went down south, part of this original number of pilots were sent to RABAUL carriers; but after the battle of SANTA CRUZ they were brought back to JAPAN to be retrained and reorganized. However, most of them were killed in action at PORT MORESBY, BUNA and SANTA CRUZ.

Q. During the period in late 1943 and early 1944, did you have other air groups for the Third Fleet in training?
A. Anticipating island fighting, the Navy trained a new First Air Fleet, different from the original First Fleet of the PEARL HARBOR attack, and trained for land-based operations.

Q. At what time in early 1944 were these newly trained air groups considered ready for operation?
A. The original plan was that they would be ready in May; that is, the Third Fleet would have sufficient power by that time. However, the American attack came earlier than expected so they were forced to go south in an incomplete condition.

Q. Did the Japanese Navy consider that it had enough planes in late 1943 and 1944 to defend the islands south and east of TRUK?
A. They did not have enough planes and they were not so confident.

Q. Did they ask the Japanese Army to help them?
A. Yes, they requested reinforcement from the Army and they got some planes.

Q. Did they get enough planes?
A. The Army planes amounted to about 300 at the maximum. The idea was to combine the Army and Navy to meet the needs. It was not the result of the Navy request. Higher forces in TOKYO decided to reinforce that area. They were not sufficient.

Q. Do you consider that the carrier air groups in the battle west of the MARIANAS in June 1944 were as well trained as the pilots in the Battle of MIDWAY?
A. The trained pilots were not as good as in the case of MIDWAY.

Q. What do you consider the reason for the pilots in the battle off the MARIANAS being not so well qualified as in MIDWAY?
A. In the case of MIDWAY they had preparation for the encounter, whereas in the MARIANAS they had not time and were rushed.

Q. Do you think the combat experience of your carrier pilots was maintained throughout the period 1943-1944, or did the combat calibre and experience decline?
A. The skill of the pilots was normal, but they lacked experience because they were on the defense.

Q. Was this lack of skill and experience the result of lack of time for training or reduction in the standards of training?
A. There was insufficient time for proper training.

Q. In the battle west of the MARIANAS, it is thought that you lost practically all of your carrier pilot strength. Was that correct?
A. It was almost a total loss.

Q. At that period in the middle of 1944, were there other carrier air groups in training?
A. They were almost unable to train any ship-based pilots.

Q. Was the Naval air training establishment or organization able to keep up with the demand for pilot training throughout the war?
A. They could not very well meet the demands.

NAV-64

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Q. When you were on the Staff of the Combined Fleet from May to October 1944, what were your duties?
A. I was in charge of operations.

Q. Were you familiar with the planning of the defense of the PHILIPPINES?
A. Yes, I am very familiar with these operations.

Q. It is my understanding that the plan was called the SHO-GO and was made up by Imperial Headquarters. Is this correct?
A. Yes, and before the plan was made by Imperial Headquarters, it had gone through a conference of the fleets.

Q. Did the plan from Imperial Headquarters provide detailed instructions as to operations, or was it a general directive with the details left to be worked out by the Combined Fleet?
A. The plan made by Imperial Headquarters covered things generally, and specific details were made up by the Combined Fleet.

Q. Did the plan issued by Imperial Headquarters assume any date for our attack on the PHILIPPINES, or did it assume any place where the attack would be launched?
A. They assumed the place; they assumed three places very roughly: LUZON, the middle part of the PHILIPPINES and the southern part.

Q. Did they think any one place was more probable?
A. They did not assume any place specifically, and the plan was made in case of invasion in one of the three.

Q. Approximately on what date was this plan issued?
A. It was after the Battle of the MARIANAS; it was in August 1944.

Q. In those plans what arrangements were made for coordination of the Navy with Army and Navy land-based air forces in the defense of the PHILIPPINES?
A. Army and Navy forces were to cooperate as closely as possible; the air forces and the surface forces were to cooperate. No single control was erected, but close cooperation was made.

Q. We understood that at this time you yourself had some additional duties on the staff of the Southern Army? Is this correct?
A. I had additional duties on the Staff of the Southern Army but it was rather nominal. I was just assigned to make closer coordination. I remained at my regular place in TOKYO, except when I went on survey trips; I went down south several times, in August, October and December.

Q. In September at the same time that our forces were occupying PALAU and MOROTAI, our carriers attacked the PHILIPPINES. Were the effects of those attacks at all serious on the planning of the SHO-GO Operation?
A. While the First Air Fleet was assembling at CEBU for the preparation of the SHO-GO Plan, they lost about 60 planes.

Q. The question is whether the loss hindered the plan?
A. Although they did not change the plan materially, it hindered execution of the plan; strength fell off by the loss of the attack on CEBU. These raids halved the execution of the plan. Losses were not satisfactorily replaced and the originally planned strength was not available at the time of the invasion.

Q. In October the Americans attacked FORMOSA. What was the effect on later operations of the FORMOSA attack?
A. We lost quite a number of land-based planes, so when your invasion came to LEYTE we had very few planes available to oppose the attack.

Q. You made the decision to send carrier planes and pilots from the Third Fleet to FORMOSA at that time as reinforcement. Why was that decision made?
A. The decision was made by the Commander of the Combined Fleet, TOYODA.

Q. What was the reason for this decision?
A. It was thought in the very beginning that JAPAN gave your Fleet a very big loss. This was later found to be a mistake; but that thought made the decision to send as much reinforcement as possible to give the American Fleet a bigger loss; in a word, to overwhelm them.

Q. Is it correct to say then that Admiral TOYODA sent down these carrier pilots in an attempt to destroy our task force on the base of exaggerated reports of the battle?
A. Yes, the idea was to destroy the American task force entirely.

Q. At that time did Admiral TOYODA believe there was sufficient chance of inflicting this destruction on our task forces to justify taking away half the planes of the Third Fleet?

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A. Although he perhaps did not believe that it would destroy the American task forces, it was thought the most effective tactics to carry out the PHILIPPINE Operation. However, Japanese plane losses were much greater in comparison, making later LEYTE defense weak.

Q. What was the effect of our B-29 attack on FORMOSA?
A. It did not have much effect on the future operations; although they lost an aeronautical depot in TAKAO, it did not affect future operations. Had the Battle of the PHILIPPINES been prolonged, the loss of this depot would have had an effect; but since the campaign was short, the effect was not noticeable.

Q. In regard to the planning of the fleet movement in the defense of the PHILIPPINES, was it not intended in the Combined Fleet to unite Admiral OZAWA and Admiral KURITA, if possible, before our attack?
A. There was no intention to reorganize the fleet and the whole plan was to operate them separately from the INLAND SEA and LINGGA. There was such a desire but it was impossible to do that because of shortage of fuel and personnel.

Q. I had understood if our invasion came a month later, it would have been possible to unite these two forces. OZAWA could have sailed for LINGGA to combine. Is that correct?
A. One month would not have been enough. Of course, we had this in mind and desired it, had the training of the carrier pilots been enough. Even so, one month would not have been enough. Although training for carrier air force continued, they never caught up with the demand.

Q. On a different subject now, in regard to the attack at LEYTE by way of SURIGAO Strait, there were two forces there - one commanded by NISHIMURA and one by SHIMA. Why was it that two independent forces were sent to one place at one time to do one job?
A. Admiral SHIMA's fleet happened to be there at the same time. In order to get to LEYTE they decided to combine. It was not originally planned that Admiral SHIMA's force should take part in this southern action. It happened only by a series of coincidences that he was first ordered to OKINAWA, then to MANILA by BAKO to attack your force but found it impossible; and so while en route to MANILA he was given orders to follow Admiral NISHIMURA's force in an attempt on LEYTE Gulf. This was truly an appendix to our plan.

Q. When the battle was under way what was the relationship between Admiral NISHIMURA's and Admiral SHIMA? Did either one control the other or were they in combined command?
A. There was no one command. It was cooperative.

Q. Is it correct to say that the principal duty of the Army air force in the PHILIPPINES was to attack our transports?
A. In addition to that, Army planes were supposed to attack the task forces too. This would be done by the very effective types of attack planes and also high class bombers.

Q. Were there any plans made to give fighter cover to Admiral KURITA as he passed through the PHILIPPINES?
A. The order was given that fighter protection should be furnished if possible, but they could not do so because of shortage of planes and bad weather.

Q. What was Admiral KURITA's fleet supposed to do?
A. His first mission in LEYTE was to attack transport and landing forces if possible.

Q. What was the mission of Admiral OZAWA's fleet?
A. The first mission was to decoy the American Forces north away from LEYTE Gulf.

Q. Was this decoy mission part of the original plan or was it a last minute decision? Was it part of the original plan going back to the August SHO-GO?
A. No, this was not the original SHO-GO Plan, but it was in the operation plan issued by the Combined Fleet.

Q. In your own view, your personal opinion, how far did this operation carry through; where did it break down and why?
A. I think the plan was a very good one, but due to damage on the air forces in the FORMOSA Campaign, and also since the damage they inflicted on the Americans was very small, the execution of this plan was a failure.

Q. Do you think the land-based air force in the PHILIPPINES was not sufficient?
A. When the American forces came into the LEYTE region, it was impossible to attack your Task Forces heavily; therefore when the Japanese fleet approached LEYTE Gulf, the fleet itself was heavily attacked and badly damaged by your Task Forces. This was the consequence of the operation of FORMOSA and previously.

Q. One of your officers told me one day that looking back on it now it appeared that the whole operation was useless, and doomed from the beginning by our attacks on FORMOSA. Would you agree with that statement?
A. It might be possible to say that now; though right after the FORMOSA Campaign, I myself thought we could attack fairly well.

NAV-64

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Q. Just one question of fact. On the morning of 25th October last year, why did not Admiral KURITA enter LEYTE Gulf?
A. Because of shortage of fuel. I was not there so I do not know.

Q. Perhaps you saw the report on the action. What reasons were given in the report?
A. I think there was a report given saying it was shortage of fuel.

Q. Was that a correct decision?
A. I cannot very well say whether it was a correct decision. I have no background to base my opinion because I was away from the scene. My personal feeling is he could not have very well done otherwise, without any air support.

Q. Which branch of the military services, that is, the Army or Navy, do you consider had the most influence in the determination of national policy prior to the beginning of the war?
A. Army.

Q. Did that influence of the Army continue strong throughout the war?
A. I think it continued throughout the war.

Q. At the end of the war when the final decision had to be made whether to continue or not, was the influence of the Army still stronger?
A. I think the decision to end the war was in the hands of the GAIMUSHO (Foreign Office). As to the decision to end this war, the Foreign Minister had great influence and the EMPEROR adopted his recommendations.

Q. What influence do you think the war in EUROPE had on the decision to commence hostilities in the Greater East ASIA War?
A. I think there was no direct influence of the European war on the commencement of the ASIA War.

Q. On the decision to start the war?
A. Whether there was a war in EUROPE or not, the war with AMERICA would have commenced.

Q. Did the progress of the European War have any effect on the timing of the initiation of hostilities?
A. I think there was none.

Q. Admiral, do you think the Navy as a whole was eager to commence the war or were they influenced by the higher decision?
A. The Navy as a whole was not eager to commence the war. They knew the difficulties of war between AMERICA and JAPAN. The Navy knew their capacity, and they knew that to continue the war the principal part of the warfare would have to be carried on by the Navy.

Q. Which campaign, which series of operations throughout the whole PACIFIC War, do you consider the most decisive?
A. I think failure of the MIDWAY Campaign was the beginning of total failure.

Q. In your opinion what were the basic causes, reasons, for the failure of JAPAN to carry out her war aims?
A. I think there are many opinions; but the chief reason I can give is in the beginning of the war everything went on successfully until right before the MIDWAY Campaign, which marked the end of the successful operation. They should have stopped to think of defense, to consolidate.

Q. Getting into specific causes, could you state them in the order of their importance? Lack of aircraft, lack of fuel, etc.?
A. 1. Insufficiency in scientific or radar research.
2. Lack of mechanical ability, productive ability.

These two caused the big difference between the American and Japanese strength. Work was done by manpower where mechanical power such as the bulldozers the Americans use was best. This made poor efficiency in transport, submarines, poor air bases. It affected everything.

Q. Of the two major lines of assault - that is, the line through the SOLOMONS, NEW GUINEA, and PHILIPPINES, and the assault across the PACIFIC which was the more serious threat to JAPAN?
A. We were confident that we could repulse an attack across the PACIFIC, but since you came the way you did, the Japanese were divided. The Americans used logical tactics with logical force.

Q. At what point in the PACIFIC War did you think that failure was inevitable?
A. April or May 1943; I was very pessimistic, since I became staff officer of the Combined Fleet.

Q. What do you consider were the principal causes for the defeat of the Japanese Air Force or for the loss of control of the air?
A. Poor production and lack of fuel, hence lack of training.

NAV-64

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 65
USSBS NO. 285

 

MINE WARFARE

TOKYO 8 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Captain TAMURA, Kyuzo, IJN; head of the Mine Sweeping Section of the Tokyo Ordnance Department during the war.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, U.S.N.

SUMMARY

Captain TAMURA answers general questions pertaining to mine warfare.

Captain TAMURA presented a paper, as previously requested which expressed the combined views of Japanese experts on the strategical, tactical and technical aspects of aerial mining as executed by the UNITED STATES. This paper is available under separate cover.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Were any coast defense vessels converted into mine sweepers?
A. No, they were too large. They were used only for sweeping moored mines; however, many sub-chasers were removed from escort duty and employed as mine sweepers.

Q. After a particular type of mine was discovered, how long would it normally take to work out and put into effect a counter-measure?
A. The time required for each type of mine was as follows: Magnetic (needle type) - one month, magnetic (induction type) - two months, acoustic (normal frequency) - two weeks, acoustic: (low frequency) - unable to construct effective counter-measure but research was completed in three months, pressure type mine - unable to construct effective counter-measure but research completed in three months. A very few mines were swept with net type sweepers.

Q. Did your research section make a study of underwater damage to ships caused by mines?
A. Yes. Although information was available regarding the construction of vessels, in order to protect them against mine explosions, it was of not much use. The steel supply limited construction so that it was impossible to incorporate new ideas in designing.

Q. What percentage of ships which struck mines were lost completely?
A. Due to the fact that mines normally were laid in shallow water, only about 50% of ships striking mines actually sank. However, the damage is such that in deep water about 70% of these vessels would be lost.

Q. What is the general opinion of high ranking Japanese Military leaders and industrialists as to the value of mine warfare such as executed against JAPAN?
A. During the first years of the war little importance was attached to mine warfare. However, in 1945 when mines were used in quantity, they became of great concern to all leaders. As an example, after the use of the pressure-magnetic mine, the problem became so acute that several military activities such as Naval Air Headquarters even made an attempt to assist in countermeasure development, although such work did not come under their department.

Q. Did mining effect military strategic plans at any time during the war?
A. The mine attacks in area outside of JAPAN did not effect military strategic planning. This was largely due to the fact that the people were not aware of the extent of the allied mine effort and also were not fully cognizant of the potentialities of mine warfare.

Q. What was the reaction of the civilian population in mined areas?
A. In view of the fact that the Japanese people were so strictly controlled and consequently did not know what was going on, mine warfare had no effect on civilians. The only agencies that were cognizant of the critical situation caused by the mines were the Shipping Control Board and those agencies that actually came in contact with the results of the mine attacks.

Q. What was the date of recovery of the British type mine?
A. In June or July 1942 we found a complete mine in a warehouse in SINGAPORE.

Q. Did you discover the British magnetic acoustic mine?
A. No.

NAV-65

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Q. Did the Germans furnish you any counter-measure information on this mine?
A. No.

Q. Did the Japanese ever give any consideration to an offensive aerial mine campaign of their own?
A. We never had any idea of offensive aerial mining in American waters because we realized that we did not have the planes. We did have a plan to mine OKINAWA when the campaign started but never had enough planes to execute it.

Q. Did you capture any personnel that proved of assistance in development of mine counter-measure?
A. We never did. Captured personnel were not of as much value as the captured mine.

Q. Did you ever consider the use of barrage balloons against mine-laying aircraft?
A. No, because the material was not available.

Q. Were Area Commanders left to combat mine attacks on their own or did they receive directives and guidance from TOKYO?
A. The Area Commanders were left to their own devices and used such equipment as was available. However they were furnished with the latest information available at TOKYO.

NAV-65

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 66
USSBS NO. 295

MIDWAY - EASTERN SOLOMONS - PHILIPPINES

TOKYO 7 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Captain TSUDA, Hiroaki, IJN; Chief Navigator of the HYUGA from September 1941 to February 1943; Chief Navigator on the YAMATO from February 1943 to February 1945.

Captain INOUYE, Isamu, IJN; flight commanding officer aboard the CHITOSE from November 1941 to September 1942.

Commander SHIBATA, Otokichi, IJN; navigator, SUZUYA (CA) at MIDWAY.

Lieutenant Commander NISHIKAWA, IJN; gunnery officer on MOGAMI (CA) at MIDWAY.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

SUMMARY

This interrogation consists of miscellaneous notes pertaining to the Battle of MIDWAY, Eastern SOLOMONS and the PHILIPPINES. Its purpose is to supplement other interrogations on these battles.

TRANSCRIPT

Captain Tsuda, Hiroaki, IJN

Q. What ships were in your formation at MIDWAY?
A. We were a supporting group for the KISKA-ADAK force. We broke off from the Main Body about 1 June and took up a position in the vicinity of 40° to 44°N, 171°E where we were to intercept any American forces passing through that vicinity to attack either the KISKA or MIDWAY forces. Our forces included:

Second (battleship) Squadron, Vice Admiral TOKASU, S. - ISE, HYUGA, YAMASHIRO.
Ninth (cruiser) Squadron - KITAGAMI, OI.
Third (destroyer) Squadron - SENDAI and 12 DDs.
(CVL) ZUIHO and 1 DD.
No. 2 Supply Group: SACREMENTO-MARU, TORA-MARU, 1 DD.

Q. Were you ever attacked by aircraft?
A. No. We received a signal on 5 June (-9) to go south to MIDWAY to reinforce the carriers with the Main Body. We expected attack at that time but none was received. After joining the Main Body we returned to JAPAN instead of continuing to MIDWAY.

Q. What effect did the Battle of MIDWAY have upon your future plans?
A. The Battle of MIDWAY was the beginning of the Japanese failure in the war. I do not mean that this was the decisive battle of the war, but the loss of our carriers and some of our best pilots and officers affected us throughout the war. It called for the reorganization of the carrier divisions and the Naval Air Force in general. Due to the loss of ships we were unable to meet the Americans in force in the SOLOMONS. A big problem was the replenishment of planes and pilots. Our training organization was unable to keep up with the losses.

Q. Were you on board the YAMATO (BB) when it was sunk?
A. No, I had left it a month before.

Q. Did the damage received from air attack on 24 October 1944 effect the navigation or fighting ability of the YAMATO?
A. No, it caused only about one-half knot less in speed. No damage was done to the turret. One hit was on the port side of the bow, the other amidships on the bow.

Q. During the battle east of SAMAR on 25 October, did it receive any hits?
A. One or two 15cm. shell hits in the stern from cruisers. No effect on the ability of the ship. There were no hits on any ship during the battle by destroyer torpedoes.

Q. What caused the damage to the CHOKAI and CHIKUMA?
A. Aircraft attack. On the 26th, YAMATO received two more hits from dive-bombers and also minor damage from the B-24 attack. The bombs from the B-24's did not hit but some landed very near to the bridge on the starboard side. The fragments did a little damage to the bridge, killed about 12 men and wounded about 60, including Admiral KOYANAGI. The bombs that landed on the port side were a little farther away so caused no damage.

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Q. What was your estimate of the speed of the U.S. carriers?
A. When they were sighted after we came through SAN BERNARDINO Strait, we thought that they were making about 20 knots.
Later on they increased to 30 knots. Another group was estimated at 30 knots as they pulled away.

Q. What action did the Japanese force take from 0930 until 1300 after breaking off the battle?
A. From 0930 until 1300 we pursued the carriers into the smoke screen in an attempt to continue the attack, but by 1300 had lost contact. Since we were low on fuel we turned north in the hopes of finding the other group.

Q. Did the lack of fuel effect your decision to enter LEYTE Gulf?
A. The chief reason for not entering the Gulf was the delay resulting both from heavy air attacks on the day before and from the engagement with your carrier force. The lack of fuel was incidental. The principal reason was the delay.

Captain INOUYE, Isamu, IJN

Q. What was the mission of the CHITOSE at MIDWAY?
A. We were part of the Eleventh Flying Squadron which was going to set up a seaplane base at KURE Island or EASTERN Island. The KAMIKAWA MARU and the tanker NICHIEI MARU were also with us. We were stationed about 6,000 meters astern of the main transport group. We were with the convoy when it left SAIPAN.

Q. Were you attacked during the MIDWAY Battle?
A. No. The main body of transports ahead of us were attacked once by horizontal-bombers during the day of 3 June (-12) and again by torpedo planes during the night of 3-4 June. The only damage reported was during the night attack. We approached to within about 400 miles of MIDWAY then reversed course, joining the Main Body later.

Q. Was the CHITOSE present in any other battle?
A. While I was on it, it was present in the Battle of the Eastern SOLOMONS, 23-25 August 1942. We were attacked by two dive-bombers just before sunset on the 24th, I think. There were two near misses, one on the port side astern and one off the starboard bow. The fragments hit the ship but there were no casualties or damage. The two destroyers with us were not attacked.

Commander SHIBATA, Otokichi, IJN

Q. What was your mission at MIDWAY?
A. CruDiv 7 was an indirect escort for the transports in a position on the flank during the first few days out of GUAM. Later took up a position between 75 to 100 miles ahead of the transports during the approach to MIDWAY. In the transport group there were about 15-16 vessels. Six or eight were special navy transports, other Army and supply vessels. The CHITOSE (CVS) was also with this group.

Q. Were you ever attacked during your approach?
A. CruDiv 7 was not attacked until the retirement. We received a message that the transports had been attacked 3 June. I do not know the circumstances.

Q. What were your orders following the aircraft carrier battle on 4 June?
A. We were proceeding to MIDWAY to attack. During the night a submarine contact was received. We turned away but the MOGAMI collided with the MIKUMA. The bow of the MOGAMI was badly damaged. The collision occurred at about 28°N, 179°W.

Q. When did you receive your first air attack?
A. The KUMANO and SUZUYA were never attacked. We were a few miles ahead of the MOGAMI and MIKUMA which were attacked in the early morning of 6 (-9) June by both horizontal- and dive-bombers. The ships were not hit by bombs at that time. One plane which was hit just astern of the MIKUMA dove into the deck striking the rear turret.

Q. Did that plane sink the MIKUMA?
A. No, it started fires and reduced its speed a little. It was later sunk by other dive-bombers. Since the MIKUMA and MOGAMI could only make about 15 knots, the KUMANO and SUZUYA increased speed to about 26 knots and rejoined the main body.

Q. What was your position in relation to the MOGAMI and MIKUMA when the MIKUMA sank?
A. We were about 50 miles ahead. The MOGAMI and MIKUMA were attacked two or three times by dive-bombers. No torpedo planes or horizontal-bombers attacked that day. Both cruisers and the two destroyers were also hit. The MOGAMI was hit four or five times by bombs. I think that the MIKUMA was hit about ten times

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in all. One destroyer was hit in the stern early in the battle. Not much damage except from fire. The other destroyer was also hit in the stern. We received a message saying that about half of the survivors from the MIKUMA were killed when the second destroyer was hit.

Q. Where did you go after the MIKUMA was sunk?
A. We continued northwest joining the Main Body about 0600, 7 June (-9). We retired to the west, then CruDiv 4 (ATAGO, CHOKAI) and CruDiv 7 (KUMANO, SUZUYA) broke off from the Main Body and went south. That was about 0900, 7 June (-9). We rendezvoused with the MOGAMI and two destroyers at 0600, 8 June. We went direct to TRUK. Later the MOGAMI returned to JAPAN.

Q. During the period of retirement were you attacked by aircraft?
A. No we were never attacked, although we worried about it while we were refueling.

Lieutenant Commander NISHIKAWA, IJN

Q. Give a description of the MOGAMI-MIKUMA collision and the damage received by the MOGAMI at MIDWAY.
A. Cruiser Division 7 (CA), composed of KUMANO, SUZUYA, MIKUMA and MOGAMI, Rear Admiral KURITA, OTC, were an indirect escort for the transports of the occupation force. The night following the carrier battle the heavy cruisers were proceeding towards MIDWAY to carry out attack. A submarine contact was reported on our starboard bow. An emergency turn left was executed by all ships but the MOGAMI. It collided with the port quarter of the MIKUMA. The bow of the MOGAMI was badly damaged, principally above the water line. The MIKUMA only suffered minor damage above the water line. At 0300, 5 June (+12) we were ordered to retire. About two hours later we were attacked by both horizontal-bombers and a few dive-bombers. No bomb hits were made by either attack but one plane dove into the deck of the MIKUMA inflicting some damage. Due to the damage to the MOGAMI and MIKUMA, the other two cruisers increased speed and turned to the northwest to join the Main Body. The MIKUMA and MOGAMI retired to the west. The next day we were attacked by about 40 SBD's. The MOGAMI received four bomb hits killing about 100 men, but it was able to navigate and later joined the remainder of the division. The MIKUM was sunk. No horizontal-bombing attacks were received except the first day attack.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 67
USSBS NO. 311

ALEUTIAN CAMPAIGN

JAPANESE TWELFTH AIR FLEET IN THE KURILES AND NORTH PACIFIC

TOKYO 12 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Commander SHIMADA, Koichi, IJN; served as Air Officer on the Staff of the Combined Fleet, flagship MUSASHI, from May 1943 until March 1944 when he became Air Officer on the Staff of the North East Area Fleet, based ashore at KATAOKA, SHIMUSHHU, in the KURILES and at CHITOSE on HOKKAIDO.

Interrogated by: Captain J.S. Russell, USN

SUMMARY

The location, strength and losses of units of the Twelfth Air Fleet, March to November 1944, while operating under the Northeast Area Fleet, are given. The sinking of two U.S. submarines by Japanese aircraft, - one in April, 1944, one in August 1944, - is claimed and the circumstances described. Some results of U.S. air and surface bombardment are given.

NARRATIVE

As of March, 1944, the Northeast Area Fleet was made tip of a surface force, - the Fifth Fleet, comprised of one cruiser division and a destroyer squadron, - and an air force, - the Twelfth Air Fleet.

The Twelfth Air Fleet organization was as follows:

Twelfth Air Fleet, Vice Admiral TOTSUKA Michitaro.

27th Air Flotilla, Vice Admiral MATSUNAGA Teiichi.

36 land-based attack planes - Type 1 (BETTY 22)
36 fighters - Type Zero (ZEKE)
36 carrier-based attack planes - Type 97 (KATE)
12 reconnaissance float planes, 3-seat (JAKE)
12 flying boats - Type 2 (EMILY)

Air Flotilla, Rear Admiral YAMADA Sadayoshi.

72 fighters -- Type Zero (ZEKE)
9 night fighters - GEKKO (IRVING)
36 land-based attack planes - Type 1 (BETTY 22)
36 carrier-based attack planes - Type 97 (KATE)
72 carrier-based bombers - Type 99 (VAL 22)
9 transports - DC-3 (TABBY)

The Twelfth Air Fleet had available to it in the KURILES the following air bases:

KATAOKA, SHIMUSHU

  1. A regular landplane base with ample runways and a permanent detail of about 150 aviation personnel.
  2. A seaplane base, ice-free in summer only, on Lake BETTOBI. Here there were buoys, but no runways, and water revetments dug into the shore line.

PARAMUSHIRO

  1. KAKUMABETSU - A secondary land and sea plane base with a single 1200 meter (4,000 ft.) runway.
  2. SURIBACHI - Landplane base with two 1200 meter runways.
  3. MUSASHI - Landplane base with two or three 1200 meter runways.

MATSUWA

A landplane base with one 1200 meter (4,000 ft.), and one 1,000 meter (3,280 ft.) runway. No seaplane facilities ashore.

ETOROFU

  1. TENNEI - A landplane base with one 1200 meter and one 1,000 meter runway.
  2. TOSHIMOYE Lake - A seaplane base, ice-free in the summer.

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The mission of the North East Area Fleet was to provide general escort and defensive cover for shipping between CHISHIMA BETTO (KURILES) and HONSHU.

In March 1944 the 27th Air Flotilla was based at TATEYAMA at the end of the CHIBA Peninsula, TOKYO Area, and at TOYOHASHI in the NAGOYA Area. In April, 36 fighters went to MISAWA, at the northern end of HONSHU, and were to continue moving north, as weather improved, to three airfields on HOKKAIDO in the vicinity of SHIBETSU. However the HOKKAIDO airfields were not ready in June, 1944. When the SAIPAN operation took place most of the fighters were ordered to IWO JIMA. From IWO, this detachment went to the KANTO Plain (TOKYO Area). The remainder of the 27th Air Flotilla joined the Combined Fleet in June, 1944.

In March 1944, the 51st Air Flotilla was in the main islands of JAPAN at TSUIKI and OITA on KYUSHU, at TOYOHASHI near NAGOYA, and at MOBARA in the TOKYO Area. In late April and early May the Flotilla moved to HOKKAIDO, thence deployed into the KURILES to provide air cover for convoys. In August the Flotilla returned to HOKKAIDO, leaving 12 carrier-based attack planes at KATAOKA. Of these, 6 returned in November and the other 6 stayed all winter. From HOKKAIDO the remainder of the 51st Flotilla returned to the KANTO Plain area and to KYUSHU, because of the LEYTE Operations. Three or four transports stayed in the north. Later some of the Flotilla went to FORMOSA and some to the PHILIPPINES.

Commander Northeast Area Fleet maintained his headquarters at CHITOSE on HOKKAIDO, but moved north by air transport to base at KATAOKA during the period 20 April to 10 August 1944.

The deployment of units of the Twelfth Air Fleet is shown in the table of appendix (A). During the summer there were almost daily American air attacks against Japanese bases and shipping in the North KURILES. There was severe damage to a picket boat line which was maintained on a 200 mile radius from KATAOKA, - 5 or 6 boats were sunk. Some damage was done ashore, with 2 or 3 planes destroyed on the ground at MUSASHI.

Between June and September there were four bombardments by surface ships. Two against MUSASHI destroyed 12 or 13 planes, damaged some buildings, and caused light personnel casualties. Two against MATSUWA damaged buildings and installations. No ship above 500 tons was sunk by air or surface action, however there were many sunk by submarine, - about 20.

During Commander SHIMADA's duty on the Staff of Commander Northeast Area Fleet, the sinking of 2 United States submarines was claimed by Japanese aircraft. In April 1944 a carrier type bomber dove from 500-600 meters (1,640-1,970 ft.) on a U.S. submarine which was cruising at periscope depth off ETOROFU. The plane released one 250 kilogram bomb fuzed with a time fuze to detonate at a fixed depth. A direct hit was made and one end of the submarine lifted out of water as the submarine sank. There were no survivors, and no identification of the submarine was made. In August 1944, off PARAMUSHIRO, a twin-float reconnaissance plane made a diving attack on a U.S. submarine. After the underwater explosion of a 250 kilogram bomb the submarine made a 180 degree submerged turn trailing oil and was presumed to sink immediately thereafter because the oil slick ended in a concentrated patch of oil which persisted for 4 days.

Japanese plane losses during the period were:

In combat - 1 night fighter, GEKKO (IRVING)
Operational - 50-60 total of all types
Bombing - 5-6 planes total
Naval bombardment - 12-13 planes total

Operational losses were particularly high in the 51st Air Flotilla because of inexperienced pilots operating from icy runways. The heaviest losses were in fighter planes. Two or more planes ran into mountains in snow storms, 5 or 6 were lost in fog. There was much trouble due to icing of wings, control surfaces, and windshields. Fog was a great hazard and frequently flights were weathered out of their own fields and had to land in fields on the lee side of mountains. Radio beacons were installed at all principal air bases and radio direction finders were used in planes, - but not too successfully.

The loss of two American planes was considered confirmed by Commander SHIMADA. In June or July 1944, a B-25 or Ventura was shot down over the sea off SHIMUSHU by Japanese fighters, and was seen to crash in the water. In August or September a B-25 strafing and bombing a picket boat collided with the mast of the craft and crashed in the sea. 3 survivors were picked up. In about 10 other instances Japanese fighters reported that planes smoked, but descended into the fog so that destruction could not be ascertained. American plane types identified in air attacks against the North KURILES were the B-25, B-24, and the Ventura. The last, he said was a difficult target for fighters because of its high speed and maneuverability.

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1944 27TH AIR FLOTILLA
Type and Strength March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov.
Fc 36 TATEYAMA MISAMA ............. IWO TATEYAMA KISARAZU ............. ............. ............. ............. .............
Fo 36 TATEYAMA MISAMA ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. .............
Flo 36 TATEYAMA MISAMA ............. ............. ............. ............. ............. .............
Fsr 12 TATEYAMA MISAMA ETOROFU ETOROFU, 6 SHIMUSHU, 6 ............. ............. ............. FORMOSA FORMOSA .............
Fd 12 YOKAHAMA MISAMA ETOROFU ETOROFU, 6 SHIMUSHU, 6 ............. ............. ............. FORMOSA FORMOSA .............
51ST AIR FLOTILLA
Fe 72 ............. CHITOSE CHIMUSHU, 36 CHITOSE, 36 ............. ............. ............. BIHORO, 72 ............. .............
Fo 36 ............. SHIMUSHU, 6 BIHORO, 30 ......., 9 ....., 27 ............. ............. ............. SHIMUSHU, 12 BIHORO, 24 ............. SHIMUSHU, 6
Fb 72 ............. ETOROFU, 6 MATSUWA, 6 BIHORO, 80   MATSUWA, 6 PARAMUSHIRO, 12 BIHORO, 75 CHITOSE, 75 ............. CHITOSE, 90 ............. .............
Flo 36 ............. CHITOSE PARAMUSHIRO, 18 CHITOSE, 30 ............. ............. ............. BIHORO, 36 ............. .............
Fnc 9 ............. ............. ............. SHIMUSHU, 4 CHITOSE, 6 ............. ............. CHITOSE, 9 ............. .............

The figures given are for normal plane complement. Additionally an immediate reserve of one-third of complement was kept on hand.

Fe - Fighter
Fo - Carrier attack
Fb - Carrier bomber
Flo - Land attack
Fsr - Float reconnaissance
Fd - Flying boat
Fnc - Night fighter

APPENDIX (A)

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 68
USSBS NO. 331

JAPANESE INVASION OF THE PHILIPPINES

TOKYO 10 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Captain IHARA, Mitsugo, IJN; Staff of Third Fleet (Gunnery), operating in the South Seas from December 1941 to July 1942; Staff of Second Fleet (Gunnery) at MIDWAY and SOLOMONS, from July 1942 to April 1943.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, U.S.N.

SUMMARY

This interrogation verifies and clarifies certain information previously obtained relative to the movements of the Japanese Third Fleet in the PHILIPPINE, CELEBES and JAVA Areas.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. List the forces assigned to the Third Fleet.
A. The organization of the Third Fleet was as follows:

Ashigara (Flagship)  
Fifth Cruiser Squadron 4 heavy cruisers
Second Torpedo Squadron 1 Lt. cruiser, 12 destroyers
Fourth Torpedo Squadron 1 Lt. cruiser, 12 destroyers
Fifth Torpedo Squadron 1 Lt. cruiser, 12 destroyers
Sixth Torpedo Squadron 4 submarines
Seventeenth Minelayer Sqd. 2 minelayers
First Base Force 30 ships (troops and supply)
Second Base Force 30 ships (troops and supply)

Q. Was the entire force listed above in FORMOSA prior to the outbreak of the war?
A. Yes, but there was also another invasion force in PALAU. The Third Fleet was divided into two forces which assembled at FORMOSA and PALAU respectively about 3 December.

Q. What time did the Third Fleet sortie from FORMOSA?
A. On the morning of 10 December, about 24 hours after the air attack on the PHILIPPINES.

Q. At what time did the Third Fleet make their first landing?
A. December 10, at APARRI.

Q. Was the Third Fleet attacked by aircraft during the approach to the PHILIPPINES?
A. No.

Q. After occupying APARRI, describe the movements of the Third Fleet.
A. Prior to leaving FORMOSA, the Third Fleet was divided into three forces. One proceeded to APARRI and one to VIGAN. The third force, which included the cruisers, operated west of VIGAN as a support force.

Q. Did all three forces leave FORMOSA at the same time?
A. No. The forces departed according to a previously arranged time schedule, the APARRI force leaving first.

Q. Were any of these three forces attacked by aircraft during their movement down to the PHILIPPINES Area?
A. No, but after arrival the APARRI force was attacked and suffered the loss of one mine sweeper sunk and one heavily damaged; the VIGAN force was also attacked and lost one sub-chaser and one transport.

Q. After the completion of the VIGAN landing, were additional forces brought down for the LINGAYAN landing?
A. Yes, the APARRI and VIGAN forces were reinforced by additional forces from FORMOSA in preparation for the LINGAYAN landing.

Q. What force was used in direct support of the LINGAYAN landing?
A. In general, the forces participated in the LINGAYAN landing were: The 14th Squadron, the Second Torpedo Squadron, and about one and half base force; which in terms of ships means three 10,000 ton cruisers, 20 destroyers, 40 small type ships and about 20 transports.

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Q. What damage was suffered by that force during the invasion?
A. The ASHIGARA was attacked by five or six bombers, but she received no damage. The bombs fell on the port quarter. Other smaller ships were damaged by strafing and near bomb misses.

Q. Where did the aircraft come from that attacked DAVAO on the morning of 8 December?
A. I think they came from PALAU, but am not certain.

Q. Were there any aircraft carriers used in the PHILIPPINE Operation?
A. I think there were two small carriers attached to the Second Fleet, but they did not operate inside of the area bounded by the PHILIPPINES, CELEBES, BORNEO and JAVA.

Q. What were the names of the carriers?
A. HOSHO; I don't know the other.

Q. After the completion of the invasion of LINGAYAN, describe the movements of the Third Fleet.
A. The Third Fleet returned to FORMOSA for fuel. It then proceeded to DAVAO and rendezvoused with the PALAU force in preparation for the forthcoming operations in the islands to the south.

Q. Do you know what damage was received by Japanese transports on the night of 24 January when attacked by American destroyers at BALIKPAPAN?
A. Four transports and one patrol vessel sunk, but this loss caused no delay in the operations as planned.

Q. Are you familiar with the engagement of BALI, 19-20 February?
A. Yes, slightly. This operation was the first one in which warships were seriously damaged. One destroyer was seriously damaged and one destroyer lightly damaged.

Q. What forces were assembled in the JAVA SEA for the invasion of JAVA?
A. The LINGAYAN force plus the Fifth Squadron, which contained four cruisers of 10,000 tons, invaded the eastern part of JAVA. The western tip was invaded by part of the MALAYA force.

Q. Where were these cruisers during the LINGAYAN Operation?
A. They operated from PALAU to assist in the invasion of DAVAO.

Q. What damage was suffered by the Japanese Fleet in the Battle of the JAVA SEA?
A. There were no sinkings, but two destroyers were heavily damaged.

Q. Can you describe the action of the EXETER, ENCOUNTER, and POPE?
A. It was just as described previously by Captain ISHIBARA.

Q. Were all three ships sunk by gunfire?
A. The EXETER and ENCOUNTER were sunk by gunfire and torpedoes. As soon as they were dead in the water and unable to maneuver, the POPE reversed course to eastward and attempted to escape. She was attacked by aircraft, heavily damaged, and, while in sinking condition, sunk by pursuing surface vessels.

Q. During the entire campaign, did the Japanese learn any particular lesson which was of value to them in future operations?
A. No. The opposition was so light that the Japanese forces were not put to a severe test and consequently they concluded that equipment available and the tactics used were satisfactory for future operations. It would have been better for the Japanese if they had encountered more opposition.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 69
USSBS NO. 345

BATTLE OFF CAPE ENGANO

TOKYO 12 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Rear Admiral MATSUDA, Chiaki, IJN ; former commanding officer of YAMATO, and Commander Carrier Division 4 (ISE and HYUGA) from May 1944 to February 1945.

Interrogated by: Lieut. Comdr. J.A. Field, jr., USNR.

SUMMARY

Rear Admiral MATSUDA discusses the conversion of ISE and HYUGA to hermaphrodite battleship-aircraft carriers, their employment in the Battle off Cape ENGANO in October 1944, and their subsequent movements. He gives his opinions of the causes for the decline of the Japanese Naval Air Force, and information on Japanese doctrine for maneuver under air attack.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. When approximately, was it decided to convert ISE and HYUGA?
A. After MIDWAY, I think; it took about nearly a year to complete.

Q. Was it decided upon in consequence of the carrier loss at MIDWAY?
A. Yes.

Q. Who made that decision?
A. General Staff I think.

Q. You were the first commander of this division after the conversion?
A. Yes.

Q. Did you yourself think it was a sound procedure, a sensible conversion?
A. Not so very good because planes could only take-off and not land, so at first all were landplanes; after, half landplanes and half seaplanes, and we had eleven seaplanes and eleven land bombers (PAUL and JUDY).

Q. Had you yourself had any experience in aircraft operation before receiving command of this division?
A. I was in command of KAMOI, a seaplane carrier converted from a tanker, in CHINA on the YANGTZE River in the second year of the CHINA War.

Q. On ISE and HYUGA, did you carry all planes in the hangar, or some in the hangar and some on deck?
A. About half on deck, half in hangar.

Q. Just half in number or one type above and one type below?
A. They were mixed types in both places.

Q. When you catapulted these planes, how did you head relative to the wind?
A. Catapulted the planes broad on the bow into the wind.

Q. What was the purpose of having two different types of planes aboard?
A. It was preferred to have landplanes only, but in order to be able to recover some of the planes it was thought necessary to include certain number of seaplanes.

Q. So that when operating the plan would be to have the landplanes go to shore and seaplanes return to the ship?
A. Yes, seaplanes particularly for reconnaissance, landplanes for attack.

Q. Did you in fact ever operate planes from these ships?
A. No, for the PHILIPPINES Campaign training for pilots was insufficient so the planes were used land based for this operation.

Q. If the ships had been converting ever since MIDWAY, why were the pilots insufficiently trained?
A. Squadron was newly organized; the squadron in question was organized middle of May, the operation took place in October so training was incomplete. Pilots for ISE and HYUGA were more or less complete, however the JUNYO and RYUHO had been added to my command and the pilots of those two carriers were not well trained so they did not participate in the operation.

Q. But so far as operating aircraft from ISE and HYUGA, even in practice operations, that was never done, is that correct? I heard that this was not done because parts were missing.

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A. Parts were okay, but pilots were not. The total planes under my command was 150 - 44 in ISE and HYUGA, the remainder in JUNYO and RYUHO.

Q. That is, four ships together made up the 4th Air Squadron (Carrier Division)?
A. Yes, those two carriers did not take part in the October battle.

Q. Why was that?
A. ISE and HYUGA participated in the sea battle off the PHILIPPINES as battleships.

Q. I was wondering why the other two did not participate.
A. The planes belonging to them were allocated to land bases and were used there, the 3rd Air Squadron under command of Admiral OZAWA supplied aircraft for the Japanese Fleet. They divided the force: two carriers were under direct command of Admiral OZAWA, and two carriers under myself.

Q. The aircraft from all four of your own carriers were sent to FORMOSA, is that correct?
A. The planes attached to my carriers were sent to FORMOSA to reinforce land-based air, and to attack your Task Force about 12-14 September.

Q. Do you know if any of the planes from the 3rd Squadron, from OZAWA's Squadron, were sent to FORMOSA at that time?
A. The planes belonging to the carriers under direct command of Admiral OZAWA took off from their respective aircraft carriers, later attacked the American Fleet, and then returned to the PHILIPPINES.

Q. When they left JAPAN for that attack did Admiral OZAWA have his full air strength, or were some of his planes used for attack from shore bases?
A. A little less than half of the original complement of planes was taken away before they left the INLAND SEA.

Q. So they took all your planes and half of OZAWA's planes?
A. Yes. That was the decision of Admiral TOYODA.

Q. Do you know what reasons he had for weakening his carrier force at that time?
A. For the reason that the pilots belonging to those two aircraft squadrons were insufficiently trained for sea operation but trained well enough for land operations.

Q. I had understood that decision to take planes away from the carriers was a sudden decision based on inaccurate reports of damage to our Task Force off FORMOSA, is that not correct?
A. I am not very familiar with the reasons for high-up decisions.

Q. In September and early October of last year were you familiar with planning for the SHO-GO Operation?
A. I was given battle orders.

Q. About what date did you receive plans or orders?
A. End of September or beginning of October.

Q. At that time what employment of your ships was planned in the event of our attack on the PHILIPPINES?
A. I rather think that the operation as carried out was according to the original plan. The vital difference was that the American Fleet attacked earlier than had been expected so we were unable to use all the forces in this operation that we had originally planned.

Q. Approximately when had you expected the invasion?
A. Though the planning of the high command was not well known to me, the directive regarding training indicated it would be complete by the end of October; possibly, I think invasion was expected in early November.

Q. You said you thought the operation was carried out more or less according to plan; we had information that the Third Fleet had intended to go into LINGGA and operate in conjunction with the Second Fleet, as in the MARIANAS, rather than operating as a decoy as eventually happened.
A. My recollection might not be accurate but I do remember that the 3rd Air Squadron was to go to LINGGA on completion of training. However I recollect that as an emergency measure, if the attack came too soon they were to act in the way they actually did. I also recollect that after Admiral OZAWA and the Third Fleet had gone south to LINGGA my own 4th Air Squadron was to combine with the Fifth Fleet under Admiral SHIMA and act as a decoy. However it turned out, I was to be a decoy.

Q. In your belief and recollection, the plan of using a decoy force from the north was part of the original plan?
A. Yes.

Q. And therefore the use of the Third Fleet as a decoy was probably no surprise to OZAWA, that is, he must have expected it in the event of an early invasion; is that correct?
A. That is correct.

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Q. Was the 4th Air Squadron a part of the Third Fleet, or merely operating with it on this occasion?
A. Part of it.

Q. Would it have been transferred to the Fifth Fleet if OZAWA had gone south?
A. No the 4th Squadron would merely have operated temporarily under the command of SHIMA.

Q. We heard that your two ships were to act as battleships with OZAWA's force. Was that as defense against airplanes or was there some thought of surface action?
A. Originally for anti-aircraft, but if necessary to carry out assault, as battleships.

Q. Could you draw a sketch of the cruising disposition of OZAWA's Fleet as it came south to the PHILIPPINES?
A. (Annex A)

Q. Did the two groups stay on the same bearing, in the same direction, from each other?
A. The bearing varied, it did not remain the same. We merely kept within visual signaling distance.

Q. When you changed course, did you also change the axis to coincide?
A. Sometimes change axis, sometimes individual turns. As a rule, if the course change was for less than one hour it would be made by turn movement; this was also the case in emergency as in the case of submarine sightings.

Q. How long did you cruise in these two separate formations? Did that continue or did you unite as you approached the PHILIPPINES?
A. When we expected attack, we formed this separate formation, but in cruising formation both groups were united. When we drew near the PHILIPPINES, we split the force.

Q. Is this an accurate picture of the united cruising disposition? (Admiral MATSUDA was here shown Annex A to interrogation of Captain OHMAE, NAV No. 36, USSBS No. 150).
A. That is correct sketch.

Q. On the 24th, when your fleet launched its attack by air against our Task Force, were you in one or two groups?
A. Two, but distance very small.

Q. How long did you stay in those two groups? Did you stay in them permanently until our attack or was there a change during the night?
A. Toward evening of the 24th, we united forces. Then the two battleships and four large (TERUTSUKI) destroyers formed a detachment and steamed southward to attack your Task Force in night battle. The information we received at that time was that the American Task Force had had two carriers damaged, also I think that there only remained one carrier and two battleships, and it was thought this force could cope with them. We steamed southward from four or five o'clock until the middle of the night.

Q. Did you sight our force or make contact in any way?
A. About eight o'clock, TOKYO time, we observed some flashes of light in the distance; it was suspected perhaps it was caused by Japanese land-based air assault against American Force.

Q. You thought it was gunfire?
A. Gunfire, or perhaps blasts by bomb hits, by Japanese land-based planes. My staff officers told me it must be gun flashes or bomb bursts but I was not sure; I suspected it might have been air electrical storm in the distance. I saw it myself very briefly.

Q. What did you do when you saw these flashes? Did you report to OZAWA, what action aid you take?
A. Because of radio silence ordered I did not make report to OZAWA. I thought if it were an actual aircraft raid, if I should draw close to the battle, there would be confusion; so I steamed parallel to the supposed course of the American Fleet.

Q. And then what happened?
A. Even after that we occasionally observed flashes, it might have been electrical storm after all.

Q. You had no radar contacts in that direction, ships or planes?
A. I remember that there was radar contact in that direction, on planes. Because of the distance, we could not make radar contact with ships; I remember it was plane contact.

Q. Do you remember roughly what the range was?
A. Fifty kilometers.

Q. Had Admiral OZAWA ordered radio silence for his force? Had you carefully maintained radio silence?
A. I was given discretion, under the circumstances I was permitted to make the judgment by myself, so I judged not to.

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Plate 69-1: Chart showing air defense formation, group two of Third Fleet Striking force, Battle of Leyte Gulf, Annex A.
Plate 69-1: Chart showing air defense formation, group two of Third Fleet Striking force, Battle of Leyte Gulf, Annex A.

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Q. And that was the only contact you had during the night?
A. Yes.

Q. About what time were these flashes first seen, and what time did they end?
A. First around seven o'clock. We continued seeing it occasionally until eight or nine o'clock.

Q. At what time did you turn northward to rejoin OZAWA?
A. Between ten o'clock and midnight. I have been trying all day to recall the exact time but I cannot. Soon after 10 o'clock I received orders from OZAWA to cease the surface operation and turn northward; however I did not obey the orders right away, but continued the southeast course for some time. The flashes thought to be gunfire were seen a little bit west of south and I shaped a course parallel to them intending to close shortly after 10 o'clock; however, I received orders to rejoin from OZAWA.

Q. What in general were plans for the 25th? Almost all your aircraft had gone; was it intended to cruise back and forth until an attack came?
A. I thought that the entire fleet in a body, according to the orders of TOYODA, would act as decoy the next day.

Q. What time in the morning did you rejoin OZAWA?
A. It was just at sunrise, about 6 o'clock I think. The formation had just been completed when American bombers appeared on the scene.

Q. Up to the time when our planes attacked you on the 25th, what information was available to you on the progress of NISHIMURA, SHIMA or KURITA?
A. By the morning we had received the information that KURITA's force had retraced his course and that SHIMA's fleet was successfully operating according to the plan; it was later that I learned that KURITA's force was engaged in surface operation here east of SAMAR and that NISHIMURA's force had received a rather bad beating.

Q. That information of KURITA's action off SAMAR and of the damage to NISHIMURA only reached you after our attack?
A. It might have been just before dawn, I am not quite sure.

Q. On the 25th, what damage was done to ISE and HYUGA?
A. No damage to HYUGA, very little to ISE; but to some of our other ships great damage.

Q. On ISE, was the damage from hits or near misses?
A. ISE damage appeared to have been inflicted by a small bomb which hit outboard on the mount of the port catapult, casualties 40 to 50. Both ships had their blisters perforated by near misses. ISE took on board a little water. HYUGA took 4 or 5 degree list due to perforation, but was easily righted.

Q. We have heard some information to the effect that OZAWA's force planned a torpedo attack on our American force the afternoon or evening of the 25th; do you remember anything of this nature?
A. At seven or eight o'clock, OZAWA radioed his intention of a torpedo attack, and steamed southward about two hours but could not find the American force. All surviving ships steamed south. OYODO and my two battleships and two or maybe three destroyers steamed southward from about 7 to 9 o'clock. Admiral OZAWA was in receipt of the intelligence that two new battleships and several cruisers and destroyers were chasing us, so he turned around to attack them thinking that he had adequate forces, but finding nothing then turned north again.

Q. Do you remember the source of that information?
A. It might have been result of reconnaissance of land-based planes.

Q. It did not come from any of your ships which were lagging behind and were under our attack?
A. Some intelligence might have been received from the ships but the other intelligence came from land-based planes, and the summary of these reports amounted to two new battleships some cruisers and destroyers.

Q. Were any of the surviving ships attacked by submarines as you went north?
A. No, not attacked; at the mouth of SATUSUKA Bay anchorage in AMAMI-O-SHIMA, I believe there was a torpedo attack by American submarines, but no damage.

Q. Do you know if TAMA was sunk by American submarine?
A. We had no report.

Q. Where did your ships retire?
A. AMAMI-O-SHIMA, then to KURE after two days stop, and reported KURE 31 October.

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Q. Then when did you go south?
A. The HYUGA left on the 8th, ISE on the 9th and they rejoined at SASEBO. They left SASEBO the 11th and went south.

Q. Directly to LINGGA or SINGAPORE?
A. Initial order was to take munitions on both carriers and go to MANILA but it was changed a bit; so we went to PARACEL Islands, to trans-ship the munitions to small ships who would take it to MANILA. The greater part of munitions we transferred but some we had to leave on board. We trans-shipped munitions to specially constructed transport vessels displacing 1000 tons, capacity 500 tons cargo.

Q. After this operation, did you continue south?
A. Here at the PARACEL Islands we rendezvoused with SHIMA's fleet from BRUNEI, and went south to LINGGA arriving 21 November. Then on 9 or 10 December, I left LINGGA and proceeded to SAIGON where we stayed in the outer port for a week or so, and then went to CAMRANH Bay remaining there until the end of December. On 1 January we left and returned again to LINGGA, remaining there in the SINGAPORE area until 10 February.

Q. Why did you go to LINGGA on 1 January?
A. There were two objectives: first, to back up the transportation route between SINGAPORE and JAPAN which was getting more and more precarious, and second, to mass our forces and stand by to give bodily attack against Americans in the PHILIPPINES according to the development of the campaign. While we were in SINGAPORE, we were scouted by B-29's based on CALCUTTA, so you must have been aware of our location. On 10 February, having taken on a load of gasoline and other materials, we left for the EMPIRE, arriving at KURE on the 20th. The Squadron was disbanded on 1 March.

Q. What is your opinion of the planning of the SHO Operation to defend the PHILIPPINES; do you think it was as good a plan as could be made with the forces available?
A. My opinion at that time was that after all the plan of the operation was insufficient to check your advance; however, under the circumstances, I thought it was the best plan. I thought it would be the last engagement for me and counted on death in the action.

Q. We thought it a very bold plan, and one which came very near success. In your opinion where did the operation break down, what was the principal cause of its failure?
A. The JAPANESE surface forces were depleted, the main hope of the operation was the Air Force. Had Japanese pilots been as skilled as in the initial stages of the war, perhaps it would have come close to succeeding.

Q. Are you speaking particularly of carrier pilots, or of shore-based units, or both?
A. Mainly of the carrier pilots; however, the pilots of land-based planes were far below standard.

Q. What was the principal cause of this degeneration in your pilot ability; was it impossible to train them, what was the trouble?
A. My principal observation is that when the Japanese air unit is placed at the front, they stay there until all the pilots are killed without leaving any skilled nucleus to create new force; furthermore, the training organ was insufficient and gasoline ran short. Altogether, training was insufficient and your force always came earlier than expected, so always training was insufficient.

Q. Between the two considerations, the lack of competent instructors and shortage of fuel which is the more important?
A. I would divide the entire period between prior to sea battle off FORMOSA and after that. Before the FORMOSA operation we had a satisfactory number of instructors and also a considerable amount of fuel; after that loss, oil and instructors ran short and got worse and worse by degrees. Perhaps oil was more serious. Also the mechanics and engineers that kept planes in operation were left on islands. As islands fell, pilots came home, but maintenance men did not and gradually skilled mechanics ran short. That was another cause. And of course the skilled men producing planes got lower and lower in standards so that the output of planes was inferior.

Q. If you had a number of ships that was attacked by air and you turned to take evasive action, was it the idea to all turn together so as to maintain the same relative position, or would you scatter in various directions in an attempt to spread out?
A. The order was for the guide carrier to change her course as seemed fit according to the attack. According to the course shaped by the carrier, all the ships changed course simultaneously, but sometimes it was not acted upon like that. Sometimes they scattered. If there was time enough to give signal, they gave signal to change simultaneously; but if not time, the carrier would change course and the others would change course to follow.

Q. Would the signal be given by flags or telephone?
A. Radio telephone and flag were both used, but radio telephone was not as developed as it should have been so we mainly depended on flags.

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Q. When you speak of giving a signal if there is time enough, you mean time for a flag signal?
A. Yes. You see Japanese cruisers particularly and also destroyers were so fearful of your air raids that although strictly ordered to do as I mentioned, their adherence to orders was not particularly well carried out.

Q. Did they feel that by scattering they lessened chance of being hit?
A. They were so fearful of the attack they didn't pay any attention to the original course, changing course without watching and as the result, confusion.

Q. To go back to conversion of ISE and HYUGA, you said the conversion was started because of the Battle of MIDWAY, and that it took about a year. When were the ships complete in their new form?
A. The Battle of MIDWAY came in June 1942. Conversion of these ships began in September that year, completed December 1943. My squadron was organized in May 1944.

Q. What did these ships do between December 1943 and October 1944?
A. Did nothing but hide because of the deficiency of aircraft.

Q. There was no thought of using them as battleships at that time?
A. No.

Q. In your opinion, or in the general opinion, was the Japanese Navy anxious for war with the UNITED STATES in 1941?
A. Preparations were going on but the Navy, I believe, did not wish to open hostilities.

Q. Would you say it was primarily the Army that wished the war?
A. I was not close enough to the central authorities to give a definite verdict; however, I think that even the Army was not desirous of opening hostilities, but I believe circumstances and world affairs and economic pressure by the UNITED STATES against JAPAN forced the war.

Q. When the war began did you expect a long war or a short war?
A. Long war, three to four years.

Q. At what point in the war did you begin to feel that things were going against JAPAN?
A. First inkling came when JAPAN lost its carriers at MIDWAY and when I observed Japanese air force could not cope with American air forces in the SOLOMONS; and then when the MARIANAS were lost I thought the situation had become most grave. In the SOLOMONS Campaign, the depletion of Japanese aircraft was so great that construction could not cope with the losses, so the situation was worse and worse.

Q. During 1943-1944 which of our lines of advance do you think was the most serious threat, our approach across the PACIFIC or from the SOUTH PACIFIC?
A. I thought that the attack against TRUK and the MARIANAS was very serious.

Q. Considering the war as a whole what do you feel was our most effective weapon or device?
A. I think that chiefly submarine attack and aircraft most serious; your numbers just overwhelmed Japanese air force. However, I did not think bombing by aircraft was so serious, number alone.

Q. What was the bore of the YAMATO main battery?
A. 45 cm. (18 inch). It was officially designated as 16 inches, even though it was 18 inches. Officers and men connected with firing of the guns knew their size, but in all records of the size it was always written 41 cm. rather than 45 cm. It was called special type 41 cm. gun.

Q. Did you ever have radar fire control?
A. Although it was not quite well developed, there was radar fire control toward the end of my command of YAMATO.

Q. That was special radar set for firing guns?
A. We attempted to use the search radar; they conducted special research in radar fire control, but it was incomplete.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 70
USSBS NO. 359

OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURSE OF THE WAR

KARUIZAWA 11 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Vice Admiral WENEKER, Paul H.; former German Naval Attache who left JAPAN in 1937 to command the pocket battleship DEUTCHLAND. He returned to JAPAN in February 1940 and has been there since.

Interrogated by: Rear Admiral R.A. Ofstie, USN

SUMMARY

Admiral WENEKER discusses various features of the war as he saw it there, with particular reference to submarine warfare, both that of JAPAN and of the UNITED STATES.

NARRATIVE

Japanese Submarine Warfare

It was the expressed desire of the German Naval Ministry that every possible effort be made to induce the Japanese to exert their maximum effort in attack against U.S. merchant shipping in the PACIFIC. Notes were repeatedly exchanged between my office and BERLIN on this subject and directives from home instructed me to press the matter further. The Japanese had one invariable answer, namely, that they must conserve their submarines for attack against the U.S. Fleet. They argued that merchant shipping could be easily replaced with the great American production capacity, but that naval vessels represented the real power against what they fought and that these vessels and their trained crews were most difficult to replace and hence were the one logical target. If, therefore, they were to hazard their subs it must be against the U.S. Navy.

The Japanese Navy thought always of the U.S. carriers. They talked about how many were building, and how many were in the PACIFIC and that these must be sunk; but it was always carriers they talked about. Next after that they would attack battleships and lesser ships but never the merchantmen except under most favorable conditions. On instructions from BERLIN I suggested specifically that they concentrate on certain supply lines, with a chance of attacking tankers and transports, but they refused. I suggested the desirability of attacking the route between HONOLULU and the West Coast because that would force the use of convoys and would force the withdrawal of many escorts from the Western PACIFIC. Again the answer was negative; the mission was the American carriers and they could not be changed on this principle.

As a matter of fact they had much the same attitude towards the employment of the air forces. They felt they could only be risked against the major threat, which was the American Fleet. The enemy fleet, they said, was bound to attack JAPAN; therefore they must destroy it first.

The Japanese had poor types of submarines in this war. First of all they were too big for easy handling under water when under attack, and consequently were too easily destroyed. Then the asdic and sonic and radar equipment was very far behind in development. We therefore arranged to bring over here a type D-9 boat which would be best for them. We brought it to KURE, to the Navy Yard, where the Japanese studied it very carefully, removing the engines and much of the equipment and looked into every part of the construction. But they then came to the conclusion that this type boat was too complicated for construction in JAPAN at this time.

We arranged for one full Japanese sub crew to be sent to GERMANY, (via the west coast of FRANCE), for training. They had, I think, very good training in German boats and in German attack methods; but unfortunately they got caught in the NORTH ATLANTIC in early 1944 while returning here.

Blockade Running by Submarines Between JAPAN and GERMANY

Throughout the war I was in charge of this operation. Usually the boats coming from GERMANY came to PENANG or SINGAPORE and I arranged to ship the vital Japanese materials down for loading and to bring what came from GERMANY up to JAPAN. I had representatives down south to handle matters there. These people also brought me information on the latest submarine war methods.

We shipped from JAPAN quinine and tin and other vital materials in exchange for some optical goods, plans for airplanes, and machine tool equipment. Also we exchanged special personnel this way.

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But this was not so easy an arrangement because of the American submarines on the route between JAPAN and the South. I knew much of this because of the shipping for which I was responsible, which I have mentioned. It was terrible. Sometimes the entire convoy including all my material would be lost. It seemed that nothing could get through.

Japanese Attitude and Capabilities

Early in the war I made a trip through the South Sea Islands (NEI) and up through the MARIANAS to see conditions with my own eyes. I was astounded in the South Seas. The Japanese there were thoroughly enjoying the lush life. They had parties continually and were drinking all the liquor they had captured. I asked them why they did not prepare fortifications and do something to make these places stronger, but they said that the Americans would never come, that they could not fight in the jungle and that they were not the kind of people who could stand warfare in the south. As far as I know all those people in those places, both Army and Navy, once they had got into a place where there was no fighting, would do nothing more about the war.

Obviously, in such time the war effort must be the maximum of the country, but here in JAPAN it was very difficult because of the corruption on every hand and the continual fighting for position. Anything would be done to get power during the war. Sometimes very good men were kept at their work only a very few weeks or months because some one else would get the job through corruption. You cannot be efficient with key positions constantly changing.

Impressions and Lessons of the War

About the Battle of MIDWAY, not so many people knew how things had gone there but there was some depression among those who did know. However, they were still too proud about their early success and these people simply said that they would work harder and would be O.K. again.

The Japanese were just not fitted for as large scale operations as other countries. GUADALCANAL was an example, where they kept putting in their strength little by little to see it all destroyed without any benefit. SAIPAN was really understood to be a matter of life or death. About that time they began telling the people the truth about the war. They began preparing them for whatever must happen. Before that, they had been doing nothing but fooling the people.

It was ridiculous the way the Japanese Army planes made exaggerated reports of the enemy ships they had sunk. I think it must have been because they felt they had to report successes to compare favorably with the Navy. This foolishness I think had bad results.

After the Battle of LEYTE the Japanese surface Navy was destroyed and it was decided to make the Navy only aviation. Most of the remaining ships were put out of commission in various places and the crews were used for all kinds of aviation work. Those who could not be used for naval aviation were transferred to the Army. This was in preparation for the final battle, but of course it was too late and it was not pushed ahead enough. It was the idea that the Special Attack Force would be trained especially to attack your carriers.

There was no real Imperial Headquarters. The Chiefs of Staff of the Navy and of the Army would get together to discuss some matters where both were interested. That then was a meeting of the Imperial Headquarters; but when they adjourned the Headquarters was no more.

Miscellaneous

Of course the Japanese over-estimated their own strength and underestimated the enemy. Then, they had very long supply lines which they could not protect; they admitted this in a pre-war statement. These were basic reasons for their failure to do better in the war. After that, I would say the reasons for their disaster could be classed about as follows in order of importance: First, and by far the worse, were the attacks of the highly efficient American submarines on the merchant shipping. Most serious of all here was the sinking of tankers and hence the loss of oil from the South. The second factor in importance was the destruction of the Japanese Navy, so they knew they could then not stop the enemy from coming to these vital areas. The third, which no doubt had some effect to close the war, was the air bombing attack on this country.

This was predominantly a naval war, and although JAPAN lost the war I do not think their Navy lost prestige with the people who know. The Army was very poor in cooperating. I heard there was much friction because the Army sometimes had to protect their own transports on the sea, but then the Navy had no escorts except some small boats such as converted fishing vessels and the like which were not much good. I have not heard what you suggest, namely that the Army was building its own escort carriers. I think perhaps this is not true because I would have known of it.

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Efforts for Peace

This was subject which you might say was of mutual interest. The Japanese desired GERMANY to make peace with RUSSIA. Of course this was impossible. Then they wanted to make some agreement with RUSSIA which would possibly assist them, that RUSSIA at least should withdraw three-quarters of a million men and her planes from MANCHURIA so the Japanese could employ their opposing forces elsewhere. To reach an agreement with RUSSIA, the Japanese were willing to sacrifice MANCHURIA, CHINA and KOREA. Next they would reach an understanding with the UNITED STATES, the plan being like this:

  1. JAPAN would renounce her position in the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES and generally in the south.
  2. They would keep their armed forces except in the areas renounced.
  3. The bargaining for a compromise peace would be based on the desirability of both sides stopping the war to avoid the heavy losses which would result if the war should continue. These early negotiations for peace I understand were handled through STOCKHOLM.

It was because of General Ott's efforts toward peace that he got in trouble with Von Ribbentrop and was forced out of his position as German Ambassador to JAPAN. This came about because of reports sent to BERLIN by Meissinger who was the Party representative here and who had access to direct communication with the head of the Reich. Ambassador Ott was then replaced by Stahmer and went to PEKING, CHINA where he now is.

German Raiders

In 1943 a passenger liner was fitted up as an auxiliary cruiser, with German crew. She went around the world to the west, down to MADAGASCAR and around the Cape, up in the ATLANTIC around Cape HORN and got back as far as an island near CHICHI JIMA where she stopped to refuel. She had fair success on the trip, destroying some ships. But shortly after leaving this last port for KOBE, at the end of her voyage, she was suddenly torpedoed in September 1943. We later picked up some 70-90 of the crew who said that the submarine had surfaced after sinking the ship and had taken two German prisoners. Since we never heard of them again we wonder if possibly the ship may have been sunk by a Japanese submarine.

NAV-70

U.S. Government Printing Office O - 1946

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End of Volume 1

United States
Strategic Bombing Survey

[Pacific]

Naval Analysis Division


Interrogations of Japanese Officials
Volume II

OPNAV-P-03-100

Interrogations
71-118

*****

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 71
USSBS NO. 360

JAPANESE NAVAL LAND-BASED AIR OPERATIONS IN WESTERN NEW GUINEA

TOKYO 12 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Captain KOMOTO, H., IJN ; Flight Leader of 753 Air Corps from February 1943 to June 1943, attached to Staff of 23rd Air Flotilla from June 1943 to July 1944.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. MOORER, U.S.N.

SUMMARY

During 1943 the 23rd Air Flotilla with headquarters at KENDARI conducted search and attack missions on a minor scale in the area southwest of NEW GUINEA. After the capture of the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS in March 1944, the headquarters of the 23rd Air Flotilla was moved to DAVAO in order to counter expected carrier attacks on the PHILIPPINES and PALAU. When it became evident that the Allied move from the south was to continue along the North NEW GUINEA Coast the 23rd Air Flotilla was moved to SORONG (April 1944) and was heavily reinforced in order to carry out the assigned mission of search and attack against Allied invasion forces. On 11 June 1944, naval air operations in Western NEW GUINEA were cancelled and all aircraft moved to PALAU in order to execute the "AGO" Plan for the defence of the MARIANAS. At PALAU the air strength was almost totally destroyed and the 23rd Air Flotilla ceased to be an offensive unit.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. When was the 23rd Air Flotilla established at KENDARI?
A. In February 1942.

Q. Where was the headquarters of the 13th Air Fleet?
A. About September 1943, the 13th Air Fleet moved from SOERABAJA to PENANG and then to SINGAPORE, then returned back to SOERABAJA in the middle of February 1944, then moved to MANILA around August or September 1944.

Q. Was the 23rd Air Flotilla the only land-based Naval Air Force in the Western NEW GUINEA Area?
A. Yes, but the total number of aircraft assigned varied from time to time.

Q. What forces were available to the 23rd Air Flotilla prior to the Allied invasion of the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS?
A. The 23rd Air Flotilla was composed of one 36 plane fighter squadron with 12 reserves (in December 1943 this squadron was moved to TRUK) and one 36 plane twin-engine attack squadron with 12 reserves (in January 1944 this squadron moved to KWAJALEIN). The above squadrons were replaced by one 36 plane fighter squadron and one 12 plane reconnaissance squadron on dates indicated above. From December to March the reconnaissance squadron was reinforced by 9 additional planes (BETTYS).

Q. Was this the maximum number of planes available to the 23rd Air Flotilla?
A. Yes, until May 1944 when the force was increased.

Q. What was the mission of the 23rd Air Flotilla prior to March 1944?
A. Prior to that time the 23rd Air Flotilla was responsible for the area southwest of the NEW GUINEA Coast. The northeast coast was the responsibility of the Army. The specific missions were: (1) Maintenance of air bases, (2) protection of CELEBES Area against air attack, (3) convoy escort, (4) search of sea area between NEW GUINEA, AUSTRALIA and TIMOR and (5) monthly attacks against DARWIN and MERAUKE.

Q. Indicate bases from which the 23rd Air Flotilla operated prior to loss of ADMIRALTY ISLANDS.
A. KENDARI, KOEPANG, AMBON, KAI Island, BALIKPAPAN, MAKASSAR, SORONG, NABIRE, SOEMBA and BABO.

Q. Were aircraft stationed at all bases mentioned above?
A. Yes.

Q. Why was it necessary to base fighters at BALIKPAPAN and MAKASSAR?
A. To protect against possible B-24 attacks from DARWIN.

Q. What was the mission of the KOEPANG and KAI detachments?
A. The detachments at KAI and KOEPANG searched shipping lanes in TORRES Strait and DARWIN Area.

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Q. During the operations prior to the capture of the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS, did the Japanese suffer any serious losses?
A. No serious losses were suffered from operations. However, in October 1943 and continuing through the winter the best pilots and planes were gradually transferred to the 25th Air Flotilla at RABAUL. As a result, in the winter of 1943 and 1944 the 23rd Air Flotilla reached its lowest strength. These pilots were replaced with battle fatigue pilots from RABAUL, thus decreasing the efficiency of the 23rd Air Flotilla. Replacement aircraft were received direct from JAPAN.

Q. At the end of March after the loss of the ADMIRALTIES, what change in directives did the 23rd Air Flotilla receive?
A. After the capture of the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS, the headquarters of the 23rd Air Flotilla was moved to DAVAO, since it was expected that your carrier Task Force would operate against PALAU and MINDANAO. We were instructed that, in order to conserve strength, not to attack in the area southwest of NEW GUINEA, but merely to protect and maintain the air bases. We were also instructed to establish a patrol along the north coast of NEW GUINEA extending to the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS. These patrols were conducted first from WAKDE, then from BIAK, and finally from SORONG. In order to carry out these orders aircraft were redistributed. Bombers were moved to DAVAO to meet your expected carrier attacks and search planes were moved to north coast of NEW GUINEA.

Q. What type of aircraft was used for the patrol?
A. Army type aircraft manned by Navy crew as well as regular Navy search planes.

Q. What was the specific mission of this patrol?
A. To search for and report your invasion forces.

Q. Were many of these aircraft lost?
A. Very few.

Q. What action was to be taken if a search plane reported an Allied Task Force?
A. Navy aircraft were to be staged through SORONG from DAVAO and PALAU. Army aircraft were also to assist in the attacks.

Q. What was the eastward limit to which the 23rd Air Flotilla operated?
A. The ADMIRALTY ISLANDS.

Q. What liaison was maintained between the 13th Air Fleet and the 11th Air Fleet which was at RABAUL?
A. The liaison was maintained by personal visits between staffs. There was an exchange of intelligence information but there were no joint operations.

Q. Why were the headquarters of the 23rd Air Flotilla moved from DAVAO to SORONG?
A. The headquarters were moved about 13 April 1944 because at that time reconnaissance revealed that there was no immediate threat to MINDANAO and PALAU as previously thought, but that the Allied forces were massing in Eastern NEW GUINEA preparatory to a possible invasion of HOLLANDIA. Since this also meant that you would not by-pass NEW GUINEA but intended to invade BIAK and then continue up the NEW GUINEA Coast to the PHILIPPINES, the force of the 23rd Air Flotilla was increased to 180 aircraft by moving air units from MALAYA, JAPAN and TRUK. The squadron from JAPAN had originally participated in the defense of KWAJALEIN, but suffered such heavy losses that it had to return to JAPAN for reforming.

Q. After the 23rd Air Flotilla was built up to a strength of 180 aircraft, who had operational control?
A. At this time operational control was changed from the 13th Air Fleet to the First Air Fleet which was in turn directly controlled by the Combined Fleet Headquarters. The 13th Air Fleet with a small force at KENDARI continued minor operations southwest of NEW GUINEA.

Q. After the 23rd Air Flotilla was moved to SORONG and placed under the control of the First Air Fleet, what changes in operational directives were received?
A. Our new mission was to search for the enemy Task Force approaching the NEW GUINEA base and if sighted, attack and destroy it. Also conduct night harassing attacks with small number of planes. The air force at PALAU was to assist when possible.

Q. During these operations what cooperation was received from the Japanese Army?
A. The Fourth Air Army with headquarters at SAMATE assisted in patrol and offensive operations against your Task Force. The responsibility of attacking the invasion forces belonged to the Navy but the Army gave support when possible. In May 1944, about 70 Army planes were sent from MANILA and placed under operational control of the 23rd Air Flotilla at SORONG, to assist in search and attacks against Allied invasion force. These planes were in addition to Army forces already in the area west of HOLLANDIA.

Q. Upon whose authority were Army planes placed under control of the Navy?
A. The Supreme Headquarters issued the orders through the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

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Q. When did you know that HOLLANDIA was to be invaded?
A. The invasion of HOLLANDIA came as a complete surprise. The aircraft available for searches were so few it was only possible to make a dawn patrol; and consequently the HOLLANDIA force was not seen until after it had anchored. After you invaded HOLLANDIA, as I said before, it was obvious that the next movement would be up to BIAK, along the north coast of NEW GUINEA instead of PALAU and MINDANAO as originally thought.

Q. How do you account for the general lack of Japanese air activity during the HOLLANDIA-BIAK operation?
A. Speaking for the Navy, the main reason for the lack of air activity in NEW GUINEA was because of small forces available and extremely difficult experience with maintenance.

Q. Does the same thing apply to the Army air forces?
A. The Army had ample aircraft but they also had terrific difficulty with maintenance. In addition, a great number of Army aircraft were destroyed on the ground by the Allied air forces.

Q. Was this very poor maintenance due to lack of supply or trained personnel, or both?
A. Material and personnel were not entirely the best. The best was previously sent to RABAUL.

Q. Were operations ever interfered with by the lack of fuel?
A. No, the aircraft were so few that plenty of fuel was available.

Q. Was this shortage of supplies due mainly to the loss of convoys?
A. The loss of convoys was not the total blame; but rather the lack of production capacity at home. An effort was made to supply spare parts by air. This, too, was unsuccessful as the spares did not exist. This lack of spare parts plus poor maintenance was a major cause of aircraft losses because aircraft could not be shifted from field to field to escape your attacks.

Q. At what time did you learn of the approach of the invasion force to BIAK?
A. Twenty four hours before the landing, the invasion force was detected by search planes.

Q. Why, after the invasion force was located, did the Japanese air force delay their attack?
A. The delay in attack was due to the fact that aircraft had to be staged from DAVAO, and there was considerable difficulty experienced in attempting to rendezvous forces from different fields in order to make a mass attack.

Q. Describe the KON Plan for the reinforcement of BIAK?
A. The purpose of the KON Plan was to reinforce BIAK with one brigade of 5,000 men. Three attempts were made to execute this plan. The first landing was to take place on 3 June. The force involved consisted of one battleship (MUSASHI), four cruisers, and six destroyers. They sortied from DAVAO for BIAK, and on 2 June were discovered by an enemy patrol plane. Anticipating a heavy attack they turned back. The battleship and two cruisers which were not carrying troops put into BATJAN, and the six destroyers and two cruisers which were loaded with troops put into SORONG. The next attempt was planned for 8 June. A maximum number of troops were loaded aboard six destroyers and sailed for BIAK. The force was subjected to a heavy air attack on the afternoon of 7 June and one destroyer was sunk. They continued on and at 2300 they were engaged by Allied surface vessels. The Japanese ships suffered no sinkings but some damage and were forced to return to BATJAN without landing the troops. The third attempt was planned for the 15th of June. The force was to be approximately the same as that in the first attempt and the intention was to land the troops at all costs, regardless of losses. However, the operation was suddenly cancelled, because on 11 June orders were received placing in effect the AGO Plan which involved the defense of the MARIANAS. All surface vessels were immediately ordered north.

Q. What effect did this change in plans have on the 23rd Air Flotilla?
A. All Navy aircraft in the NEW GUINEA Area were ordered to PALAU without delay and no further defense of NEW GUINEA was attempted by the naval air forces.

Q. What part did the 23rd Air Flotilla aircraft take in defense of the MARIANAS?
A. I do not know exactly since they were no longer controlled by the 23rd Air Flotilla Headquarters. The remaining aircraft were nearly all destroyed during the defense of PALAU. A few escaped to DAVAO. After the defense of NEW GUINEA was abandoned, the 23rd Air Flotilla moved to AMBON (28 June) and from there to the original base at KENDARI around the end of July. Army air forces were finally withdrawn from the NEW GUINEA Area and based at LOLOBATA and MENADO. After that time the Army aircraft were used to protect convoys in the CELEBES and were controlled from headquarters in JAVA.

Q. During the time the Army planes were based along the north coast of NEW GUINEA, what was their mission?
A. The first mission of the Army air forces was to attack your bases in Eastern NEW GUINEA. The other mission was to escort transports supplying NEW GUINEA garrisons. Just before the capture of BIAK the Army air force retreated to LOLOBATA and attacked separately from the Navy. They used SAMATE, NOEMFOOR and RANSIKI as advanced bases.

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Q. Why were so many Army aircraft caught on the ground at HOLLANDIA?
A. They were surprised because they never expected your air force to attack in such strength. Also many planes were grounded because of no spares and could not be moved.

Q. In July 1944 during the BIAK Operation, what planes made the night attacks?
A. Navy planes (BETTYS).

Q. Were there times when the Army and Navy planes used the same fields at the same time?
A. Only SORONG.

Q. That was after the capture of BIAK?
A. Immediately before the capture of BIAK and after.

Q. During the BIAK Operation, were there any aircraft in NEW GUINEA other than those in SORONG?
A. The Army air force used SAMATE, NOFMFOOR and RANSIKI, as staging fields but the Army air force was very small.

Q. Were the Japanese successful in the use of camouflage?
A. During this campaign we employed camouflage and revetments and dispersal; but if sufficient warning was available, aircraft were withdrawn to the west.

Q. At what time during this period did the Japanese cease supplying the Western NEW GUINEA Area?
A. After June 11, 1944, no further attempt was made to defend NEW GUINEA by air.

Q. After the Allied air force began to operate in Western NEW GUINEA, what methods were used to bring supplies into NEW GUINEA?
A. Supplies were furnished by sea truck and small landing craft.

Q. During the HOLLANDIA-BIAK Operations how did the number of Japanese Army planes in this area compare with the Navy planes?
A. After the loss of BIAK, the Navy had a larger air force then the Army.

Q. What services were responsible for establishing fields along the northeast coast of NEW GUINEA - Army or Navy?
A. BIAK was both Army and Navy; NOEMFOOR, MANOKWARI, LOLOBATA, SAMATE, SORONG - Navy; NABIRE - Navy; and HOLLANDIA - Army; WAKDE - Navy; all east of HOLLANDIA were Army. WAKDE, after March 1944, became Army.

Q. Why did the Japanese delay as long as they did before developing fields on BIAK?
A. The construction of fields at BIAK and also other fields in Western NEW GUINEA Area were delayed by the lack of material and equipment.

Q. Did the bombing of the air fields by the Allied forces seriously interfere with Japanese operations?
A. Yes, prior to and during the BIAK Campaign the only usable fields available were BABO and SORONG. SORONG was usable until the end of the campaign.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 72
USSBS NO. 366

SUBMARINE WARFARE

TOKYO 10 OCTOBER 1945

Interrogation of: Vice Admiral MIWA, Shigeyosh, IJN; successively Director Naval Submarine Department and CinC Sixth (Submarine) Fleet.

Interrogated by: Lt. Comdr. J.A. Field, jr. [sic] USNR;

Allied Officers Present: Comdr. T.H. Moorer, USN.

SUMMARY

Admiral MIWA discusses general aspects of the PACIFIC submarine war including Japanese tactical and technical problems and comments on the performance of U.S. submarines.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. In general terms I would like to know the number of operational submarines in the Japanese Fleet during the war?
A. At the beginning of this war, the strength of submarines was biggest; as the war went on, the number of submarines decreased because of the strength of constructing submarines was not adequate.

Q. About how many operational submarines did you have at the beginning of the war?
A. I cannot give you the exact number, but about 64 submarines including the oldest style which was not operational and including training submarines; about forty or forty-five submarines completely operational. That was the greatest number we had during the war.

Q. Do you include midget submarines in that figure?
A. As for the special submarines for two-men crew, I had no connection with that submarine so I do not know about those.

Q. Who was in charge of those, another department?
A. A very few staff officers of the General Staff and the War Office knew who had charge of that special submarine. As I was at sea I did not know about it.

Q. Were those special submarines ever operated as part of the Sixth Fleet during the war?
A. During the period when I was Commander of the Sixth Fleet I never used special submarines, but I used what we call a torpedo, which had a one-man crew.

Q. In what period during the war do you feel Japanese submarines were most successful?
A. Generally speaking, the effect of success of the submarine was not so good as expected before the war. In ULITHI Operation and LEYTE Operation we had good success. On those operations the Japanese submarines were, successful; but as I was only in charge a short period of time during the war, I cannot say for entire period. Although exact reports are not available from the GUADALCANAL Operation because some submarines did not return, that period is also considered to be a period of considerable success.

Q. Could you name a period or periods during the war when submarine losses were particularly serious?
A. First of all GUADALCANAL Area and LEYTE, and also the ALEUTIANS.

Q. In those periods of serious losses, did you attribute those losses to any particular causes? If so, what steps were taken to overcome that problem?
A. The reason of such serious damage was due to your skillful method of attacking our submarines, and the main reason of your skillful attack was due to the radar; so our Navy officers studied very hard on defensive methods against your radar. We studied many methods of defense such as to paint over the hull of the submarines some material such as gum. Furthermore, an attempt was made by inclining sides of conning tower to reflect the 'radar' beam downwards into water away from your radar screen. (See sketch). This attempt however was not very successful. In conclusion we found that our submarine is not successful against your radar; so I wanted to have special submarines, very speedy underwater, and I wanted to make small superstructures for surfacing at night and also I wanted some kind of special tube to supply air so they would not have to come up to recharge their batteries. I wanted the small superstructure and these special tubes and greater speed underwater. This was not imitative: after studying the method, we compared notes with GERMANY and found them to be the same.

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Sketch 72-1: shows the inclined sides of conning tower to reflect the radar beam downwards into water.
Sketch 72-1: shows the inclined sides of conning tower to reflect the radar beam downwards into water.

Q. Did you in fact make these changes in design, and about what period of the war were those changes made?
A. The time these two methods were completed was about April of this year, these two methods of special submarine.

Q. You mentioned the fear of our radar; were you particularly concerned about ship borne radar or that which was borne by our aircraft?
A. Radar of your aircraft.

Q. Did you use search receivers on your submarines?
A. Yes. On the operation of the ALEUTIANS, the Japanese Navy found out your radar was very good because our submarines maneuvering in the fog received much gunfire from your ships; so we found out you had very good radar. At the operation of the ALEUTIANS, we had not that device against radar; but after that we studied and made something like that device, but it was not successful. Towards the end our device against radar was progressing.

Q. When was radar first installed on Japanese submarines?
A. I remember that about June of last year, at about the time of SAIPAN operation, that was the first time it was installed.

Q. At the start of the war was the general plan to use submarines as auxiliaries to the fleet, or to attack our shipping, or what kind of use?
A. The fundamental nature of the mission of our submarines is as auxiliary to our fleet. After the beginning of the war, by and by our submarines got the mission of attacking your merchant shipping; but the fundamental mission is auxiliary to the fleet.

Q. What reasons brought about that change - the assignment of that mission to attack merchant shipping? Why was it done, and at what time?
A. There were two reasons for it: the principal reason, your American fleet did not offer battle so our submarine had not targets to attack; another is that the Germans wanted it. I am not sure but I think the Germans wanted JAPAN to attack merchant shipping by our submarines.

Q. What period of the war do you mean when you speak of this change?
A. That new change is about after the MIDWAY Battle. As I said before, by the request of GERMANY our submarines attacked your transport ships in the INDIAN OCEAN or near AUSTRALIA until our loss of submarines increased in the INDIAN OCEAN; and also we wanted to gather all our submarines to attack your battleships, to defeat your advance in the PACIFIC OCEAN.

Q. What makes you believe that change was made at the request of the Germans?
A. As I was officer of submarine, I wanted to attack your fleet; but I received orders from our headquarters to attack merchant ships in the INDIAN OCEAN near AUSTRALIA; so I said headquarters has some reason for that order, and I thought it was by GERMAN request.

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Q. Do you feel that was a poor thing to do, do you feel it was unwise to use submarine in that fashion?
A. We wanted to attack your fleet, and the strength of JAPAN's submarines was not big enough to attack merchant ships; we wanted to attack American Fleet.

Q. What were the dates of beginning and ending this use of Japanese submarines against merchant ships in the INDIAN OCEAN?
A. From memory, approximately began May or July 1942, and ended about July of last year 1944.

Q. We were always a little surprised you did not use submarines against our merchant ships in the Central and South PACIFIC, on ships en route to GUADALCANAL. I wonder why you never did that to any degree.
A. The scouting of your planes was very severe, and another reason was our strength was not big enough for such attack.

Q. In the early part of the war we were much impressed with the effectiveness of your submarines in search and scouting in coordination with large seaplanes and with your carrier forces. Was that a planned employment?
A. Submarines had scout planes on board and as your strength of scouting planes increased, that effectiveness grew less.

Q. I was thinking rather of cooperation between submarines and large flying boats.
A. The coordination between the flying boats and submarines was not as successful as you think.

Q. Did you find it possible to have satisfactory communication between submarines and flying boats?
A. That was not satisfactory, communications were not good.

Q. Did you ever use the submarines to scout for your carrier forces? We thought at one time your submarines reported to carriers where we were, and the carriers then launched their planes for attack; is that correct?
A. Our submarines reported the location of your fleet but not directly to the carrier. The submarines would report to headquarters and these reports would be relayed to the fleet. The carrier planes themselves made searches and did not expect cooperation from submarines. Generally speaking, the cooperation between aircraft and submarines was not satisfactory.

Q. Early in the war, for the first year of the war perhaps, your submarines made us a lot of trouble but later on we had very little trouble with them. We thought that perhaps you were using them for supply and not attack; is that correct?
A. You are right, that was the very reason. That reason was not satisfactory for the submarine officer because he wanted our submarines to be used to attack your fleet, not using them for transport.

Q. Aside from the personal wishes of the submarine officers, do you feel it was wise from the point of view of the war as a whole?
A. Aside from the feeling of the submarine officers, that is still not wise.

Q. Why, then, were they used for transports?
A. Headquarters made that decision. I do not know the reason because the Naval General Staff made the decision, and several times I reported to them that these tactics were not wise; but nothing was done.

Q. Do you feel that perhaps this was done due to the Army pressure rather than being the decision of naval officers?
A. In my personal opinion, I feel that Army request was the reason. Another reason is that our headquarters thought that the supplying for the islands is very important because many soldiers were on several islands, and they would have no food or material for fight; that is important matter.

Q. In regard to the use of submarines as transports, the transport between JAPAN and GERMANY, were many submarines employed in that route? What types of cargo or personnel did they carry?
A. Some three or four submarines were used for transport between JAPAN and GERMANY. These submarines went to GERMANY with gum and tin, brought back mainly arms, plans and samples.

Q. In the transport to the South Sea Islands I presume you took in ammunition and food; what did you bring back if anything?
A. We came back with our wounded and sick soldiers.

Q. What did you take in principally - ammunition, food, what type?
A. Principally rice and food and clothing and arms.

Q. Wasn't any importance given to bring back specially trained people, mechanics, etc.?
A. We did not bring back special personnel.

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Q. We thought at the time you were evacuating maintenance people from the Northern SOLOMONS; is that untrue?
A. A few times one or two personnel were taken back; our aim, however, was to get sick personnel back.

Q. Do you feel that any good for the war came from this transport duty, was the use of submarines for transport profitable in any way or entirely useless?
A. It is quite bad tactics; it is senseless.

Q. With regard to the building of small submarines, the two men submarines, what was the principal purpose of that program and why, particularly toward the end of the war, did you build so many?
A. As I was not in charge of that building I cannot say. I think, however, the reason is that our Japanese Navy expected your force was going to land on our land; so to defend against landing, we built up that small special submarine, and as we had no strength to maintain the strength in big ships, this was invented.

Q. However, some of these small submarines were built before the war; what reasons were there at that time?
A. I think perhaps that the special submarine was to be used for fleet operation to attack your fleet.

Q. Do you mean in PEARL HARBOR or anywhere in general?
A. They did not think at all about PEARL HARBOR attack, but in general use for any attack.

Q. But they have short range, how could they expect to use them?
A. They wanted to use that submarine in the operation of fleet against fleet, to put submarine in front of our fleet and attack your fleet.

Q. How would the submarine get there, from a base or carried by a ship to the action?
A. They were planning to bring that special submarine on board of big ship. They had a special carrier for that submarine, it was sunk near GUADALCANAL (CHIYODA).

Q. Was there ever a thought of carrying these small submarines on YAMATO or MUSASHI?
A. The MUSASHI and YAMATO were top-secret. I did not see and do not know, but it is first time I heard of such a suggestion.

Q. The small submarines that were at PEARL HARBOR, how did they get there?
A. Those special submarines were transported by other big submarines.

Q. How many small submarines could each big submarine carry?
A. Only one submarine.

Q. Toward the end of the war you began to build very large submarines of 5,000 tons. What was the reason for beginning the construction of that very large type?
A. They were planning to build these big submarines to take fighter planes to sea, and that fighter from the submarine would attack your carrier.

Q. That seems a great deal of effort in construction and material just to get one plane to attack our carriers. Do you feel that was a wise plan?
A. I think it was not wise plan, I opposed it.

Q. Whose plan was that?
A. I think that was planned by Admiral YAMAMOTO, so nobody could oppose it.

Q. If they were planned as long ago as that, was the original purpose to attack our carriers or perhaps attack the UNITED STATES?
A. That plan may perhaps have been for attacking your cities but as war went on that plan became impossible, so they planned to attack your carriers. As Chief of Submarines Officers I opposed it completely. At first this plan was to build about seven or eight such big submarines but due to the many adverse opinions they decreased that number and planned to build about four of them.

Q. Quite apart from tactical use, what is your opinion of the submarine?
A. The submarine is not a good submarine, as a submarine, and your defensive methods prevented its use. It handled rather well and dove well, but superstructure was very big, a weak point against radar.

Q. Was this type submarine ever used in an operation?
A. It was under the training, but during the period when I was commander of submarine fleet it was never used actually in operation.

Q. As far as you know, it was never actually used during the war except in training?
A. I think they have never used it.

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Q. Did they ever use Japanese submarines to attack our submarines?
A. We once used submarines that way. Last year about June our Navy found your submarine near OKINO DAITO SHIMA and we sent out two small submarines; but it was not successful.

Q. Did you ever have any reports that your submarines had found and attacked our submarines?
A. I received two such reports, one was near SINGAPORE, another was south of TRUK. The first occasion occurred in early part of the war, the second occasion I do not remember exactly but about April 1943.

Q. What results did you have from your joint operations with German submarines that came to SINGAPORE?
A. Our Japanese submarines never joined up with German submarines.

Q. But German submarines did operate from SINGAPORE, didn't they?
A. I think from PENANG. The Germans were independent, we had no communication. Our Navy helped to get fuel for the German submarines but had no connection with control of their operation.

Q. Do you know roughly how many Japanese submarines were in the Central PACIFIC at the time we attacked MARSHALLS-GILBERTS?
A. Approximately 20 Japanese submarines, one-third on station at any time.

Q. Were your forces at that time still weakened by that operation in the INDIAN OCEAN against our merchant shipping?
A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. In the planning for defense of MARSHALLS-GILBERTS and your PACIFIC Islands, was it expected your submarines would cooperate with your fleet or attack our fleet on their own? Did the submarine officers expect the fleet to join them?
A. Our submarines, themselves only, to attack your fleet; they did not expect cooperation of our fleet.

Q. In the early summer of 1944 did the same condition prevail or did they expect to cooperate with the fleet? That was before our attack on the MARIANAS.
A. I was not actually in charge of that operation but suppose there was slight difference in that operation. Our submarines expected assistance of our fleet but it was not satisfactory.

Q. We would like to talk about use of submarines in the PALAU and PHILIPPINES Operations.
A. When the PALAU Operation was begun in September of last year, we sent out four submarines to PALAU Area.

Q. What success did these submarines have, do you know?
A. We sent out three submarines to PALAU and one to HALMAHERA, and two of these sent to PALAU did not return. At PALAU, our submarines sank one cruiser or destroyer and one transport; at HALMAHERA, they reported one aircraft carrier sunk and one damaged.

Q. After these two operations at PALAU and HALMAHERA, how did you dispose your submarines for PHILIPPINE Operation?
A. We disposed approximately seven submarines in the sector between northeast and southeast of LEYTE and three off LAMON Bay.

Q. Was this all the submarines you had available?
A. That was all the submarines available. Of course we had others in home waters.

Q. When did these submarines arrive in the area off the PHILIPPINES?
A. Only three submarines of them could report here on 25th morning of October, the others were still on their way. We got report which indicated that your Task Force appeared off FORMOSA, so we sent out submarines off FORMOSA. Your Task Force retired to east and we got a report the American Task Forces was going east, so we tried to intercept with submarines; but failing in this, submarines continued onto the LEYTE Area. Three submarines could reach here by the 25th, and by the next day all ten of these submarines had arrived.

Q. Was this deployment of submarines off the PHILIPPINES part of the SHO-GO Plan?
A. Yes, that is right. It was planned in advance and was part of the SHO Operation on orders from Combined Fleet.

Q. About the 17th or 18th of October, as our fleet was moving toward LEYTE, did you have submarines in the neighborhood of PALAU?
A. No.

Q. During the LEYTE Operations then, in late October, ten submarines were all you had there. Did more go in later?
A. That ten submarines was full strength of our submarines; some of them were damaged so our strength there decreased.

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Q. How many were lost?
A. I remember that five submarines were lost.

Q. You said that one submarine attacked our aircraft carriers off HALMAHERA; was that the RO-41?
A. That is right, it was a small submarine.

Q. What instructions were given the submarines sent to LEYTE?
A. There was no special mission but they planned to attack your fleet because we were expecting the LEYTE Operation.

Q. Did your submarines there have knowledge of the plan of the Japanese Fleet; did they know, for example, KURITA was planning to enter the Gulf that day?
A. They knew that, these submarines knew that very well because the plan of operation was made by the Combined Fleet.

Q. And each submarine commander had a copy of the plan?
A. I think that each commander did not have a copy but had been instructed by the radio.

Q. What successes did they have off LEYTE?
A. I got report that two carriers and one battleship and one big transport and five or six small transport ships were sunk, but I am not sure of the precise count.

Q. In general, was it your policy to believe reports from the submarine commanders? How did you assess the reports?
A. We believed the report from the submarine commander. I believed completely the report from the submarine commander because I did not know how many percent to decrease the report; and I gave quite a severe order to the submarine commander to make an exact report and to report the exact damage to the American Fleet. I considered the submarine captains to be honest, and we gathered submarine reports and sent them to headquarters, and headquarters judged the report.

Q. After the LEYTE Operation what use was made of the submarines?
A. None of my submarines were in the PHILIPPINES inland waters. Several midget submarines were stationed at CEBU, but these submarines were not under my control.

Q. Who had the control of these submarines?
A. It was under the command of the Southeast Area Fleet, Admiral MIKAWA.

Q. In general, were the small midget submarines assigned to Area Fleet commanders as in this case, was that the usual practice?
A. That is correct. This special submarine is not in the category of submarine and was not under my control. These special submarines were divided in several groups such as those under Admiral MIKAWA. The one-man torpedo-submarine was, however, under my control.

Q. Who controlled the submarines which attacked our ships in ULITHI?
A. I sent out eight one-man torpedo-submarines to ULITHI to attack your fleet; they were transported by two regular submarines.

Q. In your opinion was that one-man torpedo an effective weapon?
A. I think it is a very good weapon.

Q. In general now, considering the operations throughout the war, what usually limited the length of time a submarine could stay out on patrol? Was it fuel or shortage of torpedoes?
A. That limit is due to the fuel and oil and water and health of the crew.

Q. These problems forced them to return before they had the opportunity to use up their torpedoes?
A. They were very rarely forced to return because of shortage of torpedoes.

Q. Again considering the war as a whole, what particular problems did you have in operating submarines, what problems were most serious?
A. First is your attacking force was increasing attack on our submarines, damage was increasing, construction of submarines could not keep up. These were the main difficulties. Secondly, the skillful well-trained crews were lost and the new trained crews were not satisfactory for operation, but our submarine crews never get tired of submarine operation. There was no trouble with morale, and the numbers of Japanese Navy sailors who wanted to be submarine crewman was increasing. They volunteered.

Q. Did you frequently have submarines return with damage from our attacks?
A. Very frequently.

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Q. Why didn't you build more submarines? Did you build as many as possible?
A. Our Navy was obliged to build battleships, aircraft carriers; so the limited material was divided and we could not build many submarines.

Q. Which type of ship was considered more important?
A. I cannot list the order of importance of construction but our headquarters allocated the limited material for the various kind of ships.

Q. Were submarine operations ever hindered by shortage of fuel?
A. We always had plenty of fuel, so far as submarines are concerned; plenty of fuel.

Q. What particular material shortages were most critical?
A. Steel.

Q. What is your opinion of American methods of attacking your submarines?
A. It was quite skillful.

Q. Did you have good information on our methods from submarines which had been attacked and which escaped and returned?
A. Our submarines which were attacked by your force, many of them did not get back so we did not get much report. I did get general opinions and beliefs about the method of attack.

Q. Which type of attack did they fear most, aircraft or destroyers and escort ships?
A. Of course from the aircraft.

Q. Why?
A. Your aircraft with radar attacked at night when the submarine is floating.
Note: This statement is of interest in that only three submarines are known to have been sunk by our night air attack during the entire war, of which two were German and one Japanese, all three of which were sunk in the Atlantic Ocean. Of Pacific night air attacks on submarines, four are presently assessed as "probably sunk."

Q. Did you feel that our ships had effective sound gear for listening to your submarines and following them and attacking?
A. I got quite a few reports that our submarine was attacked by your destroyer or other ship which had device for listening to sound of engine.

Q. Did you have any knowledge of our method of hunting a submarine by coordination between our ships and planes?
A. I think that coordination between destroyer and aircraft was very skillful; we feared it very much.

Q. In general did you feel that when our destroyers and ships detected the submarine they were persistent in attack, or did you feel that they were easily discouraged and soon gave up the pursuit?
A. I heard very often that your ships were persistent around Japanese submarines.

Q. Did the Japanese get any information of value from the Germans, any useful information which came from GERMANY?
A. We got many good information concerning methods of using devices against radar.

Q. What is your own professional opinion of American submarines and tactics? Do you feel they operated well? In what particulars were they weakest?
A. American submarine crews were very well trained, skillful, and brave. It was unexpected, we did not expect such skillfulness. This is not a compliment but the truth. One instance is our Japanese carrier going home from the south area of the PACIFIC. That carrier was attacked in the night, wind speed at 20 meters, just a single submarine and the same one attacked twice again the next morning.

Q. Which carrier, do you know the name?
A. I don't remember, but the attack was about October of last year, before the LEYTE Battle, off TOKYO Bay. Another example is the sinking of the KONGO. As Commander of the Sixth Fleet, I discussed this operation by the American submarine with my officers, saying it should be an example to our own forces of a brave skillful operation. I had no knowledge of the weaknesses of your submarines.

Q. Do you feel that the success of our submarines was due principally to superior skill, or to better devices and technical study?
A. Both.

Q. You said you did not expect this to be the case at the start of the war, I wonder why?
A. I expected that your submarine crews would be all on the same level with Japanese crews and likewise the devices of submarines; but they were superior to the Japanese.

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Q. Do you feel that the operations of our submarines had any decisive influence on the winning of the war, do you feel that some other ship was more important?
A. I think that is a very important reason, but perhaps not the most important reason.

Q. What other particularly important reasons, such as that one, do you feel influenced the course of the war?
A. I think the most important reason is your aircraft strength.

Q. What particular type of aircraft or implementation of aircraft was most important?
A. I am not expert with aircraft but of course the B-29's did great damage in the last few months. Our war was lost with the loss of SAIPAN. I feel it was a decisive battle. The loss of SAIPAN meant you could cut off our shipping and attack our homeland, and our submarine operations were completely shut out.

Q. At the beginning of the war did you expect a long war or short war?
A. I thought, this is my personal opinion, that war against America was very dangerous, we had very few chances to get away with it. Japanese military forces have many weak points, but American force has no weak point. During the period when I was a student at the Navy Staff College, I had the opinion which indicated that we should not have the war against America.

Q. Was that your opinion, or were you told that at the Staff College?
A. That was my personal opinion from the time when I was a youngster; the Japanese have many weak points, Americans none, war against America is not good.

Q. Was the Army more eager for war with America, did it have more optimistic view than the Navy, do you feel that the Army was willing to fight America?
A. We must not say such a thing, but you should understand that I know one Navy officer who has such an opinion.

Q. We understood that toward the end of the war, the Army was building submarines to operate itself. That seems somewhat peculiar. Do you know what the reasons were?
A. When the Army planned that building up his own submarine, the Navy side opposed that plan; but the Army answered they were planning on building up special submarine for supplying these islands and Army didn't want to use Navy submarine for such supplying because Navy submarine had more important mission to fight with fleet, and the Navy agreed with that plan. The Navy explained to the Army that building of submarine very difficult, and they wanted to show how to build them; but military did not want to be assisted by Navy, so military themselves built the submarines.

Q. Did they work?
A. I do not know about military submarine, but I think they were of no use.

Q. When the Navy submarines were supplying Army troops, were these operations controlled by the Army or the Navy at that time?
A. It was undecided.

Q. Who ordered them to do so, and told them where to go and what supplies to carry?
A. Concerning the operations of supply submarines, the orders issued from Navy Southeast Area Command; for the material to be located on board the submarine, that order came from Imperial Headquarters.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 73
USSBS NO. 367

ALEUTIAN CAMPAIGN

OPERATIONS OF THE JAPANESE FIRST DESTROYER SQUADRON

TOKYO 15 & 16 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of Vice Admiral OMORI, Sentaro, IJN; Commanding Officer (as a Rear Admiral) of the 1st Destroyer Squadron from October 1940 to October 1942.

Captain ARICHIKA, Rokuji, IJN; Chief of Staff to Commander 1st Destroyer Squadron from December 1941 until November 1943.

Interrogated by (Captain) J.S. Russell, USN.

SUMMARY

The plans for the occupation of certain islands in the Western ALEUTIANS, for the purpose of blocking a United States advance from the north, was known to Commander First Destroyer Squadron and his staff in late April 1942. The original plan called for the occupation of ADAK, KISKA and ATTU. As a result of the Battle of MIDWAY the occupation of ADAK was cancelled and the force assigned occupied ATTU instead, then conducted a reconnaissance of AMCHITKA. Thereafter the First Destroyer Squadron engaged in the supply and support of the ALEUTIANS with the greatest activity in summer because of the bad winter weather. This activity culminated in the Battle of the KOMANDORSKIS on 27 March 1943 (TOKYO date), when a convoy to ATTU was being escorted in force by the Fifth Fleet. This action stopped further supply by surface ships except for one or two dashes to ATTU by destroyers, and forced an attempt at supply by submarine. When ATTU was retaken by the UNITED STATES, the First Destroyer Squadron was assigned the task of evacuating the KISKA garrison. The second attempt was successfully completed under cover of heavy fog, the garrison being; embarked at KISKA between 1340 and 1435 on 29 July (TOKYO time and date).

TRANSCRIPT

Interrogation of Vice Admiral OMORI.

Q. Admiral OMORI, as Commander of the First Destroyer Squadron, what was your flagship?
A. The light cruiser ABUKUMA.

Q. Who relieved you as Commander of the first Destroyer Squadron?
A. Rear Admiral MORI, Tomochi.

Q. How long did Admiral MORI have the First Destroyer Squadron?
A. Admiral MORI was the Commander of the First Destroyer Squadron from November 1942 until June 1943.

Q. Who was next to relieve?
A. Rear Admiral KIMURA, Masatoni. I do not remember how long he remained in command.

Q. Will you please tell us in what actions you participated during the war?
A. HAWAII, Occupation of the ALEUTIANS, Battle of TOROKINA Straits 1 November 1943; after which I went to the Torpedo School at YOKOSUKA.

Q. What was the date of the planning for occupation of the ALEUTIANS, when did you first hear of the plan?
A. About May 1942.

Q. Please describe briefly the plan for the occupation of the ALEUTIANS.
A. The plan originally was to come directly to ADAK, occupy ADAK, then proceed west to ATTU and occupy ATTU.

Q. By what forces?
A. The forces in the plan were the ABUKUMA, flagship, with the 21st Destroyer Division, one battalion of Army troops aboard the KINUGASA MARU, the seaplane tender KIMIKAWA, escorted by probably two destroyers, and one mine layer the KOGANE MARU.

Q. Who was to command Army troops?
A. Major HOMOTO (Interrogator's note: - In error for Maj. HOZUMI). This was according to the plan which was made, now I shall tell you what actually took place. We, the ADAK Occupation Force, left JAPAN and came to approximately 44° N, 178° W where we learned of the Battle at MIDWAY. Because the MIDWAY

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Battle was a decisive battle, orders came from the Combined Fleet to the First Fleet and on down to the First Destroyer Squadron to stop the occupation of the ALEUTIANS. At this point we had proceeded north toward ADAK approximately 60 miles. The ADAK Occupation Force then reversed course in order to rendezvous with the First Fleet. After steaming south approximately 120 miles and dismissing the KOGANE MARU to return to JAPAN the orders were changed and we were directed to continue with the ALEUTIAN Occupation. After steaming north to approximately the 45th parallel, orders were received from Commander Fifth Fleet to occupy ATTU instead of ADAK with the forces present, sending the KIMIKAWA MARU to KISKA to cooperate with the KISKA Occupation Force. The remaining force, consisting of the ABUKUMA, 21st Destroyer Division (NENCHI, HATSUHARU, HATSUSHIMO, WAKABA), and the KINUGASA MARU, arrived in HOLTZ Bay, ATTU, on 11 June and commenced landing one hour before sunrise.

From HOLTZ Bay the troops moved overland to CHICHAGOF Harbor, approaching CHICHAGOF Harbor from the landward side. The landing party was confused in direction and crossed the island to MASSACRE Bay before going to CHICHAGOF Harbor. When they arrived at CHICHAGOF Harbor they found only about 40 natives and two Americans. The KINUGASA MARU entered CHICHAGOF Harbor about noon and began unloading supplies. KINUGASA MARU remained in CHICHAGOF Harbor completing unloading about 13 June while the First Destroyer Squadron patrolled off shore.

During this time the First Destroyer Squadron conducted a reconnaissance of the SEMICHI Islands to determine the suitability of the terrain there for installing an airfield, then departed on 13 June sailing to AMCHITKA Island where we examined the ground for a flying field. We arrived slightly before sunrise and the NENOHI sent ashore a landing party at CONSTANTINE Harbor, while the ABUKUMA's planes examined the island from the air. The ABUKUMA cruised along the northeast side of AMCHITKA to examine the shore line. The reconnaissance took approximately three hours, the force then rendezvoused off the southeast end of the island at which time an American plane was sighted. The weather was bad, and no action took place.

The force then retired to an area centered at approximately 49°-20' N, 171°-40' E. The 21st Division destroyers were ordered to go to KISKA, meanwhile the light cruiser KISO joined the ABUKUMA in the rendezvous area. The Sixth Destroyer Division consisting of AKATSUKI, HIBIKI, INAZUMA and IKAZUCHI were attached to KISKA Occupation Force, and were not under my direct command. About the 19th, the HIBIKI received sufficient bomb damage at KISKA to be returned to JAPAN.

The ABUKUMA returned to OMINATO about 25 June and sortied again the 30th. On about 30 June, we sortied in company with Carrier Divisions Four and Five, Cruiser Division Five, and Battle Cruiser Division Three. The purpose of this sortie was to lend assistance and support to the KISKA Operation. The carrier force cruised in an area centered about 43° N, 173° E, where they were in a position to intercept any American forces coming up from the MIDWAY Area to interfere with the KISKA Operation. During the time the carrier force was standing by beginning 3 or 4 July, the 18th Destroyer Division comprised of KASUMI, ARARE, SHIRANUHI, which had sailed from JAPAN, were operating in the KISKA Area. This division received an attack by an American submarine, 5 July, which sank the ARARE and seriously damaged the other two destroyers. Because of this damage, the ABUKUMA proceeded to KISKA to render aid. We remained in the area until 12 or 13 July.

On 5 July the NENOHI was sunk by submarine off AGATTU. Only 30 survivors from the NENOHI, all enlisted personnel, reach AGATTU. About 12 or 13 July ABUKUMA completed her duty, at KISKA, and returned to YOKOSUKA. From YOKOSUKA she went to OMINATO arriving about the end of July. From that time until the end of October the ABUKUMA acted as command ship for destroyers going to the ALEUTIANS; however, she herself did not go, but operated between KATAOKA and KAKUMABETSU, PARAMUSHIRO, and OMINATO. On 20 October the ABUKUMA, KISO and TAMA plus two destroyers took troops to ATTU. The destroyers were from the 21st Destroyer Division, and were, I believe, the HATSUSHIMO and WAKABA. The troops were carried on board the three light cruisers. These troops were to replace the original ATTU garrison which had been moved to KISKA. Upon the moving of the troops to KISKA, ATTU had been garrisoned only by a naval communication unit. This was for a period from about the end of August to 20 October.

We arrived in ATTU late in the evening of 22-23 October, and discharged in haste in order to be at a safe distance to the west of ATTU and away from air attack from DUTCH HARBOR and AMCHITKA by morning. 900 troops under command of Lt. Col. YONEKAWA were brought in on three light cruisers. These were infantry troops. They carried about one month's supply of ammunition and food. About 6 November, we returned to OMINATO and I was relieved by Admiral MORI.

Q. Was the ABUKUMA ever under air attack?
A. No, never.

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Q. Do you know of any damage or sinking of Japanese ships which you have not already given in the narrative?
A. About the middle of October, the destroyers OBORO and HATSUHARU were carrying supplies to KISKA. The OBORO, which carried the supplies, was sunk and the HATSUHARU was heavily damaged by air attack. This action occurred off the north end of KISKA Island. There were other attacks against destroyers, but I do not know of any other further details of damage.

Q. What routes were used to approach KISKA?
A. The approaches to KISKA most commonly used were those to the western end of the island and north around to KISKA Harbor. Occasionally ships came straight across from PARAMUSHIRO to a point due south of KISKA where they made a run directly north. These approaches were used because of danger of air and submarine attacks.

Interrogation of Captain ARICHIKA

Q. (Captain ARICHIKA), when did you first learn of the plan to occupy the ALEUTIANS?
A. At the end of April.

Q. What was the purpose of the ALEUTIAN Operations?
A. The ALEUTIAN Operations were a defensive measure against possible American attack coming from the north.

Q. What was accomplished by the operations?
A. They were not a success because we did not prepare for the occupation as we should. By that I mean we did not make preparations for the airfields and bases which were necessary.

Q. Will you give us a narrative of your experiences in ALEUTIAN waters?
A. My experiences were largely in the summertime because of the terrific winter weather. First I participated in the ATTU occupation, returned from that and later was involved in transport and escort operations.

The ATTU Occupation Force was under the command of Vice Admiral OMORI. It was comprised of the First Destroyer Squadron, ABUKUMA Flagship; 21st Destroyer Division, composed of the WAKABA, HATSUSHIMO, NENOHI, and temporarily attached, the SHIOKAZE; the transport KINUGASA MARU; the seaplane carrier KIMIKAWA MARU; and the minelayer MAGANE MARU. The HATSUHARU, which was in the 21st Destroyer Division, may have participated also. One battalion of Army troops, known as the HOKKAIDO DAITAI, was aboard the KINUGASA MARU, which was a 7 to 8,000 ton, 15 knot ship.

The occupation force left OMINATO on about 29 May and proceeded to approximately 44° N, 178° W, where it arrived about 5 June and began a run directly towards ADAK. At this time, news of the Battle of MIDWAY was received and the First Destroyer Squadron was ordered to join the MIDWAY forces; hence, the Squadron reversed course. In less than an hour this order was superceded by one directing the force to proceed to and occupy ATTU.

The plan for occupying ADAK was abandoned. The ABUKUMA, KINUGASA MARU, WAKABA, HATSUSHIMO, and NENIOHI went to ATTU. I do not remember the disposition of the other ships. The force arrived at the entrance to HOLTZ Bay, ATTU, at about 2100 or 2200 on 7 June and began landing troops at 2300. At first it was thought that the landing had been made in the wrong place, but at 0030 on 8 June a report came from ashore that the landing was a success.

I believe that the dates which Admiral OMORI gave are in error, the dates I have given are correct.

Q. How do you remember these dates? Can we be assured that they are correct?
A. I associate the dates with reports from the KISKA landings which took place almost simultaneously, but a little earlier. Records in connection with these landings were found yesterday and are being investigated.

Q. Did you see Captain ITO's unit of six flying boats at ATTU?
A. Yes, I saw them, but at KISKA, later. CHICHAGOF Harbor was not used for the initial landing because the harbor was narrow and shallow. The original plan was to by-pass CHICHAGOF and go into HOLTZ Bay. The Army troops put ashore at HOLTZ Bay made the mistake of going south across the island to MASSACRE Bay, instead of turning east and going to CHICHAGOF. This made a slight delay in the original plans. The ABUKUMA left the entrance of HOLTZ Bay and steamed to the entrance to CHICHAGOF Harbor, where at approximately 0700 the next morning, the Army troops could be seen coming down the mountains to CHICHAGOF Harbor. Until 10 June ships of the First Destroyer Squadron patrolled around ATTU. On 10 June they left for AMCHITKA, entering CONSTANTINE Harbor on or about 12 June to investigate the possibility of constructing an airfield on AMCHITKA. The ships which went to AMCHITKA were the ABUKUMA, the WAKABA and one other destroyer. Thirty men from the WAKABA were sent ashore to carry out a reconnaissance. While

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this was being done a report came from one of the ships that an American plane had been sighted in the area. Because of the fog the plane could not be seen. However, it was believed to have been patrolling in the area of AMCHITKA and KISKA. Orders were sent from the ABUKUMA to the landing party to hurry back to the WAKABA. When this was done the ships rendezvoused and fled at 20 knots to avoid detection. They remained in a stand-by area about 200 miles south of KISKA for approximately 3 or 4 days.

Q. What time of day was the American plane sighted?
A. About 6 or 7 o'clock in the morning (TOKYO Time), I'm not positive. The reason for standing by off shore was because of air attacks on KISKA by American planes. It was desired to ascertain the results of the air attacks and what further developments might ensue prior to returning to JAPAN.

Q. Do you remember what kind of attacks, and what type of planes were involved?
A. The attacks were made by B-17's, I think. Sometime between 13 and 15 June the destroyer HIBIKI received one bomb hit on the bow and was damaged. The KISO, which was also there, left at this time and came to the stand-by area. She rendezvoused with us and was undamaged. The HIBIKI, towed by the AKATSUKI, sailed to OMINATO arriving about 26 or 27 June. While standing by and making patrols around the Aleutians we had radio communication with KISKA. When the weather permitted we would sail up near the islands. We came up in the fog to avoid detection by American aircraft. When the weather cleared we moved back to the stand-by area.

At about the end of June we returned to OMINATO. Shortly afterwards, I don't recall the exact date, we left OMINATO for the ALEUTIANS Area again. This time our forces were in three groups. Standing by in waters well south of ATTU and south of us, was a carrier group. The CHIYODA went in to KISKA covered by three destroyers of the 18th Destroyer Divisions-KASUMI, ARARE, and SHIRANUHI. These three destroyers were just outside KISKA Harbor and anchored immediately north of LITTLE KISKA Island at 0300 on 5 July when they were attacked by an American submarine. The first torpedo sank the ARARE, the ship closest to the submarine which was at an estimated range of 1,000 meters. The second torpedo hit the KASUMI, the ship next to the ARARE, just forward of the bridge and almost severed her bow which dropped down to an angle of about 30° below horizontal. The third torpedo missed the SHIRANUHI, farthest from the submarine, but a fourth torpedo hit amidship and severed the hull plating and bottom so that the SHIRANUHI was held together only by her main deck and centerline structure. This was a daring and skillful attack by the American submarine, and was admirably executed. The ABUKUMA, plus WAKABA and one other destroyer went to KISKA to assist in salvage of KASUMI and SHIRANUHI.

On the same day, 5 July, the NENOHI was escorting a tanker when the tanker was attacked by a submarine. The NENOHI then attacked the submarine and sank it at sea off CHICHAGOF Harbor.

Q. What evidence of sinking was obtained?
A. Debris and oil came to the surface after a depth charge attack. The NENOHI, herself, was sunk later in the day while making 6 knots close aboard AGATTU Island. She was struck from abaft the starboard beam by one submarine torpedo, capsized within 2 minutes, and sank within 5 minutes. As she sank, one of her small boats came adrift. About 20 of her crew climbed aboard it and made off towards AGATTU Island. The IKAZUCHI sighted the smoke of the destruction of the NENOHI and steamed to the vicinity of the sinking; but all that could be found were the twenty men in the boat. About 200 persons were lost.

Interrogation adjourned at Japanese Naval War College, reconvened the following day at the MEIJI Building.

Q. Yesterday, in your narrative, you told of the ABUKUMA going to KISKA to assist in the salvage of the KASUMI and SHIRANUHI. Will you please continue?
A. The KASUMI's hull was broken just forward of the bridge and her bow hung down so that she could not move. A technician from YOKOSUKA was called into conference to survey this damage and to determine whether the bow should be cut off or whether she should be brought back intact. I believe the bow was cut off and she was towed back without her bow. The SHIRANUHI's hull was ruptured on both sides, but was held together by her main deck and centerline structure. The rupture was just abaft the forward stack. Patches were applied to the sides of the hull at KISKA, and she was towed back to MAIZURU. The KASUMI and the SHIRANUHI returned to MAIZURU at the same time, around the end of July or first of August, touching at PARAMUSHIRO.

The ABUKUMO, WAKABA and IKAZUCHI left KISKA on about the 10th and returned to YOKOSUKA arriving on 16 or 17 July. Upon arriving at YOKOSUKA the ships underwent repairs and overhaul; and conditions concerning the attack at KISKA were reported to the GUNREIBU (Naval General Staff) in TOKYO. On 2 August the ships prepared to get underway for OMINATO, departed on 3 August and arrived at OMINATO, 5 August. The cruise was uneventful.

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Upon arriving at OMINATO, plans for training exercises with the firing of torpedoes and guns were made, but on 8 August five American cruisers and several destroyers carried out a surface bombardment against KISKA. While we were making plans for our training we received news of the American bombardment, and we therefore departed from OMINATO at night on the 8th and arrived at PARAMUSHIRO about 10 or 11 August. The KISO, which was also at OMINATO, left with us and went to PARAMUSHIRO. At PARAMUSHIRO the Fifth Fleet rendezvoused and prepared to go to KISKA, but because the American forces withdrew, the Fifth Fleet did not sortie.

The organization of the Fifth Fleet at OMINATO at this time was:

NACHI (Fleet Flag), KISO, TAMA;
1st Destroyer Division - SHIOKAZE, HOKAZE
1st Destroyer Squadron, ABUKUMA (Squadron Flag)
21st Destroyer Division - WAKABA, HATSUSHIMO, HATSUHARU
6th Destroyer Division - IKAZUCHI, INAZUMA
Independent, - USUGUMO

Tanker - TEIYO MARU

(The tanker and 1st Destroyer Division were normally under the Commandant OMINATO, but joined the Fleet during sorties.)

Q. Were there any ships in KISKA Harbor during the bombardment, and were any damaged?
A. The only ships there were two grounded transports which were previously damaged by air attacks. These two ships were the NOJIMA MARU and the KANO MARU. Also, there was a ship NISSAN MARU which had been previously sunk, but whose mast and bridge stuck up out of the water. The KASUMI and SHIRANUHI may have been present. About five midget two-man submarines were present. There were no cruisers, battleships nor destroyers. The seaplane carrier KIMIKAWA MARU may have also been there.

Q. Was there any damage to any of these ships?
A. No damage was done to the ships in the harbor, mostly the warehouses ashore were damaged. I believe that some planes were destroyed, but how many, I do not know. Three persons were killed. I do not remember how many were wounded. The Chief of Staff of the Fifth Fleet, Rear Admiral NAKAZAWA, (Tasaku), who had arrived by destroyer, was present during the bombardment.

From the time the Fifth Fleet arrived at PARAMUSHIRO until February of the next year there were absolutely no offensive operations carried out by the Fifth Fleet as such. During this period the Fifth Fleet conducted training exercises, while the destroyers and the KISO made transport runs to ATTU and KISKA. These were exciting because in order to avoid detection by American planes, the ships had to run in during the night, unload cargo and get clear before daylight.

Q. What can you say of the American occupation of ADAK?
A. I considered the American occupation of ADAK as being a "thorn in the side." Intelligence reports were received indicating that the Americans were building airfields on ADAK and that construction was being carried out very rapidly. This worried us because we realized that we would soon be subjected to additional land-based bombing attacks.

Q. On what date did you first learn of the ADAK landing?
A. I do not remember the exact date. The reports came in from a reconnaissance plane which had reconnoitered ADAK. I believe the first news was around 1 October. We were very surprised at the speed with which the building of the airbase progressed.

Originally we planned to occupy the SEMICHI Islands, and build airfields there, but we lacked forces and time to occupy those islands and were forced to hold only ATTU and KISKA.

Method of Running Supplies into KISKA and ATTU

Transport operations were very difficult to carry out because to avoid detection by American aircraft during the daytime, we had to take advantage of storms and fogs. This jeopardized our transport operations.

Three 17 knot transports were used, the ASAKA MARU, SAKITO MARU, AWATA MARU, as well as the light cruisers and destroyers. A scouting radius from ADAK and AMCHITKA of 600 miles was considered, it was presumed that the American search planes scouted a 15 degree sector. When a transport arrived at the 600 mile radius, a dash in was made using radio intelligence of the planes air-borne to choose an uncovered sector of approach or to follow in through a sector behind the plane which was scouting there. The transport attempted to arrive in darkness and to discharge with utmost speed. The route away from KISKA was also

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chosen on radio intelligence of the air scouting in progress, choosing a sector which was not covered by air, or following the outbound track of a search airplane. Radio intelligence of the search plane call signs was an aid in determining the uncovered sectors; also, radar reports from KISKA assisted in this function. We did not break down the aircraft code successfully. The various approaches to KISKA were labelled "A" "B" "C", etc., and from intelligence plotted on board the ABUKUMA, a track for running into KISKA was determined and given to the ships participating. This system was very successful.

In one of the transport operations, the AKAGANE MARU was sunk by American cruiser gunfire. The AKAGANE MARU was in position 53° 20' N, 171° E, and a picket boat, which heard the sound of gunfire, was about 25,000-26,000 meters to the west. The picket boat was the coast defense ship KUNAJIRI. At this time KISO and SAKITO MARU were about 200 miles north of KISKA. A seaplane scout reported the American cruisers to be steaming east after the sinking. If KISO and SAKITO MARU had continued to KISKA they would have been intercepted by the American cruisers; hence, they turned and retired. Also at the same time the ABUKUMA and the AWATA MARU were on their way to KISKA in position approximately 56' 20' N, 171° 30' E. The ABUKUMA and the ASAKA MARU, plus one destroyer, continued on and went to KISKA.

The ABUKUMA and the one destroyer escorted the ASAKA MARU to a point about 120 miles north of KISKA, whence the AWATA MARU continued on into KISKA alone. The ABUKUMA and destroyer reversed course and returned to PARAMUSHIRO because of the great number of American planes in the vicinity at the time. During 21 February the ABUKUMA and her destroyer took the most northerly course possible to make the return voyage. They swung up to about 59° N, reaching the most northern point on the night of the 22nd; then proceeded south between BERING Island and the Gulf of KAMCHATKA to PARAMUSHIRO, arriving at PARAMUSHIRO on 24 or 25 February.

The AWATA MARU stayed in KISKA Harbor about one hour unloading her cargo and returned directly to YOKOSUKA by the southern route.

Because of the sinking of the AKAGANE MARU by naval gunfire, a change in transportation plans became necessary. Transports could no longer be sent in groups of one or two ships at a time; it became necessary to send transports to the ALEUTIANS in larger force. At the beginning of March, the exact date I do not remember, the entire Fifth Fleet consisting of the First Destroyer Squadron, the NACHI, MAYA and TAMA (KISO is believed to have been in MAIZURU at this time), and the transports ASAKA MARU and SAKITO MARU went to ATTU, where they arrived early in March. The First Destroyer Squadron, at this time, included the ABUKUMA, and six destroyers: WAKABA, HATSUHARU, HATSUSHIMO, INAZUMA, IKAZUCHI and USUGUMO, the last operating individually. During the night the larger vessels, the NACHI, MAYA and TAMA with the destroyers INAZUMA and IKAZUCHI, patrolled about 20 miles off shore to the north of ATTU. The ABUKUMA, with the destroyers USUGUMO, WAKABA, HATSUSHIMO and HATSUHARU patrolled about 20 miles off the shore to the south of ATTU.

The northern group patrolled only the northern side of the island. The southern group stayed south of the island with the exception of the ABUKUMA, the command ship, which returned to the entrance of HOLTZ Bay. The transports unloaded their cargo in one hour and departed. They rendezvoused to the north of the island and returned to PARAMUSHIRO. The Captain of the USUGUMO believed that he had picked up an American submarine near the entrance to HOLTZ Bay because of a sudden flash which is believed to have been a torpedo fired at him which detonated without having hit anything.

One of the other ships, it is not known which one, heard on their communication system a plain language broadcast from the alleged submarine. The gist of the broadcast was that Japanese ships were coming. This broadcast was about 30 minutes before the cargo ships entered HOLTZ Bay. The convoy returned to PARAMUSHIRO without having received any damage. The exact date of the convoy's arrival at PARAMUSHIRO is not known, but it is believed to have arrived there between 10 and 15 March. The cargo taken to ATTU at this time consisted mainly of materials for airfield construction and food.

On about 24 March the Fifth Fleet with identical organization as before, but with an additional transport, the SANKO MARU, prepared a convoy run to ATTU. The force sortied from PARAMUSHIRO in three groups. The SANKO MARU was escorted by the USUGUMO and because of the slow speed, left on the 23rd. Next to sortie, on 23 March, were the ASAKA MARU, the SAKITO MARU and the First Destroyer Squadron. Last to sortie, on 24 March, was the main body of the Fifth Fleet which was comprised of the NACHI, MAYA, and TAMA. The second two groups rendezvoused sometime during the afternoon of the 26th. Very bad weather was encountered on the 25th and 26th, and little progress was made. Rendezvous was set for 0100, 27 March, and a radio message to this effect was sent out. The force was in column, in order from van to rear: NACHI, MAYA, TAMA, WAKABA, HATSUSHIMO, ABUKUMA, IKAZUCHI, INAZUMA, ASAKA MARU, and SAKITO MARU, course north, when one of the ships in the rear signaled that two silhouettes were to the south at a distance of 6000 to 8000 meters. The distance between ships in our column was 600 meters, except the destroyers, which were 300 meters apart.

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The report was passed on to the NACHI that the USUGUMO and SANKO MARU had been sighted. At 0313 we discovered that it was the enemy. At this time the enemy bore 160 degrees true, distance 13½ miles. Because of the high bridge on the NACHI, she probably discovered the enemy at the same time that we did, or before. The NACHI immediately ordered the transports to retire to the west. The course of the column was changed to east and then southwards, and orders were given to take battle formation.

The First Destroyer Squadron formed with the ABUKUMA in the lead, followed in column by the WAKABA, HATSUSHIMO, IKAZUCHI and INAZUMA. The wind was from the northeast, seven knots. The action was opened with a salvo from the NACHI. The American force opened fire very soon thereafter. The NACHI fired torpedoes within the first 25 minutes at the American force to the southwest.

In the turn to the southwest and west the TAMA cut inside and the First Destroyer Squadron cut inside the TAMA. The TAMA came out slightly in the lead on a westerly course at about 0430. The ABUKUMA was to the north and at this time, that is between 0430 and 0500, the ABUKUMA received most of the fire of the American force. The ABUKUMA fired her four port side torpedoes at a range of about 15,000 meters and made a turn to the north. This placed the ABUKUMA somewhat behind the TAMA and the NACHI. Between 0500 and 0600 the American force laid a smoke screen and it was very difficult to see any of the ships. Occasionally they were made out. At about 0530 the ABUKUMA received orders to cross astern and come up on the south side of the NACHI. Because the ships of the 6th Destroyer Division, IKAZUCHI and INAZUMA, were old and slow and could not keep up, we reduced our speed a little to about 28 knots from a previous speed of 30 knots. Because of the smoke screen, we did not know whether or not the American force would go north or south, but we assumed that if it were to go south, the ABUKUMA and the destroyers would be able to close more quickly. We continued to sail west to close with the American force. At 0615 ABUKUMA fired her four starboard side torpedoes at a range of 16,000 meters. At about 0630 we turned south and the ABUKUMA was again abreast the TAMA and NACHI in formation. We continued sailing west, zig-zagging somewhat, searching for the American force. A little before 0700 we spotted the Americans directly south and the WAKABA and the HAT SUSHIMO fired 6 torpedoes each. The range was approximately 16,000 meters. It is believed that our torpedoes went inside the group of ships, but whether or not they made hits is not known.

Note: The torpedoes which NACHI, ABUKUMA and the two destroyers fired were set at 32 knots, which would give an extreme range of 32,000 meters; all were oxygen torpedoes which left no wake, Type 93, diameter 61 centimeters (24 inches).

At about 0615 we received a message that ten-plus planes (bombers) were on their way to the scene of the battle; where from and the exact number unknown. It was believed the message came from KISKA. I don't know how many groups there were, but there were ten-plus planes; and at this time we wished to hurry the battle to an end. An additional reason for our wishing to hurry the battle was because of the low fuel capacities of the IKAZUCHI and the INAZUMA.

Our observation planes, which had been launched from the MAYA or NACHI early in the engagement, reported to us but the reports were meager because of the smoke screen, and the reports were jeopardized by the inability of the observers. We did not know what damage had been done to the enemy. At approximately 0700 we saw one cruiser with a 15 degree list to the west. I could not tell which direction the cruiser was headed. She was also smoking. We saw 2 or 3 destroyers smoking. Later the planes reported that the cruiser with the list was lying dead in the water.

A duel between the NACHI and MAYA and American destroyers was going on about this time (0700). We could see the guns of the American destroyers firing very rapidly. I am not positive whether it was the destroyers or cruisers who fired torpedoes at us. These torpedoes exploded prematurely at 1500 to 2000 meters to the port side of the ABUKUMA. If these torpedoes had not exploded prematurely, it is believed that they would have made hits on the ABUKUMA. Shortly after 0700 we decided to break off the engagement because of the report that American airplanes were coming and because of the low fuel capacity of the two aforementioned destroyers, and also in consideration of the fuel capacity of the other ships. The ABUKUMA had plenty of ammunition left at the end' of the battle, but the NACHI and the MAYA had nearly exhausted their supply. At about 0730 we disengaged by remaining on a westerly course while the American ships went south.

Q. What were the size and number of the guns on the ABUKUMA?
A. 14cm. - six guns. She carried 200 to 250 rounds per gun. Each gun of the TAMA fired about 50 rounds and they had about 150 rounds left per gun.

Q. Who was embarked on the ASAKA MARU?
A. Colonel YAMAZAKI's force.

Q. What was on the SANKO MARU?
A. A very few soldiers, mostly supplies. In command at ATTU at this time was Lieutenant Colonel YONEKAWA; Colonel YAMAZAKI was to take command upon arrival. There were no troops embarked on any of

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the combatant ships. Later, Colonel YAMAZAKI reached ATTU; I do not remember the ship on which he was embarked, but it was at a later date.

Q. At the time, what damage did you think you had done to the American force?
A. We thought we had damaged one cruiser and two or three destroyers, nothing sunk. When we were steaming west, we came upon a large oil slick and realized that we had done serious damage.

Q. Did any destroyers make a run into ATTU after this battle?
A. There were submarines supplying KISKA and ATTU and I believe that one or two destroyers got in to ATTU early in April, at which time Colonel YAMAZAKI was landed.

Q. What happened when you reached PARAMUSHIRO?
A. ABUKUMA left PARAMUSHIRO for MAIZURU, arrived there about 10 April and underwent overhaul. At this time radar was installed on the ABUKUMA. While ABUKUMA was overhauling, the flag of the First Destroyer Squadron was transferred to the KISO. After embarking the flag, the KISO left MAIZURU for PARAMUSHIRO, touching at OMINATO en route. She arrived at PARAMUSHIRO on about 20 April. On about 9 May the KISO, WAKABA and HATSUSHIMO left PARAMUSHIRO in company with the KIMIKAWA MARU which was transporting seaplanes to KISKA.

The plan for the convoy was to proceed to a point about 250 miles southwest of ATTU, where the planes were to be launched to fly to ATTU, and then to proceed to KISKA. However, we learned of the American landing on ATTU at about 1200 on 12 May; hence, the plan was changed. No planes were launched and the KIMIKAWA MARU was ordered to return to PARAMUSHIRO alone. We planned to go with the rest of the ships, the KISCO, WAKABA, and HATSUSHIMO, to ATTU to make an attack. We realized that if we went during daylight we would be at a great disadvantage because of the strength of the American force there. Hence, we planned to attack on the night of the 13th. However, from our position, we could not cover the distance even though we sailed at full speed, so we waited in an area about 250 miles southwest of ATTU. That night we received orders from Commander Fifth Fleet to return to PARAMUSHIRO.

At the end of May the situation at ATTU had become definitely critical and the ABUKUMA, which had come to PARAMUSHIRO from MAIZURU early in May, was sent out on 25 May with four destroyers. The plan was to take supplies to the troops. After landing the provisions we were to evacuate important personages who were familiar with the situation ashore. These persons were the Naval Communications Staff Officer, a Commander EMOTO, and one Staff Officer of the Army (name unknown) who had gone to ATTU from HOKKAIDO for observation purposes. It was intended to work past the American ships on the night of 29 May. We proceeded up to about 150 miles southwest of ATTU, but because the weather was clear and because we had no intelligence reports, we were afraid of detection by enemy aircraft; so we delayed our run-in one day. The night of the 29th. Colonel YAMAZAKI sent a message that the situation on ATTU was very grave, and Commander Fifth Fleet ordered us to return to PARAMUSHIRO.

Q. When did the last surface ship arrive in KISKA?
A. About the end of February or early in March, a destroyer. After that, there was only submarine transport. Two Japanese submarines were sunk to my knowledge south of KISKA. There may have been more. Transporting goods to KISKA by submarine was a very difficult proposition, and early in June it was decided that we would have to withdraw our troops from that island.

Orders came from Vice Admiral KAWASE, Shiro, then Commander Fifth Fleet, down through Rear Admiral KIMURA, Masatomi, then Commander First Destroyer Squadron, to me to draw up plans for the evacuation of troops from KISKA. This plan had to be done in time to withdraw the troops by July. I was given the light cruisers ABUKUMA, KISO, TAMA; the Sixth Destroyer Division - IKAZUCHI, INAZUMA; the 21st Destroyer Division - WAKABA, HATSUSHIMO; Ninth Destroyer Division - ASAGUMO, USUGUMO, HIBIKI; also the converted cruisers ASAKA MARU and AWATA MARU. These last two ships, I decided, were too slow for the operation, and also that the TAMA was too old and unreliable. I decided that there were not enough destroyers, and requested six more. As a result, the following were assigned: the Tenth Destroyer Division - YUGUMO, KAZAGUMO, AKIGUMO; and an independent group of destroyers - SHIMAKAZE, NAGANAMI, SAMIDARE. At the same time the Sixth Destroyer Division was ordered back to JAPAN. On 7 July the ABUKUMA and KISO left PARAMUSHIRO with the 9th, 10th, 21st Destroyer Divisions and the three independent destroyers, plus the tanker NIHON MARU which was being escorted by the coast defense ship KUNAJIRI.

We went to a position about 200 miles southwest of KISKA where we stood by until to July, when we returned to PARAMUSHIRO because the weather did not favor our evacuating the troops. The second time we left PARAMUSHIRO, at 2010 on 22 July, we ran south-southeast to about 46° 30'N thence east to the 170th meridian where we waited in an area generally to the southeast of that point. At 1700 on 26 July the KUNAJIRI collided with the ABUKUMA. In the resulting confusion the WAKABA and NAGANAMI collided in the rear of the

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column. The KUNAJIRI returned to JAPAN at 9 knots in company with the WAKABA. At 0000 on 28 July we were roughly at 46° 40'N, 173° 10'E. From this point we made a direct run in, course about 020° true, to a point 15 miles from Cape ST. STEPHEN. At this point the TAMA left us and returned to PARAMUSHIRO. The remainder of the force, after getting a brief glimpse of Cape ST. STEPHEN at about 1000 29 July, ran on soundings about a mile off shore until we reached the indentation on the west coast of KISKA, when we headed for a point one mile off shore near KISKA Volcano. We then circumnavigated the north end of KISKA Island about one mile off shore, thence we ran directly down into KISKA Harbor. Navigation was by sounding and radar, aided on the last leg by bearings of a radio beacon on SOUTH HEAD.

When the ABUKUMA first sighted the north tip of LITTLE KISKA Island it was mistaken for an American cruiser, and four torpedoes were fired. Two of these exploded against LITTLE KISKA and two against SOUTH HEAD. At 1340 all ships went in, anchoring at the inshore end of KISKA Harbor, except for HIBIKI which took station off LITTLE KISKA, and SHIMAKAZE, NAGANAMI and SAMIDARE which patrolled the entrance. The visibility inside KISKA Harbor was good. 5100 personnel were taken aboard, 450 to each destroyer and 1200 to each of the light cruisers. We were underway at 1435 and proceeded from KISKA Harbor in two groups. The first group was made up of the ABUKUMA, YUGUMO, KAZAGUMO, AKIGUMO, SHIMAKAZE and SAMIDARE. The second group was made up of the KISO, ASAGUMO, USUGUMO, HIBIKI, HATSUSHIMO and NAGANAMI. The track out followed the same track as going in until north of KISKA Volcano, when the ABUKUMA Group proceeded down midway between KISKA Island and PILLAR ROCK, then southwest. At a point two miles south by east of PILLAR ROCK, an American submarine surfaced at about 2000 meters from ABUKUMA. A 45 degree turn away was immediately made, and the American submarine submerged. Course was resumed again, and the ABUKUMA group proceeded at 28 knots on course approximately 210° true to the 48th parallel of latitude, thence along that parallel to about 159°E, thence directly to PARAMUSHIRO where the group arrived on 1 August. The KISO came south only as far as the 50th parallel and arrived in PARAMUSHIRO with her group on the 31st of July.

The senior officer among the evacuated personnel was Rear Admiral AKIYAMA, Katsuzo, IJN ; the senior Army officer was Major General MINEKI. There was no one left ashore except for three dogs; however, timed explosives were left to detonate a few days later to give the impression that troops were still present and going about the business of changing the defenses. Each destroyer carried one landing boat, and the ABUKUMA and KISO, two each. About five boats were available from the shore. These were sunk after the embarkation was complete. We wondered if the American submarine had reported our presence, or whether it mistook us for an American force. The center smoke stack of the ABUKUMA was painted white so that in the fog it would appear that she had only two stacks.

I left the First Destroyer Division in November. After the evacuation of the KISKA garrison we engaged in convoy work, returning to YOKOSUKA on 7 October.

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Plate 73-1: Captain ARICHIKA's rough sketch of KOMANDORSKI action, 27 March 1943, Annex A.
Plate 73-1: Captain ARICHIKA's rough sketch of KOMANDORSKI action, 27 March 1943, Annex A.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 74
USSBS NO. 371

 

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

TOKYO 12 NOVEMBER 1943

Interrogation of: Captain KAMIDE, S., IJN; Commanding Officer of the 901 Air Flotilla from September 1943 to December 1944, and Senior Staff Member of this Flotilla from December 1944 until the end of the war.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. MOORER, U.S.N.

SUMMARY

This interrogation covers general information on the Japanese anti-submarine effort so far as aircraft were concerned. The 901 Air Flotilla, equipped with a mixture of obsolescent aircraft made a weak effort to protect Japanese shipping against submarine attack. Organization, equipment, search and attack doctrine, development and research, and training are discussed very briefly.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. When did the Japanese organize an air fleet to be used chiefly for anti-submarine missions?
A. In December 1943 the 901st Air Flotilla was organized at TATEYAMA solely for the purpose of escorting convoys.

Q. Describe the organization of the 901st Air Flotilla?
A. When organized in December 1943, the 901st Air Flotilla was composed of one unit equipped with 48 land-based twin-engine bombers and another unit equipped with 32 four-engine flying boats. As the American submarine threat increased, the fleet was gradually enlarged. In January 1945 it reached maximum strength. The aircraft assigned were as follows:

80 VOS (DAVE)
30 VB (KATE)
30 VF (ZEKE)
20 VB(2)   (BETTY)
8 VPB (EMILY)

The above aircraft were moved from base to base according to operational requirements.

Q. Was anti-submarine warfare, as conducted by aircraft, given a low priority by the high command, thus making it difficult to build up the forces to the necessary strength?
A. In the beginning of the war it was not considered of great importance, which accounts for the low strength of the 901st Air Flotilla. In December 1943, prompted by serious shipping losses, we quickly increased its strength and enlarged the organization.

Q. Were all the aircraft in the 901st Flotilla land-based?
A. Yes, but the Escort Fleet also operated escorts carriers for protection of convoys. The carriers were never sent out on offensive missions.

Q. At what time during the war do you consider that aircraft were most successful against submarines?
A. Defensively speaking, it was during May 1944, at which time we convoyed ships from the EMPIRE to SAIPAN, with the loss of only one ship. Speaking from offensive standpoint, the most successful period of operation was the fall of 1944 when we were shipping very heavily between FORMOSA and the PHILIPPINES to supply the Army based there. I estimate that the Americans had over 10 submarines operating in that region and I think the flying boats were able to sink four or five of them. I lay much credit to the fact that we equipped the aircraft with MAD. No ships were lost to submarines at that time.

Q. Make an estimate of the total number of submarines sunk by Japanese aircraft during the entire war?
A. The 901st Air Flotilla estimated that they sunk about 20 during the entire war. I've no accurate information on the total number of sinkings, although they reported at one time to have sunk as high as 500. This exaggeration is caused by the fact that pilot reports are inaccurate since they are not required to furnish proof.

Q. Were the, aircraft listed in the organization moved from base to base according to the estimated location of American submarines, or according to the volume of sea born traffic in the subject area?
A. Both factors were taken into consideration when moving aircraft. Attention was given to the value of the convoy as well as the size.

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Q. Why was this force organized in the number indicated?
A. The 901st Air Flotilla was organized with what aircraft were available, regardless of their adaptability to antisubmarine warfare.

Q. What type of aircraft was considered most effective against submarines?
A. BETTYS and flying boats. Due to the range and endurance and experience of the pilots, the above aircraft were the only type used for night operations.

Q. Did the Japanese construct a special aircraft to be used against submarines?
A. In May 1945 we developed a special plane (LORNA) for escorting convoys, which was very similar to the BETTY. Twenty of these aircraft were delivered in July 1945 and used until the end of the war.

Q. Aside from standard equipment, what special equipment was installed in your anti-submarine planes?
A. Radar and MAD; no other special equipment was carried.

Q. Was any special equipment provided for aircraft employed at night?
A. No special night equipment was used; aircraft homed on the submarine with radar until within 500 meters at which time they completed their run by dead reckoning.

Q. Did you have a special base or establishment where you studied anti-submarine warfare in order to develop special weapons for use against submarines?
A. All research was done along with other aircraft development at YOKOSUKA.

Q. What do you consider to be the outstanding anti-submarine development made by the Japanese during the war?
A. The MAD and Radar equipment.

Q. After the special equipment was developed, was it installed in the aircraft at your outlying bases or did you have to make the in JAPAN proper?
A. They all were originally installed in JAPAN. Toward the end of the war it was possible to make installation at outlying bases.

Q. Were the radar and MAD equipment improved as the war progressed?
A. Yes, both were improved technically as well as operationally. As a result of this improvement the range of the MAD was increased from 130 to 280 meters.

Q. Describe the depth bomb used by Japanese aircraft.
A. We had two types: 250 kg. and 60 kg. which were ordinary bombs fitted with special nose and tail adapters. The fuses employed were time fuses rather than hydrostatic fuses and were set at 3, 5, 10 and 16 seconds which gave an explosive depth of 10 meters, 45 and 80 meters respectively.

Q. Under what conditions were the above fuses used?
A. At night, when it was generally considered that the submarine would be on the surface, the 10 and 45 meters were carried. In the day time, when the submarine would spot the aircraft and thus have time to dive to a greater depth, the 45 and 80 meter fuses were used.

Q. Were any other weapons such as torpedoes used against submarines?
A. In February and March 1944 we tried to use torpedoes against submarines but after four or five months of unsuccessful attacks the idea was abandoned. The torpedo employed traveled in a reducing spiral. An attempt was made to drop the torpedo 200 meters in advance of the submarine normal to its course. It made four complete circles during which time it sank to a depth of 200 meters. This torpedo was fitted with contact fuses.

Q. Did the Japanese patrol critical areas day and night?
A. Yes.

Q. What type of search was used?
A. Sector, box and spiral searches were used depending on the situation. Sector searches were conducted at a range of 250 miles by multi-engine aircraft and 120 miles by single-engine aircraft.

Q. By what method did the Japanese maintain a plot of the position of American submarines?
A. All plots of submarine positions were kept by the Grand Escort Fleet in TOKYO. This plot included the entire PACIFIC Ocean Area. However, area commands were only furnished information concerning their own area and this was done only when special intelligence was available to the Grand Escort Fleet.

Q. Were you able to make use of RDF in order to plot the position of American submarines?
A. RDF searches were sometimes used to maintain a general plot but due to communication difficulty between various stations, the information was not received in time to be of immediate operational value.

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Q. How did you cover a convoy with aircraft not equipped with MAD?
A. Two planes were normally used. One aircraft was continuously circling at the radius of 3,000 meters while the second plane covered the sector about 60° on each bow ahead to a distance of 5,000 meters. The angle varied with the speed.

Q. What reports were made after contacting a submarine?
A. The doctrine was to attack first, report the contact, then mark the location of the submarine.

Q. At what altitude did the aircraft normally patrol?
A. Day time, between five or seven hundred meters; at night, between two or three hundred meters.

Q. What altitude was flown when using radar?
A. The same altitude as given above was used when operating radar.

Q. Was the radar operated at all times during the patrol?
A. Continuous use at night time; shut off during the day time.

Q. Why was it not used during the day time?
A. Because the Japanese radar was not so efficient and the use of visual search was more reliable. When the visibility was bad we used radar.

Q. Did the Japanese give any consideration to the fact that the use of air-borne radar might possibly warn the submarine of the presence of Japanese aircraft?
A. No consideration was given to that fact.

Q. What was the normal range at which you expected to pick up a submarine with radar?
A. About 12 miles. Large targets were normally picked up at a greater distance.

Q. After the submarine is picked up by the radar, is the pilot able to fly directly to the submarine?
A. Yes, they can.

Q. When homing to a submarine, do you fly a collision course or fly in a curve such that the aircraft is always headed towards the submarine?
A. We fly a pursuit curve since it is necessary to keep the submarine directly ahead.

Q. At what distance does the submarine fade away from the radar?
A. The target fades at 500 meters.

Q. Did you consider the aircraft as an attack weapon, or merely as a means to discover the presence of the submarine which would later be destroyed by surface craft?
A. The aircraft was considered a primary means of destroying submarines but surface vessels cooperated whenever possible.

Q. Describe briefly your attack doctrine.
A. It was our policy to attack immediately as soon as the submarine was sighted. The submarine was not strafed since we had no guns. One or two bombs were dropped depending on the decision of the pilots. The pilots were allowed to attack at any time they thought they had a chance to damage the submarine. After making the attack, the pilot immediately made a contact report and marked the best known position of the submarine and remained on station until relieved or fuel exhausted. We had no plans of coordinated attack by more than one aircraft.

Q. Did your pilots make a special effort to avoid AA fire when approaching a submarine?
A. No, in almost every case the submarine submerged before the aircraft was in range.

Q. Did you have a plan for coordination with surface vessels during a submarine contact?
A. An effort was made to work out a plan but due to communication difficulty no cooperation was possible. The aircraft merely marked the spot and visually directed the surface craft to the scene of the contact.

Q. How long was a submarine contact followed before you abandoned it?
A. Two or three days. In planning the search during this time, it was thought that the American submarine made 3 knots submerged.

Q. Where were pilots trained to use special equipment such as MAD and radar?
A. Training was done at SAIKI and YOKOSUKA. Experienced pilots from squadrons in outlying bases were sent to the above places and thoroughly trained in the use of the new equipment in order that they might return to their squadron and train all hands. These pilots were also given special bombing training on a tame submarine at MAIZURU.

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Q. Was any information relative to anti-submarine warfare obtained from the Germans?
A. None of value.

Q. Were the pilots assigned to anti-submarine units considered inferior to those assigned to standard combat units?
A. The inexperienced pilots, that is new pilots, were equal to those furnished to other units as replacements. An effort was made to "freeze" anti-submarine pilots but it was difficult during the last year of war because some of the best pilots were assigned to the special attack units.

Q. Did the Army ever assist in convoy duty?
A. The Army did escort work in the area assigned them by headquarters from TOKYO. There were no joint escort operations between the Army and the Navy. The Army escorted convoys at distant bases such as NEW GUINEA.

Q. What was the greatest cause of loss of the Japanese anti-submarine aircraft?
A. American fighters.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 75
USSBS NO. 378

JAPANESE WAR PLANS AND PEACE MOVES

TOKYO 13-14 November 1945

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Interrogation of: Admiral TOYODA, Soemu; September 1941, CinC KURE NavSta; November 1942 appointed Supreme Military Counsellor, residing in TOKYO. May 1943 became CinC YOKOSUKA NavSta. May 1944 became CinC Combined Fleet succeeding Admiral KOGA when latter was killed. May 1945 appointed Chief of Naval General Staff; later post superseded by position of Chief, Naval Combined Forces, September 1945 which he held until dissolution of that organization 15 October 1945.

Interrogated by: Rear Admiral R.A. OFSTIE, USN; Maj. Gen. O.A. ANDERSON, USA; Lt. Comdr. W. WILDS, USNR.

Allied Personnel Present: Mr. P.H. NITZE, Vice Chairman, USSBS; Captain T.J. HEDDING, USN; Lt. Comdr. J.A. FIELD, Jr., USNR.

SUMMARY

Admiral TOYODA discusses the influence of the Japanese Army in politics and the implications of this influence in the history of Japanese expansion, the strategy and economics of the basic Japanese plan for war against the UNITED STATES, the question of implication of the armed forces, and the consideration of the surrender question at Imperial Conferences in the summer of 1945.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. (Admiral Ofstie) Throughout the war were your positions such that you were fully informed on the progress of the war, on the plans and policies under discussion in the Supreme Council, Imperial Headquarters, by the General Staffs, etc.?
A. In the Japanese Navy, the commandants of the various fleets and the various Naval Stations, while they received instructions from Central Headquarters regarding operations, are not consulted on matters of fundamental policy; and, therefore, from the beginning of the war I was not consulted on those matters by the TOKYO headquarters.

Q. I assume, however, that you were thoroughly familiar with the Japanese War Plan, their National War policy for the Greater East ASIA War; is that correct?
A. I may be wrong as to the exact date, but I believe it was on 5 November 1941 that the Commander-in-Chiefs of the various Naval Stations and minor Naval Stations were brought together in TOKYO and were given an explanation regarding our plans for operations in the event of war against the UNITED STATES. No opportunity was given us, however, to make any comments on those plans or to suggest modifications.

Q. Admiral, would you say that in the preparation of the basic war plans there appeared to be full understanding and agreement on the part of the Army as well as the Navy?
A. No. I regret to say that such was not the situation. Because the Army had great political power, if the Navy were to endeavor to get all that it desired, it would encounter certain difficulties. Such was the situation not only during the war but prior to the beginning of the war.

Q. To go slightly further - as an example, when the basic war plan was changed and it was decided to somewhat expand the immediate objective by going into the ALEUTIANS, SOLOMONS, MIDWAY, was that change agreed to or given consideration by the Army and a satisfactory accord reached?
A. Having been in KURE at the time, I was not in a position to have knowledge as to the Navy's basic policy or the question of cooperation with the Army upon such points.

Q. But still, when a major change, such as the decision to go into the ALEUTIANS, to go into the SOLOMONS and to PORT MORESBY, to land on MIDWAY, was made, surely such a matter would have been rather widely discussed between the services, wouldn't it?
A. Of course, I think that discussion between the services on points of such importance took place as a matter of course, but as I was not in TOKYO at the time, but in KURE, I do not know how those discussions took place or were carried out. of course I had definite personal opinions of my own regarding these questions when they were made known to me, but no chance was given to me to forward such opinions to Central Headquarters.

696691 O - 46 - 3

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Q. Admiral, what do you consider, just briefly, were the Japanese war aims?
A. I, of course had an opinion of my own as to what the war aims probably were. There was undoubtedly other opinion on the part of the general public, and war aims as held by the Government have been clarified; but I did not at any time give expression to what I considered to be the war aim of our country. From my official position I made no statement regarding war aims.

Q. What was your understanding of the Government's position as to war aims?
A. It is very difficult for me to give a definite opinion of my own as to what the Government's war aim probably was for the reason that I feel now and felt at the time that the country could have avoided the war if it had tried hard enough.

Q. What steps do you think might have been taken that were not taken that might have avoided the war?
A. Our country needed at the time to avoid war, the presence of a strong and wise statesman who could have led the country at the time.

There is great doubt in my mind as to whether the Government that was in power at the beginning of the war should alone be held responsible for the war that the war started. I wonder whether we should not go back farther, even to the Manchurian Incident when the situation in the country became such that it was virtually impossible for the situation in the country as envisaged by our EMPEROR to be made known to the rest of the World. I believe I understand the object of your interrogation, but there is one point upon which I must secure understanding and that is the fact that, from early days, it has been my conviction that soldiers and sailors should not mix in politics; and that is, in fact, one of the important points brought out in the EMPEROR's rescript to the military and Navy. That has always been my conviction, that nothing can come from combination of political and military power in one and the same hands.

It was about the time that I became a Rear Admiral that the Manchurian incident broke out, and ever since that time I have been telling my young officers my conviction on that point. For that reason, although of course I have personal opinions regarding this war, I question whether it would coincide with views of others. It probably would not, and for that reason I doubt whether an expression of my personal opinion on the various phases of the war would be of much value to you.

Q. From an earlier statement, however, I gathered that you felt the Army was very much in politics, much more so than the Navy, if the Navy was at all. Is that correct?
A. I do not hesitate to state definitely that such was the case; namely, that the Army did participate in politics and that is not a recent phenomenon. It goes back considerably into the past, tracing as far back as the MEIJI era. I can see from the way in which the Army played a part, even in the formation of the cabinets, that the political activity of the Army went back many years into the past.

Q. In other words, the Army had a profound influence on national policies. It that a correct statement?
A. I think so.

Q. Did that influence extend to a point where it had a direct effect upon naval operations; such, for example, as pushing expansion in certain directions, using submarines to supply troops in the field, use of naval strength primarily for objectives which the Army selected? In other words, did they interfere with strictly naval responsibilities?
A. In the field of military equipment, I think we felt the effect of the Army's influence to a considerable extent, but in matters of operations the cooperation between the two services was quite satisfactory, with a few exceptions perhaps.

Q. In the early stages of the war, what was the opinion of the highest echelons as to the probable major threat to the success of its plan? Was from forces in CHINA, was it the possibility of the Russians coming into MANCHURIA, was it down in the AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA Area - the American forces there - or was it the U.S. forces in the east, in the early part of the war?
A. Of course, as already stated, I had no part in the laying down of the war plans in central headquarters, but I personally felt that our biggest objective was of course the American Naval and Air Force.

Q. The threat from the east or from the southeast? This was at the beginning of the war when a perimeter has been established and which JAPAN faced all the war around. At some point there was possibly the greatest threat.
A. I felt the biggest threat was the action of the American Navy coming across the PACIFIC.Q. To what extent do you consider that operations of the Army in CHINA reduced or otherwise affected JAPAN's ability to defend herself from the attack from the east which you mention?
A. Of course I do not know much about the Army as such, but I have always felt that it was a great mistake to try to carry on, at the same time, war against the UNITED STATES and war against CHINA on the Asiatic Continent; and I felt that we should liquidate the war with CHINA even at some sacrifice.

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Q. If the major threat, again, was from the American Navy from the east, then the major responsibility for meeting that threat rested with the Japanese Navy. Is that a fair statement?
A. Yes, such was my opinion, and I believe that feeling was shared by the naval authorities in TOKYO Headquarters; and I have heard that there were officers in our Navy who expressed the opinion that around the time that the operations were being carried on around NEW GUINEA that we could not carry out those operations with maximum success unless all the Japanese aircraft, including those of the Army, were placed at the disposal of the Japanese Navy.

Q. Did this general situation continue for a considerable period? Did it continue after the MARSHALLS Operation, after SAIPAN, after the PHILIPPINES: or was there a change in the relative importance of the threat - that is, of the U.S. Navy threat? Did that at some time become less important?
A. Yes, taking the whole period of the war, my feeling is that the American surface forces were our principal threat. That is not to overlook the effect of the U.S. Air Force, but even that was made effective only through the cooperation of the American Naval Task Force. So while there might have been exceptions locally in isolated spots, taking the whole area of the PACIFIC, I think that the U.S. surface forces constituted our main threat. Toward the end of the war, particularly after the loss of the PHILIPPINES, it became more or less clear that we could not successfully use our naval forces against the American naval forces; so that, especially just prior to the conclusion of the war, we decided that the only way to combat the American Fleet was by what we termed "bleeding" operations, should American forces endeavor to make a landing either on JAPAN proper - HONSHU - or on some nearby island.

Q. In following the progress of the war as you saw it, what would you say, in just a few words if it can so be done, were the chief causes for the inability of JAPAN to carry out her war aims?
A. On the material side, the fact that our country was woefully weak, lacking resources. On the spiritual side, I should say that the biggest hindrance was the fact that people were not told what this war was actually for, and for that reason they were not able to really put themselves into the war effort.

Q. From the standpoint of the UNITED STATES, what was the principal force you might say that resulted in Japan's inability to carry out her war aims?
A. On the American side I should say that it was the fact that you had adequate raw materials, bountiful resources, and tremendous production capacity, and the fact that production plans were carried out very much according to schedule. I recall that when I left TOKYO to take over command of the Combined Fleet I made one request of the Navy Minister, and that was the fact that he should promise that all the ships, all the planes, and other supplies which were promised to the Combined Fleet under the Naval Plan should be carried out to the letter; that if he felt that it was impossible to go through with the number designated in the plan, to change the plan. For instance, if he thought it was going to be difficult to let the Combined Fleet have ten planes, don't put ten planes down but reduce that to five, but be sure to come through with the five planes. But as it turned out, the Navy Minister was not able to carry out that promise, not because of lack of will to do so but because production simply did not keep up with the plan.

Q. Then to go a little further along the same line, lack of production has many causes. What would you ascribe the principle reason for the lack of that production?
A. It is difficult to point to any one thing as the reason for failure in production because there are many and each, I think operates to affect the others in more or less of a vicious circle, but if I have to name one, I would point out lack of raw materials and natural resources. It was, of course, impossible to supply our production plants with raw materials from JAPAN proper, CHINA and MANCHURIA. That was evident from the first, and it was for that reason that our Army and Navy extended their insufficient force over such a broad area, along battle lines all out of proportion to our strength in men, in order to obtain raw materials from the south, but as it turned out, that was simply taking in too much territory with the strength that we had in that area.

Q. What was the principal reason why you couldn't get those raw materials to your country from the south?
A. The main reason, I think was that we did not have a sufficient number of ships to begin with, and such as we had, we suffered heavy damage owing to your submarines and air action.

Q. As major items in the position that you came to, what would you say were the primary causes? Was it the loss of shipping, was it the severe damage to the fleet strength, was it loss of air power, was it blockade by air and submarines, or was it bombing of the homeland?
A. Beginning this year, I think the biggest cause of fall in production, especially in aircraft and air material, was the effect of your bombing on the domestic plants - factories - in JAPAN proper; but as regards the effects on our war strength on the whole, I think the greatest effect was felt after all by the lack of ships and consequent inability to bring material from the south. Along that line also there were periods in the war when there was not a lack of material in JAPAN, but they could not be moved from one place to another owing to lack of transportation facilities. In other words, various causes affected one another to bring down the general fall in production level.

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Q. Now, considering all factors - the lack of production and the condition of the fleet and your position with respect to air strength - at what point in the war did you realize the probability that the war could not be successfully continued? Is there some one point, some action, some operation?
A. I felt it was difficult from the very beginning, but I think what might be termed the turning point was the Battle of MIDWAY. Our losses there had a very serious effect upon us, together with the fact that we used very much fuel at that time, more than we had expected would be necessary; and the effect of that was felt right through afterwards. When I came to Central Headquarters as Chief of the Naval Staff this year and was informed of the situation prevailing then with regard to aircraft, aviation fuel, heavy oil for surface units, I realized more than ever, then, that continuation of the war under such conditions was extremely difficult. I believe the turning point, in so far as the fuel situation was concerned - that is, the period after which our fuel situation became extremely acute - was our loss of the PHILIPPINES to your forces, because after that you had control of air and sea over South CHINA and completely cut off our shipping lanes to the south.

Q. What was the first time when the movements of the fleet were definitely restricted by lack of fuel?
A. The fleet fuel situation became very acute early in this year. Our surface units were restricted even as to their training activities, and any large-scale operation requiring heavy supplies of fuel became almost out of the question. On 7-8 April of this year when the battleship YAMATO was sent with a dozen or more destroyers into OKINAWA, we questioned whether there was a 50-50 chance. Even in getting that squadron together we had a very difficult time getting the necessary 2,500 tons of fuel oil together. But it was felt that, even if there was not a 50-50 chance, nothing was to be gained by letting those ships lie idle in home waters, and besides it would have been contrary to the tradition of the Japanese Navy not to have sent them, even though we could not clearly perceive they had a 50-50 chance of success. That is how acute the fuel situation was in the early part of this year.

Q. What was the situation, let's say, one year preceding that? Were you free to move your fleet about?
A. No, I would not say that we had adequate fuel supplies a year before. I took over the Combined Fleet in May of the preceding year. At that time, however, we had access to the oil in BORNEO and SUMATRA. We were able to obtain supplies directly from the south; so while the stock of oil was almost sufficient for purposes of a fleet, the difficulty was in tankers. I had asked for and obtained approximately 80,000 tons of tankers for fleet use, but we began to suffer damages through submarine operations; and by the time of the SAIPAN operation, the greatest hindrance to the drafting of the operation plans was the fact that we did not have sufficient tankers to support it.

Q. Again with regard to the SAIPAN or the MARIANAS Operations, did the original A-GO Plan contemplate the use of the fleet in defense of the MARIANAS?
A. Yes, use of the fleet was included in those plans from the beginning. But while the possibility of your offensive against the MARIANAS was not ignored or belittled, we thought the probability would be that your attack would be directed more against PALAU, and that was the reason for our adoption of the A-GO Operation Plan, which was more to our advantage because of the shorter distance involved and would eliminate the need of tankers to some extent, which was, as already stated, our greatest handicap.

Q. But if the attacks did come to the MARIANAS, it was intended to employ the fleet from the beginning?
A. Yes, it was intended from the first that if your attack should be directed toward MARIANAS we would have to use the fleet.

Q. Now, in coordination of the effort of the fleet and of the shore-based air, both of which stemmed up to you, what means did you have for quickly coordinating the operations of the two forces at SAIPAN?
A. Cooperation between the land-based air forces and the fleet was extremely difficult. Because of the difficulty of communication, for the two commanders to meet on land was practically out of the question. Staff officers were sometimes dispatched to joint meetings and in some cases staff officers were sent from naval General Staff Headquarters to the headquarters of the land-based air forces; but generally speaking, failure to maintain close communication throughout was one of the main difficulties in the way of adequate cooperation between the two forces. Our communication method had not been developed to the stage where, for instance, surface units could intercept or receive messages from land-based aircraft. One reason for the difficulty in communications was the low efficiency of communications equipment.

Q. Now, in connection with the SHO-GO Operations in the defense of the PHILIPPINES, when did you estimate that our attack there would arrive, and did we arrive in advance of your estimate and with what consequences?
A. I expected that your attack against the PHILIPPINES would commence around August or September, and my expectations in that respect were correct; that is just about when the operations did begin. In regard to the A-GO Operation, we expected the attack May; but the actual attack came about a month later, in June. I stated that I expected your offensive against the PHILIPPINES would commence around August or September; that is not to say that we were prepared at the time to meet that offensive, for the reason that our forces, both Army and Navy, had lost practically all their supporting aircraft at the various operations and it took anywhere from four to five months to replenish the lost aircraft. Since the SAIPAN Operation had taken place in June and July, we were not prepared to start the SHO-GO Operation before October or November; but I felt that you would not wait that long, instead that you would commence your operation against the Philippines around August or September.

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Q. In the SHO-GO Operations again, what losses were you willing to take in the fleet against what gains? In other words, what were you prepared to trade there - losses and gains?
A. As already stated, our Task Force and our air squadron were not ready for operation at the time that your campaign began. We felt that to take the Task Force into LEYTE was to take a big gamble; and while it would not be accurate to say that we were influenced by public opinion, questions were beginning to be asked at home as to what the Navy was doing after loss of one point after another down south, such as MARIANAS and BIAK. So, after having consulted headquarters in TOKYO and having obtained their consent, it was decided to take this gamble and to send the whole fleet into the PHILIPPINE Operations. A part of the fleet at the time was in home waters. That was rushed south in a hurry to take part in this operation with the rest of the fleet, and it was our plant that part of the fleet should be used in an endeavor to draw your Task Force up north; but since without the participation of our Combined Fleet there was no possibility of the land-based forces in the PHILIPPINES having any chance against your forces at all, it was decided to send the whole fleet, taking the gamble. if things went well, we might obtain unexpectedly good results; but if the worst should happen, there was a chance that we would lose the entire fleet. But I felt that that chance had to be taken.

Q. Was the use of the northern force, which you mentioned as a decoy, planned from the beginning or was it a decision of the moment depending upon conditions present?
A. No, that was not a part of the basic plan originally laid down, but it was adopted when the news came that landings had begun in LEYTE. It was not a part of the original SHO-GO Operation Plan.

Q. About the middle of October, we were told that certain numbers of aircraft from Carrier Divisions 3 and 4 were sent to FORMOSA to be land-based. What information was that based on? What was the reason for that?
A. The reason for that order was that many of the pilots had not received sufficient training and therefore, while they could take off from carriers, were not able to successfully always get back to the carrier. Therefore, it was decided to order them to join the land-based force at FORMOSA.

Q. What was Admiral KURITA's mission? Was it to destroy the American Task Force, or the transports, or attack the beachhead? What specific mission; and, also, were there any restrictions placed on him by you, whether specific or implied, as to what losses he could take there? How far could he go in the operation?
A. Admiral KURITA's mission was complete destruction of the transports in LEYTE Bay. In the orders there was no restriction as to damage that he might take. The situation was that, on the afternoon of the 24th, the Second Fleet suffered considerable damage from your air force, so they started to turn back while in the Strait. Thereupon I sent an order from the Combined Fleet worded something like this: "Advance counting on Divine Assistance." The meaning of that order was, while it does not appear in the wording of the orders, that damage could not be limited or reduced by turning back, so advance even though the fleet should be completely lost. That was my feeling when sending that order; consequently I am safe in saying that the Second Fleet was not restricted in any way as to the damage it might suffer.

The reason for my determination when sending that order was the fact that should we lose in the PHILIPPINES operations, even though the fleet should be left, the shipping lane to the south would be completely cut off so that the fleet, if it should come back to Japanese waters, could not obtain its fuel supply. If it should remain in southern waters, it could not receive supplies of ammunition and arms. There would be no sense in saving the fleet at the expense of the loss of the PHILIPPINES. That was my reason for that order.

Q. Then why did Admiral KURITA turn back? What reason did he give in his report to you for turning back and not having gone into the Gulf?
A. The Headquarters of the Combined Fleet at the time was located in JAPAN, and in this operation, as in other operations, while the Headquarters of Combined Fleet indicates the general aim in respect to certain operation plans, questions of detail are left to the local commanding officers. It must have been that Admiral KURITA decided that to advance into the Gulf from that point would not be productive of the results anticipated; consequently, he decided to withdraw.

Q. Under the circumstances as they are now known, in your opinion what that decision of KURITA to turn back a correct one?
A. Looking back on it now, I think that withdrawal was not a mistake. At the time I did not have and Combined Fleet Headquarters did not have information regarding the details of the engagement. Later, when we learned that Admiral HALSEY's Task Force was further south than we thought it was, I believe that Admiral KURITA then would have been within the range of air attack from your Task Force, so that it was not unwise for him to have turned back at that time.

Q. You would not criticize his action now in turning back?
A. I would not criticize.

Q. Considering the operation as a whole - the movement of Admiral NISHIMURA's force through SURIGAO and Admiral KURITA's through SAN BERNARDINO and the employment of Admiral OZAWA in the north - what would you say was the primary cause for the lack of success in that operation?

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A. Our weakness in air, and to that I wish to add the failure of the operation was due also to, really a part of the same answer, the fact that the pilots under Admiral OZAWA were not sufficiently trained. One unexpected result of the decision to send the Second Fleet into LEYTE Gulf was the appearance of the so-called Special Attack Air Corps. That is not to say that the Special Attack Corps were organized then on the spur of the moment. The matter had been talked over among members of air units, not only among staff officers but even among pilots themselves. It had been under consideration because of the feeling that the method of special attack was the only one likely to prove successful in view of the insufficient training which most of these pilots had received. When the news came to the land air forces that the Second Fleet was being sent into LEYTE Gulf, Admirals ONISHI and FUKUDOME, in command respectively of the First and Second Air Fleets, decided that if the surface units are taking such desperate measures we too must take similarly desperate measures, and started the first operation of the so-called Special Attack Force. This was in some ways a somewhat unexpected result from the entry of the Second Fleet into LEYTE. The First and Second Air Fleets were at the time stationed in the PHILIPPINES.

Q. What were the basic reasons for the failure or success of that operation, not the Special Attack, but the whole fleet operation?
A. The fact that we were drawn into the engagement before we were fully prepared, combined with insufficient training of the fleet itself and air weakness as already pointed out.

Q. You mentioned the status of the Special Attack Forces there; what was their objective, the destruction of what - ships or shore points? What was the purpose of the attack by the Special Attack Corps?
A. The principal objective of the Navy's Special Attack Units was your aircraft carriers, while the principal objectives of the Army Special Attack Units were your Task Forces when close by, but more your landing points and transports.

Q. (Lt. Comdr. Wilds) You referred early in the conversation to the threat which you considered our Navy represented from the east early in the war, after JAPAN had filled in her perimeter. How would you evaluate that threat as between carriers, or surface fleet, or amphibious operations?
A. Early in the war I think the submarines were the part of the UNITED STATES Navy which I considered the greatest threat.

Q. Will you, then, elaborate as to the relative threat in your opinion that the carrier force and the surface fleet and our potential amphibious capabilities represented?
A. In positive offensive operations, I agree that aircraft carriers are indispensable, and in landing operations, even land-based air force is not sufficient without the cooperation of the surface Task Force units; so in that sense, I evaluate surface Task Forces very highly, especially where the landing is to be made beyond the range of land-based air units. So we felt that if we could deal a serious blow to your surface Task Force, that would widen the gap between your landing attempts and also shorten the distance between the stepping stones by which you made the advance toward JAPAN.

Q. In considering JAPAN's inability to stabilize and hold the perimeter which had been almost achieved in the first six months of the war, what factors would you say were accountable? That is, was it a lack of bases of sufficient size to build up necessary strength or was it inability to supply the bases? Was it a logistics problem, in other words?
A. I think there was a mistake at the top from the very beginning as to the nature of modern warfare. It a little closer study had been made of the Second World War as it started in EUROPE, especially in the fighting going on between ENGLAND and GERMANY around the MEDITERRANEAN, the fighting that meant so much consumption of material, and if we had laid our plans from the beginning with some sounder ideas as to the nature of modern war in mind, it might have been different. We had at the beginning only 6,000,000 tons of ship bottom, and once the war started, the plan adopted wax to build a million tons annually. That was a puny figure as compared to the amount actually needed, and the same applied as to the other consumption materials, armaments, etc.; entirely too small a scale.

Q. Would you say then that the plan executed by JAPAN was in excess of her capability?
A. As already stated, even the plans that were laid could not be carried out; but the plans to begin with, I think were not accordance with the need of the war.

Q. How did the Japanese Navy expect to end the war? What were its specific expectations concerning the end of the war?
A. I can hardly make a clear statement as to what the Navy expected at the beginning of the war, as I was not in a position where I could acquire such information.

Q. Did you participate in any Imperial Conferences concerning the termination of the war?
A. Yes, after May of this year when I took over as head of the Naval General Staff, I attended Imperial meetings to the end of the war.

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Q. Will you please enumerate those meetings and summarize the discussions and decisions reached?
A. I arrived in TOKYO in my new position May 19. Prior to that, I believe beginning in May, members of the Supreme War Guidance Council had been discussing ways and means whereby the war might be terminated. This so-called Supreme War Guidance Council is composed of six members: The Prime Minister, War Minister, Navy Minister, Foreign Minister, Chief of the Naval General Staff, and Chief of the Army General Staff. The meetings of this group were held on:

6 JUNE, the six members - in addition to the six members, there were numerous others present, including Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, Chief of the Naval Bureau of Military Affairs, also of the Army Bureau of Military Affairs, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and Chief of the Cabinet Research Bureau - discussed what steps should be taken relative to the prosecution of this war. The conclusion of that meeting was that unless some radical measure could be adopted to arouse the people, the nation's war power was bound to decline very rapidly. That is not to say that anyone there expressed the opinion that we should ask for peace; for when a large number of people are present like that, it is difficult for any one member to say that we should so entreat. So the decision was that something must be one to continue this war.

Two days later on 8 JUNE, practically the same members held another meeting, this time in the presence of the Emperor. There was no discussion but merely a report of what had taken place at the prior meeting on the 6th. Independent of these official meetings of the Supreme War Guidance Council, the same six members which constituted the Council were holding meetings with the view to obtaining the services of Soviet RUSSIA at an opportune time. The Foreign Minister was taking a leading part in this and the matter had already been presented to Ambassador MELIK in TOKYO; and at the same time our Ambassador SATO in MOSCOW had been instructed by the Foreign Minister to prepare the ground there for the dispatch of the special ambassador for the purpose from TOKYO to MOSCOW. However, these negotiations, both in TOKYO and in MOSCOW, made no satisfactory headway, and some 20 days passed after the commencement of the negotiations, but nothing was accomplished.

On 26 JUNE, The Emperor called these six members of the Supreme War Guidance Council into his presence and stated that, while it was of course necessary to keep on pushing this war, it was necessary at the same time, in view of the domestic situation, to consider the possibility of bringing the war to a conclusion. What did the members of the Council think of that idea? In reply to the Emperor, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Navy Minister stated that they concurred fully with the Imperial view and that such steps were now being taken to that end. Then the Emperor in turn asked when the Ministers expected to be able to send a special Ambassador to MOSCOW. The reply given was that the date was not certain but hoped that he would be sent before the POTSDAM Conference should be held.

On JULY 10, the Emperor suddenly called our Foreign Minister and stated, "As it is now early July, should not our special ambassador be dispatched to MOSCOW without delay?" The situation was that the Russian Ambassador to TOKYO was reported ill and the Foreign Office was having difficulty in maintaining contact with the Russian embassy here, so it was decided to send instructions to our Ambassador in MOSCOW to propose to submit to the Russian Government our proposal to send a special ambassador there. Our Ambassador SATO in MOSCOW approached the Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs with this proposal, and when asked, "For what purpose are you sending the Ambassador - to ask us to intervene with a view to bringing about peace?", our Ambassador replied that such was the case. That was about the 13th of July that this conversation took place in MOSCOW, and the answer given was that since STALIN and MOLOTOV were both about to depart for POTSDAM, they promised to give an answer upon their return to MOSCOW.

The actual answer that our Government did get from MOSCOW on 8 August was breaking of diplomatic relations with JAPAN, that was the answer. Thus, our efforts to bring the war to an end with the intervention of RUSSIA ended in a flat failure. There were only two people in all of the Navy who had any knowledge of the discussions relating to intervention of RUSSIA; namely, the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff. It may be that, since frequent conferences were being held, some of the others high up in the Navy Department might have had some suspicions; and because I, myself, felt that such might be the case, I stated to my Deputy Chief of Naval General Staff that, although conversations were being carried out relative to the conclusion of the war, that was not an affair with which officers should be concerned. Only with the prosecution of the war should they be concerned at all, for, for them to consider questions of peace would serve only to reduce their morale; and I believe that a similar situation prevailed in the Army Department; namely, that only two officials had definite knowledge of these discussions.

Q. Will you outline the principal points which it was intended would be the basis for seeking peace through RUSSIA? What the terms should be?
A. What the terms should be, while it might have been in the minds of officials in the Foreign Office, did not come up for discussion among us, principally because we thought that it was a matter in which opinions of RUSSIA should be respected. By way of concrete terms, we of course were prepared that, whatever the result, it would be worse than pre-war conditions.

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Q. In effect, then, the Navy was in favor of peace whatever the basis?
A. At the time that peace discussions were taking place, of course we had not heard of the POTSDAM Declaration; it had not come out yet. We did not think, however, that the actual situation, if and when the war should end, should be quite so stern as under the term of the declaration, and the same is true as regards the CAIRO Declaration. We looked upon that as a declaration but not as one whose terms would be actually applied to us. By way of possibility of reducing these terms, if you should continue pushing the war, we would demand of you the heavy sacrifice when your landing operations should commence in HONSHU.

Q. At what time during the course of the war would the Navy have accepted an Imperial Rescript terminating the war?
A. That is very difficult to answer because even on the 15th when the Imperial Rescript to terminate the war was actually issued, even then we found it difficult to hold down the front-line forces who were all "raring to go", and it was very difficult to hold them back.

I do not think it would be accurate to look upon use of the Atomic Bomb and the entry and participation of Soviet RUSSIA into the war as direct cause of termination of the war, but I think that those two factors did enable us to bring the war to a termination without creating too great chaos in JAPAN.

Q. Perhaps my question was not entirely understood by you. I did not mean to direct it to the loyalty of the Navy to the Imperial will, but to get an estimate based on a cold appraisal of the course of the war. At what point in the progress of the war would the Navy have agreed to and would have backed the issuance of an Imperial Rescript to stop the war?
A. It is difficult for me to say whether, apart from the intervention of Soviet RUSSIA, if at any time prior to the actual termination of the war the Emperor had issued a rescript terminating the wary, the Navy would have been willing to say that is not a mistake; because so long as one feels that there is any chance left, it is very difficult to say that the time to quit had already come.

Q. The Admiral referred to the Imperial Conference with the Supreme War Guidance Council of 8 June. What was the Emperor's comment or reaction to the information you gave him at that time?
A. So far as I can recollect, there were neither comment nor questions from the Emperor.

Q. Early in our conversation of yesterday afternoon, in discussing the causes of the loss of the war, you mentioned the spiritual side of the people, that they were not told what they should have been told. Will you develop more specifically what you had in mind?
A. Going back to the early days of the war, I believe that one of the reasons for the failure of the people to be fully prepared for the later stages of the war was the fact that our operations went extremely smoothly in the early period, especially HAWAII and the various southern regions; and while our official announcements came one after another, victory after victory, tended to get the people "victory-drunk" one might say, and it was difficult for the people to get out of that stage, even after the war began to go adversely against us.

As I stated yesterday, I personally believe that the turning point of the war was the Battle of MIDWAY; and at that time I believe that not only the Government and the two services but the people also should have realized that the turning point had come and made up their minds for the future accordingly. Notwithstanding, the general public got the impression that the Battle of MIDWAY was an outstanding victory for us. Moreover, out withdrawal from GUADALCANAL, although that marked a definite disadvantage for the Japanese forces, was publicized as though it had been a grand and sublime operation and tactics on our part. On the material side, although it was known from the start that there would be basically a shortage in resources as the war progressed, the rapid depletion of what we had to start with was not made known to the people as a whole. To be sure, individuals realized that there was a shortage in activities with which they were directly concerned, that is true; but they were not given a chance to find out the overall shortage that was increasing from day to day, because that shortage was kept under cover as a national secret, and the people had no chance to find out how bad the situation was becoming. Because of the failure of the people to acquire such information, it was not possible for them to make up their minds to live out the slogan that was adopted by the Government; namely, "100,000,000 people united and ready to die for the Nation." They could not place themselves in a state of mind to carry out that in their actions.

Q. It is your belief, then, that the people should have been told the facts concerning the course of military operations throughout the war?
A. Of course there were some things that the people could not be told from a standpoint of concealing such certain facts from the enemy, so that it would not have been possible otherwise to tell them everything; but certainly they should have been given a chance through acquisition of more information, at least, to understand how the war was progressing. One of the things that impressed me on your side was the fact that Ambassador Grew, after his return to WASHINGTON, kept warning your people that JAPAN must not be held too lightly and that JAPAN's war strength was very deeply rooted. On the contrary, the situation in JAPAN was that certain information coming from your country would be used by our propaganda organs in just contrary fashion. For instance, the fact

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that more women were joining industry would be pointed out as an indication that your resources were running low, both in material and manpower. In other words, the propaganda policy of the two countries seems to have been just opposite.
Q. Yesterday you referred to your belief that military people should stay removed from politics. By what means did the Japanese Navy create and influence national policy? How could the views of the Navy concerning national policy have effect?
A. The official setup is that the Navy's opinion as to what the Government policy should be or how it should be modified is all expressed through the channel of the Navy Minister. That is the proper and set channel, and that is the way it should always be done. It has been the tradition of the Navy that that channel should be followed and none other; but during the war I think, to my regret, that that was not always followed, that there were exceptions where individual officers endeavored to influence the Government in its establishment of policy.

As I have already stated, the way in which the Navy could bring its opinion to be reflected in Government policy was through the person of the Navy Minister. Throughout the war, not only did the Emperor, but the Japanese people in general, feel the deep concern regarding cooperation between the Army and the Navy. It goes without saying that smooth cooperation between the two services was absolutely essential to success. However, as I stated yesterday, the Army had great political influence and power so that in order to obtain that smoothness, which I considered necessary, the only thing possible was for the Navy to follow the Army's leadership. In that respect the position of the Navy Minister throughout the war was an extremely difficult one; and while I find certain points in the steps taken by Admiral SHIMADA as Minister of Navy, which I consider regrettable, at the same time I feel deep sympathy for the difficult position in which he was placed.

I believe that the period during which Japanese Navy's influence was most effectively exerted in Government politics was just before, during, and after the Russia-Japanese War. The Navy Minister at that time was Admiral YAMAMOTO, (Gumbai), who in addition to being a good sailor, was an excellent statesman and was able through his statesmanship to equip the Navy in preparation for the war, to lead the Navy through the war by laying the foundation for the successful operational plans.

Q. Using hindsight on the war, looking in retrospect on the war which was just ended, how would you invest the Navy's resources in each of the following categories: (1) Carriers, (2) land-based aviation, (3) surface combat ships? In what proportions would you invest the resources available to the Navy?
A. In light of the actual material situation that we faced, I think that we should have devoted more to land-based aviation. The fact is that we did have plans for strengthening aviation, but the plan simply did not carry out. I think that we overstressed the importance of battleships and need not have devoted as much attention to battleships as we did.

Q. Was a single, unified military service, combining the Army and Navy and Air, ever discussed before or during the war?
A. I heard that there were some suggestions of that kind coming from the Army but I know nothing of the details.

Q. Did such a suggestion ever come from the Navy?
A. It is my understanding that the Navy was always opposed to such a change. As an ideal, it may be a good thing to combine the two services under one command which we might call "Defense Force"; but as a practical question, especially under the conditions that prevailed in JAPAN, such a step would have been quite impossible and would only have led to confusion.

Q. Will you discuss more specifically why it was impractical and, as General Anderson says, whether it was considered inadvisable purely because the war was going on?
A. Of course the fact that the war was already going on was one of the factors, I should say; but more fundamentally, if the two were to be combined into one service in JAPAN, the head would probably have had to be an Army man. Under him there would have been created two sections, the Army section and the Navy section; and with an Army man as Minister, it would have been inevitable that the Navy section would have become a relatively weak service.

Q. In any discussions concerning a joint-forces set-up, was a separate air section, combining Navy Air and Army Air, envisaged? What would the status of the air forces have been under the proposal discussed?
A. Even should a single service be formed through the merger of the two services, I believe that so far as the Navy is concerned, the Naval Air Force would have to be attached directly to the Navy in order to effectively cooperate with the surface units. The situation, I think, is very much as that which prevailed in ENGLAND: Although an independent air service exists there, actually its cooperation with the Navy is so close that this independent air service is independent only in name and I think actually could be termed a part of the naval force. That I think is the ideal.

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Q. (General Anderson) Do you mean by that, what the British call their Coastal Command or Fleet Air Arm? The British used a Fleet Air Arm and also had a Coastal Command which also worked very closely with the Navy; the Coastal Command was a part of the RAF.
A. I refer to the Fleet Air Arm. I believe that in ENGLAND there must be a corresponding air force working with the Army; and then in addition, to have an independent land-based air force such as your bombing forces would not be objectionable.

Q. (Lt. Comdr. Wilds) Do you have any further information or comment you wish to make on the discussion we had yesterday afternoon regarding the termination of the war?
A. Continuing with the story of the meetings of the Supreme War Guidance Council, there was no member of that Council who had any fundamental objection to terminating the war, but there was some question raised as to whether or not all the terms of the POTSDAM Declaration would be acceptable to JAPAN. The points upon which considerable discussion took place were three: (1) the question of the Emperor's future position; (2) the question of disposition of war criminals; and (3) the question of JAPAN's future form of organization. (Note by the Interpreter: I think we have often translated the phrase as National Equality.)

On the first point, namely, the question of the Emperor's position, all the members were united in their view that it should be maintained. On the question of war criminals, the desire was expressed by some of the members that the Japanese Government should be permitted to ferret out and try the war criminals; and as regards JAPAN's "future form of National Organization", the desire was expressed that since the present organization of the country was one based upon the deep convictions of the people we should be permitted to maintain the present form. In other words, determination of the form that it should have in the future should be left to the Japanese people and not, for instance, to a plebiscite organized by Allied authorities.

These discussions took place on 9 August and as there was no agreement, a meeting was called in the presence of the Emperor on the 10th at about 0230 in the morning; and the decision was reached there that, subject to the condition that the Emperor's position should in no way be affected, the term of the POTSDAM Declaration would be accepted.

After the meeting held in the morning of the 10th, our readiness to accept the POTSDAM Declaration was transmitted to the UNITED STATES Government through the neutral Governments of SWITZERLAND and SWEDEN. The official reply of the UNITED STATES Government was received on the 13th, but we learned the purport of that reply from a SAN FRANCISCO broadcast on the 12th. The Supreme War Guidance Council reconvened on the 13th and continued the meeting until late at night, discussing the American reply.

On the question of the Emperor's position, the American reply made no direct statement but did state that the powers of the Emperor and the Japanese Government would be subject to the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The main point of discussion at that meeting had to do with the Emperor's position, since it was the conviction of the Japanese people that the Emperor was a living god above whom there could be no earthly being. It was feared that the Japanese people would not readily accept the wording of the reply which placed the Emperor in a position subordinate to that of the Supreme Commander of the Occupation Forces. In practice, of course, it was readily understandable that such would have to be the situation because, being the defeated power, it was understandable that our head should have to be placed in a position subordinate to that of the representative of the victorious powers; but the language as it was worded, it was felt, would be found difficult to accept. So to overcome that difficulty, the suggestion was made that, would it not be possible to have the orders and instructions of the Supreme Commander of the Occupation Forces go directly to the Japanese Government and that those orders would be passed on by the cabinet to the Emperor who, in pursuance of his constitutional right, would carry out the work connected with the termination of the war. However, no conclusion was reached after those discussions and the fear was expressed that, in view of the international relation obtained at that time, the Allied Powers would not accept such a set-up. Therefore, another meeting was held on the 14th in the presence of the Emperor which led to the decision to accept the POTSDAM Declaration in its full form.

The Imperial decision to bring the war to a close was made by the Emperor himself without suggestions from any other quarters. The words that he used on that occasion might be summed up somewhat as follows:

"Continuation of the war does not promise successful conclusion no matter from what angle the situation is considered. Therefore I have decided, without suggestions from anyone, to order the conclusion of the war, as I cannot endure the thought of having to kill tens, evens hundreds of thousands of my subjects, and moreover to have to be called the disturber of world peace. moreover, it is extremely difficult for me to have to turn over to the Allied authorities officers and men upon whom I have depended all this time as though they were part of my own body. But I have decided to endure what is unendurable and to accept the terms of the POTSDAM Declaration."

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He closed his statement by saying that if necessary he would go to the radio and broadcast to the people in addition to issuing the Imperial Rescript and he asked for the continued assistance of the members of the council. It was a very moving scene. Of course, that is just a bare summary of what the Emperor stated on that occasion.

Q. (General Anderson) For the purposes of the record, I would like to get the fundamental or major reasons that dominated the thinking and the conclusion of this Supreme Council that the war should be terminated? What were the factors, what were the reasons, the causes, that were considered and weighted at the time the Supreme Council was debating and considering the matter of terminating hostilities throughout that period? I think the first session began in June, did it not? I want to know what the factors were at that time that caused the Supreme Council to take up initially the matter of finding a solution to the termination of the war. I also want to determine what the factors were that led to final decision to accept the POTSDAM Declaration.
A. May I point out that the discussion of that question commenced some weeks before I assumed command of the Naval General Staff; namely, that those discussions commenced somewhere around the first of May. I was not a member of the Council at the time, so I cannot say with authority; but since it was evident from the early part of the Spring that JAPAN's war strength was begin very rapidly depleted, it is possible that the situation came to the Emperor's attention and that he might have suggested to the Prime Minister or to some other member of the cabinet that such discussion should begin. That is merely a possibility; definitely, I do not know.

Q. We were conducting at that time operations on the surface, we were making invasions, moving ahead on the surface; but also by that time we had begun the air attack on JAPAN proper. How would you list the relative importance of these various military operations in their contribution to the decision on the part of the Supreme Council to surrender: (1) the air attacks against the homeland proper; (2) the surface invasions; and (3) the threat of course of further advances of our surface forces?
A. The fact that the Japanese Navy's surface units had been badly defeated was not generally known in JAPAN outside of the services, so I think that your bombing against JAPAN proper, together with our failure in the OKINAWA Operations, had a great deal to do with the decision to cease hostilities. So far as the Navy's surface units were concerned, it was realized that we couldn't expect much of our Navy once the PHILIPPINES were lost, because of the fuel situation.

Q. You referred to the rapid depletion of military resources. Do you have an estimate as to what form of force that we were employing against JAPAN contributed most toward the depletion of JAPAN's military resources for the continuation of hostilities?
A. Cutting off of our supplies from the south, principally through the loss of shipping bottoms and disruption of transportation facilities in general.

Q. Did you feel that these air attacks, these fire attacks, were contributing in any degree toward the disruption of the remaining military resources?
A. Until this year our main loss in shipping was due to submarine activities; but, especially beginning around April and May of this year, your air raids were the principal cause of our shipping losses.

Q. We know that shipping had become interdicted rather effectively, leaving JAPAN with only the military resources on the homeland with which to conduct her further military operations. What effect was the air attacks, the fire attacks, on the homeland having on the remaining military resources that you had on the homeland proper with which, if you had continued war, you had intended to continue war? How much effect did those operations have on further depleting your resources for continuing war?
A. I cannot give even approximate figures as to the extent of damage done to material in JAPAN proper, but I believe that greater than the effect on the destruction of materials themselves was the destruction of our production equipment by air raids.

Q. Production capacity?
A. Yes, production capacity.

Q. How did you feel that it affected the will of the people to continue to fight? In other words, what effect did these air attacks, these fire attacks, have on the will of the nation to continue war? Did it tend to deteriorate? If so, to what degree?
A. The effect on the people's morale was not as great as we had feared. In other words, while people who lost their homes faced extremely difficult times, it did not develop to the point of wanting to give up the war. To be sure, it had an effect on production because it cut off transportation, and in some cases, no doubt, some factory hands stayed away from factories because of the danger of bombing. That affected production to some extent, but affecting the people's will to fight was not as great as we had feared.

Q. In these conferences leading to the consideration of surrender, what value was put on the air assaults on JAPAN proper? How did they evaluate that when they were considering the matter of terminating war?
A. I do not believe that the question of air raids came up in the minds of the members as an independent question at all; that is there was no idea that we must give up the war to avoid even a single additional day of bombing.

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The main consideration that led to the decision to cease hostilities was, after all, the overall weakening of the Nation's production capacity, loss of material, etc.

I refer to the statement already made regarding the effect on morale and point out that outside of bombed areas, especially in the country, people appeared to be almost wholly unconcerned about bombing as was evidenced by their failure to dig air raid shelters, etc.; so that, taking the country as a whole, the effect on morale was very light.

Q. Was there any attempt at this time to put a value on the cumulative effect of sustained bombing of this nature had it been permitted to continue on for many months, the cumulative effect that such sustained operations would have on JAPAN proper, her capacity to wage war, or to survive?
A. The point that worried me most was the effect of continued bombing on aircraft production. Whereas the year before we were producing over 1,000 naval aircraft alone monthly, in July of this year that production had fallen to around 600, less than half of the previous year; and so far as I could see we were just about nearing the end of our aviation fuel supply, and I could not see how we could possibly procure sufficient aviation fuel after September; and since those two facts, namely, fall in aircraft production and shortage in aviation fuel, were largely due to your air raids, we would naturally reach the conclusion that, if the air raids were to continue for months after that, it would become impossible for us to continue the war.

Q. I want to get from you the naval estimate of their capabilities prior to the opening of the war; that is, the Japanese Navy's capabilities in terms of American capabilities.
A. As a result of the WASHINGTON-LONDON Naval Disarmament Treaties, Japanese Naval strength had been restricted to around 60% of UNITED STATES strength. After those treaties were abdicted [sic] it was, of course, no longer incumbent upon us to maintain that ratio, so we devoted our efforts to the building up of the Navy, quantitatively and qualitatively so that in no case would our relative strength fall below 60% of yours. I do not remember by figures what the relative strength of our Navy was categorically. When we faced the necessity of taking on both the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND in this war, the question of our relative strength with the UNITED STATES became relatively a small question. Never in the history of our Navy were plans ever drafted which envisaged a war with GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES as allied enemies. Consequently it may safely be said that this was not a war in which the Japanese Navy laid down plans which had even a fair chance of success.

Q. After this war became inevitable, after the decision was reached to conduct this war, what generally was the naval war plan for opposing the enemy Navies, American and British? How did you intend to cope with this opposing naval power?
A. As I stated yesterday, I was not in Central Headquarters at the time so that I am not in a position to say what were the plans with regard to equipment and operations against the American and British Navies, but my guess in that since the decision had been made they had to get up and fight with what we had on our hands.

Q. I was wondering if you were informed on the broad general war plans under which they proposed to conduct operations against the opposing Allied naval forces?
A. I wonder whether the emphasis on the Navy was not placed upon surprise attack.

Q. That carries to another question I'd like to ask and that is: In the planned attack on PEARL HARBOR, which apparently was to attack a concentrated target, did the Japanese Navy have any alternate plan for such a surprise attack in the event that there was not such a concentration of force? If the force had been out in the open, was there another plan to be implemented in case this concentrated target was not found?
A. I have not heard of any such plan. If such a force had not been found in PEARL HARBOR, the surprise attack would have been a big gamble.

Q. (Captain Hedding) I assume that in preparing for war in the Japanese Navy, as well as we did in the American Navy, you laid certain basic plans for eventualities. Did you know of those basic plans or are you now fairly familiar with what those plans were prior to the war?
A. Yes. Every naval plan made is submitted to the Emperor for his approval, but I do not believe that those plans are made known very widely even in the Navy, and I doubt whether they are made known even to the Naval Station authorities.

Q. But you were familiar with, more or less, the general planning?
A. No.

Q. Captain OHMAE has outlined from either records or from personal knowledge a basic plan for this war which went about as follows:

To obtain certain areas in the south and to establish a perimeter to protect these resource areas, the perimeter being roughly from the KURILES, the MARSHALLS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO and south of SUMATRA, MALAY, BURMA. Do you feel that the naval resources were sufficient to carry out this broad plan?

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A. I believe that this was one of numerous plans which was too big to be carried out by the resources at our command. Even with the forces which we had to start with, the carrying out of this plan would have been difficult, much more so later when you consider that naval force after all, is consumption goods. As war progresses we suffer losses, and sufficient measures had not been taken, could not be taken in view of shortage of material and manpower, to continually replenish those losses. I felt at the outset that we had over-extended our line when we took in the ALEUTIANS and MIDWAY. I always felt that the line should be made compact and to concentrate the forces that we did have in a relatively narrow area. Because of the necessity of obtaining resources from the south, it was of course inevitable that our lines should be extended as far as JAVA and SUMATRA but not beyond that, down south. It would have been wiser had we kept ourselves to Central PACIFIC, not going further east than TRUK. That is not to say that I would have favored giving up the MARSHALLS to being with, but I would have put in there only sufficient force so as to have delayed your offensive from that region a sufficiently long time to enable us to strengthen the inner line.

Q. We had heard opinions expressed by some of the senior Japanese naval officers that, prior to the war, they felt that the Japanese navy could only operate successfully for perhaps a year or perhaps a year and a half. Would you affirm or deny that opinion?
A. I believe that such was the feeling among high officers, although I know of no changes or expressions of opinion to that effect; each man kept it to himself. I have heard, not directly but through a third person, that Admiral YAMAMOTO expressed as his opinion that "we can carry through for one year some way, but after that I don't know."

Q. Do you think similarly now?
A. Yes, I more or less shared the view that while we might do well enough in the early part of the war for a year or so, after that it would become extremely difficult. It so happened that for two years prior to the beginning of the war I was Chief of the Naval Technical Department at Kenzai Hombu and there was in a position of responsibility regarding the Navy's equipment and ships, and I noticed that there was not always unanimity of opinion regarding the types to be constructed, regarding specifications of ships, difficulty in material. The principal cause of our difficulty in material was our shortage in steel. Our annual supply was about 6,000,000 tons which, as compared with anywhere from 80,000,000 to 100,000,000 tons annually for your country, was an almost negligible quantity, and the difference in our fuel supply was even greater. Our fuel supply was almost out of the question as compared with yours, we being able to produce only around 10% of our annual needs.

Going back to shipbuilding, the difference in opinion regarding categories and specifications arose from the fact that under the WASHINGTON and LONDON treaties we were subject to quantitative limitations. Emphasis had been laid upon quantity so that during the time that I was head of the Naval Technical Department although we were then no longer under treaty restrictions as to tonnage, the same idea of improving quality remained in the minds of our shipbuilding experts, and we used to receive orders from different sections of the Navy for ships of higher efficiency. I felt at the time that now that we were no longer held down by a quantitative ceiling, we should redirect our attention from quality back to quantity and to increase the number of ships, because we could see from experiences of the Second European War, which had already started, that one could not expect to keep ships safely for any length of time. In other words, ships were consumption goods and would have to be replaced rapidly to maintain a standard of strength.

Q. You stated that one of the lessons learned at MIDWAY by the Japanese Navy was that too much emphasis had been placed on the organization of the fleet, which organization gave too much emphasis on battleships, and that as a result of the MIDWAY battle a reorganization was made to place increasing emphasis on carriers as the major effective weapon of a fleet. Would you give your opinion as to the correctness of such statement?
A. Yes, that is true, and the reason for the battleship having held the center of the picture prior to that was the fact that we had the idea there would be important naval engagements, fleet against fleet. But as a result of the MIDWAY engagement, we learned the lesson that battleships as such were not effective weapons unless they had sufficient air support. A similar lesson was learned with regard to destroyers and submarines and methods of construction of those two types were varied after that.

Q. (General Anderson) In the overall plans for the conduct of this war, what were the basic concepts of the Japanese Navy in the coordinated use, as it expanded its perimeter, of land-based aviation to further support and work with mobile surface forces? Was there a plan in this extension of the perimeter to coordinate land-based aviation with floating aviation to increase its effectiveness to defend this perimeter, and did plans envisage coordinating land-based aviation in direct supporting cooperation with fleet Task Forces?
A. Two important naval engagements took place while I was in command of the Combined Fleet in which the whole of the Navy's carrier-based planes were thrown in; and while orders had been that there should be closest cooperation between headquarters land-based air force and carrier-based planes, that cooperation could not be effectively

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carried out owing to the fact that the carrier-based air force was too weak, both in quantity and in quality. We didn't have enough carrier-based planes and the pilots were not highly trained; consequently, cooperation never went well.

Q. What I would like to develop and explore is the Japanese naval concept on the matter of utilizing land-based aviation and working under a canopy of land-based aviation, to increase the capabilities of the naval forces in their operations working within the ranges and the supporting distances of land-based aviation, thereby gaining an increased strength to combat forces coming from the east, from AMERICA, setting up this perimeter of defense?
A. Yes, such an idea was no doubt in the minds of naval authorities, but failure to utilize land-based air forces effectively was attributable principally to weakness of the land-based air forces, and as I stated yesterday the weakness of cooperation between the land-based air forces and carrier-based air forces was the poor communication between the two. Operations in which the two were to cooperate had to be carried out by liaison between the respective headquarters. Our communication system had not developed to a point where there would be communication between the forces at lower levels.

As an idea, of course, we wanted to draw your surface units within range of our land-based planes, but we always had difficulty in bringing that about; and the reason, as already stated, was that we didn't have enough aircraft and pilots were not sufficiently trained. By way of an example, at the MARIANAS, the First Air Fleet was taken down there, stationed at TINIAN Island in preparation for the coming engagement. It had been trained in JAPAN and rushed down there in a hurry, and just got there when MARIANAS Operation started.

Q. Yesterday I understood you to say in answer to a question that you considered surface forces constituted the greatest threat to the Japanese Navy. What do you consider was the most effective weapon that was employed against the Japanese Navy in this war? I'll probably have to clarify that by stating, between surface fire and air fire.
A. By what weapon?

Q. The air weapon or the sea weapon in its effectiveness against the Japanese Navy in attrition.
A. I think that I would have to divide the war into two periods in answering the question. The first half of the war I believe the submarine constituted the most effective weapon.

Q. Against the Japanese Navy?
A. Yes; and the latter half of the war that your air force was the most effective weapon.

Q. I want to ask just one other question. In this operation against MIDWAY which I understand was considered as a very decisive one, changing the capabilities of the Japanese Navy, what was the objective of that operation against MIDWAY? Why, strategically, was that operation launched?
A. I don't know what it was and I can't understand what might have been the object of that. That is the reason I pronounce that an utter failure. I think that, this is just a guess on my part, the MIDWAY Operation was undertaken as one step in the tendency which arose as a result of the outstanding success of the first operations, to extend this scope of activity in all directions, HAWAII on the east and as far west as CEYLON in the INDIAN OCEAN.

If I may be permitted another guess, I think the decision to expand the area of operations so widely might be attributed to a feeling on the part of the Japanese authorities at the time that the state of mind under which you fought the war and the state of mind under which we fought the war were very different, in that to us this was the war for our very national existence, whereas in your case it was merely a case of national honor or perhaps protection of your economic interests in the Far East; and, because to you the war under such conditions would be of relatively slight significance as compared with ours, there might have been a feeling on the part of our leaders that, should the war continue a little longer, you would lose your will to fight, and with that idea we might have continued spreading the battle line.

Q. I was trying to get the evaluation on the strategic significance, or the advantage to the Japanese as they evaluated the taking of this one lone island so short a distance from HAWAII, unsupported by other land masses at all - whether it was one of increasing their security, adding to their strength, or for further exploitation, in other words, as a stepping stone for further advance. You see, this is just one island here, and unless it had some significant relationship to either security or to further offensive operations, we have a little difficulty analyzing that operation.
A. It is possible that MIDWAY, this is just another guess, might have been planned as a stepping stone in preparation for subsequent operations, that is a possibility; but as for getting MIDWAY by way of increasing our security, that is hardly possible because even with MIDWAY remaining in American hands, I do not believe that it constituted such a serious threat to the safety of JAPAN; and the fact that we might get it would not necessarily increase the feeling of security on this side. So it is difficult for me to see what really might have been the object. I have never discussed that question with anybody nor have I heard what the operation was for.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 76
USSBS NO. 379

JAPANESE WAR PLANNING

TOKYO 17 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Admiral YONAI, Mitsumasa; Navy Minister in various cabinets as follows: HAYASHI Cabinet February-June 1937; First KONOYE Cabinet, June 1937-January 1939; HIRANUMA Cabinet January-July 1939. Appointed Member Supreme Military Council, August 1939; Premier January-July 1940; Deputy Premier and Navy Minister in KOISO Cabinet, July 1944; Navy Minister in SUZUKI Cabinet, April 1945.

Interrogated by: Rear Admiral R.A. OFSTIE, USN

Allied Officers Present: Admiral J.H. TOWERS, USN, Comdr. 5th Flt.
Captain T.J. HEDDING, USN
Lt. Commander W. WILDS, USNR

SUMMARY

Admiral YONAI describes the functions of various agencies having major responsibilities in government and for the prosecution of the war, and discusses significant developments of the war and other events leading to its termination.

Q. Admiral, we are generally familiar with your career. We have a brief period missing, however, between the time you were Premier in 1940 and the time you joined the KOISO Cabinet in 1944, and we would like to know what in general your activity was during this period?
A. Practically nothing during these years.

Q. Were you in a position, however, in your associations, to be generally familiar with the trend of thought in the country; perhaps, you might say, the high level discussions that were going on?
A. In the newspaper circles in JAPAN, any person who has once served as Prime Minister or is accorded the treatment as ex-Prime Minister by the Emperor, is looked upon as "Jushin". This Jushin is Senior Statesman and the general impression seems to be that they should know everything that is going on in the upper circles; but the fact is that they are told nothing as to what is going on in the Government or the Supreme War Council. Consequently, whether the trend of the country is toward war or against it, so-called Senior Statesman are in no position to know.

The so-called Jushin or Senior Statesman is a group of persons set up principally for the purpose of getting their advice or opinion when, upon the resignation of a cabinet, the question of a new cabinet comes up; their advice is asked. This group of so-called Senior Statesman is rather a strange existence. It has no power of decisive action; it is merely consulted by the Privy Seal. Such information as they give him may not be adopted at all. It is merely an advisory council, and there appears to have been some misunderstanding on the part of the general public as to the exact function of this group.

Q. Today we wanted to get a clarification of some features of High Command planning and decision and to get your opinion on certain features on which we naturally assume that you are a principal authority.
A. As I have already stated, having been completely out of touch with Government activities until I joined the KOISO Cabinet toward the end of July 1944, I am in no position to know anything, and consequently can make no statement in regard to plans prior to this time. Subsequent to the end of July 1944, however, of course from my positions of Deputy Premier and Navy Minister I am ready to tell you what I know.

Q. In our questioning we will take note of that. Admiral, would you give us, please, a brief description of the functions of the Supreme War Guidance Council and its manner of operation?
A. The Supreme War Direction Council was made up of two parts: (1) Regular members consisting of six - Prime Minister, Army Minister, Navy Minister, Chief of the Army General Staff, Chief of the Navy General Staff, and Foreign Minister; (2) In addition, however, they had authority to bring any other Cabinet Minister as a regular member whenever necessary. In addition there was what might be termed the Secretariat which had no direct responsibility for anything that took place in the meetings of the Council. In addition, while they were not regular members, there also attended the meetings of the Council these two: The Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff and the Deputy Chief of the Naval General Staff. The fact that the two Deputy Chiefs of the General Staffs attended and not the Vice Ministers is explained by the fact that this custom arose when formerly, the Chief of the Army Staff and the Chief of the Navy Staff were Imperial princes, and it was felt that the attendance of the deputies was necessary to assist; and this custom was maintained even after the two Imperial Princes were replaced by Commoners.

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Q. Now, how were problems or questions presented to the Supreme Council? What was their method of functioning?
A. Discussions of this Supreme Council were not confined to discussion of operational plans; rather, the greater emphasis was perhaps placed on other phases of the war effort - measures for maintaining fighting strength, especially the economic side, and discussion of the question as to whether, under the present situation, the war could be successfully prosecuted.

Q. And those questions were presented by some outside medium or by the Chiefs of staff, or from what source was material received for consideration?
A. It all arises within; that is, among the six regular members. In other words, nothing is submitted from the outside.

Q. I gather then that the six regular members are the only ones who have what you might call "voting power"; or do the extra members have any power in this direction?
A. Yes, the six regular members have the voting power. They adopt any measures that they consider necessary. However, this is not final, for with relation to any matters of great importance, the subject matter, once adopted by the Supreme Council, is passed on to the Cabinet and unless also passed by the Cabinet, it does not become final.

Q. Does the Supreme War Direction Council have direct access to the Emperor in matters of difference of opinion or dispute?
A. In case the discussions are considered to be of special importance, the Council requests the Emperor to attend its meeting. Of course, it is left to the members of the Council itself to determine whether or not a question is of sufficient importance to warrant the Emperor's attendance; and there were occasions upon the initiative of the Emperor, informal meetings of the Supreme War Direction Council were held. One instance in point of an informal meeting of the Council being held upon demand of the Emperor was, I believe, June 6 when a meeting was held to discuss whether it would be possible to continue this war. Another one of similar nature, I believe, was the 22nd of June.

Q. Would you give us a brief description similarly of the Imperial General Headquarters, Dai Honei; how it worked?
A. As contrasted to the Supreme War Direction Council, the Imperial General Staff confined its activities to questions of operations. Consequently, members of the Supreme War Direction Council frequently knew nothing about operation plans.

Q. But was the Imperial General Staff an organized body with a secretariat functioning continuously, or did it simply become known as such a body when it met, yet was more or less of a permanent organization for the period of the war? How were agreements reached in these two bodies, or one or the other as you may see fit to talk of; by voting or by what means?
A. This is with reference to the Imperial General Staff, what is discussed and adopted within the Staff is known only to the two Chiefs. Certainly, prior to the adoption, it is known to no one else; and frequently, even after adoption, it is not made known to the others. Once a question is adopted there it may be passed on to the Supreme War Direction Council which in turn discusses whether the execution of such a plan is possible or not, but not always.

I believe that any misunderstanding regarding the nature of the Supreme War Direction Council will be removed if you will look upon it as a liaison organ between the military and the cabinet. It's name tends to create the impression that it is sitting at the top of the pyramid which is the national war effort, but I think it is a misnomer because it really was more of a liaison organ between the military and the government.

Q. And so far as war direction is concerned, the Imperial General Staff would be a more influential body?
A. Yes, so long as questions of operations are concerned, decidedly so.

Q. How were decisions actually reached in the Imperial General Staff? Was it a matter normally of unanimous agreement or just what was the physical means of arriving at decisions?
A. Within the Imperial General Staff as far as questions of Army operations are concerned, if the Chief of the Army General Staff says that we will do this, that is the end of it; and so far as the Navy operations are concerned, if the Chief of the Navy General Staff says we will do this, that fixes it; and should there develop difference of opinion between the two chiefs, then nothing can be accomplished.

Q. Isn't the makeup of the body such that there was no majority vote to settle an important question?
A. There is no such. The question of majority could not arise. The situation is very similar to that of a Cabinet meeting. It isn't a question of a majority vote. If they can't obtain agreement on a question, it means there is a lack of unity.

Q. Questions then would not be put directly to the Emperor in case of a definite difference of opinion?
A. In case of failure to arrive at an agreement, if the question is of very great importance, it may be passed on to the Emperor for his decision, and such was the situation at the end of the war. In the period just prior to the end of the war, such a situation did arise. While there was general agreement to bring the war to a termination, there was disagreement on certain detailed points. So such were presented to the Emperor with two possibilities, asking for the Emperor's decision on one or the other; and he gave his decision.

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Q. Now with reference to the Supreme War Direction Council again, was there any difference in the influence of the Army or of the Navy in this body - the weight or strength?
A. It is very difficult to make a general statement on that. I myself had to speak up quite strongly at times in the meetings of this War Direction Council. Generally speaking, it might be said that the Army and Navy have quite different complexions; and should a proposal be made by the Army representative which I considered not proper, I never hesitated to oppose it; and some strong arguments did take place at these meetings.

Q. I assume, particularly in the latter stages of the war, that there would be some fundamental differences that were very difficult to reach agreement on. I wonder if you could give us briefly the substance of the principal discussions?
A. The fundamental question on which there was a definite split of opinion between the Army and the Navy was the question as to whether we should continue the war or bring it to an end. This difference began on a period as early as June and cropped up in the meetings of the Supreme Council on the 6th and 22nd of that month. But I think that it was really in the early part of August that this split became definite - the Army insisting upon continuing to the very last, whereas I expressed the belief that there is a limit to all things, that in view of both the world situation and conditions within Japan, the time had come to terminate the war.

Q. In this connection, was the Army fully cognizant of the Navy's condition and the Navy fully informed and cognizant of the Army's position, strength, etc., throughout?
A. At least the Navy knew the situation as regards the strength of the Army that was left, and I believe that the Army authorities were cognizant of the situation with regard to the Navy strength. The reason for my so stating is that modern war is not a question of the Army fighting it or the Navy fighting it. It depends upon total strength of the nation.

Q. Then what was the relative influence, if you could express an opinion on the subject, the relative influence of the Army and the Navy on national war policies?
A. This is toward the end?

Q. At any time during the war.
A. Politically?

Q. Politically, yes.
A. On political influence, definitely the Army. The Army had some power which it was impossible for us to analyze or measure. I believe that such a situation prevails in other countries.

Q. Did that power extend to the point where it directly affected Naval operations, the scale of effort that the Navy would be able to employ?
A. Toward the end of the war I recall that a situation arose in which the Navy felt that it should take control of our air forces, but we were not able to realize that. Although I cannot cite any concrete instances, I felt that the Army's political influence did have some effect on the Navy's operations.

Q. And the intent of the item you mentioned, that is to take over direction of all the air forces, was to coordinate that force to employ it against the greatest threat?
A. There might have been differences of opinion on this point, but I at least felt that the Navy was superior to the Army in all phases of air activity, and therefore felt that it would be to mutual advantage for the Navy to take control of all aspects of air effort.

Q. What was the Army's answer? What was their primary objection to such action? Was it pride?
A. Yes, I think it boils down to a question of its pride. They didn't like to give up part of their own forces to the Navy. I believe that there were numerous instances where the Navy felt that this or that should be the principal objective of a combined air attack. The Army would disagree, considering that some other point should be made the butt of a combined attack; and because the chain of command of the two forces was completely divided, the Navy could not persuade the Army to bring their air force to support the Navy effort, and vice versa. That was one of the reasons for the Navy's insistence that it should be given control of the entire air force. Toward the end of the war there was one instance when the Navy's view was accepted to a certain degree by the Army, as a result of which the Army agreed to place a part of its air force under the command of the Combined Fleet. This took place at the time of the OKINAWA Operations when the Army placed its Sixth Air Force under the command of the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet.

Q. Was the difference of opinion on the employment of air forces one of a question of wide dispersion of objectives on the part of the Army, or what specifically was the difference of opinion as to how they should be employed?
A. I believe that the difference arose from the difference between the Army and the Navy as to what your next probable objective would be. In other words, as one instance, the Navy might think that you would probably attack OKINAWA next, whereas the Army would guess that your offensive was going to be directed against FORMOSA.

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Q. Admiral, just a question here to place your status a little more accurately. When plans for a major naval operation had been approved by the proper agencies, to what extent did the Naval Minister exercise control over the manner of conduct of that operation?
A. The actual situation was this: There had to be close coordination of the Chief of General Staff and the Navy Minister before any big operation plan was adopted, because two chief functions of the Navy Minister are (1) to make it possible for front-line forces to carry out any plan of operations that is adopted, and (2) is to maintain control within the Navy Department. Since the Navy Minister has control of the material, properly speaking, it was up to the Chief of Naval General Staff to consult the Navy Minister prior to deciding upon any major operation. This was my own personal private opinion, but I held the view that the Naval General Staff should be brought within the Navy Department under the Minister.

Q. Then did the Navy Minister from time to time, following the course of an operation, exercise any control, advisory or direct, while an operation was progressing?
A. Once an operation is started, the Navy Minister exercised no further control.

Q. Referring now to the basic war plan, as expressed by the scope of the initial advances - and here I am asking your opinion unofficially since you were not directly concerned at the time, but realizing your broad general understanding of the war potential of Japan - what were your views as to the correctness of the initial plan and the capability of the Japanese nation to meet the probable demands?
A. I think to this day that it was not a proper plan in view of the situation, our national war strength.

Q. That is, you thought initially that it involved too much expansion, too big a plan; or what was your thought?
A. I can't give you any details, I don't know them; but I think it should not have been undertaken at all, and I firmly believe that, had I been Prime Minister at the time, we probably would not have had this war.

Q. In the early stages of the war, Admiral, recognizing again that you were in an unofficial position, what was the opinion as to the major threat to holding the perimeter or to holding the southern resources area that is both together, the southern resources and the perimeter? Where did this major threat come from-Russia, China, American forces to the east, or what?
A. Would you be satisfied with the answer that the American strength was the principal threat, or do you want this broken down?

Q. Well, let's have it broken down.
A. To express this from the opposite side of the picture, the part where we felt the safest was where your forces could not reach.

Q. Well, then, what did you think we would do? What were those areas we could not reach? What did you feel we would do toward this perimeter? What would we do which would constitute this threat?
A. I don't know whether this will be a direct answer to your question but I will put it this way: Once the war started we had to get the resources from the south, especially oil, and the points down south which were the furthest away from your Naval Bases were the easiest for us to capture. When you took the PHILIPPINES, that was the end of our resources, in cutting off the southern supplies.

Q. But in the early stages, what was it that JAPAN had to defend against; what force?
A. You mean the task force, submarines, or what?

Q. That, or was it the Army forces in Australia, forces in India?
A. The United States Fleet. So long as the United States Fleet didn't interfere, it was easy for us to get hold of southern supplies.

Q. Would you then say that this was primarily a naval war, or did the Army command have greater or equal responsibility, as looked at from the Japanese side?
A. I think it was the Navy's war.

Q. We have been given to understand from various discussions with prominent Japanese Government officials that the coordination between the Army and Navy was not all that could be desired. If you are in agreement with that, what were the, principal points of friction? Was it personalities or was it war aims, or what was the reason for the lack of cooperation?
A. Fundamentally I believe it was a difference in education between the Army and Navy. The Army starts its education with young boys of 15 and 16, and from that early age teaches them nothing but war. Therein I believe lies the fundamental difference between the ideas of the Army and Navy officers. As a result, it follows as a matter of course that the Army develops a narrower vision, can't see as broadly as the Navy officers.

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Q. I gather that when you say they are taught nothing but war, you imply that they taught nothing of the broad international picture?
A. Yes, I believe not teaching them anything outside. This is, of course, merely my feeling on the matter. I do not make the statement by the way of criticizing the Army.

Q. Admiral, we would like to have your opinion, and discuss it as you will, on what you consider the turning point of the war, the occasion or the situation where there were definite indications of the doubtful successful conclusion of the war?
A. To be very frank, I think that the turning point was the start. I felt from the very beginning that there was no chance of success, but of course this is not an answer to your question. Once the war had started, I would pick either MIDWAY or our retreat from GUADALCANAL as the turning point, after which I was certain there was no chance for success. Later on, of course, it was the loss of SAIPAN followed by LEYTE, and I felt that that was the end.

Q. Why do you pick MIDWAY and why do you pick the retreat from GUADALCANAL?
A. I pick MIDWAY principally from the naval standpoint because of the heavy fleet losses suffered there. GUADALCANAL, on the other hand, I pick from a more general point. When we had to retreat, taking the whole situation, I felt that there was no further chance of success; and our defeat at LEYTE, of course, I felt was tantamount to loss of the PHILIPPINES.

Q. What do you consider the major effects on the Japanese naval war potential of the U.S. operations? Which part of our total operations had the major effect on the naval war potential? Just what was the major U.S. effort that had the greatest effect?
A. Very broadly speaking, the thing that was really fatal to JAPAN, was the fact that the "ocean-crossing" operations of the United States were carried out with complete thoroughness and according to plans. In somewhat more detail, JAPAN was subjected to heavy blows from after the Battle of MIDWAY, and from submarines subsequent to LEYTE Battle. Moreover, the U.S. Air Force was much greater in the PHILIPPINE Area than had been expected.

Briefly, it was the fact that America's trans-ocean operations were carried out completely according to schedule which hurt JAPAN the most.

Q. In the late Autumn of 1944 the Japanese radio broadcasts told of tremendous losses inflicted upon the U.S. Navy off FORMOSA. The Japanese staged a major naval offensive in the PHILIPPINE Area from the 23rd to the 25th of October. Did the Japanese Navy really believe that heavy losses had been inflicted and expect to meet a much weaker U.S. Fleet than they did meet?
A. I don't remember, of course, what figures were given in those broadcasts from Tokyo in the Autumn of 1944, but it is possible that there was some exaggeration in the figures announced. But generally speaking, I think that there is bound to be some differences in the judgment of those who actually take part and the judgment of those who see it from the Central Headquarters, especially in the case of air engagements where most of the damage is inflicted by our air force. Reports from different flyers would often overlap. This is not known of the front, so mistakes sometimes creep in without the deliberate intention to exaggerate.

Q. What I really meant was: Did that - we'll say, exaggeration - have any real effect on the subsequent operation in October? Was there a belief in the High Command that, when the operations were ordered, the American Task Forces were less strong than perhaps was the fact?
A. I don't know whether there was actual exaggeration.

Q. Can you express an opinion as to the relationship between the naval war potential at any time in the war and the national war potential, expressed as a comparison between them?
A. As a direct answer, I believe that whenever the Navy suffered a heavy blow, that naturally brought down the nation's fighting power because of the necessity of replenishment of what the Navy had lost. But generally speaking, the general situation is perhaps the reverse; that is, change in the nation's fighting power directly affected the Navy's fighting power. In this war, however, balance between those two was completely lost, principally owing to shortage in material. The question of education and training came into some extent, but principal. cause of loss of balance between the nation's fighting strength and the Navy fighting strength was shortage of materials.

Q. Do you feel that General TOJO had a full understanding of the implications and the problems, etc. of naval strength and naval warfare?
A. I wouldn't venture a guess on that. It is impossible to make a statement without asking General TOJO first.

Q. At what stage of the war would the Navy High Command, as it existed at various periods and had it been free to make the decision itself, have taken steps to terminate the war?
A. I believe that the first occasion would have been, in looking at it solely from the Japanese side, I believe that the first opportunity would have been the month in which the war was begun; that is, after the victories of HAWAII, SINGAPORE, etc. The second, I believe, would have been after the loss of SAIPAN, and after that it appeared to be a question of being dragged along, fighting on by inertia, etc. That is looking at it from only the Japanese side, but even if the Japanese Navy had proposed to end the war, I don't know how it would have ended. That depended on the attitude of the enemy.

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Q. Would the younger officers of the Navy, alone, have been willing to accept such an action, say after SAIPAN? Just an opinion, of course.
A. That is a question. It would appear that it's impossible to end a war until the proper time has come. A certain inertia moves it along until that time does come.

Q. How much influence in delaying the conclusion of the war would you say the ultimate hope of German victory had?
A. So far as I am concerned it had no effect at all because I felt from the very first that GERMANY had no chance. I believed so firmly from the very outset that GERMANY had no chance that I was one of those who strongly opposed a tie-up with GERMANY; and because that feeling of mine was known in certain quarters, I was forced, more or less, to resign from my position as Prime Minister, because the feeling in those quarters was that with Admiral YONAI as Prime Minister there was little chance of the tie-up with GERMANY materializing.

Q. At what time did the overall military situation first give rise to positive statements and expressions of opinion in the High Command, high government circles, that the war should be brought to a conclusion?
A. Beginning in May of this year.

Q. And what were the significant factors of the Japanese war potential at that time? What were the major deficiencies at that point? How capable was Japan of continuing war?
A. About that time it was definitely realized that our economic strength was just about depleted as to the military side. I could not point out any particular thing that was significant because everything had just about come to the bottom level. To explain in a little more detail - the question of oil shortage, for instance, had become acute because after the loss of the PHILIPPINES not a drop came from the south. On the shipbuilding situation, the capacity had fallen immensely owing to the steel shortage. In the field of manpower, while we appeared to have plenty so far as number was concerned, for some reason that did not appear in production, that is, we were not able to use the manpower effectively; so that by May I personally felt, that, looking in whatever direction, we had come to the end of the road.

Q. Would you give us the substance of any discussions you had with Admiral SUZUKI, after joining his cabinet, on the matter of taking positive steps to terminate the war?
A. The SUZUKI Cabinet was formed early in April of this year and at that time it was difficult for me, or I think for anyone else, to broach the subject of war conclusion to anyone. But after Admiral SUZUKI became Premier I did speak with him in an abstract way, saying to him "I don't think we can continue with this much longer". The first concrete step taken with the idea of terminating the war was probably the instruction given to the Coordination Bureau within the Cabinet to make an investigation as to the present state of various war materials. As a result of that investigation, the situation became more and more clear that continuation of the war was going to be difficult. In May I felt personally that it was going to be extremely difficult, and by early June I felt that it was absolutely no sense in continuing this any longer.

I would like to repeat something I have already stated about Senior Statesmen because there does seem to be so much misunderstanding about the position and character of this familiar body; even among our own people there appears to be much misunderstanding. As I have already stated, it has no power whatever, does not discuss questions of national policy. Because of misunderstanding in JAPAN itself, by some people, Senior Statesmen have been placed in rather difficult position, and I wish to make this repetition to remove any possible misunderstanding on your part.

One thing that was a great source of worry to me at the end of the war was this: The Imperial Rescript was issued on August 14th and broadcast on the 15th; and being deeply concerned for what young officers in the Navy might do, I took every possible measure to forestall possible untoward incidents, and I believe that I was more or less successful, and the same may be said with regard to the Army. But after all, the thing that made it possible to avoid serious trouble of any kind was the power of the Emperor rather than anything that I or the Army were able to do. During my long career as Navy Minister I probably never worried so much as I did during the period from the 14th to about the 23rd of that month, and I felt greatly relieved when we were able to go through this period without any serious trouble in the Navy.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 77
USSBS NO. 387

OPERATIONS OF 22ND AIR FLOTILLA IN MALAYA

TOKYO 14 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Captain SONOKAWA, Kameo, IJN; Flight Leader of Genzan Air Corps in Genzan, Korea from 1 September 1941 to 1 April 1942.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, USN.

SUMMARY

This interrogation is concerned with the operations of the Japanese naval land-based aircraft during the occupation of British MALAYA. Captain SONOKAWA was commanding officer of the Genzan Air Group and has furnished a detailed and interesting account of the sinking of HMS REPULSE and HMS PRINCE OF WALES.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. What naval air forces were based in SAIGON Area at the beginning of the war?
A. There were three units comprising the 22nd Air Flotilla:

GENZAN - 36 BETTYS, 12 in reserve
MIHORO - 36 BETTYS, 12 in reserve
KANOYA - 27 BETTYS, 9 in reserve

Also attached directly to the 22nd Air Flotilla were 18 fighter planes (six in reserve) and six reconnaissance planes. GENZAN was situated at SAIGON, MIHORO located about 20 miles north of SAIGON, KANOYA Force established about 60 miles southwest of SAIGON.

Q. During the invasion of the PHILIPPINES and the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES what was the mission of the 22nd Air Flotilla based in SAIGON?
A. We had no participation in the PHILIPPINES Operations. We acted in direct support of the MALAYAN invasion and gave slight support in the BORNEO and JAVA Operations. For operations in the PHILIPPINES and NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES the 11th Air Fleet, less the 22nd Air Flotilla, was responsible. The GENZAN Air Group, which I commanded, later became the 755th Air Squadron.

Q. Was the GENZAN Air Group controlled by the 11th Air Fleet?
A. Yes, all naval air forces at SAIGON were under the 11th Air Fleet at TAKAO.

Q. What was the state of training of GENZAN Air Group?
A. It was the best unit in the 11th Air Fleet, which was manned with very experienced and competent pilots.

Q. What type of attack did you specialize in?
A. Bombing and torpedo attacks against ships, also night operations.

Q. Was special torpedo attack training given?
A. Yes, each pilot was trained with live torpedoes.

Q. Explain the basic torpedo tactics used by you.
A. Although the ordnance department claimed that the torpedoes could be dropped at an altitude of 500 meters, we found by experience that only 10 per cent would run properly at 200 meters and 50 per cent at 100 meters. Consequently an effort was made to drop at from 20 to 50 meters. Since the aircraft torpedo was dropped at short ranges, the low altitude also afforded protection because of depressing limit of AA guns. Pilots were instructed to attempt to drop the torpedo in such a manner that it struck the ship immediately after it leveled off at set depth. Of course conditions varied but a standard drop was made from a range of 600 to 400 meters, at a speed of 160 to 170 knots and at an altitude of from 20 to 50 meters. The aircraft torpedo was armed immediately after striking the water. It weighed 800 kg. and had a 145 kg. warhead. The above tactics were used by our carrier planes against your LEXINGTON. After the Battle of the CORAL SEA the size of the warhead was increased to 220 kg.

Q. How were the Repulse and Prince of Wales first located?
A. We had previous intelligence reports that the British battleships were probably in the area but did not know for sure. On 8 December the ships were photographed in SINGAPORE Harbor. There were no air searches on 9 December because of bad weather. However, on afternoon of 9 December the ships were sighted by a submarine which gave their position (approximately 7° North, 105' East, course 000 degrees).

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Q. Upon learning of the position of the two ships, what action was taken?
A. We received the first sighting report from a submarine at 1600, 9 December. The message was originated at 1400 but not received at the 22nd Air Flotilla Headquarters until two hours later. At that time we were in the process of loading bombs for an attack on SINGAPORE Harbor. We re-armed with torpedoes as quickly as possible. This was not finished until 1800 and although it was getting dark we decided that in spite of difficulties we would attempt a night torpedo attack because it was feared that the REPULSE and PRINCE OF WALES would attack our invasion transports. In order to cooperate with the aircraft and sink any damaged enemy ships, the HARUNA and KONGO were also ordered to make contact if possible. Due to bad weather the aircraft were unable to locate the enemy ships and returned without mishap about midnight. At 0315, 10 December a contact report was received from a second submarine which gave a new position indicating that the ships were heading south and returning to SINGAPORE. At 0600, 10 planes (GENZAN, two 60 kg. bombs) were launched to conduct a sector search for the enemy ships. About one hour later the striking force, composed of 88 aircraft (27 bombers, 61 torpedo planes) was ordered to proceed to the best estimated position of the enemy ships. The striking group was organized into 9 plane flights which proceeded south along the 105th meridian as soon as they rendezvoused. Because of reduced visibility the search planes did not discover the enemy ships until after beginning the return leg. At 1100 the contact was broadcast to the striking group and headquarters.

Q. Describe the method of attack. Who controlled the attack?
A. The attacks were controlled by the flight leaders and were ordered according to the situation. The general plan was to attack continuously, leading off with a bombing attack from 2500 meters by the GENZAN Group. They were followed in turn by the MIHORO and KANOYA Groups as soon as they arrived. The first attack began about 1130.

Q. Approximately how many planes attacked each ship?
A. The planes divided their attack approximately as shown below:

  PRINCE OF WALES REPULSE
  Bombers Torpedo
planes
Bombers Torpedo
planes
Total
GENZAN group ................................ 9 9   9 27
MIHORO group ................................ 9 9 9 8 35
KANOVA group ................................   6   20 26
Total ................................... 18 24 9 37 88

Q. Why were more torpedoes directed at the REPULSE than the PRINCE OF WALES?
A. The first attack by the GENZAN planes was successful in slowing the REPULSE to such an extent that the pilots were attracted to the crippled target. It was originally planned to concentrate on the PRINCE OF WALES.

Q. Estimate the number of hits received by the British ships.
A. The REPULSE was hit by one or two bombs and about 12 torpedoes. The PRINCE OF WALES was hit by one bomb and 10 torpedoes. I am not sure about the bomb hits.

Q. How many aircraft were lost?
A. A total of 4 aircraft were lost during the attacks, one by the GENZAN Unit and three by the KANOYA Unit. I think their (KANOYA) loss was caused by the high altitude they used to drop the torpedoes. Since they were the last to attack their losses should have been less.

Q. Did all planes of the striking group take part in the attack?
A. No, a few bombers became separated and attacked a British minelayer, also one bomber formation made a premature drop. The leader dropped by mistake and everyone followed suit.

Q. What were the weather conditions at the time of attack?
A. Weather was clear over ships; some cumulus at 500 meters.

Q. At what time did the British ships sink?
A. REPULSE sank 1230, PRINCE OF WALES about 30 minutes later.

Q. What was the location of the sinking?
A. The scene of action was about 50 miles east of KWANTAN Airfield (4° N, 104° E). I think the ships were separated about 5 miles when they sank.

Q. What happened after the attack?
A. After the attack one plane was left to observe results. He remained on station until both ships sank. During this time ten BUFFALO fighters arrived but the observing plane managed to escape. Japanese fighters arrived too late to take part in the action. Six or seven bombers were reloaded for the second attack but before they could take off word was received of the sinking.

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Q. What was the general operating condition in the SAIGON Area so far as airfields, technicians, etc. were concerned?
A. Supplies of fuel, parts, etc. were very good during MALAYAN Operation; also the maintenance was excellent. Furthermore, the type of pilot we had was high standard and during the whole MALAYAN Campaign my unit lost only two planes, one at PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE battle and one at SINGAPORE. We always had full strength of 36 planes.

Q. What was the gist of the operation order for the MALAYAN Campaign so far as aircraft were concerned?
A. There were two missions: one was offensive, to support operations in MALAYA, British BORNEO, and JAVA; second was reconnaissance of the South CHINA SEA. We did not support land operations in MALAYA because that was an Army job, but we were ordered to attack the British Fleet at SINGAPORE.

Q. What Army air forces were available in SAIGON Area to support the MALAYAN Campaign?
A. About 200 planes.

Q. What mission was assigned Army planes?
A. Direct cooperation with the MALAY Landing, the Navy didn't cooperate directly at all.

Q. What effect did this tremendous success have on your future planning?
A. One result was the adoption of my conception that torpedo bombing at 20 meters was more efficient. Second result was the emergence of the conception that the airplane was more powerful than the ship. We had a conception that the aerial torpedo was very effective and so we increased torpedo training. Also the morale of the air personnel was raised very much. However the Japanese still did not fully appreciate air power. Failure to recognize value of air power was one of the greatest causes of our defeat.

Q. What missions did the 22nd Air Flotilla at SAIGON perform in the occupation of British BORNEO?
A. While our basic directive was to support and participate in North BORNEO Operations, the landings and operations there were so simple that there was nothing for us to do; so actually we didn't do a thing.

Q. After the MALAYAN force moved from SINGAPORE down to BATAVIA, did the 22nd Air Flotilla participate in any way in the JAVA and SUMATRA Occupation?
A. We had nothing to do with the SUMATRA Operation but cooperated in the JAVA Operation in two ways. One was escort of convoys to the landing point west of BATAVIA. Second way was to attack combined naval units coming out of BATAVIA to resist the landing forces.

Q. In the meantime, did you search and do escort work in the southwest area during December, January and February?
A. Until middle of January 1942 we patrolled South CHINA SEA; after that time we patrolled the JAVA SEA.

Q. How far to the eastward did you patrol the JAVA SEA?
A. Patrolled the western part of the JAVA SEA to center of JAVA.

Q. What were your total combat losses in aircraft in these three squadrons up until the capture of JAVA?
A. Altogether GENZAN lost two, MIHORO one, KANOYA three.

Q. Did you make any attacks on American submarines in this area?
A. Never sighted any.

(Note: The remaining part of this interrogation covers operations during the Allied move toward the PHILIPPINES in 1944.)

Q. On 1 August 1944 what forces were assigned to the 23rd Air Flotilla?
A. After August 1944 the 23rd was a maintenance unit with no planes.

Q. From 1 August 1944 until February 1945 did the 23rd Air Flotilla continue to act as a maintenance and upkeep unit?
A. Yes, until February 1945 our function was merely maintenance and defence. Defence was carried out by anti-aircraft guns not by planes. However, the Army had heavy-bombers based at KENDARI for attacks on MOROTAI.

Q. What bases were under your command?
A. We had only two bases, KENDARI and AMBESIA (15 miles south of KENDARI).

Q. Who maintained the other bases in the CELEBES Area?
A. 13th Air Fleet.

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Q. Were the aircraft operating from these bases Army or Navy?
A. Army.

Q. Were there any naval land-based aircraft in the CELEBES-BORNEO Area after 1 August 1944?
A. No, these were the only bases used and they were for maintenance. At BALIKPAPEN the 13th Air Fleet had fighters for defensive work. 13th Air Fleet Headquarters were at SINGAPORE.

Q. What other forces were controlled by 13th Air Fleet?
A. BALIKPAPEN, 381st Squadron - 70 fighters; SINGAPORE, 331st Squadron - 10 fighters plus about 20 carrier type bombers. About 90 training planes were scattered through SINGAPORE and JAVA Area.

Q. Was the mission of these planes at SINGAPORE and BALIKPAPEN purely defensive?
A. I know for certain the planes based at BALIKPAPEN were for defense. The mission of the planes of the 13th Air Force is not certain.

Q. Did the Navy at that time (Fall 1944) abandon bases around JAVA SEA Area?
A. 13th Air Force was using them, but we were in the process of abandoning the fields and were getting rid of all the planes which were operational and could fly away.

Q. What aircraft in the BORNEO-CELEBES Area were responsible for the defence of MOROTAI, BRUNEI Bay and TARAKAN Area?
A. The Army. The Navy maintained certain bases. The 7th Air Army was responsible for the defence of MOROTAI. No Navy planes were available, only defense personnel on the spot.

Q. Did any of the 11th Air Fleet or the 22nd Air Flotilla have any previous combat experience in CHINA?
A. The whole 11th Air Force in its entirety participated in air attacks on CHINA, based at HANKOW and attacked CHUNGKING. This was July and August 1941 before basing at FORMOSA.

Note:

When furnishing details concerning the PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE action, Captain SONOKAWA was assisted by Commander SHIGEMURA, intelligence officer of the 22nd Air Flotilla.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 78
USSBS NO. 889

EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY, 2 NOVEMBER 1943

TOKYO 16 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Vice Admiral OMORI, S. IJN; Commander-in-Chief. RABAUL Assault Force, 15 October 1943-15 November 1943.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

SUMMARY

Detailed account of Japanese operations at the Battle of EMPRESS AUGUSTA Bay, 2 November 1943, resulting in sinking of SENDAI (CL) from shellfire and HATSUKAZE (DD) from collision. Minor damage to HAGURO, MYOKO (CAs), SAMIDARE and SHIRATSUYU (DDs). Japanese attempt to stop U.S. landings at EMPRESS AUGUSTA Bay, during BOUGAINVILLE Occupation, thwarted by U.S. cruiser-destroyer action.

Establishment of bases in BOUGAINVILLE Area accelerated neutralization of RABAUL. Losses sustained in attempt to hold southern perimeter seriously effected defense of the Central PACIFIC Area.

Navigation track chart, Battle of EMPRESS AUGUSTA Bay submitted.

Q. Give a description, including ships present in the Battle of EMPRESS AUGUSTA Bay, 2 November 1943.
A. Our operations during that period commenced on 31 October. The ships that were employed varied slightly due to arrivals and departures from RABAUL. It was one of our weak points because we were not able to train together. However, it was necessary because we had to maintain a continuous supply line to RABAUL.

At 1000, 31 October, I received orders to get underway to intercept an American Task Force that had departed GUADALCANAL and was steaming up the SOLOMON ISLANDS. We did not know its destination but it was my opinion that it was SHORTLAND ISLANDS. We got underway at 1500, 31 October and proceeded down ST. GEORGES Strait towards the TREASURY ISLANDS. The following Eighth Fleet ships were present:

5 S (CA) MYOKO (F), HAGURO, Vice-Admiral OMORI, S.
3 S (CL) SENDAI (F) Rear Admiral IJUIENE, S. and (CL) NAGARA and 2 ,DD's.

Two observation planes were sent out from the MYOKO and one from HAGURO. They searched for the U.S. ships but due to bad weather were unable to find them. The planes returned to BUKA that night while the ships retired toward RABAUL at slow speed.

At 0030, 1 November, we received a report that American ships were near BUKA, so we turned to the north to intercept them. By the time that we approached SAND Island we had no further contact report, so turned northwest again, returning to RABAUL and anchoring at 0900, 1 November.

Immediately upon returning to RABAUL, headquarters there notified me that American forces were landing at Cape TOROKINA. I was then ordered to take a force and make a counter-landing at MUTUPINA Point Wand near TORKO. 1000 military personnel were then being loaded upon 5 destroyer transports. At 1500, 1 November, I got underway with the following ships:

5S (CA) MYOKO (F), HAGURO. Vice Adm OMORI.
10S (CA) AGANO
(DD) HATSUKAZE
WAKATSUKE
NAGANAMI
3rd (CL) SENDAI
(DD) SIGURE
SHIRATSUYU
SAMIDARE
5DD (Army personnel transports)

After reaching ST. GEORGE'S Channel I received a despatch that there was a delay in loading the military personnel, so was forced to wait until 1830 before all ships rendezvoused. Due to submarine activity in this area I did not like this delay. Furthermore, it later affected our operations because the destroyers were old types which

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limited our speed. This prevented us from regaining the time. As soon as all ships joined up we proceeded on course 160 degrees at 26 knots. Just after leaving ST. GEORGE'S Strait a U.S. submarine was sighted. In order to avoid it, we took a course to the south which caused additional delay in reaching our destination. The three reconnaissance planes which we had launched the day before came out from BUKA and gave us cover and search during the passage.

A time schedule of the main events of the battle is as follows (All time -9):

1 November

1920: SENDAI attacked by one U.S. plane about 6° 30' S, 153° 30' E. No damage received. Apparently a large search plane, type not remembered. The original plan was to land the troops before dawn, 2 November. In view of the initial rendezvous delay, the additional delay due to avoiding the submarine, the limiting speed of the destroyer transports 26 knots, and the fact that we were sighted by the American plane, I recommended that the counter-landing not be attempted, but that our combatant ships attempt to destroy the American transports unloading in the vicinity of EMPRESS AUGUSTA Bay.

2230: Approval of plan received. Five destroyer transports returned to RABAUL. The remaining ships increased speed to 32 knots and proceeded to a point south of SAND Island.

2330: HAGURO attacked by U.S. plane off Cape MOLTKE. One bomb hit received amidships. Opened up side plating and reduced speed of formation to 30 knots. Due to darkness, the type of plane was undetermined.

2340: HAGURO reconnaissance plane sighted an American Force consisting of 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers about 50 miles from the beach halfway between TORKO and MOLTKE.

2350: Changed course to engage U.S. Force.

2400: Just after changing course information was received that reconnaissance plane had dropped flares over EMPRESS AUGUSTA Bay and found many transports unloading troops.

Changed course again towards EMPRESS AUGUSTA Bay to engage transports.

2 November

0045: SENDAI sighted U.S. Force of 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers about 10 km. off port bow. Eighteen torpedoes were launched by the SENDAI and its destroyers. Changed course 160° to 180°. Received report that 2 torpedo hits had been made.

0050: U.S. ships commenced firing. SENDAI received many hits, thought to be from CA's, and became unnavigable. In avoiding fire of U.S. ships, the destroyers SAMIDARE and SHIRATSUYU, which were with the SENDAI, collided. The collision occurred while in a turn just after firing torpedoes. Due to the damage received in the collision, these two destroyers were only able to navigate at 14-15 knots. Since they could not maintain sufficient speed in combat, they turned in toward the beach of BOUGAINVILLE, then proceeded back to RABAUL arriving there at 1300, 2 November.

0100: Just after collision, SAMIDARE attacked by gunfire from U.S. destroyer. 3 hits received. Not much damage.

U.S. Forces still not definitely fixed in position. MYOKO fired starshells but were apparently duds. No illumination resulted. MYOKO under fire of U.S. ships. HATSUKAZE (DD) also under fire, turned to the left to avoid, then in turning right to regain position in formation collided with the MYOKO. MYOKO apparently cut HATSUKAZE in half. One portion floated along port side of MYOKO damaging main deck structure and tearing off 2 torpedo tubes.

HAGURO received six 6" hits. 4 of them were duds. One man killed. 5 men wounded. Minor fires started.

Due to collision and general evasive action, Japanese force now separated into three distinct groups: Fifth. Cruiser Squadron (MYOKO and HAGURO) to the southwest, Tenth Cruiser Squadron (AGANO and 3 DD) in the center, Third Destroyer Squadron (SENDAI and 3 DD) to the northwest.

0113: MYOKO (F) sighted U.S. Force for first time bearing 080° T. CruDiv 5 changed course from 180° to 160° to close range. Opened fire on U.S. Force.

0120: MYOKO launched 4 torpedoes. HAGURO launched 6 torpedoes at U.S. Force.

0127: Received report that 1 torpedo hit leading U.S. cruiser, 2 torpedo hits on second U.S. cruiser, 2 torpedo hits on third U.S. cruiser. Shell fire hits also reported on U.S. Force.

0128: Changed course to 180° T.

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Plate 78-1: shows Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, 2 November 1943, Annex A.
Plate 78-1: shows Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, 2 November 1943, Annex A.

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0137: Issued order for all ships to retire to RABAUL. This decision was based upon several factors. The definite composition of the U.S. Forces was never established. The analysis of reports indicated that there were at least 7 heavy cruisers and 12 destroyers opposing us. I had lost one cruiser by shell fire, one due to collision and two additional destroyers out of action due to collision. The MYOKO had lost 30% of its torpedo tubes. Our formation speed was reduced to 26 knots due to bomb damage of the HAGURO. We had exhausted our supply of flares. Aircraft flares did not seem effective. The HAGURO had received six 6" hits although four of them were duds. In addition I felt that I should retire by 0100 in order to be outside of the radius of dive-bombers by dawn. This radius was considered 250 miles.

0140: Cru Div 10 launched 8 torpedoes at leading cruisers but it was at extreme range.

0154: Cruiser Division 10 reported 1 torpedo hit on a U.S. cruiser.

0200: SENDAI sank.

1300: Arrived RABAUL.

1500: RABAUL attacked by about 200 B-25's. Attack directed at airfields and installation. No ships reported lost or damaged.

Summary of losses:

1 (CL) SENDAI sunk from gunfire. 20 men killed, 300 missing. A number of men reached BOUGAINVILLE on rafts. I also ordered a submarine to the area. The submarine rescued some personnel including the commanding officer. About 20 of the Third Destroyer Squadron Headquarters Staff personnel were killed by shellfire.

1 (DD) HATSUKAZE sunk as result of collision. All personnel lost.

2 (DD) SHIRATSUYU and SAMIDARE damaged due to collision.

1 (CA) HAGURO received minor damage from shell fire.

1 (CA) MYOKO received one 6" hit from cruisers, and structural damage from collision.

Q. What caused your unusual number of collisions?
A. Lack of training in night operations. By the time of this battle we had lost about 40 destroyers and about 6 cruisers from the fleet that operated in the RABAUL-SOLOMNS Area. In order to maintain our bases we had to substitute ships from other fleets. These ships never had an opportunity to train together. Sometimes, as in this action, they would report in the afternoon and be engaged in an action the same night. We had some modified aircraft radar sets in this action but they were unreliable. I do not know whether the sets or the operators were poor, but I did not have confidence in them.

Q. What effect did this action have upon your plans?
A. I do not think that this action by itself was too important. However when considered with the other actions of this campaign, it appeared to me to be the climax of your advance up the SOLOMON ISLANDS. This advance was a cleverly conceived strategic plan which we were not prepared to counter in force.

After this battle you were able to establish bases on BOUGAINVILLE which permitted you to maintain constant air assault upon RABAUL, which prevented us from providing support and air cover to our bases on NEW GUINEA and NEW BRITAIN.

We had thought that your counter-action against the EMPIRE might come from the south. We planned to use RABAUL as a main point of the NEW GUINEA-BISMARK-SOLOMON perimeter defense. By your constant advancement of airbases through the SOLOMONS you were able to neutralize RABAUL without actual assault. During 1943 we attempted to hold this line at all costs. It was very expensive. We lost most of our best pilots, many valuable ships and many well trained military personnel that we were unable to replace.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 79
USSBS NO. 390

BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAIT

TOKYO 18 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Commander NISHINO, Shigeru, IJN; Commanding Officer of the Japanese destroyer SHIGURE in the Battle of SURIGAO STRAIT on 25 October 1944.

Interrogated by: Lieut. Comdr. J.A. Field, Jr., USNR.

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY

Commander NISHINO is the only surviving commanding officer of the force commanded by Vice Admiral NISHIMURA, which attempted to force the southern entrance to LEYTE Gulf on the morning of 25 October 1944. His discussion of the planning and execution of this operation gives valuable information on the condition of the Japanese Navy at the time of its last desperate battle.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Would you tell us what ships were in Admiral NISHIMURA's Force?
A. The Second (battleship) Squadron composed of YAMASHIRO and FUSO, the flag being in the former, plus MOGAMI and four destroyers; these were MICHISHIO, ASAGUMO, and YAMAGUMO from DesRon 1, and SHIGURE, of which I was commanding officer.

Q. In the SAIPAN engagement, did SHIGURE operate as a part of the Second or Third Fleet?
A. The Second Fleet.

Q. Had FUSO and YAMASHIRO been in either the Second or Third Fleet in the MARIANAS engagement; if not, where were they?
A. Both were in the Combined Fleet; they were in the INLAND SEA at the time of the MARIANAS Operation, I am not sure why but I think it was for training.

Q. MOGAMI was a Second Fleet ship all the time?
A. Yes, and participated in the MARIANAS engagement.

Q. In regard to the SHO-GO Plan, when did NISHIMURA's force learn of its mission in the defense of the PHILIPPINES?
A. They arrived in LINGGA on 10 October and on the 20th we received documentary orders to participate in the SHO-GO Operation.

Q. Are you sure they arrived at LINGGA on the 10th and left on the 20th? I believe you left LINGUA for BRUNEI on the 17th or 18th.
A. I think that possibly you are right on your dates, I now remember being at BRUNEI Bay when we received the documents.

Q. Who issued the operation plan which was received by you at BRUNEI Bay?
A. Evidently NISHIMURA received the order from KURITA, not from the Combined Fleet Headquarters, and on the basis of this order, NISHIMURA issued his own operation order.

Q. You now believe, Commander, that this plan was received in BRUNEI Bay and not in LINGGA?
A. I am positive it was at BRUNEI Bay.

Q. Before you received this plan at BRUNEI Bay, in your own mind had you expected to operate with NISHIMURA's force separately, or to operate in KURITA's fleet?
A. We knew in general that we were going to operate in the LEYTE Area, but did not know in what capacity. We came up to BRUNEI with the YAMASHIRO and in general knew we were to proceed in this area but didn't know exactly in what capacity. We knew we were going to operate in general with the Second Fleet, but the fact there was going to be a division into two forces was not known until later when we received the operation plan.

Q. When you got the operation order what was your assigned mission?
A. The orders were to reach LEYTE Bay at dawn on the 25th, at 0530 in the morning; the mission was to attack immediately surface forces there as well as transports which were attempting a landing. (NOTE: The time used by Commander NISHINO throughout this interrogation is one hour behind that kept by U.S. forces, e.g. the ETA at LEYTE given as 0530 was scheduled for 0630 our time.)

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Q. Was there a choice between surface forces and transports, was either one given preference?
A. The first job was to attack the transport force. If we were fully occupied with that we would not bother with the warships. The primary mission was to destroy the transports.

Q. What opposition did you expect inside the Gulf?
A. I do not remember too clearly; in general, the advance information was that you had two or more battleships, five or six cruisers, ten or more destroyers, and eighty transports.

Q. Did the operation order which you received at BRUNEI include the battle plan?
A. Yes, it did.

Q. Will you draw the cruising, approach, and battle dispositions?
A. (See Annex "A") In the change from approach to battle disposition, the two destroyers screening YAMASHIRO fell into column astern of the two leading destroyers. This disposition was suitable either for gun or torpedo attack.

Q. Was a conference of the commanding officers of these ships held before leaving BRUNEI Bay?
A. Yes.

Q. In general what matters were discussed at this conference?
A. We were told to look out for a shoal in northern part of LEYTE Gulf. We determined to do our best. Then we had a few drinks. The Captain of YAMASHIRO and the Admiral had already talked it over at LINGGA so it was already decided, and they did not participate in the discussion.

Q. At the time of this conference what knowledge did you have of the overall plan including coordination of the forces of Admiral KURITA, SHIMA, OZAWA, and NISHIMURA?
A. We knew that SHIMA and the Fifth Fleet were coming down to help us, and there was some discussion about joining up with him; however, SHIMA was senior to NISHIMURA and therefore they couldn't cooperate. NISHIMURA did not want to be under the command of SHIMA.

Q. What were his reasons for not wishing to subordinate himself to SHIMA?
A. To the best of my knowledge NISHIMURA was older than SHIMA and had more naval and battle experience, in spite of that SHIMA was his superior; probably nothing more than a personal antipathy. In my opinion, however, we should have joined forces.

Q. We have been told that one reason they did not cooperate was that SHIMA did not have full plans on the operation, that he had been ordered there as an afterthought, and therefore, although he was senior, he did not have enough information to command. Is that correct?
A. I have not heard of that. I do not know the real reasons for the failure in cooperation but merely give my opinions.

Q. What did you know of the movements of KURITA relative to your own?
A. I was not on the Staff but I am fairly certain NISHIMURA must have known.

Q. But did you yourself know?
A. I knew KURITA's general plan because I was in on the meeting. I knew that KURITA was supposed to approach by SAN BERNARDINO Strait and rendezvous with our force off SULUAN Island on the 25th, after we had attacked according to our particular mission.

Q. What time was the rendezvous scheduled?
A. I do not remember the time; it was soon after dawn because we were supposed to enter the Gulf at dawn, and KURITA was to attack just off SAMAR at this time.

Q. Was it not intended that KURITA was to enter the Gulf, also, to attack transports?
A. When I referred to attacking the enemy off SAMAR, I meant a provisionary objective; that is, if an enemy was encountered, they were to attack. I think their primary objective however was to attack you in LEYTE Bay, and probably after the NISHIMURA attack in the same area. According to the best of my knowledge, NISHIMURA was to enter the Gulf and attack first, then go out to the rendezvous point, then KURITA was to go in.

Q. While at BRUNEI Bay, at this conference was it believed that NISHIMURA's force was strong enough to force an entrance into the Gulf against the expected opposition?
A. We thought we would succeed, but even if we did not the plan was to attack in the Bay regardless of the enemy strength. According to the estimate of the situation we would be able to force the Strait, except for a possible excess of strength on your part in heavy cruisers. I thought the balance was evenly matched.

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Plate 79-1: shows C Force Disposition at Battle of Surigao Strait, Annex A.
Plate 79-1: shows C Force Disposition at Battle of Surigao Strait, Annex A.

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Q. What did you know of the projected movements of Admiral OZAWA in the northern force?
A. I knew no details, but in general I thought that OZAWA's job was to come down from the north and in an indirect way cooperate with KURITA, possibly engaging American forces in this area (indicating area east of LEYTE and SAMAR).

Q. Did you at that time or later have any information on the location of our Task Forces?
A. We had occasional reports of American Task Force from patrol planes but in this particular part of the operation we were not concerned with your Task Force.

Q. After the attack on the transports and the rendezvous with KURITA what was your plan for retirement? Were you and KURITA to retire together or separately?
A. I do not know the details of any withdrawal plan; they must have had one but I do not know what it was.

Q. For example, you do not know whether your force planned to withdraw by SURIGAO Strait or by SAN BERNARDINO Strait?
A. I do not know.

Q. When did NISHIMURA's force leave BRUNEI?
A. At 1500 on the 22nd, we left BRUNEI Bay.

Q. Had KURITA's Force previously departed?
A. I think KURITA's force left at 1000. I am certain KURITA left on the same day, but before we did.

Q. What course did you follow to LEYTE?
A. (See Annex B).

Q. What was the purpose of these detours en route?
A. Following our usual practice of avoiding submarine patrol areas, and although we had no specific information at this time, from previous experience we made a wide swing to the westward from BRUNEI before turning east. Then while passing through the SULU SEA, our course was diverted to the north in an attempt to avoid the air search from MOROTAI.

Q. What was the speed of advance during this approach?
A. 18 knots.

Q. What was your first contact with American forces?
A. About 22 or 23 carrier-based planes attacked on the 24th at 0800. The FUSO received one bomb in the region of the catapult which caused a fire. Her planes were destroyed, I am not sure whether there were two or three, and the fire raged for about an hour. I do not know the casualties. I think the aviation gasoline caught fire. The SHIGURE received a direct hit on the No. 1 turret, an armor piercing bomb which exploded in the turret and killed five and wounded about six. This bomb hit on SHIGURE had no effect on speed or navigability, but forced them to borrow personnel to man the gun, and the gun was inefficient; it was not put out of action, but we had to borrow radar personnel to man the gun. The FUSO, so far as I know, was not seriously affected by the hit.

Q. No other hits on any of the other ships?
A. No, and no near misses either. As far as I could see, the planes dove on FUSO pulling out over SHIGURE and did not attack other ships. (See Annex A.)

Q. Did the planes in this attack fire rockets?
A. I did not see any.

Q. Did this attack slow you down behind schedule or have any serious effect on future plans?
A. No.

Q. Was this the only air attack of the day?
A. No more air attacks, no untoward incidents until arrival at SURIGAO Strait.

Q. Do you know if a report of that attack was made to the other forces?
A. NISHIMURA sent a report to KURITA. This report, so far as I know, simply said that FUSO and SHIGURE were attacked, light damage, no effect on navigability.

Q. What information did you have at that time or later during daylight of the 24th on the position of Admiral SHIMA's fleet?
A. We received word on the 24th that SHIMA's force was coming south in the SULU SEA.

Q. Did you ever sight it or communicate with it?
A. No.

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Plate 79-1: shows track of C Force enroute Leyte, Annex B.
Plate 79-1: shows track of C Force enroute Leyte, Annex B.

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Q. Did you believe SHIMA would be astern or ahead of you, and why?
A. I do not know. We thought they were astern, but I do not know where or why. There was no plan as to how far behind SHIMA was supposed to come, but I do know they were supposed to follow.

Q. During the afternoon of the 24th, what information if any did you have of KURITA's progress?
A. We received word that Admiral KURITA's force was having a difficult time due to bombing attacks, and that he had changed his plan of going through SAN BERNARDINO Strait and had withdrawn back on his same course; at which time KURITA dispatched a signal to TOYODA informing him that for the above reasons he could not make passage according to plan. However TOYODA sent an answer to the effect that NISHIMURA and KURITA were to proceed according to the original plan.

Q. Did SHIGURE receive both KURITA's message and TOYODA's reply?
A. Yes, received both messages.

Q. Did the delay caused by KURITA's retirement have any influence on your action? For example, did you slow your advance?
A. NISHIMURA's force continued its cruising speed according to plan without any regard for events as they happened to KURITA.

Q. Did you feel that the message from TOYODA saying to advance applied to them as well as KURITA?
A. The message came directly from TOYODA, but NISHIMURA was simply an information addressee.

Q. You said your time of arrival was 0500 or 0530; at what point were you supposed to be at this time in the morning?
A. We were to be at the southern entrance to SURIGAO Strait at 0530.

Q. And this was the plan scheduled in the operation order?
A. That was all Admiral KURITA's order.

Q. What time did you reach that point?
A. At 0130 in the morning.

Q. Why did you get there four hours early?
A. I do not know.

Q. Do you have any knowledge of a message sent from NISHIMURA to KURITA, perhaps about 2200 on the 24th, informing him that the hour of arrival had been advanced?
A. I am pretty sure that NISHIMURA must have dispatched such information, although I do not know when, because it was standard procedure during the day to advise KURITA of our position at certain times, so KURITA must have received it. For example, NISHIMURA reported the morning air attack and gave our position at that time.

Q. So far as you know, advancing the time of arrival by four hours was the decision of Admiral NISHIMURA alone, is that correct?
A. I am pretty certain that it was NISHIMURA's own decision. I think it may have been due to the fact that NISHIMURA was an old style Admiral and preferred a night engagement to a day engagement.

Q. The original plan, however, had contemplated a morning daylight engagement?
A. I think it probably was planned to have a day battle. Actually NISHIMURA's time of arrival here was not according to the plan.

Q. What were your own expectations? Did you yourself expect a day or night battle after arriving at SURIGAO?
A. I know that NISHIMURA was the type by reputation, the sort of fellow who would prefer to fight a night battle. I originally thought there would be a day battle as a result of KURITA's order.

Q. Was the speed of 18 knots raised as you made your final approach?
A. At midnight we increased speed from 18 to 20 knots. I think it was planned to maintain 20 knot speed until we reached the objective.

Q. What was the best speed of FUSO and YAMASHIRO?
A. 23-24 knots was top speed of the FUSO and YAMASHIRO.

Q. When did you assume the approach disposition instead of the regular daytime cruising disposition?
A. About 2000 on the 24th the MOGAMI and the three destroyers, ASAGUMO, YAMAGUMO, MICHISHIO, were advanced to reconnoitre ahead of the main force. My belief is that they approached to within a couple miles of PANAON Island and then returned to rejoin the remainder of the force; at 2330 they rejoined.

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Q. What was the purpose of this reconnaissance?
A. Previous routine air patrols had given us the idea that possibly there was a danger of enemy ships being active in this area; this was the reason for sending them out to make certain such ships were not there.

Q. Do you know at what speed they were advanced?
A. About 23 to 26 knots probably. At 2045 what were originally thought to be four American torpedo boats, later on the quantity increased, were sighted southeast of the formation at a range of between 6000 and 8000 meters, sighted by the deck watch. Upon this sighting SHIGURE, which was directly ahead of the two battleships at a distance of 2000 meters, fired flares, as a result of which the torpedo boats were plainly visible. They closed in to a distance of about 2000 meters. At this point the three ships executed a turn movement toward the torpedo boats in order to present a smaller target. I am fairly certain that torpedoes were fired by these boats, but no tracks were seen and no hits. Soon afterward, left hand turn was again made to resume course and the formation proceeded. The three ships fired a heavy barrage at the torpedo boats and I saw what I thought might have been one torpedo boat destroyed. These torpedo boats followed us until the entrance to SURIGAO Strait. Although we could hear their inter-ship telephone all the time, we were not able accurately to determine how many boats there were. They did not again attack.

Q. Are you sure that the first contact with torpedo boats was west of CAMIGUIN Island?
A. To the best of my memory, it was to the west of that island; I am uncertain because the conditions for determining position were not good.

Q. Is the time pretty certain, if not the location?
A. Now that you bring it up, there may be an error of an hour.

Q. What was the weather and visibility at that time? Were you navigating by radar?
A. Weather was bad with rain but the sea was calm.

Q. Did the squalls interfere with navigation?
A. Somewhat; we did not navigate by radar however. The visibility ranged from a low of 5000 meters to a high of 10,000 meters. Sometimes due to the squalls we were unable to see the mountains.

Q. Did you know you were being shadowed by night flying aircraft at that time?
A. I did not know that.

When the three destroyers and MOGAMI returned from their patrol and rendezvoused at 2330 approximately, we then formed the approach disposition. At 2400 speed was increased to 20 knots. At 0130 we passed through the entrance to SURIGAO Strait, and at approximately 0200 three or more American destroyers were sighted to the north-northeast at a range of 8000 to 10000 meters, approaching on a southerly course. Shortly after the sighting, these destroyers changed course and went back where they had come from. (See Annex C.)

Q. During the rest of the approach, were there any attacks by torpedo boats subsequent to the ones you mentioned before, and was there any damage?
A. No further torpedo boat attacks and no hits.

Q. So up until the approach of the three American destroyers, no attacks and no damage?
A. That is correct. Immediately upon sighting the destroyers at 0200, searchlights were employed and the battle opened. All our ships opened fire. As far as I know, these destroyers did not fire at all. I am sure they did not fire torpedoes, and if they fired any shells, they were very few.

Q. By their maneuvering did they appear to be attempting a torpedo attack? If so did the Japanese ships attempt evasive action?
A. I did not see them that close, I only saw their funnels. There was a possibility but they seemed too far away. At 0215 at a distance of 9,000 to 12,000 meters we saw, through a smoke screen to the northwest, the funnels of what we thought was one cruiser and two or more destroyers, also heading south.

Q. Did you fire on this second group?
A. Shortly after this second sighting some of the ships opened fire on these new forces, but due to the poor visibility they were unable to sight the target very well; and although SHIGURE attempted to aim by radar, we could not differentiate between the ships and the land, we just got one merged reaction on the screen. We fired regardless but I think it was very ineffective.

Q. Did the American ships in the second group launch torpedoes or open fire?
A. The second American force was inactive, fired no shots and no torpedoes.

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Plate 79-3: shows C Force at Battle of Surigao Strait, Annex C.
Plate 79-3: shows C Force at Battle of Surigao Strait, Annex C.

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Q. Still no damage of any sort?
A. No. At 0235, immediately after assuming battle disposition with SHIGURE the last destroyer in column, torpedo attack was received both from port and starboard sides. Hits were registered on the first three destroyers; the third destroyer YAMAGUMO sank, the MICHISHIO and the ASAGUMO were hit and though they did not sink were unnavigable and fell out of the disposition. The hits that sank YAMAGUMO came from port. The SHIGURE took evasive action and avoided all torpedoes. This was approximately easy for SHIGURE since at the moment of the attack we were still heading northeast in the transition from approach to battle disposition. I think the torpedoes which passed close to us came from the west but I am not sure. I did not see the hit which registered on YAMASHIRO but those who did told me she received a torpedo hit amidships, from which side is not known, evidently hitting the magazine for the ship exploded and broke in half. No damage was inflicted on FUSO and MOGAMI.

Only torpedoes were used, there was no gunfire seen from American ships. Admiral NISHIMURA issued commands by wireless telephone; we received a communication from NISHIMURA: "We have received a torpedo attack. You are to proceed and attack all ships."

Q. We heard from a member of the staff of Admiral SHIMA that they intercepted a telephone message from NISHIMURA to reverse course to avoid torpedo attack, do you recall any such message?
A. I received no such message.

Q. During these various attacks by American destroyers, and up to this message you just mentioned, did Admiral NISHIMURA issue any new instructions for the conduct of the battle?
A. No.

Q. That leaves FUSO, MOGAMI and SHIGURE still untouched, is that correct?
A. That is correct. I increased speed to 26 knots after the torpedo attack, at which speed SHIGURE maintained a northerly course for a time without any sightings and without knowing my exact position. I then made a complete turn and proceeded south for a very short distance, as I was concerned about the whereabouts of YAMASHIRO. I went back to find out what had happened to YAMASHIRO and to get orders if possible; then made a second turn and proceeded north again. MOGAMI and FUSO were still continuing north at this time, and at 0255 I gave up the search for the YAMASHIRO which had been for the purpose of finding out what had happened to the flagship and also the possibility of changing the flag to my ship. At 0255 I determined there was no more use looking for the YAMASHIRO and decided I must go to the van of the force. We were unable to make telephone communication with YAMASHIRO. While searching for YAMASHIRO, the lookout informed me he had sighted what he thought was the YAMASHIRO sinking. I did not attempt to pick up survivors, but shortly after this information proceeded to continue the battle. I was able to maintain communication with the FUSO.

Q. Did FUSO take charge of the operation?
A. The Captain of the FUSO, Captain BAN, took charge. At the time of my turn north at 0255 I did not know the position of the FUSO and MOGAMI relative to me, this was only discovered later.

Q. What orders did Captain BAN issue for the conduct of the battle?
A. No orders at all.

Q. How did you know he was in command.
A. On the basis of prior knowledge that BAN was senior officer next in line, I assumed that command had fallen to him, However, at no time did I communicate with Captain BAN on the FUSO nor he with me. I made radar searches but was unable to locate the enemy force.

Q. Could you locate your own ships, FUSO and MOGAMI, on your radar?
A. If they did I did not hear about it. I heard and saw vague flashes of fire in LEYTE Gulf but we got no reaction on the radar screen and made no location. At 0313 or 0315 being unsuccessful in finding the enemy, and determining that the rest of our force had been annihilated, I decided to withdraw without receiving orders from anyone. (Commander NISHINO was shown the plot of this battle reproduced as one of the plates in the CinCPac publication, Operations in the PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS, October 1944, and stated that he remembered sighting HIBUSAN Island before reversing course, and that he believes he advanced farther up the Strait than this chart would indicate.)

Q. Was your ship under gunfire at any time?
A. I was receiving a terrific bombardment. There were so many near misses that the gyro compass was out. The ship was constantly trembling from force of near misses, and the wireless was out.

Q. At 0310, shortly before you turned, you said you saw FUSO and MOGAMI afire. Did they appear to be out of the action or were they continuing northward at this time?
A. MOGAMI's course was south and FUSO headed east.

Q. Was FUSO dead in the water or still underway?
A. I saw hits register on the FUSO and at that point I saw big explosions and she appeared unnavigable. before this point, however, FUSO had been firing at American ships to northward.

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Q. At 0310, when MOGAMI was sighted on fire heading south, was she still receiving gunfire?
A. MOGAMI was under constant heavy fire when we sighted her.

Q. Did you launch your torpedoes in the general direction of the American ships, or had you already launched them, or did you take them back with you?
A. I had not fired any torpedoes during my maneuvering in the Strait in search of YAMASHIRO and my later return northward. I had received torpedo attacks but no hits. At no time did I myself fire torpedoes because I was not able to find any enemy ships; I did not fire any torpedoes before going south. At about 0315 SHIGURE received a 23cm. hit on deck aft which penetrated to an oil storage tank but which did not explode.

Q. Was this at the time you were turning or after you had turned south that you received this hit?
A. I think it was just after turning south.

Q. That was the only hit SHIGURE sustained during the engagement?
A. That was the only hit.

Q. From the moment that you turned and headed south, was MOGAMI always in sight? What condition was she in?
A. When I saw MOGAMI, as far as I can recall, she was dead in the water. When I started on a southerly course I was making 30 knots, so I saw her for a very short time. She was dead in the water, on fire amidships. At 0335 I lost steering control. To repair the rudder took thirty minutes. The damage was to the automatic control of the rudder lines, imposed by the force of a near miss, but was soon repaired. The rudder never was usable in satisfactory fashion, but we were able to navigate after repairing the rudder. I retired at 24 knots and at 1400 hours passed south of NEGROS and went to CORON Bay. While proceeding through the MINDANAO SEA about 1100 on the 25th, we received a bombing attack from one B-24 which was part of a flight of possibly 16 others which were attacking other units in this area. No damage was done in this air attack.

Q. On your way out of the Strait, did you sight Admiral SHIMA's force advancing to the attack?
A. About 0350 I sighted Admiral SHIMA's force advancing northward, while we were repairing the rudder.

Q. Did you communicate with Admiral SHIMA's force to tell him what damage had occurred?
A. I signaled to Admiral SHIMA by blinker because the telephone was broken.

Q. What did you tell Admiral SHIMA?
A. I signal led to the approaching force requesting them to identify themselves, as I was not sure but that they might be American surface units. The answer received was "I am the NACHI". I answered "I am the SHIGURE, I have rudder difficulties." There was no communication after this message.

Q. Why did you not inform Admiral SHIMA of the course of the battle?
A. At 1200 hours of the 25th I sent the following dispatch to Admirals TOYODA and KURITA, "The Third or 'C' Force has been annihilated, location of enemy unknown, please send me your instructions. I have trouble with my rudder, my wireless, my radar, and my gyro, and I received one hit." The reason I did not communicate directly with Admiral SHIMA and inform him of the situation was that I had no connection with him and was not under his command.

Q. Under such circumstances as you mention, was that the usual procedure? Was it not Japanese practice to exchange useful information between separate forces?
A. I assumed that SHIMA knew conditions of the battle and that he would get his instructions from his Commanding Officer, Admiral KURITA or from TOYODA.

Q. How did you assume he had learned of the battle in the entrance to the Gulf?
A. In my opinion Admiral SHIMA would know the situation by sighting the burning ships FUSO and MOGAMI, and by seeing me on a retiring course.

Q. That being the case, it was not considered necessary to give any other further information?
A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Why was it necessary to wait until 1200 to send the message to KURITA and TOYODA?
A. Because my wireless was not functioning, and secondly I was busy with the air attack.

Q. At what time approximately did you complete repairs to your wireless?
A. I used my auxiliary wireless set, the "TM" set. This set had been in commission all the time. I probably could have used it earlier to send the message. When I sent the message I relayed it through Admiral SHIMA because of the short range of the TM set. Its range is about 150 miles.

Q. Were you able to receive messages during this time when his wireless was out?
A. Yes, I could receive to a certain extent.

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Q. We have some information that KURITA's force heard of his battle fairly early in the morning, perhaps 8 or 9 o'clock. Do you know, or do you think it possible that MOGAMI sent such a report?
A. As far as I know, mine was the first information relayed to higher authority.

Q. Are you positive that this message was sent at 1200?
A. That is correct as far as I can remember. It is possible that SHIMA from the NACHI may have sent some sort of situation report.

Q. Did you witness the collision of NACHI and MOGAMI?
A. No, I only heard about it about 15 days later.

Q. What other crippled ships did you see during the retirement besides MOGAMI?
A. I saw of course the FUSO, later on I saw two burning hulks but, although I approached quite closely, I still am not sure whether it was the two halves of the YAMASHIRO or the two destroyers. I am inclined to the view that it was the destroyers. These two destroyers were the MICHISHIO and ASAGUMO.

Q. As you passed out through the southern end of SURIGAO Strait, did you see the ABUKUMA?
A. No.

Q. On the 25th did you receive any air attacks except from the single B-24?
A. No other air attacks; we made a sighting once but no attack.

Q. So far as you know, FUSO was never hit by torpedoes, only by gunfire?
A. According to the best of my knowledge that is correct.

Q. I would like to have your professional opinion regarding the operation here in SURIGAO Strait.
A. The most important reason for the way the battle went was that, except for Admiral NISHIMURA and the YAMASHIRO and FUSO, our ships had trained together in LINGGA. This battle we engaged in was the first time that this force had fought together with the above two ships under NISHIMURA's command, and basically NISHIMURA's tactical conception were quite different from those of the other ships under his command in the above engagement. Another reason was that the efficiency of the American radar fire control was far ahead of the Japanese.

Q. Would you elaborate a little on the tactical conduct of the battle by Admiral NISHIMURA?
A. I think the tactics used were wrong for the type of place we were going to fight in. NISHIMURA's basic strategy was advancing in a straight column which I think makes the force a set-up for radar detection and radar fire control. I think it would have been better to have advanced in a staggered formation, zig-zagging as we advanced. Furthermore, it would have been much better to have joined SHIMA's and NISHIMURA's units, and have let all the destroyers from both forces take the lead with the heavy ships in the rear. It was foolish to have two independent forces engaged in the same operation.

Q. What in general was Admiral NISHIMURA's service reputation, what type of officer was he considered to be? What was his specialty?
A. He was an old destroyer man. I never met NISHIMURA personally, but it was said of him that he was clever and a capable Navy man. I will say this much, though, that there are some people who think NISHIMURA was very fortunate not to have returned from this battle.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 80
USSBS NO. 392

JAPANESE NAVAL PLANS

TOKYO 20 NOVEMBER 1946

Interrogation of: Fleet Admiral NAGANO, Osami; Chief of Naval General Staff from April 1941 to February 1944 when he was appointed Supreme Naval Advisor to Emperor.

Interrogated by: Rear Admiral R.A. OFSTIE, USN - Captain T.J. HEDDING, USN.

SUMMARY

Admiral NAGANO discusses features of high level planning, cooperation with the Army, and effects of U.S. Operations on the national war potential.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Admiral, we want to get a clarification of some features of the high command planning and decision and to ask your opinion on various subjects which presumably fell within your purview. One of the first problems on which we haven't gotten a full understanding is the change in the plans after the initial perimeter was established. What we would like you to do is just tell us the reason for the expansion in that perimeter, where the new plan originated. (Referring to chart).
A. I took over the Naval General Staff in April of 1941. I believe that the line which my former subordinates have indicated here for you was a line which they determined as a result of their studies together in my office.

Q. Was it the original basic plan to obtain the so-called southern resources and to establish a perimeter for its defense?
A. This perimeter which has been drawn here for you, I believe, indicates one part of the total naval operations plan; namely, the part which had to do with the procuring of the source of supplies from the southern region. But once that operation was started it went so smoothly that after securing this perimeter, decision was made to extend the line further by way of securing the defense of the area which had already been occupied. The southward advance was commenced shortly after this line was completed.

Q. In conceiving and arriving at this plan to expand, was that explained to the Army General Staff and did it have their agreement? First of all, did the Army General Staff agree on the basic elements of that initial step?
A. This plan was adopted as a result of consultation between the two staffs.

Q. Was the further expansion to the south and the expansion to the east also with the agreement of the Army General Staff?
A. Both as a result of consultation with the Army.

Q. And would you say that there was full agreement, complete agreement?
A. Yes, in that respect, complete agreement. There had to be because the operations could not be undertaken without Army support.

Q. In general, did naval plans of such a magnitude always require the Army's agreement?
A. I think that it might be a misnomer to look upon this as a naval operation; because the problem is such a large one, it is a problem of the entire nation.

Q. With respect to the operations in CHINA, which you might say were predominantly Army in character, did the Navy have full information as to the extent, the resources required, and so on, of those operations?
A. On the continent, in respect of operations which were purely land operations, the Navy had no part in preparation of plans or direction thereof; but in cases of what might be called joint operations, plans were drawn up by the Army and they were presented to the Navy for its approval. Frequently if the operation was one which a sailor could not understand, the approval or consent would be given without any study or discussion. Fortunately the two staff headquarters were located close together in TOKYO. Communication was easy and cooperation between the two went smoothly without effort on either side to conceal the facts from each other.

Q. With respect specifically to the ALEUTIANS, would you say that was initiated by the Navy, was it of primary naval interest?
A. When the plan came to me it was already a completed plan, so exactly how it started I do not know. It is like sitting at a dining table and having a well prepared steak placed in front of you; the steak is good but one does not know from that who the cook was. It was a relatively small operation, so my guess is that staff officers from the two headquarters on the lower level got together and during discussions arrived at a decision on this operation. It was one upon which the Combined Fleet was set on undertaking, very anxious to carry it out. At first the Naval General Staff was opposed, but the Combined Fleet was so urgent about it that the Naval General Staff finally gave its consent, although with disastrous results.

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Q. With respect to the movements in the South, GUADALCANAL and down the SOLOMONS, was that primarily of Navy or Army interest and initiation?
A. I think that the GUADALCANAL and TULAGI Operations were mainly naval. I believe that those two operations were initiated by the Navy and supported by the Army.

Q. In the southern resources area, would the defense and the interest there be primarily Army or primarily Navy, or equal?
A. I think that the interest in the national resources area was neither mainly Naval or Army, both were equally interested. Not only the two services but the civilian elements were extremely interested, because after the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS refused to sell any more oil, our country was seriously threatened by oil shortage. Consequently, every element in JAPAN was keenly interested in that region. I think that one of the large causes of this war was the question of oil.

Q. In general, could it be said that the interest of the Army was largely continental and the interest of the Navy was primarily toward the east?
A. No, I would not say quite just that. In respect of CHINA herself, the continent, the Army undoubtedly had greater interest than the Navy; but so far as this entire area was concerned, I think that the Army was just as deeply interested as the Navy.

Q. Would you express an opinion as to whether the operations of the Army in CHINA, for what they accomplished, detracted from the operations to the East in which the Navy had more active participation?
A. At least during the time that I was in office as Chief of the Navy General Staff, I did not have such an impression that the Army's activities in CHINA detracted from the effectiveness of naval operations. Looking back upon it now, however, if instead of having such large land forces engaged in CHINA and MANCHURIA, and bringing them down in greater strength to the southern regions, the naval operations down south might have gone more successfully.

Q. Admiral, several high ranking Japanese naval officers have expressed opinions regarding the capabilities of JAPAN to hold and develop the areas acquired in the initial stages of the war. We would like to have your opinion on that subject.
A. I certainly felt a deficiency in naval strength, especially in its air arm, as a force for maintaining its hold on the area within the initial perimeter.

Q. Similarly, opinions have been expressed as to the wiseness of extending and advancing towards the east and towards the southeast; I would also like to have an opinion on that subject.
A. Question of wisdom quite aside, I think that this was just about the limit, the maximum limit of our capability. With the forces at the command of the Japanese services, that initial perimeter was just about the limit.

Q. In the early stages what was considered the greatest danger to that perimeter? Where did the greatest danger to its security come from?
A. My idea throughout was that the principal line of your counter-offensive would be more or less of a straight line beginning with the MARSHALLS as a sort of stepping stone and through SAIPAN in the direction of the PHILIPPINES, and that the operations down here (indicating NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS) were merely by way of preparation for that main counter-attack. Not only as a hindsight, but my idea was that from the beginning, and I expressed my opinion as such at the time.

Q. The fleet supported operations were the principal danger?
A. Yes, the American naval forces together with its air support.

Q. Admiral, what would you consider was the turning point from the offensive to the defensive for JAPAN, and what was that caused by?
A. I look upon the GUADALCANAL and TULAGI Operations as the turning point from offense to defense, and the cause of our set back there was our inability to increase our forces at the same speed that you did.

Q. Since the movements were primarily in the ocean area to the east, how would you describe the principal responsibility for holding the line? Would you say it was a naval responsibility or an Army responsibility?
A. I find it difficult to define responsibility definitely or clearly between the two services. It was, of course, the duty of the Army to maintain hold on any newly occupied territory, but at the same time it was the duty of the Navy to keep those occupying forces supplied. So in that sense it would be more proper to say that there was joint responsibility for maintaining that line.

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Q. Now as to the operations in NEW GUINEA, which were primarily of ground forces, would you say they were principally holding operations, or did they have a direct immediate effect on other operations throughout the area?
A. This island was held principally by Army forces with some naval support on land. The object of that occupation was not only to keep hold of that island, but also to utilize that hold for nearby operations - utilize the hold on the island to facilitate operations in neighboring regions.

Q. Admiral, looking at the whole operation in the PACIFIC during the time you were Chief of the General Staff, what particular U.S. Force would you say had the most effect against the Japanese war potential?
A. I was most bothered by Naval Air Forces.

Q. Did the Chief of the Army General Staff express a similar view in your discussions with him?
A. I myself believe that I was very fair and impartial in my views and judgments, but to others it may appear not to be so. In the same way the Chief of the Army General Staff may think that he is very fair and straightforward in his views and judgments. I myself think there were times when, after all, I was taking the Army's point of view. That is not in answer to your question. Judging from the fact that your Naval Air Force was also the cause of considerable concern to the Chief of the Army General Staff, I believe that he was generally of the same opinion as myself. It was one of the causes of great regret to me that notwithstanding that we put everything we had into building up our air force to something comparable to yours, we were never able to do so.

Q. Do you feel that throughout the period of the war, during the period you held your position, the Army General Staff had a clear picture of the problems as they developed?
A. I myself spent some time in explaining those problems as they developed, not only to the Chief of the Army General Staff but to the Army Minister as well and his assistants, in particular the Deputy Chief; so I believe that those problems were fairly well understood by the Army General Staff.

Q. With respect to oil, which was mentioned earlier as one of the most vitally necessary items for war, what was the primary cause of the inability to get an adequate supply of oil from the south, if such was the case, and when did it become critical?
A. I can't remember the date when we got our final refusal from the Dutch Government.

Q. I mean during the war.
A. In the early stages, submarines constituted the main difficulty but afterwards it was your air force; and I believe that the air force, once it got operating, was more effective than the submarines in checking shipment of our oil.

Q. What was your feeling, Admiral, with respect to the German position? Did you benefit by your association with them, did you feel assurance in their success, did that help you overall? What did you gain from the alliance with GERMANY?
A. That comes to a question which is not military in nature so that I do not feel fully competent to discuss it. However, it is true that the idea of a tie-up with GERMANY was expressed in Army circles from some time back, but had been consistently opposed by the Navy. As a result of the endeavors made for and against such a tie-up, there were two cabinet changes over that question. In 1940, however, the Three Power Pact became a reality; but even at that time my predecessor, the prior Chief of the Navy General Staff, expressed the opinion that even with the formation of the Three Power Pact it was not advisable for JAPAN to undertake a war against AMERICA and GREAT BRITAIN, and it was that sentiment in the Navy which had kept the naval authorities constantly opposed to a tie-up with GERMANY. Once that Three Power Pact was signed, however, the trend in the nation went in the direction which the Navy considered undesirable. But it was, so to speak, a force let loose, similar to the water in Lake Erie flowing into the upper rapids and in turn into Niagara; it could not be stopped. Consequently, whether it was good or bad I do not say, but I regretted the formation of the Three Power Pact. After the war started, however, we hoped for the success of German arms, since she was then our Ally, in the hope that success would serve to check the employment of BRITAIN's forces against JAPAN, would reduce the amount of force that ENGLAND could apply against JAPAN.

Q. Now with respect to naval operations in the PACIFIC, did the Germans, through their representatives, attempt to get you to change any of your plans? Did they, for example, suggest different employment of submarines or any other arm; was there any pressure from them to do differently than you did in the PACIFIC?
A. There were never any such suggestions from German sources. To be sure there were exchanges of opinion between representatives of GERMANY and our side, exchanges of facts or information which we considered might be of mutual benefit, but no such suggestions were ever made to us by German representatives. Once we received a gift of one or two submarines from GERMANY, and on that occasion they sent their technicians and gave our officers some technical instructions. Aside from that, there was some activity by German submarines in the INDIAN OCEAN, and once a converted cruiser came out into the PACIFIC; but that was about the extent of German participation or assistance in the PACIFIC War.

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Q. Admiral, we are very much interested in your employment of submarines in the war. Did you have a specific limitation or directive on the employment of submarines?
A. I know practically nothing about submarines.

Q. Aside from the supply of outlying and cut-off islands, it would appear that your submarine employment was not very energetic. Very little of our shipping was lost, and we wondered if the submarines were being held back for some specific purpose.
A. No, I do not think that there was any policy of restricting the employment of submarines. If they proved ineffective against your shipping it must have been either some defect in the submarines themselves or in the method of their use. The number used in supplying outlying islands was relatively few and I do not believe that there was any special restriction on the employment of the remaining submarines. Commander YAMAGUCHI believes that we did not have enough of them and also the inefficient employment of the submarines.

Q. We have heard in prior discussions with leading persons in the Japanese Government that the coordination and cooperation between the high commands of the Army and of the Navy was not of the best. Can you tell us what was the real basis for differences of opinion or inability to fully cooperate?
A. Your informants on this point are civilian officers?

Q. Military as well. High level cooperation.
A. I personally cannot remember any particular cases where there was outstanding or pronounced lack of cooperation or coordination between the two headquarters. There was, however, quite a strong opinion from the outset that the two General Staffs should be combined into one command. However, that opinion did not prevail and I wonder if it were not the advocates of that merger who might have pointed out to you instances of lack of close cooperation. - Commander YAMAGUCHI comes to my assistance and says that there were two or three cases of disagreement between the two headquarters, due principally, he thinks, to differences in viewpoints which they had regarding operations. By the time those things reach the Admiral, however, they are so nicely fixed up that he can't see the difficulties that were encountered on the way.

Q. Admiral, what do you think was the major mistake made by the Japanese High Command? Would you say that the senior officers were too old or that they were not air minded, or that they weren't broadly enough experienced? Was there some major item like that that was important in decreasing the efficiency, let us say, of the military forces?
A. Apropos of your comment about being too old, it is quite possible the Chief of the Navy General Staff was too old.

Q. We've heard a great deal about the influence of one group or another, the Army or Navy, on national policies. Would you care to say how you feel about the position of the Army or of the Navy, politically, in the country, their strength and its effect?
A. The question of service men participating in politics or political affairs of the state was, I believe, a point of fundamental difference between the Army and the Navy. Many Army officers have definite opinions on political questions and undertook to have their opinions exert influence in questions of national policy, especially as regards the affairs in CHINA. The Navy, on the contrary, believed in keeping completely out of political affairs, strictly in accordance with Emperor MEIJI's instructions to service men. There was neither any desire for, nor effort made, to obtain political influence for the Navy in state affairs. Army officers had numerous opinions about political subjects and many officers who wanted to give expression to those opinions; but generally speaking, naval officers were very quiet on subjects of politics.

Q. Admiral, you have stated that the Army had more of a tendency to take part in political discussions and expressions of opinion, but do you consider that the Army exerted political influence?
A. Undoubtedly some effort was made to exert political influence on the part of the Army officers, but I think to some extent that was checked by the efforts that were made by the Navy to maintain close coordination with Army officers. Consequently, the Army was not able to run its own sweet course, there being efficient Navy officers cooperating and coordinating with Army officers with the result that they were able to check their political influence to some extent. I confine my remarks to question of an administrative nature, questions that went through the Cabinet. On matters that did not go through the Cabinet, I am not in a position to know to what extent Army's political influence was exerted.

Q. This is a rather broad question. In tracing the whole war, following the whole war as you saw it in your position and thereafter in private and retired life, what do you consider were the chief reasons for JAPAN's failure to carry out her war aims?
A. This is going back just slightly to the opening of the war. In the official discussions that took place with a view to commencement of hostilities, I expressed my opinion that we should be able to carry on this war successfully for about two years. After that there would arise the question of replenishment and expansion successfully, we would be up against definite difficulties from that time on. And as I had feared, when that time came, we could not. The difference in the speed and effectiveness with which you carried out those things, namely, keeping up and increasing of forces, was so much greater than the speed and effectiveness with which we were able to do it that the dire results which I had foreseen in the event of our inability to do that transpired. Behind that difference was the difference in production capacity of the two countries. Another important cause for our failure, I believe, was the fact that we were far behind you in our scientific researches, also in civil engineering technique, air field construction, etc. We were very poorly equipped as compared with you who were able to produce sufficient arms, many kinds of them, in tremendous quantities.

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Q. Admiral, do you feel that if you had been able to have the unrestricted use of the resources that JAPAN acquired early in the war, you could have maintained your production facilities and possibly achieved your war aims?
A. Had we received no restrictions on the utilization of resources from the south, we certainly could have endured a long war, a protracted war.

Q. Admiral, you stated before that you considered that the turning point from your offensive to defensive operations was GUADALCANAL; but now with the overall progress of the war, at what point do you think, either in your position or your knowledge, was the turning point in the war, the time when definite steps must be taken to terminate the war?
A. When that time arrived I was no longer Chief of the Navy General Staff. Would any opinion still be worthwhile?

Q. Your personal opinion, please.
A. When we lost SAIPAN, "Hell is on us". Not to the extent of being ready to throw up our hands, but this was terrible.

Q. Would you use the expression "the handwriting is on the wall"?
A. I don't mean it in just that way. It isn't so strong as to exclude the will to continue, nor to the extent of giving up all further effort; but in any case, we had come to a precarious situation.

Q. What would you say was the reasoned situation, a comparison of strengths; not the will to continue but the reasoned or calculated position of the country?
A. Of course a comparative study had been made all along, but when SAIPAN was lost to you "this is terrible." This gives expression to an emotion neither scientific nor calculated.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 81
USSBS NO. 395

OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND DUTCH EAST INDIES

TOKYO 18 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of: Captain FUJITA, Masamichi, IJN; Staff Officer of 2nd Fleet, Southern Sea from 1941 to 1942; Staff Member of Bureau of Military Affairs, Navy Department, Tokyo from 1942 to 1945.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. MOORER, U.S.N.

SUMMARY

This interrogation amplifies and clarifies certain points discussed in previous interrogation (NAV. NO. 14: USSBS No. 67) regarding the Japanese occupation of the PHILIPPINES and NETHERLAND EAST INDIES.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. After the move into the PHILIPPINES and MALAYA was initiated, what was the expected reaction from: first, the Americans in the PHILIPPINES; second, the Dutch; and third, the British in MALAYA?
A. From the Americans, air opposition; from the Dutch, no particular opposition with the exception of submarine attacks; and from the British, surface opposition.

Q. In regard to the air opposition of the Americans, do you mean that you expected attacks on the invasion force? Did you think that the American Air Force would be able to sink your ships?
A. It was thought that there would be some damage to ships, but the main concern was the attack by the American aircraft on the Japanese Air Force.

Q. What was the most critical factor likely to cause the failure of the operation?
A. The most critical operation at the beginning of the campaign was considered to be MALAYA, followed in turn by the LUZON landing. We expected considerable resistance in the JAVA SEA during the final phases of the operation.

Q. For what reason did you think that the MALAY Area was particularly strong?
A. Because the British were increasing their sea power. We didn't expect much air strength; but after the arrival of the PRINCE of WALES and the REPULSE, we expected a commensurate air cover.

Q. What action did you plan to take in case you met such strong opposition that you were unable to carry out the original operation?
A. The plan was to continue the operation in the PHILIPPINES with all the forces available, regardless of cost; and after that was completed to again attack MALAYA.

Q. Explain the cooperation affected by the Army and the Navy during the invasions?
A. According to directives from General Headquarters, there was mutual cooperation. However, there was no fast rule as to who was in command of each operation. Generally speaking, the service having the predominant force controlled the operation.

Q. Concerning the method of control of the land-based force, was it controlled by the Second Fleet or controlled by the invasion force at the focal point of the action?
A. The 11th Air Fleet was merely ordered to cooperate in the landing operation; any request for air support not in the operation order had to be directed by the Second Fleet, if not volunteered by the 11th Air Fleet.

Q. After a base was captured, for instance BALIKPAPAN, do you know what time was required to establish the air base?
A. About 7 to 10 days were required to repair a field. That was one of the weak points of the campaign. Although an effort was made by the base force to furnish aviation supplies and field equipment, considerable time was required since the fields had to be constructed by hand labor.

Q. What small aircraft carriers were in this operation?
A. Only the RYUJO.

Q. Did the original plan provide for the use of the RYUJO?
A. Yes, it was held in readiness in case a weak point in the plan was discovered. In this case there was no suitable fields available in the SUMATRA Area, so the RYUJO was ordered down there to assist in the last stages of the JAVA Campaign.

Q. On 8 December many small Japanese fighters attacked our seaplanes based at DAVAO ; where did they come from?
A. PALAU.

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Q. Describe the movements of the main body of the Second Fleet after the initial success of the PHILIPPINE and MALAYA landings?
A. The main body proceeded to FORMOSA and then to PALAU where in the latter part of January it rendezvoused with an additional carrier force from JAPAN.

Q. Why did you concentrate such a large force at PALAU?
A. In order to support the JAVA Operations and then attack the British in INDIAN OCEAN.

Q. And that plan was not in the original operation order?
A. It was made after the success of PEARL HARBOR, and in view of the general favorable conditions it was decided to rendezvous this force and proceed to the INDIAN OCEAN.

Q. How long did you operate around KENDARI?
A. About one week. We attacked PORT DARWIN 19 February.

Q. What was the mission of the Second Fleet during operations south of JAVA?
A. It was to cut off any escape of the Allied Forces from the JAVA SEA.

Q. Do you know of any operations conducted down there?
A. Yes. We bombarded CHRISTMAS Island and attacked a Dutch destroyer. Very few Allied ships escaped from JAVA SEA.

Q. Explain the mission of your submarines.
A. The submarines in the South CHINA SEA were ordered to attack the British ships; the submarines stationed around the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS were to act as scouts. In general, the submarines were used entirely to cooperate with the Second Fleet and not as an attack weapon against merchant ships. Submarines discovered the PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE and were instrumental in causing their destruction.

Q. During these operations was the Admiral in command of the several amphibious operations free to move from one place to another at his own discretion, or was his flagship assigned a task for each invasion?
A. He would go on his own accord to carry out his mission, depending upon the situation of the time.

Q. Was the total number of ships, including warships and merchant ships that were used in each invasion, assigned in advance, or were the many small forces necessary for simultaneous operations organized as the campaign progressed?
A. The forces were organized in advance. A provision was also made for possible losses but they did not occur.

Q. What was, in your opinion, the general situation after this area had been occupied? What do you think the Japanese should have done next?
A. It was my opinion and also that of several officers of the Second Fleet that the Japanese should have fortified the PHILIPPINES and EAST INDIES with the forces available and should not have attempted to advance to the east, thereby introducing a supply problem we could not successfully solve.

Q. Did you think that at the time, 1 March 1942, or did you form that opinion in 1945?
A. 1942. I think the biggest mistake made by the Japanese was the fact that they occupied the advanced bases rather than making strikes and then withdrawing to the inner wall formed by a line of SAIPAN, PALAU, SORONG, TIMOR, JAVA and SINGAPORE.

Q. After the completion of this campaign, was there some high level indecision as to what policy to follow?
A. Yes, the opinion of the Second Fleet was to stop the advance as it was, but the General Headquarters in TOKYO decided to go on.

Q. Was this decision made by the Army or Navy?
A. Both. The Combined Headquarters at TOKYO did not know the difficulty we had with supplies in advanced areas.

Q. Do you think one of your biggest difficulties was one of supply?
A. The difficulty of supplies and, also, the men were tired of fighting. The men were tired because of the continuous fighting.

Q. Army or Navy men?
A. Both, but mainly Navy because the men of the ships were tired because the same ships were used in all the operations. There was no relief and ships were always underway and always fighting. This applies particularly to small ships - destroyers and cruisers.

Q. Did the First and Second Base Forces provide ships for all of your operations?
A. Yes, in Japan the Base Force is a local defense force, providing auxiliary vessels, patrol vessels and minesweepers.

Q. Were the troops and land forces supplied by Army or Navy ships?
A. The troops and supplies were carried in vessels chartered by the Army.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 82
USSBS NO. 396

MOVEMENTS OF JAPANESE SECOND FLEET IN CENTRAL PACIFIC

TOKYO 20 November 1945

Interrogation of: Captain SHIKI, Tsuneo, IJN; Senior Staff Officer of Commander Second Fleet (Vice Admiral KURITA), January 1943 to August 1944.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman TELLER, USN.

SUMMARY

Captain SHIKI describes the principal movements of the Second Fleet between 1 November 1943 and 1 March 1944 and lists the damage sustained by units of this fleet during the carrier air strikes on RABAUL, 5 November 1943.

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Describe the movement of the Second Fleet and other units from TRUK to RABAUL in early November 1943.
A. A cruiser and a destroyer force of the Second and Third Fleets left TRUK on 3 November for RABAUL to assist in the defense of BOUGAINVILLE. The force consisted of the Fourth Cruiser Division - ATAGO (flagship of Vice Admiral KURITA, Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet), TAKAO, MAYA and CHOKAI; the Seventh Cruiser Division - KUMANO (Flagship), SUZUYA and MOGAMI; the Eight Cruiser Division - TONE and CHIKUMA; the Second Destroyer Division - NOSHIRO or JUNTSU (flagship) and 4 to 6 destroyers; and the Tenth Destroyer Division - AGANO (flagship) and 4 to 6 destroyers. Enroute to RABAUL we received information by radio that a tanker to the northward had been attacked and damaged by a submarine. The cruiser CHOKAI and two destroyers were detached to help this tanker and escorted her back to TRUK.

The force arrived at RABAUL shortly after sunrise on 5 November and reported to the Commander-in-Chief Southeastern Fleet (Vice Admiral KUSAKA). We immediately commenced preparations for fueling. (At this point in the interrogation Captain OHMAE interjected that "recommendation had been made to avoid RABAUL because of frequent enemy air attacks on the port").

Carrier Aircraft Attack on Rabaul 5 November 1943

Q. Describe the carrier air attack on your force that day.
A. About one hour after arrival at RABAUL, the force was taken by surprise by a heavy carrier air attack, mostly dive-bombing. Fuel lines were cast off and most vessels got underway. During the attack the following damage was done to naval vessels:

ATAGO - 3 near misses by bombs, which caused 18 deaths (including captain) and 20 injured. Some damage to above water portion of hull at the bow. Speed and maneuverability were unimpaired. The casualties were due largely to bomb fragments.

TAKAO - 1 bomb hit alongside #3 turret forward, penetrated two decks and detonated in the third deck; knocked guns of this turret out of commission but did no other serious damage except 3 killed and 14 seriously injured.

MAYA - 1 bomb hit which exploded in the engine room. Fire broke out in engine room and burned until sunset that day.

CHIKUMA - 1 near miss by bomb. No serious damage.

MOGAMI - 1 bomb hit on aircraft stowage deck aft. Fire broke out. 20 casualties.

AGANO - All anti-aircraft guns damaged. 11 casualties. Cause of damage unknown.

JINTSU or NOSHIRO - 1 small bomb hit in boat deck, 14 casualties.

KUMANO - May have received slight damage. Details unknown.

NAGANAMI (DD) - Aircraft torpedo hit stern and blew off after 1/3 of ship. Torpedo evidently was intended for a cruiser on her beam. This was only torpedo hit and the only destroyer to suffer significant damage.

The submarine tender CHOGEI was present but was not damaged.

Q. What did you do after this attack?
A. During the attack most all of the ships got underway and proceeded out of the harbor to obtain maneuvering room. They all re-entered the harbor about 1400 that day. After the attack a discussion was held. There was some feeling that the undamaged or only lightly damaged ships should take reinforcing troops to BOUGAINVILLE or otherwise assist in repelling the American advance in the SOLOMONS. However, the Commander-

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in-Chief Southeastern Fleet decided that the force should lave 1600 and return to TRUK. After landing the wounded, the force finally sailed after sunset and consisted of ATAGO, TAKAO, KUMANO, SUZUYA, TONE, CHIKUMA, MOGAMI and 5 or 6 destroyers. This force arrived at TRUK on 7 November. The damaged MAYA was left at RABAUL for temporary repairs. She later returned to TRUK also. The NOSHIRO or JINTSU and about 5 destroyers remained to reinforce the Southeastern Fleet.

The force arrived at TRUK on 7 November and between 9 and 15 November the damaged ATAGO, TAKAO, TONE and MOGAMI left TRUK for repairs in JAPAN. The AGANO and NAGANAMI remained about one month making temporary repairs, then also left for JAPAN. The MAYA left TRUK for JAPAN late January 1944. Admiral KURITA shifted his flag to the CHOKAI.

Q. What other movements did the Second Fleet make in the Central PACIFIC?
A. A training cruise was made to ENIWETOK in mid-October 1943. On 21 November 1943 a force consisting of the Fourth Division - CHOKAI (flag of Second Fleet), the Seventh Cruiser Division - probably SUZUYA, the Eighth Cruiser Division - CHIKUMA and several destroyers left TRUK for KWAJALEIN. It was our purpose to assist in repelling your invasion of the GILBERTS by attacking a portion of your fleet if our air squadrons had successfully beaten off your air force, and to bombard your positions in the GILBERTS if possible. We arrived at KWAJALEIN on 24 November. There I saw the ISUZU and NAKA with troops on board. Because KWAJALEIN was considered within range of your air attack, our force left that atoll on 25 November and arrived ENIWETOK on the 27th. We took on fuel and departed on the 28th for KWAJALEIN arriving there 30 November. By that time it was not practicable for us to attack your fleet because of your air superiority and the lack of air cover for our force. Furthermore, we saw a carrier plane approaching one of the nearby islands and assumed there would be an air attack on KWAJALEIN soon. So we left that port on 2 December for TRUK where we arrived the night of 7 December 1943. There were not other significant movements of the fleet until we left for PALAU on 10 February.

Q. When did the Second and Third Fleets leave PALAU and where did they go?
A. All of the Second and Third Fleet units, including Admiral KOGA'S flagship, left the evening of 28 March 1944 before your carrier strike on PALAU the 29th. These ships proceeded to LINGGA Anchorage. Admiral KOGA remained at this shore headquarters at PALAU and flew out in a plane after the carrier strike.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 83
USSBS No. 407

SAVO ISLAND - MIDWAY - SOLOMONS - LEYTE GULF

TOKYO 13-14 November 1945

Interrogation of: Rear Admiral SIJI, AKIRA, IJN; Commanding Officer, MOGAMI (CA), at MIDWAY.
Captain KATO, Kenkichi, IJN; Executive Officer, CHOKAI )CA), at MIDWAY and SAVO Island; also Executive Officer, MUSASHI (BB), when sunk at LEYTE Gulf.
Captain UKITA, NOBUYE, IJN; Gunnery Officer, KONGO (BB), at MIDWAY, 13 October 1942 and at the bombardment of GUADALCANAL and SANTA CRUZ, October 1942.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Lieut. Comdr. J.A. Field, Jr., USNR.

Summary

Savo Island: Cruiser Division Six and Cruiser Division 18 intended to attack U.S. transports unloading troops and supplies at GUADALCANAL and TULAGI during the initial landing operations 7-9 August 1942. Engaged U.S. Cruiser Screening Force at close range then retired. CHOKAI (CA) received minor damage from shell fire. KAKO (CA) sunk by U.S. submarine while entering harbor at KAVIENG following the battle.

Midway: KONGO (BB) and CHOKAI (CA) in screening force protecting transports. No attacks received during the battle. MOGAMI (CA) and MIKUMA (CA) collided while taking evasive action from submarine contact. Received bombing attacks severely damaging MOGAMI and sinking the MIKUMA. ARASHIO (DD) also damaged by bombs killing many MIKUMA survivors. One other destroyer received minor bomb damage but not sunk.

Leyte Gulf: MUSASHI (BB) capsized to port after receiving about 30 bombs and 26 torpedo hits. About 1100 men lost. Colored burst used in anti-aircraft shells to facilitate fire identification.

TRANSCIPT

Savo Island

Q. (Captain KATO) What ships were present in your force at SAVO Island, 8-9 August 1942?
A. The following ships from the Eighth Fleet:

6S CA) - KINUGASA
KAOK
FURUTAKA
AOBA
18S (CL) TENRYU
TATSUTA
1 DD

Q. Give a description of the battle.
A. Cruiser Division Six departed KAVIENG and joined Cruiser Division Eighteen in St. GEORGES Channel. Cruiser Division Eighteen had left RABAUL. The ships then proceeded northeast between GREEN Island and Cape HENPAN, then southeast through BOUGAINVILLE Strait between the two lines of islands, to SAVO Island. Our mission was to destroy the U.S. Forces landing on GUADALCANAL.

About an hour before reaching SAVO Island, a plane was launched from the CHOKAI. This plane gave us good reports of the position of the U.S. ships during the action. It also dropped flares 200-300 meters away.

When we arrived at SAVO Island we saw a picket destroyer moving very slowly away from us to the south. Our guns were trained upon it but did not open fire, se we didn't shoot. Shortly afterwards we saw the silhouette of your cruiser force between Cape ESPERANCE and Pt. LUNGA. Those cruisers were about 5,000 meters away, we fired torpedoes then turned left to intercept the second group of cruisers which had been reported by the scouting plane. During this turn, the column of ships divided. Cruiser Division Eighteen passed close to SAVO Island to the west of the second group. Cruiser Division Six passed to the east of the group. The range was very close, about 2000 meters. When the CHOKAI approached the enemy, the main battery of the first ship that we saw, which I think was the last ship in the column, was not trained on either of our groups of

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ships. The fact was first reported by our lookouts, so we continued the battle very easy mindedly, without any worries. The only fire that we received was from machine guns and a few anti-aircraft shells. The range at which we were firing varied from 2000 to 5000 meters.

The CHOKAI was the only ship that received any damage in this action. We received a large number of machine gun hits but they did not do any damage. We illuminated with our searchlight intermittently. I think that that is when we were fired upon. We also received four shell hits from the leading ship in your column. One shell hit the port side of the forward turret, killing ten men; three hits were received just aft of the bridge, killing about 30 men; and one hit was near the aviation crane, causing some structural damage.

Following the battle we retired to the west of SAVO Island. At that time opinion was divided as to whether we should turn back and attack the transports. I thought that since we had so badly damaged the cruiser screen that we could successfully return and destroy the transports. However, the Admiral did not want to engage in another night action with your cruisers, and further felt that he should not be within range of your aircraft at daylight; so decided to retire to RABAUL and KAVIENG.

As we entered the harbor of KAVIENG, the KAKO (CA) was torpedoed and sunk at the harbor entrance. This was 9 August 1942.

Q. Did you receive any air attacks during this period?
A. No air attacks were received during this battle, either going down to SAVO Island or during the return. We received some air attacks on the night of 14 October 1942 when the CHOKAI and MAYA shelled the airfield, on GUADALCANAL, but we were not damaged.

We were attacked once again, I think that it was November 1942, southwest of GUADALCANAL. It was a heavy dive-bombing attack. The CHOKAI was not damaged but some of the other ships in Cruiser Division Seven (MOGAMI, AOBA, SUZUYA, KUMANO) were damaged, and I think that the KINUGASA was sunk at that time. I do not know the details.

Leyte Gulf

Q. In what engagements did you participate while you were Executive Officer of the MUSASHI?
A. I joined the MUSASHI in the INLAND SEA while it was fitting out in November 1943. In January 1943 we proceeded to KURE and then to TRUK where we served as flagship to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. In April we returned to YOKOSUKA. In May we returned to TRUK with a load of ammunition. In February 1944 we returned to TOKYO and after taking Admiral KOGA to PALAU, proceeded to TRUK again. On 28 March we left TRUK because of our fear of carrier attacks in that area. As we sortied from the west entrance, the MUSASHI was hit on the port bow by one of three torpedoes fired by a submarine. We returned to KURE for repair in April, then proceeded to TAWTAWI in May.

On 24 October 1944 while passing through the SIBUYAN SEA we were attacked by American aircraft. In the first attack, about 1030, the MUSASHI was hit on the starboard side by three torpedoes. The second attack came about 15-20 minutes later. We received five torpedo hits on the port side from this attack. From about 1300 we gradually fell astern of the main disposition and by 1430 were well separated from the other ships. We were accompanied only by the TONE. About 1530 the heaviest attack of the day was made against this ship. The total number of hits received was about 30 bombs and 26 torpedoes. At about 1700 the rest of the fleet departed to the east. About 1830 the TONE was relieved by two destroyers. We attempted to beach the MUSASHI on the north coast of SIBUYAN Island, but about 1930 it capsized to port and sank. It sank because two torpedo attacks hit in the same place on the port side abreast of No. 4 engine room. The first attack penetrated the outer hull, and the second attack penetrated the inner hull flooding No. 4 engine room. Pumping was hindered due to the cumulative bomb damage above, so it was impossible to check the flooding. About 50% of the 2200 men on board were lost.

Q. Did you use colored bursts in your anti-aircraft shells?
A. Yes, each ship in the division had a different color. Red, blue, white or conventional black bursting charges were used to identify ships fire. I am uncertain when this colored ammunition first reached the fleet, but I think that it was first used in the MARIANAS engagement.

Midway

Q. Were you on the CHOKAI at MIDWAY?
A. Yes, we were with the Second Fleet. We left JAPAN to act as a screening force for the transports from SAIPAN. I can't tell you much about the battle because we never saw an enemy plane or ship during the entire battle. About 0930 the day after the battle, Battleship Division Three (KONGO, HIEI) and Cruiser Division Four (ATAGO, TAKAO, MAYA, CHOKAI) left Cruiser Division Seven (MIKUMA, MOGAMI, KUMANO, SUZUYA) and went northeast, then northwest and joined up with the Main Body early the morning of the 6th.

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We proceeded west about 0900 the 7th when we were joined by the KUMANO and SUZUYA and turned south to act as a screening force for the Main Body which turned south a little later. We were also to protect the MOGAMI and escort it to the Main Body. After we joined the Main Body, the cruiser force split up. Cruiser Division Seven went to TRUK, but we returned to JAPAN. We were never attacked either during the approach or retirement.

Rear Admiral SOJI

Q. Give a description of your action at MIDWAY.
A. I was commanding officer of the MOGAMI at MIDWAY. It was the fourth ship in column in Cruiser Division Seven which consisted of the KUMANO, SUZUYA, MIKUMA and MOGAMI. After the carrier battle on the 5th we were headed towards MIDWAY to bombard. We had not been attacked by either airplanes or surface vessels at that time, although we saw a formation of planes in the distance the afternoon before. We later heard that the transport group which was astern of us had been attacked.

About 2300 5 June (-9) a submarine was sighted on the starboard bow of the flagship. All ships made an emergency turn to the left but I was late in receiving the order. The MIKUMA had turned to the left 60 degrees, but I had only turned about 45 degrees when we collided with the port quarter of the MIKUMA. The bow of the MOGAMI was bent to port, some of it was missing. A few plates were extended into the water which reduced our speed. We were using power for 24 knots but only making 16. When we received the order to retire about an hour later, we were already on a westerly course due to the damage. All ships stayed together that night but the next morning, due to a difference in speed, the KUMANO and SUZUYA gradually drew ahead of us. We had two destroyers with us also.

Early the next morning, the day after our carriers were damaged, about 0500 6 June (-9) we received a bombing attack from both dive-bombers and horizontal-bombers. The MIKUMA was on our port bow. The attacks occurred about the same time. The dive-bombers dove out of the sun astern of us and were difficult to shoot at. The MOGAMI was not hit in this attack but one bomb from a dive-bomber landed about 10 meters away. There were about 6 near misses. The metal made many holes in the bridge and the stack. We maneuvered and fired all guns, and I think may have hit some planes.

About the same time two or three groups of bombs fell about 200-300 meters astern of the MOGAMI and MIKUMA. About 10 or 12 horizontal-bombers had dropped them. None of our ships was hit. The planes were 4000-5000 meters high. We did not see them until the bombs had landed. We fired at them but I do not think that we hit them.

The MIKUMA was not hit by bombs in this attack but I saw a dive-bomber dive into the last turret and start fires. He was very brave.

There may have been one more attack that afternoon but I am not sure. I faintly remember bombs but no ship was damaged by bombs until the next morning.

On 7 June we received three big dive-bombing attacks. There were no horizontal-bombing attacks of surface action. The attacks started about 0700 7 June (-9). The MOGAMI received two hits in this attack. The first bomb landed on top of No. 5 turret, penetrated the armor and killed every one in the turret. The second bomb hit amidships. Damaged torpedo tubes. Started fires below decks but they were put out. One destroyer was also hit at this time, I think, but it was navigable and returned with us. As I remember the MIKUMA received two or maybe three hits at the same time.

Two or three hours later we received another attack. Because of our maneuvers the MOGAMI was ahead of the MIKUMA in this attack. We received one hit amidships and one forward of the bridge, which started fires. The MIKUMA was hit many times and was burning. A destroyer, the ARASHIO tried to go along side to rescue personnel but the fires were too bad, so they put boats in the water and picked up the men. Due to our fires amidships we had slowed down, but were still ahead of the MIKUMA.

Another dive-bombing attack came soon after this one in which the MOGAMI received another bomb hit amidships. It went through the deck and killed all the men that were fighting the fire and also damaged the doors to the engine room so the personnel there could not escape the fire. About 93 men were killed in this attack. The MIKUMA was hit several more times and the ARASHIO was hit in the stern but was navigable and returned with us. Almost all of the survivors of the MIKUMA who were on deck of the ARASHIO were killed by this bomb. We did not receive any more attacks.

I do not know when the MIKUMA sank. Some time during the late afternoon or night, I think. We expected to be engaged by cruisers or battleships because during the day we saw one or two of your float-type observation planes and thought your ships were near. The next morning, the 8th, we joined the KURUTAKA, SUZUYA and other ships, refueled and went to TRUK for temporary repairs.

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Captain UKITA

Q. What ships were in your force at MIDWAY?
A. Battleship Division Three - HIEI and KONGO, - Vice Admiral MIKAWA, Gunichi.
Cruiser Division Four - ATAGO (F), CHOKAI, TAKAO, MAYA - Rear Admiral KONDO. 2 Destroyers.
Cruiser Division Four and Destroyer Squadron Two (JINTSU and 12 destroyers joined this group about 27° N, 176° E.

Q. Did you receive any attacks at MIDWAY?
A. We did not receive any attacks in our formation. We received information that the transports received one air attack in the afternoon of the day before the main carrier battle, but I do not know the details. On the 5th, before reaching our destination, we saw one PBY but it did not attack. It remained out of range of our guns, then finally went away.

At about 0800 5 June (-9) we heard that the AKAGI and KAGA were badly hit and sunk. About 0900 the same day we received a report from a Japanese reconnaissance plane that the American force ahead of us consisted of one aircraft carrier, five cruisers and five destroyers. A little later it was reported to be three carriers, five cruisers and twenty-two destroyers. That night we received orders to cancel the attack on MIDWAY. I don't know which direction we went during the night but in the morning we were on course 270 degrees. The ATAGO and CHOKAI were with us all of the time. About the 8th or 9th we joined the Main Body. After we refueled we left the Main Body and went up towards the ALEUTIAN as a screening force although we did not see anything. One carrier joined us up there. I think that it was the ZUIHO or ZUIKAKU. About six or eight destroyers, and the KAMIKAWA MARU, a seaplane tender, also went to the ALEUTIANS with us. We stayed up there until about the 21st then went to OMINATO.

Solomons

Q. Were you on the KONGO in the SOLOMONS?
A. I was there until October 1942.

Q. Did you participate in any action in that area?
A. About the middle of October 1942 we bombarded the airfield on GUADALCANAL during the night. The HARUNA and several destroyers were with us. We came in fast around SAVO Island, ran down past the field, then turned around and went past the field again. We fired for about an hour. Our object was to destroy aircraft which might be used against our ships bringing in troops. Our greatest fear was of running aground. I think we were attacked by motor torpedo boats at that time, but we could see the tracks of the torpedoes so avoided them. We did not receive any air attack either during the approach or the retirement.

We were also present at the Battle of SANTA CRUZ, 26 October 1942 but did not see much action. We received one air attack but no hits made. It was during the day. There were seventy or eighty planes in the air at the time. Mostly B-17's. They were 3000-4000 meters high.

None of our ships were hit. The dive-bombers concentrated on the ZUIHO and SHOKAKU which received some hits. That night we turned towards the enemy fleet and saw one of your carriers burning, then we retired.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 84
USSBS No. 408

 

ALEUTIAN CAMPAIGN

JAPANESE ARMY GARRISONS ON ATTU AND KISKA

TOKYO 21 November 1945

Interrogation of: Lieutenant Colonel FUJII, Kazume, IJA; an Air Staff Officer for the North Area Army, with headquarters at SAPPORO, HOKKAIDO, from January to October 1942, when he was assigned to a similar position on the staff of the KISKA Army Garrison until August 1943.

Interrogated by: Captain J.S. RUSSELL, USN.

Summary

Colonel FUJII made an inspection trip to KISKA for ten days beginning the last of September 1942. While there he became familiar with the Army defences of KISKA, and flew in a Navy float plane over AMCHITKA Island, making an aerial survey for an airfield. He arrived in KISKA for duty on 10 November 1942, and was on that island or on ATTU, except for two trips back to JAPAN to request additional troops and supplies, until the evacuation of KISKA on 29 July 1942 (TOKYO date). His last trip to JAPAN was for the purpose of planning the evacuation. He returned from this trip on the light cruiser KISO which was engaged in the actual evacuation. The organization of the Army forces on KISKA and ATTU is given, as well as some information on losses of Army transport ships in the area. Colonel FUJII describes what he saw of the Battle of KOMANDORSKI ISLANDS from the auxiliary cruiser ASAKA MARU. The effectiveness of the United States air and sea blockade of KISKA and ATTU is evident throughout the narrative.

Narrative

Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) FUJII was sent to KISKA from the Staff Headquarters of the North Area Army to make a survey of KISKA and the surrounding islands to determine the adaptability for defense. He was taken to KISKA in the destroyer WAKABA and returned on the same ship. The WAKABA approached to about the 100 or 200 mile circle from KISKA then made a high speed dash in, arriving in the evening. No submarine nor air contacts were made.

After looking about KISKA, he was flown over AMCHITKA Island (about 5 October 1942) in a Navy float plane. At this time the U.S. occupation of ADAK was known to the Japanese. Colonel FUJII was rowed out to the plane, in rubber boat, from the seaplane base on northwest shore of KISKA Harbor. During the flight, one B-24 was sighted from a distance. The weather and visibility were good. The flat land on the eastern end of AMCHITKA Island was not too suitable for airfields, Colonel FUJII thought, because of the large number of ponds which indicated marshy land.

About every other day while Colonel FUJII was at KISKA there were air attacks by 5 to 10 bombers and 10 to 15 fighters. The GERTRUDE Cove area received one attack, the remainder directed against the KISKA Harbor area.

The organization and deployment of Japanese Army troops in the Western ALEUTIANS as of 30 September 1942 were: -

ATTU - No Army troops present, these had been removed to KISKA about August 1942.

KISKA - Army force in command of Major HOZUMI, MASATOSHI, 301st Independent Infantry Battalion.

4 Companies Infantry (110 x 4)   440
1 Machine Gun Company   180
1 Artillery Company (70mm. Howitzers)   180
2 Companies AA Artillery (180 x 2)   360
1 Company Engineers   200
1 Platoon Shipping Engineers   60
Total   1520

The Army headquarters were located about one mile inshore at the end of GERTRUDE Cove. A road connected the Army headquarters with the Navy headquarters on KISKA Harbor. This was a good road except for the section through the mountains. The Army had a defense line across the island just west of GERTRUDE

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Cove. Three infantry companies, one artillery company, and one machine gun company were in the Cove area. Anti-aircraft artillery was emplaced on the northwest and southeast sides of the Cove. Mines were laid across the entrance to the two coves east of GERTRUDE. An infantry company was deployed in the pass west of KISKA Harbor. The engineer company and shipping platoon were encamped at the head of GERTRUDE Cove.

Subsequent reinforcements to Army troops arrived at KISKA as follows:

     1 infantry weapons company

10 November 1942, via one destroyer (WAKABA?), - Part of North Seas Garrison Headquarters with Major General MINEKI, Toichira, 80
End of November 1942, via URAGIO MARU and AWATA MARU, - 3 infantry companies of the YAMAGUCHI Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel YAMAGUCHI, Sadama 330
     Part of Rear Echelon Service Troops, North Seas Garrison Headquarters (Communication, Quartermaster, and Weather personnel) 40
     Half of Battalion Headquarters 50
     Army Anchorage Headquarters, Lt. Col. NAGAMINE 60
End of December 1942, via KISO, ABUKUMA and other ships, at night,  
     1 infantry company 110
180
     Engineer battalion headquarters 40
Early January 1943, via MELBOURNE MARU and either AWATA or ASAKA MARU,  
     1 company of engineers 200
     Field hospital 100
     Half of Battalion Headquarters 30
End of January 1943, via unidentified ships - ABUKUMA possible included,  
     Anti-aircraft battalion 40
     1 machine gun company 180
     Part of North seas Garrison Headquarters 100
10 April 1943, via submarine, -      First sector Unit (Island Command) Colonel SATO, Masaji 30
  Total troops Arriving - 1570
  Total troops present - 1520
  Grand total - 3090

These additional troops were deployed in the following manner. The main strength of the YAMAGUCHI Battalion went to the area between KISKA Harbor and KISKA Volcano - 3 companies were in the mid area, with platoons from these covering the east and west sides of the area of lakes just south of the volcano. The HOZUMI Battalion expanded somewhat to the southwest where one company and two platoons were sent to the extreme southwest end of the island. One company of the YAMAGUCHI Battalion took over the pass west of KISKA Harbor. Some anti-aircraft went to NORTH HEAD and the remainder to GERTRUDE Cove. Two companies of engineers moved up to build the airstrip just north of KISKA Harbor.

With this deployment, Colonel YAMAGUCHI was responsible for the defense of North KISKA Island; Colonel HOZUMI, for the South. One hundred men from each battalion were assigned as an airstrip guard. The Navy was responsible for the defense of the harbor and had their artillery set up in that area and on Little KISKA. Navy construction personnel were also working on the airstrip. The Army had no radar but received good information from the navy radar installation in the hills west of the Navy main camp.

The last surface ship reached KISKA late in January or early February. Thereafter supplies were brought in by submarine only.

The Army air personnel were limited to four: Colonel FUJII, a senior technician, and two junior technicians.

The airstrip on ATTU was to be an Army strip. Because the strip on HOLTZ Bay was narrow, it was intended to base there a fighter unit of only 30 airplanes, Type Ki-43 "HAYABUSA". A second larger field, with better approaches, was planned for MASSACRE Bay. A field was also planned for SHEMYA Island in the SEMICHI Group, but there was a shortage of men, materials and water transport. The lack of a harbor at SHEMYA was considered a very great disadvantage, but it was planned to discharge cargo over the beaches at the east and west ends of the island. An airstrip on AMCHITKA was also planned. An airstrip on a site at the southwest end of KISKA was considered, but no beach suitable for unloading cargo was found and building a road from GERTRUDE Cove presented extreme difficulties.

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Colonel FUJII went from KISKA to ATTU by submarine, arriving on 15 February 1945. The Army garrison on ATTU at this time consisted of: -

North CHISHIMA Coast Defense Infantry Unit - Lt. Col. YONEKAWA, Hiroshi,  
     Headquarters 50
     3 infantry companies (150 x 3) 450
     1 machine gun company 180
303rd Independent Infantry Battalion - Major WATANABE  
     Headquarters 50
     2 infantry companies (150 x 2) 300
No. 2 Sector Unit Anti-Aircraft Battalion (Part only)  
1 company 180
One company of shipping engineers 150
Army Anchorage Headquarters (Part of this unit was at KISKA) 60

The Army headquarters on ATTU were located well inshore up the east valley behind HOLTZ Bay. It was moved to the CHICHAGOF Harbor Area after the U.S. landings on the island.

While Colonel FUJII was on ATTU, on 19 February, a U.S. naval bombardment took place. As a result of this shelling, three were killed, three wounded, and three barracks destroyed. One or two U.S. cruiser spotting planes flew over and were mistaken for Japanese planes, and hence were not fired upon for some time. He believed that these planes dropped some small bombs in the CHICHAGOF Area after they left HOLTZ Bay.

Colonel FUJII flew in a float plane over the SEMICHI ISLANDS about 1 March, surveying these islands from the air with the idea of selecting a suitable airfield site.

On 7 March a U.S. bombing raid was made against ATTU. As a result 5 were killed and 5 or 6 wounded, 3 barges were sunk and 2 buildings in a native village of CHICHAGOF were blown up.

About 1 March the SAKITO MARU and the ASAKA (or possibly AWATA) MARU, carrying food and airstrip material, ran in the HOLTZ Bay at night and unloaded for two hours. Because a U.S. submarine had been sighted, the unloading was not complete before the ships got underway and retired.

Colonel FUJII left ATTU on 15 March and went by submarine to KASHIWABARA on PARAMUSHIRO Island where he arrived on 18 March. He had a conference with Commander Fifth Fleet where he requested the delivery of personnel, food and ammunition for the Army forces on ATTU and KISKA. He departed PARAMUSHIRO on about 25 March embarked in the ASAKA MARU. On board the ASAKA were:

No. 2 Sector Unit Headquarters, Colonel YAMAZAKI 30
1 Company of the 303rd Independent Infantry Battalion 110
Replacements for the YONEKAWA Unit 300
1 anti-aircraft battalion headquarters 30
     Total 550

The SAKITO MARU sailed in the company with the ASAKA MARU, and these two ships were escorted by the First Destroyer Squadron. The SAKITO MARU had had an epidemic of typhoid fever aboard and hence carried no troops; however, she had a capacity load of cargo.

A slower ship, the Army chartered SANKO MARU, had sailed the day before. This ship carried ammunition, food and materials, but no troops.

The group of ships in company with the ASAKA MARU were joined by the cruisers of the Fifth Fleet at about noon of 26 March. At 0300 on 27 March an American Force was sighted. The last two ships in column at this time were the ASAKA MARU and the SAKITO MARU. The ASAKA MARU was the first ship to identify the enemy, and passed the word up to the column to the NACHI. The NACHI turned to the right in the direction of the enemy, while the ASAKA MARU and SAKITO MARU fled towards the KOMANDORSKI ISLANDS. Colonel FUJII saw the exchange of gunfire, hits on the NACHI, and later, the U.S. destroyers lay a smoke screen. (He heard later that 40 had been killed on the NACHI.) The transports were tracked by American flying boats for about an hour beginning at 1400. Once, the ASAKA MARU opened fire at one of these planes.

All ships returned to PARAMUSHIRO and Colonel FUJII requested an Immediate reattempt at getting the same convoy through, arguing that the American Force would have left the area after the battle. The request was not granted by the Navy because of a shortage of ammunition and fuel for the warships. Instead Commander

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Fifth Fleet assigned 3 destroyers which could carry a total of 200 personnel. This space was assigned by the Army as follows:

YAMAZAKI Headquarters 30
Anti-aircraft battalion headquarters 30
Replacements for YONEKAWA Unit 140

Colonel FUJII heard that the destroyers IKAZUCHI, INAZUMI, and one other were assigned, that they reached a point west of ATTU where they were recconnoitered by U.S. planes and that they therefore returned to PARAMUSHIRO. He also heard that Colonel YAMAZAKI finally reached ATTU by submarine on 27 April.

Meanwhile Colonel FUJII went to TOKYO to try to get something done towards defending the ALEUTIANS. A meeting was held on 8 April with the Naval General Staff. Commander Fifth Fleet was present at this meeting. A decision was made to move in reinforcements by submarine. However, because of the lack of fog in April, it was also decided that the movement must wait until May and June when it could be done under the cover of fog.

Colonel FUJII left TOKYO on 20 April, embarking on the submarine I-7 at YOKOSUKA. The I-7 carried food and ammunition, and went directly to KISKA where it arrived on 1 May.

While on KISKA awaiting the arrival of additional supply submarines, and on about 10 May, it was learned that U.S. Forces were attacking ATTU. A plan was made to load two submarines with food, ammunition and all possible troops and run them to ATTU. This plan was not carried out. Between 10 and 29 May the progress of the battle on ATTU was followed by radio dispatches. On 29 May word was received of preparations for the final charge by the Japanese ATTU garrison.

During the ATTU battle, TOKYO and SAPPORO were requested to send Army reinforcements to KISKA because a landing there was feared also. The morale of the garrison was low because ATTU had been occupied and KISKA was surrounded. On the island, work was stopped on the airstrip and the construction personnel were used to augment the defense forces. Additional defensive positions were rushed for the entire island. At this time the total personnel strength, both Army and Navy, was 5400.

Three transport submarines arrived bringing food, ammunition and a few pieces of light field artillery. One of these was the I-7 which arrived between 20 and 30 June. She was taken under fire by an American picket ship off GERTRUDE Cove and her conning tower was holed. She continued into the Cove, however, and unloaded her cargo. Leaving, she was again engaged by the American picket ship, and, being damaged, she was beached on the point southeast of the Cove. Forty of her personnel survived. Two or three submarines were sunk trying to make their way around the north end of KISKA Island.

Every day on which the weather permitted U.S. air attacks were made. On foggy days U.S. surface ships patrolled close to the island.

About 7 June a senior Army staff officer, Colonel YANAOKA, Takeshi, went to PARAMUSHIRO by submarine. He returned on about 20 June bringing news of the plan to evacuate KISKA. The formulation of a plan for the evacuation of the island was undertaken immediately by a joint council - General MINEKI, Colonel YANAOKA, and Major FUJII for the Army; Admiral AKIYAMA and Commander YASUNAMI for the Navy. The plan was to maintain the lines of defense up to the latest possible time, then to withdraw only the personnel to the ships. If an attack developed prior to embarkation, the garrison would fight to the last man.

On about 28 June, Commander YASUNAMI of the Navy staff and FUJII, representing the Army, went to PARAMUSHIRO on board a submarine (I-35 ?). There, they consulted with the Staff of Commander Fifth Fleet and of Commander First Destroyer Squadron giving the plan for assembling the troops. One of the most active participants in the planning was Captain ARICHIKA, Chief of Staff, First Destroyer Squadron.

Originally it was planned to evacuate the troops at 1600 on 11 July. The KISO and ABUKUMA with destroyers of the First Destroyer Squadron were to embark the troops. The ASAKA MARU, one tanker and the KUNAJIRI were to be a reserve group. About 1000 persons were to be taken aboard each of the light cruisers, and about 500 on each destroyer. The date, time, and plan of anchoring were sent by radio to KISKA. Rear Admiral KIMURA, Masafuku, Commander First Destroyer Squadron was in charge of the operation.

The evacuation force sailed on 7 July. Commander YASUNUMI was on board ABUKUMA, FUJII on board KISO. The stand-by area was reached on time, but there was insufficient fog on 11 July; hence, the dash to KISKA was postponed. While awaiting foggy weather, fuel ran low and the force returned to PARAMUSHIRO. They sortied again on 22 July and word was sent to KISKA to be ready to embark on 26 July. Because of the weather the dash to KISKA was delayed until 29 July. The force arrived in KISKA Harbor at about 1300 on 29 July. The troops were loaded in about 50 minutes. The evacuation group sailed in two parts; the KISO with 4 destroyers arrived in OARAMUSHIRO on 31 July, the ABUKUMA with the remaining destroyers on 1 August.

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Colonel FUJII learned from the embarked troops that the personnel had assembled several times, bringing only their small arms, and then returned to their defense positions. Booby traps were laid, trip wires were attached to bombs in air raid shelters, and various installations were blown up. Starshells and gunfire were seen to the south of KISKA on the night of 27-28 July, and the troops feared that the evacuation force had been destroyed. From the KISO, Colonel FUJII saw or heard nothing of the enemy. Their great worries aboard ship were gunfire by radar, and the lifting of the fog with air attack from AMCHITKA.

The troops were disembarked at KASHIWABARA, the location of the headquarters of the North CHISHIMA Garrison, hence they were deployed to various points in the North CHISHIMA RETTO (KURILES).

Army airfields in this area were at KITANO DAI, MIYOSHINO, and a temporary landing field north of KATAOKA. At the first of these was based the 54th Air Regiment (Fighters, KI-43) Colonel SHIMADA.

Comment on Attacks and Shipping Losses

One ship was beached at GERTRUDE Cove, it was attacked by air and damaged before Colonel FUJII's arrival.

NISSAN MARU, KANO MARU, and NOJIMA MARU were sunk or beached in KISKA Harbor before Colonel FUJII's arrival.

About 7 or 8 October - a B-26 attacked a ship in GERTRUDE Cove by torpedo, but no hit was made.

MELBOURNE MARU was not lost at KISKA. It was under attack once, but no hit was made.

Late November 11942 - URAGIO MARU was attacked by bombing and strafing, and was beached off the Main Camp at KISKA Harbor as a result of the attack.

Early December 1942 - one unidentified Army chartered ship was sunk by airplane attack 50 miles southwest of KISKA. Aboard was 1 machine gun company and 1 engineer platoon which were lost.

Early December 1942 - KOTOHIRA MARU, 7000 ton, Army charter, was sunk just before entering HOLTZ Bay at ATTU, by low level B-24 attack; aboard were approximately 1 platoon of men, food and other supplies for ATTU.

Mid-December 1942 - CHERIBON MARU, 6000 ton, Army charter, was sunk by a B-24 while unloading in HOLTZ Bay; 1 platoon of men had disembarked, there remained aboard part of the rest of her cargo of food and military supplies.

February 1943 - AKAGANE MARU, 5000 ton, ARMY charter, missing west of ATTU cause unknown; carried about 1 platoon of men and military stores including some equipment for building the airstrip; no survivors.

He also remembered an air attack against two destroyers west of KISKA in which one destroyer was sunk and the other got away.

Col. FUJII's estimate of Army casualties on KISKA due to air attacks was 45 killed, 50 seriously wounded.

United States Air Losses

September or October 1942 - a B-36 crashed into a ship in GERTRUDE Cove. This ship, whose name he did not remember, was already aground. It burned as a result of the crash. It was a 7000 ton ship with one stack and two masts.

December 1942 - a P-38 fell into the sea off KISKA Harbor. The pilot disappeared in the cold water.

January 1943 - a P-40 was shot down in GERTRUDE Cove.

Random Comment

When asked to make a general comment on the ALEUTIAN Operation, Colonel FUJII stated that if the Japanese had built many airfields immediately after the occupation it would have been a success. He considered that the rapid installation of airfields on AMCHITKA Island and at MASSACRE Bay, ATTU, was essential.

He said that horizontal-bombing by B-24's from 500-2000 meters (1600-6500 feet) was effective because of the volume of explosive dropped. The low-level attacks by B-25's and B-26's were very effective. Strafing was a fairly good form of attack, but the use of shelter reduced the Japanese personnel losses.

radar warning from the Navy station was good. It picked up planes almost as they took off from the nearest airfield. He considered its effective range to be 120 kilometers (65 nautical miles).

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 85
USSBS No. 413

JAPANESE CAPTURE OF WAKE ISLAND

TOKYO 11 November 1945

Interrogation of: Captain KOYAMA, Tadashi, IJN; Chief of Staff of the 6th Torpedo Squadron from December 1941 to 26 December 1941.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, USN.

Allied Officers present: Captain C. Shands, USN.

Summary

This interrogation describes in detail the Japanese naval action during the capture of WAKE Island. The first attempt on 10 December was a complete failure and the Japanese were forced to retire to KWAJALEIN where they revised thier plans and added considerable reinforcements. On 23 December they successfully forced a landing after having been ordered to complete the capture regardless of losses.

Transcript

This interrogation describes in detail the Japanese naval action during the capture of WAKE Island. The first attempt on 10 December was a complete failure and the Japanese were forced to retire to KWAJALEIN where they revised their plans and added considerable reinforcements. On 23 December they successfully forced a landing after having been ordered to complete the capture regardless of losses.

Transcript

Q. List the forces involved in the invasion of WAKE Island.

WAKE Invasion Force
(First Attempt, 10 December 1941)
YUBARI (F) Rear Admiral KAJIOKA

Destroyers

MUTSUKI   MOCHIZUKI
YAYOI   KISARAGI
DITE   HAYATE

Transports
2 Converted Destroyers (225 troops each)

Submarines
Two old type submarines

Surface Support Force
Cruiser Division 18

TENRYU (OCL)   TATSUTA (OCL)

Air Support Force
Land Based Bombers (KWAJALEIN)

WAKE Island Invasion Force
(Second Attempt)
23 December 1941

Cruisers
Yubari (F) Rear Admiral KAJIOKA

Destroyers

MUTSUKI   MOCHIZUKI
YAYOI   ASANGAI
OITE   YUNAGI

Transports
2 converted destroyers (250 troops each)

Submarine Force
Two old type submarines

Surface Support Force
Cruisers

KINUGASA   TENRYU
FURUTAKA   KAKO   AOBA

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Air Support Force
Aircraft carriers

SORYU   HIRYU

Land Based Bombers
(KWAJALEIN)

Q. What forces did the Japanese expect to find at WAKE?
A. The estimate of your strength was 1,000 troops and 600 laborers. We expected to have a rough time and that we would have difficulty with a landing force of only 450 men. As it was at the beginning of the war, we couldn't mass as many men as we considered necessary, and it was planned in an emergency to use the crews of the destroyers to storm the beach.

Q. What American aircraft did you expect to find at WAKE?
A. The estimate of your strength was 15 fighters. In order to neutralize them we had 30 BETTYS at KWAJALEIN. They made bombing attacks against WAKE Airfield on 8 and 9 December, so actually we had little aircraft opposition. I think that possibly five American fighters were left when we were ready to make the landing on 10 December.

Q. In general, what was the plan of the attack?
A. The general plan was to have 150 men land on WILKES Island and the balance, 300 men, on the south side of WAKE Island to capture the airfield. The northeast coast line was unsuitable for amphibious landings; also we didn't think this was too favorable a place due to the defenses. The alternative landing plan was that in the event of bad winds on the south side of the island we would land on the northeast and north coast.

Q. What were the missions of the submarines?
A. They were used as a sort of advance lookout force and their mission was to reach WAKE about 0200 on the 10th, and to look the situation over and see if they thought it was satisfactory for landing and then proceed south along the course and rendezvous with the main force, 75 miles south of WAKE. The submarines were specifically directed to investigate the reported presence of your torpedo boats.

Q. What opposition from American surface craft did you expect?
A. None was expected on 10 December but it was thought probable on 23 December.

Q. Describe the first attempt at landing on 10 December.
A. The first landing was attempted at 0300 of the 10th, along the south coast near the airfield; but it failed because the waves and wind were so strong that they overturned the boats as soon as launched. In addition we were attacked by three fighter planes and also gun emplacements from the southeast tip of WAKE. At 0730 the KISARAGI was sunk by bombing attacks and at 0815 the HAYATE was sunk by shore defense guns. Also TENRYU and TATSUTA were strafed and one of the transports (KONGO-MARU) was bombed and set afire. By reason of the bad weather and these attacks, the first landing failed.

Q. At what time prior to the approach to WAKE were you attacked by American aircraft?
A. In my opinion we were not sighted to attacked at all until we approached in sight of the island. A picket destroyer was placed 10 miles in advance in order to spot the island and notify of any unexpected opposition.

Q. Repeat the explanation of why surface forces were not expected from PEARL HARBOR.
A. We didn't think there would be any surface opposition because we knew there were no local forces. When we received the report of PEARL HARBOR, we knew there would be no opposition. However, by 23 December you had begun to recover from PEARL HARBOR attack, so we thought you might give WAKE support.

Q. Did you make a reconnaissance of WAKE before the war?
A. No, we relied on the intelligence reports from TOKYO.

Q. At what time was the decision made to abandon the landing attempt on 10 December?
A. At daylight 10 December; it was already light and we were not able to shoot down your three aggressive fighter planes. Since we had already suffered losses and the defense guns were very accurate, the O.T.C. decided at 0700 to retire to Kwajalein and make another attempt when conditions were more favorable.

Q. What action was taken by the support force on 10 December?
A. The old cruisers, TATSUTA and TENRYU, were attached to the invasion force to give support if necessary. They did not take part in the operation, but were strafed by fighter aircraft.

Q. Describe your movements after the retirement.
A. We arrived back at KWAJALEIN on 13 December, remaining until 20 December, during which time we revised plans and conducted landing exercises. The plan was not changed substantially from the previous one although we did think the same difficulty would be present; that is, fighter opposition and weather trouble. However, we received no change in instructions from superior headquarters so we proceeded with the following revision: In place of the two destroyers that were lost in the first attempt, we substituted ASANGAI and the

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YUNAGI. Also, the two aircraft carriers, SORYU and HIRYU, were ordered by the Combined Fleet Headquarters to support the landing by a pre "D" Day air attack. We embarked about 250 troops on each of the 800 ton transports. In addition, a support force was assigned consisting of four cruisers: AOBA, KINUGASA, FURUTAKA and KAKO. The landing was made on 23 December. The two aircraft carriers commenced their strikes on the 22nd and continued it during the landing operation until just before the troops went ashore.

Q. What was the location of the aircraft carriers?
A. I think they were navigating 200 to 250 miles northwest of WAKE.

Q. Did the support force include the AOBA group plus the TENRYU and TATSUTA?
A. Yes, there were six cruisers in the group; the AOBA group joined immediately after participating in the GUAM action. The supporting force did not actually take part in the invasion, but was stationed east of WAKE in the event American forces advanced from PEARL HARBOR.

Q. During the second approach to WAKE, were you attacked by American aircraft at any time?
A. No, the aircraft carriers destroyed the American aircraft.

Q. Describe the second landing operations?
A. The weather was the same as when previously attempted. Due to the threat of the gun emplacement on the southeast tip of WAKE, which had caused such damage before, it was planned to beach the destroyer transports at 12 knots to insure that the troops would reach the shore. The officer in command thought that there might be some danger of the transports capsizing because of the coral, but the decision was made to carry on. Four large MLC's, loaded with 50 troops each, were put over the side off-shore prior to the beaching of the transports. Two of the MLC's landed in the region of the southeast tip of WAKE to attempt to neutralize the gun emplacement there. The other two large MLS's landed on south coast of WILKES Island.

Q. What damage did your force receive during the approach to the beach?
A. No damage, until after arriving at the beach. In landing on WILKES the troops suffered damage before reaching the beach. One MLC may have been sunk and we had considerable casualties. In general that particular phase of the operation was unsuccessful. This action was before sunrise. The American defense guns fired at the transports, seriously damaging the one to the east. Several troops were killed, but they continued with the operation. The other two large MLC's that landed on the southeast tip of WAKE were successful and were able to put the gun emplacement there out of commission. After destruction of the American defense guns the operation proceeded satisfactorily until complete security of the garrison. The total casualties were about 250 for the whole operation with about one-half killed and one-half wounded (figures approximate).

Q. Then the total loss of ships in the second operation amounted to the two beached transports.
A. Yes.

Q. Just prior to the landing on 23 December, did the flag ship and escorting destroyers bombard the beach?
A. No. Due to the previous experience with the American shore batteries, we did not want to come within range. In addition to this we were not sure of the exact location of your guns. It was thought that under cover of darkness the landing craft and the transports could approach the island undetected and make a successful surprise landing. In the event this failed, it was planned to use all landing forces aboard the cruisers and 6 destroyers. The orders were to seize WAKE Island at all costs, beaching the destroyers if necessary.

Q. At what time did the Japanese learn that fighters were based on WAKE Island?
A. We didn't have any idea before 3 or 4 December, when information was received from TOKYO saying that there were probably 10 fighters on WAKE. Prior to that, we had no knowledge.

Q. Did you expect to find American flying boats on WAKE?
A. We thought that there would be some from PEARL HARBOR, going back and forth on patrol. We didn't think any were based there permanently.

Q. Were the submarines in the second operation also?
A. Yes, they participated and had the same mission as before.

Q. Were they of any particular assistance?
A. We were worried about the presence of torpedo boats off shore and the submarines informed us that there were none. They also told us that there were planes flying around WAKE.

Q. How long did the Japanese Force remain in the WAKE Area after the operation was completed?
A. The support force left on 24 December and the invasion force left on the 26th.

Q. How many planes did your ships shoot down during both operations?
A. I think all of your planes were put out of commission before the second operation, but we downed about seven in the first operation. The American fighter pilots were admired for their skill and bravery.

Q. Did you receive any report to the effect that an American fighter dove into the Japanese destroyer (KISARAGI) at the time it was sunk?

NAV-85

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A. It was impossible for me to tell whether a plane dove into the destroyer because of the distance. However, I could see a tremendous explosion. Since there were no survivors, it was impossible to determine accurately what happened to the ship. Due to the fact that this ship was carrying an extra supply of depth charges, it is possible that the bomb set them off causing such a big explosion that the plane was caught in the blast.

Plate 85-1: chart of Japanese invasion of Wake Island (10 Dec to 23 Dec 1941), Annex A.
Plate 85-1: chart of Japanese invasion of Wake Island (10 Dec to 23 Dec 1941), Annex A.

NAV-85

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 86
USSBS No. 414

PRODUCTION, WASTAGE AND STRENGTH

JAPANESE NAVAL AIR FORCE

TOKYO November 1945

Interrogation of: Cmdr. FUKAMIZU, J., IJN.

Interrogated by: Lt. Cmdr. R.P. Aikin, USNR.

Summary

1. In response to a request, Cmdr. FUKAMIZU prepared the following charts showing the status of the Japanese Air Force as of 1 December 1941 (Annex A) and the total number of Naval Air Force planes on hand as of 1 December 1941, the beginning of each fiscal year, 1 April, and at the end of the war (Annex B).

2. On both charts one of the categories is listed as "planes in storage" (Kokusho). Cmdr. FUKAMIZU explained that Kokusho was comparable to our A & R and Fleet Pool; that is, 65-75% of aircraft in Kokusho were under repair, 10-15% new aircraft unassigned or awaiting delivery to tactical or training commands and the balance obsolete planes, some of which were disassembled. Generally speaking, planes under repair would be available in about six weeks.

3. Cmdr. KUKAMIZU stated that approximately 25% of total strength as shown in Annex B was in Kokusho until the spring of 1945 when the percentage declined to 20%. At the end of the war 15% of the total Japanese Naval Air Force strength was in Kokusho.

Plate 86-1: chart showing Strength of Japanese Naval Air Force, 1 Dec. 1941, Annex A.
Plate 86-1: chart showing Strength of Japanese Naval Air Force, 1 Dec. 1941, Annex A.
Plate 86-2: chart showing Japanese Naval Air Strength, Production and Wastage from 1941 through 1945, Annex B.
Plate 86-2: chart showing Japanese Naval Air Strength, Production and Wastage from 1941 through 1945, Annex B.

NAV-86

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 87
USSBS No. 420

FIRST AIR FLEET - SPRING 1944

TOKYO 27 October 1945

Interrogation of: Captain FUCHIDA, MITSUO, IJN; a permanent naval officer and naval aviator; Senior Staff Officer of the First Air Fleet, 7 March to 20 June 1944.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman TELLER, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Lt. Cmdr. R.P. AIKEN, USNR.

Summary

Captain FUCHIDA provides the organization, strength and disposition of the First Air Fleet at the time of the first U.S. carrier attack on the MARIANAS, 22 February 1944. This air fleet was in process of deploying its units to the MARIANAS at the time and all of the 120 aircraft in the islands were destroyed or severely damaged.

Night aircraft torpedo tactics for attack on U.S. Task Forces were changed radically in February 1944 from a form of coordinated attack which required skillful pilots to a less complicated method.

Transcript

Q. Describe the organization, strength and disposition of the First Air Fleet on 20 February 1944?
A. The diagram I have prepared shows the information. The First Air Fleet was in process of organizing and training in JAPAN and deploying some of its units to the south, hence the figures on strength represent that to which we were building up. The actual strength was about 500 of which 380 were in JAPAN. When your carrier aircraft struck the MARIANAS on 22 February, 120 aircraft had reached those islands and all were destroyed or seriously damaged in the course of the attack or operations incident thereto. I know that 40 of our aircraft were lost during attack operations against your Task Force the night of 21/22 February and that next day 20 were shot down and 30 destroyed on the ground. I cannot explain the difference between this total of 90 and the figure of 120 lost which appears in the diagram.

By May 1944 the actual strength of the First Air Fleet was only about 400 planes in spite of our attempts to build it up. This was due to the constant attrition in actions with U.S. carrier forces and in the Central PACIFIC Islands. None of the First Air Fleet's planes were sent to NEW GUINEA during this period.

Operational losses during ferrying flights at this time averaged about 10%. The small carriers TAIYO, JUNYO and CHUYO were used to transport aircraft. Previous to this the RASUGA MARU also had been used.

Q. Do you know why the U.S. Carrier Task Force was unopposed in its approach to TRUK on 16 February 1944?
A. The first positive warning of your approach was given by our radar detecting your planes 30 minutes before the first attack. Six reconnaissance planes and bombers were sent immediately to attack the force. None of these planes returned.

Q. Describe the tactics used by your torpedo planes in attacking U.S. Task Forces at night.
A. (Refer to Annex A). Until February 1944 a method of coordinated attack was used. All torpedo planes attacked from one side as soon as proper illumination had been provided by illuminating planes which dropped flares (1,000,000 candle power) a distance of 3,000 to 5,000 meters on the opposite side of the force being attacked. This type of coordinated attack required skillful pilots.

In February 1944 the method was changed to one in which the illuminating planes circled the ships to be attacked at a radius of 3,000 to 5,000 meters and dropped flares at 20 minute intervals. The attacking planes also circled the ships but at about 10,000 meters radius. When the flare illumination was correct for one section in position to attack, that section went in without further orders. Thus the attack was prolonged, but did not require a high degree of coordination and therefore not many skillful pilots. This method was attempted without success against your force approaching the MARIANAS during the night of 21-22 February 1944.

NAV-87

--376--

    C.O. - Type A/C and
strength
 
Bases
  121 Air Corps M. IWAO. Cmdr.
SUISEI 48
(Rec.)
(KATORI)
TINIAN
  261 Air Corps T. UEDO, Cmdr.
SERO F. 96
10
(KAGOSHIMA)
SAIPAN
  263 Air Corps A. TAMAI, Cmdr.
ZERO F. 96
(MATSUYAMA)
GUAM 30
1st Air Fleet
Commander in Chief K.
KAKUDA
265 Air Corps T. URATA, Cmdr.
ZERO F. 96
(SHINCHIKU)
SAIP{AN
Vice Admiral
Chief of Staff Y. MIWA
321 Air Corps T. KUBO, Cmdr.
GEKKO 48
(KATORI)
TINIAN 10
Capt.
Senior Staff M. FUCHIDA
343 Air Corps M. TAKENAKA, Cmdr.
SHIDEN 96
(TATEYAMA)
TINIAN
Comdr.
(KANYA-KATORI)
521 Air Corps G. KAMEI, CAPT.
GINGA 96
(KISARAZU)
GUAM
TINIAN 523 Air Corps T. WADA, Cmdr.
SUISEI 96
(SUZUKA)
TINIAN
20
  761 Air Corps S. MATSUMOTO, Cmdr.
ICHISHIKI 96
(Torpedo)
(KANOYA)
TINIAN
40
  1021 Air Corps H. AWANOHARA,
Comdr. DOUGLAS 48
(KATORI)
SAIPAN
10
    Total   816 Lost   120

Note: Figures in the right hand column indicate the number of aircraft and their distribution in the MARIANAS on 20 February, 1944. All were lost in U.S. Carrier Strikes on 22 February.

696691 O - 46 - 7

NAV-87

--377--

Plate 87-1: upper diagram shows coordinated night torpedo plane attack employed by Japanese Naval Aircraft until February 1944 and the bottom diagram shows wave form of night aircraft torpedo attack employed by Japanese Naval Aircraft after February 1944.
Plate 87-1: upper diagram shows coordinated night torpedo plane attack employed by Japanese Naval Aircraft until February 1944 and the bottom diagram shows wave form of night aircraft torpedo attack employed by Japanese Naval Aircraft after February 1944.

NAV-87

--378--

 

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 88
USSBS No. 424

 

21ST AIR FLOTILLA

TOKYO 18 November 1945

Interrogation of: Captain SHIBATA, Bunzo, IJN; Senior Staff Officer 21st Air Flotilla in Formosa from December 1941 to March 1942.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, USN.

Summary

Captain SHIBATA discusses Japanese shore-based air operations during the PHILIPPINES and SOLOMONS Campaigns (December 1941 to January 1943).

Transcript

Q. List the number of aircraft assigned to the 21st Air Flotilla?
A.

First Group (TAKAO):   72 VF, Type Zero
24 VF, Reserve
6-9 Reconnaissance
KANOYA Group (TAIGHU):   54 VB (2), type One
18 VB (2), Reserve
TOKO Group (PALAU):   12 VP (4), Type 97
4 VP (4), Reserve

Note: 18 fighters of the First Group and 27 bombers of the KANOYA Group were based at SAIGON.

Q. At what time was the 21st Air Flotilla sent to FORMOSA in preparation for the war?
A. Between the 1st and 15th of November 1941.

Q. What was the general plan for the use of the aircraft in FORMOSA after the war started?
A. The mission of the 21st Air Flotilla at the very beginning of the war was divided into three parts: the first, to attack and destroy the American air force on LUZON; second, to attack the surface vessels in and around the PHILIPPINES; and third, provide coverage for Japanese invasion forces.

Q. What was the state of training of naval aircraft at FORMOSA?
A. The state of training at FORMOSA was as follows: the First Air Group was well trained and practiced day and night bombing attacks and day torpedo attacks, but no night torpedo attack. One third of the First Air Group was particularly trained in night attacks. The flying boats of the TOKO Air Group practiced long distance reconnaissance, to a distance 700 miles and approximately one-fourth of this group was trained in night reconnaissance. The KANOYA Air Group trained in the same manner as the First Air Group. The Third Air Group of the First air Attack Force (which is the same as the 21st Air Flotilla) practiced air coverage and strafing tactics. The air coverage practice was to a distance of 500 miles.

Q. Did this state of general training apply also to the 23rd Air Flotilla?
A. The degree of training of the 23rd Air Flotilla was approximately the same as for the 21st Air Flotilla except that the KANOYA Air Group of the 21st Air Flotilla was considered a little stronger than the TAKAO Air Group, and the Third Air Group of the 23rd Air Flotilla was considered a little stronger in its fighting ability than its brother air group, the Tainan Air Group.

Q. On the day the war began, what was the first mission flown by the 21st Air Flotilla?
A. The first mission flown by the 21st Air Flotilla, combined with the 23rd Air Flotilla, was made on the morning of 8 December. Because of the fog we were delayed. We intended to attack at dawn but actually delivered the attack on CLARK Field and NICHOLS Field about 1230.

Q. What was the purpose of the first attack?
A. The purpose of the first attack was to destroy enemy planes and installations on the ground. The fighters were to provide coverage for the bombers and intercept any American planes which arose in the air. After the bombers successfully completed their mission, they were to withdraw and the fighters were to strife.

Q. Did the fact that you were delayed by the fog interfere with the accomplishment of the mission?
A. There was really no effect although we were very worried because we were sure after learning of PEARL HARBOR that you would disperse your planes or make an attack on our base at FORMOSA. At FORMOSA we put on gas masks and prepared for an attack by the American aircraft.

NAV-88

--379--

Q. How many American aircraft did you expect to find on LUZON?
A. According to intelligence report from headquarters, we figured on about 300 American planes.

Q. Were they divided according to fighters and bombers?
A. I don't remember what the division was, but I think that there were 70 to 80 bombers and the rest fighters.

Q. After the fight was delayed by the fog, were you surprised to find that the American planes were still on the field?
A. Yes. As I said before, we were surprised because we thought that on account of the fog the American planes would be coming over to make an attack and we might possibly pass them in the air.

Q. In the original plan, how long did you estimate it would take to destroy the American air force in the PHILIPPINES?
A. We figured that if complete surprise was attained on 8 December it would take about four or five attacks; one week.

Q. Were planes launched from PALAU at the same time on 8 December to attack Southern PHILIPPINES?
A. At PALAU there were flying boats and fighters that were used to attack the Southern PHILIPPINES.

Q. Were there any aircraft carriers in this operation?
A. No carriers present at all. At one time we considered launching planes from a carrier to support the LINGAYAN landings but the carriers were needed at PEARL HARBOR.

Q. At what date was the 21st Air Flotilla moved into the PHILIPPINES Area?
A. It was two or three days before the Japanese landed at DAVAO. I think it was the 19th or 20th of December when the headquarters moved to PALAU.

Q. What forces were moved to PALAU?
A. About 27 planes of the KANOYA Air Group and about one-half of the TOKO Air Group went to PALAU.

Q. After the Japanese had made successful landings on LUZON and had commenced their movements south of the PHILIPPINES, did Japanese naval aircraft continue to operate in the area north of DAVAO, or was that mission taken over by the Army?
A. Part of the 23rd Air Flotilla was left in FOMROSA. Most of them needed repairs, but there were some operational planes left there in the event of air attacks by the Americans. They were later used to bomb CORREGIDOR.

Q. But in general, the support of the Japanese Army troops in the PHILIPPINES was taken over by the Army Air Force?
A. Yes, the area south of the PHILIPPINES was assigned to only Navy aircraft. Army aircraft operated in LUZON and SAIGON.

Q. When was the headquarters moved from PALAU to DAVAO?
A. We moved to DAVAO about the end of January or the first of February.

Q. At that time, from what bases were the aircraft of the 21st Air Flotilla operating?
A. In the operation against MENADO about one-half of the Third Air Group and about one-half of the KANOYA Air Group operated from the field near DAVAO. The other half of the 21st Air Flotilla operated from FORMOSA.

Q. At what time did the 21st Air Flotilla move from DAVAO to MENDADO?
A. The move was made between 10 and 20 February. At this time the Naval air forces were organized into what was known as the First Air Attack Force. It was composed of units of both the 21st and 23rd Flotillas as follows: KANOYA Group - 27 VB planes; First Air Group - 36 VB planes; Third Air Group - 48 VF planes; TOKO Group - 18 flying boats.

Q. What type of operations did the 21st Air Flotilla conduct from MENADO in preparation for operations against KENDARI?
A. Our mission was to destroy American aircraft in this area, to destroy American surface vessels and to provide coverage for occupation forces. Also we took paratroopers from DAVAO to MENADO.

Q. In the paratroop operation from DAVAO to MENADO, were the troops Army or Navy personnel?
A. Navy personnel; special Navy landing force.

Q. How many troops and planes were involved in that operation?
A. 20 transports and about 600 troops.

NAV-88

--380--

Q. Was the operation considered successful?
A. Yes.

Q. Was this force used in future operations?
A. Yes, they were used at KOEPANG.

Q. Why were paratroopers used at MENADO?
A. The idea was to take the field as fast as possible and to set up preparation for future operations as fast as possible.

Q. Do you know why no further use was made of paratroopers in later operations conducted by the Japanese?
A.I had no connection with the use of paratroopers and don't know why they were not used elsewhere after KOEPANG.

Q. Were those the only two units?
A. There were no others.

Q. At what time did the 21st Air Flotilla move to KENDARI?
A. About one week after the occupation of KENDARI (24 January).

Q. From what bases was the attack on AMBON launched?
A. Nine attacks were made from DAVAO, many attacks were made from MENADO.

Q. Did the 21st Air Flotilla participate in the attack on the American ships on 4 February?
A. Yes. We had gathered all our air strength at KENDARI because of the very good landing field and prepared for the operation against JAVA. While on a bombing mission to SOERABAJA one of our aircraft spotted the Allied ships and the attack resulted. We used all aircraft available.

Q. During the time the 21st Air Flotilla was operating in KENDARI, where was the 23rd Air Flotilla?
A. The 23rd Air Flotilla did not operate east of the CELEBES; main bases were TARAKAN, BALIKPAPAN, and BANJERMASIN.

Q. In general, what was the mission of the flying boats?
A. Reconnaissance. At the early part of the war we made night bombing attacks on AMBON.

Q. Did the 21st Air Flotilla move south of KENDARI?
A. No, but we went to AMBON for a while, then returned to KENDARI and then back to JAPAN.

Q. Are you familiar with the action south of JAVA in which the LANGLEY was sunk?
A. Yes, the ship was sunk by aircraft from the 21st Air Flotilla and the 23rd Air Flotilla.

Q. Did you launch a special search for the LANGLEY or was she located during a routine search?
A. Before the occupation of JAVA we carried out extensive regular patrols south of SUNDA Island, and it was one of the patrols that located the ship. An attack was launched immediately and succeeded in sinking the LANGLEY.

Q. Did you consider that the American flying boats were a particular threat to your operation?
A. No, there was very little interference by American flying boats. They made bombing attacks at DAVAO and JOLO but I don't know details. They were used mostly for reconnaissance.

Q. Did you make any special effort to locate and destroy the planes and the tenders that these planes were operating from?
A. Yes, we generally sent out about 10 planes to bases where we thought there would be flying boats, for the purpose of strafing and setting them afire. There was no special effort made to locate and destroy the bases \ of the flying boats.

Q. What units of the 23rd Air Flotilla based at KOEPANG?
A. About one-half of the Third Air Group - only fighters.

Q. Did this group participate in the attack on BROOME, the end of February?
A. Yes.

Q. What damage did they inflict in that attack?
A. They destroyed 10 large seaplanes.

Q. How did you know the flying boats were at BROOME?
A. Fighters attacking BROOME were sent out on a regular reconnaissance attack mission. This attack was standard throughout the campaign.

NAV-88

--381--

Q. What was the relationship between the Naval Air Force and the surface forces conducting the advance to the south?
A. Before the operation, orders were issued setting forth all details of air operations and the air force acted accordingly. As a general rule we provided cover up until the day of the landing and then supported the landing. There was cooperation but no direct chain of command. The commander of the Second Fleet was the controlling authority.

Q. Were the Japanese able to construct airfields as rapidly as planned?
A. Generally speaking, the construction of the airfields was slower than we anticipated.

Q. In regard to maintenance of aircraft, was that considered satisfactory during the operation?
A. Yes, we had good supplies and the maintenance personnel were efficient.

Q. How many aircraft were lost in the operation?
A. Actually there were very small losses. The majority of losses were operational due to poor navigation, also aircraft were lost due to bad condition of airfields. About 10 to 15 planes were lost in the whole operation while on combat missions.

Q. Did you expend your reserve aircraft during the operation?
A. Yes, most of the reserve planes were expended. Originally the reserve planes were left in FORMOSA and ferried down as needed. Later, repair depots were set up in the PHILIPPINES and replacement aircraft assembled there. No additional aircraft were received from JAPAN as the reserves were sufficient to fill our needs.

Note: The remainder of this interrogation deals briefly with the activities of the 26th Air Flotilla, of which Captain SHIBATA was senior Staff Member, in the RABAUL Area during the fall of 1942. Information obtained is summarized below.

Immediately after the capture of RABAUL the 25th Air Flotilla was ordered into the area. The aircraft assigned was as follows:

TAINAN Air Group  : 48 fighters
Fourth Air Group   15 bombers
TOKO Group   6 flying boats

The primary mission of the Japanese aircraft was to search south of RABAUL and make attacks against PORT MORESBY and HORN Island. After the American invasion of GUADALCANAL the 25th Air Flotilla was joined by the 26th Air Flotilla which at that time was composed of:

KISARAZU Air Group   36 bombers
MISAWA Air Group   36 bombers
Sixth Air Group   48 fighters

The 25th and 26th Air groups operated together and were assigned the following mission:

(1)Destroy American air power
(2) Assist in the capture of GUADALCANAL

It was anticipated that the Americans would feed 400 planes per month into the SOLOMONS and plans were made accordingly.

Until January 1943 there were no operational Army aircraft in the RABAUL Area.

NAV-88

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 89
USSBS No. 427

CARRIER AIRCRAFT STRIKES ON SAIGON AND FORMOSA

TOKYO 22 November 1945

Interrogation of: Commander TERAI, Yoshimori, IJN; a permanent naval officer and naval aviator of 17 years service; on duty at Navy Department and Naval General Staff from June 1942 to end of war.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman TELLER, USN.

Summary

Commander TERAI lists vessels known sunk or damaged by the carrier air strikes at SAIGON and vicinity 12 January 1945 and on FORMOSAN ports 15 January 1945.

The shortage of experienced naval aviation pilots became important toward the end of the SOLOMONS Campaign in October 1943. Japanese pilots preferred fighter assignments, were about equally divided in preference for carrier and shore-based squadrons, and particularly disliked patrol duty.

Q. What information do you have regarding results of U.S. carrier strikes in SOUTH CHINA SEA between 12-15 January 1945 and from what source did you obtain it?
A. The information was obtained from Japanese documents recently brought to TOKYO and turned over to U.S. Armed Forces. On 12 January your carrier aircraft attacked SAIGON with the following results: 12 aircraft destroyed on the ground, 3 Ex-French transports sunk (names and tonnage unknown), 1 oil storage tank burned.

Near Cape St. JACQUES the same day, six transports which were at anchor were burned or sunk. At the same time the following vessels were attacked and received damage but details are unknown because we have no further records of them: Coast defense vessel No. 17, Coast defense vessel No. 19, Coast defense vessel CHIBURI and Special naval transport No. 149.

To the northward of SAIGON on 12 January a north bound convoy was attacked by carrier aircraft with the following damage: 10 transports or freighters damaged or sunk, Convoy flagship KASHI (OCL) sunk, and the following coast defense vessels either damaged or sunk: URUKU, DAITO, TSUSHIMA, No. 23, No. 27 and No. 51.

At FORMOSAN ports on 15 January, carrier dive-bombers caused the following damage:

TAKAO - HATAKAZE, sunk; No. 14 Transport sunk; MIRI MARU, slight damage.
BAKO- TSUGA (DD), sunk.
KIIRUN - YOSHUN MARU, beached; BEIJU MARU, slight damage.
BORYO - ENTO MARY, beached.

During these same attacks two naval training planes were destroyed on ground, one was severely damaged and one patrol plane received slight damage.

The foregoing information is not necessarily complete because all reports are not available; however, the damage listed is correct.

Q. What were your duties in the Navy Department and at Naval General Headquarters?
A. From January 1943 to January 1945 I was in charge of allocation of aircraft pilots. After the latter date I worked on basic air planning.Q. At what point during the war did the shortage of naval aviation officers or pilots become an important factor in planning?
A. We always had enough pilots in numbers but after the SOLOMONS Campaign, about October 1943, the shortage of skillful pilots became apparent. A skillful pilot was considered to be one who could operate from a carrier day or night and carry out coordinated torpedo attacks. On the average it required about 800 hours of flying to make a skillful pilot.

Q. What were the naval pilots' principal preferences and dislikes in duty assignments during the war?
A. All pilots, particularly the young ones, wanted to go to the active front. Carrier duty and advanced base squadrons were about equally preferred. Fighter planes were most popular, patrol and reconnaissance planes the most unpopular. Patrol plane duty was particularly disliked because it was felt that the research on design of patrol planes and their equipment was far behind what it should have been.

NAV-89

--383--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 90
USSBS No. 429

OBSERVATIONS ON JAPAN AT WAR

TOKYO 8 November 1945

Interrogation of: Admiral NOMURA, Kichisaburo, IJN; former Ambassador to the UNITED STATES (1941), appointed member of the Privy Council, 26 May 1944.

Interrogated by: Rear Admiral R.A. Ofstie, USN, Mr. Paul Baran, Lt. Comdr. C.N. Spinks, USNR.

Allied Personnel Present: Mr. Paul Nitze, Captain T.J. Hedding, USN, Colonel Philip Cole, AUS.

Summary

Admiral NOMURA discusses the background of the war, the situation within JAPAN at various times, and the peace efforts.

Q. (Rear Admiral Ofstie) Please outline your official status and activities from time of return to JAPAN until the close of the war.
A. Upon my arrival at SINGAPORE, on my way home to JAPAN, I submitted my resignation but it was not confirmed for two or three months. I was at that time an Ambassador at Large, which position I kept until about the end of that year. As I had no official position, I did not go to the Foreign Office. This year I was appointed to the Privy Council upon the recommendation of Admiral SUZUKI who was President or Vice President of the Council. During this period I traveled quite a bit about the country, and I observed that the people did not know the true situation.

Q. Were you fairly familiar yourself with what talk was going on in General Headquarters; did you discuss it with your friends in the Government?
A. I knew in general what talk was going on, but when I speak with our generals they did not seem to know much of the situation although I spoke frankly with them. As the situation wasn't going well, it was rather embarrassing for them. Since joining the Privy Council, I heard discussions by Army and Navy officers and they must have been more frank in these discussions than they were to newspaper men; and also, since I was at one time a professional naval officer, I was able to grasp the situation from their talks a little bit better than the average person. Of course, they were reluctant to discuss the situation publicly and wished chiefly to maintain the morale of the people. They seemed to think that if we stood fast the people in the UNITED STATES might by and by weary of the war.

Q. And make a compromise peace?
A. I, myself, wished that. From the beginning I did not think the Japanese could win this war because your country is so vast and your resources so very great. I had little confidence in the outcome, and also during my duty as naval attache I studied your country and militarily it is strongly situated and impregnable.

Q. Was there any effort by people like yourself or official people to start a compromise peace earlier?
A. There were many intelligent people who believed that the longer the war lasted the worse it would be for Japan, and I think there must have been many who wished it to end much earlier. However, in the mind of the people an early termination of the war seemed impossible and the thought was that the people must be kept together.

Q. How early do you suppose that feeling developed; was it 1943-1944, after some particular operation?
A. The results of the Battle of MIDWAY were concealed from the people. I left NEW YORK just after this battle, so that I knew what had happened from reading the NEW YORK papers; but the people at home did not know at all. Later on when SAIPAN was lost I thought it very bad for JAPAN.

A. The Council was very ignorant about the war situation. There were three Navy men and two Army men on the Privy Council, and since the Army men on the Council were always thinking of ground operations they could not grasp the ocean strategy. I was later told that the late President of the Council who died a year ago was very disappointed and, therefore, he died quickly. When I was appointed to the Privy Council he was President and I approached him and told him the real situation. When I told him very frankly what was going on he was rather surprised.

Q. Do you feel that all through the war there was the same thing, the Army people did not understand the sea and the problems of the Navy?
A. There must have been an exchange of information and talk between the Army General Staff and the Navy General Staff and they must have realized the true situation.

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Q. Did the Privy Council really decide what to do?
A. No, the Privy Council was very impotent. Whenever a bill proposed by the government and sanctioned by the EMPEROR was presented to the Privy Council, it was assumed to be all right and in most cases we agreed.

Q. You interfered not at all with military affairs?
A. That is not done in the Japanese political system. The EMPEROR is Commander in Chief and he has as his Staff, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy and their Staff Officers, who are quite independent of the Government and, further, they do not allow outside interference. This I think is a question for careful study as to whether or not it is a proper system.

Q. Did you say this war in the PACIFIC was primarily Army or Navy?
A. I don't know for sure, but it has been said that the Navy went too far at the beginning and that the Army did not like to follow the Navy.

Q. When the first basic plan was set, don't you believe the Army and Navy were together on that?
A. They must have agreed willingly or reluctantly, I do not know; but the Army perhaps did not think so well of it and it must have been difficult for them to agree to some of the plans initiated by the Navy. For instance, BOUGAINVILLE in the SOLOMONS; it was said that the Army did not like to go so far.

Q. Was their interest mostly in MANCHURIA and CHINA?
A. The Army was thinking mostly about the Continent.

Q. Do you think because of the attitude they obstructed the work of the Navy in the PACIFIC?
A. At the last, they must have agreed on what was done.

Q. That is, the General Staff had to be in agreement before any move would be made; for example, the expansion of the original plan would go up into the ALEUTIANS, and MIDWAY?
A. Yes, they must have agreed because according to our system they could not act individually. Therefore, in spite of difficulties, they must have agreed before any operations were undertaken. Before I left for the UNITED STATES I discussed the possible war with naval officers. The younger people were not sure in their own minds, but the older officers did not wish war with the UNITED STATES at all; and, therefore, they wished that my mission would be successful. I believe that all of the older officers I met with wished my mission success.

Q. How did you fell about the MANCHURIA and KWANTUNG Army people; did they want war?
A. They perhaps under-estimated the speed of your reactions. They did not consider that when we occupied our outposts and established garrisons that the UNITED STATES would react as quickly as actually happened. Some people believe that your advance towards JAPAN would be very slow. However, I myself agreed to this, I did not think your force would be mobilized so quickly and on so big a scale. Although the people to whom I talked upon my return thought I always overestimated the potentialities of the UNITED STATES, now I feel that I myself underestimated.

Q. Was that with particular reference to the Navy, or our movements of troops, our Amphibious Forces or what?
A. In every respect. During the last war I was in your country and was permitted to visit ship-building yards, and I saw with my own eyes what you were doing there. My people think that I overestimated the strength of the UNITED STATES, not only in speed but quantity too. My people thought that in the first war you only accomplished about 80% or 90% of what you planned. I was four years in Washington during the first World War and could imagine what you could do this time.

Q. When you came back, then, you yourself knew what Americans could build, and how fast. Did you feel that the High Command in JAPAN felt that they could actually win the war, or were they all expecting a compromise peace?
A. I think what they had in mind was to get a draw and maintain our national honor and not unconditional surrender. In the Russo-Japanese War, although the Russians came in superior numbers, our fleet defeated their fleet at TSUSHIMA, and intelligent people knew that was the end of the war in which we got a compromise peace. Public speakers always told that we had won a brilliant victory, and the Army didn't think it was a draw, which I think most intelligent people must have known, but did not speak of officially so as to maintain morale of the people.

Q. Do you think that many people in High Command had hopes of German victory over RUSSIA or over ENGLAND?
A. I think most people thought that GERMANY would win; at least a majority thought so.

Q. Consequently there would be a better chance of winning a compromise peace if GERMANY won?
A. They did not think that GERMANY would be defeated. Even at the time of the NORMANDY landings most people thought that this landing would be a very difficult operation, and they did not think that the Allied armies would so quickly continue on to GERMANY's defense line. They were disillusioned.

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Q. Do you feel there was any real common interest between JAPAN and GERMANY other than both fighting the Allies at the same time with the consequent obvious advantages?
A. Once the alliance was made we had to stick to it. It was wrong for our people and I personally think it was a very foolish policy.

Q. There was no common interest other than to win the war?
A. Mutual help was impossible. Our interests were very much in the sea, and since the GERMAN naval power was small in comparison with UNITED STATES or ENGLAND it was a very unwise policy to make an alliance with GERMANY. I do not feel that the Japanese Navy was in favor of this alliance. Admiral YAMAMOTO, before he became Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, was Vice Navy Minister and was greatly influenced by younger naval officers. He was even threatened by gangsters.

Q. Do you think that the Army was more in favor of this alliance in view of the desire to eliminate RUSSIA as a force on the Asiatic Continent?
A. They must have thought along these lines. I believe that the Tri-Partite Alliance was a development of Anti-Comintern Pacts.

Q. Do you feel that the Army was looking toward RUSSIA as the major threat, and the Navy perhaps looking into the PACIFIC?
A. Yes, but as I told you before, most people did not know the strength of the UNITED STATES. I think there were some in the Navy who favored war with the UNITED STATES, but it must have been a very small movement. Those who favored war must have thought that I was appointed to WASHINGTON through influence by the Navy.

Q. The Navy being anxious to avoid war, is that the reason?
A. Yes, but I think things went too far. Although I am not a diplomat and that is beyond my understanding, I feel very strongly that the Navy people, especially the head of the Navy, wanted me to try one more time to avoid the war; and therefore I was obliged to go to Washington. The Army was much stronger than the Navy in politics.

Q. Did they have actually more power in Imperial Headquarters around the Throne?
A. That I do not know. The Army was far more influential politically than the Navy. They had organizations of men stationed throughout the country, in every "gun" (county), city and village, and had direct influence on Perfectural governments and even down to the local police. The Navy, on the other hand, was centered in a few locations such as at YOKOSUKA and KURE, and didn't have much to do with the government of the Prefecture. They kept their hands out of politics. Therefore, upon comparison I feel that the Army had far more influence on public opinion and in politics.

Q. When you returned here, after MIDWAY, what was the common opinion then as to the weakest point in the defense perimeter, the most dangerous to JAPAN?
A. I think our fighting line was extended too far beyond our national strength, our line was everywhere weak and we could not help the weak points. Too much expansion in comparison with our national strength. In CHINA, the Chinese do not fight, therefore we could maintain that extended fighting line for many years; but even there our fighting line was too much extended.

Q. But particularly in the PACIFIC?
A. On the land too, they could not supply the necessary shipping. They went too far in the original plan. All our reserves were distributed at first to the front fighting lines, and we could not help them when these reserves were used up. We could not supply our outposts.

Q. Which would you say was the principal threat of the two in the PACIFIC, the one through the Central PACIFIC or the one from AUSTRALIA - NEW GUINEA?
A. Both very dangerous. I did not know that our Navy was going to make a surprise attack on HONOLULU, but when I returned I found out from the Navy Department that this was the limit of the Navy strength and they could not go any further than HONOLULU. Some of your people say that we could have landed; but with so large an expedition necessary for this, it was impossible to affect surprise. Therefore the plan was to make an attack and retire; that was the maximum we could do. On the southern front I personally thought our fleet might come from the south through NEW GUINEA and to the northwest; if not that to bomb SINGAPORE and JAVA. Both of these were very serious threats and there is no difference between the two.

Q. Was it the American Fleet that would constitute that threat from the south, coming to the northwest?
A. If they cut our lines between NEW GUINEA and the PHILIPPINES some troops might accompany this force, but it would be carried out principally by the Navy. I think a small number of troops became rather small garrisons on those islands.

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Q. But after MIDWAY we had a very small fleet and it couldn't be much of a threat for some time; you had no fear of our fleet, then?
A. I don't know exactly, but imagine it would take quite a time for you to recover your fleet strength; but you recovered more quickly than we expected. We were told by the navy spokesman that you had repair facilities beyond our imaginations, that you had big floating docks for use in repairing ships which you brought from the UNITED STATES. Your repair facilities were better than we calculated.

Q. Was it the quick increase in the size of our fleet which took you by surprise; was it because our fleet was bigger than you thought?
A. The speed of your operations must have been far quicker than our people thought. Our Navy must have been surprised. For instance, after the MARSHALLS Campaign, SAIPAN came far earlier than expected. Therefore, SAIPAN was not prepared at all. The Army sent two divisions to SAIPAN and the Commanding General, after his arrival, had hardly looked over his island when your attack began. Everywhere, I think, you attacked before the defense was ready. You came far more quickly than we expected.

Q. You think that was again because of the American Fleet being built up more quickly and having good repair facilities right behind it?
A. Your repair facilities counted very much. I understand that in the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS there is a big repair base, also in the MARSHALLS there are repair facilities. Our Navy must have figured that when your ships were damaged they would have to go to HONOLULU and not to the islands where floating docks and other repair facilities were available. I have been told that in some docks you could repair even heavy ships.

Q. Where did you hear that?
A. I heard that in the Privy Council. I know that SAIPAN was a very important position and an acquaintance of mine was in the air force stationed there. I asked whether or not the Saipan defenses were all right. He said that the coast of SAIPAN being very precipitous that if the landing points were properly defended SAIPAN was safe. This was just a few days before the actual landing. I believed that, but I know you landed there and it disappointed me very much.

Q. Was it generally known that landing was about to begin?
A. The people didn't actually know. However, they knew we had a fleet and thought that there would be a fleet action there and placed their hopes on this fleet action.

Q. When these vast moves went along one right after another and finally came to LEYTE, did that come as a surprise to the Privy Council - the landing at LEYTE?
A. They expected that you would come to DAVAO in MINDANAO by way of BOUGAINVILLE and NEW GUINEA. You did not come to our defended points but hopped over defended places and went to weaker places. Our Army and Navy should have guarded against such an operation from their knowledge of past experience. There were several occasions in NEW GUINEA and the SOLOMONS where you by-passed well defended points. You did not come to RABAUL but left it behind; therefore, they should have known and guarded against this.

Q. Do you think that possibly the U.S. Forces might have avoided the PHILIPPINES entirely?
A. They must have thought you would come to the PHILIPPINES; but I thought you would not come to FORMOSA but rather to the RYUKYUS. Premier SUZUKI in his speech about a year ago stated that we must have a good defense in the RYUKYUS; he felt that would be your approach. I myself thought FORMOSA would be by-passed. In such large islands there are many people and only a small amount of resources, whereas in the RYUKYUS there were good resources and supplies. Therefore, you would not come to FORMOSA but rather to the RYUKYUS.

Q. You didn't expect we would go to the CHINA Coast?
A. That was discussed, and SAISHU TO and KOREA were considered, for instance. I myself being a Navy man always thought it would be much easier to capture an island, an island which has operational advantage.

Q. Why go to the PHILIPPINES; did you still feel we would go to the PHILIPPINES?
A. Yes, there was much talk by one of your Generals that he would recapture the PHILIPPINES. He gave much praise to the Filipinos and said that he would come back to the PHILIPPINES. Therefore, it was our opinion that you had to go there.

Q. You think we had to go?
A. That I don't know. Our lines of supply were cut so it would result in much waste of blood to capture an island just to be used for the purpose of advancing a further operation. It is far more useful not to land on big islands.

Q. Don't you think that was one weak point in Japanese defense that she had those small islands undefended?
A. Yes, I felt that there were many weak points throughout the Central PACIFIC. These islands were weakly defended. The garrisons that were sent there couldn't depend on help from outside, they could only do their best

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and fight until they died. Those were very weak points, so many small places poorly defended. If we had been able to maintain our lines of communications, any need for help from these places could be requested by radio; but we could not maintain our lines of communication.

Q. What is your opinion how extended a line should you have established?
A. When I was on the Navy General Staff it was felt that the best we could do was fight in the PHILIPPINES; but the initial successes must have caused them to expand their ideas. Initially it was the PHILIPPINES.

Q. That was to keep the lines of communication to the south and west?
A. Yes; but when they went as far as BOUGAINVILLE in the SOLOMONS, it was a great mistake.

Q. Too much for shipping available?
A. Yes, I believe people at home miscalculated our shipping losses. They did not anticipate the large decrease in shipping; they thought losses could be compensated for by new building. Airplanes and submarines damaged our shipping very much.

Q. You said before that everyone was surprised by early recuperation of the American Navy. What did you estimate as time for recovery after the PEARL HARBOR disaster?
A. I am not sure how they felt. I myself thought that the ships at PEARL HARBOR could be repaired within at most one year. We had experience at PORT ARTHUR; the ships sunk there, later on joining the Japanese Fleet. Therefore with your facilities I felt that you could repair your ships within one year.

Q. Assuming that JAPAN would have been allowed two or three years to prepare her defenses, how would they have planned to do it? How would they use these two or three years?
A. That is a very difficult question. I believe that the ideas of our people were that the war might last many years and that if we resisted very stubbornly you might get tired.

Q. (Mr. Baran) Was there a very strong idea of organizing economic resources of the south resources area?
A. They tried to use these resources, for instance oil. Therefore as soon as these islands were captured, experts were sent to get oil. At first all went well; but when our lines of communication were disturbed, it did not go so well.

Q. You mean if JAPAN had had more time you think they might have been able to draw major advantages from these islands?
A. We felt we could get resources from those islands; we depended on that. Our oil stocks were very limited and we must get oil from these islands; and, therefore, whether or not you initiated your attack quickly or slowly was the big question, the determining fate of the war. Most people thought if we could get supplies from those islands undisturbed we could go on many years.

Q. Do you think that the preparations for economic exploitation were adequate for this area in JAPAN after they conceived of the idea of militarily occupying these islands?
A. That I do not know, but my common sense tells me that they thought we could get oil from those areas and continue the war. However, they very greatly under-estimated the strength of your submarines; they did not expect they would be so effective.

Q. Did the submarines come too soon?
A. Yes, your submarines were very efficient and their operations very extensive. It was believed in JAPAN that your people did not like submarines because in the past your Navy always advocated the abolishment of undersea craft. Therefore, we did not believe that you would employ submarines so extensively.

Q. Would you be willing to make a judgment as to whether or not Japanese derived economic advantage in terms of her potential?
A. I am not too well informed on that; however, I believe it must have been felt that we needed a great amount of oil, rubber and metals, etc. However, in the early stages we got very little and I believe that they were too optimistic at the beginning.

Q.(Rear Admiral Ofstie) Do you think that the operations of the Army in CHINA absorbed so much of the war effort that it affected the war in the PACIFIC?
A. Personally I do not know; however, our Government always wanted to finish the CHINA War, and during my tour in Washington we requested your President to act as an intermediary. It was felt that if we could arrive at an agreement which would be in accord with your basic policies and would withdraw from CHINA, we could arrive at an agreement. However, at that time our people thought we were winning in CHINA and that we must get something out of CHINA. That was a major cause of this war. If we had terminated the CHINA War much earlier, this war would not have occurred as there would have been no reason.

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Q. The Army of course was responsible for that feeling about CHINA?
A. Yes, however, the Army wished to end the CHINA War quickly, but at the same time they wished to get something out of it.

Q. They weren't willing to come out entirely?
A. They were not willing to come out entirely, and they wanted to station troops in certain points in CHINA and then be able to say to the people, "We have spent so much but we have received so much". Now we feel that the CHINA situation was a big mistake.

Q. You think the Army expanded too much in CHINA, the Army had too big ideas of what could be done in CHINA?
A. They thought the job would be much easier than it was and they thought that they could accomplish things without much cost. However, I don't think they planned to go as far as they did.

Q. Why did they go further than planned?
A. The situation perhaps made them go beyond their original plans. I was told that they considered that it could be finished within six months.

Q. Do you think the Army actually did all that was possible to finish the CHINA Campaign or was it a minimum undertaking? Did they throw in all they had in the CHINA War, or wasn't it an all out attempt, or was it a limited war?
A. I think they believed it was a limited war and that they did not need to commit many soldiers or a great deal of material.

Q. In 1939 and early 1940 they must have realized this was a very difficult procedure. If you didn't need your forces in any other theater, why didn't they go all out to win the CHINA War?
A. It might not have been possible but would have been very difficult. In CHINA, due to the geographical situation, there was no way in which to use our full strength against the CHUNGKING Government; and therefore to a certain extent Chiang Kai Shek was in an impregnable position. This can be compared to the war between RUSSIA and GERMANY in which RUSSIA could have retreated east of the URALS where they could have reorganized their Army and where they had steel and other production potential. They could have resisted for a long time and in this situation it was impossible for the German Army to utilize their full strength beyond the URALS. The same situation applied to Chiang Kai Shek. We had many opportunities to make a compromise with Chiang Kai Shek, but to save face or for some similar reason we stopped attempting to make a compromise.

Q. Did you say the Army was primarily responsible for this situation?
A. I think this was true. The Army was very influential and they promised many things to our people. If they evacuated CHINA they would lose their prestige. In order to save face they were forced to continue.

Q. With all their interest and activity in CHINA, did they during the war to any extent attempt to control naval operations? Did they, for example, insist on using submarines for supplying bases; did they interfere in naval business?
A. I do not believe they interfered with naval operations although they sometimes were not contented with the way the Navy was operating. I have also been told that they built their own submarine transports and transport carriers. They did not go so far as to attempt to control the Navy. However, they would requisition transports for their own use; and when HONGKONG was captured, the Army wanted to keep half of the dockyard in order to repair their transports and to build additional transports. The Navy did, however, provide personnel to help them build transports and to train officers in their use, but they did not interfere with fleet operations.

Q. They did not exert pressure to try to get the Navy to go out and destroy our fleet?
A. I did not hear of any such pressure. In the past there were instances, for example in the China-Japanese War, when Army officers were appointed to be Chief of Naval Operations. However, in this war that did not occur. They might talk but they had no authority to act.

Q. (Mr. Baran) Do you think the structure of your war organization at the top had anything to do with the way the war went? Did the relationship between Army and Navy and Air strength make any difference? Did you ever think it could be changed and improved?
A. There was considerable discussion regarding the use of a single air force, independent of the Army and Navy. There was also considerable dispute between the Army and Navy on how to divide munitions; that was always a big question. Therefore, the Department of Munitions was established. However, the possible use of our total force for a single purpose did not go smoothly, the Army wanted so much and the Navy so much and there were many disputes.

Q. What view did you take?
A. I haven't arrived at any opinion on that subject; however, I do know that there is much discussion going on now on that subject.

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Q. To whom did the Privy Council make its report after a decision was made?
A. We made our report to the EMPEROR.

Q. In that case then, the head of the Privy Council would go direct to the EMPEROR himself?
A. The EMPEROR would be present at the final sessions of the Council. During my years of experience in the Council though, there wasn't much dispute; they always arrived at an agreement.

Q. Would you say that Baron HIRANUMA had a good deal of influence with the EMPEROR?
A. He was one time Premier, and how much influence he has I do not know.

Q. Did he have more or less influence than KIDO?
A. Marquis KIDO always had great influence on Privy Council matters. He always had the confidence of the EMPEROR and therefore had quite wide influence in the country.

Q. (Lt. Comdr. Spinks) What influence did the JUSHIN exercise in the selection of a new Premier after a Cabinet resignation?
A. The JUSHIN had little influence. Only recently was this body used to select Premiers; and since they only had experience of a few years, they were not requested to attend important meetings. The Lord Privy Seal however had much influence in the selection of the Cabinet.

Q. Looking at the overall picture, Admiral, what would be your personal opinion of the cooperation of the Army and Navy during the war? Did they work at cross purposes?
A. That is a difficult question to answer. Admiral SHIMADA who was the Navy Minister at the beginning of the war worked very closely with Premier TOJO, and the Navy was quite disappointed in this. The Navy felt it was losing its own individuality and they complained that SHIMADA made too many compromises with TOJO; and as a result of this feeling, they compelled him to retire. I have a feeling that the Navy always wanted to maintain its own individuality. In the three years after PEARL HARBOR, perhaps SHIMADA worked too closely with TOJO, and the Navy complained very much, particularly about the disposition of aircraft production. The Navy General Staff felt that SHIMADA should get more planes for the Navy. During the three years, I do not feel that he satisfied the Navy.

Q. Thereafter, when you came back for example, did things go smoothly then?
A. When I returned to JAPAN the people did not know the real situation, after the MIDAY Battle. They thought the war was going along very well and they had no complaint. But later on when losses began to be announced, although this was a part of the real situation, they complained very bitterly. I do feel, however, that the Navy did know the real situation.

Q. When did Admiral SHIMADA retire as Navy Minister?
A. About the middle of July 1944. He was succeeded by Admiral NOMURA, Naokuni, who held the position only three days, because three days later the TOJO Cabinet fell.

Q. Why, in your opinion, was that change made just before the eve of the fall of the Cabinet?
A. At this time TOJO wanted to remain and did not expect that he would be forced to retire. Although a new Navy Minister was appointed, this had little effect since TOJO did retire.

Q. Did the Navy force that situation?
A. The Navy did not interfere. However, their primary interest was in maintaining the Navy, and therefore, within the Navy it was an almost unanimous feeling that the Office of the Navy Minister and the Chief of Naval Operations must not be embodied in a single person, which feeling compelled SHIMADA to retire. Although they did not say that the Army should do the same, I have feeling that this trend resulted in TOJO's retirement. He combined the Chief of Staff with Premier, and was also War Minister.

Q. Was it the Lord Privy Seal who asked TOJO to retire?
A. I do not know that; however, I do not think so as only the EMPEROR can compel the retirement of the Prime Minister. However, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal can make proposals and recommendations to the EMPEROR. The EMPEROR, however, is very gentle and does not remove ministers because he is displeased. I do remember, however, that there is perhaps one instance when Premier TANAKA was compelled to retire, but such cases are very unusual.

Q. Then if the Prime Minister feels that the EMPEROR is dissatisfied, he retires on his own initiative?
A. In the case of TANAKA, this was so. That was because of the bombardment of CHAN SO LIN, MANCHURIA. Whether or not the EMPEROR expressed his will, I do not know. However, if the Minister felt that the EMPEROR was displeased, he would probably retire.

Q. In the case of TOJO, was it a similar incident?
A. I am not sure of this; however, it was impossible for TOJO to maintain his position. I was told that some of our senior statesmen were saying that TOJO should have resigned much earlier.

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Q. At what time did the Cabinet first reconsider the question as to whether or not the war should be continued?
A. As far as I know that question came up at the end of the SUZUKI Cabinet. I knew SUZUKI very well and served under him, and I feel sure he knew the true situation, and that when he became Prime Minister he was perhaps informed by the Army and Navy of their true situation. He further knew the EMPEROR's mind, and together with his own convictions he made attempts to approach Soviet RUSSIA hoping that RUSSIA would act as an intermediary. Whether or not that was wise, I do not know. In any case the Tri-Partite Pact was still in force, and in any case RUSSIA did not answer. Our minister approached MOLOTOV and requested that RUSSIA act as an intermediary. In view of this, SUZUKI must have felt that the war must be ended. There were still many responsible men who wanted to continue the war. I cannot understand what the Army and Navy must have been thinking of; but if the war continued, JAPAN would be wholly destroyed and I think some of the Army and Navy would not hesitate to be destroyed completely, and they persuaded the people that they must die fighting. I also know that in the country where I was, the farmers believed that when such an occasion came they must be ready. SUZUKI thought that we could not sacrifice the people for the sake of the Army and Navy, the people must be saved. As a result of this strong feeling, near the end of the war, his house was burned down. I still feel that, as Premier, SUZUKI did the right thing in taking steps to stop the war and prevent the Japanese people from being destroyed. I feel that the Prime Minister was not as concerned with the war as he was with saving the people, even though the Navy and Army lost face. He felt he must save the people, and even today he thinks he did the right thing.

Q. Did SUZUKI get much support from others in that policy?
A. So far as I know there was considerable disagreement among council members. Although as Premier, SUZUKI felt the war should be stopped, it was necessary that the Council be in accord, and if he could not reach an accord in his Council he would be compelled to retire. The Minister himself could not take the responsibility for ending the war. I believe that the EMPEROR told SUZUKI that his mind was made up to end the war; and in spite of the fact that certain ministers made eloquent speeches to continue the war, the EMPEROR said, "My mind is made up in this case. Your views are understood, but I know what we must do in this case". I was told some of them retired with tears in their eyes.

Q. I imagine it was most difficult for the Army Minister?
A. As member of the Cabinet he knew the real situation, but as head of the Army he knew that there was a strong feeling in the Army for continuing the war. Therefore, he was in a dilemma, and after signing the EMPEROR's orders that they had taken the responsibility for ending the war, which all Ministers must sign, he killed himself. He was in a very difficult position, being both a member of the Cabinet and head of the Army, and it was said that he acted truly like a gentleman.

Q. The Navy Minister did not face as difficult a problem?
A. He was a good man too, and he felt that all the people must not die, and I understand he supported SUZUKI that the war should end. However, there were some younger officers, for instance the Navy Special Attack Groups at ATSUGI, who wanted to continue the war; but the Minister knew the true situation and supported SUZUKI.

Q. What influence do you think the atomic bomb had on the decision?
A. Although the Soviets joined the war and the atomic bombs were mentioned, we feel that when the people understood the real situation they would know that we were then exhausted.

Q. As we understand it, there was some discussion among the intelligensia as early as December 1944, at which time the proposition of ending the war was discussed; do you know of that?
A. No; however, there are always some people who seek an opportunity to make peace, especially among the diplomats. Service people considered that that was a defeatist attitude and were very critical of them.

Q. Was it considered that SUZUKI was a man who might reconsider the question of continuing the war when appointed Premier?
A. He was attempting to bolster the people's morale and must have felt that in order to prepare for peace it would be necessary to disclose the real situation; then the people would not lose their morale. I have been told that SUZUKI was thinking very deeply of that, must have always had it in mind; therefore, even approached Soviet RUSSIA.

Q. TOJO, did he know the truth?
A. Yes, he knew it.

Q. Did TOJO collaborate with the Prime Minister in planning negotiations?
A. Prior to the beginning of the war, TOJO was the Foreign Minister; and TOJO once told me, after I returned from the UNITED STATES, that during this period when he was Foreign Minister he had a feeling that everything was pointed toward a war and that he also felt he would not have complete freedom of action. He must

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have been referring to the Tri-Partite Pact on one side and attempted negotiations with CHIANG-KAI-SHEK on the other side, and that everything was not going well and that he did not have freedom of action. As Foreign Minister he countersigned the declaration of war.

Q. Whom do you think were the principal people who advised the EMPEROR to select SUZUKI at the time he succeeded KOISO?
A. I believe it was the Senior Statesmen (JUSHIN). In the past, it was the elder statesmen (GENRO) who advised the EMPEROR. The present Senior Statesmen are not elder statesmen in that sense. The Senior Statesmen are former Prime Ministers. However, I don't believe they were very influential.

Q. How many people do you think advised the EMPEROR to appoint Admiral SUZUKI?
A. About five or six, the former Prime Ministers and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

Q. What would you say was the primary factor in the minds of those who were of the peace party? Were they more influenced by the Navy Department or the Army Department, or Army defeats, or continued air attacks?
A. The people's mind was made up to continue to the very last. But some of the thinking people, when air attacks became frequent and we were not fighting against them, those people must have become very disillusioned. In spite of this however, they continued to be loyal and did not talk of peace in spite of how they may have seen the war was going. Although the people may have sensed the true situation, they were loyal to the Government. The Japanese people obey government orders. Therefore, although there were among the people a very few who favored peace, these few did not express their views. I feel that the people did not know the true situation. As for the Navy, we might say that they thought the war would be almost hopelessly gone if a landing was made, but the Army people always thought we should fight even after the landing.

Q. With those who were concerned over the American air attack, do you think they were more influenced by the reduction in production of war materials or because the cities were being burned and the population suffering?
A. Production of airplanes suffered, naturally; but that, the people did not know. They did suffer themselves from the air raids, but even then, as I told you before, the people did not say peace. Willingly or reluctantly, I cannot say, but they were prepared to sacrifice themselves if the Government so ordered. In the country where I lived, when things went very badly in February, the small Postmaster said there was no other way than to kill themselves fighting; such was a common feeling. There must have been some of the people who felt that this feeling was very unwise, but they did not express their views. However, I felt that after the war was over and they really understood the true situation, they were glad that the war stopped when it did. For example, in the country where I live there was sometimes a farmer who had five boys, all of them at the front during the war. He was ready to give them to the country, knowing that they might not ever return; but after the war was over, then he understood that they were returning, he was very happy.

Q. Had they known the true situation then, would the Government have initiated steps toward a compromise peace at some earlier date?
A. It seems very likely to me that our Government said little about the true situation in order to maintain the people's morale.

Q. If the Army was not then of great influence in the Government, do you think the Navy might have taken steps toward a compromise peace sometime earlier?
A. This would be a big responsibility and it would have taken a very big man to take this responsibility.

Q. Could Admiral YONAI have taken it when he came into KOISO Cabinet?
A. That I cannot say, but I feel that YONAI felt that it was impossible to destroy all the people. But whether or not he could carry out such an idea as Prime Minister in the closing moments, I do not know. Even at the end of the war some of the Army people attacked SUZUKI's house and he very narrowly escaped; so it seems to me that it was the destiny of our country to continue this very unwise war to the very end.

Q. ABE, who was Home Minister in the SUZUKI Cabinet, told us that when he came into office he had changed the policy of the Government to one of giving full information of damages caused by air raids and of the Army and Navy losses in the field. He said that as a result of the former policy of keeping news from the people, there had been a cloud of rumor, and that it was considered unwise to consider that policy in the hope that that would build a spirit of cooperation so that they would withstand invasion. Had you heard of that change of policy?
A. That, I do not know. When the full explanation was made to the people, they must have thought that they were fooled and were not told the truth. In some country prefectures people still continued to believe what they had been told and, as a result attacked the house of the Prefecture Governor. Throughout all the country, people were still stubborn. I have heard that the delay of two days, due to bad weather, of MacARTHUR's arrival at ATSUGI Airfield was very lucky and that these two days were sufficient to have the people calmed down.

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Q. (Rear Admiral Ofstie) Assuming that you and YONAI and SUZUKI were in control, at what time would you have taken steps to get a compromise peace?
A. That is a very difficult question to answer. We three worked together in the Navy General Staff. SUZUKI was Chief, I was Deputy and YONAI was Head of the First Section; and we were very good friends from that time on. Also, YONAI was in command of a ship when SUZUKI was Commander in Chief. I am not too well acquainted as to what went on these past two years. However, at the end of the war there were many who thought that we should have ended this war much earlier, that the best time would have been when SAIPAN fell. Although SHIMADA was considering retirement at that time, he put off time of retirement until after SAIPAN fell. I, myself, thought we had a chance of facing the situation after SAIPAN fell, and then at that time he retired.

Q. So that is the date you would have selected, although you wouldn't have started the war initially. What would YONAI do?
A. If we had stopped the war any earlier the people would not have understood. They had never been told the truth about the situation and there would have been civil war in JAPAN among the people.

Q. But supposing there had been complete information on the progress of the war given in JAPAN as was given in the UNITED STATES; then, when would the war have ended by compromise?
A. Many people knew at the very beginning it was very unwise to make war against Anglo-Saxons; but situation being as it was, they were very compelled to go to war.

Q. What do you say was the major thing done by AMERICA in a military way to bring about the collapse of JAPAN?
A. Submarines initially did great damage to our shipping and later the submarines, combined with air attack, made our shipping very scarce. Our supply lines were cut and we could not support these supply lines. Although our aircraft factories were being destroyed and we could not replace our planes, the people in general had the idea that it was these airplanes that were so important without appreciating the loss of our shipping. Our experts knew that it was necessary to have 3,000,000 tons of shipping just for civilian living in JAPAN.

Q. Then as an expert opinion, would you say that the loss of shipping was the cause of the loss of the war?
A. Whether or not it was the major cause, it damaged us very much. At the end of the war we had few lines of communication around HONSHU Island; even to KOREA, ships were not running, and in HOKKAIDO it was very difficult to bring coal. The scarcity of shipping was very difficult.

Q. Three million tons was absolutely necessary to continue?
A. That was almost a unanimous view among expert people.

Q. In addition to that, how much was required to maintain the Army and Navy in the field?
A. I can't exactly say, but in this country during the war we had 6,500,000 tons, distributed about one-half to civilian requirement and one-half to Army and Navy.

Q. The 6,000,000 was only Japanese merchant shipping; in addition you had merchant shipping acquired in MANILA, SINGAPORE, etc.?
A. That was only one-tenth.

Q. In the event you had more time to fortify or strengthen your perimeter, what type moves would have been made to strengthen the perimeter?
A. I don't believe the perimeter was properly fortified. I am not too sure of this, but in any case I know the defenses were very weak. We were very short of guns, especially anti-aircraft guns. We could not defend our perimeter. Our garrisons were very small.

Q. Would you have put in larger garrisons and more guns in the event you had time and shipping?
A. These garrisons should have had some guns. However, it was impossible to get guns to these islands. We didn't even have them here in JAPAN.

Q. Do you think it would be possible, by any means you can imagine, to successfully defend a place like KWAJALEIN Atoll?
A. We had hoped that the enemy would not come to KWAJALEIN. Although that was a very unwise thought, we were compelled to think that way.

Q. As a member of the Privy Council and in your position in JAPAN in which you discussed the progress of the war with the leaders of the Army and Navy, officially and unofficially, when, in your opinion, did the war take a bad turn for the Japanese?
A. When I left NEW YORK in the middle of June, I didn't know exactly how the Battle of MIDWAY went. I didn't know that we had lost so many aircraft carriers; but I did know that, compared to what we did in PEARL

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HARBOR, there was a big difference. Also, I had some fear at that time that the war might be turning unfavorably. So it was my idea when I returned home that I would let our people know the full strength of the UNITED STATES as I saw it. But the people at that time did not wish to believe that, they did not realize it would be a difficult war. I also heard that at GUADALCANAL, in August, we sent a lot of transports and I heard that almost all of them were lost. That was not disclosed here but I heard such a rumor. I felt we went too far.

Q. You felt the decision was made there, in the early part of the SOLOMONS - GUADALCANAL, etc.?
A. We advanced very fast when the Americans weren't prepared; but when they were prepared and came back, we were forced to retreat.

Q. From your position here in JAPAN and watching the progress of the war, do you consider that the operational planning of Imperial Headquarters was sound?
A. That, I did not study carefully, but I have a general idea that they made many blunders. When they plan an operation they should be prepared to take the defensive; that is, to maintain and support what they acquired offensively, and this must be calculated carefully. But they only thought of pushing forward; they were little concerned with the defensive. They did not calculate shipping losses or materials to supply and maintain their positions acquired.

Q. Do you think your planning and thinking was too offensively minded?
A. That is very true. They made the mistake of thinking an attack is the best defense. They made a great mistake in following this proverb without proper preparation. Some people even wanted to go still further.

Q. Do you think those ideas were the ideas of the Navy, Army people as a while?
A. As I understand it, what sense is there in losing your blood in useless attacks against power? We thought too much of the present, we did not plan in detail.

Q. In the event the plan had been a much smaller plan, to take merely the PHILIPPINES, how would you have met the problem of oil?
A. We accumulated oil. In the war with RUSSIA we stored anthracite coal and the same policy was being followed. The tanks were being built to keep a certain amount of oil, but it was impossible to last many years. So those who knew the situation did not advocate the war at all. Some people might think that Admiral YAMAMOTO, Commander-in-Chief, was a supporter of this war. It is not so. He always was against the war. He told Prince KONOYE, "Yes, one year or two, we might fight. Later, we don't know." Therefore, for the war, one year or two. If it lasted longer, we did not know what would happen. I always thought, from Washington, Government must be careful. Once it happens, it must be a many-year war. In that case, no one knows how it would become on shortage of oil, fuel, and many other items.

Q. In other words, in order to fight a longer war, the inclusion of oil resources in the arrangement was necessary. Is that correct?
A. Yes, they must go to the south. There was a question if SUMATRA could be captured or not; and then, how much it would be destroyed, how long it would take to recover once the wells were destroyed. No one knew. Therefore, this war was a very risky war from the beginning. Even the Chief of our Naval Staff told me. We asked him. We were being struck by embargoes. Then, no one knew how it would be. If operation went well for JAPAN, there might have been a chance. With such idea, it is very risky, some people say, for a long war with our national resources; but this war will be long, no doubt. I agreed strongly with KONOYE's conviction that we must make agreement with the UNITED STATES. He wanted to go to HONOLULU, if it was possible, to meet with the President. Therefore, I made such a proposal. The President announced there must be a preliminary understanding, and we did try to reach one, but we could not agree. If, as I told you before, in the CHINA affair we make compromise, then it could be carried out. Now, we think it must have been a much wiser course, but that is quite foolish now to speak.

Q. In your estimation, did the Japanese General Staff, in its planning prior to the war, give sufficient emphasis to the problem of air power?
A. That is not so. I have had one of them, Vice Chief of Naval General Staff who killed himself, who was complaining that our old Admirals were not air-minded at all. Even modern ones, they were not quite air-minded; so it was very difficult for them to understand the meaning of air power.

Q. Do you think with adequate air power you would have been able to hold this perimeter?
A. It might have been within our power. On production we were left. I think in JAPAN we did rather better than we expected. To increase our aircraft production we tried. I did not expect that they could build 2000 a month. It went rather better than we expected.

Q. But if you had had 4000 a month, would it have been possible to hold the perimeter?
A. That I don't know, but anyway it was impossible for us to train pilots. It was a very difficult job in JAPAN. It would take at least one year and a half to let them fight. We could not expect speed from our student pilots.

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Q. Admiral, when it was possible to take French INDO-CHINA without it being involved in war, why wouldn't it have been desirable to have gone on and taken SUMATRA and JAVA and completely by-pass the PHILIPPINES? Was that discussed?
A. I don't know, but I discussed it with your government, and your government warned on August 17th; when Mr. Roosevelt returned from the ATLANTIC Conference, I got the warning. At that time our forces proceeded to French INDO-CHINA and in that warning if JAPAN go any further - I don't remember the exact words - but if you go any further, then in the present situation the UNITED STATES will be compelled to take immediately all necessary steps to safeguard their rights and interests.

Q. Do you know whether the Japanese government discussed that - taking JAVA and SUMATRA during that period and by-passing the PHILIPPINES?
A. No, I don't know. I don't know at all about those conferences.

Q. Was there any discussion, at the time, of the possibility of taking BORNEO and MALAYA, and becoming involved, at that time, in EUROPE; of becoming involved with BRITAIN but not with the UNITED STATES?
A. They did know, as I told you, that if we went into French INDO-CHINA, the UNITED STATES would take all necessary steps, immediately, to protect their rights and interests. They did know. I reported this to the government office in full detail and they must have known that. By marching our troops into French INDO-CHINA, all trade ceased, the embargo was placed and everything frozen, and that was economic blockade. If we went any further, then war with the UNITED STATES. They must have known that. That was August 17th.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 91
USSBS No. 434

SHORE-BASED AIRCRAFT

TOKYO 23 November 1945

Interrogation of: Captain SASAKI, AKIRA, IJN, a member of the YOKOSUKA Air Corps at YOKOSUKA from March to July 1944.

Interrogated by: Rear Admiral R.A. OFSTIE, USN

Summary

The function of units at the YOKOSUKA Naval Air Station in mid-1944 was purely training, with no operational units stationed there.

As soon as the SAIPAN landing developed, attempts were made to get together the maximum number of planes for an early strike against the U.S. landing force. At YOKOSUKA they were able to scrape up about 120 - 130 miscellaneous naval aircraft including BETTY'S, carrier bombers, torpedo planes and fighters. Of the pilots employed, only about one-third were experienced, the others being students. This conglomerate attack was launched on 18 June 1944 with the specific objective of attacking the land-beaches or the landing-ships. Enroute, however, they became involved with U.S. carrier aircraft with result that few, if any, reached the assigned target.

Practically all attacking aircraft were lost either through being shot down or as a result of forced landing and landing crashes instant to damage battle. However, approximately 50 pilots survived the action.

The Japanese were unable to employ regularly organized combat air groups from the Mainland for the simple reason they didn't have such groups available. The campaign against the MARIANAS was initiated before the training program had accomplished useful results.

(No Transcript)

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 92
USSBS No. 435

SHIP OPERATIONS - RABAUL AREA

TOKYO 20 November 1945

Interrogation of: Commander DOI, Yasumi, member of Staff of S.E. Area Fleet at RABAUL from March 1943 to March 1945.

Interrogator: Commander T.H. MOORER, USN.

Summary

This interrogation contains information relative to the effect of Allied mine attacks in the RABAUL Area, as well as the operations conducted by the Eighth and Ninth Fleets.

Narrative

During the SOLOMONS-NEW GUINEA Campaign, from August 1942 to March 1944, the mine sweeping forces available in the RABAUL Area consisted of 4 minesweepers augmented by 10 destroyers and auxiliary craft as necessary. The minesweepers were based at TRUK but were controlled by the Eighth Fleet at RABAUL. Sweepers were operated as far south as SHORTLAND Harbor where they succeeded in clearing the channels of mines. However, ships did not follow the channels and, consequently, 3 destroyers were damaged. Farther south at KOLUMBANGARA, three destroyers (KAGERO, KUROSHIO, OYASHI) were sunk on the morning of 8 May 1943. Since two or three submarines disappeared in the SOLOMONS Area it is possible that they also hit mines.

The American attempt to mine RABAUL (SIMPSON Harbor) was unsuccessful because of the depth of water. One mine was recovered and analyzed. There were no ships damaged at RABAUL by mines.

The mining of KAVIENG, beginning in September 1943, was very effective. KAVIENG was particularly important to Japanese operations since it was used as a major supply point from which supplies were carried down to RABAUL via truck boats and other small boats which were not so vulnerable to air attack. Also, KAVIENG was used as a haven for damaged naval vessels while effecting temporary repairs. The mining of KAVIENG was first observed by watchers in July 1943. At that time no minesweepers were present and they were dispatched from the SHORTLAND Islands. The first sinking occurred in September and continued until January 1944 when the harbor was no longer regularly used. One survey ship and five large cargo vessels were sunk and several ships damaged. The mining attacks also forced Japanese to anchor outside of the regular harbor, thus greatly reducing the efficiency of the port and interfering with logistic support. The mining of the ADMIRALTY Islands was not effective and no sweeping operations were attempted. The mining at WEWAK was not effective. One destroyer was damaged.

Minesweeping equipment throughout the RABAUL-NEW GUINEA Area was deficient in quantity and quality. Since the American ground mines were ineffective in depths greater than 50 meters, an attempt was made to keep ships in deep water.

Operation of Japanese Surface Vessels - RABAUL and NEW GUINEA Areas

The Japanese surface forces operating from RABAUL were controlled by the South East Area Fleet through the Eighth Fleet and was composed of the following ships:

2 heavy cruisers
1 light cruiser
12 destroyers
4 minesweepers
10 auxiliary vessels
7 submarines

The Eighth Fleet was established in RABAUL in June 1942. Until 3 August 1943, the Eighth Fleet was responsible for the area eastward of a line running southeast from a point just west of the ADMIRALTY Islands (2° 30' S-146° E) through the KIRIWINA Islands. This includes the entire SOLOMON Area. After 3 August 1943, the Eighth Fleet moved to BUIN and assumed responsibility of the area east of longitude 154° E. The South East Area Fleet then took over the responsibility of the area formed by the 45° triangle having 2° 30'' S-146° E as apex and 154° as the base.

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Ships of the Eighth Fleet lost in action were replaced by forces from TRUK, Headquarters of the Combined Fleet. Also, reinforcements were furnished as necessary for particularly important operations.

After the Battle of the BISMARK SEA, it was realized that control of the air was lost and, consequently supplies to NEW GUINEA were shipped by destroyer and submarine only. FINCHHAVEN was supplied until captured by the Allies, but supplies in the NEW GUINEA Area were totally inadequate.

On 15 October 1943, after the loss of LAE and SALAMAUA, the Ninth Fleet (1 destroyer, 6 subchasers, 1 coast defense vessel) was established at WEWAK and MADANG to assist in convoy work from PALAU to WEWAK and to maintain liaison with the Army. The liaison was particularly important in view of the fact that the land forces in NEW GUINEA were composed of 7,400 naval personnel at WEWAK and MADANG in addition to the two Army divisions. Before the loss of LAE and SALAMAUA the ground forces were under dual control, but subsequent to that time the Army assumed control of all ground forces.

After Allied occupation of the ADMIRALTY Islands it was no longer possible to convoy ships from PALAU to WEWAK. At this time the Ninth Fleet was ordered to report to the Southwest Area Fleet since all forces were withdrawn from the Southeast Area Fleet to RABAUL.

The attack by American carrier planes on 5 November 1943 seriously damaged the heavy cruisers HAGURO and MYOKO. After December 1943 no large Japanese ships entered RABAUL.

During the Allied invasion of the ADMIRALTY Islands all forces had been withdrawn from RABAUL and the Eighth Fleet was unable to offer opposition. The Southeast Area Fleet recommended use of surface forces from TRUK but the idea was vetoed by the Combined Fleet Headquarters who were attempting to replace the forces destroyed by American carrier plane attacks on 17 February.

Although the Japanese realized the vital necessity of reinforcing the defense forces in NEW GUINEA, the attrition in the SOLOMONS of land, sea, and air forces was so high that such action was impossible.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 93
USSBS No. 438

ALEUTIAN CAMPAIGN

TOKYO 24 November 1945

THE JAPANESE HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE NAVAL BATTLE
FOUGHT OFF THE KOMANDORSKI ISLANDS, MARCH 1943

Interrogation of: Commander OKUMIYA, Mastake, IJN, who conducted the research for the Historical Division, Japanese Naval War College. Commander OKUMIYA was the air officer on the staff of the Commander Second Mobile Force when that force made the carrier attacks on DUTCH HARBOR in June 1942.

Interrogator: Captain J.S. RUSSELL, USN.

Summary

The most authoritative account yet received from the Japanese on the Naval Battle off the KOMANDORSKI ISLANDS is given. A track chart from the personal papers of the Commanding Officer of the TAMA, a chronological table of gun and torpedo fire with remarks on the progress of the battle, and a chart of damage received are included.

Translation of Documents Received

War History Investigation Department
Japanese Naval War College
23 November 1945

Summary of the KOMANDORSKI Engagement.

Note: Information was given by the following officers who took part in the engagement, and is summarized by Commander OKUMIYA.

Senior Staff Officer of the Fifth Fleet   Captain TAKAHASI, Tadao
Staff Officer of the Fifth Fleet   Cmdr. HASHIMOTO, Shigefusa
Chief of Staff, 1st DesRon   Captain ARICHIKA, Rokuji
Captain of H.M.S. TAMA   Rear Adm. KANOME, Zensuke
     
1. Time.
From: March 22nd, 1943
To: March 28th, 1943

2. Participating Forces.
   
Divisi   Commanding Officer   Force   Main Mission
Main Body   Commander
Fifth Fleet
  21st Squadron
(NACHI (FF), MAYA, TAMA)
21st DesDiv
(WAKABA, HATSUSHIMO)
  Support Force
Throughout
Operation
Escort Force   Commander
1st DesRon
  ABUKUMA (F)
6th DesDiv
(IKAZUCHI, INAZUMA)
  Direct Escort
of "D" Convoy.
Indirect Escort
of SANKO-MARU.
Participated
in Engagement.
2nd Escort Force   C.O. of USUGUMO   USUGUMO   Direct Escort
of SANKO-MARU.
"D" Convoy
Independent
Transport
  ASAKA-MARU, SAKITO-MARU
SANKO_MARU
       

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3. Summarized Account of Operation.

  (a) Own Situation.
    (1) Defense Force KISKA 3000, ATTU 2800
    (2) As the transportation by an single transport of slow cruising speed was out of consideration, it was decided to escort a high speed convoy with all the power of the northern force. Such an operation had been successfully carried out to ATTU early in March. That operation was called "The First Urgent Transport as a Part of 'A' Operation."
  (b) Estimate of enemy situation.
    (1) U.S. Forces landed on AMCHITKA Island on 24 Jan. and constructed an airfield. The enemy is trying to recapture KISKA and ATTU by cutting off the Japanese transport lines to those islands. Repeatedly heavy air raids are being made against these islands from bases at ADAK and AMCHITKA.
    (2)The Northern Fleet of the United States consists of one heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers and 6 destroyers. It has been operating around KISKA and ATTU, shelled ATTU, and to the west of ATTU it shelled AKAGANE MARU and sank it.
  (c) Purpose of Operation.
    (1) Escort of convoy destined to ATTU.
    (2) To catch the enemy fleet and destroy it.
  (d) Description of Engagement.

March 22 1500 The 2nd Escort Force and SANKO-MARU, sailed from HOROMUSHIRO.
March 23 1200 Escort Force and "D" convoy sailed from HOROMUSHIRO.
March 23 1700 Main Force sailed from HOROMUSHIRO.
March 26 1100 Main Force and Escort Force joined together.
March 27 0313 One enemy cruiser and a destroyer came in sight.
March 27 0326 Another enemy cruiser and 3 destroyers appeared.
March 28 0328 Convoy retired.

Note: The 2nd Escort Force saw the engagement at 0355, directed the convoyed ship to retire, and tried to join the main force, but at 0653 headed to HOROMUSHIRO by order.

The Japanese force deployed in order of column: NACHI, TAMA, and 1st DesRon, cut off the enemy's line of retreat, engaged at 0342 on opposite courses. The Japanese fleet closed to 11000 meters from the weatherside and shelled heavily. One enemy heavy cruiser got several direct hits and the forward turret was damaged. The enemy fleet began to lay a smoke screen, started evasive maneuvers in dispersed formation, and tried to disengage. However, the Japanese kept contact with the enemy for about 4 hours, and pursued him closely, but could not sink him. The actual record of the battle for each ship is listed separately.

Before the engagement was over, at about 0630, it was reported from KISKA that some enemy bombers took off to attack us. At the same time, almost all of the armor piercing shells of NAGHI and MAYA were consumed and the fuel remaining in the destroyers was becoming low. Therefore, we gave up the pursuit and turned back toward HOROMUSHIRO at 0730.

At 0930, the 1st DesRon departed from the main force to pick up the convoy. From 0915 to 1105, the convoy was tracked by one to three large planes, but anti-aircraft fire against these made them retreat.

At 1305, the convoy was picked up.

On March 28, the main force anchored at HOROMUSHIRO at 0800, the convoy at 1800.

4. Results.

On account of the appearance of the enemy fleet, the main purpose of this operation, the transportation, was not achieved. However, we were able to give the enemy considerable damage.
  (a) Estimated Enemy Losses.
Heavily damaged: Heavy cruise (PENSACOLA Type)
Moderately damaged: 2 destroyers
Slightly damaged: 1 Light Cruiser (Unknown Type)

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 (b) Our Damage
NACHI 5 direct hits, 15 killed, 27 wounded
TAMA 2 direct hits, 1 slightly wounded.

5. Disposition of Submarine Forces.
  (a) I-169, I-171
March 22, 0400, Sailed from HOROMUSHIRO
March 25, 0300, Commenced duty at the 1st scouting line.
(1-171 at 52° 55' N, 174° E)
(1-169 at 53° 15' N, 174° E)

(b) I-168
March 18, sailed from KISKA, patrolled area south of AMCHITKA, returned to KISKA on April 2.

  :(c) I-31
March 23, 0400, sailed from HOROMUSHIRO; March 25 0300, arrived at the point of patrol, 10 nautical miles south of AGATTU Island; returned to ATTU on April 1.

Chronological table of Action

Time 0342 0346 0350 0352 0354 0356 0358 0407 0430 0443 0451 0457 0502 0507 0515 0518 0519 0525 0529 0531 0537 0538 0540 0545 0547 0548 0552 0605 NACHI _ o _ _ _ _ _ -- _ | | _ _ | | | | | | _ | _ | _ | _ _ | _ MAYA _ | | | | | | | + | _ _ _ | | | | | _ _ _ | | | | _ _ o TAMA _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ o _ | _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ABUKUMO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ WAKABA _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ HATSUSHIMO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ IKAZUCHI _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ INAZUMA _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ A solid line below the ships named to the left indicates that their main batteries were firing REMARKS A few minutes later we opened fire. NACHI fired 8 torpedoes. One hit each on the mainmast and starboard side of bridge of NACHI, 11 dead, 21 wounded. One hit on the torpedo tube compartment of NACHI, 2 dead, 5 wounded. No. 1 plane of NACHI launched, planes no. 2 & 3 were jettisoned.   An enemy CA on fire. MAYA fired 4 torpedoes.     Concentration of fire by Americans on ABUKUMA.   Orders for entire force to attack. TAMA fired 4 torpedoes. A little later the enemy laid a smoke screen.                       Concentrated fire on TAMA by the enemy. Maya fired 4 torpedoes.

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Time 0607 0610 0613 0615 0619 0620 0621 0632 0636 0639 0640 0642 0643 0645 0647 0648 0649 0650 0651 0654 0658 0700 0706 0708 0711 0717 0720 0730 NACHI o _ _ | _ _ | _ | | _ _ _ | | | | | | | _ _ | | _ _ _ _ _ MAYA | | | _ _ _ _ _ | | | | | | _ | | _ _ _ _ _ | | | | | _ _ TAMA _ _ _ _ _ | _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ | | | | | | | | | | | | | _ ABUKUMO _ _ _ + _ _ _ _ _ _ | | | | | | | | _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ WAKABA _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ | _ _ _ _ o _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ HATSUSHIMO _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ | | | | | | | _ o _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ IKAZUCHI _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ INAZUMA _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ A solid line below the ships named to the left indicates that their main batteries were firing. REMARKS NACHI fired 8 torpedoes.       ABUKUMA fired 4 torpedoes.       The enemy CA began losing oil and fled because of hits by the main battery of NACHI.             The enemy ship is listing about 15° and withdrawing. NACHI receives a hit on No. 1 Turret, 1 killed, 1 wounded. WAKABA fired 6 torpedoes. All of the enemy ships entered the smoke screen, their movements are difficult to discern. TAMA made a hit on the 4th ship of the enemy and the ship listed about 15° and withdrew. HATSUSHIMO fired 6 torpedoes.   We perceived the wakes of 4 enemy torpedoes and the CA on fire. Hits on mainmast of enemy destroyer by main battery of MAYA.         We lost sight of the enemy force.

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Plate 93-1: two diagrams showing hits on the NACHI and TAMA, Annex A.
Plate 93-1: two diagrams showing hits on the NACHI and TAMA, Annex A.
Plate 93-2: Track chart of KOMANDORSKI engagement, 27 March 1943 (TOKYO date), from the personal papers of the commanding officer of the TAMA, Annex B.
Plate 93-2: Track chart of KOMANDORSKI engagement, 27 March 1943 (TOKYO date), from the personal papers of the commanding officer of the TAMA, Annex B.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 94
USSBS No. 440

JAPANESE ARMY AIR FORCE - NEW GUINEA AREA

TOKYO 21 November 1945

Interrogation of: Colonel KANEKO, Rinsuka, IJA; member of Staff of 8th Area Army at RABAUL from July 1943 to August 1943; member of Staff of Fourth Air Force (Supply) at RABAUL from August 1943 to September 1944.

Interrogator: Commander T.H. MOORER, USN.

Summary

Colonel KANEKO discusses the organization, the operation and the destruction of the Fourth Air Army which was based in NEW GUINEA from July 1943 until July 1944. By that time it was almost completely destroyed.

Transcript

Q. When the Japanese Army Air Force initially moved into NEW GUINEA, what forces were planned for that area and where were they to be located?
A. The Fourth Air Army Headquarters at RABAUL controlled the 6th and 7th Air Divisions. It was planned to base the 6th Air Division principally at WEWAK and the main strength of the 7th Air Army Division at BUT, with about a third of its strength at AMBON and related airfields. As of 10 August 1943, one-third of the Fourth Air Army strength was in RABAUL and two-thirds at the above fields. The original plan was to have advance staging fields at TSURUBU, LAE, SALAMAUA, MADANG, and ALEXISHAFEN. Main operating airfields in the NEW GUINEA Area were to be at HANSA, WEWAK, BUT, and AITAPE. HOLLANDIA, according to original plan, was an auxiliary field to be used for withdrawal purposes. Each of the above localities had two airfields with the exception of LAE, SALAMAUA and MADANG and the two fields at AITAPE which were not operational until the end of 1943. In addition to the above there were two fields at MANUS Island in the ADMIRALTIES. Overall strength of the Fourth Air Army was as follows: 6th Air Group strength - 5 fighter air groups containing 36 planes each; three reconnaissance squadrons - 12 planes each; and three bomber groups - 36 planes each; total 324 planes. This entire strength was at WEWAK. At BUT the 7th Air Division had one reconnaissance squadron - 12 planes, two fighter groups - 36 planes each, and two bomber groups - 36 planes each; total 156 planes. The 7th had the remainder of its strength mainly at AMBON which consisted of one fighter group - 36 planes, one reconnaissance squadron - 12 planes, and one bombing group - 36 planes. Between 10 August 1943 and 20 September, the entire strength of the Fourth Air Army moved to NEW GUINEA from RABAUL and AMBON with headquarters at WEWAK. Except for a small maintenance unit and a small transport plane unit, the 6th Division moved its entire strength from RABAUL to WEWAK. However, prior to 7 July, there were 12 reconnaissance planes in RABAUL attached to the Eighth Area Army. There were no planes in NEW GUINEA at that time because no fields were ready. The Eighth Area Army commenced moving to RABAUL by 10 August 1942 and between that date and 7 July 1943, they kept moving forces into RABAUL. Between 10 August and 20 September, this strength moved gradually to WEWAK. During the same period, the 7th division strength was moved from the CELEBES and AMBON to WEWAK.

Q. During the time the 6th Air division was in RABAUL attached to the Eighth Area Army, what missions did they fly?
A. The 6th Air Division's duties were cooperation in the GUADALCANAL operations and providing air cover to convoys going between SOLOMONS and RABAUL and between NEW GUINEA and RABAUL.

Q. After the Fourth Air Army was fully activated in August 1943, for what general area was it responsible?
A. At the beginning, the Fourth Air Army, with headquarters at WEWAK, operated under Eighth Area Army and was responsible for the NEW GUINEA Area east of longitude 140° E. In November 1943 the 7th Air Division was withdrawn to AMBON and although still attached to the Fourth Air Army it was controlled operationally by the Second Area Army at MENADO. This move was made in order to assist the Navy in protection and patrol of the CELEBES Area. At this time the 23rd Naval Air Flotilla in KENDARI had been greatly weakened because most of the strength had been sent to RABAUL to replace heavy losses in the SOLOMONS Area.

By 25 March 1944 the losses at WEWAK was such that the Fourth Air Army moved its headquarters to HOLLANDIA, and less than one month after (15 April), when the invasion of HOLLANDIA appeared imminent, the headquarters were moved to MENADO. It was at this time that the Fourth Air Army, less the 6th Air Division which was completely destroyed in the HOLLANDIA operations, reported to the Second Area Army, who assumed responsibility for all operations in NEW GUINEA.

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Plate 94-1: chart showing Japanese Army Air Force, Fourth Air Army (New Guinea area 1943-1944), (6th & 7th Air Div's.), with number of aircraft available for operations, Annex A.
Plate 94-1: chart showing Japanese Army Air Force, Fourth Air Army (New Guinea area 1943-1944), (6th & 7th Air Div's.), with number of aircraft available for operations, Annex A.

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Q. Then after loss of HOLLANDIA, the only Army air forces remaining were assigned to the 7th Air Division at AMBON?
A. Yes; with the exception of a few utility aircraft at WEWAK, that is true. The 6th Air Division was physically destroyed and then deactivated. The number of Army aircraft operated in the NEW GUINEA Area after HOLLANDIA was about 50. The 7th Air Division also had 50 planes in the CELEBES Area.

Q. After loss of HOLLANDIA, how was it planned to use Army aircraft in NEW GUINEA?
A. The original plan provided for the 7th Air Division to operate from AMBON and the 6th Air Division to operate from BIAK. However, the 6th was destroyed and the Americans moved so fast we were forced to change the plans. The Fourth Air Army at MENADO operating through the 7th Air Division at AMBON and BIAK used fields at NOEMFOOR, SAOWI and SAMATE until NEW GUINEA was completely lost. After that planes were flown from MENADO through LOLLOBATA to attack your forces in NEW GUINEA.

Q. When was the Fourth Air Army built back up to strength after losses in the NEW GUINEA Campaign?
A. While we were at MENADO, we received the order that informed us that we would receive reinforcements. Actually, we didn't receive reinforcements in MENADO but in the PHILIPPINES. After the Fourth Air Army moved to the PHILIPPINES, its strength was built up to over 400 aircraft. These aircraft were practically all destroyed during October, November and December of 1944.

Q. Where did your reinforcements come from when the Fourth Air Army was built up in preparation for the defense of the PHILIPPINES?
A. About two-thirds from CHINA and JAPAN and one-third from SINGAPORE, BURMA and DUTCH EAST INDIES.

Q. What directive governed the Fourth Air Army defense of MOROTAI?
A. We had orders to operate nightly attacks from MAKASSAR and MENADO in the defense of MOROTAI, and were supposed to carry out nightly attacks by few planes. But in actuality, due to weather conditions and American air activity, only sorties from one to four planes were possible.

Q. What were the primary targets during your defense of MOROTAI?
A. Our mission was to prevent the Americans from completing their airfields.

Q. Did the Japanese defense of MOROTAI interfere with the reinforcement of the PHILIPPINES?
It didn't really interfere because the defense of MOROTAI and interfering with your airfield construction was part of the PHILIPPINE defense plans. Our idea was that the more we interfered with your fields at MOROTAI the easier the PHILIPPINE defense would be.

Q. After the loss of NEW GUINEA, what policy was in effect as to the relative responsibility of the Army and Navy in the CELEBES Area, insofar as aircraft was concerned?
A. The NEW GUINEA Operation was an Army responsibility. BIAK Operation was an Army and Navy job. In the HALMAHERA Operation, the Navy was supposed to have cooperated from DAVAO. In BORNEO, the Navy had no connection and it was the Army planes in MENADO and KENDAIR that were primarily responsible for operations in that area.

Q. To go back to the early operations, who was responsible for the furnishing of supplies to the Army force in NEW GUINEA?
A. The responsibility for supplying Army air force in NEW GUINEA changed with the period. In the beginning of the war the supply from JAPAN to the PHILIPPINES was the responsibility of Air Headquarters in JAPAN and from the PHILIPPINES onward to the front line bases the responsibility was that of units under the control of the Fourth Air Army. From the beginning of 1944, there was a direct air transport service set up from JAPAN and an effort was made to by-pass the PHILIPPINES.

Q. At what time did the Japanese abandon the practice of sending large merchant vessels into NEW GUINEA?
A. The last vessel to come into WEWAK was 9 March 1944. This was sunk on the way back and no more came to WEWAK. During May, the last vessel to come to MANOKWARI arrived and no more were dispatched to the NEW GUINEA Area. However, there were the sea trucks that came down the coast of NEW GUINEA. The last of the small coast supply vessels to operate around GEELVINK Bay was in July 1944 according to a report by a senior officer who walked up the coast from HOLLANDIA. Subsequent to that, there were ships supplying west of HALMAHERA and I don't know what day they stopped.

Q. What was the primary reason for discontinuing the sailing of large ships in the NEW GUINEA Area?
A. Destruction of ships by American aircraft in NEW GUINEA Area and by submarines northwest of NEW GUINEA.

Q. Did the Army Air Force furnish air coverage for these large transports coming into the NEW GUINEA Area?
A. The policy was to provide air coverage to convoys within 125 miles radius of the port, but up to that point small naval escort vessels did the job.

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Q. Were these escorts designed to protect the ships against submarine or air attacks?
A. From the Army point of view, the coverage was against enemy aircraft. The Navy escort vessels protected against submarines.

Q. How many aircraft were normally employed in convoy protection?
The number of planes dispatched varied with the time and place, but the most we ever sent out was 80 and several times we sent groups of 25. We always sent out our full fighter strength.

Q. During these operations in NEW GUINEA what was your normal aircraft availability?
A. Up until April 1943 about 50% of aircraft on hand were in normal operation; subsequent to that time only about 25% of the total aircraft on hand were in full operation. This figure was even lower as the war progressed.<.p>

Q. Name in order of importance the primary reasons for such a large number of grounded aircraft.
A. The two main reasons were: first, poor maintenance which was due to the poor equipment and lack of maintenance personnel which also resulted in high operational accident rates and second, the lack of pilots due to illness. There were other causes, but they all stem from the above conditions.

Q. Did the Fourth Air Army have an adequate supply of heavy equipment necessary to change engines and make major structural repairs?
A. Although we had an air depot at WEWAK and HOLLANDIA, equipment was very poor and the satisfaction we got from these repairs and replacement units was very small. We could not move much heavy field and shop equipment because of inadequate shipping.

Q. In regard to quality of the spare parts in the aircraft themselves, did you notice any marked decrease as the war progressed?
A. Yes, there was a marked decline in quality of engine parts and spare parts in general. The Zero Mark 4 had many operational accidents due to bad quality of spare parts.

Q. What ratio of pilots to planes did the Fourth Air Army endeavor to maintain in the NEW GUINEA Area?
A. According to our standard practice in a squadron of 54 planes, including reserve planes, we would have about 48 pilots. However, that was the idea and actually the figure was less in both categories.

Q. Did the proportion remain the same?
A. No, the proportion changed. Actually, many of the squadrons would usually have less than their assigned number of planes.

Q. In other words, the number of pilots assigned each unit would remain approximately the same, but the planes would change?
A. Yes; generally speaking, we usually had more pilots than planes although we lost many pilots through combat and sickness.

Q. Give a general figure percentage of cause of losses suffered through the NEW GUINEA Campaign.
A. During the period between May 1943 and April 1944, including HOLLANDIA Operation, the losses were divided as follows: result of aerial combat, 30%; destroyed on ground, 50%; operational losses, 20%. These are general figures only. I can remember occasions when entire flights failed to come back. The figure varies with operation conditions. For planning it was estimated that during big operations 50%; of the fighters, 40% of bombers and 20% transport planes would have to be replaced. However, due to low production and shipping and ferry losses this plan was not followed; and consequently, the NEW GUINEA Air Force was destroyed.

Q. How do you account for the extremely high loss of aircraft on the ground?
A. With machinery and labor available, we were not able to provide an area large enough to disperse our planes and had to keep them all in a narrow confined area. Also, low availability mentioned above made it impossible to withdraw aircraft from threatened fields after receipt of warning of a possible air attack.

Q. What type of American aircraft would you consider most effective in attacks on the ground?
A. That varies with the area involved. Speaking for the NEW GUINEA Area, I would say that the B-24's and B-25's were most effective, particularly the formation of 30 or more B-24's. Also, the use of many small bombs were effective in this sort of operation.

Q. Did the Fourth Air Army make any particular effort to attack the American aircraft sent out against Japanese shipping at night?
A. A few night fighters were used to defend shipping in the harbor but no night protection of convoy was done.

Q. Will you make an estimate as to the total number of aircraft you lost in the NEW GUINEA Area during the campaign?
A. From August 1943 until HOLLANDIA Operation, April 1944, I would estimate a total loss of 800 planes.

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Q. If it had been possible to receive supplies in the NEW GUINEA Area by use of larger ships, do you think the Fourth Air Army would have been able to maintain supremacy in that area?
A. Yes, in my opinion we failed not only because we received insufficient planes but because we did not have sufficient personnel and heavy equipment to build proper airfields and properly maintain what planes we had.

Q. At what time was the last replacement aircraft received in NEW GUINEA?
A. In HOLLANDIA, several days before the landing, we received a few planes.

Q. When did the airplanes cease coming in a flow to the NEW GUINEA Area?
A. About 10 April 1944, just before the HOLLANDIA landing.

Q. Prior to that time, did you receive the number they requested?
A. They came regularly but never in quantity as planned.

Q. Were aircraft deliveries to the Air Army in NEW GUINEA made via RABAUL or direct?
QA. Prior to March 1943 aircraft were delivered by carrier and by air via TRUK and RABAUL; after that time they came direct from PHILIPPINES and CELEBES.

Q. Why did the Japanese Navy not oppose the invasion up the coast of NEW GUINEA with a large force of combat ships?
A. Due to shortage of sea power, the defense plan was to attack your landings with land-based aircraft.

Q. Are you familiar with the KON plan?
A. Yes.

Q. Did the Fourth Air Army endeavor to give air coverage in their approach to BIAK?
A. The Fourth Air Army Force which was based at SAMATE did the best they could, but the force was so small it was ineffective.

Q. Are you familiar with any of the air operations during the American invasion of TARAKAN and BALIKPAPAN?
A. There weren't many. There were so few airplanes, it was impossible to make any worthwhile plans.

Q. Were there any weaknesses in the American attack methods of your air bases?
A. In my opinion, the outstanding weaknesses was that you always attacked about 11 o'clock and we were able to anticipate your attack.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 95
USSBS No. 441

JAPANESE NAVAL OPERATIONS
NEW GUINEA AREA

TOKYO 25 November 1945

Interrogation of: Captain OHMAE, Toshikazu, IJN; member of Staff of Southeast Area Fleet, June 1942 to December 1943; Chief of Staff, First Mobile Fleet, December 1943 to January 1945.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, USN.

Summary

Captain OHMAE furnishes information relative to activities of the Ninth Fleet in the NEW GUINEA Area and discusses the effect of the NEW GUINEA Operations on Japanese general planning during the course of the war.

Transcript

Q. At the time when the SHOHO was sunk on 4 May 1942, you intended to capture PORT MORESBY. After that sinking, did you ever plan to attempt another invasion of PORT MORESBY?
A. On 4 May, Japanese forces were enroute to PORT MORESBY to occupy that area. After the naval engagement, further plans were made to complete this operation and the Eighth Fleet was established at RABAUL. However, forces originally intended to be used in the second attempt were expended in activities in the SOLOMONS; and at the same time, the Japanese Army introduced the plan of advancing on PORT MORESBY across the OWEN STANLEY Mountains. Consequently, a second attempt to invade PORT MORESBY was never made.

Q. When did you activate the Ninth Fleet in WEWAK?
A. 15 October 1943. It was deactivated 10 July 1944.

Q. Do you recall what ships were in the Ninth Fleet?
A. Very small; two or three minesweepers, one or two destroyers and one coastal defense ship.

Q. Was there a geographical division of responsibility between the Eighth and Ninth Fleets?
A. Yes, the Ninth Fleet was merely a base force and operated along the NEW GUINEA Coast. The mission of the Ninth Fleet was mainly administrative in order to effect communications with the Japanese Army in NEW GUINEA and learn how the war was going there.

Q. Why was not the Ninth Fleet reinforced in order that landings along the NEW GUINEA Coast could be opposed by surface vessels?
A. At first we were very busy with the SOLOMONS invasion; also we had no more forces in the NEW GUINEA Area. We thought that protection of the SOLOMONS and drawing your naval strength there more important than NEW GUINEA, because we thought from the SOLOMONS you could go right up to TRUK. After your capture of SALAMAUA and LAE, conditions in NEW GUINEA were found to be very serious, and in order that proper liaison would be maintained between the Army in NEW GUINEA and the Navy in RABAUL, the Ninth Fleet was activated. It was not the intention to build up a large force.

Q. When did you commence the high speed destroyer transport system down to NEW GUINEA?
On 27 June 1942, we sent an Army force to BUIN. We tested the destroyer transport system maybe August 1942. On 4 or 5 January 1943 we sent an Army force to LAE and five out of six regular transports succeeded in landing supplies. Next time, on 3 March, we lost six transports and four escorting destroyers. So we realized it was very serious and we could send only by destroyer to FINSCHAFEN. From there, Army forces could move supplies up along the NEW GUINEA Coast by road. As a result of the failure of 3 March (Battle of Bismark Sea) the Army decided to send their forces from WEWAK and MADANG to make a road to LAE; but it took a long time, and in fact they did not send forces in time. When U.S. Army forces came to FINSCHAFEN, about 22 September 1943, two or three battalions had arrived by road; but the road was very incomplete so our Army didn't carry heavy guns. They walked through the mountains with only rifles, so could not fight as well as possible.

Q. What do you think was the most important factor which led to the abandonment of RABAUL?
A. That occurred after I left, but I believe that the loss and serious damage to the Japanese Air Force in the SOLOMONS caused the decision to withdraw forces from the RABAUL Area.

Q. After the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS were captured did you anticipate a move back through NEW GUINEA or through the Central PACIFIC?
A. We expected both, but mainly we thought you were very anxious to attack PALAU directly. At that time there were two opinions, one to SAIPAN and one from the ADMIRALTIES to go to PALAU. Commander

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in Chief, Grand Fleet warned that American Forces would come to PALAU directly before you attacked SAIPAN and TINIAN on June 1944; so before that time, we made plans only for protection of PALAU. We had no idea to protect GUAM and SAIPAN at that time. In fact, we thought you would go to PALAU before the MARIANAS, so the operation plan of A-GO was mainly for protection of PALAU. The plan was later modified to protect the MARIANAS. It was first thought that the American forces would proceed from the ADMIRALTIES to PALAU, and plans were made to fight a major engagement between the PHILIPPINEs and PALAU. When it was evident that your fleet was going to the MARIANAS, it was planned to fight off the MARIANAS.

Q. During the U.S. advance through HOLLANDIA, BIAK, etc. was there any serious consideration to opposing the invasions with large naval surface forces?
A. No, because the Americans were very strong in Northwest NEW GUINEA and BIAK and we were weak.

Q. When you executed the A-GO Plan, did you abandon the KON Plan altogether?
A. Yes, A-GO is main operational plan. When you came to BIAK we made tentative plan for sending fleet to transport troop reinforcements. The KON Plan which involved use of the YAMATO, MUSASHI, two heavy cruisers and six destroyers was made for that purpose.

Q. At that time, these ships were based in the PHILIPPINES?
A. Yes, at TAWITAWI. Military forces were prepared at ZAMBOANGA where they boarded the ships. The original KON Plan involved use of two light cruisers and destroyers, but due to the presence of the American Task Force north of BIAK, the force was increased to include YAMATO, MUSASHI, two heavy cruisers and six destroyers. However, on 11 June we executed A-GO Plan because of your move on SAIPAN.

Q. At that time you moved all naval aircraft from NEW GUINEA to PALAU, abandoned KON Plan and rendezvoused your fleet. Does that mean that the Japanese Navy made the decision to abandon NEW GUINEA?
A. Yes, the situation at SAIPAN and GUAM was more serious, so we abandoned NEW GUINEA and left responsibility of the NEW GUINEA Area to the Army.

Q. Were the MARIANAS considered more important because their capture would introduce a threat to the homeland or to the PHILIPPINES?
A. Both. At that time, we had a reserve of fuel and tankers and were in a position to destroy the American Fleet. The A-GO Plan designed to bring it to action and destroy it at a position clear of land-based air protection and within reach of our land-based air.

Q. After the American landings in the PHILIPPINES, what directives were issued relative to defense of the area south of the PHILIPPINES, including BORNEO and CELEBES?
A. The decision was made to withdraw all forces from BORNEO, CELEBES, JAVA Area to SUMATRA and MALAYA and leave only Army forces to protect anchorages and important oil centers.

Q. Were you successful in withdrawing your forces?
A. The above plan was very difficult to execute due to American attacks on Japanese shipping and transportation facilities. However, the Japanese were successful in moving two Army divisions from the CELEBES-BORNEO Area to MALAYA. At the time of the American attack on MOROTAI, BALIKPAPAN and TARAKAN, Japanese forces were very small and only harbors and oil centers were manned with troops. There was no plan to reinforce CELEBES-BORNEO Area but rather to evacuate it. After February or March 1945 the Southern Army was in operational control of all naval forces in the SINGAPORE Area. This change in control took place immediately after the ISE, HYUGA and main part of the Japanese Fleet left for JAPAN in February 1945. All naval forces in the SINGAPORE Area were then left under operational control of the Japanese Army.

Q. During the entire war when you were very closely connected with planning, were your decisions affected at any time by the Allied mining effort? Did it have any effect on your plans for military operations?
A. Very little, the only place where mines interfered with military operations or plans was at KAVIENG beginning August 1943. At that time KAVIENG was very important because it was used as a supply base; and after mine attacks, it was necessary to take ships directly from TRUK to RABAUL, where they were then subjected to air attack.

Q. How about SINGAPORE? Did the mining interfere with the use of SINGAPORE by your fleet?
A. It didn't effect use of the harbor much, I have heard one cruiser had trouble with the mining, but generally speaking SINGAPORE was quite all right. Mining did not interfere with the use of SINGAPORE Harbor. Most of the Japanese Navy in SINGAPORE returned to the INLAND SEA in February 1945.

Q. Then KAVIENG was the only place where mining affected your plans?
A. No effect in any other place, I think.

Q. Do you recall how many ships were sunk by mines there?
A. One cruiser damaged, two or three destroyers damaged, 5 or 6 transports sunk or damaged. The number is not sure.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 96
USSBS NO. 445

MARSHALLS-GILBERTS OPERATIONS

TOKYO 24 November 1945

Interrogation of: Rear Admiral NABESHIMA, Shunsaku, IJN; Chief of Staff of Japanese Fourth Fleet (Inner South Seas Area) December 1942 to December 1943.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman Teller, USN.

Summary

The Japanese relied principally on reinforced island garrisons and land-based air squadrons for defense of the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS. Reinforcements in both categories were in progress at the time U.S. Forces invaded the GILBERTS. The combined strength of Japanese fleet in the Central PACIFIC was not sufficient for a concerted effort to oppose the invasion. Severe attrition of land-based aircraft in the area and lack of air groups for their carriers made impractical any form of surface force attack on the U.S. Forces.

Transcript

Q. I have been told in earlier interviews that in November 1943, the general plan was to defend the MARSHALL-GILBERT ISLANDS by reinforcing the island garrisons, by bringing in more shore-based aircraft from TRUK and RABAUL and relying on the island garrisons and aircraft to defend the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS. Is that correct?
A. Reinforcement aircraft were brought in from KISARAZU. Some troops were sent from TRUK to reinforce the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS. It was planned that the Fourth Fleet would cooperate with the Combined Fleet in defending the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS. Of course, the Fourth Fleet being small could not do much by itself. The general expectation was that you would attack either NAURU, the GILBERT ISLANDS or WAKE. These points would be defended by the troops on hand and the Navy. Army troop reinforcements would be moved into the KWAJALEIN Area and from there would be distributed where needed in the MARSHALLS for defense. It had been intended to send reinforcements also to NAURU, GILBERTS and WAKE, but the U.S. attack on the GILBERTS occurred before this could be done.

Q. Did the Commander of the Fourth Fleet determine where reinforcement troops were to be sent and order them to those islands?
A. Two days prior to your initial attack on the GILBERTS, an attack in this general area was anticipated. The headquarters of the Fourth Fleet was moved to KWAJALEIN by air on 19 November. It was planned to bring troops from TRUK to the area for reinforcement, using three cruisers and two destroyers. It was also planned to bring reinforcement aircraft into the area from RABAUL and TRUK. However, recent aircraft losses and damages in the RABAUL area prevented any substantial reinforcements. It was the responsibility of the Commander of the Fourth Fleet to deploy troops as he considered necessary for defense of the islands.

Q. Can you recall the troop reinforcements which you received subsequent to July 1943 from JAPAN and other areas outside of the Central PACIFIC?
A. Between July 1943 and the initial GILBERTS Operation, only one Army division of about 15,000 to 16,000 was brought into the Inner South Seas Area. No naval reinforcements were received. The 22nd Air Flotilla was reinforced, but I don't recall to what extent. I believe it was about 40 planes. I believe the Army troops spoken of were brought from UTSUNOMIYA.

Q. What was the A(KOO) detachment?
A. I don't know of a detachment by that name; however, I believe it was probably an Army detachment. Early in October, two Army battalions passed through, one via TRUK and the other PONAPE; both going on without delay to KWAJALEIN.

Q. When you moved the Headquarters of the Fourth Fleet to KWAJALEIN, did the flagship move there or did you go ashore at KWAJALEIN?
A. The Headquarters of the Fourth Fleet was always ashore, normally at TRUK. In this instance, we flew to KWAJALEIN and based ashore.

Q. Tell me of the movements of the Fourth Fleet cruisers and destroyers after 1 November 1943.
A. On 18 November, the cruisers, NAKA, ISUZU, and NAGARA and four unidentified destroyers left TRUK. The NAGARA and ISUZU plus two destroyers were carrying troops to MILLE. The NAKA and remaining two destroyers were carrying Army troops to KWAJALEIN.

Q. When these ships left TRUK, did you intend them to go to MILLE and KWAJALEIN or to some other islands?
A. The reinforcements in NAGARA and ISUZU were intended for MILLE because the garrison there was considered weak. The ships bound for MILLE arrived at that island on the evening of November 22nd or 23rd,

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unloaded their troops during the night and departed the next morning for KWAJALEIN, arriving at KWAJALEIN one day later. The ships which went directly from TRUK to KWAJALEIN arrived 22 November.

Q. Did all seven ships remain at KWAJALEIN then until our carrier attack on 4 December?
A. The NAKA and her accompanying two destroyers had left KWAJALEIN on the 23rd for TAROA to take troop reinforcements, and consequently were not at KWAJALEIN for the carrier attack on 4 December. These three ships landed reinforcements at TAROA and left immediately, returning direct to TRUK.

Q. When did the Second Fleet units enter and depart KWAJALEIN?
A. Units of the Second Fleet arrived KWAJALEIN on 22 November. A conference was held between the Commanders-in-Chief Second and Fourth Fleets to discuss the situation then developing in the GILBERT ISLANDS. It was decided that the combined forces of the Second and Fourth Fleets were not sufficient to attack or repulse the American Force and that the Third Fleet, namely the carriers, would be necessary for this purpose. However, since there were no aircraft groups available for the carriers, the use of this force was not possible. Consequently, since air strength was insufficient, the Second Fleet retired to BROWN Atoll, leaving KWAJALEIN on the 24th and arriving at BROWN on the 25th, where it remained until 5 December, at which time it departed for TRUK.

Q. Did you have any warning of the air attack on KWAJALEIN by carrier planes on 4 December?
A. We were alerted for attacks at all times, but the exact time was not anticipated.

Q. Do you recall the damage to ships and installations that was done in that carrier attack on 4 December?
A. The NAGARA received near misses only and was able to navigate. The ISUZU received two bomb hits putting rudder out of commission and making her unnavigable, but she was eventually repaired. Three freighters, 2,000 to 3,000 tons, were sunk by bombs and strafing. In this connection, it was customary to send only the small type freighters to the MARSHALLS Area. Estimate ten aircraft destroyed on the ground, personnel casualties very slight. On 25 December, the 24th Air Flotilla was brought in to the MARSHALLS because of the losses sustained by the 22nd Air Flotilla originally there. About this time, 20 fighters from the Third Fleet were also brought into the MARSHALLS for reinforcement. These fighters came from the Second Carrier Division which was a part of the Third Fleet.

Q. When did the NAGARA and ISUZU return to TRUK from KWAJALEIN?
A. About 1 January.

Q. Were there any other movements of your ships in this area during November or December?
A. The only movement of large ships was the trip of the NAGARA and ISUZU from TRUK to NAURU, towards the end of October, for the purpose of carrying troops. In early November, two destroyers went from TRUK to KWAJALEIN also carrying troops. There were about 20 auxiliary powered sailing vessels of approximately 300 tons, wooden construction, which were used for supplying the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS Area.

Q. Do you remember the Number 2 NANKAI MARU which went to MILLE about 22 December?
A. I'm not familiar with this ship, but she may have been one of the two aviation supply ships operated by the 22nd Air Flotilla, which carried aviation gasoline and aircraft parts to various bases.

Q. On 18 September 1943, some B-24's attacked NAURU. Do you recall what damage was done during that attack?
A. Airfields were heavily damaged and ten aircraft destroyed.

NAV-96

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 97
USSBS NO. 446

 

AIR OPERATIONS BY JAPANESE NAVAL AIR FORCCES BASED AT RABAUL

TOKYO 19 November 1945

Interrogation of: Captain MIYAZAKI, Takashi, IJN; Commanding Officer of the Fourth Air Group at RABAUL from September 1942 to April 1943; senior staff officer of the 25th Air Flotilla at RABAUL from April 1943 to April 1944.

Interrogated by: Captain C. SHANDS, USN
Commander T.H. MOORER, USN.

Summary

This interrogation covers in general Japanese Naval Air Operations in the RABAUL Area from the beginning of the war until 18 February 1944. At that time all air strength was withdrawn from RABUAL.

Transcript
JNAF in Rabaul

Q. (Comdr. Moorer) Describe the organization of the Japanese Naval Air Force in RABAUL?
A. From February to April 1942, the Fourth Air Group had 36 bombers and 36 fighters attached to it. Also at RABAUL was the YOKOHAMA Air group which had a strength of 18 flying boats. In April 1942 the Fourth Air group was reduced in size and lost its 36 fighters to the TINIAN Air Group. These three forces, the Fourth Air Group, the YOKOHAMA Flying Group and the TINIAN Flying Group were organized into the 25th Air Flotilla.

In November (?) 1942, the names of the above forces were changed as follows: Fourth Air group became the 702nd Air Group; the YOKOHAMA Air Group became the 801st Air Group and the Tinian Air Group became the 251st Air Group. The mission of the 25th Air Flotilla was to attack NEW GUINEA as far west as MADANG and southwest to MORESBY, as well as the entire SOLOMON ISLAND Area.

It was customary for air units in the Japanese Air Force to have one-third of their strength additional reserve, but the units at RABAUL did not get reinforcements to this extent.

In November 1942, the 25th Air Flotilla returned to JAPAN for training, rest and replacement. The 801st Unit did not return from JAPAN to RABAUL, but remained at YOKOHAMA while the 251st and 702nd units did return.

In July 1943, the 251st was attached to the 26th Air Flotilla and was replaced by the 704th Air Unit which came from the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. In November 1943, the 25th Air Flotilla consisted of the 751st Air Unit which had come from NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, the 253rd which had come from JAPAN and the 251st which was transferred back from the 26th Air Flotilla. By November 1943, the 702nd and 704th Air Units had completely lost all their planes.

Q. What was the most western point to which the planes in RABAUL operated?
A. To HORN Island south of NEW GUINEA in 1942, and MADANG along the north coast in 1943.

Q. Were there any Army aircraft in RABAUL which cooperated with the Navy in NEW GUINEA Operations?
A. Up until November 1942, no Army aircraft had gone to RABAUL. Later, the FOURTH Air Army was organized in RABAUL and then moved to WEWAK.

Q. At what places in NEW GUINEA did the 25th Air Flotilla have bases?
A. The three bases we had in NEW GUINEA were LAE, SALAMAUA and BUNA. The LAE Field was used from August after the start of the SOLOMONS Operation. We had 20 fighters there. The SALAMAUA Field was too small and never used. The Buna Field was used after July or August 1942 for the SOLOMONS Operations and also as a staging field for the planes from LAE enroute for MORESBY attacks. No planes were used at BUNA.

Q. What time were these fields abandoned?
A. By the time I returned from JAPAN in April 1943, due to the inability to supply bases at LAE, it was no longer usable. SALAMAUA was the same, and BUNA was rendered unusable by the Allied advance up the coast by December 1942 and January 1943.

NAV-97

--413--

Q. After the loss of the bases in NEW GUINEA, what operations over the NEW GUINEA Area were conducted by the 25th Air Flotilla?
A. We conducted night bombing operations over MORESBY, BUNA and MILNE Bay.

Q. At what time during the war were the forces at RABAUL at maximum strength?
A. (See Annex A for general information regarding strength).

Q. After the commencement of the GUADALCANAL Operations, from what source were reinforcements supplied?
A. From TRUK, the MARSHALLS, and the CELEBES. Although some reinforcements were new planes from JAPAN, most were from the 24th Air Flotilla at TRUK, SAIPAN and the MARSHALLS and the 23rd Flotilla at KENDARI. This transfer to RABAUL reduced the strength of the above bases.

Q. At what time did the Army have aircraft based at RABAUL?
A. I do not know for sure. Most of the Army was in NEW GUINEA. When I returned from JAPAN in April, there were about 60 planes in the MUNDA Area. After the MUNDA operation those remaining were all withdrawn from the SOLOMONS and sent back to JAPAN. Only a few Army reconnaissance planes were left in RABAUL.

Q. At what time were the last reinforcements received in the RABAUL Area?
A. A few came, only 10 planes, in December 1943. None after that date.

Q. Was it after or before the loss of the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS that it was decided to move planes to TRUK?
A. Almost immediately after TRUK was attacked (17 February) we withdrew our planes to TRUK. I think the movement was 18, 19, or 20 February.

Q. Did any planes operate from RABAUL in opposition to the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS Invasion?
A. There were only about 10 planes available at the time of the ADMIRALTY landing. They made one or two attacks.

Q. There was a rapid decline in air strength from October 1943 until the first of February 1944; is that correct?
A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Why were planes sent to TRUK?
A. After TRUK had been attacked it was necessary to replace losses and if possible so as to stop your advance, to make counter-attack.

Q. At what strength were the RABAUL Air Forces when TRUK was attacked?
A. We sent 120 planes to TRUK, leaving about ten in RABAUL.

Q. What effect did the American carrier attacks on LAE and SALAMAUA on 10 March 1941 have on the operations of the 25th Air Flotilla?
A. In that attack six fighters from the Fourth Air Group came from RABAUL, staged at GASMATA and attempted to land at the LAE Field; but due to the bad weather only one or two were able to land. The rest returned to GASMATA. The idea was to stage at GASMATA, go to LAE and engage in defense of the field and the transports in that area.

Q. What action was taken by the Japanese aircraft in RABAUL during the occupation of MILNE Bay by the Allies?
A. Attacks were made against coast-wise shipping and U.S. landings. We did not make any day attacks on MILNE, but made a couple of night attacks. In middle of May 1943, the Japanese attacked your base at BUNA, using about 50 fighters and about 20 BETTYS.

Q. What was the purpose of that attack?
A. The mission was to destroy American land forces at BUNA and prevent their advance.

Q. Where did you discover the Allied Task Force; when did you realized that the invasion of LAE and SALAMAUA was to take place?
A. We realized that an operation was pending, due to heavy concentrations of shipping in BUNA and MILNE Bay; and also, due to the fact that we were using a great part of RABAUL strength in the SOLOMONS Operations, we assumed you would take advantage of this fact to advance up the NEW GUINEA Coast. In August the Japanese attacked a convoy with the object of sinking as many ships as possible. The convoy was attacked while heading for the landing point for the attack on LAE. The invasion force was sighted by a patrol plane, and planes were sent to attack it. According to my information, we registered bomb and torpedo hits on one or two cruisers and two destroyers, with no certainty as to whether or not sinkings resulted. The participating aircraft were from the 25th and 26th Air Flotillas and consisted of 58 fighters and 18 light bombers.

NAV-97

--414--

Plate 97-1: chart showing the comparative air effort in New Guinea and Solomons, Annex A.
Plate 97-1: chart showing the comparative air effort in New Guinea and Solomons, Annex A.

NAV-97

--415--

Q. During the month of September, when the LAE-SALAMAUA Area was particularly active, were continuous strikes scheduled for that area?
A. During this period we planned to patrol every day, but were unable to make only one or two daylight attacks each week due to heavy requirements for the BUIN Operation. Therefore we planned to make night attacks when weather permitted. However, the total attack schedule was not very heavy until the end of November when the issue in the SOLOMONS was decided. At that time, we thought we would be able to increase attacks on FINSHCAFEN and LAE Areas during December, but in actuality, attacks were no more frequent than during preceding three months due to the heavy losses in RABAUL.

Q. I would like to know what effect the American carrier raids of 5 and 11 November had on the RABAUL Air Force.
A. During October, as a result of low level B-25 attacks, our force lost 40 or 50 planes on the ground; but as a result of the carrier attacks in November, our force was not particularly affected except for some losses due to aerial combat. Your carrier attacks seemed to direct more attention to shipping in the harbor than to attempt to destroy planes on the airfields.

Q. What efforts were made to launch counter-attacks against American carriers?
A. There were constant plans for a Japanese Surface Task Force to attack American Carrier Task Force, but in spite of sending BETTYS out to patrol, they were not able to discover the location of the carrier force. If they did discover it, they never were able to get information back to the base. So those plans were not realized. Actually we had insufficient fighter strength to furnish proper air cover necessary to attack your carrier force without surface ships.

Q. Was there any special plan in effect which would provide for attack by land-based planes against American Fleet units?
A. We conducted daily searches of three or four planes which had orders to immediately inform the base of carrier task force sightings, in which case a group of BETTYS were always help in readiness for an attack. We were losing on the average of five planes each week, particularly in the searches of the SOLOMON Sea. North of NEW IRELAND, in January of 1944, we discovered an American Carrier Force and attacked it with undetermined results. The plan of battle was to send out BETTYS at noon with the prospect of sighting the American Force after sunset in order to carry out a night torpedo attack.

Q. Were these planes sent out singly or in groups?
A. In groups of three or four.

Q. During what period were these search tactics employed?
A. September 1943 to about January 1944. Before September, according to the plan, if searches resulted in enemy sightings during the daytime, we attacked immediately.

Q. Describe Japanese Naval Air Force action during the occupation of ARAWE and Cape GLOUCESTER.
A. Against these landings we planned to render continuous attacks which lasted three or four days from the time of landing. The plan was to have two daylight attacks and one night attack. Fighters would engage in diving and strafing and the light bombers in bombing during the day while the BETTYS would make torpedo attacks at night. Each attack of the fighters, bombers or BETTYS would consist of between 20 and 30 planes.

Q. Were the operations conducted as planned?
A. This was not merely a plan but was actually carried out. The standard plan at this time was immediately upon sighting a landing force to send out all available planes.

Q. At what time was the Cape GLOUCESTER landing force first located?
A. The above air attack tactics were carried on the greatest extent against the landings at ARAWE, very little carried out against the Cape GLOUCESTER landing, ARAWE landing was discovered the morning of the landing by accident by a patrol plane. Information regarding the Cape GLOUCESTER landing was sent to us by Japanese ground forces at GLOUCESTER. Upon receipt of the information from Cape GLOUCESTER the 25th Air Flotilla sent out about 8 BETTYS to carry out night attacks only; no day attacks were made. These night attacks were continued until January when American occupation of GLOUCESTER was accomplished.

Q. Describe Japanese air action during the ADMIRALTY Occupation?
A. There was very little air action taken against the ADMIRALTY Occupation. It was limited to patrol and possibly only two attacks. At that time all aircraft had been withdrawn to the TRUK Area leaving only 10 planes, so these two attacks were carried out by two or three planes at a time. The little effort available was exerted against the GREEN Islands which were given high priority by Senior Headquarters due to proximity of GREEN Island to RABAUL. However, those of us on the spot felt that unwise, and that the ADMIRALTIES were more important strategically. The withdrawal from RABAUL was commenced the day after the U.S. carrier attack on TRUK, and extended for a period of three days (18-19-20 February).

NAV-97

--416--

Q. During the time that the RABAUL Air Force was active, were daily searches always conducted in the SOLOMON SEA as well as the area to the east of RABAUL; was this routine?
A. Yes, the area to the south of RABAUL was searched by BETTYS for a distance of 650 miles until November 1942. The SOLOMONS SEA Area was covered by BETTYS from May 1943 to September 1943. Beginning with the occupation of LAE and SALAMAUA, night searches were carried on to January 1944, covering the entire north coast of NEW GUINEA from Cape WARD HUNT to MADANG.

Q. What effort was made to pass the information obtained from the searches to the Army Air Forces at WEWAK?
A. We informed the Eighth Area Army at RABAUL. They informed the Fourth Air Army at WEWAK.

Q. Was the Army Air Force conducting air searches in this area at the same time?
A. Due to shortage of planes, the Army conducted only occasional one or two plane day searches no night searches conducted.

Q. Was the Army air force in NEW GUINEA of any assistance in the attacks on the LAE, SALAMAUA, Cape GLOUCESTER convoys?
A. The Army conducted occasional independent attacks on the LAE convoy but did not attack at GLOUCESTER, to best of my knowledge.

Q. Did the Army Air Force based in RABAUL and MUNDA participate in any action in the NEW GUINEA Area?
A. I am fairly certain that no NEW GUINEA attacks were made by Army air force in RABAUL. About 60 Army aircraft were based in the RABAUL-MUNDA Area in January 1943 and remained until the Allied capture of MUNDA when all aircraft which had not been destroyed were withdrawn. Most aircraft were destroyed; only a few reconnaissance planes were left in the RABAUL Area.

Q. What liaison existed between Army and Navy Air Forces; was there any cooperation at all in attacks and searches?
A. The Army assisted with limited daylight patrols; they could not patrol at night. There was occasional cooperation and on three attacks the Army and Navy went out to attack MUNDA. But cooperation was in low level, not by senior officers.

Q. In your opinion why was the majority of the RABAUL effort placed in the SOLOMONS Area rather than the NEW GUINEA Area?
A. Originally it was thought that the Army would take care of the NEW GUINEA Area and the Navy was anxious to take over the SOLOMONS Area, because we felt, from a Navy point of view, it was more important. As it turned out, the Army wasn't able to send enough planes to NEW GUINEA for its defense and the Navy was forced to contribute as much defense as possible.

Q. What effect did the drain of naval effort toward the NEW GUINEA Area have on the success of the operations in the SOLOMONS?
A. Up until the loss of TOROKINA, if we had been able to use all the aircraft we had, I think we would have been able to hold back your forces in the SOLOMONS because the Navy's job was to insure arrival of supplies to Army troops. This we were unable to do because of ship losses which might have been prevented with sufficient aircraft. After TOROKINA Operations I think the SOLOMONS Campaign was lost and NEW GUINEA Operations had no effect.

Q. If the SOLOMONS Operations had not been going on, do you feel that the force in RABAUL was sufficient to stop the movement up the NEW GUINEA coast?
A. I think that before you established 4 or 5 airfields at BUNA and had as many as 200 planes there, we would have been able to push back Americans with what air strength we had at RABAUL; but once Americans were firmly established at BUNA, it was impossible.

Q. What effect do you think this constant drain of reinforcements down from the MARSHALL and GILBERT ISLANDS and from TRUK Area to RABAUL had on the success of your defense against our drive across the Central PACIFIC?
A. I think the result of constant reinforcement from the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS greatly weakened that area. We didn't get many from the MARIANAS, mostly from the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS which was greatly weakened. Although we were getting newly manufactured planes from JAPAN, we also were getting many reinforcements from the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES and MARSHALLS-GILBERTS which weakened them in those two areas.

Q. At what time did the officer in command of the Japanese Naval Air Force at RABAUL feel that the SOLOMONS Area was lost?
A. In October 1943, when the 26th Air Flotilla withdrew their planes from BUIN.

NAV-97

--417--

Q. What was the biggest source of your aircraft losses?
A. Our greatest fighter losses were caused in the aerial campaign against American fighters. Regarding bombers, first cause of loss was by ship anti-aircraft fire; second, by base anti-aircraft fire; third, by American fighters; fourth, planes lost on the ground; fifth, by weather.

Q. What percent of your aircraft were destroyed on the ground by bombing and strafing attacks?
A. At the beginning of the war there weren't many lost by strafing; but after TOROKINA (EMPRESS AGUSTA BAY) was taken, the Americans used that field, and the percentage of planes lost by ground strafing was considerable, although not so much in actual quantity because we didn't have many planes left.

Q. Was the availability of aircraft affected by lack of supplies or the skill of the maintenance personnel?
A. In the beginning of the war, during 1942, if 100% of the planes were available for an attack one day, the next day 80% would be available, on the third day 50%. In 1943, at any one time, only 50% of the planes were ever available and the next day following an all out operation only 30% would be available. By the end of 1943, only 40% at any one time would be serviceable. In 1942, the low availability was due to lack of supply; from 1943 on, it was due to lack of skill on the part of maintenance personnel and faulty manufacturing methods. Inspection of the aircraft and spare parts, prior to their delivery to RABUAL, was inadequate, and there were many poorly constructed and weak parts discovered. The Japanese tried to increase production figures so fast that proper examination was impossible.

Q. During the BISMARK SEA Battle, 2 March 1943, did the RABAUL Naval Air Force make any attempt to give the Japanese convoys air cover?
A. The 21st and 26th Air Flotillas were sent out, but due to insufficiency of numbers they suffered severe losses and were unable to stop your attacks.

Q. At what time did the Army Air Forces in NEW GUINEA commence operations to the eastward so as to be of assistance to the naval Air Force in the NEW GUINEA Operations?
A. They commenced patrolling during early 1943, mainly weather flights.

Q. What time did Army aircraft participate in large scale operations?
A. The first operations of any scale conducted by the Japanese Army Air Force in NEW GUINEA were against Allied landings in SALAMAUA and LAE.

Q. Was any effort made at RABAUL to counter the American flying boat night attacks on Japanese shipping?
A. We didn't attempt any countermeasures against flying boat night attacks on convoys, but in May 1943 we did train some night fighters for protection of RABAUL.

Q. Was there any special effort made by the Japanese to destroy the tenders and bases from which American flying boats operated?
A. After our attacks on MORESBY in 1942, we never attacked flying boat bases nor did we ever attempt to attack seaplane tenders.

Coral Sea

Q. (Capt. Shands) what operations did you carry out during the battle of the CORAL SEA, 4-8 May, 1942?
A. We conducted air searches from RABUAL with both seaplanes and land planes. Sometimes we operated from seaplane tenders at SHORTLAND, RUSSELL, LAE or TULAGI. The searches covered a triangular sector to the south of the bases. Three sectors were searched with a 650 mile radius.

The first knowledge that we had of the presence of your carriers in the CORAL SEA was following your attack upon TULAGI, 4 May. In that attack we lost 3 or 4 float type fighters. Two old type destroyers were damaged. The KIKIZUKI (ODD) was beached and later sunk, the other returned to RABAUL. One supply ship may have been hit but not sunk. Three or four small landing boats which had taken men and supplies to GAVUTU were also lost.

We had twelve planes operating from LAE when you attacked TULAGI. We did not know the position of your carriers at that time, so after your attack we sent all but two, which were out of order, on a search to the east. It was fortunate because LAE was attacked by Australian planes just after they had left. We did not have any planes operating from SALAMAUA. These search planes returned to SHORTLAND where they operated for about a week, then went to RABAUL.

On the following day (5th) one of our seaplanes from the RUSSELL Islands located your force about 200 miles south of RENNELL Island. I think that we lost contact the next day, but on the 7th received a report from a carrier search plane that your carrier force had been located. This report was an error because the carrier planes attacked your supply ships.

NAV-97

--418--

Early the same morning (7th) our search planes located some of your cruisers and destroyers about 500 miles south of RABAUL. These were seaplanes from SHORTLAND. As soon as we could load torpedoes, we sent twelve (12) twin-engine attack planes (BETTYS) accompanied by 20 fighters from RABAUL. These planes made a torpedo attack upon your cruiser force. We received incomplete reports because only two torpedo planes returned. We did not lose any fighters however. I think that two of your ships were damaged and one sunk. One ship was identified as one of your heavy cruisers. There were also several British cruisers and destroyers.

Q. Did you have any bombing planes in this attack?
A. No; all planes carried only one torpedo each. That was the only attack made by the shore-based planes of the Southeastern Area Flotilla. After that day our searches were made by groups of four planes loaded with torpedoes, but we did not locate any of your ships. I think that all other attacks were made by our carrier planes, because your ships were out of range of our shore-based planes.

Guadalcanal

Q. What was your air strength in the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL Area on 7 August 1942?
A. We had eight (8) float fighters (Rufes) permanently based there. We also had 18 four engine flying boats (KAWANISHI 97) of the YOKOHAMA Group which were operating in this general area. We did not have any landplanes on GUADALCANAL although we had made one or two trial landings there with light planes. There were no seaplanes on GUADALCANA.

On the day of your attack we lost all eight of the fighters and 10 to 12 of the flying boats. About four were operating from SHORTLAND. Some had already been lost in operations.

Early in the day we lost communication with GAVUTU so did not know what happened. Later we did not think that our personnel had fought very well.

Q. On 8 August you made a very determined aircraft torpedo attack upon our transport force. Do you have any information concerning your losses in this attack?
A. We sent down 20 twin engine attack planes (BETTYS) armed with torpedoes and 24 fighters as cover. I think that the fighters turned back due to weather conditions just before reaching GUADALCANAL. No fighters were lost. 12 landed at BUKA and 12 returned to RABAUL. Only 3 torpedo planes returned. Two landed at RABAUL. One landed at BALLALE. It was reported that we sank two of your cruisers and three transports.

Q. Did you plan any night bombing or torpedo attacks upon GUADALCANAL?
A. No mass attacks. At first we sent one or two planes down at night if the weather was favorable just to keep the forces there disturbed. Both landplanes and seaplanes were used. We made night attacks later around MUNDA. We were forced to do it there because of losses in day attacks.

Q. What were your plans regarding establishing bases in that area?
A. We had no big plans for seaplanes. Just the bases at GAVUTU and HALAVO. We usually operated seaplanes from tenders. We had planned to have a large landplane base on GUADALCANAL that would give us a radius of action to the south and east about the same as we had from RABAUL.

Battle of Eastern SOLOMONS 25 August 1942

Q. What operations did you carry out in the Battle of the Eastern SOLOMONS?
A. The 25th Squadron based at RABAUL searched to 160-30 E then back to SHORTLAND. The patrol planes based in the SHORTLANDS searched out to 164-00 E. On 22 August one of our patrol planes sighted and reported your carrier force. I think it was about noon. The plane did not return. We did not make contact again after that although we had two groups searching. I think that we lost one other patrol plane late that same day. About noon the 25th, twenty attack planes (BETTYS) bombed your airfield in support of our troop landings. I think that we lost 5 planes in that attack.

Q. What damages were received at BUIN in the raid of 5 October 1942?
A. A few planes there were lost. Some holes in the landing strips which were repaired. It was being used as a staging field at that time.

Q. What operations did you conduct in the Battle of SANTA CRUZ, 26 October?
A. Only search operations against your ships. I do not recall any contacts. We also carried out attacks against GUADALCANAL during this period.

Q. What were your operations at the Battle of GUADALCANAL, November 1942?
A. I was in JAPAN from November 1942 to April 1943, so I am not familiar with those operations.

NAV-97

--419--

Q. What is your estimate of your aircraft losses in the GUADALCANAL Campaign?
A. About 1,000 between August 1942 and February 1943, during the GUADALCANAL campaign. About 500 between February and June 1943 and about 1000 between June 1943 and January 1944. Most of the planes lost during 1943 were lost in the MUNDA-NEW GEORGIA-BOUGAINVILLE defense.

Q. Here are some official Japanese figures of aircraft losses during this period. Check them with your figures. (See Annex B)
A. They appear correct.

Q. When was your greatest loss?
A. I think during the MUNDA Campaign, although in April or May 1943, we lost about 70 out of 130 planes attacking GUADALCANAL. About one half of the planes in that attack were Army. The losses were about equal.

Q. What were the effects of our carrier air strikes on the BUKA-BONIS fields, 1-2 November 1943?
A. Damaged about 15 planes, destroyed some supplies and damaged some harbor shipping. Prevented this field from being used during your BOUGAINVILLE Operations.

Q. How successful were you in the use of night fighters?
A. We sent up one night fighter at night which would usually shoot down one or two bombers. We averaged about five bombers per week. At first the B-17's were very easy targets because they did not take evasive action. Starting about July 1943 when they took evasive action, our results were poor. It was always difficult to shoot down the BEAUFIGHTERS because they were fast and maneuverable.

Q. Did you use radar fighter direction or radar in your night fighters?
A. No, the enemy planes were first located by land radar and then the night fighter informed by voice radio. After that the plane was spotted in a searchlight and the fighter made an individual attack.

Q. In your opinion as Chief of Staff of air operations at RABAUL during this period, what had the greatest adverse effect upon your operations?
A. The loss of shipping was the most serious loss in our operations. We were dependent upon shipping for all of our supplies, except aircraft. We flew most of them into our fields. Without fuel, ammunition and replacement of technical personnel our aircraft were useless. We were able to repair the landing strips without much delay, but we were always short of aircraft fuel and ammunition. this was also true for anti-aircraft ammunition. We generally had sufficient food. We also lost most of our best naval pilots in this period. Beginning in 1943 we were unable to replace these losses with equally trained pilots. This loss became most serious in our later naval operations.

Q. What immediate effect did our operations against your air force have upon the defense of hte SOLOMONS?
A. There was no serious effect at first except the loss of pilots. We had sufficient aircraft at the beginning. During the campaign, our aircraft and pilot losses became too great to make it practical to continue to hold the SOLOMONS. Without aircraft cover and support we were unable to supply our garrisons without a useless expenditure of surface shipping. When our attempts to hold the SOLOMONS was at its greatest in the last part of 1943, your advance through the GILBERTS made it impracticable to hold the SOLOMONS any longer. At that time our Naval Air Force had become too weak to assist in the defense of the GILBERTS.

NAV-97

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Plate 97-2: chart showing the disposition of Japanese 11th Air Fleet - Land Based and the Solomons Islands Campaign August 1942 - February 1944 combat losses of Japanese Naval aircraft, Annex A.
Plate 97-2: chart showing the disposition of Japanese 11th Air Fleet - Land Based and the Solomons Islands Campaign August 1942 - February 1944 combat losses of Japanese Naval aircraft, Annex A.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 98
USSBS NO. 447

OVERALL PLANNING AND POLICIES

TOKYO 26 November 1945

Interrogation of: Lieutenant General KAWABE, IJA; Chief of General Affairs Section of the Army Bureau of Aeronautics from beginning of the war until April 1943; Commander of the Air Army in MANCHURIA May 1943 to August 1944; Deputy Chief of the Army Bureau of Aeronautics from August 1944 until April 1945; Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff from April to October 1945.

Interrogated by: Rear Admiral R.A. OFSTIE, USN - Captain T.J. HEDDING, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Colonel COLE, AUS.

Summary

General KAWABE discusses cooperation between the Army and Navy, the responsibilities and primary interests of the two services, and the effects of operations in the various theatres. The General was a strong advocate of fighting the war "to the very end," in the belief that had they been able to inflict heavy casualties on the U.S. landing forces it might have been possible to get terms more favorable than absolute surrender.

Transcript

Q. (Admiral Ofstie) General, we want some clarification of certain features of planning and decision in the Japanese Army, and your opinion on certain matters in which you might be considered a principal authority. Do you feel that, while you were on the General Staff, that organization had full information on naval operations of import?
A. Basically there was interchange of information as much as possible, and exchange of staff officers. I don't know exactly when this started and I learned it only after I became Deputy Chief of the General Staff; but as a regular thing, we met three times a week in a joint conference to confer on operational matters. So I believe that the senior staff officers were well aware of the progress of operations on both sides.

Q. Were there any major differences of opinion during the period you were on the General Staff; if so, will you give us the substance of such matters?
A. While I was in office, as far as operational matters were concerned, there were no differences of opinion.

Q. Differences of opinion were more confined to matters of national policy?
A. Since I became Deputy chief, I had no experience of any such difference of opinion between Army and Navy, but admit that my time was short in the General Staff.

Q. Just after the start of the war, in early 1942, were you familiar with the overall plan of the defense perimeter that it was the intention of JAPAN to hold?
A. I will have to first of all say that at that time I was not on the General Staff so it has to be just hearsay, my personal opinion and what I heard as rumors. But I think that the extent of the Japanese line was to have been what it was in about March 1942; in other words, SUMATRA, JAVA, and BORNEO.

Q. What was the then current opinion in your circles as to the ability of JAPAN to hold that line?
A. I felt, or my associates felt, that if we stopped at this time which I just mentioned, we were confident that we could hold it. The feeling in the Bureau of Aeronautics was that if we had stopped at that time and then made subsequent strategical moves and political moves, we could have held the extent which was held in March 1942.

Q. What was the current opinion as to the greatest danger to that line, the greatest threat?
A. As far as the extent of thinking of the Bureau of Aeronautics went, we felt that some time, eventually, there would be a counter-attack from the U.S. Forces. But from what direction that would come, the Bureau of Aeronautics people hadn't given it consideration.

Q. Were you informed, or did you get the information at the time of its occurrence, of the failure of the first attempt to land at PORT MORESBY or of the failure to land at MIDWAY?
A. I don't recall exactly, but I first learned about PORT MORESBY comparatively early. I think that considerable time passed before I learned about the failure of the MIDWAY Campaign.

Q. At what time did you consider that the outer defensive perimeter had actually been broken, and where?
A. As I said before, the original plan was to maintain the line mentioned before. But then, at that time, it was found that the U.S. Forces were weaker than had been originally expected, so the Japanese forces fanned out to

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PORT MORESBY, BISMARK, etc. Actually when I first thought the inner line was broken was when SAIPAN fell; but as for the turning point, when the positive action ceased or even became negative, it was, I feel, at GUADALCANAL.

Q. Now at GUADALCANAL and at RABAUL, who had the major responsibility for Japanese Air?
A. The Navy was the one mainly responsible. As far as the Army was concerned, Western NEW GUINEA was as far as they could possibly go. Even supplying Western NEW GUINEA was a very difficult task, and I know that because I was in that part of the Bureau of Aeronautics.

Q. Why was it difficult to supply Western NEW GUINEA with aircraft? What was the limitation?
A. In the first place, the Army put emphasis on that area; they emphasized FRENCH INDO-CHINA, BURMA and MALAYA. So with that as a center, Western NEW GUINEA became very far off. Moreover, there was the long supply route by sea which the Army was not well experienced in handling.

Q. Was the matter discussed between the Army and Navy Staffs, and did the Navy request additional aircraft to support the SOLOMONS Operation?
A. I was in TOKYO at the Bureau of Aeronautics and got a request from the Army General Staff to send as much aid as could be sent from the points where we had placed the emphasis, to aid in the SOLOMONS Operation. I imagine that that request originated with the Navy, but we did send some reinforcements or aid.

Q. What were the major causes of loss of Army aircraft that were moved forward into the Eastern NEW GUINEA and SOLOMONS Area?
A. Although there may be many reasons, the biggest reason, I still think, was the long supply route. We couldn't send adequate strength down there and they were being constantly chopped off. It was the long supply route which was the biggest cause of losses.

Q. Was it lack of shipping to support the intermediate bases or was it inability of the pilots to carry out the flight all the way from the home island?
A. I feel it was more the actual inability of pilots and also lack of material rather than shipping difficulties which brought about that weakness. Just to ferry the planes all that long distance was very difficult task to be undertaken by the Japanese air forces of that time - from the technical inability standpoint. I want to add, because I have had a particular interest in this phase of things, that the very first pilots who were sent down to the SOLOMON-BISMARK Are were very good, excellent pilots, and to have them killed was a very painful thing.

Q. Did the Army request the Navy to take steps to provide carriers to transport planes down, or to assist them in any way in getting planes into the area?
A. As far as I recall, the Army never did make any request for help from the navy for transportation of these planes, but there may have been some cooperation locally.

Q. Would you say that there were sufficient aircraft being built in JAPAN to render much more aid, but that it was primarily a failure of the supply line?
A. At that time, although we didn't have any to spare, I feel that the production was more or less adequate. But of the planes produced in the home country, we couldn't have one-hundred percent of them in action at the destination.

Q. What percent could you have, normally?
A. I can't express it exactly in figures, but it was a very small figure. One of the reasons for that low percentage of planes reaching the destination which were operational was that, unlike the UNITED STATES, the maintenance bases enroute were very poor. Had we been able to set up good bases fast like the UNITED STATES did, our losses would have been much smaller. But as it turned out, only a very small percentage actually became operational at the destination.

Q. Well, roughly 10 to 25 percent?
A. The ones that actually engaged in combat after they got there, I would guess around 10 percent.

Q. What effect did that effort to support the SOLOMONS Operation, and the losses incurred in getting them there, etc., have on later operations to the west - Western NEW GUINEA, the PHILIPPINES, and so on?
A. Generally speaking, the planes that were sent down there were wiped out. Those losses both enroute and at the destination, especially the loss of our best pilots, had a big effect on later major campaigns.

Q. Now to go a little further on, in May 1944, U.S. Forces were landing at BIAK. About the 1st of June, the naval air forces in the MARIANAS sent a certain number of planes down to BIAK, just before the MARIANAS Campaign. Was this done at the request of the Army?

A. I don't know a thing about it because I was in MANCHUKUO at that time.

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Q. When you returned to JAPAN in August 1944, operations were still going on in the MARIANAS. Did the Army supply air craft to the defense of the MARIANAS?
A. The MARIANAS Campaign was over in July. I don't remember exactly when it was, but it was before the fall of IWO. The Army carried out an attack against SAIPAN from the mainland via IWO. This was in very small force, just sort of a guerilla attack, and we had no intention of recovering SAIPAN or anything like that; just nuisance value.

Q. When you returned to TOKYO at this time, August 1944, what was the feeling in the Army as to the significance of the loss of the MARIANAS?
A. It was considered a very great loss. The loss of SAIPAN and, at the same time, the matter of the defense of the homeland really became serious matters. That was the general idea within the Army.

Q. What was the status of Army aviation as a whole at that time, strength in various positions, training of pilots and adequacy of aircraft?
A. The main body of the combat strength of the Army Air Forces was at that time in LUZON. A part of the strength was in CHINA and another part in the MALAYA-BURMA Area, with a fairly strong training force still in the homeland. There was practically nothing in MANCHURIA. I was in command of the air forces in MANCHURIA; and while I held that position, all of my planes were taken away from me, and that is why I returned to the homeland. Those planes had been sent forward to the PHILIPPINES.

Q. About the planes in CHINA and BURMA, what was their status? Were they obsolete, were they well equipped, or were they limited in numbers and in efficiency?
A. The number, as far as the force goes, was small; but some of the pilots were fairly well trained and well experienced as a whole, both in CHINA and in the BURMA-MALAYA Area.

Q. Why were the aircraft units maintained in CHINA at this time? Was it considered that there was a considerable threat in that region?
A. They had a two-fold purpose - one was to aid the Army operations in CHINA, this CHINA War was still going on, and on the second was to act as defense against CHINA-based American planes.

Q. Do you feel personally, that the Japanese Army did their best to settle the affair in CHINA as early as they could, or did they simply want to continue in occupation?
A. The time element of the CHINA Incident was utmost in their mind. It was very, very rigid policy to finish that incident or affair as fast as possible.

Q. Would you say then, that throughout the period of the war the Army was more involved, more interested in CHINA than to the East?
A. Numerically, of course, they had the biggest forces in CHINA, but they had to divert strength to the PHILIPPINES and even way out to the MARSHALLS for defense purposes. But basically, they still put most of their emphasis on the CHINA Campaign. Fundamentally, after the start of the CHINA Incident, every effort was made to settle it, but actually it turned out to be the forerunner to the big Greater East ASIA War; and so it was found that unless they settled the war in other areas, the CHINA affair couldn't be settled. That is why they did divert some strength down into the southern area.

Q. You said that most of your planes from MANCHURIA were sent to the PHILIPPINES. What reports did you get on the operation of those planes as to their losses and so on, that first group was sent down there?
A. I can say, in general, that the original Army air forces were lost in that SOLOMONS Campaign. So it was planes from MANCHURIA, plus replenishments from the homeland, which were in the PHILIPPINES and which were also eventually wiped out.

Q. (Captain Hedding) During these campaigns from September 1944 to January 1945, I would like to have a general statement as to the approximate losses sustained by the Japanese Army planes sent down to reinforce the PHILIPPINES.
A. I don't have definite figures, but from September 1944 to January 1945, practically all the planes that were sent out there were wiped out.

Q. General, would you give the major cause for the loss of those planes?
A. The strength of the U.S. Forces.

Q. What forces?
A. The whole matter is that the UNITED STATES were numerically superior to the Japanese air strength. for example, during the LEYTE Campaign, I don't know whether they were shore-based or carrier-based, but numerically the U.S. air strength finally got the uppermost of the Japanese. As far as the Japanese were concerned, of course, they were all shore-based planes.

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Q. I would like to get a general comparison of the strength and capabilities of the Japanese Army air forces in four different time periods; namely, in the SOLOMONS in the middle of 1943, after the fall of the MARIANAS in July 1944, after the completion of the LEYTE Campaign in November 1944, and the status as of April 1945 when you became the Deputy Chief of Staff.
A. First of all, from the standpoint of number and also of trained personnel, I think that around that MARIANAS time was the highest, it was at its peak. Next to that I think it was around the time of the SOLOMONS, the middle of 1943. The second one, that is, the period of the SOLOMONS, we didn't have the number of planes but the pilots and crews were best trained during that period. And then after that comes the LEYTE period; and then the final, April of 1945. This is very much of a personal guess, but assuming the MARIANAS period to be 100, I would say that the LEYTE period would be around 70, and April of this year to be in the vicinity of 50.

Q. (Admiral Ofstie) When you first went to MANCHURIA, what roughly was the size of the Army air forces which you had there?
A. When I first got to MANCHURIA it was still fairly well equipped. I roughly guess that, although they were old-type planes, there were about 1500 all told in May of 1943.

Q. Those were pilots who had been there some time and might be called fairly well trained?
A. They were very well trained pilots, they had very good commanders out there.

Q. What were the principal occasions, military reasons, for gradually moving those people out; and at approximately what time were they moved out?
A. In July or August of 1943 the bulk of the planes were moved out of MANCHURIA. The reason for that was that most of the planes that were sent out to other fronts had been lost, and it was as replenishments that the planes were moved. Before I assumed my post in MANCHURAI, in about February of 1943, that was the first time that the MANCHURIAN Air Force was called upon for planes and they went straight to RABAUL. The first ones sent out after I assumed my post went from July to August 1943 and, as I recall, their destination was the PHILIPPINES. I never was aware of their destination. They just called for the planes and I turned them over.

Q. In July and August 1943, was there considered to be a threat to the PHILIPPINES that would warrant a large number of planes being sent thee, or were they more in the nature of a replacement pool to be maintained in the PHILIPPINES?
A. As the gradual advance of the U.S. forces made us feel that the PHILIPPINES should be better defended, that was the reason for sending out those planes. As you know, the SOLOMONS and GUADALCANAL were followed by a move further north, and the air strength from MALAYA and that area was called on for replenishment in the NEW GUINEA Area. They put up a very bad showing there, one after another being wiped out and leaving this general PHILIPPINE Area empty of planes. That was why the General Staff ordered that the PHILIPPINE Area be reinforced, and it could also be called a replenishment center. The airplane production in the homeland was satisfactory. It was on the up-grade at that time but the training of personnel was not adequate, and that was the reason they had to call on such forces as from MANCHURIA.

Q. What was the reason that the training was inadequate in mid 1943, the basic reason?
A. It was just at a period when, although we had a good number, we hadn't reached that point where the training was sufficient to carry out operations in an adequate manner.

Q. Then for the last 8 or 10 months of your time in MANCHURIA you had practically no aircraft left there, is that right?
A. For the last six months I was there, anyhow, the actual planes which could be considered operational were nil - practically none. They had some trainers and were engaged in training, not combat.

Q. Now to go again to the MARIANAS. The MARIANAS had been lost and you say the plane and pilot situation was bad because of lack of training. What was the view then as to the next move? How could the Army expect to improve its position in the future if that were the case?
A. One step they took was to have the government emphasize the air production industry. Much emphasis was put on training pilots, even by drawing on student bodies to be trained as fast as possible.

Q. And what was the intended objective of those trained pilots? What American forces were they going to fight against primarily?
A. The main objective, main targets, were U.S. aircraft. That is, they put the emphasis on fighter pilot training and not so much on bombers. Overall it was to put the most effort in fighter pilot training.

Q. That was defensive, in other words?
A. Yes, defensive. The general trend of the war made bombers less important. Another thing was that the manufacture of the bombers took so much more material than fighters, and the natural trend of things had become more defensive. It was twice as easy to produce fighters with the material on hand.

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Q. Why was it, in your mind, General, that the MARIANAS were lost? What was the major cause of the loss?
A. It is my personal opinion, but basically I feel that there was too much delay in setting up defense of the MARIANAS, the defense preparations were inadequate.

Q. The MARIANAS you considered, as you stated earlier, was a major catastrophe, the breaking of that line?
A. Yes.

Q. What effort did the Army Air make to try to prevent that break?
A. I don't know clearly but I do know that many troops were sent in there as fast as possible.

Q. But why didn't Army Air contribute to the defense? What, if anything, did they contribute to the defense of the MARIANAS?
A. Nothing. That was entirely the Navy jurisdiction, and even the Army forces which we put on those islands came under the command of Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet. It is my understanding that the plan was for the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet to have under him the fleet and the Army personnel on the islands, an adequate number to carry out the defense of the entire area.

Q. The Navy then, was entirely responsible for the adequate air strength in that defense?
A. Yes.

Q. General, looking over the whole war as it was carried out, the operations in CHINA and MANCHURIA and in the PACIFIC, would you say that the Navy or the Army had the greater responsibility for the conduct of the war?
A. This is a very interesting problem on which I have put much thought lately. I would like to have you thoroughly understand that these are just my personal views. Very basically, the general plan for the defense of the nation was: where the Continent was concerned it was the Army's duty, and where the PACIFIC was concerned it was the Navy's duty. Both from the standpoint of desire and from effort, it was always well known by most people that JAPAN couldn't carry out war on the scale that it actually did. It was materially impossible to employ our entire Army on the Continent while at the same time using our entire Navy in the PACIFIC. That such a situation should not be allowed to arise was one of the basic principles. From an Army man's standpoint, I felt that any kind of a campaign on the Continent could be carried out entirely by the Army alone, that we needed no cooperation or assistance from the Navy. Since both the Straits of SHIMONOSEKI and the TSUGARU Straits were quite freely navigated, we didn't have to call on the Navy at all to carry on Continental warfare, but if war was to be carried out in the PACIFIC, we could leave that entirely to the Navy. I felt that with the Japanese naval strength the Western PACIFIC could be adequately held by the Japanese Navy alone; that is, strictly the Western PACIFIC, I don't know about anything further. This war was the kind of a war which should have been avoided at all cost according to theory. But right after the opening of the war, the Navy did rush down very fast and obtain all that area, and so I felt that I was justified in my earlier belief that the Navy did have the strength necessary to look out for the whole Western PACIFIC. So after the first line was established, I thought it was the wisest thing to stop there. Moreover, I thought that was the plan, that they were going to stop there and stabilize their position, consolidate their position and build up defenses. Then after that, when they started such things as the MIDWAY Campaign and the SOLOMONS Campaign, I personally was very much surprised. Then when the sort of a turning point came, when they started to retreat, they didn't have any position consolidated enough on the original line that they could hold and carry out successful defensive warfare. I feel that the naval losses that were suffered during that time had a great effect on the unfortunate termination of the war. If the Army had had a bit more strength, if they had been able to pour in more troops and more strength in NEW GUINEA and all those various island bases, possibly they would have been able to hold that perimeter. If I were to try to say who was responsible, the Army or the Navy, for the final defeat, I would say it was mutual. They both didn't have the power to carry out the war to a successful termination. I feel, looking back on it now, that had JAPAN been prepared for the eventuality of such a war on the scale of this one, then we might have had a better chance. The national potential wouldn't allow JAPAN to build up a military force adequate for a war on this scale, so the bold beginning at the outbreak of this war was just a very unfortunate thing.

Q. Now at what point in the war would you say that it became obvious that JAPAN didn't have the war potential to carry their effort on successfully?
A. I am not in a position to speak for JAPAN as a whole, but I do know from hearsay that even at the time of the outbreak of the war, or even before that, there were many people both in government and in military circles, both Army and Navy, who had considerable anxiety as to whether the national potential could maintain or carry on such a war.

Q. At what time did you realize that there was talk of arranging a termination of the war, talk in any high circles?
A. As far as I myself am concerned, the time it actually happened was the first I heard, August 15th. As Deputy Chief of the General Staff, I was of the opinion that we would fight to the very end, and moreover I believe that we should have fought to the very end.

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Q. How far would you say that "very end" extended?
A. I desired a landing operation. I felt that should the UNITED STATES attempt landing operations that, with our strength in the homeland, we could have inflicted heavy casualties on the U.S. Forces and caused considerable damage. At no time did I have any thought that JAPAN would be able to use the strength that was left over after that to recover the PHILIPPINES or the MARSHALLS. There was no thought like that, but I was convinced that considerable damage could have been inflicted on any landing attempt by the U.S. Forces on the mainland. It was my desire that that would result not in an unconditional surrender but probably a compromise, and I was under the impression that I was given this duty to continue the war to that extent. I also feel that even if things didn't turn out where we could inflict heavy damage and so forth, if things turned out more unfortunately and U.S. troops occupied the main points, that even at the cost of becoming a second GERMANY, I felt the battle should have been carried out.

Q. Was that, you might say, the general attitude and opinion of the Army? Of the High Command?
A. I would say it was pretty well general throughout the Army.

Q. Would you then say that perhaps one of the influences that brought about the early termination of the war was the Navy, or was it a civilian group?
A. Of the opinion in Navy circles, I am not aware. But I feel that there have been quite a few in civilian life, of course, who had also suffered quite a bit, and among the politicians, who weighed profit and loss of immediate surrender against fighting on. Those people may have, in some way, influenced the EMPEROR to arrive at that final decision. I can't of course, say which was the right thing to do, to stop it when it was stopped or to go on to the end; but as far as I myself am concerned, I would have gone on to the very end.

Q. In line with this general subject, did you notice any change in the attitude of the Navy that you associated as a consequence to their loss of the fleet?
A. I did not get that impression. I feel that at least in the Navy General Staff circles, the Navy was prepared to even put their men on shore to carry the fight to the end. That was the impression I got.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 99
USSBS NO. 448

SHORE-BASED AIR IN THE MARIANAS

TOKYO 25 November 1945

Interrogation of: Captain FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, IJN; Senior Staff Officer of the First Air Fleet, in which capacity he was in the MARIANAS from September 1943 until April 1944; Air Staff Officer to CinC Combined Fleet from April 1944 to end of war.

Interrogated by: Rear Admiral R.A. Ofstie, USN.

Summary

When Central PACIFIC forces approached the MARIANAS, in early June 1944, the Japanese put into effect the "AGO" Plan for the defense of these islands. The plan provided for an attack by the Japanese Fleet, and coordinated employment of fleet and shore-based naval air forces.

Captain FUCHIDA gives details of the organization, strength, operations and losses of the shore-based naval air forces. He also comments on the Army concept of the PACIFIC War.

Transcript

Q. What were your duties in June 1944?
A. I was Aviation Officer on the Staff of Commander in chief, Combined Fleet.

Q. Tell me what Naval Air Forces were based on SAIPAN, GUAM and TINIAN on 1 June.
A. Two airfields on SAIPAN: the first, ASLITO, had about 100 Type ZERO fighters; in the second airfield at MARPI POINT there were about 50 SUISEI (Dive-bombers). At that time Airfield No. 2 was not in perfect condition, so part of the SUISEI were transferred to ASLITO. There were three airfields on TINIAN: No. 1 was the biggest, and had about 80 land-based planes and 20 reconnaissance planes (converted SUISEI); No. 2 airfield about 50 SUISEI and 20 GEKKO (night fighters); No. 3 airfield was incomplete, still under construction. On No. 4 airfield, which was just off No. 1, were 80 type Zero fighters. There were two airfields on GUAM completed and one under construction. About 100 type Zero fighters and 10 GEKKO on No. 1; on No. 2 about 60 GINGA (bombers). On ROTA, although there was an airfield, it wasn't used. On YAP about 15 Type ZERO fighters and 50 SUISEI. On PELELIU, there were about 40 Type One land-based attack planes and 40 TENZAN (ship-based torpedo planes). There was nothing based on ANGUAR. On BABELTHUAP, there were about 20 type Zero fighters. On IWO JIMA, there were 20 ZERO type fighters and 10 TENZAN.

Q. What was the command organization tying all those aircraft together?
A.

Plate 99: chart showing the command organization - CINC Combined Fleet, First Air Fleet, Tinian Saipan GUAM, 23sf ITO, 26sf ARIMA (Davao), 22sf (SUMIKAWA (Truk), 61sf UWANO (Peielieu) & YAP PALAU, Annex A.
Plate 99: chart showing the command organization - CINC Combined Fleet, First Air Fleet, Tinian Saipan GUAM, 23sf ITO, 26sf ARIMA (Davao), 22sf (SUMIKAWA (Truk), 61sf UWANO (Peielieu) & YAP PALAU, Annex A.

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Q. What general orders had been issued to these units by Commander FIRST Air Fleet to cover the expected attack?
A. The plan was that if the U.S. Task Force struck the MARIANAs, then the strength from PALAU would be moved up to the MARIANAS to reinforce and attack with all the forces except Air Flotilla 23. It was made very mobile to meet the expected attack. When the attack was expected, Admiral OZAWA's Task Force, which was in LINGGA and the Homeland, was to rendezvous at TAWITAWI and then move up to position northeast of PALAU and stand by so as to meet the attack.

The duty of Air Flotilla 22, 23 and 26 was mainly to carry out reconnaissance on that occasion. Part of the MARIANAS force was sent to WOLEAI to search. The main attacking force was Air Flotilla 61 and Admiral AZAWA's Task Force. That was the general order issued prior to the attack. Then, when the earlier attack came to BIAK (May 27), about half the force from the MARIANAS and PALAU were ordered to Western NEW GUINEA. On 1 June, about half the force was shifting from the MARIANAS down to NEW GUINEA.

Q. Were those forces returned to the MARIANAS, or what happened to them down there?
A. About half of the force that was transferred to Western NEW GUINEA was lost in the BIAK Operation, the other half was to return to their original station. But when they got to PALAU they were attacked by large type seaplanes and were practically all lost.

Q. When did you first get word of our fleet movement?
A. About 10 A.M. on 9 June. I think that was from a reconnaissance plane.

Q. Were any new orders then issued to the Air Fleet?
A. That was the time when the planes which had been shifted to BIAK were ordered back to their original position.

Q. After the action started and the fleet came within range of the MARIANAS, were any new aircraft units ordered into the MARIANAS?
A. Reinforcements were brought from the Homeland through IWO JIMA. They started to arrive about the time of the SAIPAN landing, about 200 to 250 planes.

Q. Were they organized units?
A. They were formed from planes from the YOKOSUKA Air Group and Air Flotilla 27 which was up in HOKKAIDO, and they were placed under the command of Commander, Air Flotilla 27. It was a temporary organization of about 200-250 planes and known as the HACHIMAN Air Attack Force. Later this became a formal organization and was made the THIRD Air Fleet. This was tight after the MARIANAS Operations, around July.

Q. The air action began there on the afternoon of 11 June with a fighter sweep. Did you then begin getting reports as to the losses and what was going on in the MARIANAS?
A. We didn't know the absolute detailed losses but were aware in general of the losses as we received daily reports of the number of planes which were available for the following days operation. From that we could tell what the losses were.

Q. What was the nature of those losses?
A. On 11th, 12th and 13th, practically all of them were wiped out. It was ordered that aircraft carriers were to be the target all the time, but we received no reports that they were effective. We did receive reports that attacks were carried out on one or two cruisers and one or two auxiliary carriers, but got reports that their attacks against the Task Force as a whole was not much of a success.

Q. Did any of the planes come out of there, return to the PHILIPPINES or PALAU or to the homeland?
A. A few planes did get back to the PHILIPPINEs, less than a hundred all told. In that number there were some which originally were on Admiral OZAWA's Task Force carriers, which had flown in to the MARIANAS and then returned to the PHILIPPIINES.

Q. Sometime after the battle of 19-20 June, there were a few planes being flown in from PALAU and YAP at night. Do you recall the orders for those planes, how they happened to be coming in?
A. 15 fighters moved up from PALAU; first to YAP, then from YAP to TINIAN, as I recall on the 18th or 19th. The order was to send as many as possible in every way possible. We also sent planes from IWO to attack during the night and land at GUAM, and then at dawn move on to PALAU. They were ordered to do what they could. Admiral KAKUTA on TINIAN had reported that around the MARIANAS there were quite a number of escort carriers whose planes were acting as cover for the landing on SAIPAN, so the plan was to inflict as much damage as possible on these escort carriers so as to temporarily gain control of the air. Another plan which was carried out, although in small numbers, was after we learned that a powerful Task Force had retired to refuel.

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Planes were sent from IWO JIMA to attack, and then to return to PALAU and TRUK, then to attack at SAIPAN and down to GUAM. Because of these attacks from PALAU and IWO JIMA, to TRUK, SAIPAN, Guam, etc., we used up practically all of our planes.

Q. That is, the planes assigned to this operation; not additional planes?
A. Yes; when it was seen there was no chance to recover SAIPAN, then orders were issued to retire to the PHILIPPINES. That was the hundred planes mentioned a while ago.

Q. When did they decide that SAIPAN was lost?
A. About 5 July. At that time there was a plan proposed to take the entire surface force and carry out one final attack, but by that time we didn't have air strength so it was called off.

Q. Did you assume that the U.S. Forces would continue with the occupation of GUAM and TINIAN after finishing SAIPAN?
A. Yes.

Q. What steps were taken so far as air was concerned to counter that operation?
A. We had no intention of trying to carry out any large scale attacks, having assumed that GUAM and TINIAN would be lost. So, first, we planned to build up the air strength in PALAU, but couldn't do that; so retired to PHILIPPINES to build up the defenses there. In the meantime, the planes did carry out small scale nuisance attacks, but nothing on a big scale.

Q. At any time during this operation did you ask the Army for air assistance?
A. We did ask the Army to carry out attacks from MINDANAO, PALAU and Western NEW GUINEA, but nothing came of it. That is, the Army didn't have the ability to carry out attacks on the sea.

Q. Did the Army have planes?
A. They had a total of about 300 planes in that area.

Q. What would you say was the effect of the MARIANAS Operation on the naval air strength; did it virtually eliminate the remaining naval air?
A. Fundamentally, this operation, which was known as the AGO Operation, was to be a decisive one because we felt if the MARIANAS were lost there could no longer be a dependable line even in the PHILIPPINES. So we planned an all out attack and used up practically all of our air strength.

Q. The only considerable number of aircraft which you had left, then, after the AGO Operation, were the planes of units in training?
A. That is correct, about all which were left were the training planes which were used in the SHO Operation about 3 months later. We estimated that for the UNITED STATES to consolidate their position on SAIPAN and move to TINIAN, GUAM, PALAU and HALMAHERA it would take about 3 months; so the training program was stepped up to end in about three months time.

Q. Did you build a new Naval Air Force in that three months period?
A. That is correct. Although we estimated three months for training it actually did take four months. Then the U.S. attacks came a month earlier, before we were ready for them, in the PHILIPPINES. These new trainees would have been ready to participate in actual operations in November, but the attack came in October.

Q. Did you consider that this new Air Force would have been well trained by November?
A. Good enough to participate effectively in the campaign. The Navy alone figured on 1000 planes by that time, ready for the PHILIPPINES Operation.

Q. You had no plans then for any considerable air operations when PALAU was attacked?
A. No, we had no large scale plans for air employment in PALAU at that time.

Q. Due to lack of trained units?
A. Yes. The original plans, which were carried out to certain extent, were to move all the air power from the RABAUL Area up to TRUK, all the air power in the Southwest Area to the PHILIPPINES, HALMAHERA, CELEBES, and Western NEW GUINEA, and the FIRST Air Fleet to the north of the MARIANAS. The plan was to use all these air forces, amounting to 2,000 planes, in one big decisive battle which we expected to be around the SAIPAN Area. However, when the attacks came to the MARIANAS, we couldn't concentrate our attack in one all-out attack, and we had to move part of our forces to Western NEW GUINEA because of the attack on BIAK. Another factor was that quite a few which were in Western NEW GUINEA caught malaria. Anyway, we couldn't have one big decisive battle, so our strength was whittled down a little at a time until finally all of it was wiped out.

Q. At what time would you say your naval air power was wiped out?
A. Within a month after landings on SAIPAN.

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Q. At that time, what would you say was the position of the Army Air Forces?
A. Although in number they had about the same as the Navy, they weren't very active because they didn't have the ability to carry out any operations over the sea. The Navy was convinced that if the line was broken from the Homeland to IWO JIMA to the MARIANAS, BIAK, and Western NEW GUINEA, it would be just a matter of time until the end. The Navy was firmly convinced of that. The Army, although they believed this too, didn't have the conviction of the Navy and weren't willing to pour all their strength into one decisive battle. Instead they kept some air strength in BURMA, CHINA and PHILIPPINES and weren't willing to throw in everything on one defensive stroke. The reason for that split was that, in spite of the fact that the Commander may have had the same ideas, since the chain of command was entirely separate they couldn't have coordinated the operation. The Army refused to consolidate forces with the Navy and unify the entire thing. After the failure of the operation to hold that line, the SHO Operation was activated. This was to hold the line from the mainland through FORMOSA and the PHILIPPINES.

Having learned a lesson from the failure of holding the first line, to a certain extent the Army and Navy did unite air forces but by that time it was too late.

Q. Did you consult, occasionally, with your opposite number in the Army Headquarters?
A. Yes, I did. As for major problems, the General Headquarters took them up, but I would confer sometimes with regard to local operations.

Q. Did you feel that your opposite number had a good understanding of such an operation as the AGO Plan?
A. I think that he did have a thorough understanding of the situation, but that the Army man had too much confidence in ground forces. That is, he felt that with the ground forces on GUAM, SAIPAN, TINIAN, etc., they could hold these islands without air assistance. Actually, he was wrong.

Q. What did you think of the Army, generally, in your dealings with them? Were they generally alert to the import of the U.S. Fleet movement across the PACIFIC?
A. I felt that they did not have a thorough understanding of the entire PACIFIC Campaign. Even in the SOLOMONS Area, they couldn't see any reason for air support. They were much more interested in their Continental Operations than in the PACIFIC Operation. Even in placing ground forces in the MARIANAS, the Army was rather opposed to it. It was only through the efforts of certain high Army officials that they were finally able to get about three divisions from MANCHURIA into the MARIANAS. Even those Army forces weren't sent until the MARSHALLS reverse. Until then we just had Naval Guard Divisions holding the MARIANAS. After the MARSHALLS reverses, however, the Army suddenly realized, in March, that they should send in forces from the KWANTUNG Area; but they were still unhappy about it.

Q. What would you personally have done different in the MARIANAS if you had conducted the AGO Operations?
A. The biggest mistake was to spread the air power from the MARIANAS, and then send them to the BIAK Operation. The BIAK Operation should have been carried out with Army Air Forces from the PHILIPPINES-CELEBES Area. Prior to that operation, Admiral KOGA, CinC Combined Fleet, had been killed and one month elapsed before Admiral TOYODA assumed position of CinC Combined Fleet. During that one month period the CinC Southwest Fleet was acting as overall commander for this entire area. The CinC Southwest Fleet, being at SOERBAJA, had placed too much weight on the BIAK Operation. Naturally from his position down in SOERBAJA that looked like the most important operation; that was why this naval air strength was taken out of the MARIANAS and shifted down to Western NEW GUINEA. If KOGA had been in command, or if TOYODA had taken over immediately, I don't think this mistake would have been made.

Q. What mistakes do you think we made with our task Forces?
A. No mistakes.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 100
USSBS NO. 454

PALAU STRIKES - MARIANAS

TOKYO 22 November 1945

Interrogation of: Comdr. NAKAJIMA, Chikataka, IJN, Staff of CinC Combined Fleet.

Interrogated by: Rear Admiral R.A. OFSTIE, USN.

Summary

Task Force 58 struck PALAU, 30-31 March 1944, to destroy naval and air forces and merchant shipping, and in support of forthcoming operations against HOLLANDIA. Three destroyers and about 20 merchant ships were sunk, while numerous vessels, were left beached and burning; about 160 Japanese planes were destroyed, airborne or on the ground.

Comdr. NAKAJIMA, on the Staff of CinC Combined Fleet, was in PALAU during these attacks and gives details of the action. He also relates circumstances leading to the death of Admiral KOGA, then CinC Combined Fleet.

Transcript

Q. When did Admiral KOGA, CinC Combined Fleet, leave TRUK?
A. The Flag of the Combined Fleet was on the MUSASHI, which left TRUK for home on 10 February. About 20 February, MUSASHI left the home country and went to PALAU. The day before the carrier strike at PALAU, CinC Headquarters was moved ashore at KORROR. It was the desire of the CinC to be as far as possible in the frontline at all times; therefore, earlier, he had been at TRUK. About 10 February, it was decided that TRUK had inadequate defenses for the Combined Fleet and was within range of the large type U.S. planes; so he went to PALAU which was an advanced position and still out of range of the large type planes.

Q. What naval forces were there when you got to PALAU?
A. The Second Fleet, which at that time had no battleships but five to six cruisers and destroyers. The MUSASHI was an independent ship, being flagship, and was the only battleship there. The balance were maintenance ships. PELELIU was the base for the 26th Air Flotilla. Air Flotilla 26, however, had been down at RABAUL and had suffered heavy casualties, and at PELELIU had very little strength and was in the process of reorganization. Half of this flotilla was at DAVAO, half at PELELIU, with headquarters in PELELIU and operating under CinC Combined Fleet. I think there were not many planes in DAVAO.

Q. During the month of March, what changes occurred in the naval surface forces in PALAU?
A. between 10 and 17 February, the YAMATO and NAGATO left TRUK enroute to SINGAPORE, and I think, toward the end of February or early March, were in and out of PALAU. Nothing else of significance.

Q. What was the employment of the forces there during that period?
A. In preparation for eventualities, they were training.

Q. Maneuvers at sea?
A. Inside the reef, they did not go out to sea.

Q. Was the merchant shipping in the same general area in PALAU Harbor?
A. Practically none, but transports were in Palau Harbor.

Q. When did you first get word of an expected attack by U.S. Naval Task Forces on PALAU?
A. I think it was about 10 o'clock on 28 March when a patrol plane from WOLEAI reported that they sighted your Task Force. I remember that we considered various plans, such as to have the transports retire and to put out patrol planes; but as I recall, the only steps taken was to increase air patrols. It is possible that Base Force 30, which had charge of such things, did issue some orders for retirement of merchant ships; but as far as Combined Fleet was concerned, no orders were issued.

Q. When were any orders, based on the approach of the Task Force, first issued by CinC and what were the reasons?
A. It was first decided to go out and engage the Task Force, and orders were then issued to have merchant shipping retire from PALAU. Then after receiving a further patrol report that the U.S. Forces were retiring from PALAU, it was decided to retire to the north with the fleet, and, after ascertaining exact situation, to then decide whether or not to engage the U.S. Task Forces. At that time it was decided to have the Combined

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Fleet Headquarters go ashore at PALAU. Reasons for doing that was to get the MUSASHI to the Second Fleet to increase the strength of the Second Fleet in case a battle was to take place. These orders were sent out at about 1030 on the 29th.

Q. Did the entire staff of CinC Combined Fleet go to shore headquarters?
A. Yes.

Q. Did the CinC Combined Fleet, at that time, issue any orders to shore-based air units with regard to increasing the air strength at Palau or sending them away?
A. There were no orders for retirement; and as for strengthening, that couldn't be done either. But there was an order issued to the 26th Air Flotilla to fight as hard as possible. It was a very elastic order because Air Flotilla 26 was still in the process of being organized. They were told to do their best, and if warranted to retire. It was apparently left up to the Commander of Air Flotilla 26.

Q. How long thereafter did CinC Combined Fleet and Staff remain at PALAU?
A. On the night of the 31st they were to board a total of three flying boats and head for DAVAO. Actually, only two planes took off, one plane with the Commander in Chief aboard becoming lost and is believed to have fallen into the ocean. The other made a forced landing at CEBU and the plane was badly damaged, the Chief of Staff and his party going ashore there. The third plane, which left the morning of the 1st, had such personnel as communications officers, etc., and arrived safely at DAVAO.

Q. Why did the CinC Combined Fleet leave at that time, and why did he start for DAVAO when his Flag was in the MUSASHI?
A. It was decided by that time that the CinC Combined Fleet would have more freedom of action if he based on shore. Various points for his headquarters were considered, such as SAIPAN, GUAM and DAVAO; and DAVAO just happened to be one of the points which had been considered earlier. The MUSASHI had already been given to the Second Fleet to increase its power. Communications facilities, etc. on DAVAO had not been completed as yet, but it was decided it would be the best place to go.

Q. Why did he leave that night? Was it because communication facilities had been destroyed during the day?
A. The reason that the night of the 31st was picked was that during the afternoon on the 31st, attacks by the U.S. task Force slakened and it was believed the Task Force was withdrawing. Then a patrol plane reported in the evening of the 31st that he sighted the Task Force close by. Later it was found out that the patrol plane actually saw reefs and rocks to the east of PALAU, and mistook these for the task Force. That report finally decided them to pull out that night to a point from which command could function with more freedom. I was among those who originally suggested leaving in the daytime of the 1st. They left because of seeing those rocks.

Q. Did you expect a landing?
A. Some thought they would, some didn't.

Q. How long did you, personally, stay on at PALAU after the carrier attacks?
A. 8 or 9 April, staying at KORROR.

Q. You were, then, in a position to get reports on the results of the attacks. What losses and damage occurred to naval and other shipping?
A. Of the naval vessels, the AKASHI, a repair ship which had been previously damaged in the vicinity of TRUK and could only get about 12 knots, was sunk at PALAU Anchorage; WAKATAKE, a destroyer or possibly a patrol ship, was sunk on the way out of the reef right near the west entrance. There were one or two small patrol boats also lost. About two tankers attached to the Navy sunk, one SHIRETOKO and one more which I think was the ERIMO. Both of these had been damaged before, and SHIRETOKO was practically inoperative. Those two were regular navy tankers. Then there were three other tankers which the Navy had requisitioned which were also lost, one of them was the ASASHIO MARU. One freighter in the employ of the Navy was sunk, the GOSHU MARU. About 7 or 8 Army transports, possibly more, were sunk. I regret very much the hospital ship MURO MARU, which had left all of the vessels and was by itself on the high seas, had about 100 machine gun holes in it but did not sink.

Q. Did you know that mines had been dropped by our planes, and do you recall any effects of that mining?
A. I did know they had been dropped. The west channel was closed to navigation for a period of about 20 days because they suspected magnetic mines there. We had no equipment to sweep them and, while such equipment was requested metal and wire bound drums and other experimental equipment was used. We also knew that BABELTHUAP Channel had been mined, and one small ship hit a mine there on 3 April and sank. Being pretty certain there were no mines in the southwest channel, the hospital ship TAKASAGO MARU was directed to come through, and after negotiating almost all that channel they did hit a mine; the ship was beached and saved from sinking. So for a period of 20 days all channels were closed to navigation; the whole harbor was closed. Since the NEW GUINEA Campaign was looking more and more unfavorable, it was decided that PALAU was no longer an effective Naval Base, so it was no linger used as a base.

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Q. Why did the ships which could operate remain in the harbor after being ordered to get out when the attack was coming?
A. Orders were issued to retire, but Base Force 30 was not accustomed to such operations; and because there were so many Army transports, which were not used to this type of orders, carrying out of orders was considerably delayed. On top of that, quite a number of those people thought it would be safer to keep close to shore, especially in PALAU where you can get in next to shore where the water is very deep. This may have influenced them to stay. The Second Fleet actually did retire northward the evening of the 29th, and there was also a convoy which retired that night. The many Army transports had difficulty getting communications, and moreover Base Force 30 was not used to operating at night through a channel which was difficult even with lights, and they couldn't make it. So order was issued if they couldn't make it during the night, if they couldn't get far enough from there to be safe, it was ordered that they stay inside the reef and disperse. But they had communication trouble again, and started to go out again early in the morning. That was when the WAKATAKE was sunk. So the rest turned about and came back to anchorage, where they were when the strike occurred. These Navy ships that were spoken of earlier were all damaged ships, and from the beginning had been ordered to go inshore and they are the ones which were sunk. I don't quite know why the requisitioned tankers didn't go out.

Q. What happened to the shore-based air?
A. Based on orders issued on the 28th, patrols were stepped up on the 29th. There were only about 4 or 5 large type planes available for this, and they could only carry out about 90 or 100 degree sector search. Of those planes, one or two were shot down by the Task Force, and I think the remainder went to DAVAO. I think there were only about 10 fighters, and early in the engagement they did everything they could. But they were not skilled and one by one were lost until before noon they were all gone. There may have been a few more small planes operating out of NGESBUS.

Q. What damage was done to shore installations at KORROR?
A. The Military Supply Depots and warehouses were completely destroyed at MARKARA Island, and this meant loss of some oil and much gasoline and foodstuffs. Based Force 30 had its marine supplies (mines, etc.) destroyed. The Army ammunition dumps at KORROR and other supplies there were considerably damaged. There was a natural sort of tunnel or cave across the peninsula in which they stored gasoline and oil, and a plane came down very low many, many times and firing machine guns bullets and destroyed this gasoline. It was a very remarkable job.

A. Of course, the headquarters was completely folded up, so I got orders to come home; and although there weren't many flying boats out, I did get one to TOKYO.

Q. When did you again join the staff CinC Combined Fleet?
A. The former staff was completely wiped out so a new staff was organized, new members of which I was a part. I think that it was finally organized 1 or 2 May.

A. I was not aware of how the CinC looked upon the loss of PALAU, but I, myself, realized that whether or not there was an attack, sooner or later PALAU would become quite ineffective. The only reason those ships were there, even at that time, was as a stopping place without operational value. By that time, we were already selecting bases in the vicinity of NEGROS Island, and TAWITAWI and such places were being used as fleet bases.

Q. But up to that point it had been an advance fleet base?
A. Yes, it was used temporarily as such because the facilities in the PHILIPPINES hadn't been completed yet. Because our losses in BOUGAINVILLE, etc., in October-November 1943, were so great we couldn't hope to carry out any sort of positive action, and the only reason we considered PALAU at all was for emergency use, not for offense purposes.

Q. Did the staff of Admiral KOGA prepare any orders or estimates and directives for the defense of the MARIANAS?
A. There was a very general order for the defense, not only of the MARIANAS but the Western CAROLINES and Western NEW GUINEA, issued about July 1943. That was based on general directives established by central authorities in TOKYO. One of the contributing reasons for going back to TOKYO in February was to confer and establish general plans for defense of the MARIANAS. One of the major things that was decoded on that occasion was the organization of the Central PACIFIC Fleet about March 1944, and another thing decided on was to send large Army forces to the MARIANAS and in Western CAROLINES. That was the basic reason for the establishment of these new airfields at PALAU; actually, they had already been started but this speeded it up.

Q. When the new Staff (TOYODA's) started functioning what effective steps were taken to strengthen air bases in the MARIANAS?
A. Heretofore, planes and men were sent out in small numbers without sufficient training and skill. The new

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policy was to give more thorough training at home, and then send them out in large organized groups. That program was begun in the fall of 1943, during Admiral KOGA's time. That was the nucleus of the First Air Fleet. What remained after reinforcement of the MARIANAS was the Second Air Fleet. The program of strengthening was speeded up considerably after TOYODA took over; but it was not necessarily TOYODA's doings, but simply that the stepped up program was begun at this time. By the time Admiral TOYODA actually took over he had the start of a well organized shore-based and carrier-bases air force, and that is what made him decide to have a decisive battle either in the MARIANAS or Western CAROLINES. He had confidence they had as much strength as possible. One of the results of this program was the engagement by carrier striking forces about 19-20 June.

Q. That was one of the reasons that influenced TOYODA to order the action of 19-20 June, rather than holding the fleet as initially considered for defense of the Western CAROLINES?
A. The way I look at it, Admiral KOGA started out with a very disorganized air force. All he could do during his time was train and try to get it organized, and by the time the fruits of such efforts could be born he was gone and Admiral TOYODA was in. So it wasn't necessarily the difference in personal ability of the two men. I recall myself, when I assumed my new position on the staff in September (1943), Admiral KOGA kept saying, "March of next year, we will carry out this program."

Q. Why was Admiral KOGA's force disorganized when he took it over?
A. One of the reasons was that organizing the First Air Fleet was holding planes back from operations. Another thing was that up to April 1943, the carrier planes had been heavily employed on missions from which they weren't expected to come back. They were used at RABAUL with the intentions of stopping any further expansion of the U.S. Forces from GUADALCANAL, which was finally given up in February. This was the intention of Admiral YAMAMOTO in taking carrier planes and pilots out to RABAUL. This is pure conjecture on my part, because I was with the Third Fleet at the time and was not with the Combined Fleet, but I think possibly that Admiral YAMAMOTO's intention was to hold the U.S. Forces until such bases as on BOUGAINVILLE and MUNDA could be strengthened; and for that he thought it was worth while to expend available carrier planes.

Q. When the MARIANAS landings started, was there any source of additional naval planes that could be sent in from the EMPIRE or the PHILIPPINES?
A. It was about the time of the MARIANAS landings that the new distribution of the air strength had been fairly well completed, and we still had confidence that if the enemy came from one direction we would be able to smash it with this, and we had no particular reserves on which to call for reinforcements. At that time we had planned to use everything we had, both air and surface, in one big operation; and so everything was in readiness and waiting for the enemy to come.

Q. Were any planes ordered in from outside, such as from the PHILIPPINES?
A. Some planes were brought in from the PHILIPPINES, but they were not reserves because they were part of the First Air Fleet in the first line of attack but the second phase. Also in view of the situation in NEW GUINEA at that time, a certain number of planes had been sent to that area. These were recalled.

Q. Roughly how many planes would you say had been moved up to Guam?
A. There was a completely new unit that was brought into IWO JIMA from YOKOSUKA Air Unit after the Task Force withdrew. As I recall, it was just before the second attack on IWO, the end of June, that they sent reinforcement from YOKOSUKA to IWO JIMA.

Q. Do you know the losses suffered by that reinforcement group as a result of the second strike in the IWO JIMA-CHICHI Area?
A. From attacks and hits, practically all were lost.

Q. What was the size of the group which was sent in?
A. I don't recall exact numbers but think it was in the neighborhood of 20 twin-engine planes, besides probably 20 or 30 fighters.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 101
USSBS NO. 459

SINKING OF THE USS HOUSTON AND HMS PERTH - 1 MARCH 1942;
FIRST TRANSPORTATION CORPS IN DEFENSE OF
THE PHILIPPINES - 1944

TOKYO 17 November 1945

Interrogation of: Rear Admiral SHOJI, Akira, IJN; Captain of the MOGAMI in the Pacific Ocean from September 10, 1941 to 1 November 1942; Commander of the First Transportation Corps at TAIWAN and MANILA from 25 September 1944 to April 1945.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, USN.
Lt. Comdr. J.A. Field, USNR.

Summary

Rear Admiral SHOJI describes the sinking of the USS HOUSTON and HMS PERTH and also discusses the operations of the First transportation Corps in defense of the PHILIPPINES - 1944.

Transcript
Sinking of USS HOUSTON and HMS PERTH

Q. (Comdr. Moorer) List the forces assigned to the MALAYA Force on 8 December 1941.
A. Forces assigned were the 7th Cruiser Squadron composed of four cruisers: SUZUYA, KUMANO, MIKUMA and MOGAMI, and the 3rd Torpedo Squadron composed of the light cruiser YURA and 12 destroyers.

Q. Trace the course of the MOGAMI from 7 December up to and including the MALAYAN Operations.
A. The MOGAMI Group operated West of BORNEO in support of the landing at MIRI and KUCHING using CAMRANH Bay as a base. After completion of the MALAY landings, the MOGAMI returned to HAINAN and rendezvoused with the JAVA invasion force. This force arrived at unloading point off BATAVIA at 2300, 29 February.

Q. I think it was during this operation that the HOUSTON was sunk. Please describe the action from the first time the HOUSTON was sighted until she was finally sunk.
A. The direct support unit was composed of the FIFTH Destroyer Flotilla with the cruiser NATORI as the Flagship, plus THIRD Destroyer Flotilla with the cruiser YURO as Flagship. Each flotilla consisted of nearly ten destroyers. The indirect support unit consisted of two cruisers, MIKUMA and MOGAMI, plus one destroyer. In addition there were nearly fifty transports which carried Army forces. These units with cruiser and destroyer escorts left SANGA on HAINAN Island on 18 February at 10 o'clock and proceeded to vicinity of BATAVIA. At 2300 on the 29th of February they arrived at BANTEN Bay. The length of time required to make the cruise was due principally to the fact that when information was received that Allied forces were in the vicinity of BATAVIA, the force would reverse course and proceed north until the area was considered clear.

the destroyer FUBUKI which was on patrol north of BANTEN Bay first sighted the HOUSTON, 1 March at 0030, TOKYO Time. The HOUSTON was followed by the PERTH. The HOUSTON was sighted about 12 miles from SOEMBA Strait. The FUBUKI was north of the HOUSTON and turned so as to follow her. At the same time, MOGAMI and MIKUMA were patrolling to the north, and as soon as they saw the firing from the Allied ships they turned and headed for the Strait in order to prevent their escape. At about 0130, the cruisers closed within range of the HOUSTON and PERTH. Prior to this time, the HOUSTON sighted the NATORI and patrolling destroyers to starboard ahead, and turned northwest towards them. Upon sighting Japanese destroyers, the HOUSTON and PERTH ceased firing at transports and turned sharply to the right and headed to the north-northwest. It was at this time that the FUBUKI, which had been trailing the Allied ships, delivered a very effective torpedo attack on the HOUSTON. At the time the HOUSTON was torpedoed, the MOGAMI and MIKUMA were several miles to the north and had not yet entered the engagement. Simultaneously with the right turn by the HOUSTON and PERTH, they ceased firing at the transports and directed the fire towards the NATORI and patrolling destroyers. The HOUSTON was torpedoed by FUBUKI at about 0100. After being hit by the torpedo, the HOUSTON gradually slowed from 20 to 10 knots. The PERTH remained in company and the Allied ships continued to fire at the destroyers. At 0130, the MOGAMI and MIKUMA had closed the range sufficiently to enter the engagement. When this firing began the HOUSTON and PERTH ceased firing at the destroyers to the south and directed their fire at the Japanese cruisers. The

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Japanese destroyers withdrew in order not to interfere with the cruisers. Because of PANJANG Island being dead ahead and the fact that Japanese cruisers were on opposite course to the PERTH and HOUSTON, they reversed course to starboard, thereby closing the range, and continued the action immediately after changing course. The PERTH was sunk at 0145, the HOUSTON was sunk 15 minutes later at 0200.

As soon as the ships were sunk the Japanese cruisers returned to their station.

Q. Were these ships sunk solely by cruiser gunfire or did the Japanese destroyers enter the action also?
A. In addition to gunfire, the Japanese heavy cruisers also attacked with torpedoes, and towards the end of the action with the PERTH and HOUSTON were torpedoed by the destroyers which had previously withdrawn. The torpedo hits were decisive factors in sinking these ships.

Q. At what range were the HOUSTON and PERTH firing at the transports?
A. Nearly seven miles at the beginning. The range was rapidly closed and finally it was so close that the Japanese transports were subjected to heavy machine gun fire.

Q. Did the PERTH use torpedoes against the transports?
A. During the engagement two or three of the transports were sunk and several were damaged by gunfire; also, personnel were lost from machine gun fire. However, it is thought that the main damage was caused by torpedoes, probably fired by Japanese destroyers attempting to hit the HOUSTON. I am not sure whether the torpedoes were from FUBUKI or from patrolling destroyers north of BANTEN Bay. In the latter case they would have been fired at extremely long range.

Q. What damage was inflicted on Japanese cruisers and destroyers by Allied gunfire?
A. One Japanese destroyer was hit shortly after the HOUSTON was torpedoed. Although there were many near misses, there were no direct hits on the Japanese cruisers. After the PERTH was sunk the HOUSTON divided her fire so as to attack both Japanese cruisers. The fire was very accurate. Many straddles but no hits.

Q. At what range was the engagement between the HOUSTON and PERTH and the MIKUMO and MOGAMI fought?
A. From 7 to 5 kilometers.

Q. What was the exact location of the sinking of the Allied vessels?
A. PERTH and HOUSTON were sunk in that order north of SOEMBA Strait. I do not remember the exact location.

Note: For track chart of the above action see Annex "A."

First Transportation Corps in defense of PHILIPPINES

Q. (Lt. Comdr. Field) I understand that you commanded the First Transportation Corps, which was charged with PHILIPPINE reinforcement in the latter part of 1944. To whom were you responsible for the operations of this command?
A. This command, which was organized on 25 February 1944, was under the direct control of the Combined Fleet.

Q. Were you not responsible to the Commander Southwest Area Fleet in MAINLA?
A. That came later. I am not sure of the date, but it was about 17 October that I was put under the direct control of the Southwest Area Fleet.

Q. Were you at MANILA at that time?
A. The headquarters of the First Transportation Corps was organized in JAPAN proper, and moved to FORMOSA on 23 October and to MANILA about the 28th, then briefly back to FORMOSA returning to MANILA about 7 November.

Headquarters finally left MANILA for FORMOSA on 30 December 1944.

Q. What was the purpose of organizing the First Transportation Corps?
A. It was organized for the transport of supplies and personnel.

Q. Did you have a regular complement of ships assigned your corps?
A. When first organized, the First Transportation Corps was composed of nine transport ships, and as time went on new ships built in JAPAN were added. In the end, about 30 ships were permanently under the control of the First Transportation Corps.

Q. In view of the nature of your duties at this time, perhaps you could tell us whether the Army originally planned

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Plate 101-1: chart showing the track chart in JAVA (Banten Bay), Annex A.
Plate 101-1: chart showing the track chart in JAVA (Banten Bay), Annex A.

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to reinforce and strongly defend only LUZON, or whether it was planned to establish a mobile counter-landing force which was to oppose our invasion at whatever point in the PHILIPPINES we might land?
A. I am not sure, but both alternatives seem to me to be correct.

Q. Did your Transportation Corps have any particular mission assigned in connection with the SHO-GO Operation?
A. At this time, some small landing vessels were put under my command to supplement the transport force, and we carried one brigade and also war material to MANILA.

Q. Are you acquainted with the TA-GO Plan for the reinforcement of ORMOC?
A. Yes; in this operation I carried personnel and material to LEYTE. This plan was made after 17 October when your landings began.

Q. At that time, was the TA-Go Operation considered to be a change in the basic strategy for the defense of the PHILIPPINES?
A. I am not sure about that. However, I did have part of the responsibility for the LEYTE reinforcement, and at that time great importance was placed on this operation. My force was ordered entirely to this duty.

Q. What strength was made available to you for escort?
A. No escort was provided me. Once or twice I had some destroyer support, but these transport vessels were heavily equipped with AA guns and machine guns so it was not thought necessary to have many escorts.

Q. How about air cover from Japanese fighter planes?
A. I recognized the importance of this type of protection and requested support from planes but I did not get as much as I desired. These planes were requested both from the Army and the Navy, inasmuch as the LEYTE reinforcement was a joint operation, conducted in coordination. We had support alternatively from the Army and the Navy, one one day and the other the next, or sometimes one from 0800 to 1000 and the other from 1000 to 1200, etc. I would make the requests but the allocation of planes was not made by me. Both Army and Navy tried to meet my requests but I still did not get as many planes as I requested.

Q. How many convoys did you send to LEYTE?
A. I reached MANILA on 7 November, and convoys were sent from the beginning of November to the beginning of December; nine convoys were sent during this period.

Q. Roughly, how many troops were successfully landed on LEYTE?
A. About on brigade of Army troops and nearly one company of Marines. Some merchant ship transports were added to the Transportation Corps for this operation.

Q. Was that the number that was sent from MANILA, or the number that actually reached LEYTE?
A. That number actually reached LEYTE.

Q. Roughly what were the losses in personnel sent from MANIAL?
A. The loss in these operations was three ships at ORMOC and two off MASBATE and two off MARINDUQUE, so far as my Transportation Corps was concerned. All these losses were caused by aircraft bombing and strafing. What the losses in these ships of personnel and material amounted to, I do not recollect.

Q. Were other ships, not connected with your Transportation Corps, involved in the reinforcement of ORMOC?
A. There were some.

Q. Who controlled such ships?
A. At one time the Commander of Torpedoes (DesRon Commander) controlled the operation, and at another time the Commander of Escort Group would be in control. At one time, also, by order of the Commander of the Southwest Area Fleet, some ships under my own direct control were placed under the control of these commands.

Q. Do you know the dates of the losses to your ships that you mentioned?
A. I don't recollect the precise dates. These losses were caused not at the same time but at separate times.

Q. Could you give a general estimate of the results of our carrier plane strikes on shipping in MANILA Bay?
A. I was stationed at MANILA from October until late December, and during this period, to the best of my memory, two cruisers were lost and perhaps three or more destroyers, although I am not sure, and one tanker and several merchant ships. These are the losses which I now remember, but probably there were more. In any event, MANILA Bay became extremely difficult for shipping, so our ships were diverted to SAN FERNANDO. This change was decided upon at the end of November and put into effect at the beginning of December.

Q. From the beginning of December, then, MANILA was no longer of importance as a port?
A. A very few ships entered MANILA Bay after this time, but as a port it had lost its importance.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 102
USSBS NO. 460

ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE CONVOY ESCORT

TOKYO 19 November 1945

Interrogation of: Captain OI, ATSIIHI, IJN; Staff Officer of Combined Escort Fleet from Nov. 1943 to Aug. 1945; Commander SOGAWA, Kiyoshi, IJN; Member of Naval General Staff from 27 Nov. 1942 to the end of the war.

Interrogator: Captain Steadman Teller, USN.

Summary

At the outbreak of war, the Japanese had neither an efficient organization nor adequate ships for escort of convoys over their long lines of communications. As the war progressed, various ineffective steps were taken to improve the organization until finally tactical commands were established for this particular purpose. This was a belated step and only half of the planned number of convoy escort commands became active. Various reasons are given for the adopted policy of sailing unescorted merchantmen in groups rather than singly when routed through dangerous waters.

Partial information is given on the damage to Japanese shipping caused by the carrier air strikes at CORON Bay in September 1944 and on SAIGON in January 1945. The dates and places of sinking of several escort carriers engaged in convoy escort are also listed.

Transcript

Interrogation of Captain OI:

Q. What were the various steps in development of convoy escort organization following establishment of the Combined Escort Fleet in November 1943?
A. The reorganization of escort units under the Combined Escort Fleet consolidated control of the naval stations which heretofore had obtained direct from the Naval General Staff the few instructions available to them. The First Escort Group actually controlled single escorts until the spring of 1944. It was desired to organize escort flotillas at the time of organization of the Combined Escort Fleet but the lack of officers in the grade of Commander and Captain prevented. Consequently, a convoy commander system, similar to that of the British in World War I, was inaugurated. Retired Captains were called to service, 15 being assigned to the First Escort Group and 4 to the Second Escort Group. Because of the age of these officers, only one-third to one-half of them were available for duty at any one time.

Organization of the two escort groups did not place active senior officers in command of convoys and escorts because these groups were purely administrative. Commencing in the spring of 1944, the first flotilla was organized as a tactical unit of the First Escort Group, and additional ones were added very gradually. It was desired to have eleven such flotillas but by May 1945 only six had been established.

The Second Escort Group Headquarters, which had originally been located at TRUK, was moved to SAIPAN in March 1944. At SAIPAN it also acted as the Base Force Headquarters Group. All the personnel of this headquarters were killed following your landing in June and the Second Escort group was never reestablished.

Q. What carriers and air groups were employed primarily on missions of protecting shipping?
A. The first use of a carrier in convoy escort was the experimental trip of the CHITOSE with a convoy to SINGAPORE, in January 1944. The SHINYO, TAIYO and UNYO were assigned to escort duty throughout the war until each was sunk by submarine torpedoes. The 801 Air Flotilla was shifted to the First Escort Squadron about August 1944. The 931 Air Flotilla was a training force for escort carriers and was placed under the First Escort Group about December 1944. The 901 and 936 Air Flotillas, also, were engaged primarily in protection of shipping during the latter part of the war.

Q. Why did you so often sail unescorted merchant ships in groups rather than singly when they were routed through dangerous waters?
A. We found it better to keep unescorted ships in groups for the reasons: first, that they might be sure to get a radio message back to base giving essential details of the attack; second, to make better use of the few convoy commanders; third, to improve the chance of rescuing crews of sunken ships; fourth, because the British appeared to have found it successful in World War I. There was an added factor in that the navy had taken

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many of the experienced merchant ship captains and chief officers leaving comparatively inexperienced merchant marine officers to take charge of the ships. These officers had no training in handling ships under attack. There was also reluctance on the part of many merchant captains to sail singly in dangerous waters. Most of them who did sail singly in dangerous waters were lost in the early part of the war. After that, if a ship was ordered to sail alone, the captain often would put into port at the first scare and wait until he thought the threat of the attack was over. This caused reduction in the usefulness of shipping, of course.

The question as to whether to sail unescorted ships singly or in groups was discussed frequently in the Naval General Staff during the war. The policy of sailing in groups was adopted in 1942 and adhered to throughout the war. The chief of Navy General Staff was opposed to it but was persuaded by other members to adopt it for the above reasons.

Q. Do you recall when and where the escort carriers you mentioned were sunk?
A. SHINYO - September 1944 in YELLOW Sea.
TAIYO - August 1944 off LAOAG, LUZON.
UNYO - 17 September 1944 in middle of SOUTH CHINA Sea.

Interrogation of Commander SOGAWA:

Q. What plans existed at the beginning of the war for escort and protection of shipping?
A. Each year the officers in the fleet who would be responsible for this operation submitted a plan for escorting shipping and a recommendation for building escort vessels which they knew would be needed. It was estimated that 360 of the large type escort vessels would be needed for our long lines of communication. the Navy postponed building additional escort vessels, so when the war started we had old destroyers, a few mine sweepers and such craft assigned to this duty under the various area fleet commanders of Naval Bases. At that time, there was no unified control of escort and these various commanders did the best they could with the means at their disposal. It was not until 10 April 1942 that the First Escort Unit was formed.

Q. What was the tactical command organization in the convoy-escort combination at the time of organization of this unit?
A. At first the senior escort vessel captain was in charge. The convoy ship captains, however, had difficulty in navigating and maneuvering and in carrying out the instructions given to them at sea. The senior escort captain was too busy running his own ship and was not experienced enough to handle several other escort captains and a group of convoy ship captains. The result was utter confusion. To remedy this a number of retired naval captains were introduced as Chief Navigation Officers of Convoy. This, in effect, produced divided command, the Chief Navigation Officer having charge of the convoy ships and the Senior Escort Captain commanding the escort vessels. The method of coordination was left to those two officers, thus producing a variety of methods and, generally, poor results. Some Chief Navigation Officers made their headquarters on an escort vessels and used flag signals. This was unsatisfactory, particularly in bad weather. Some used their escort vessels like sheep dogs to round up stragglers. Some paid no attention to the escort commander, particularly if the latter was the junior.

Naval General Headquarters tried the expedient of placing classmates in these two positions and also tried making the senior of the two the overall commander. Neither innovation helped the situation very much and finally to improve matters there were established 8 escort convoys with flag officers in command. But these flag officers and their staffs remained shore-based and were administrative commanders only. The Chief navigation Officer and escort commanders were retained in their respective assignments and matters did not improve as desired.

The next step was to provide these Escort Convoy Commanders with flag ships and to make them tactical commanders of both convoy and escort. Although it was planned to have eight of these organizations, there were never more than four.

Q. What reports of actions were made upon completion of a convoy escort operation?
A. Upon return to port, the Chief Navigation Officer or convoy commander made a personal report. Also the escort commander made a written action report in addition to submitting the ship's logs.

Q. Why did you so often sail unescorted merchant ships in groups rather than singly when they were routed through dangerous waters?
A. There were several reasons for sailing them in groups, most of which developed from experience. First, we considered it better for communications and easier to keep track of our ships; second, we considered that a group of ships offered better defense against air attack; third, it was possible to rescue survivors; and fourth, it made best use of the experience of our convoy commanders. We tried sailing ships singly and in pairs but our experience showed it was better to form them into larger groups.

696691 O - 46- 11

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Q. Give me the names or description of your merchant ships sunk in CORON Bay, PHILIPPINES by carrier air attack in September 1944.
A. I know the following:

Naval Vessels sunk
AKITSUSHIMA - provision ship
IRAKO - depot ship
KAMOI - transport

Transports sunk
KOA MARU (JDFJ)
KOGYO MARU (JFEM)
one name unknown

Transports burned
2 - names unknown

Q. Can you identify any of the vessels sunk by carrier air attack at or near SAIGON on 12 January 1945?
A. I know of the following:

Naval escort ships:
KASHII
No. 35 coast defense vessel
No. 43 coast defense vessel
No. 51 coast defense vessel
No. 101 sweeper
No. 103 coast patroller
No. 31 submarine chaser
No. 41 submarine chaser
No. 43 submarine chaser

Transports:
More than 10

Q. When were the carriers which were employed in convoy escort sunk?
A.

KUMOTAKA (UNYO) 17 September, 1944
KAMITAKA (SHINYO) 17 November, 1944
OKITAKA (CHUYO) 3 December, 1943
OTAKA (TAIYO) 18 August, 1944
UMITAKA (KAIYO) 10 August, 1945

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 103
USSBS NO. 461

ALEUTIAN CAMPAIGN

DEPLOYMENT OF JAPANESE ARMY FORCES IN THE KURILES, 1942 to 1945

TOKYO 22 November 1945

Interrogation of: Major SHIMADA, Masuda, IJA; a member of the Military Affairs Section of the Army Headquarters in TOKYO, who presented the material contained in the following report in response to a formal memorandum to the Japanese Government (Nav. Memo. 26) requiring information of the Army activities in the defense of the KURILES.

Interrogated by: Captain J.S. Russell, U.S.N.

Summary

The deployment of Japanese Army troops in the KURILES is given.

The retaking of ATTU by U.S. Forces marked the beginning of a movement on the part of the Japanese to strengthen the northern island flank of the Empire. In the first half of 1943 the numbers of battalions in the north, central, and south KURILES were 3, 1, and 2 respectively. The 3 battalions in the north were augmented by an additional 3 battalions evacuated from KISKA at the end of July. As a reinforcement for the island forces, one division was being brought up to strength in HOKKAIDO. By November 1943 the so-called 'First Reinforcement' was complete, with the addition of an amphibious brigade and 3 battalions to the north KURILES, and an amphibious brigade in HOKKAIDO.

The spring and summer of 1944 witnessed a further and much greater increase of Army strength in the KURILES. This was a part of the general scheme for a strong island frontier for the protection of the Empire, in which the KURILES were the northern end of a line continuing south through the OGASAWARAS, MARIANAS and CAROLINES to NEW GUINEA. At this time the Army forces in the KURILES were augmented, in the north, to one division plus an amphibious brigade, in the center, to one division less two battalions, - and, in the south, to two mixed brigades and one amphibious brigade. This deployment was backed by two divisions in HOKKAIDO.

In November 1944, because of the approach of heavy winter weather which made certain beaches impractical for assault, and which, likewise, made the supply of defense troops at these locations very difficult, most of the troops on the ONNEKOTAN-SHASU-KOTAN Island Group were shifted to PARAMUSHIRO, and those on SHIMUSHIRU, to URUPPU.

The year 1945 found the Japanese island frontier well perforated, and this was reflected in the KURILES although considerable forces were maintained there until the end of the war. One amphibious brigade was removed to KYUSHU, and one to the KANTO Plain; while one division was sent to KARAFUTO.

The above deployment can be summarized in approximate totals of men as follows:

KURILES 1943  
1944
1945
8,000 to 14,200 men
41,000 men
27,000 men
HOKKAIDO 1943
1944
1945
17,000 to 20,800 men
34,000 men
17,000 men

Those men were Japan's answer to threat of U.S. invasion from the north, via the ALEUTIANS. The men were not in action, except in defense against harassing air raids, or against sporadic shore bombardment by light U.S. naval forces. However, they were required to maintain their defensive positions and hence were unavailable for combat assignment elsewhere. Moreover, their supply and movement afforded excellent shipping targets for U.S. submarines. This resulted in a heavy loss of ships to Japan as well as a loss of about 10 percent of the total personnel deployed in the islands.

The report is given in the form of a series of charts (See Plates 103-1 to 6), the last of which shows a plot of Army shipping losses in as complete detail as the destruction of official records permitted.

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Plate 103-1: Chart showing deployment of troops 1943, first half immediately after the KISKA evacuation.
Plate 103-1: Chart showing deployment of troops 1943, first half immediately after the KISKA evacuation.

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Plate 103-2: Chart showing deployment of troops 1943, about November at the completion of the first reinforcement of the KURILES.
Plate 103-2: Chart showing deployment of troops 1943, about November at the completion of the first reinforcement of the KURILES.

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Plate 103-3: Chart showing deployment of troops the period during which the KURILES were most strongly defended. Mid 1944.
Plate 103-3: Chart showing deployment of troops the period during which the KURILES were most strongly defended. Mid 1944.

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Plate 103-4: Chart showing deployment of troops 1944, about November.
Plate 103-4: Chart showing deployment of troops 1944, about November.

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Plate 103-5: Chart showing deployment of troops August 1945.
Plate 103-5: Chart showing deployment of troops August 1945.

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Plate 103-6: Chart showing Army shipping losses in the KURILES.
Plate 103-6: Chart showing Army shipping losses in the KURILES.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 104
USSBS NO. 462

THE KON OPERATION FOR THE REINFORCEMENT OF BIAK

TOKYO 26 November 1945

Interrogation of: Captain SHIMANOUCHI, Momochio, IJN; on Staff 16th Cruiser Division from March 1943 to October 1944.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, USN.

Summary

Captain SHIMANOUCHI describes in accurate and complete detail the three phases of the KON Operation devised for the purpose of reinforcing BIAK.

Transcript

Q. Who devised the plans for the KON Operation?
A. The plans were devised for the Staff of the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet on about 29 May 1944.

Q. Explain the inception and objective of the KON operation.
A. With the progress of the Allied advance along the North Coast of NEW GUINEA, it became extremely important, for the defense of the HALMAHERAS and PHILIPPINES, that we hold BIAK Island. Finally, in the latter part of May, the Allies began the invasion of BIAK. Although our defense forces put up a very brave and skillful fight, we realized that unless fresh forces were thrown in regularly it would be impossible in the long run to hold the island. Herein arose the necessity of the KON Operation. This operation had as its main objective the transportation to BIAK by Navy combat ships and small craft of the No. 2 Amphibious Brigade (about 2500 troops), which was at that time in ZAMBOANGA. The secondary objective was a Naval bombardment of enemy land positions if the situation permitted.

Q. Describe the command organization for the operation, and list the ships assigned each unit.
A. Because of the rapidly changing situation, there were three consecutive organizations set up for the execution of the plan. Only the second organization was actually used. The three organizations were as follows:

Organization No. 1 (1 June to 6 June)

Transport Division

  16th Cruiser Division AOBA (FF)
KINU
  19th Destroyer Division   SHIKINAMI
URANAMI
SHIGURE

Screening Units

No. 1 5th Cruiser Division MYOKO (F)
HAGURO
  27th Destroyer Division HARASAME
SHIRATSUYU
SAMIDARE
No. 2 10th Destroyer Division FUSO (F)
ASAGUMO
KAZAGUMO

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Detached Force

ITSUKUSHIMA (F)
TSUGARU
36th Sub Chaser Squadron
37th Sub Chaser Squadron
30th Picket Boat Group
127th Special Transport Group

Note: At 2025, 3 June, the 5th Cruiser Squadron, FUSO and 10th destroyer Group detached from above force and returned to DAVOA. (See Annex A).

Organization No. 2 (7 June to 9 June)

Transport Division

  19th Destroyer Division SHIKINAMI (FF)
URANAMI
SHIGURE

Screening Unit

  27th Destroyer Division HARUSAME (F)
SHIRAKUYU
SAMIDARE

Detached Forces

No. 1 16th Cruiser Division KINU (F)
AOBA
No. 2   ITSUKUSHIMA (F)
TSUGARU
36th Sub Chaser Squadron
37th Sub Chaser Squadron
30th Picket Boat Group
127th Special Transport Group
 

Note: On 7 June the Commander of the 16th Cruiser Squadron shifted his flag from the AOBA to the SHIKINAMI for the destroyer run in to BIAK, 8 June.

Organization No. 3 (10 June)

Attack Division

  First battleship Division YAMATO (FF)
MUSASHI
  5th Cruiser Division MYOKO
HAGURO
  2nd Destroyer Squadron NOSHIRO
SHIMAKAZE
OKINAMI
  10th Destroyer Division ASAGUMO

Transport Unites

No. 1   16th Cruiser Division AOBA (F)
KINU
  19th Destroyer Division SHIKINAMI
URANAMI
  4th Destroyer Division YAMAGUMO
MOWAKE

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No. 2   ITSUKUSHIMA (F)
TSUGARU
36th Sub Chaser Squadron
37th Sub Chase Squadron
30th Picket Boat Group
127th Special Transport Group

Supply Unit

MIYAKE (F)
HITAMA
EIXO MARU
EIHO MARU

Note: The Third Organization never functioned as a unit since the KON Operation was cancelled on 13 June in favor of the AGO Operation.

Q. Commencing with the time the troops left ZAMBOANGA, describe the operation in detail. I will interrupt you with questions if necessary.
A. I have here a track chart, (see Annex A) of the operation. Referring to organization No. 1, the Transport Division left TARAKAN on May 30 and arrived ZAMBOANGA, 31 May where the 2 cruisers and three destroyers embarked about 1700 troops and continued on to DAVAO arriving 1 June. The remaining 800 men were later transported direct from ZAMBOANGA to SORONG by the Detached Force. They arrived SORONG 2300, 8 June. At 2330 on 2 June the Transport Division and screening units departed DAVAO for BIAK. The No. 2 Screening Unit took separate course to provide deception. On morning of 3 June the No. 1 Screening Unit sighted periscope and at 1100 the force was shadowed by two b-24's. At 2025 the KON Operation was temporarily halted. The 5th Cruiser Division, FUSO and 10th Destroyer Division returned to DAVAO, The Transport Division, AOBA flagship, continued on to SORONG. On the night of 3 June the Transport division and the 5th Cruiser Division were bombed by large type planes. Bombing inaccurate, no damage.

Q. Who made the decision to halt the first operation and what factors prompted him to do so?
A. The decision was made by Commander in Chief Combined Fleet. In view of the submarine and aircraft contacts mentioned above and also the fact that a strong Allied force was reported east of BIAK, it was decided to alter the operation.

The Transport Division arrived SORONG on 4 June and unloaded troops. The 19th and 25th Destroyer divisions proceeded to AMBON for fuel and the AOBA and KINU anchored in vicinity of WAIGEO Island. At this time orders were received reestablishing the KON Plan according to Organization No. 2, and preparations were made on 5 June. At 1715, 6 June, the AOBA was heavily attacked in KOBUI Bay, WAIGEO Island by B-24s. Although the attack lasted 2 hours the AOBA received no damage.

On the morning of 7 June, the two cruisers and six destroyers rendezvoused north of MISOOL Island. Since according to Organization No. 2, only destroyers were to be used for run to BIAK, Rear Admiral SHIMOUNOUCHI shifted his flag to the SHIKINAMI. The Transport Division and Screening Unit, composed of 3 destroyers each, then proceeded to SORONG where each ship of the Transport Division loaded 200 soldiers and necessary equipment. The AOBA and KINU sailed for AMBON for supplies with orders to return as quickly as possible and standby in the vicinity of SALAWATI. No. 2 Detached Force was held in readiness in vicinity of HALMAHERAS. At 000, 8 June, the Transport Division and Screening Unit headed for BIAK. After sunrise, air cover was provided by fighters of 23rd Air Flotilla. At 1245, a score of B-24's and 30 P-38's made low level strafing and bombing attacks, bearing 320° distance 80 miles from MANOKAWARI. As a result of a near miss, the HARUSAME sank in about 5 minutes. Some flooding of SHIRATSUYU from hole caused by bomb fragment but navigation not impeded. Also some damage to SHIKINAMI and SAMIDARE from strafing. After rescue of HARUSAME crew, we proceeded again towards BIAK. At 1800, an aircraft report was received stating that an Allied surface force composed of one battleship, four cruisers and eight destroyers was east of BIAK, proceeding west at high speed. Nevertheless, the operation was continued despite the fact that we were behind schedule. At 2230, we arrived off the North Coast of BIAK and prepared to enter KORIMU Bay and unload troops. However, at 2240, one of the screening destroyers sighted the Allied Force approaching and we quickly withdrew to the northwest. By 0040, 9 June, the Allied Force had closed to within range and we were subjected to a terrific shelling which we opposed with gunfire and torpedoes. SHIRATSUYU received hits but no serious damage. At 0345, contact was severed in vicinity of MAPIA Islands. During the melee, the 19th and 27th Destroyer Divisions became separated. Because of rain no air attacks were received on 9 June. The 27th Destroyer Division, less HARASUME (sunk), proceeded direct to BATJAN while the 19th destroyer Division proceeded to SORONG, disembarked troops, proceeded to SLAWATI arriving 1500, 9 June, rendezvoused with AOBA and KINU, shifted flag back to AOBA, then proceeded to BATJAN, arriving 10 June.

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Plate 104-1: chart showing KON Operation 2 June to 11 June 1944, Annex A.
Plate 104-1: chart showing KON Operation 2 June to 11 June 1944, Annex A.

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Q. When was the plan involving Organization No. 3 put into effect?
A. Immediately after the above battle experienced, the KON units were organized into powerful forces as shown in Organization No. 3. The YAMATO and MUSASHI plus the 2nd and 4th Destroyer Divisions arrived in BATJAN from TAWITAWI on 11 June. The 5th Cruiser Squadron and 10th Destroyer Group arrived from DAVAO about 9 June. By 11 June, all forces were in BATJAN ready for operations, but on 13 June everything was cancelled in favor of the AGO Operation for the defense of the MARIANAS. The YAMATO and MUSASHI accompanied by the 5th Cruiser Division, the 2nd Destroyer Squadron, the 4th and 10th Destroyer Divisions departed BATJAN for rendezvous with the Main Fleet in preparation for battle west of SAIPAN.

Q. Why didn't the AOBA and KINU accompany the battleships?
A. They were too slow, they were to join later.

Q. Why were operations similar to the KON Operation not planned and executed previously, in order to stop Allied advance up the NEW GUINEA coast?
A. Two reasons. The AGO Operation was most important because we thought you would attack PALAU, so all ships must be trained for that operation. This training was not completed until about June. Also prior to your arrival in BIAK we did not have proper bases for support of attacks on, say HOLLANDIA. If the KON Operations had been successful, they were to be continued. We planned to use AMBON, BOBO, SORONG, MANOKWARI and BATJAN as advance bases and support them from the PHILIPPINES and PALAU. Since the Allies would be forced to advance along the single line up NEW GUINEA Coast, we would have advantage. However after AGO Operation began, we had to abandon NEW GUINEA. We did not have enough ships for both operations.

Note: Referring to annex "A" the following symbols are used to indicate forces involved:

S - Battleship Division or Cruiser Division
Sd - Destroyer Squadron
dg - Destroyer division

NAV-104

--454--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 105
USSBS NO. 463

ESCORT OF SHIPPING

KURE 1 November 1945

Interrogation of: Rear Admiral MATSUZAKI, Akira, IJN; served as Chief of Staff of the Second Southern Expeditionary Fleet, April 1943 to February 1945.

Interrogated by: Commander T.H. Moorer, for Captain Steadman Teller, USN.

Summary

Rear Admiral MATSUZAKI, Akira, IJN, estimates that 40 percent of the shipping losses in the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES were caused by submarines, 40 percent by mines and 20 percent by aircraft. Most of the large ships in the area had already been sunk by the time aircraft began to operate in considerable numbers. Low-level bombing was the most effective form of aircraft attack. An attack on shipbuilding yards was effective in destroying small ships and facilities for repairing them.

Transcript

Q. What were the most important causes of shipping losses in your area during the time you commanded the SOERABAJA Naval District?
A. Ninety percent of all ships over 500 tons were lost to Allied attack. Some ships were salvaged and sunk the second time. I estimate the causes to be: Submarines - 40 percent, Mines - 40 percent, and Aircraft - 20 percent. The most serious form of air attack was low level bombing. Most of the vessels sunk by aircraft in my area were less than 500 tons since practically all the larger ones were sunk before aircraft began to operate in great numbers.

Q. In what manner were escort vessels employed?
Escort vessels were used primarily for defense against submarines. Because there was a shortage of escort vessels there was great loss in the usefulness of shipping.

Q. When did it become impractical to continue supply of the following areas by ships and why: Western NEW GUINEA, TIMOR, AMBON, BORNEO?
A. Air attacks made it necessary to stop shipping to NEW GUINEA and the eastern N.E.I. when you commenced operating aircraft from bases at BIAK and MOROTAI. Supply was stopped on the following dates: Western NEW GUINEA - May 1944, TIMOR - June 1944, AMBON - May 1944, BORNEO - July 1944. Schooners were used to supply AMBON and TIMOR from SOERABAJA.

Q. How did the destruction of shipyards in BORNEO, MAKASSAR and MALAYA by air attacks, affect the shipping situation?
A. Attacks on ship building at MAKASSAR and on the BORNEO coast were very effective. Not only did they destroy new vessels, but they also destroyed facilities for repairing those already in use.

NAV-105

--455--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 106
USSBS NO. 464

CAPE ESPERANCE AND CORAL SEA BATTLES
MIDWAY AND SANTA CRUZ BATTLES

TOKYO 27 November 1945

Interrogation of: Captain KIJIMA, Kikunori, IJN; Chief of Staff, CruDiv 6 (AOBA 1941-42 during Battles of Cape ESPERANCE and CORAL SEA).

Rear Admiral KOMURA, KEIZO, IJN; Commanding Officer CHIKUMA (CA) at MIDWAY and SANTA CRUZ.

Interrogated By: captain C. SHANDS, USN.

Summary

Cape ESPERANCE: CruDiv 6 (3 CA) plus 2 DD intercepted by U.S. cruisers off Cape ESPERAMCE night of 11 October 1942. FURATAKA (CA) and FUBUKI (DD) sunk, AOBA (CA) badly damaged. Japanese mission to bombard GUADALCANAL thwarted.

CORAL SEA: CruDiv 6 escorting SHOHO to PORT MORESBY when SHOHO was sunk by dive bombers, 7 May 1942.

MIDWAY: CruDiv 8 (CHIKUMA and TONE) cruiser escort for aircraft carriers at MIDWAY received minor air attack late afternoon, 5 June (-9), from B-17's and dive-bombers. No hits. CHIKUMA participated in rescue of survivors from HIRYU and SORYU. Rescue destroyer bombed afternoon day after battle. No hits.SANTA CRUZ: CruDiv 8 (CHIKUMA and TONE) escorting ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU. CHIKUMA received three hits from dive-bombers about 0900, 26 October 1942 (-9). Received second bombing attack late same afternoon from about 3 horizontal-bombers. Three near misses at 50 meters. TONE hit during battle SHOKAKU and ZUIHO damaged by bombs. Failure of the general land and sea assault upon GUADALCANAL considered the turning point of the SOLOMON Campaign.

Transcript

Cape ESPERANCE - Captain KIJIMA

Q. What ships were present in your force?
A. CruDiv 6, Rear Admiral GOTO.

AOBA (F)
FURUTAKA
KINUGASA
FUBUKI
MIRAKUMO

Q. Describe the action of your force in this battle.
A. We were proceeding to bombard your airfield on GUADALCANAL. We were also covering a landing of troops and supplies from a tender and two destroyers at TASSAFARONGA. This supply group was supposed to complete landing operations at 2200 and retire at about the same time that we were to commence our operations.

We were in a "T" formation when attacked by your ships. The AOBA was leading with the FURATAKA and KINUGASA astern. The FUBUKI was on the port beam of the AOBA and the MURAKUMO on the starboard beam.

While we were approaching about 2000 we saw a flare or search light from the southeast. We thought that it might be our supply unit so we answered it. When there was no answer we thought that it might have been some of your forces so we used the searchlight signal again to try to draw your attention away from the supply force. A blue and white signal was to be used between the supply force and the forces on the beach.

At about 2145 we were fired upon by your ships. At first we thought the fire was from our own supply group. It was a surprise attack. All ships but the KINUGASA immediately reversed course to the right. Due to the shell fire and the congestion during the turn the KINUGASA turned left. As a result of their turn the KINUGASA only received minor damage from three hits. The AOBA was hit about 40 times and was badly damaged. The FURATAKA and FUBUKI were sunk. The FUBUKI sank before it completed the turn, although it only received four hits. Due to the smoke from the AOBA, the MURAKUMO was not hit. The KINUGASA did most of the fighting from our force.

NAV-106

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Plate 106-1: chart showing track of Japanese force at Battle of Cape ESPERANCE, 11 October 1942, Annex A.
Plate 106-1: chart showing track of Japanese force at Battle of Cape ESPERANCE, 11 October 1942, Annex A.

696691 O - 46 -12

NAV-106

--457--
Plate 106-2: chart showing track  chart of SHOHO (CV). PORT MORESBY occupation Force. Drawing from translated Japanese Naval document, Annex B.
Plate 106-2: chart showing track chart of SHOHO (CV). PORT MORESBY occupation Force. Drawing from translated Japanese Naval document, Annex B.

NAV-106

--458--
Plate 106-3: chart showing torpedo and bomb hits made on SHOHO (CV) by aircraft carrier task force, CORAL SEA 7 May 1942. Drawing taken from translated Japanese Naval documents, Annex C.
Plate 106-3: chart showing torpedo and bomb hits made on SHOHO (CV) by aircraft carrier task force, CORAL SEA 7 May 1942. Drawing taken from translated Japanese Naval documents, Annex C.

NAV-106

--459--

Soon after the action started Admiral GOTO was mortally wounded. While he was dying I told him that he could die with easy mind because we had sunk two of your heavy cruisers.

Following this action we retired to the northwest. The MURAKUMO turned back and rescued about 400 survivors. When your forces reappeared it departed the area trying to make you chase it within range of our aircraft.

Q. Did you have any three stack cruisers or auxiliaries in your force?
A. No.

Q. The official Japanese Navy Department report of losses indicates that the MURAKUMO, NATSUGUMO and AKATSUKI were all sunk near SAVO Island on 11-12 October 1942, in addition to the FURATAKA and FUBUKI. How do you account for their loss?
A. I don't know. I failed in this task and was relieved as soon as we arrived at RABAUL.

Coral Sea - Captain KIJIMA

Q. Were you on the AOBA, 7 May, when the SHOHO was sunk in the CORAL SEA?
A. Yes. The KINUGUSA, FURATAKA, ATAGO and the SAMANAMI plus one other destroyer were also there. We were on our way to PORT MORESBY.

Q. Were any other ships hit?
A. No, there were a lot of near misses but no hits on any ship but the SHOHO. It received about 30 hits and sank straight down. The SAMANAMI picked up the survivors. About 0600, three B-17's attacked the transports but no damages.

Q. Did you receive any other attacks in this battle?
A. The day before the SHOHO was sunk, we received a horizontal-bombing attack when we were about 150 miles southwest of BUIN. It was about 0900. There were about five B-17's in the flight 3-4000 meters high. The bombs landed about 100 meters away. no damage. This was the AOBA's baptism under fire.

Q. Did you intend to return to PORT MORESBY?
A. Not by sea. You were too strong in that area, so later plans called for landing at BUNA-GONA Area and marching over the OWEN STANLEY Mountains.

Note: It was very difficult to derive any information from this officer. Subsequent information from other Japanese officers indicates that he has been contemplating hari-kari because he feels that his failure and death of Admiral GOTO during the Battle of Cape ESPERANCE contributed to the defeat of JAPAN.

Midway - Rear Admiral KOMURA

Q. Describe the operations of the CHIKUMA during the Battle of MIDWAY.
A. CruDiv 8, consisting of the TONE and CHIKUMA, provided escort for the aircraft carriers under Admiral NAGUMO. We thought that we would be attacked earlier than we were because we had sighted one of your search planes the day before the main battle. Our seaplanes were searching for your forces, but due to bad weather were unable to make proper observations.

Early in the morning of 5 June (-9), the formation received a torpedo attack from aircraft, but no hits were received by our ships. One member of my crew reported a torpedo wake astern of the CHIKUMA, but I did not see it.

The torpedo planes came in low and were shot down by our fighters.

Q. Did any of the torpedo planes dive into your ships?
A. I did not see any. I don't think that any of them were able to get near enough. Soon after the torpedo attack the dive-bombing attacks started. At first they concentrated upon the carriers, although a few bombs were dropped near the CHIKUMA, about 0730 (-9). No hits.

About 1100 the SORYU was torpedoed. We attacked the submarine then lowered a boat to pick up survivors. The boat and survivors were later recovered by destroyers. Following the torpedoing of the SORYU we went over to join the HIRYU. At about 1400 we were about 5,000 meters from the HIRYU when it was attacked by about 50 dive bombers. It was hit several times.

The TONE and CHIKUMA were also attacked about this time but no hits. The attack lasted about 30 minutes. We were attacked by B-17s at the same time but no hits. Some time later when we were about 10,000 meters from the HIRYU we were attacked again by horizontal bombers, not many. Some were about 2-3,000 meters, others were lower. There were also some carrier borne aircraft at low altitudes but we were not hit. Some were close.

NAV-106

--460--

Q. Were any other ships damaged in these attacks?
A. Neither the TONE nor CHIKUMA was hit. No hits reported from any other ships. All bombers concentrated upon the aircraft carriers. We learned that we needed many more anti-aircraft guns for protection but we were too far apart.

Q. Were any of your battleships or destroyers attacked?
A. The KIRISHIMA and HARUNA were attacked about the same time that we were but they did not report any hits. Most of the destroyers were busy picking up survivors from the carriers which were sinking astern of us. Late the next day one reported a horizontal bombing attack but no damage. It had picked up the pilots from the HIRYU's planes. I think that there may have been a dive bombing attack too but am not sure. All destroyers returned. Our seaplanes were searching for your carriers at the time.

Q. Did you receive any more attacks during retirement?
A. No, only on the 5th while with the carriers. We expected attacks all day the 6th but none came. The MIKUMA and MOGAMI were attacked to the south of us that day, but I think that that was all. The next day (7th) there was a heavy fog. After that we returned to JAPAN.

Eastern Solomons: 25th August, 1942

Q. Did you receive any damage in the Battle of the Eastern SOLOMONS?
A. No, we were not attacked. We were with the heavy forces (Bat Div 11, HIEI, KIRISHIMA, Cru Div 7, SUZUYA, KUMANO and Des Ron 10, NAGARA 10 DD's) detached from the carrier force. We saw your planes going to attack and sink the RUYJO but we were not attacked. The TONE (Admiral HARA, Chuichi,) was the flagship with the RUYJO. In the evening after the air battle our force searched for your ships, but did not find them. We received orders from the Admiral to turn back. He said that if we had gone on one more hour we would have received much damage.

Battle of SANTA CRUZ, 26 October, 1942. Rear Admiral KOMURA

Q. What ships were in your force?
A. Bat Div 11 : HIEI (F), KIRISHIMA. Rear Admiral ABE.
Cru Div 8 : TONE (F), CHIKUMA.
Cru Div 7 : SUZUYA (F)
Des Ron 10 : NAGARA (F)
Des Ron 10 : 3 DD's
Des Ron 17 : 4 DD's

Q. What was your mission?
A. We were a supporting force for the Third Fleet which was made up of the First Flying Squadron (SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU, ZUIHO and destroyer.) Vice Admiral NAGUMO commanded this force. Ships of the Second Fleet under Vice Admiral KONDO were also in the area. The JUNYO (Second Flying Squadron) was with that group. I don't remember the other ships. We were widely separated, sometimes a hundred miles apart. Our fleet was supporting a general attack upon your base at GUADALCANAL.

Q. When did you receive the first information of the location of the U.S. Forces?
A. We had been receiving very good reports of your ships in the area from our submarines and search planes from the RUSSELL and RENNEL Islands. These reports were plentiful during October, particularly of your battleship forces south of GUADALCANAL. On 23 October, one of your patrol planes was sighted by my ship (CHIKUMA) while we were in advance of our carrier force. I think that we were near the STEWART Islands at that time. We saw patrol planes every day after that. One of our scout planes definitely located your carrier force the morning of the 26th, although we knew that they must be someplace in the area because we had seen so many of your search planes.

Q. When did you receive your attacks?
A. During the afternoon of the 25th, about 1300, six B-17's attacked without inflicting damage. Early the next morning (0540, 26 October) the ZUIHO was attacked by dive-bombers. Two hits reported. At 0800, SHOKAKU reported six hits from dive-bombers.

At 0745 (-9), the CHIKUMA was attacked by about 12 dive-bombers. Two bombs hit the bridge. All but 12 men in this area killed. I was badly wounded. One bomb hit behind the bridge and entered the engineering spaces, killing some men and reducing our speed. Two other bombs landed very close on the starboard side amidships. I thought that they were hits at first. Did some damage from shrapnel. It was a skillful attack because we were maneuvering at high speed and firing all guns. Unfortunately, we were not close enough to the other ships for protection and we did not have air cover. Late that same afternoon while retiring, we were again attacked by three horizontal-bombers. There were about 3,000 meters high. The nearest bomb landed about 50 meters off the port bow.

NAV-106

--461--

Q. Were any of your battleships or other cruisers damaged in this action?
A. The TONE was not hit. I don't think that any battleships were hit. No damage reports were made.

Q. What effect did this battle have upon your plans?
A. In my opinion it was more important than the November action in GUADALCANAL. Our naval losses were not as important, but the general assault to recapture GUADALCANAL failed at a time when our forces were much stronger than yours. Following the attack, you were able to reinforce GUADALCANAL and increase your sea strength in that area, while the naval strength available to us in the November action was reduced by this battle. We also lost some of our most experienced pilots in this action. The damage to the carriers and loss of pilots prevented proper air coverage during the November battle. After this action we were never able to reinforce our garrison on GUADALCANAL with sufficient strength to recapture it. You were able to use GUADALCANAL as a base to capture the remainder of the islands. I think that this was the turning point of the war in that area.

Q. To what reasons do you attribute the loss of this battle?
A. Although we retired and my ship was badly damaged, I don't feel that we lost the naval battle, because we sank some of your ships. I feel that the general attack was a failure because the Army failed to carry out its schedule in recapturing GUADALCANAL. That forced us to remain in one area under observation of your search planes. When the battle finally occurred our fuel supply was very low. Unfortunately our ships were damaged at a critical time.

NAV-106

--462--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 107
USSBS NO. 465

SUBMARINE ATTACKS ON JAPANESE CONVOYS

TOKYO 7 November 1945

Interrogation of: Commander SHIBATA, Otokichi, IJN; Staff Officer of 8th Escort Convoy and First Escort Fleet.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman Teller, USN

Allied Officers Present: Captain C. Shands, USN

Summary

Two successful submarine attacks on Japanese convoys are described.

Transcript

Q. Describe your personal experience with U.S. submarine attacks on convoys.
A. I was staff officer for Rear Admiral SATO, Commander Eighth Escort Convoy. During the first 10 days of June 1944 in approximate position Latitude 19° N, Longitude 120° E, our convoy, consisting of 15 or 16 ships, 5 escorts and the escort carrier TAIYO, was on a southerly course. Just after sunrise, we received a torpedo attack from a submarine on the port beam. One torpedo passed through the formation, struck and damaged a new 10,000 ton tanker, the last ship in the starboard column. The tanker was able to proceed under its own power to MANILA where it received temporary repairs, then returned to JAPAN. Two escorts attacked this submarine for three hours with unknown results.

In mid July 1944, a north bound convoy from MANILA to JAPAN was in position Latitude 16°25' N, Longitude 117°20' E. The convoy consisted of 9 ships in three columns, 5 or 6 escorts and the carrier TAIYO. At about midnight, the 10,000 ton tanker OTORIZAN MARU, second ship in center column, was torpedoed. She was loaded with aviation gasoline and immediately caught fire, sinking later as a result. At the same time, the leading ship in starboard column, a 8,000 or 9,000 ton freighter, was hit and stopped dead in the water. About one hour later the leading ship in port column, the 10,000 ton freighter KIYOKAWA MARU, was attacked and damaged by a torpedo, but was able to proceed under her own power. One escort was left to guard the freighter which was stopped, but at 1500 the next day another submarine attack sank this freighter. Refer to Annex A for action diagrams.

NAV-107

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Plate 107-1: chart showing submarine attack which occurred between 1 and 10 June 1944 just after sunrise in approximate position 19 degrees North 120 degrees East and a midnight submarine attack on northbound convoy in mid-July 1944 in approximate position 16 degrees 25' North, 117 degrees 20' East.
Plate 107-1: chart showing submarine attack which occurred between 1 and 10 June 1944 just after sunrise in approximate position 19 degrees North 120 degrees East and a midnight submarine attack on northbound convoy in mid-July 1944 in approximate position 16 degrees 25' North, 117 degrees 20' East.

NAV-107

--464--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 108
USSBS NO. 466

JAPANESE SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

TOKYO 22 November 1945

Interrogation of: Commander FUJIMORI, Yasuo, IJN; Commander of two submarines during the early part of the war; assigned to the Naval General Staff from June 1943 to August 1945.

Interrogator: Captain Steadman Teller, USN

Summary

Commander FUJIMORI commanded the submarine RO-60 at the outbreak of war and was engaged for a short time in defensive patrol east of the MARSHALLS. He then took command of the minelaying submarine I-121. The I-121 was scheduled to fuel Japanese patrol planes at FRENCH FRIGATE SHOALS prior to the attack on MIDWAY, 4 June 1942, but was prevented by the presence of our patrol planes and a seaplane tender in that area.

In August 1942, the I-121 received minor damage from attack by two carrier type aircraft north of the SOLOMONS, and the next day missed two opportunities to attack a carrier thought to have been the SARATOGA.

Transcript

Q. In what operations did the RO-60 engage while you were her commanding officer?
A. The RO-60 was in a submarine squadron operating from the MARSHALL ISLANDS in defense of that area at the outbreak of war. A total of 6 submarines were employed in patrolling three areas a distance of 400 to 600 miles to the eastward of the MARSHALLS. One area was located across the line between the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS and the MARSHALLS, a second was located to the south of this, and the third area was located to the north. All areas were 200 miles wide and located on a rough circle 500 miles from KWAJALEIN. One and sometimes two submarines were assigned to each area depending upon their availability. There was also a patrol established between BAKER and HOWLAND Islands. My submarine took part in both patrols from early December until I left her for JAPAN on 26 December 1941. We had no sightings or other experiences of note.

Q. What was your operational experience as commanding officer of the submarine I-121?
A. The I-121 was a 1400 ton minelaying submarine built shortly after World War I according to a German design. I took command of her on 15 January 1942, and, shortly afterward, proceeded to DAVAO in the PHILIPPINES. We operated between DAVAO and KENDARI to protect ships making passage along that route. We would usually patrol about 300 miles northeast of MOROTAI for the purpose of intercepting American submarines. We had no radar nor any means of detecting underwater signals from your submarines, so we depended on our lookouts. At times we would intercept radio-telephone transmissions from your submarines. We communicated with our tender by medium wave radio.

Shortly after arriving at DAVAO, we experienced trouble with our minelaying equipment so returned to JAPAN for repairs. After repair we left JAPAN on 2 April 1942 with a load of 40 tons of aviation gasoline and 12 tons of oil for servicing our flying boats at FRENCH FRIGATE SHOALS in connection with their scouting operations scheduled for the attack on MIDWAY. We proceeded via the MARSHALLS and arrived off FRENCH FRIGATE SHOALS on 26 May (TOKYO date). Our flying-boats were scheduled to rendezvous with us between 25 May and 1 June for fueling. When I arrived I sighted a small seaplane tender in the anchorage and observed your patrol seaplanes in the area most of the day. We had to remain submerged during the day, but at night I surfaced and reported the situation to ur base at KWAJAEIN. We had no direct radio communication with our planes, but since they did not appear during the time we spent in vicinity of the shoals, I presume that the base instructed them to cancel the fueling operation. About 1 June we left that area and proceeded in a general westerly direction, sighting your patrol planes daily. Just after sunset on 6 June we sighted an American submarine. That submarine was southwest of LISIANSKI Island and on a course northeast. I had no torpedoes so could do nothing about it. We had no further experience during the Battle of MIDWAY and returned to JAPAN.

Q. What events occurred during the remainder of your cruise in the I-121?
A. We left JAPAN and went to the SOLOMON ISLANDS where I cruised around quite a bit but had no particular experience except to bombard your airfield at GUADALCANAL three times and an encounter with a carrier which I believe was the SARATOGA. At sunrise about 24 August, 1942, I was in a position about 175 miles bearing 040° from SAN CRISTOBAL Island. The I-121 was on the surface when I saw two carrier type airplanes. We were rather slow in diving and the hull was only 20 feet under the surface when the planes dove and

NAV-108

--465--

Plate 108-1: chart showing track of Japanese submarines, Battle of MIDWAY, 3-7 June 1942, Annex A.
Plate 108-1: chart showing track of Japanese submarines, Battle of MIDWAY, 3-7 June 1942, Annex A.

NAV-108

--466--

dropped depth bombs or charges, making two hits near the after portion of the hull. We took quite a bit of water in and the submarine was forced down, stern first. We were able to trim the ship, however, and proceeded toward GUADALCANAL. The next morning at 0600 in position about 150 miles northeast of SAN CRISTOBAL Island we observed a carrier, which I believed to be the SARATOGA, in the act of launching aircraft. She was 8,000 meters due north of me and heading east, screened by four destroyers. Shortly afterward, the carrier made a wide sweep to port and steadied on a southerly course, passing 10,000 meters to the west of the I-121, about 0900. I was not able to get a shot at her from either position and returned to the GUADALCANAL Area.

NAV-108

--467--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 109
USSBS NO. 467

SOLOMON ISLANDS ACTIONS 1942-43

TOKYO 20 November 1945

Interrogation of: Commander YAMAMOTO, TADSHI, IJN; Communication Officer and Adjutant, Staff, Destroyer Squadron 2, aboard HOYASHIO (DD) at GUADALCANAL 11-14 November 1942. Also participated in other SOLOMON ISLANDS engagements.

Captain OHMAE, Toshikazu, IJN; Chief of Staff, Southeastern Fleet (RABAUL). Responsible for planning and operations in SOLOMON Area during 1942-43.

Interrogated by: Captain C. Shands, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Commander T.H. Moorer, USN.

Summary

Battle of GUADALCANAL, 12-14 November 1942. General attack upon U.S. Forces in late October 1942 considered unsuccessful due to failure of Army and Navy to maintain planned schedule. Description of the Battle of GUADALCANAL, 12-14 November, resulting in loss of HIEI, KIRISHIMA (BBs) and AYANAMI (DD) by gunfire; KINUGASA (CA) and 11 transports by dive-bombers and torpedo planes. The loss of this battle was the last major effort to recapture GUADALCANAL. The constant attrition of first class pilots in the SOLOMONS Campaign (Air Groups 21, 24, 25, and 26) weakened Navy defense of the MARSHALL Area. Losses never replaced due to curtailment of training program in 1943. Summary, including ships present and track chart confirmations on Battle of SAVO Island, 9 August 1942; VELLA LAVELLA, 6-7 August 1943; VELLA LAVELLA 17-18 August 1943; VELLA LAVELLA, 6-7 October 1943; and Cape ST. GEORGE, 25 November 1943.

Transcript

Q. What was your estimate of the situation existing in the SOLOMONS in November 1942?
A. The situation was becoming very serious. When you first landed on the SOLOMONS in August we thought that we could easily retake the areas that you had captured. Our information was that your forces were small in the GUADALCANAL Area therefore the Army did not think that it was necessary to send many troops. They reported that you had less than a thousand troops ashore. They based their requirements to retake GUADALCANAL on the Army forces required against the Chinese in the CHINA and MALAYAN Campaigns. We also had information that you were hard pressed in America due to PEARL HARBOR losses and shipping losses in the Atlantic, therefore we did not believe that you would be able to engage in a major operation at that time. Our Army misjudged both your strength and fighting ability at GUADALCANAL between August and November.

Our first effort to reinforce our garrison at GUADALCANAL failed when a submarine sank our transport 9 or 10 August near RABAUL. It may have been the SHINYO MARU. It was loaded at TINIAN with 600 marines who had returned after the failure at MIDWAY. This was a well trained special unit for landing operations. During August and September we continued to send Army reinforcements each time expecting that there would be a sufficient number to retake GUADALCANAL. We also deployed our submarines in an effort to cut your supply lines.

In September you appeared to be getting stronger so after a general conference in TRUK between the Army, CinC Combined Fleet and CinC Southeastern Fleet, a general assault was planned for 21 October but failed, principally because the Army did not carry out the schedule agreed upon for attacking your airfield on GUADALCANAL. The Navy lost ships, airplanes and pilots while trying to give support to the land assault which was continually delayed. The Army did not understand the position of the Navy in that it could not stay in one area indefinitely without being attacked. We were also consuming valuable fuel. When the assault was finally forced we had become weakened both at sea and in the air, although there were about 26,000 Army troops ashore and 3,500 special Navy landing force.

On 26 October, after this attack I (Capt. OHMAE) went to GUADALCANAL by destroyer to organize another general assault with all ships and troops that could be assembled. The entire HIROSHIMA Division of the Army and a large quantity of supplies were in the RABAUL-SHORTLAND area. These troops were destined for an attack upon PORT MORESBY. Following the conference General HYAKUTAKE, Commanding General of the 18th Army ordered the plans to attack PORT MORESBY changed to attack GUADALCANAL. Since it appeared that the advance in the SOLOMONS was more serious than the advance through NEW GUINEA, this

NAV-109

--468--

plan was supported by the CinC of the Combined Fleet. The force to be landed consisted of about 10,000 Army troops and 1000 special Navy landing troops. The Navy troops also had about 38x8cm guns. A large amount of supplies were also being sent to the forces that were already on GUADALCANAL.

Q. What ships were present in the Japanese Forces at GUADALCANAL 12-14 November?
A. There were three main units which were geographically separated to the north, center and south.

Bombardment Force (North), 12 November 1942

Second Fleet.

Bombardment Group : BatDiv 11 : HIEI (F), KIRISHIMA
Bombardment Screen



:
:
:
:
DesRon 10
DesDiv 16
DesDiv 61
DesDiv 6
:
:
:
:
NAGARA (F)
AMATSUKAZE, TOKITSUKAZE
TERUTSUKI
AKATSUKI, INAZUMA, IKAZUCHI
Sweeping Group

:
:
DesRon 4
DesDiv 2
:
:
ASAGUMO (F), MURASAME, SAMIDARE, YUDACHI, HARUSAME
Picket Group
Between RUSSELLS
and GUADALCANAL
:
:
 
DesDiv 27


:

SHIGURE, SHIRATSUYA, YUGURE


Bombardment Force (North), 14 November

Bombardment Group

:

CruDiv 4
BatDiv 11
:
:
ATAGO (F), TAKAO (Vice Adm. KONDA
KIRISHIMA
Bombardment Screen





:





DesRon 10
DesDiv 61
DesDiv 11
DesRon 4
DesDiv 2
DesDiv 6
:
:
:
:
:
:
NAGARA (F)
TERUTSUKI
SHIRAYUKI, HATSUYUKI
ASAGUMO (F)
SAMIDARE
IKAZUCHI
Sweeping Group



:



DesRon 3
DesDiv 1


:
:


SENDAI (F)
URANAMI
SHIKINAMI
AYANAMI

GUDALCANAL Reinforcement Force (Center)

Escort Unit: 





DesRon 2
DesDiv 15
DesDiv 24
DesDiv 31
DesDiv 30

:
:
:
:
:

HAYASHIO (F) (R. Adm. TANAK, Rasizo)
OYASHIO (F), KUROSHIO, KAGERO
UMIKAZE (F), KAWAKAZE, SUZUKAZE
TAKANAMI (F), MAKINAMI, NAGANAMI
MOCHIZUKI
AMAGIRI
Transport Unit


  ARIZONA MARU: KUMAGAWA MARU, SADO MARU, NAGARA MARU,
NAKO MARU, CANBERRA MARU, BRISBANE MARU, KINUGAWA MARU, KIRO-
KAWA MARU, YAMAURA MARU, YAMATSUKI MARU

OUTER SOUTH SEAS SUPPORTING UNIT (SOUTH). (Eighth Fleet)

Main Body

:

CHOKAI (F), KINUGASA, ISUZU (R. Adm. MIKAWA)
DesDiv 8 : ASASHIO, ARASHIO
Supporting Unit






:






CruDiv 7
CruDiv 4
CruDiv 18
DesDiv 10


DesDiv 8
:
:
:
:


:
SUZUYA (F)
MAYA
TENRYU
MAKIGUMO (F)
YUGUMO
KAZAGUMO
MICHISHIO

NAV-109

--469--

The Eighth Fleet always operated from RABAUL. The Second Fleet operated from TRUK. These two fleets operated together in any big action. The senior officer normally had general command of the action. The Grand Fleet Headquarters was at TRUK since the CinC of the Second Fleet was the senior officer.

Q. What were your plans for landing troops?
A. We were providing direct support for the transports. I (Capt. YAMAMOTO) was in the HOYASHIO (DD) with the staff. We departed from the SHORTLAND Islands at 8 1/2 knots. It took us two and one-half days to reach GUADALCANAL. Prior to our arrival, the battleship and cruiser forces were scheduled to bombard your airfield in order to destroy your planes and sufficiently damage the airfield and supplies so you would be unable to recover from that attack before we landed our troops.

During the first part of November we had landed some troops at KOLI Point. We already had a large number of troops on the west end of the island. Our plan was to land the HIROSHIMA Division at KOLI Point to reinforce the Army already there. Following the landing a general assault was scheduled from both the east and west side of your defense. We thought that we would make you divide your land forces and felt that we would then have sufficient strength to defeat each half.

However these plans were changed about 3 or 4 November, and the KOLI Point forces retired by mountain trails behind your airfield to the west side near KOKUMBONO. When this retirement was completed we were ordered to land the troops between Cape ESPERANCE and TASSAFARONGA.

(Capt. OHMAE) In August he had only about 80 landing barges in the SHORTLAND Islands where the troop movements originated. About 50 were used to support GUADALCANAL while the other thirty were used to strengthen the other SOLOMON ISLANDS. In order to decrease the water haul, about September we planned to build a road down the length of SANTA ISABEL. We set up three landing points on the island but the road was not completed by November. We used a few trails and moved a few troops from the southeastern tip of SANTA ISABEL to TASSAFARONGA and KOLI Point, but we were never able to use it as we had intended.

Q. Did any of your ships bombard GUADALCANAL?
A. None of the Escort Force bombarded but both the Northern and Southern Forces were supposed to bombard. They succeeded but they also had a surface engagement. The Northern Force was supposed to bombard the field at about 25,000 meters, then retire between SAVO Island and FLORIDA Island, but they were intercepted and fought the night battle. The HIEI was damaged and later lost in the first night battle; the KIRISHIMA was lost in the second battle. The AYANAMI (DD) from the northern group was also lost. These ships had special ammunition for bombardment and were very short on ammunition for ship engagements so were not prepared for a general ship action. After the southern group retired the KINUGASA was sunk the 14th by dive bombers south west of RENDOVA Island. The attack occurred between 0640-0845. At the same time the ISUZU was seriously damaged, while the CHOKAI and MAYA were moderately damaged.

A. On 14 November the following transports were sunk by dive bomber and torpedo planes:

ARIZONA MARU
KUMAGAWA MARU  
SADO MARU
NAGARA MARU
NAKO MARU
CANBERRA MARU
BRISBANE MARU
(JDZD)
(JRBJ)
(JPAN)
(JBNH)
(JRWJ)
(JPLK)
(JJAC)
9683 T  
7508
7179
7148
7145
6477
5425
Sunk
"
"
"
"
"
"

On 15 November the following ships were beached at DOMA Cove GUADALCANAL, due to damage received in the air attack during the 14th:

KINUGAWA MARU
HIROKAWA MARU
YAMAURA MARU
YAMATSUKI MARU
 

(JURM)
(JFFO)
(JCAM)
(JYXL
 

6936
6872
6798
6438
____
77,609 T

Q. Did you lose any other ships in this action"
A. No, but in supporting actions the FURATAKA (CA) was sunk near SAVO Island on 11 October during a night cruiser action and the TERUTSUKI (DD) was sunk on 12 December.

Q. Were you in company with the transports when they were attacked?
A. Yes. We received our first attack early in the morning of 14 November. It was from a dive bomber. I do

NAV-109

--470--

not remember if any hits were made. Only one or two planes. We were very happy because we thought that the bombardment groups had succeeded in destroying your planes the night before. But about 0900 14 November (-9) we started to receive many attacks from dive-bombers and torpedo planes. We had some fighter cover during the day but not enough. All afternoon your dive-bombers and torpedo planes were very plentiful. We also had a B-17 attack about noon. No hits registered but near misses. Our fighters attacked them before they inflicted damage, but we did not have enough fighters to protect us all day.

The first big attack occurred north of VANGUNU Island. The second occurred northeast of VANGUNU. The last main attack occurred north of the RUSSELL Islands. These were smaller attacks between the main attacks. At the end of the day, all of the eleven transports had been bombed or torpedoed. Seven of them had been sunk, or sank during the night; four of them, badly damaged, were able to beach themselves at DOMA Cove and land a few of the troops. The afternoon attacks were very severe. Most damage occurred between about 1300-1500 in the afternoon.

Were any of the escorting ships damaged?
A. None of the combatant ships in the Escort Force were attacked. The 15th Destroyer Squadron left the transports and went over to join the Northern Force after the attack upon the transports. The 31st and 24th were busy picking up survivors, so did not join. We later escorted the four damaged transports to DOMA Cove, then part of the escorts passed west of SAVO Island while the others passed east of it. All destroyers then returned to SHORTLAND. The heavy units returned to TRUK.

Q. What effect did this battle have upon your plans?
A. Up until this battle, we were determined to retake GUADALCANAL. The Army, particularly, desired to do so, but the transportation was too difficult, mainly due to your dive-bombers and strafing planes, which were able to locate and destroy the transports and landing barges which were hidden during the day time. Following the battle, it was decided to do as much as we could by reinforcing the GUADALCANAL Garrison by destroyers, while a sufficient supporting force of aircraft was being built up in RABAUL. This plan was not too successful.

We were able to land a number of troops and supplies, but our air losses were too great. Almost all of the navy's first class pilots and a few of the Army's were lost in the SOLOMON Operations. The greatest portion of these were lost against GUADALCANAL. At one time, we had three or four squadrons at RABAUL, but they were sent down one at a time. The constant attrition was very expensive. The 21st, 24th, 25th and 26th Air Groups were lost. This loss was keenly felt in the defense of the Empire during the MARSHALL-GILBERT Campaign.

In 1943, our training program began to be restricted, so we were never able to replace these losses, although we still had a number of carriers. In January 1943, due to your increased strength and our difficulty in supplying GUADALCANAL, it was necessary for us to withdraw.

Q. From your records, sketch the navigational track of the Japanese Forces in the Battle of GUADALCANAL 12-14 November 1942.
A. See Annex A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I.

Savo Island 8-9 August 1942

Q. What ships were present in the Battle of SAVO Island?
A.

  CHOKAI (F) (Adm. MIKAWA)
CruDiv 6 :



AOBA (F)
FURUTAKA
KINUGASA
KAKO
CruDiv 18 :


TENRYU
TATSUTA
1 DD
  See Annex J for track chart.

Q. Give a description of the battle.
A. we had arrived at RABAUL on 29 July and had not had an opportunity to operate these ships together. The CHOKAI and CruDiv 18 departed RABAUL and joined up with CruDiv 6 between GREEN Island and Cape ST. GEORGE. About 1000 of KIETA one of your planes sighted us and maintained contact for about an hour. At that time Admiral MIKAWA reversed course in order to make it appear that we were returning to RABAUL. After the plane departed we again reversed course and headed for GUADALCANAL between the islands. In order to avoid confusion and accidents during the night we just maintained one column. Since our mission was to pass around SAVO Island, bombard your transports, then retire we did not expect any difficulties. On our way to GUADALCANAL we received a despatch that one of your transports at GUADALCANAL was burning so we felt that we could easily locate your force.

NAV-109

--471--

About an hour before reaching SAVO Island we catapulted seaplanes to search the area and also to drop flares. These planes provided us with the position of your two cruiser forces as well as the transport forces at GUADALCANAL and TULAGI.

Just to the west of SAVO Island we sighted two of your destroyers steaming very slowly to the southwest. We passed between them about 500 yards astern of the southern one. We were afraid that they would open fire upon us so had all guns trained upon them. When the one to the south did not fire, I was afraid that we may have been seen and reported but not fired upon.

Our destroyer remained outside SAVO to act as a picket and also to engage your destroyers if they should follow us.

Soon after we passed around SAVO Island we sighted your southern force of cruisers. About two minutes after sighting we fired torpedoes, then opened fire with guns. Immediately after firing the torpedoes we changed course to the left and sighted your northern force.

During the turn left the column broke up but the division remained together. The CHOKAI and CruDiv 6 passed to the east of your force while CruDiv 18 passed to the west. We fired both torpedoes and guns. The CHOKAI illuminated briefly with search lights. Your ships concentrated upon her but most of the hits were made by machine guns. The range was very close. Outside of machine gun hits the only damage received was by the CHOKAI which was hit by a salvo from your leading cruiser in the northern group. Two shells landed in the operations room, just aft of the bridge and killed about thirty men. They also burnt up all of our charts.

Following this action we passed north of SAVO Island. At that time the formation was inverted with the flagship (CHOKAI) in the rear due to the different turning circles used after the first engagement. We considered returning to the area to attack your transports. Due to about a two hour delay in reforming we felt that we would be within radius of your planes the next morning if we returned. We knew that you had planes in the vicinity because we had been listening to "Red Base" and "White Base" broadcast all day. We did not have air cover. In addition all of the charts on the flagship had been destroyed, which would have made navigation dangerous, therefore we decided to retire. The KAKO was sunk by submarine the next morning entering the harbor at KAVIENG.

Vella Lavella, 6-7 August, 1943

Q. What ships were present in the battle of 6-7 August 1943?
A.
DesDiv 4   : HAGIKAZE (F), ARASHI (Capt. SUGIURA, Kaju, IJN)
DesDiv 27 : KAWAKAZE, SHIGURE

Describe this battle.
A. These four destroyers were transporting 950 Army troops and 55 tons of supplies to KOLOMBANGARA when they were surprised by your cruiser force. The ARASHI and KAWAKAZE received torpedo hits which caused fires to break out. The KAWAKAZE sank very quickly. The HAGIKAZE and ARASHI were also lost. The SHIGURI received some damage, but was able to fire torpedoes at the American Force, then retire. It rendezvoused with the SENDAI, which had been carrying supplies to BUIN, then returned to RABAUL. Some of the survivors were able to swim ashore, then walked overland and reached SHORTLAND about two weeks later.

Note: The chart of this action shown in Combat Narrative # XI was considered true except that Captain YAMAMOTO thought that the Japanese ships sank about three miles from the VELLA LAVELLA coast line. This distance was judged as "swimming distance."

Vella Lavella, 17-18 August, 1943

Ships present:

DesRon 3
DesDiv 17
DesDiv 27
Transports




:
:
:
:




SAZANAMI (F) (Capt. IJUIN, Matsuji)
HAMAKAZE (F), ISOKAZE
SHIGURI
17 landing barges (DAIHATSU)
2 auxiliary subchasers
4 shipboard landing craft
2 armed Daihatsu
1 armored boat.

The four destroyers were acting as an indirect escort for the landing craft, some of which were transferring two companies of Army troops and 80 naval personnel to HORANIU, while others were empty and destined to

NAV-109

--472--

evacuate troops from VELLA LAVELLA to BUIN. The destroyers had been waiting at SHORTLAND, but when it was reported that American destroyers were proceeding towards VELLA LAVELLA; our destroyers went down to protect the landing craft.

The night action started with gun and torpedo fire at 2230. No damage was received by any of the destroyers, although 2 auxiliary subchasers, 2 landing craft and 1 armed Daihatsu boat were sunk. When the American destroyers were closing the range on the loaded barges, the SHIGURE left the formation and made a feint towards the U.S. Force, firing torpedoes in order to turn them away. During this action, the loaded transport unit headed for HORANIU alone, arriving at dawn of the 18th, successfully landing 290 Army troops and 80 naval personnel.

Note: The track chart shown in Combat Narrative XI is considered correct.

Vella Lavella, 6-7 October, 1943

Ships present :

DIRECT ESCORTS :

Transport Unit
Cover unit
DesRon 3
DesDiv 17
DesDiv 10
DesDiv 27


:
:
:
:
:
:
AKIGUMO (F) (Capt. IJUIN, Matsuji, IJN.)
ISOKAZE (F)
MAKIGUMO (F), KAZAGUMO, YUGUMO
SHIGURE (F), SAMIDARE
FUMITSUKI (F), MATSUKAZE, YUNAGI
Auxiliary subchaser and small boat units from First Base Force.

The Transport Group was on a mission to evacuate personnel from VELLA LAVELLA to BUIN. When the American Forces were sighted by the main body of escorts, the Transport Unit was ordered to retire, therefore did not participate in the engagement. American Forces were engaged between 2100-2130. There was a delay in opening fire due to erroneously identifying the U.S. destroyers as our own Cover Unit. During the action the YUGUMO was sunk. The next day, 3 officers and 22 enlisted men returned to BUIN in a motor launch from a U.S. destroyer. During the action the subchasers and small boats evacuated 576 personnel from the northern tip of VELLA LAVELLA.

Note: Track chart shown in Combat Narrative XI considered correct.

Cape St. George, 25 November 1943

Ships present :


DesDiv 31
DesDiv 11
DesDiv 30
:
:
:
OHNAMI (F), MAKINAMI. (Capt. KAGAWA, Kiyosum)
AMAGIRI (F), YUGIRI
UZUKI

The above destroyers departed RABAUL for BUKA at 1330 24 November. They unloaded 920 Army troops and 35 tons of supplies completing the operation at 2210. 700 troops being evacuated were then loaded on board for the return trip. The destroyers were proceeding in two columns (no radio contact) when engaged by a U.S. Force. The OHNAMI and MAKINAMI received damage immediately and were later sunk. The other three destroyers proceeded to the north at full speed. During the retirement the YUGIRI was sunk about 60 miles east of Cape ST. GEORGE at 0110 the 25th. Before the YUGIRI sank, it fired all torpedoes at the U.S. Force.

Note: The track chart shown in Pac-5-lp, A16-3/November, serial 00806 dated 28 February 1944 is considered correct.

Q. Were you present in RABAUL during the aircraft carrier raids on 5 and 11 November 1943?
A. Yes. The damage that we received there was due to an error in judgment by the headquarters of the Grand Fleet at TRUK. The Grand Fleet wanted to make an attack on your ships in the SOLOMONS. We had advised them that they should proceed direct from TRUK instead of stopping at RABAUL for fuel. We considered this necessary because RABAUL had been within range of your carrier aircraft in the SOLOMONS for some time.

The fleet entered RABAUL about 0600 5 November and immediately started to refuel. About 0800 the carrier strikes started. There were about three mass attacks. The worst thing about the carrier raids, was after the planes dropped their bombs they went back for more and kept coming. When the raids started the ships got underway and tried to evade the dive bombers and torpedo planes.

The Maya received a bomb hit and was burning badly, so could not get underway. It returned to TRUK under its own power some time later. The TAKAO, MOGAMI and AGANO were also hit by bombs. They were not seriously damaged, although they suffered some casualties. The CHIKUMA and ATAGO received some shrapnel casualties from near hits. One destroyer had half of the stern blown off by a torpedo. I think it was the NAGANAMI.

696691 O - 46 - 13

NAV-109

--473--

During the attacks, I (Capt. OHMAE) was in a small boat carrying a message from the CinC Southeastern Area Fleet to the Second Fleet. I was strafed by a dive-bomber. One of the members of the boat crew was wounded but that was the only damage. About 1300, the ships finally rendezvoused and returned to TRUK, where they were repaired. Some of them required a long time before operating again.

On the 11th, there were very few naval vessels present because they were being repaired in TRUK. About a dozen transports were sunk, which was very discouraging to everyone. The AGANO, which had received minor structural damage on the 5th, received a torpedo hit in the stern and could only turn in circles. It was later repaired. The SUZANAMI (DD) was sunk.

Q. What overall effect did the SOLOMON Campaign have upon your plans?
A. The loss of the SOLOMON ISLANDS was not too important, but the losses in ships and pilots trying to hold them was vital. When the war started, it was not planned to take the SOLOMONS. However, the early actions were so easy that it was decided to increase the perimeter defense line and to gain a position which would control American traffic to AUSTRALIA. Expansion into the SOLOMONS from RABAUL was then carried out. Unfortunately, we also carried out other expansion at the same time instead of consolidating our holdings in that area. After you captured GUADALCANAL, we still thought that we would be able to retake it and use it as an outpost for the defense of the Empire. This effort was very costly, both at the time and in later operations, because we were never able to recover from the ship and pilot losses received in that area.

As you advanced through the SOLOMONS, it was necessary to revise our defense lines. When you occupied the MUNDA Area, about September 1943, the SOLOMON ISLANDS became just an outer defensive area for RABAUL. Then RABAUL lost its effectiveness after you occupied NEW GEORGIA, BOUGAINVILLE, LAE and SALAMAUA.

I personally think that a major reason for our defensive failure was due to the loss of our naval air power. First, we lost our best carriers at MIDWAY, then our pilots in the SOLOMONS. Due to our reduction of fuel, we were unable to properly train replacements, even though we were able to produce carriers. In the MARSHALL-GILBERT Campaign, we were unable to support the islands because we were afraid to risk a fleet action without air cover. The defense of those islands was made by a few land-based planes and the military garrisons. You moved too quickly for us to replace our losses. The same thing happened through the MARIANAS and the PHILIPPINES.

NAV-109

--474--

Plate 109-1: showing Battle of Guadalcanal 12 November 1942, plan of bombardment of airfield, GUDALCANAL, night of 12 November 1942. Bombardment group arrived SAVO Island 2200 but delayed 40 minutes due to unfavorable weather report from observation post on GUADALCANAL. Rounds: 438. Illumination  2 Recco seaplanes. range: 18-23 km, Annex A.
Plate 109-1: showing Battle of Guadalcanal 12 November 1942, plan of bombardment of airfield, GUDALCANAL, night of 12 November 1942. Bombardment group arrived SAVO Island 2200 but delayed 40 minutes due to unfavorable weather report from observation post on GUADALCANAL. Rounds: 438. Illumination 2 Recco seaplanes. range: 18-23 km, Annex A.

NAV-109

--475--
Plate 109-2: chart showing Savo Island and Battle of Guadalcanal 12 November 1942, Annex B.
Plate 109-2: chart showing Savo Island and Battle of Guadalcanal 12 November 1942, Annex B.

NAV-109

--476--
Plate 109-3: chart showing ship tracks Battle of GUADLACANAL 12 November 1942, Annex C.
Plate 109-3: chart showing ship tracks Battle of GUADLACANAL 12 November 1942, Annex C.

NAV-109

--477--
Plate 109-4: chart showing track of YUDACHI (destroyer), Battle of GUADALCANAL 12 November 1942, Annex D.
Plate 109-4: chart showing track of YUDACHI (destroyer), Battle of GUADALCANAL 12 November 1942, Annex D.

NAV-109

--478--
Plate 109-5: chart showing track of Japanese ships, Battle of GUADALCANAL, 12 November 1942, Annex E.
Plate 109-5: chart showing track of Japanese ships, Battle of GUADALCANAL, 12 November 1942, Annex E.

NAV-109

--479--
Plate 109-6: chart showing track of Japanese ships around SAVO Island, Battle of GUADALCANAL, 14 November 1942, Annex F.
Plate 109-6: chart showing track of Japanese ships around SAVO Island, Battle of GUADALCANAL, 14 November 1942, Annex F.

NAV-109

--480--
Plate 109-7: chart showing track of Japanese ships off coast of ESPERANCE, Battle of GUADALCANAL, 14 November 1942, Annex G.
Plate 109-7: chart showing track of Japanese ships off coast of ESPERANCE, Battle of GUADALCANAL, 14 November 1942, Annex G.

NAV-109

--481--
Plate 109-8: chart showing track of Japanese ships off coast of ESPERANCE, Battle of GUADALCANAL, 14 November 1942, Annex H.
Plate 109-8: chart showing track of Japanese ships off coast of ESPERANCE, Battle of GUADALCANAL, 14 November 1942, Annex H.

NAV-109

--482--
Plate 109-9: chart showing Battle of GUADALCANAL, 14 November 1942, movements of CRUDIV 7, Annex H.
Plate 109-9: chart showing Battle of GUADALCANAL, 14 November 1942, movements of CRUDIV 7, Annex H.

NAV-109

--483--
Plate 109-10: chart showing Battle of SAVO Island, 8-9 August 1942, sketch submitted by Capt. OHMAE, Annex J.
Plate 109-10: chart showing Battle of SAVO Island, 8-9 August 1942, sketch submitted by Capt. OHMAE, Annex J.

NAV-109

--484--

INTERROGATION NAV NO. 110
USSBS NO. 468

ESCORT OF SHIPPING

TOKYO 29 November 1945

Interrogation of: Captain ABE, Tokuma, IJN, a regular officer of 23 years service which included 6 years of submarine and anti-submarine warfare duty prior to the war. His duties during the entire war consisted of staff work with various escort forces and command of escort units at sea.

Interrogated by: Captain Steadman Teller, USN.

Summary

Captain ABE, because of his earlier experience in submarines, and his duties with escort of shipping, took considerable interest in the development of U.S. submarines, their equipment and tactics. In his opinion, the steady improvement in all these factors was the most important cause for the loss of Japan's tanker fleet. He also admired the efficiency of U.S. naval communications between submarines and between submarines and aircraft. In contrast, he describes the inefficient organization of Japanese escort early in the war, the lack of escort ships and equipment, and the failure to provide and coordinate adequate air cover for Japanese convoys throughout the war.

Transcript

Q. Describe the organization and operations of the 22nd Base Force at the time you reported for duty in November 1942.
A. This force was called the 2nd Base Force and had its headquarters at BALIKPAPAN where I spent my entire tour of duty between November 1942 and February 1944. At first the force had only 3 small sub chasers and was responsible only for convoy escort within the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. About the middle of 1943 the force was strengthened and assumed added responsibilities of escort to PALAU, TRUK and RABAUL. Vessels assigned at that time were PC-1 and PC-4 class subchasers 1 to 8 inclusive, and 4 of the SC-1 class. We also had some trawlers which had been converted and equipped. Our largest and most powerful vessel was the ex-American destroyer STEWART which had been raised at SOERABAJA and commissioned. At first we could not make her equipment work. Finally Lieutenant Commander MIZUTANI was placed in command of the ship and after hard work got her running and all her equipment working properly. I believe that officer already has been interviewed.

When I first arrived at BALIKPAPAN there was no system for escort operations. We would not always know when a ship would arrive in a port and require escort. If there was an escort in the port it was assigned to the new arrival; if not the merchantman sailed alone.

As we acquired more ships and better ones we also obtained some SONAR equipment. There was a serious shortage of depth charges and when we were equipped with SONAR the Navy Ministry said "Now that you have this good instrument you won't need so many depth charges" and tried to reduce our allowance. At first we had only 36 depth charges per ship. By begging and borrowing we were able to put 54 aboard each of the larger vessels when we got SONAR gear. After some argument with the Navy Ministry, the allowance of 50 per escort vessel was finally established. Our principal duties were escorting tankers.

Q. When did the losses in tankers first become serious and what was the cause?
A. It first became serious the end of 1942 and was caused by submarine attacks. As an opinion, in general, as American operational areas increased you were able to produce the weapons of war sufficiently to operate in various areas. Your production of submarines increased so much that you were able to operate in areas where formerly there was no threat to our shipping. This coincided approximately with the end of 1942. Not only were you increasing the number of submarines, but were doing a very good job of training crews, and as far as we were concerned this was a vicious cycle. The more submarines you had the more training the crews had, you had better and more experienced skippers to train new crews. By the end of the war the situation was reached that we were fairly certain a tanker would be sunk shortly after departing from port. There wasn't then much doubt in our minds that a tanker would not get to JAPAN.

A. Did you devote a lot of time to studying American submarines?
A. From my own six years experience in submarines and anti-submarine warfare before the war I formed the following opinion of American submarines: I had devoted a lot of study to American submarines and admired very much the speedy changes in their construction. That is they were being improved all the time. I admired

NAV-110

--485--

their maneuverability; they dove or surfaced or performed any naval operation with a great deal of facility and adroitness. A second point was that extremely good communications were achieved between submarines and airplanes; third point, high submerged speed; fourth point, the extreme efficiency of your radar which was far superior to anything the Japanese had.

Q. What effect did the changes in our submarine tactics have?
A. I did notice that, in the beginning, the submarine tactics were from a point of view of one submarine operating alone. Toward the end of the war they seemed to operate as teams, from two to four.

Q. Did you consider these later tactics more effective than the single submarine patrol?
A. I think that the wolf pack tactics were very good, particularly at night when I believe the greater percentage of submarine's successful attacks on Japanese shipping occurred. These night operations were successful for the reasons stated above - radar, speed, etc. and, in addition, the extremely good inter-submarine communication by means of wireless telephone.

Q. To what extent could you intercept communications between our submarines and bases, submarine and submarine, and submarine and aircraft?
A. We were able to intercept all such communications.

Q. Did you ever hear messages from plane to submarine, telling them what ships to hit?
A. Yes.

Q. In what area did you observe the most numerous airplane to submarine communications?
A. Along the FRENCH INDO-CHINA Coast in 1945 there were many periods during the day when tankers were sighted; mostly, it was between 10 and 11 in the morning.

Q. Were you able to associate conversation between a U.S. airplane and submarine with the subsequent sinking of one of your ships?
I remember one instance where we intercepted conversation between submarine and airplane and later a tanker was sunk. It had stopped at PADARAN in early February 1945. The next day it was sunk enroute north.

Q. Can you tell me specific instances of tankers being sunk during the time you were Senior Staff Officer of the 22nd Base Force? A. In general, tankers were loaded in BALIKPAPAN, SOERABAJA or PALEMBANG, and would proceed to TRUK, RABAUL, and PALAU through MAKASSAR Strait. There were heavy losses in MAKASSAR Strait, particularly between MAKASSAR and KATABAROE. I know, of two ships which were sunk in that area in December 1943. Names are unknown, but both were 4,000-ton tankers fully loaded with oil. Another 4,000 ton tanker, the same month, received nine torpedo hits and finally sank in approximately latitude 3°20' S, longitude 117°30' E. This ship was travelling unescorted, due to faulty liaison with the Base Force, and was going southwest headed for MAKASSAR, loaded with oil. In the beginning, the most dangerous point was the northern entrance to MAKASSAR Strait, near MANGKALIHAT. The shipping that was able to navigate close inshore was relatively safe, but the shipping that was forced to navigate cross-channel or into the open sea was in great danger of being sunk. There was a great deal of sinking off the entrance to SOERABAJA Harbor, but I don't remember any details.

Q. Did you suffer any losses from air attack in this area?
A. Not during the period that I was on duty at BALIKPAPAN. The only American air raids on BALIKPAPAN during this time were from PORT DARWIN. As soon as you started using MOROTAI as an air base, the entire situation in the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES changed.

Q. At the time you left BALIKPAPAN in February 1944, what was the general situation with regard to tanker and other shipping losses in that area?
A. In that particular month during your attacks on TRUK, we lost the majority of our sizable tankers.

Q. Now tell me of your experience with the No. 4 Surface Escort at OKINAWA between February 1944 and January 1945.
A. Just shortly after the American occupation of SAIPAN in the ordinary process of escorting Army convoys to OKINAWA an Army transport with 4,000 troops on board was at a little island in the eastern part of AMAMI group and was sunk in spite of six small escort units convoying her. These troops were bound for OKINAWA. We thought there were four certainly three submarines and believe we damaged three and possibly sank two of them.

Q. Do you recall any other major losses in this area?
A. The particular area NANSEI SHOTO-KAGOSHIMA KEN was considered the most dangerous. We had many losses in small ships in 1944 but I don't remember details. In the same area I recall two large ships which were sunk, both freighters carrying military equipment. One was 3,000 tones, one was 8,000 tons, the latter was

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Plate 110-1: chart showing INDO CHINA coast, submarine torpedo attacks off PADARANG 18 February 1945 following intercepted communication between US aircraft and submarine, Annex A.
Plate 110-1: chart showing INDO CHINA coast, submarine torpedo attacks off PADARANG 18 February 1945 following intercepted communication between US aircraft and submarine, Annex A.

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called a Naval Special Duty Ship. The 8,000 ton ship carrying weapons was headed for the OKINAWA Base Force and due to the non-arrival of this ship, the defense functions of the unit were rendered ineffective. At the end of 1944 a 6,000 ton ship carrying iron ore from HAINAN, was sunk just north of AMAMI-o-SHIMA.

Q. Tell me of your experiences after you took command of the 22nd Escort Squadron, particularly attacks by aircraft or submarine.
A. The first trip I made was from MOJI to SINGAPORE escorting three tankers and they arrived safely. My flagship was Escort No. 52. On the way back we escorted two tankers, one of which was the above mentioned ship that was sunk north of PADARAN. It was a civilian 10,000 ton ship with a load of 15,000 tons of oil aboard. This was on 18 February 1945. The first attack was at 0700, after sunrise. Our speed was 10.5 knots. The second attack was at 1100 the same day. (See Annex A). After this trip losses were not so severe because we knew pretty well the places where we were most likely to receive attacks. These dangerous areas were spotted and carefully avoided. Also we found that if we were able to navigate within five miles of a shore line the danger of attack was greatly lessened on the theory that submarines could not proceed in too shallow water. We tried to imitate the Australian tactics of navigating along the coastline, as Australian ships do inside the Great Barrier Reef. We had made an error in interpreting the conversation between submarine and the plane. We knew the submarine was in the area but some people mistook the range and thought submarine was much further out than it was. That is why we come out of port; otherwise we wouldn't have tried to get by.

We then proceeded at a 14 knot speed. About 19 February, this same convoy, with only one tanker, reached the west side of HAINAN Island in the middle of a very thick fog. There we were attacked by probably B-24's. I believe there may have been only one plane involved, but five separate attacks were made through the thick fog without any damage occurring. The plane was not seen, but the plane I think could see us because our mast was sticking up through the fog.

Q. Did you have your own aircraft to cover your convoys as you went up and down CHINA and INDO-CHINA Coast?
A. We had air cover everywhere except where it was really needed. In the dangerous places we never had air cover. When we were near a base where we could request air cover, the only planes which showed up were American planes.

Q. Did you have airplanes to search for submarines ahead of you and warn of their presence?
A. We theoretically had such patrol planes but I never saw one except for one instance. Off MALAYA, once, such a patrol plane did inform me that there was submarine ahead and that I must take evasive action but no submarine sighting was made.

Q. Were you able to communicate with your own aircraft?
A. Although we made efforts to establish such communication, they were unsuccessful, and in every case we had to communicate with the airplane base rather than with the airplane directly.

Q. Which was considered the most dangerous to shipping during the time that you went up and down this coast, submarines, aircraft or mines?
A. It depends on the place. From BHATRANG to TOURANE, submarines were considered the most dangerous. In most other places, the danger from aircraft attack was predominate, particularly in the HAINAN Island Area and along the South CHINA Coast where planes, which I believe came from the PHILIPPINES, attacked continuously. Later on in this area, attack from surface forces and flying boats was a danger. However, in the latter stages, I found it impossible to predetermine the type of weapon which was to be most feared in a given area. If I concentrated my efforts on looking out for submarines, the chances were that we would receive an airplane attack and vice versa. So in the latter stages it would be very difficult to say which was the most dangerous.

Q. Were aircraft attacks at night in the area between FORMOSA and HAINAN considered dangerous?
A. On 29 January, enroute to SINGAPORE with the convoy mentioned in the early part of the interrogation, off AMOY one plane, unidentified type, dropped two heavy bombs and many small type, straddling the leading tanker but registering no hits. There was a heavy fog. In general, I was of the opinion that night bombing in the area mentioned was not a potent weapon. We were able to navigate close inshore from HIANAN north by use of radar.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 111
USSBS NO. 469

ESCORT OF SHIPPING

TOKYO 20 November 1945

Interrogation of: Commander MIZUTANI, Katzuji, IJNR; Commander of various naval escort vessels during World War II.

Interrogated by: captain Steadman Teller, U.S.N.

Summary

Commander MIZUTANI, while commanding an escort vessel in convoy, experienced two day-long carrier aircraft attacks on convoys at sea. One occurred west of SAIPAN on 12 June 1944 and the other northwest of CHICHI JIMA 4 August 1944. He also was present at OWASE during the sustained carrier air attack on that HONSHU port, 27 July 1945.

A successful midnight submarine attack on an important convoy off PALAU, on 1 May 1944, described in detail. Commander MIZUTANI claims to have sunk one American submarine after it made a successful attack on a small convoy. He had good recollection of details and appeared very careful to answer questions accurately.

Transcript

Q. What experience did you have with aircraft or submarine attacks while in command of coastal destroyer No. 4 between April 1944 and February 1945.
A. On 11 June 1944, the day before your preliminary bombing and bombardment of SAIPAN began, a convoy of 12 ships and 10 escorts left TONAPAG Harbor for JAPAN. The convoy consisted of small freighters and one large one of 7,000 tons. The escorts were all small except for the torpedo boat CHIDORI, whose captain commanded the convoy, and my coastal destroyer No. 4. After sailing from SAIPAN we received word that an air attack from a carrier Task Force was expected and consequently headed west. On 12 June about 0930 (Tokyo Time) the first wave of carrier planes began attacks which were to last practically all day. This first wave consisted of about 35 planes and concentrated on the merchant ships. Seven of the twelve were damaged and left burning. The second attack wave followed about two and one half hours later and concentrated on the escorts, strafing heavily. The CHIDORI was sunk and coastal destroyer No. 4 was severely damaged by the strafing. One hundred men, about half my crew, were either killed or wounded. One other escort vessel was heavily damaged by strafing and all escort vessels suffered some damage. At each attack, the convoy took individual evasive action and consequently dispersed over the area. The third and last wave struck us about 1500 and again concentrated on the merchant ships. All these ships except one were stopped as result of previous damage or attacks of the third wave. After this attack the weather became squally and the convoy separated further. I headed first for OKINAWA then north. Next morning No. 4 coastal destroyer was alone and the weather was still bad so I returned to the area to search for survivors. During the next 3 days I looked for other ships of the convoy and then returned to JAPAN. I learned from other officers and reports on my return that all the remaining naval ships reached JAPAN, but only two or three of the original 12 merchant ships reached port. They must have sunk in the rough weather due to damage received in the attacks.

I had another experience with carrier plane attacks at the time cruisers and destroyers bombarded CHICHI JIMA and IWO JIMA 4 August 1944. A convoy of five small merchant ships, about 2,000 tons each and escort had just arrived at CHICHI JIMA carrying reenforcement [sic] troops for both islands. We were anchored in FUTAMI harbor unloading troops when word came by CHICHI JIMA radio that American fleet units were closing IWO JIMA. We wanted to sail that day but it was decided to unload all the troops. We sailed the next morning at 0530 (Tokyo Time). A total of six merchant ships were escorted by the destroyers MATSU (Vice Admiral TAKAHASHI commanding the escort and convoy). HATAKAZE, coastal destroyers No. 4 and No. 12 and subchaser No. 51 of the CSS 51 class. We steered northwestward in a compact formation. Vice Admiral TAKAHASHI always insisted on a close formation when air attack was expected and would not permit individual maneuvers to scatter the convoy as other commanders had done. The total number of 25mm guns in the convoy was about 140, so we had good close in defense.

At about 0930, the first wave of 50 carrier planes arrived. The convoy was closed up and upon approach of planes changed course to the west. Attack was concentrated on the merchant ships, the MATSU and HATAKAZE. The only serious damage was the HATAKAZE's rudder being put out of commission. There were a few casualties and only near misses from bombs. I estimate we shot down two or three planes. The second

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attack occurred at 1100. I observed only one direct bomb hit on a merchant ship and this did not slow her. Strafing caused heavy casualties on MATSU, HATAKAZE and No. 12 coastal destroyer. The third wave attack arrived at 1400 and consisted of torpedo attacks on the merchantmen. All of these were hit, five being sunk immediately with an average of one or two hits each and the sixth sustained damage and caught fire. No bomb hits were seen although a few were dropped. The torpedo attack came from all directions and I believe two or three planes were shot down. (See Annex A.)

The weather became worse about 1800 and Vice Admiral TAKAHASHI ordered rescue operations. My ship, No. 4 coastal destroyer, was ordered to standby the only surviving merchantman and we proceeded westward slowly. Numbers 12 and 51 escorts evidently misunderstood signals in the bad weather and stood away to the northward, eventually reaching port safely. At about 1930 or 2000 I received a radio message from the MATSU that she was being attacked by four cruisers and six destroyers. She was on a southerly course at this time. The HATAKAZE had lagged behind, perhaps on account of her damaged rudder. I learned later from one of her officers that they could see the gunfire of the fight between the MATSU and American ships, but was out of gun range. Shortly afterward, the last merchantman sank, about 2100, due to damage received and the rough sea. About 2300, MATSU sent another radio message saying that she was again being attacked. This message was broken off before completion and the destroyer was not heard from again. There were no survivors. The destroyer HATAKAZE was still separated from MATSU at this time and turned north, reaching JAPAN safely.

I had one other experience with carrier aircraft attack, this time in the southern HONSHU port of OWASE. The attack occurred on 27 July 1945, beginning about 0600 and lasting all day. Dive-bombing, rockets and strafing were employed. I know of the following damage to ships:

KOMAHASHI - old merchant ship converted to submarine tender aground after being damaged forward by rockets.

No. 45 coast escort vessel - heavy damage just forward of bridge where four or five rocket and bomb hits nearly severed the hull. Aground.

No. 14 coast escort vessel - near miss by rockets near bow, many holes in hull. Aground.

No. 18 BANSHU MARU - (old ship) sunk.

There probably was other damage to tankers and small craft, but many escaped by being hidden under trees close to shore.

Q. From your experience with rockets and dive-bombing, which do you consider most effective against shipping?
A. From the little I saw of rockets, I would say they are more effective. They appear to be more accurate and even the misses are not far from the target, so they also do damage. The fiery effect of the rockets also disturb the gunner's aim. On the other hand, a plane delivering rockets in a shallow dive is easier for anti-aircraft machine guns to hit than a dive-bomber.

Q. Were your convoys attacked by multi-engined aircraft or by any aircraft at night?
A. During November and December 1944, I made several convoy trips between TATEYAMA and CHICHI JIMA, arriving off the northern island KITANO JIMA about 2300 (Tokyo Time) and at CHICHI JIMA at sunrise. We would remain at the latter place unloading during the day and leave for JAPAN at sunset. While in the harbor, my convoys were attacked on four occasions by four-engine bombers in formation of five to ten planes. They bombed from about 1500 meters in salvo but made no hits. The ships were instructed not to fire at them. We relied on the shore-based anti-aircraft batteries for protection at CHICHI JIMA.

In the vicinity of KITANO JIMA, I was attacked twice at night by a single rocket plane with no hits or damage.

Q. Do you remember details of any submarine attack on your convoy?
A. Yes; on 1 May 1944, a convoy of four large ships and four escort vessels was leaving PALAU after the ships had unloaded troops and supplies. The convoy was 35 miles northeast of PALAU on course 090° when, about midnight, a submarine torpedo attack damaged the two ships in the port column. The leading ship, MIIKE MARU, an ex-NYK liner of 12,000 tons, was hit in engine room and stopped. The ASOZAN MARU, ex-MITSUI liner 9,000 tons, was hit on port bow and also stopped (See Annex B). The destroyer HATAKAZE with the two undamaged ships returned to PALAU and ordered the coast defense vessels No. 4, MANJU and KASADO to remain with the two damaged ships. In spite of this protection, about two hours later a second torpedo attack was made and the MIIKE MARU was hit on the starboard bow near the gun. The ammunition for the gun caught fire and the resulting fire burned for two or three days until she sank. The ASOZAN MARU made repairs in about four hours and, accompanied by No. 4 coast defense vessel, reached KOSSOL Roads where she made further repairs before returning to JAPAN.

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Plate 111-1: chart showing convoy formation during carrier air attacks at 0930 and 11 4 August 1944 north west of CHICHI JIMA, and convoy formation during carrier aircraft torpedo and bombing attack at 1400 the same day, Annex A.
Plate 111-1: chart showing convoy formation during carrier air attacks at 0930 and 11 4 August 1944 north west of CHICHI JIMA, and convoy formation during carrier aircraft torpedo and bombing attack at 1400 the same day, Annex A.

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Plate 111-2: chart showing submarine torpedo attack about midnight 1-2 May 1944 in position 35 miles northeast of PALAU, Annex B.
Plate 111-2: chart showing submarine torpedo attack about midnight 1-2 May 1944 in position 35 miles northeast of PALAU, Annex B.

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Plate 111-3: chart showing US submarine attack on convoy 8 miles north east of island in approximate position 30 degrees N., 140 degrees - 30' E. in January 1945. Submarine believed to have been sunk by No. 4 coast defense vessel, Annex C.
Plate 111-3: chart showing US submarine attack on convoy 8 miles north east of island in approximate position 30 degrees N., 140 degrees - 30' E. in January 1945. Submarine believed to have been sunk by No. 4 coast defense vessel, Annex C.

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Q. Did you sink any American submarines during your escort duty?
A. I consider only one attack successful. In January 1945, about 8 miles northeast of an island located at approximately latitude 30° N, Longitude 140° 30' E I was convoying three small ships (See Annex C). A submarine made an attack from the starboard beam of the convoy and sank the last ship. I turned to port and attacked the submarine with depth charges, bringing up much oil which I watched for six hours. Then a subchaser relieved me and observed much oil continue to come up from the same spot for 24 hours. I believe the submarine was sunk.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 112
USSBS NO. 473

THE AIR WAR, GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

TOKYO 27 November 1945

Interrogation of: Captain GENDA, IJN; Staff, First Air Fleet, December 1941 to June 1942; Air Officer, ZUIKAKU, July-September 1942; Staff, Eleventh Air Fleet, November 1942; Imperial Headquarters, TOKYO, to January 1945; Commander Air Group 343 (Fighters) to end of war.

Interrogated by: Rear Admiral R.A. OFSTIE, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Captain S. TELLER, USN,
Commander T.H. MOORER, USN.

Summary

Captain GENDA finished the war in command of a fighter group in KYUSHU which had been through the OKINAWA Operation. His pre-war and war assignments placed him as an aviator of broad experience, and provide an excellent opportunity for accurate observation. He is of the so called "younger" school, intelligent, alert, and perhaps hot-blooded.

The comments herein range from PEARL HARBOR to the war's end, including a few notes on the Japanese Army.

Transcript

Q. Since you have been most lately in KYUSHU, I should like your observations on the effects of American fighter plane sweeps over the airfields on KYUSHU.
A. In the early stages, we lost many planes, but later on when we were well dispersed, the losses were not high. The damages to the air bases were relatively small, but when continuous attacks were made it was very difficult to know when to send out attacks.

Q. What comment would you make on the various types of attacks made by U.S. planes?
A. In the fighting plane attacks, the American carrier planes were much the best, much bolder and more strongly carried out than other fighters. For the bombing, the B-24's did the most damage.

Q. Do you recall the reports you received of the American Carrier Task Force strikes on the PHILIPPINES in the early part of September 1944, the first carrier strikes against the PHILIPPINES? What was the substance of those reports?
A. Until about two to three days before, we were unaware that the Task Force was on the move. About 100 fighters that were on CEBU were lost when the United States raided that area. Outside of the losses of the fighters on CEBU, we lost some planes, but not to the extent that it would interfere with subsequent operations.

Q. Did the Army officers on the Staff of the Imperial Headquarters get corresponding reports, and did you confer with them?
A. The Army Air Staff Officer, also, would get reports, but didn't get them in as much detail; and sometimes there were times when the Army did not notify the Navy.

Q. What were the reports on the Army planes?
A. I don't remember exactly, but roughly it was much like the Navy, except for the fact that around MANILA they did suffer heavy losses.

Q. Referring now to the first air strikes on FORMOSA, about the middle of the next month (October), what can you tell us about the results of those strikes?
A. Very generally; FORMOSA did suffer considerable damage, especially in plane losses.

Q. When the American landings were first made at LEYTE, on October 20th, what was the general condition of the Naval Air Force in the PHILIPPINES to resist that landing?
A. The overall plan was called the SHO Operation, under which the Naval Task Force was to carry out the initial attacks, while our shore-based air forces moved back to MALAYA, BORNEO and FORMOSA, not to be used if possible; and to hold them until the U.S. transport forces appeared, and then to bring them forward and use the shore-based planes to attack the transport units. It was a very difficult operation and didn't work as well as expected.

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Q. What was their condition? Did you consider they were well organized and well trained?
A. The ones that were fairly well organized and trained were the night attack units, but they had suffered losses in the FORMOSA Area previously and, therefore, had lost their fighting power. They were the ones which were best trained; the others were not well trained and organized.

Q. From conversation with your opposite Army number on the Imperial Staff, did you gain some impressions as to the corresponding status of the Army?
A. After the navy suffered losses, I feel that we became about the equal of the Army. It is possible that the Army was somewhat better in fighter plane strength and trained pilots, but that was mainly due to their having better planes and materials.

Q. Also from reports at Imperial Headquarters, when did you consider that the strength of Army and Navy airplanes in the PHILIPPINES had ceased to be effective?
A. I was sent to MANILA for about two days in November, and at that time the air strength in the PHILIPPINES was practically ineffective, except for the Special Attack Forces. So, I imagine that from the middle of October to the latter part of October, they were ineffective except for these Special Attack Forces.

Q. Was there, then, enough strength in FORMOSA to be considered as a possibility of replacement for these losses?
A. At that time, the air strength in FORMOSA had been pretty well depleted and replacements were sent from the Second Air Fleet. Under the overall SHO Operation Plans One, Two, Three and Four, they were all to counter the possibility of attacks in the various areas. If the attack came to the PHILIPPINES Area, then that would activate SHO One Operation. In that case Second Air Fleet based in KANOYA, KYUSHU, would be pulled down to the PHILIPPINES Area and the 13th Air Fleet, which was in the SINGAPORE Area, would also be pulled in to the PHILIPPINES Area to reinforce the First Air Fleet, which was already there. If the attack were to come against Central JAPAN, then the Second Air Fleet would have come to the aid of the Third Air Fleet, which was in the KANOYA Area, and also pull down the 12th Air Fleet, which was in northern JAPAN. But after the raids on FORMOSA, or even before that, we were fairly certain that the attack was to come to the PHILIPPINES; so the Second Air Fleet was moved from KANOYA to FORMOSA, where it was standing by, and after that raid, was moved down to the PHILIPPINES. The original plans of the Imperial Headquarters was to unify command between the Army and Navy Air for these various operations, SHO One, Two, Three and Four; but we didn't succeed in getting any unification in the far north where command was unified.

Q. What was the reason for the inability to get unified shore-based air?
A. In spite of the fact that it might have been logical to unify command, neither branch of the service was willing to give up control of their air strength. From the Navy standpoint, its surface forces would become completely ineffective if the air was taken away; and in the same way, the Army would have lost its ground strength if the air were taken away. Neither one was willing to sacrifice its air power to the other service, and I believe that was the reason for not unifying command.

Q. Generally speaking, at Imperial Headquarters were your relations with your Army associates satisfactory; do you feel they cooperated and understood your problems?
A. As far as my relations with my corresponding rank, relations were quite satisfactory. As rank went higher, the relations correspondingly worsened; that is, the Deputy Chief of one with the Deputy Chief of the other was much worse than among subordinates.

Q. Were instructions issued by the Imperial General Staff for the initial employment of the Kamikaze units in October?
A. There wasn't an order issued from Imperial Headquarters, but it was the idea of the CinC First Air Fleet (Vice Admiral ONISHI) and I believe Vice Admiral ONISHI had those ideas even before he left the homeland.

Q. You were in RABAUL during the month of November 1942?
A. That was a regular assignment, just one month. In January 1943, I was at RABAUL for liaison purposes for a period of two to three days, then again in September of the same year. Also went to SOLOMONS in September 1943.

Q. When you were there in November 1942, what was the principal cause of combat losses of your aircraft?
A. The fighter losses were comparatively small but the middle type land-based attack planes suffered fairly heavy losses from U.S. Grumman fighters. These attack planes were lost on attacks carried out on GUADALCANAL.

Q. What sort of operational losses did you have there?
A. I don't remember exactly, about a third or fourth of combat losses. Those figures are for fighters. For medium type land-based attack planes, they were perhaps lower.

Q. With respect to the war as a whole, did you think that your Army Air Force contributed its share to the war?
A. Towards the end of the war, I felt that the Army did do the best they could. Near the beginning, they took

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apparently no part of it, that is until the MARIANAS Operation. We considered a number of bold operations, as for example, the HAWAIIAN Operation, some of which couldn't be carried out by the Navy alone. The Army was always willing to cooperate if such operations were on land, but when it came to an operation over the sea, they didn't cooperate. the Army fliers didn't like to fly over the ocean. As for the Army General Staff Headquarters, I am not sure whether or not they realized the situation. They acted as though they didn't realize the importance of the control of the sea, and that was the reason they didn't like to send their air force to aid in controlling the sea.

Q. What do you think was the principal mistake in the landing of the sum total of Japanese aviation; what was the major correction action which should have been taken?
A. The whole organization was split into three - that is, the Navy, Army and what is known as the government - and the only one which could coordinate those three was the EMPEROR. For the moment, disregarding the government, there was no single agency which could coordinate both the Army and Navy. Had there been someone between the EMPEROR and the two branches of service who had the power to coordinate, I feel things would have gone much better. As it was, each branch tried to carry out operations of its own with insufficient understanding of the other branch. The war was primarily a naval war, I personally feel, but as far as the Imperial Headquarters is concerned that was not necessarily the case.

Q. In that case, then, and with what you said previously about lack of understanding of the Army, the head man would have to be a Navy man or an exceptional Army man who understood amphibious operations?
A. There was no such person. It wouldn't make any difference whether it was Army, Navy or civilian as long as he had a very broad view so as to be able to see the whole picture.

Q. Were there, in your opinion, any Army men who knew the whole picture?
A. It is my own personal opinion there were some Army men; however, they were friends of mine of rank of major and Lieutenant Colonel. There may have been older persons of rank, but I don't know any of them.

Q. To what extent did the loss of ships, or lack of shipping for aircraft supplies and equipment, affect the deployment of the fighting power of the various air fleets?
A. There was some effect but not of great importance. The loss of shipping had a considerable effect on production but not on transportation or deployment, although at one time in the PHILIPPINES it did cause us to have only enough fuel for the next two or three days. We never actually did have a time when we ran out of fuel. As for planes and equipment, practically all were flown. Altogether, shipping losses didn't actually affect fighting power of air operations to any great extent.

Q. During the approach from JAPAN to PEARL HARBOR, what use was made of merchant ships or destroyer pickets to screen the force from detection?
A. We had no merchant ships, destroyers or picket boats, whatsoever, to carry out patrols. The only thing we had was to send three submarines about 300 miles ahead to carry out patrols; but due to bad weather, even their patrols were ineffective. The only thing we did was to have the fleet formation as compact as possible.

Q. At what point along the advance did the Force Commander consider that he was committed to the attack and could not turn back?
A. The original plan was that we would turn back any time until the final attack orders were issued, and the orders for the said attack were to be given the day before the attack was to take place. In other words, 600 to 700 miles straight north of OAHU. But according to the situation, we could turn back at any time; the orders were very flexible.

Q. If the American Fleet had sortied from PEARL HARBOR just prior to the attack, what action would have been taken by the Japanese; how far were they prepared to search?
A. If we received reports that the American Fleet sortied, we would carry out searches; and if orders were issued, we would attack. While we were proceeding eastward, if we happened to run into the American Fleet, such an eventuality had been considered, that is from the standpoint of maneuvers, etc. But there was no provision in actual orders for such an eventuality.

Q. During withdrawal, was attack planned on MIDWAY, on the way back?
Depending on conditions, we would attack MIDWAY.

Q. Did you consider that the shelling by destroyers on Sunday night (7 December) inflicted sufficient damage to make an attack unnecessary?
A. We did not consider it sufficient and we received orders enroute home to attack MIDWAY; but due to weather conditions, very high waves, we could not accomplish this.

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 113
USSBS NO. 484

BISMARK SEA CONVOY, 3 MARCH 1943

TOKYO 29 November 1945

Interrogation of: Colonel SUGITA, Ichiji, IJA; on staff of 8th Area Army at RABAUL, embarked in an escort destroyer of subject convoy as liaison officer to 18th Army.

Interrogated by: Rear Admiral R.A. Ofstie, USN.

Summary

The convoy consisted of 6 transports, ranging from 2000 to 5000 tons each, and two small freighters of about 1000 tons each. The escort comprised 8 destroyers.

The convoy and escorts were attacked by U.S. Army aircraft northeast of DAMPIER Straits. The destroyer on which Colonel SUGITA was a passenger was stopped by an underwater hit, and he transferred to another destroyer which was picking up survivors. Later in the day, the load of survivors was adjusted with another destroyer, and they returned to RABAUL.

In the vicinity of the attack, the ships became widely scattered, but Colonel SUGITA said he saw about three or four ships sinking. On return to RABAUL, he received a report that all ships of the convoy (6 transports, 2 freighters) had been sunk, plus four of the escorting destroyers.

Total personnel, all services, in the sunken ships was on the order of 7000. Of these, roughly half were lost, although survivors who had reached land near the action came straggling in for some time thereafter and hence exact figures cannot be arrived at.

No Transcript of Interrogation)

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 114
USSBS NO. 485

JAPANESE ARMY AIR FORCES IN SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN

TOKYO 28 November 1945

Interrogation of: Lieutenant Colonel TANAKA, Roji; Military Affairs Section of War Ministry, April 1941 - September 1942; Staff Officer, 8th Area Army RABAUL, September 1942 - September 1943; attached to SAMBO HOMBU (GHQ) from September 1943 to end of war.

Interrogated by: Rear Admiral R.A. OFSTIE, USN>

Summary

1. The following were the movements of all Army aircraft into RABAUL Area:

(a) December 1942 - 12th Air Regiment.
   1st Division - 50 fighters.
   11th Division - 50 fighters.
      This group had been operating in BURMA and were ferried to SOERABAJA by air; from SOERABAJA to TRUK by aircraft carrier; flown to RABAUL from TRUK. These were the best fighter units the Army had in the RABAUL Area.

(b) November 1942.
   10th Division - 7-8 reconnaissance planes.
      Brought by carrier from MANCHURIA to RABAUL.

(c) January-February 1943.
   14th Division - 27 heavy bombers.
      Ferried by air from BURMA to RABAUL.

(d) March-April 1943.
   208th Division - 30 light bombers.
   45th Division - 30 light bombers.
      In February, transferred from MANCHURIA to the Homeland, taken to TRUK by carriers. After about ten days maintenance work at TRUK, the 45th Division flew to RABAUL. The 208th Division had more maintenance trouble and did not leave TRUK until end of April, then leaving about 10 of its unsatisfactory planes at TRUK. Neither of these divisions was of much effectiveness in operations.

(e)April-May 1[9]43. 14th Air regiment.
   68th Division - 30 fighters.
   78th division - 30 fighters.
      The 78th Division, from MANCHURIA, came from YOKOSUKA to TRUK by carriers in late April. On departing for Rabaul via air, this unit proceeded on wrong course and lost 18 of 30 planes in forced landings on a reef, but with little loss of personnel. The 68th Division went to RABAUL via PHILIPPINES and NEW GUINEA in May.

(f) April-May 1943.
   13th Division - about 30 two-seat fighters.
      Came from Homeland via PHILIPPINES and NEW GUINEA, arriving late April and early May.

2. Strength figures given are organizational strength. Actually, only about two-thirds of this number became operational at the destination due to losses en route. The 1st and 11th Divisions were exceptions, however, having practically no losses en route.

No Transcript of Interrogation)

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INTERROGATION NAV NO. 115
USSBS NO. 503

THE NAVAL WAR IN THE PACIFIC

TOKYO 9-12 December 1945

Interrogation of: Vice Admiral FUKUDOME, Shigeru, IJN; Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet from 1940 to April 1941; Chief First Section, Naval General Staff, TOKYO, April 1941 to May 1943; Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet from May 1943 to March 1944; Commander, Second Air Fleet, July 1944 to 15 January 1945; Commander, 10th Area Fleet, 15 January 1945 to present date.

Interrogator: Rear Admiral R.A. Ofstie, USN.

Allied Officers Present: Colonel R.H. Terrill, USAAF.

Summary

Admiral FUKUDOME offers high level comment on important plans and operations throughout the PACIFIC War. He discusses the employment of shore-based naval air forces throughout the PHILIPPINE Campaign and action in the SINGAPORE Area for the last seven months of the war, the planning and decision of the Combined Fleet under Admiral KOGA, and the planning of the Naval General Staff from the beginning of the war to the spring of 1943.

Transcript

Philippines 1944

Q. What was the reason for your being ordered to command of the Second Air Fleet, and what were the movements of your headquarters?
A. The only reason I can think of for my appointment to that position, since I was not an air expert, was the fact I had just recovered from a sick spell when the new air force was organized, and it was a matter of convenience that I was assigned to that position. At the time I took it, the Second Air Fleet really had not reached the stage of a unit; it was more in the training stage. I received the appointment in TOKYO and took over command at KATORI, in CHIBA Prefecture, on 15 June. Toward the end of July, I received orders from Central Headquarters to move headquarters to KANOYA, in KYUSHU. The areas of operation assigned to me were KYUSHU and OKINAWA district. In the opinion of the Imperial General Staff at that time, the American offensive was expected to be at one of three possibilities; first, against the PHILIPPINES; second, against TAIWAN-KYUSHU Area; third against HONSHU; and as I already had headquarters in KYUSHU I was ordered to take charge of the TAIWAN-KYUSHU district. It was as a result of that order that my command became operational. At the time, the First Air Fleet was stationed in the PHILIPPINES Area and the Third Air Fleet, based at KISARAZU, was responsible for the KANTO District. Toward the end of August, it appeared that the weight of the American offensive was directed southward, namely the PHILIPPINES, and I was therefore ordered to change my headquarters to TAIWAN, which I did on 10 September. There was, however, no change in the area for which I was responsible - KYUSHU, OKINAWA, TAIWAN district - it was simply a change in headquarters. At the time that I took over the Second Air Fleet, the pilots were still inadequately trained, so that the period when I was in KANOYA was spent in further training. Four days after I had established my headquarters, on 14 September, I received the first attack from your Task Force.

Q. On arrival in FORMOSA on the 10th, what was the status of your aircraft?
A. My fleet had approximately 100 planes, but simultaneous with my advance into TAIWAN about 200 Army planes were placed under my command; so from that time on I had a total of about 300 planes. As already stated, you made your first air attack on 14 October, and I undertook a counter-attack with a part of my air force on the night of the 15th and 16th with some success. The greater part of my air force was used in day counter-attack, but I believe that they obtained very little result with that counter-attack. The 300 planes used in this counter-attack were those stationed in KYUSHU, and after attack flew down to TAIWAN. These were in addition to the other 300.

Q. What were those 300 counter-attack planes; were they Army, Navy or both?
A. All Navy planes which I had trained from the beginning.

Q. What was the organization in KYUSHU on your arrival; what flotillas did you have, and what types?
A. There were many changes in reorganization during the time I was there. I cannot recall the exact system, but there were three principal divisions: the fighter corps, reconnaissance corps, and attack planes. Each division was further divided into two groups ranging in strength from 30 to 40 planes each. In addition to those three divisions, there were the land service forces divided between TAIWAN, OKINAWA and KYUSHU. These latter might be called maintenance units.

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Q. You took command of the Second Air Fleet plus the Army aircraft on your arrival. Were those all the Army planes in TAIWAN, and did you have direct command of these Army planes?
A. I had command of the Army planes through the Commandant of the Army Air Division which was already there, and the 200 Army planes I mentioned were all of the Army planes there.

Q. What advance intelligence did you have of the approach of the Carrier Task Force on 12-14 October?
A. As I had just established my headquarters in TAIWAN only a few days earlier, my intelligence had not been well organized yet, and I was, therefore, forced to rely on information from Central Headquarters. However, since your Task Force had attacked OKINAWA on about the 11th or 12th, I conjectured that the Task Force on its way southeast, might undertake an attack against TAIWAN.

Q. What reports did you have on the strike on OKINAWA, which was within your area of command as I understand it?
A. Just prior to your attack on OKINAWA, a very small number of scouts which I had in OKINAWA, as a result of daytime reconnaissance, brought the report that the Task Force was not a very large one. Its nucleus was probably two or three carriers, and not certain whether or not there was a battleship included. As a result of the first attack, all of those scouting planes were lost, so that no further reports of scouting were received.

Q. About how many Japanese planes were reported lost at OKINAWA?
A. Around ten, all scouting planes. The following attack on TAIWAN was made jointly by your Task Forces moving up from the PHILIPPINES; that was the report we got from our reconnaissance planes in TAIWAN.

Q. What losses did you sustain in the Task Forces attack on TAIWAN?
A. The Navy lost between 170 or 180 planes, which included about 120 fighters, 30 attack planes, and 10 reconnaissance planes. Of the Army planes, only about one-half of the total of 200 were really fit for actual fighting, and I believe that practically all of those were lost. Consequently, the total aircraft loss was somewhat less than 300. (Note: This apparently refers to the attack in October, as mentioned later).

Q. What results, by way of damage to the American Third Fleet, did you report to TOKYO?
A. As already stated, our daytime counter-attack proved practically of no value, we got very little results. The night attacks undertaken on two successive nights were considerably better. Of course, the reports made by commanders of the units actually participating in the raids are inclined to be exaggerated. As reported by them, however, three carriers and several other vessels were reported either sunk or damaged. These counter-attacks were made by medium type, land-based attack planes with torpedoes. The day attack was made from TAIWAN, but that did not prove effective; the two night attacks were made from KYUSHU bases. (Aside from Mr. Mizota, the Japanese interpreter: I might add at this time, as there had been no reports of successful engagements for some time, the newspaper played this up quite prominently).

Q. Was the report believed by the General Staff; did you send in a qualifying statement to TOKYO, or was it a positive statement?
A. As the two night attacks were made by the planes based in KYUSHU, the results were reported in by a Captain in command there. Of course, the only thing I could do was to get those reports together for transmittal to the Imperial General Staff. As a general practice, I believe that these reports from the operating units were not taken at their full value by the Imperial General Staff; just what attitude they took toward this particular report I do not know.

Q. After the action was over, what reinforcements did you then receive from the Homeland; Army, Navy, carrier planes, etc.?
A. In October it became more and more apparent that your counter-thrust would be directed further southward, namely the PHILIPPINES; and as the First Air Fleet assigned to the PHILIPPINES Area had lost the greater part of their planes it was decided that the Second Air Fleet should be sent into the PHILIPPINES Area to reinforce the First Air Fleet. With that end in view, the Second Air Fleet received by way of reinforcement perhaps a slightly larger number of planes than I had lost in the TAIWAN engagement. These reinforcements were planes which had been gotten together from all parts of JAPAN and sent to TAIWAN.

Q. What was the actual date of movement of headquarters to the PHILIPPINES?
A. I, myself, went to MANILA on the 22nd, and the 450 planes of the Second Air Fleet reached CLARK Field the next day, on the 23rd.

Q. What would you say were the overall results of the Task Force strikes on the RYUKYUS and FORMOSA; what effect on the subsequent PHILIPPINES Operation?
A. In the TAIWAN engagement, a part of the planes of the First Air Fleet took part, together with my planes. While the results attained were probably not as great as reported at the time, I felt that considerable success had been attained and hence expected that some time would lapse before you would undertake the attack further south. However, your thrusts against the PHILIPPINES came much sooner than expected.

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Q. We heard from Admiral TOYODA that he had reinforced you with Third Fleet aircraft. What aircraft were received from Admiral OZAWA's Force, and were they received in response to a request from you?
A. I think that, at that time, I received no carrier-based planes from Admiral OZAWA's Force. I wonder whether or not Admiral TOYODA did have in mind some 40 or 50 well trained pilots who participated in the night counter-attacks against your Task Force, on October 12 and 14 from KYUSHU, working under the Second Fleet. It is possible, also, that I might have received some reinforcement from the carrier fleet. However, as the reinforcements come from Central Headquarters, I don't know exact source from which planes actually came.

Q. In the PHILIPPINES on your arrival, 22 October, I understood you brought with you, arriving a day later, roughly 450 planes of the Second Air Fleet; is that correct?
A. Yes, attached to the Second Air Fleet. More accurately, the majority of the 450 flew down there on the 23rd, the balance coming later. It was the intention, however, that those planes flying to the PHILIPPINES on the 23rd should attack your Task Force on the way, but on account of bad weather conditions they didn't encounter your Task Forces.

Q. What was the strength of the First Air Fleet at this time?
A. The First Air Fleet had suffered heavy losses around DAVAO, and the balance of approximately 100 planes were concentrated around MANILA, the Commandant of the Fleet at the time being Vice Admiral ONISHI.

Q. What was the exact date of formation of the First Combined Base Air Force?
A. I believe that the time was 26 October. When I arrived in MANILA, I joined Vice Admiral ONISHI, and, from that time on, the Two Air Fleets operated jointly under Vice Admiral OKOCHI, who was CinC Southwest Area Fleet. The First Air Fleet was already under the Southwest Area Fleet, and when I joined Admiral ONISHI, then, we both came under Vice Admiral OKOCHI's Southwest Area Fleet. On the 23rd the majority of the 450 planes which flew from TAIWAN to LUZON undertook attack on your Task Force on the way, north of LUZON, but without success owing to bad weather, as I stated earlier. Then on 24, 25 and 26 October, three consecutive days, the First Air Fleet under Admiral ONISHI and the Second Air Fleet carried out attacks against your Task Forces north of LUZON, operating not as one unit but separately. I followed my own tactics while Admiral ONISHI used his own. Incidently, Admiral ONISHI's Force was very weak at the time.

Q. What results were reported to you from the air attacks against American Forces?
A. The Second Air Force reported very limited results; namely, some damage to two carriers, types unknown. As against that, the First Air Fleet, which was much weaker in strength than the Second Air Fleet, reported several vessels sunk or damaged. This difference in results between the two fleets is to be explained by the fact that while the Second Fleet, which was relatively well balanced, followed standard tactics, the First Fleet under Admiral ONISHI attempted the so called special attack tactics which probably accounts for the difference in results.

Q. Over that same period of time, through the 26th, approximately what losses did the two air fleet sustain?
A. I don't remember exact figures, but the loss was relatively slight in the case of the Second Fleet, owing principally to the fact that planes had difficulty in finding your units owing to bad weather. The First Air Fleet, while they used the special attack method, had only a small number of planes to begin with. Consequently, I believe that the total loss of the two fleets was somewhere between 20 and 30. On the 25th, our surface fleet came into action, and the planes which gave air support to the surface fleet suffered some loss.

Q. What was the approximate status of the Army air at that time; strength, losses, etc.?
A. Most of the well trained Army Air Force was concentrated in northern BACALOD, further south, and were directing their attack directly against LEYTE. Those further north were still in the stage of training. Altogether, the Army aircraft were slightly less in number than the Navy planes.

Q. From the time of the LEYTE Operation, what reinforcements did you request from TOKYO, and what did you get?
A. Myself, together with my colleagues on the spot, felt that victory at LEYTE was absolutely indispensable; and those in General Headquarters were of the same opinion. So there was agreement that every possible plane, as well as all possibly Army forces, should be sent to the PHILIPPINES. I believe that up to the middle of December, the total air strength of between 600 and 700 planes was maintained. After that, however, replacement could not be continued to keep up that level. The losses increased as time passed and, from the middle of December, replacement could not keep pace with our losses; and by early part of January, I had lost practically all of my planes, my air force had been practically wiped out. Replacements were not getting through owing to operations of your air force. Consequently I had made up my mind to concentrate thereafter on deployment as ground forces. However, I was transferred to SINGAPORE just at that time, the order being dated 8 January. The winding up of the business took so much time it was not until the 15th that I was able to go to SINGAPORE and relieve my predecessor on the 16th as CinC, Tenth Area Fleet.

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Q. Did you leave from LUZON?
A. The latter part of my stay in the PHILIPPINES was at CLARK Field, but in going to SINGAPORE I went on a seaplane taking off from MANILA.

Q. During your whole period in the PHILIPPINES, what is your rough estimate of the total air losses you sustained?
A. I would guess roughly around 3,000 planes.

Q. Was that due to general attrition losses, material failures; or how can you break that figure down as to the principal cause of the loss of that number of planes?
A. I enumerate the various causes without dividing the number. Our planes were flying almost daily over LEYTE and surrounding waters usually under unfavorable weather conditions, and many planes were lost due to weather itself. New replacements were not highly trained, which accounts in part for the fact that many planes were lost on the way before they got to TAIWAN. There was also a steady increase in the frequency and number of your attacks, with the result that our losses on the ground increased greatly; and when our planes took off in a hurry to avoid being destroyed on the ground, they were immediately knocked down by your planes. General speaking, as replacements were relatively poor pilots, there was considerable loss resulting from poor handling. In other words, the greater part of the total loss was traceable to other than air combat.

Q. At the end of that period then, mid-January 1945, would you say that the air striking power was very low, both Army and Navy?
A. The situation just prior to 8 January, when I was ordered to SINGAPORE, was that the Navy had only 30 fighters, which I moved from CLARK Field to ICHAGI near APARRI. My intention at the time was that, with the remaining 30 lost, I would have to resort to ground operations, as mentioned previously. I believe that the situation with regard to the Army Air Force was probably even worse than in the case of the Navy.

Q. What happened, now, to the former First and Second Air Fleets, which formed the Combined Air Fleet, when you moved out?
A. Simultaneously with my transfer to SINGAPORE, the Second Air Fleet was dissolved, its personnel being incorporated into the First Air Fleet as it had no more planes. But I believe that the name "Combined Base Air Force" was used for some time after that, instead of the First Air Fleet. At that time, the remaining air fleet under Admiral ONISHI changed its base to TAIWAN from the PHILIPPINES.

Q. During your period of stay in the PHILIPPINES, how did you coordinate your operations with those of the Army air, through what agency?
A. The Army Air Forces had its headquarters, throughout, at MANILA, but its Chief of Staff was stationed at CLARK Field in order to coordinate with the Naval Air Forces. There was general agreement between the two services that they should work very close together, and if possible as a single unit. But in practice that was very difficult to attain for various reasons, one of which was the fact of difference in formation between the two air forces, difference in terminology used in orders, etc. Even when an order was given to take off and rendezvous at a certain point, they couldn't always do that; so that in actual practice about the best they were able to accomplish would be that the Army would take off at a certain hour, the Navy would take off at a certain hour; just agreement at different times of taking off.

Q. And agreements on targets, etc.?
A. Yes, designation of time and target was about the limit of actual cooperation.

Q. Referring now to the SHO-GO Operation Plan, did you have full knowledge of the plans for fleet employment at LEYTE?
A. I did not have information in detail regarding the use of the fleet. I knew only such as was contained in the orders which the air force received from the Combined Fleet. The same applied to Admiral ONISHI.

Q. What was the substance of the directive for the employment of the air forces in this operation?
A. It was only in the nature of a general order to the effect that, whether in the course of the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd SHO-GO Operation, our air force should be employed to drive back any attempt at landing by the enemy. There was no detailed order regarding special points to be attacked.

Q. Did you have direct communications and direct access to the fleet forces moving up to LEYTE?
A. Yes, we had direct communication.

Q. What is satisfactory?
A. Yes, I was able to send any kind of communication. However, actually messages from myself to the fleet were usually reports of reconnaissance planes, and in the reverse direction from the fleet to the air force, it was usually asking for air support. It was, of course, my desire to give the utmost support to the Task Forces under Admiral OZAWA, KURITA, SHIMA and NISHIMURA, but I discovered as a result of this, my

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first experience with land-based air forces, that land-based air forces are lacking the same facility in operation that you have in a carrier force. The result was that I was not able to give to our surface forces one-tenth of the assistance I would like to have given.

Q. Did the fleet forces inform you, from time to time, of the actions they were engaged in, or their difficulties and movements, besides requesting cover?
A. Yes, constantly.

Q. With specific reference to Admiral KURITA's Force, do you recall what air protection was arranged for in the plans, and what was given to KURITA on the 24th, the day of KURITA's approach?
A. In using this unwieldy land-based air force to support a constantly moving fleet, about the best that could be done would be to send fighters to protect the surface units, and scouting planes to search for submarines. But to do that would mean a serious weakening of the attacking power of the air force. Therefore, although there were repeated requests for such support from KURITA, I turned a deaf ear to those requests, and decided that the best protection I could give to KURITA's Force would be to concentrate my entire air force in attacking your Task Force which was waiting outside beyond the channel. However, owing partly to bad weather conditions, the attack against your Task Force was not successful. I did send a few fighters to protect the surface units and to scout for submarines in compliance with KURITA's request.

Q. The reason then for the ineffectiveness of the air protection against air attack was the small numbers available for the job?
A. Yes; in part, lack of sufficient numbers and also in part to the bad weather mentioned before.

Q. Would you comment on the use of the Special Attack (Kamikaze) at LEYTE?
A. After the two air fleets were combined to form the Combined Base Air Force, I, being the senior officer took command with Admiral ONISHI as Chief of Staff. Throughout, the Kamikaze or Special Attack planes constituted the nucleus of my air force. The targets varied from time to time and were selected from a standpoint of obtaining greatest advantage to our forces. Principal targets were perhaps carriers, sometimes cruisers were selected, and again, especially when your destroyers came in large numbers against the forces that we had landed in LEYTE, they were designated as principal targets. The Kamikaze confined its operations to naval vessels (sea units). In the operations against land targets, we used principally medium type, land attack planes and ordinary attack planes and bombers, but used horizontal-bombing and not dive-bombing against land targets. In addition, we used seaplanes for attacking torpedo boats.

Q. What was the reason, throughout this period, that loaded transports were not a primary target of the Special Attack Force?
A. I wish to correct myself on an earlier statement. Loaded transports were looked upon as at least of equal importance with carriers, perhaps even a little higher than carriers, as targets.

Q. In fact, however, no loaded transports were ever hit, and for that reason I assumed that such orders were never issued.
A. On one occasion loaded transports were made the principal targets, some 300 miles east-southeast of LEYTE; and on another occasion, in an area very close to LEYTE, our Kamikaze were sent out to attack what we supposed were loaded transports, but, by some error, the attack was made against small landing craft.

Q. With respect to the whole LEYTE Operation, you have already stated that it was virtually a finish fight. Can you say whether or not the Army, from the beginning, intended to make LEYTE an all-out operation, including all reinforcements they could put in there?
A. What the policy was at the top, I don't know, because that was in the hands of the CinC, Southwest Area Fleet. But I was under the impression that, at first, the Army was hesitant to throw in their full force with the idea of fighting a decisive battle, but after a few days elapsed, it appears as if headquarters and local authorities agreed that that was what they should do. But when decision was made, actually they couldn't get reinforcements down there to carry on the fighting.

Q. Subsequent to the retirement of Admiral KURITA's Force through SULU SEA, and the completion of the Naval Operation, what, if any, new directive was received from CinC, Combined Fleet?
A. So far as I can recall, there was no change in the operation ordered from the Combined Fleet. I believe that the order was to continue using the Naval Air Force to its utmost with a view to cutting off subsequent landing operations.

Q. Again at this time, after the naval action had been fought, roughly, how many planes did you have and, roughly, how many planes of the Army were operational in the PHILIPPINES?
A. At the period that you mention, namely, immediately after our Task Forces had withdrawn, there had not been any serious depletion in air force because it was still the early part of the LEYTE Operation, and the continuing bad weather made the number of air combats relatively few.

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Q. Did you have definite plans for air support of the reinforcing convoys going into ORMOC, and was it in conjunction with the Army?
A. I am not at all certain on this, but I do not believe that any definite air support was planned for that reinforcement. However, I think that the job was assigned to the Army Air Force based near MENADO.

Q. Admiral, what are your opinions as to the primary reasons for failure to defend successfully against the invasion of LEYTE?
A. Very briefly stated, I would say that the principal reason was inadequacy of our force plus the inability to reinforce and to send supplies. In other words, difference between the strength of your force and ours. In slightly greater detail, the Army, the 16th Division, was insufficiently strong to prevent the first landing. After that it was pushed back further.

Q. During the period between the LEYTE landing on 20 October and the MINDORO landing on 15 December, what was the usual employment of your force?
A. Throughout that period, our Naval Air Force was employed in operations centered about LEYTE, principally against your transports, cruisers, destroyers and Task Force, whenever it made its appearance, and occasionally against land targets in which we had the support of the Army Air Force.

Q. Were there any markedly heavy losses during that period, 15 October to 15 December; and if so, from what cause?
A. Our largest, heaviest losses were at the bases while our planes were on the ground, the losses being caused by attacks from your Task Forces, and after you constructed airfields on LEYTE also from the Leyte air bases. But I believe that we suffered heaviest from your carrier-based planes. I do not recall any particular instance where there was an outstandingly heavy loss.

Q. Did you receive replacements during this period, or about how much had your strength decreased by the time of the landing on MINDORO in December?
A. Up to the commencement of the MINDORO landing we probably lost over 2,000 planes; but replacement was kept up more or less steadily, so that the original strength of between six and seven hundred planes was maintained. It never reached the number of 1,000, but the original number was maintained more or less throughout. But that marked the peak of the fighting in that area, and after that, replacement stopped and there was a very sudden fall in our strength.

Q. During the MINDORO Operation, the Task Force maintained what we call a "blanket" over the fields on LUZON. Do you recall any marked activity of that nature during the MINDORO Operation?
A. Yes, I felt the effect of that "blanket" operation in that attacks increased in frequency, and also prevented replacements getting through.

Q. You said that there was a sharp drop in strength after mid-December. What was the primary reason for that drop in strength?
A. The principal reason was inability to keep up, continue replacement, which in turn was traceable to the fact that replacement would be attacked on the way.

Q. From FORMOSA, etc.?
A. Principally south of FORMOSA, after taking off from FORMOSA, as your planes were active day and night. The other reason for inability to keep up replacement was that the source was fast drying up, both as to material and personnel. This is merely a conjecture, but it is possible that one reason for the drop in replacement was the change in policy at Headquarters toward the LEYTE Operation. At first they decided to put everything they had into it, but as the prospect for final success did not appear too bright, they might have changed their minds and withheld part of the replacement originally intended for that area. That was the impression I got regarding the situation in LEYTE.

Q. When did you get the first intelligence of the movement of the American Forces toward the LINGAYEN landing which was made on 9 January?
A. We had no advance information of your movement against LINGAYEN until the fleet actually arrived there, which I believe was on 5 January, when your fleet began to move north from MINDORO. Our planes kept constant watch, and our belief was that landing would be attempted around MANILA Bay or points south; so we were taken by surprise when they appeared in LINGAYEN and started landing there.

Q. Was there any special employment of air against that invasion force, other than Special Attack tactics?
A. We put all the air force we had into that attack, not only the Special Attack ones, but all the others as well and that was virtually the end of our air strength. In other words, we lost practically everything.

Q. Do you believe that there would have been any difference in the ultimate outcome in the war if the American Forces had stayed at LEYTE and ot gone to MINDORO and then to LINGAYEN?

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A. I do not believe that there would have been any difference in the ultimate situation, but that the end might have been delayed somewhat. The reason for so thinking is that, had your forces stopped at LEYTE instead of going on to MINDORO and the subsequent operation, the reinforcement of our forces at LEYTE as originally planned would have been gradually increased. Although in the end you would strengthen your forces in that area to such an extent that we would be overwhelmed, for a period, anyway, we would have been able to continue. To that extent I think it would have been delayed.

Q. In respect to the American movement, suppose the American Forces had stopped at MINDORO and established airfields there, would there have been any difference?
A. Yes, to about the same extent as in the case of LEYTE. The answer is very much the same. It would have delayed the end of the PHILIPPINE Operation, because the fact that you made your last advance into LINGAYEN, which was wholly unexpected on our side, speeded up your recovery of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. It would simply have been a difference in time in the general situation. I think that it would have made no difference whether you stopped or continued as you did. It would have slowed up our subsequent operations; we would have continued resistance for a much longer period.

Q. Would it have affected the operation at IWO JIMA? Would that operation have gone off on time, without any greater resistance? Was it necessary to the conclusion of the war that we occupy the whole of the PHILIPPINES?
A. I think we go back to the original answer. There would have been no difference in the ultimate result, because if you held the principal bases, the supply would be cut off, the source of supply as well as replacement. We would have "dried up" in time, but by continuing to advance you merely speeded up the end.

Q. You had no directive from TOKYO Headquarters indicating that they had decreased the flow of replacement aircraft, is that correct?
A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Then if they supplied you with all the aircraft they could, you and the Army, would you say the PHILIPPINE Campaign practically marked the end of Japanese air strength of both the Army and Navy?
A. As I have already suggested, I had the feeling toward the end that I was not receiving all the replacement that might have been sent down there, due probably to the fact that Central Headquarters had their mind on the next operation; just exactly where, I do not know. It might have been OKINAWA, KYUSHU or even around the KANTO District, so that you would not be accurate to say that the end of my stay marked the end of the Japanese Air Force. Had it been decided to send everything in the way of reinforcement that was available from JAPAN at the time, it would probably be about 2,000 Navy planes and another 2,000 of the Army, but that would have meant discontinuance of training altogether.

Q. Were there any particular features of the whole PHILIPPINE Campaign that worked either for or against the success or efficient employment of the Japanese Naval Air Force?
A. The principal cause of the serious handicap that the Navy Air Force constantly faced was the fact that, owing to the low training level of our air personnel, there were various accidents before the planes ever got to the PHILIPPINES, accidents on the way. That difficulty was increased by the fact that we were always facing bad weather, and since your fighters were facing the same weather condition, it boils down to difference in training level. We were all agreed on that point, and I cannot remember any particular difficulty having arisen from location of airfields or failure of parts to come through. I might mention one additional feature, namely, that because of the very rapid depletion of our fighting force, the replacements had to be put into combat as soon as they arrived. In other words, we had no opportunity to receive training under local geographical and weather conditions.

Q. Was the cooperation with the Army air and ground forces generally satisfactory over the whole period of the PHILIPPINE Campaign, or were there any particularly important points of friction or personalities that had any appreciable influence on the efficiency of the overall air operation?
A. No, I do not think that there was any particular friction between the Army and Navy Air Forces. The two services were supposed to have the same number of planes in the PHILIPPINES; but as a matter of fact, the Navy constantly had more than the Army and were operating more actively than the Army planes, with the result that the Army Air Force took the attitude of thanking the Navy for taking more than its share of the burden. That was one of the reasons for the absence of friction. The other was that the PHILIPPINES Operation ended before the land forces had a chance to get into action. If land operation took place in any extensive scale, there might have been friction, but the operation ended before there was such a chance.

Q. If the operation were to be done over again, what different method of operation would you have adopted?
A. If you left the matter to me, I would have made a serious stand against your landing at LUZON. I might have employed a few planes earlier, but I would have saved the mass of my forces to counter-attack your landing

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on LUZON Island proper, for a last counter-attack. Because we divided up our forces to meet each landing, as you so heavily outnumbered us, we were bound to lose heavily.

Q. In the discussions of the battles for LEYTE Gulf with Admiral OZAWA and Admiral KURITA, it appeared that neither of them had good information as to the location of the principal American Forces. They stated that they were working in the dark as to where the American Task Forces were, and of what strength. Admiral KURITA, specifically, on coming through SAN BERNARDINO Strait, did not know what forces he was going to meet outside. He then had an engagement with a force, the composition of which he did not know. Why was there not a better search made to let these officers know where the American Task Forces were and what they were doing?
A. That is to be explained, first, by the fact that on the 23rd, 24th, and 25th, those three days, the weather conditions were particularly bad, and second, it so happened that the Navy's scouting force was at its lowest level at that time. We did not have suitable scouting planes and principally had to rely on the Army. Also, because of the inadequate number, I was unable to send out these planes except once a day or, at most, twice a day for reconnaissance. Even then they returned without covering the whole area, but only small sections. What Admiral KURITA wanted was a complete report on enemy movements, but the best I was able to do was to give the approximate position of the enemy Task Force once a day or twice a day. As far as Admiral OZAWA's force was concerned, he was way up north beyond the area under my command, and, consequently, I was not able to give him any information at all.

Q. Admiral KURITA stated that one reason for his turning north rather than entering LEYTE Gulf was because of his lack of knowledge of where the American Task Forces were. What is your view of Admiral KURITA's decision to turn north instead of entering LEYTE Gulf as was the original instruction?
A. My contention has always been that a fleet or task force, to operate effectively, must have its own carrier-based air force, because land-based air force, such as we had, insufficient in number and especially lacking in sufficient training, could not give efficient assistance, especially in the way of reconnaissance. In that particular case, Admiral KURITA started out with his fleet with the intention of making a thrust into LEYTE Gulf, but turned back, as you say, because of his not knowing what was waiting for him in the Gulf, nor what was the strength or position of the enemy in his vicinity. That might have been the correct thing to do under the circumstances, but if I had been in Admiral KURITA's place, I do not say this by way of criticism of Admiral KURITA, but had I been in his place, since he started out with the purpose of engaging the enemy whatever it might be, I would have continued and made a thrust into the Gulf and undertaken the engagement.

Singapore 1945

Q. Will you briefly recount your movement out from MANILA to SINGAPORE, where you got your aircraft, and your route?
A. During the day time of the 8th, I had made up my mind to take the remaining 30 planes and move to ICHAGI, near APARRI; but I received my orders transferring me, so on the night of the 8th, I moved to CAVITE. Usually this trip takes about two hours, but because of various incidents, it took me twelve hours from CLARK to CAVITE. During the night of the 9th, a flying boat was supposed to be sent to CAVITE from FORMOSA, but because of bad weather it arrived on the morning of the 11th. At about 0300 I departed CAVITE, arriving at CAMRANH Bay, in French INDO-CHINA at 0900. This was in a float reconnaissance plane single-engine, two-place. During the afternoon of the same day, I moved to SAIGON. I was supposed to have moved on from SAIGON to SINGAPORE, but there was a U.S. Task Force attack on the 12th so my reconnaissance plane could not get through, and actually didn't get away until the 15th. I relieved my predecessor from his post - CinC Tenth Area Fleet - on the 16th.

Q. What damages did you observe or learn of from the Task Force attack on SAIGON?
A. As I recall it, the attack came in four waves. The main targets seemed to be boats along the rivers, fuel tanks and airfields. On the airfields about 20 Army fighters, which had just come back from BURMA for training purposes, were either damaged or destroyed, and about 20 to 30 Navy planes were either damaged or destroyed by machine gun fire. Several ships were damaged and sunk and about two or three oil tanks burned. But since I was just a traveller, I had no official knowledge of the extent of damages.

Q. At SINGAPORE, was there any Army command corresponding to your command?
A. The Seventh Area Army was in SINGAPORE.

Q. What naval and air forces did you have under your command there?
A. Although I said I assumed the position as CinC Tenth Area Fleet, actually I was CinC Thirteenth Air Fleet, also of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet. Under the Tenth Area Fleet, I had four heavy cruisers: TAKAO, MYOKO, ASHIGARA and HAGURO - the TAKAO was badly damaged and the MYOKO was non-operational - and a number of smaller vessels, mine sweeps and so on. The Thirteenth Air Fleet was mainly a

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training unit, the reason being because of the fuel situation at home; here fuel could be obtained and SINGAPORE Area was considered behind the lines. The only actual combat strength we had was about 50 fighters for the defense of BALIKPAPAN and TARAKAN oil areas, and about 60 or 70 seaplanes for anti-submarine operations. We had three training units, about 400 planes, mostly trainers. The First Expeditionary Fleet had some small vessels.

Q. What was the area of your responsibility, roughly?
A. BORNEO, western half of NEW GUINEA, French INDO-CHINA, NICOBAR and ANDAMAN; in short, all the southern occupied areas.

Q. What was your relationship to fleet units which would come into your area?
A. Prior to the PHILIPPINE Operation, the KURITA Fleet occasionally came to SINGAPORE Area for training; but since I came to SINGAPORE, not a single fleet vessel came, except submarines of the Sixth Fleet. I had practically no opportunity to have any connection with fleet units.

Q. You had the responsibility for handling convoys and shipping generally in the area? Was it your direct responsibility, or how was it handled?
A. Escort duties came under the CinC Seventh Fleet who was in JAPAN. Regardless of where convoys go, the CinC Seventh Fleet is mainly responsible for planning such convoys. But since the CinC Tenth Fleet is responsible for the safe conduct of anything that may come into his territory, he acts in actual cooperation with the agent for the Seventh Fleet who is in SINGAPORE.

Q. What effect, if any, did the January Task Force attack that we just spoke of have on convoys or the shipping in the southern areas?
A. These Task Force raids had much effect. The recovery by the UNITED STATES of the PHILIPPINES practically cut the entire transportation route from the south; and added to this were the Task Force raids in French INDO-CHINA. So from the middle of January to the middle of February, outside of a few planes which made communication between the Homeland and the southern areas, no ships whatsoever got though. The situation could not be allowed to continue. Even if we lost 4 or 5 tankers, we thought it was worthwhile if we got one through. From the middle of February to the latter part of March, we carried out ship transportation operations. At that time, there were a dozen or more tankers in the southern areas. Only a third of these were successful, and two-thirds were sunk en route. As I recall, 5 or 6 arrived with 40,000 tons of gasoline, and this was the gasoline used until the end of the war. These ship movements were known as the "NAN" Operations. There was no more traffic after that.

Q. What was the principal cause of the loss of those tankers, and what stopped it entirely?
A. They were sunk by submarines and by aircraft. I believe that more were sunk by aircraft.

Q. Were those, generally, single plane attacks of the 4-motor land planes?
A. I recall on one occasion they were sunk by a formation of 5 or 6 planes which we thought came from MINDORO. In all other cases they were single planes, like Liberators.

Q. What was the system of reporting the losses of ships in your area? To what agency did you report and when?
A. The commander of the convoy directly reported to the CinC Seventh Fleet in every instance. If such an instance occurred in the Tenth area, then the CinC Tenth Fleet was notified simultaneously. I recall once where all five escorts were sunk and there was nobody around to make the report.

Q. Were there other important effects from the Task Force attack in January?
A. In addition to the effect on shipping, the principal effect of the Task Force air raids in January was the moral or spiritual effect. That is not to say that our forces, as a result of those raids, thought that all was over. The moral effect I refer to affected the southwestern areas where I was in charge - MALAYA, SUMATRA and BORNEO which served principally as a sort of logistic base. After those raids became intensive, they realized that the front line was moving up, as evidenced when I arrived in SINGAPORE. After nearly three years of fighting going on, very little defensive preparations had been made. Once this new feeling was established, they got busy on defensive works.

Q. What naval operations did you conduct in your area, and for what purposes?
A. The general situation changed greatly as a result of the loss of the PHILIPPINES. The opinion was gaining strength that in the end the Navy would have to join in with the ground operation. In February, in respect of land operations, I was brought under General TERAUCHI. As for sea operations, the principal work of SINGAPORE Headquarters was in supplying the front areas, doing very much the same work as naval stations of JAPAN proper. There was shortage of rice, shortage of oil close to enemy positions. The result was that I was using naval vessels as transports. It was while engaged in such operations that we lost the ASHIGARA and HAGURO, in conveying supplies to the Army divisions down south.

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Q. What were the details of the loss of the HAGURO and ASHIGARA?
A. The HAGURO was lost about 30 miles southwest of PENANG on 16 May. She was on her way to the ANDAMAN and NICOBAR Islands, going with the destroyer KAMIKAZE, both loaded with food supplies. Both of those islands were running badly short of food, and two earlier attempts had been made to get food through by using small ships; but in both cases they were lost as a result of attacks by planes, probably British. It was, therefore, decided that use of small slow speed ships would be of no use, and, therefore, the HAGURO and KAMIKAZE were assigned to this duty. They had just gotten through MOLUCCA Strait on the night of 16 May when they got information that there was a British Task Force ahead; so they turned back. On the way back they encountered a flotilla of five British destroyers which came through the narrow passage there, near the north tip of SUMATRA, and a naval engagement took place at this point. It was reported by KAMIKAZE that three shots from the HAGURO sank one of the British destroyers, but I, myself, later met the commander of that destroyer and learned that while damaged, it was not sunk. The KAMIKAZE, itself, received one shot but managed to get into PENANG. This naval engagement was fought by our side under a very serious handicap as both ships were loaded to the deck to such an extent that only half of the guns could be used against the British destroyers, the intention from the beginning having been to avoid encounter with any enemy ships.

Q. What happened to the HAGURO, sunk buy gun-fire?
A. The HAGURO was sunk by a torpedo from the destroyers. The next morning, namely the 17th, the KAMIKAZE went out to the south where the HAGURO was sunk and rescued 150 to 160 survivors; and according to the report of the survivors, the Commander of the 5th Cruiser Division, Vice Admiral HASHIMOTO, and the captain of the ship were on the bridge as the HAGURO went down, so they were not killed as a result of actual firing. The ASHIGARA was sunk by a torpedo from a submarine while transporting Army personnel as a result of the change in the general situation. As a result of the loss of the PHILIPPINES, it had been decided to move our forces from the CELEBES and the islands near-by further westward, particularly to around SINGAPORE and French INDO-CHINA. The ASHIGARA at that time was carrying about 1,200 Army personnel from BATAVIA to SINGAPORE, and received the torpedo hit while passing through the BANKA Strait in June. The British say, however, she sank possibly from a magnetic mine dropped by air.

Q. Were there any other naval losses besides these?
A. The only other one, not a very serious one, was the damage to the cruiser TAKAO, as a result of a sudden explosion which took place about 2100 on 31 July. We were at a loss at first to account for the cause of the explosion, and divers were sent down to investigate, and discovered attached to the hull two magnetic mines, each containing about 30 kilograms of powder, in addition to one large ship-shaped mine of perhaps one ton. How these mines became attached, they were a complete loss to explain. It was only recently that this riddle was solved when an officer of a British submarine came to me with the story that he had gone there on his submarine and done that work probably on that day or the previous day. There were no other naval losses of importance.

Q. What activities occurred in your area in connection with German submarines?
A. At present there are two German submarines at SINGAPORE and one each in BATAVIA and SOERABAJA, which we took over from the Germans and turned over to the British. The Germans had established a liaison group for their submarines at PENANG, SINGAPORE and BATAVIA. In addition, they had two seaplanes in BATAVIA. I had received orders from Headquarters to cooperate with German submarines in the matter of supplies and maintenance, but had nothing to do with the operation. There was cooperation between TOKYO and BERLIN with regard to the operations of German and Japanese submarines in the INDIAN OCEAN. Liaison was effected through these liaison groups in order to avoid collision between the two groups of submarines while operating in the INDIAN OCEAN. The operation of our submarines was under the control of the Sixth Fleet, so I had absolutely no connection with the operation of the German submarines. My service was purely logistic.

Q. Why were the German submarines based at BATAVIA, and what did they do with their seaplanes over there?
A. Formerly, the Germans had their base at PENANG, but as the number of mines in MOLUCCA Strait increased, and the patrol and defense against submarines in the northern section was strengthened by the British, it was felt safer for the German submarines to use SUNDA because of the change of route. The two seaplanes were to protect their submarines as they went through SUNDA Strait. Both of these planes were supplied by the Japanese Navy, but the personnel was German.

Q. Did you have any friction or any difficulties in working with the German liaison group?
A. None at all. The liaison was placed in the hands of our Naval Attache in SINGAPORE, and the question of liaison of German submarines was never brought to the commanding officer.

Q. Did your forces, at any time that you were there, make a positive identified sinking of any U.S. submarine?
A. None at all.

Q. How serious were the effects of minefields laid by the U.S. and British, which you encountered in your area, and where were those most serious?

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A. The effect of the mines was very serious, particularly the damage suffered by ships entering and leaving SINGAPORE. Among the larger ships damaged during the time that I was there were the ISE, HYUGA and the hospital ship HIKAWA MARU. At least 10 and perhaps as many as 15 or 16 ships and two or three small ships were sunk. Other areas heavily mined were around BANKA Strait and the entrance to BATAVIA. The larger of these mines were probably magnetic mines laid by planes. There might have been some which were laid by submarines also.

Q. Somewhat earlier, you commented on the lack of defense work which you noticed immediately on arrival in the southern area. Did you inspect your whole area, did you find it to be common in the southern areas that were not directly in contact with the enemy?
A. Yes, I covered my territory very shortly after taking over, and found the situation much the same in all the parts. The possible explanation of that situation is probably the fact that when the southern area reached the extreme stage, there was a feeling that this marked the end of the offensive operation. Especially in Army circles, there was an opinion, thereafter, that the work of the Army would be military administration, so that they should withdraw all except 200,000 men to other regions. When I went to SINGAPORE and saw what the situation was, I ordered that an effort should be made at once to strengthen the defense there, but I did not make much headway. By the end of the war, the situation was so bad that when the British came, they were surprised at the lack of preparation there.

Q. What was your position at the end of the war, and what did you then do?
A. I was CinC Tenth Area Fleet until the termination of the war. Then I became prisoner of war under the control of the British, and have since been in charge of the operation of Japanese ships engaged in repatriation of Japanese nationals under CinC MALAY British Naval Force.

Q. After receipt of the imperial Rescript concluding the war, did you have any difficulty keeping naval personnel in check or getting them to accept the Rescript?
A. No. Generally speaking, I have been able to maintain control of my center from the very moment of the termination of the war, the only exception being that about 300 naval personnel, mostly sailors and a sprinkling of warrant officers, fled immediately after they heard of the outcome. However, most of them have come back. Some, apparently trying to turn pirate, were themselves killed by native pirates. Some were killed by bandits, but most of the survivors have returned to SINGAPORE.

Q. What was the situation in respect of the Army on that same question in that area?
A. Very much the same as in the case of the Navy. The Army too had some who fled, some deserters.

Q. Do you have any comment to make on your relationship with the Army in the SINGAPORE Area?
A. Since the war came to an end before there was any serious heavy fighting in SINGAPORE Area, there was no occasion for friction between the Army and Navy, especially as I had been instructed to work under the command of the CinC Southern Area. In so far as land operations were concerned, I tried to give positive cooperation to all activities on land. For that reason there was no difficulty with the Army, and no occasion in which I was criticized by the CinC Southern Army.

Q. Do you have any comment on the Army command in the south?
A. I have no criticism to make of the Army in the southern area aside from the reference I made to the sentiment that prevailed in the upper levels of the Army in the early stage of the southern operation, that that marked the completion of the campaign and they were ready to neglect all defensive work. The situation actually was that I made reference to the decision of the Army to withdraw all but 200,000 of the Army force in the south; and it was actually while this withdrawal was being made that counter-offensive at GUADALCANAL was made, so that the troops were shifted and used at GUADALCANAL against your counter-offensive there.

(During the following portion of the interrogation Allied Officers present included Col. R.H. Terrill, USAAF; Col. J.F. Rodenhauser, USAAF.)

Q. Will you describe briefly for us the air attacks of importance that were made in the SINGAPORE Area while you were there?
A. From the time that I arrived there on 15th January until the end of the war there were six raids, the number of planes, all B-29's, varying from 30 to about 120. In the case of the heaviest raids, the planes came in small formations in sort of waves, so it is possible that the same planes might have been counted two or more times. The last of these six raids took place early in March. The six raids took place while the Army Air Force was base in CALCUTTA. Aside from those heavy raids, there were reconnaissance flights over the area, and also mine laying from planes coming in small numbers. The principal targets were the naval and merchant shipping ports, shipyards and the waterfront. In general, in the naval port the dock was seriously damaged, while in the merchant shipping port, wharves and warehouses were practically wiped out. The missiles dropped were principally bombs, but in two or three of the raids incendiary bombs were used to a considerable number, especially

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against the warehouses. Human casualties were very low. The most serious loss to the Navy was the damage to the dock, while the Army felt most the destruction of the wharves and warehouses. The net result of these six raids did not very seriously affect our total fighting strength there, but it might have been quite serious had the raids been continued for ten or more times thereafter.

Q. Were the mine laying raids easily identified and could you then take immediate measures to sweep?
A. Altogether, mine laying raids were carried out perhaps a dozen or more times during the period of my stay there, and always on moonlit nights, taking advantage of the moon. On the first two or three occasions we were caught more or less unawares. After that we increased our observation and we could always detect their coming by means of radar; so we were able to tell fairly accurately where the mines were laid, but could not always take the necessary counter-measures because of insufficient mine-sweeping facilities. We could go to the areas in which we thought the mines had been laid, and sweep the region as best we could; after which we would try to put a ship through thinking it was all clear, but on several occasions the ship hit remaining mines. As stated yesterday the principal places where mines were laid were the east and west entrances to the SINGAPORE Harbor, the JOHORE Strait, and the channel leading toward BATAVIA.

Q. What was the approximate number of vessels sunk and seriously damaged by aerial mining in areas under your control?
A. I think this was mentioned in passing yesterday. The total damage from mines in the SINGAPORE Area was 14 or 15 ships, of which three or four small ones sank. The remaining ones were slightly damaged, and were able to get back into operation with little repair. There was also a few mine laying raids near PENANG and SOERABAJA. The total losses at those two points were probably 5 or 6, of which one or two sank. Hence, the total loss from mines laid by planes in the area for which I was responsible was around 20; and while that is not a very large number, we felt the loss quite heavily because the total number of ships that we had was small. Twenty out of a relatively small number was quite a big proportion.

Q. Did you attempt interception with your fighters of any of the air raids; if so, with what results?
A. As I stated yesterday, the naval air force in SINGAPORE was primarily a training unit with the exception of 50 or 60 planes that were assigned to protection of the oil areas in BALIKPAPAN and TARAKAN. Also, there were training units scattered through JAVA, PENANG and French INDO-CHINA; but because they were primarily training planes, they were not of much practical value in actual operations. Therefore, the basic policy was to reserve the Navy's planes for use to support sea operations, such as in the case of the appearance of Task Forces, etc. Consequently, in the numerous raids, including mine laying raids against SINGAPORE, the interception was left to Army planes belonging to the Third Air Army with headquarters in SINGAPORE, under the command of Lieutenant General KINOSHITA. This Army had approximately 1000 planes which were deployed in supporting land operations as far apart as BURMA and NEW GUINEA; and in the raids of the B-29's against SINGAPORE, these Army planes were used for interception. In addition, the Army had quite a number of planes for the protection of PALEMBANG. During my stay there, most of the good Navy planes were ordered back to JAPAN, only those of little actual value being left in SINGAPORE, which situation was natural enough since the primary purpose of the Naval Air Force there was training. As soon as the pilots reached a certain stage they were taken back to JAPAN, but I felt that the recall to JAPAN was going a little faster than I considered practical or wise.

Q. Do you recall what success the Army had in interceptions?
A. During the time that I was there, the only result that I heard of was when the Army planes intercepted a British Task Force which approached the PALEMBANG Area two or three times, either late in January or early February. Just what the figures were I do not know, but I think that Army losses on our side were considerable . What results were obtained in BURMA, I do not know either. I also heard that a few Army planes had been sent out against the American Task Force off French INDO-CHINA, but I have no knowledge of the results. The general policy, as already stated, was that the Navy should use its planes to support sea operations. As well trained pilots and practically all serviceable planes were consistently being sent back to JAPAN, I was forced to pick up wrecks and scraps and repair them, and use them for training purposes. I was able to recover 30 or 40 planes in that way and save them for the last stand there, when your landing should be undertaken. The policy was much the same with the Army. In other words, they too were saving up their planes for the last stand. Consequently, the Army planes which went up to intercept B-29's were in relatively small numbers. That may explain in part the small results obtained in the air combats in which the Army planes engaged. Toward the end the Army planes too were being brought back to JAPAN in large numbers, so that the number of those remaining in SINGAPORE from the Army as well as the Navy had gotten very small. One other raid which I should have mentioned took place near the end of July, raiders composed of 1 B-24 and 8 P-38's, probably American craft, coming from BORNEO region principally for reconnaissance purposes. Two or three of our Army planes took to the air and engaged in air combat. While I received no formal report from the Army, I heard that we lost two planes and that the enemy suffered no loss.

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Combined Fleet 1943-44

Q. Admiral, was there any particular reason why you were assigned as Chief of Staff Combined Fleet on Admiral KOGA's Staff; for example, the peculiarities of the strategic situation at that time with which you were especially familiar?
A. My predecessor was Vice Admiral UGAKI who was injured over BOUGAINVILLE at the time that Admiral YAMAMOTO was shot down. That was 18 April 1943. They were in separate planes but both were shot down. As the injury was serious and as Adm. UGAKI was confined to bed, it was necessary for the Chief of Staff as well as Commander in Chief to have a successor. So when Admiral KOGA was appointed Commander in Chief and left TOKYO for TRUK, he left word with the Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral NAGANO, that if upon arrival at TRUK he should find Admiral UGAKI in too serious condition to continue as Chief of Staff, I should be sent down to replace him. Admiral KOGA discovered at TRUK that Admiral UGAKI's injuries were very serious, and I was ordered to proceed there at once.

Q. Will you give us briefly the movements of the Commander in Chief during the ensuing year, during the time you were Chief of Staff?
A. Admiral KOGA arrived at TRUK and took over the post 23 April; his flagship was the MUSASHI. On 23 May he came on the flagship to TOKYO for discussions with headquarters, proceeding from there to KURE and the INLAND SEA in June for repairs and some training. He returned to TRUK aboard his flagship in August and remained there until some time in October when, anticipating the arrival of an American Task Force in the MARSHALLS Area, he went to BROWN (ENIWETOK). But as the American Task Forces did not make appearance, he returned once more to TRUK. He was in BROWN about a week, so the entire trip was between 10 and 20 October. On 11 February 1944, he once more came to TOKYO for further consultation with headquarters, and this time went to PALAU. This was 25 February, and it was on 31 March when he was proceeding from PALAU to DAVAO by plane that he was killed in an air accident resulting from bad weather conditions.

Q. At the time of the visit to TOKYO for the conference in May 1943, what was the estimate of American intention, and what new dispositions or orders were issued consequent to that conference?
A. Admiral KOGA's purpose in coming to TOKYO in May 1943 was twofold: first, since at that time our operations in ATTU and KISKA Areas up north were just beginning, he wanted to guide those operations from as close a point as possible, and consequently preferred to be in TOKYO at the time rather than so far south; second, he did not wish to feel bound to his predecessor's policy and wanted to let the Imperial General Headquarters know his feelings in the matter. Admiral KOGA's basic policy in regard to naval operations as told to me was that the one chance of success lay in a decisive naval engagement. We had just completed what might be called the first stage operations, and were just entering the second stage operations, and it was Admiral KOGA's belief that it would not do at this stage to rely upon passive defense plans, that we must take the offensive. There were those who told him that this point must be defended and that that point must be defended, etc., but it was his conviction that we must concentrate in one big decisive fleet engagement, which he felt had at least a fifty percent chance of success if such engagement could be made to take place during 1943.

Q. His plan then was dependent on his being able to get the U.S. Fleet into such an engagement, to draw it into such an engagement?
A. I wish to add before answering your last question that during the period that Admiral KOGA was in TOKYO, between May and August, there was a strong opinion in the Imperial General Headquarters that, as in the case of the American Fleet, it would be wise for the CinC Combined Fleet to have his quarters on land in TOKYO, principally in order to attain the closest possible coordination between the Fleet and the Imperial Japanese Headquarters. Admiral KOGA opposed this opinion, however, on the ground that circumstances of the American Fleet and the Japanese Fleet were different, and that in his case he must personally assume the leadership of the fleet; and hence, insisted upon proceeding again to TRUK. He felt that the operations around GUADALCANAL and vicinity were against us, and that the American Naval Forces were bound to push farther and farther north. Just against what point their thrust would be made, of course, could not be guessed; but KOGA felt that if he only waited at TRUK, that would give him a chance for a decisive engagement against the American Fleet when they should proceed north, irrespective of what particular point they might strike. He, therefore, concentrated the full fleet strength at TRUK instead of sending a part of it further west as some advised. In other works, it was not a plan of any positive action to draw the American Fleet into a decisive action, but rather to wait until the American Fleet came up; and he felt that they were bound to come up if he only waited.

Two attempts were made at such decisive engagements; one, already mentioned, being in October when it was anticipated that the American Task Force was proceeding north. That is when Admiral KOGA went to BROWN Atoll. Before that, near the end of September, information was received that American Task Forces were approaching MARSHALLS Area. Admiral KOGA, himself, waited at TRUK with the main force of the fleet held in readiness, also Admiral OZAWA's Air Fleet and the Second Fleet under Admiral KURITA. But on this

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occasion, also, the Task Forces failed to make an appearance and nothing came of it. In the latter case mentioned, namely, the end of September, Admiral OZAWA's Air Fleet and Admiral KURITA's Second Fleet remained at BROWN Atoll for approximately a week, and then returned to TRUK; KOGA himself remained at TRUK all the time. Those were the two occasions when KOGA undertook to engage the enemy in a decisive naval engagement.

Q. What was the reason behind movement of the striking forces from TRUK to BROWN on both occasions?
A. The information transmitted through TOKYO was that the American Task Force would make its appearance somewhere north of the MARSHALLS, in which case BROWN would be most advantageous base for our striking force. Just what the source of that information was, I do not know.

Q. Admiral, you mentioned earlier the ALEUTIAN Operation at KISKA; what was the decision with respect to the ALEUTIANS, and the reason for it?
A. There appears to have been considerable difference of opinion between the Army and Navy as regards future policy for the ALEUTIANS, the Navy favoring fighting to the last man while the Army felt that this would be a waste of manpower if there was no prospect of ultimate success of the Northern Operations. The final decision as rendered by the Imperial General Headquarters was that it would serve no useful purpose to fight on, and, hence, it was decided to withdraw. When Admiral KOGA came to TOKYO, it was his hope that with KISKA and the rest of the ALEUTIANS as a base he might get a chance for a decisive engagement with your naval forces somewhere in the northern waters; but by the time he reached TOKYO the situation had already gone too far for him to undertake execution of any such plan.

Q. What had been the object of the Northern Operation? Was it to obtain a base for the purpose just mentioned?
A. My memory on this point is somewhat hazy, but I believe that our object in occupying the area of natural resources in the south was not a strategic one. The purpose was to get the materials necessary for existence and our war effort. But the Navy felt that in order to hold this very expansive area it would be necessary to get far outlying lookout points, and while we might not be able to hold on to such outlying points, we must at least get them once, even if we were to lose them to the enemy again later. It was in pursuance of that policy that we occupied or tried to occupy such distant bases as the ALEUTIANS, RABAUL, and MIDWAY.

Q. Was this particular objective - that is, the Western ALEUTIANS - included in the plan over the objections of the Army? That is, was it primarily sponsored by the Navy?
A. No, it was not against Army opposition that the ALEUTIAN bases were included in this plan. The idea originated with YAMAMOTO who, when laying down a plan of Naval operations, felt that the holding of such outlying bases was essential to an overall success of the Navy's plans. When that idea was transferred to Imperial General Headquarters, the Army took the view that if the Navy feels that such a policy is essential then we give it support. They fell in readily with the Navy's proposal, the difference of opinion arose only when the time came for the withdrawal from KISKA. The reason for the Navy favoring defense to the last man was that since they had gone there in the first place with the expectation of having at some future time to lose it, why not fight it out to the last man? Against that, there was considerable Army objection.

Q. The Imperial General Headquarters finally making the decision to evacuate KISKA?
A. Yes, that decision was made by the Imperial General Headquarters.

Q. At the time of the conference in TOKYO Area, in summer 1943, did KOGA's staff make an estimate, or did headquarters present an estimate which set forth the major threat or danger to the perimeter at that time; if so, what was the danger considered to be?
A. During the summer of 1943, there was a difference of opinion between the central authorities and the fleet. The central authorities were of the belief that the attack or threat would be more from the west than from the east, and that the east attack would come later. That was due to the fact that ITALY fell about this time. The central authorities felt that the U.S. Fleet together with the British Fleet would attack from the west after crossing the INDIAN OCEAN. KOGA, however, felt that as long as the U.S. Fleet was in the east, the main fleet force should be kept out east as a threat. The central authorities agreed with KOGA finally and decided to let the fleet keep its own air strength without diminishing it, and just strengthen defenses of the west. To strengthen defense of the west, central authorities felt it best to send planes from JAPAN. The strengthening of the west was to be taken care of by central authorities, the fleet did not bother with it. That was the policy attempted, but actually it was not carried out; western defenses were not actually strengthened. Probably central authorities were not able actually to carry out that step.

Q. Was it the estimate then of central authorities that Allied forces would perhaps land in MALAYA, and otherwise make an effort down towards SINGAPORE?
A. That was their estimate.

Q. In speaking of the threat form the east, how did the staff locate that threat; was it directly from the east geographically or from the RABAUL Area?

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A. They made only very rough estimates, and as to detailed estimates as to when what forces would arrive where, they were always wrong. Those forecasts were worse than weather forecasts. Roughly, however, they believed that the attacks would come to the Eastern CAROLINES Area and MARSHALLS or from the north through the ALEUTIANS and HOKKAIDO; but the biggest probability in their view was straight east through HAWAII and MIDWAY. That was the biggest threat in that they felt there was bound to be fleet action and that was the strongest fleet action route, because at that stage of the war the Japanese Navy felt that the U.S. Navy was still playing the main part as contrasted with the Army. Consequently, while there might be small landings on small islands sufficient to support Naval operations, no major landings would be undertaken; hence the view that the principal threat would be from the east and to the CAROLINES Area. Of the three possibilities, the one from the north was considered the least likely.

Q. At this same time, what was the staff estimate of the situation in the RABAUL, SOLOMONS, general South PACIFIC Area, and were major decisions made relative to strengthening that region or attempting new strategy there?
A. As far as the SOLOMONS Area was concerned they assumed that the situation had been settled. In the RABAUL Area the operation was very difficult, but the fleet was not in favor of increasing its strength, and insisted on using only their existing strength because at that time KOGA was still in favor of that decisive battle without spreading his strength. By August and September in the RABAUL Area, air strength was considerably diminished. The Command there had asked for air support time and time again but the Commander in Chief could not send any of his own planes. Then after the failure of the decisive surface engagement planned from BROWN, Admiral KOGA finally decided to send a small number of carrier-based planes to be used for a short time at RABAUL. The actual strength that was sent to RABAUL was most of the planes of OZAWA's Air Fleet. They were to be used for a very short time, about a ten day period, and then returned to the fleet so as to maintain the strength of the fleet as a whole. Looking back on it now, this was a bad mistake because having sent the carrier planes to RABAUL for a period of about ten days, on about the very day they were supposed to return, the occupation of BOUGAINVILLE and SHORTLAND took place; and in spite of the fact they didn't intend to use these planes for such operations, they just couldn't stand by and not employ them. They were finally employed against these U.S. landing operations and the majority were lost. With the loss of these planes, the fleet as a whole lost considerable efficiency.

Q. What was the exact date again? How many planes from how many carriers went down there?
A. As I recall, it was the very end of October that they were sent to RABAUL. There was a total of about 250 planes from , I think four or five carriers, all the fighters from Admiral OZAWA's fleet. On about 10 November, when they were saying we will return tomorrow, the BOUGAINVILLE Operation started and these planes were employed against that operation. They did attain some results on the 11th. Shortly after the BOUGAINVILLE landing operation started, KOGA ordered the Second Fleet to RABAUL to carry out counter-attacks. OZAWA, having led those planes originally to RABAUL, was already there with his land-based air force. The plan was to carry out heavy counter-attacks. Unfortunately the very day after KURITA's Second Fleet arrived, the fleet was subjected to heavy bombing raids and suffered heavy casualties; no ships sunk but heavily damaged.

Q. What dates were they damaged, and what was the attack from?
A. I do not remember exactly what day, it was shortly after the BOUGAINVILLE Operation started. I believe it was somewhere between 15 and 20 November and I believe that the raids were carried out by carrier-based planes from U.S. Task Forces. As I recall, it was not the attacks of 5 or 11 November. Admiral KURITA had not arrived until after that so it was neither one of those strikes. OZAWA's planes did participate in the raids you mentioned but KURITA's fleet had not yet arrived. (This statement is corrected below.)

Q. What results did you have reported from the Naval Air Force, based ashore, of their attacks on the American Task Force?
A. I do not remember exactly OZAWA's reports but I recall that they did attack a Task Force to the north of BOUGAINVILLE, at which time one carrier was badly damaged; I do not recall the exact date. There was another Task Force to the south of BOUGAINVILLE, as I recall. Three carriers, including an escort carrier probably, were claimed sunk and 7 or 8 transports sunk or badly damaged. Later it was found that the reported carriers turned out to be special type landing vessels.

Q. A little earlier in that same area, the Allied Forces had occupied SALAMAUA, LAE and FINSCHHAFEN, that was in September and October. How much did that affect the status or RABAUL, or the naval plans; how much concern, in other words, was that to the Commander in Chief?
A. Earlier, RABAUL-SOLOMONS area was looked upon with much importance. As a matter of fact, YAMAMOTO had himself gone to RABAUL to direct operations at one time. But by the time KOGA took over, he considered the situation fairly well settled, and did not feel that it was necessary at that time to risk interfering with the strength of his fleet. It wasn't that he did nothing, but that he sent only enough strength to be of nuisance value, but never to interfere with fleet strength.

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Q. What was his re-estimate from the loss of SALAMAUA, LAE and FINSCHHAFEN? How did it affect the RABAUL situation; did it at all?
A. I do not remember exactly what effect the loss of SALAMAUA, LAE and FINSCHHAFEN had upon RABAUL, but as I said earlier RABAUL carried on with limited air strength only. At this time, JAPAN's air power was at its lowest. When KOGA took over, the entire air outlook was the poorest; after this it was again built up. KOGA, having been asked time and time again for air reinforcement, finally sent planes from the carriers down there to reinforce RABAUL.

Q. In other words, you did not consider the loss of these three places of particular concern?
A. We didn't consider it important enough to make any changes in plans.

Q. The Task Force strikes that were carried out on 5 and 11 November 1943 - what, if any, effect did those strikes have on subsequent Japanese operations?
A. At the time, our air strength at RABAUL consisted of the planes that had been sent there from Admiral OZAWA's carrier, plus 100 or less land planes which were stationed at RABAUL. These were used in intercepting your Task Force aircraft on the 5th and 11th. I believe that the air loss was not a very serious one. As for the loss on sea, we did not have a very strong surface force there. Such as we had were the vessels which had been employed in the operations in the SOLOMONS Area. I believe that the damage to those vessels not very serious. Consequently, the net effect of those two attacks on subsequent operations around RABAUL was not a very serious one. However, the BOUGAINVILLE landing operations which took place immediately after those two attacks necessitated our retaining the carrier planes which were intended to be sent back to Admiral OZAWA's Fleet; and as most of those were lost at BOUGAINVILLE, the effect of that on subsequent operations was very serious as it meant practically the complete loss of the carrier-based planes.

Q. Yesterday, you mentioned the movement of Admiral KURITA's Force to the south - KAVIENG-RABAUL Area - and mentioned the serious damage to that force. What were the composition, movements and cause of loss to KURITA's Force?
A. I do not remember the exact date of this occurrence, but I believe it was just after the BOUGAINVILLE Operation started. The purpose of the movement southward was to cooperate with the carrier-based planes which had been sent from Admiral OZAWA's Fleet, in order to check the BOUGAINVILLE Operations. However, this fleet was discovered while it was proceeding from TRUK to RABAUL and was attacked the day after reaching RABAUL. The Second Fleet, at the time, had been practically undamaged, and of that force Admiral KURITA took the crack units south on this mission, consisting of three cruiser divisions numbering 10 or 12 units, and one destroyer squadron containing one cruiser and about a dozen destroyers. The attack I believe was by carrier-based planes plus perhaps some land planes. Our force was bombed while at anchor in the harbor; some tried to pull out and were bombed outside. There might have been also a few torpedo attacks. The losses suffered were as follows: one destroyer sunk and 5 or 6 damaged, of which one or perhaps two were so seriously damaged as not to be able to proceed to TRUK for repair. The others were sent back to TRUK for repairs and some of those were brought back to JAPAN for major repairs. As a result, although the Southern Fleet was not rendered completely inoperational, there is no question but that it was seriously hurt.

Q. What was the approximate date that KURITA's Force arrived at RABAULL?
A. I believe that Admiral KURITA came south after hearing of the landing at BOUGAINVILLE, and, therefore, I believe that the arrival was around the 14th or 15th, though I am not certain of that. He might have got there in time to receive the second attack on the 11th.

(Note: Admiral FUKUDOME later corrected these dates by the following statement:

According to the statement of Commander NAKAJIMA, who was Communication Officer under Admiral KOGA, Admiral KURITA's Fleet left TRUK on 3 November and arrived at RABAUL on the evening of the 4th, just in time to be attacked on the morning of the 5th. The date of the flight of Admiral OZAWA's carrier planes to RABAUL took place on 1 and 2 November, the majority going on the 1st with the Admiral himself. The date of Admiral KOGA's departure from TRUK for TOKYO was the 10th and not the 11th of June.)

Q. How long did Admiral OZAWA stay down at RABAUL when he went there in November 1943?
A. I believe that Admiral OZAWA returned to TRUK around 20 November. The planes remained under Admiral OZAWA's command. He was to engage in joint operations with the commanding officer of the local force, in the same way that joint operations were carried on around the time of Admiral YAMAMOTO's death in April - the commanding officer of the air force going in to cooperate with the fleet officer. Incidentally, the commanding officer with whom Admiral OZAWA cooperated at RABAUL was Vice Admiral KUSAKA, CinC Southeast Area Fleet.

Q. After you received positive intelligence that the American Forces were conducting landing operations at TARAWA and MAKIN, what directives did you issue and what changes did you make in the surface fleet disposition?

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A. As stated yesterday, Admiral KOGA's idea was to save up his full strength for one decisive engagement. That was the reason why he disregarded the constant request for air reinforcement from RABAUL, because the only planes that could be sent were carrier planes. But in November, as BOUGAINVILLE landing operations commenced, he was forced to send his air strength to RABAUL. As it turned out, practically all of them were lost at RABAUL and BOUGAINVILLE. Consequently, the Fleet air strength was almost completely lost, and although the GILBERT fight appeared to be the last chance for a decisive fight, the fact that the fleet's air strength had been so badly depleted enabled us to send only very small air support to TARAWA and MAKIN. The almost complete loss of carrier planes was a mortal blow to the fleet since it would require six months for replacement, and it was felt that it would take until May or June of 1944 to complete that replacement. In the interim, any fighting with carrier force was rendered impossible. The net result was that operation plans were revised early in February; that is, plans regarding operations in the GILBERTS and MARSHALLS.

Q. In the meantime was a determined effort being made to build up the land-based naval air force in the MARSHALLS?
A. Yes, every effort was being made at that time to strengthen the land-based planes in the MARSHALLS. But aircraft production at that time had fallen to the lowest level, and although effort was made to bring all possible planes from the other fronts, the total number gathered there was very small.

Q. To go back, briefly, was the sending of Admiral OZAWA's air strength down to RABAUL done under pressure of Naval or Imperial General Headquarters, or was it purely a decision by Admiral KOGA?
A. This movement was based upon Admiral KOGA's own decision. However, as you will recall, the Imperial General Headquarters had not always seen eye to eye with Admiral KOGA regarding the question of one decisive battle, and the view in the Imperial General Headquarters was that carrier planes should be despatched to any section where chances of success appeared. On this particular occasion, however, the movement was undertaken solely upon Admiral KOGA's decision without any pressure from Imperial General Headquarters.

Q. A brief Task Force strike was made on KWAJALEIN on 4 December, shortly after the GILBERT landing. Did that strike indicate to the staff future intended American operations, and did it in any way affect their dispositions?
A. From some time prior to that, our fleet authorities had been anticipating landing operations around the MARSHALLS. The brief attack on KWAJALEIN strengthened that feeling on our part, but since we had already lost practically the whole of our carrier-based air strength, we were forced to give up the idea of a decisive battle in that region and it was necessary to revise operational plans.

Q. What generally was the employment of the major fleet units between the GILBERT landing and the KWAJALEIN landing on 31 January?
A. They remained at TRUK.

Q. Any special employment?
A. The purpose in holding the main units of the fleet at TRUK was to use them with the support of such land-based air forces as we had there against your Task Force, should it come so far out.

Q. What was the staff estimate of the American intentions after TARAWA landing and what were the reasons?
A. At the time, we thought there were two possibilities, two major possibilities, regarding subsequent American intentions: one was a counter-offensive in the direction of the MARSHALLS, and the other toward PONAPE and KUSAIE. Of the two, we thought there was a greater probability of an attack in the region of the MARSHALLS. There was considered also a third possibility, namely, a direct thrust in the direction of TRUK. However, it was not until the attack in the direction of MARSHALLS actually began that we were in a position to know what your exact intentions would be.

Q. In mentioning the possibility of a thrust at TRUK, did you consider it as a possible landing operation with intent to bypass the MARSHALLS?
A. One thrust from the direction of KUSAIE and PONAPE. I do not mean a direct thrust without touching anywhere, but an island to island advance. I thought that the greatest possibility was the MARSHALLS; but until the situation appeared quite certain to me, I continued to remain at TRUK.

Q. Did you consider the defense of TRUK at that time adequate to defend against a landing operation of the same scale as that which went on in KWAJALEIN?
A. The defense of TRUK in 1943 was extremely weak, and I believe it could have been easily taken. The strengthening of the defense there began after that, commencing in 1944. There was no Army force there and the Navy force consisted of a land party with not more than 1,000 men. The fleet, of course, was there, but since it was without carrier air force worth mentioning, had the landing been undertaken there, the fleet would have been either destroyed there or would have had to flee. The situation was that everything possible had been sent to RABAUL; in fact, it was virtually empty.

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Q. When the landing started at KWAJALEIN, or when you had definite realization that landings were made in the MARSHALLS, what orders were issued; what new dispositions were taken?
A. By the time that your landing around the MARSHALLS commenced, we were able to estimate fairly well the strategic situation in that region. There was no change in Admiral KOGA's fundamental policy which was the need of one decisive engagement, but the new situation forced the following change: namely, a decision to make the MARIANAS and the Western CAROLINES the last line of defense. The fleet air force was practically gone so it was decided that all possible land-based planes, both in JAPAN and at the various fronts, should be concentrated in that region for a big air combat, with surface units participating to as great an extent as possible. Admiral KOGA was determined to lead our forces in this final engagement himself. In pursuance of this new plan, Admiral KOGA came to TOKYO aboard his flagship on 17 February, leaving TRUK on the 11th, for consultation with central authorities, ordering the rest of the fleet to a point west of the Western CAROLINES.

Q. West of PALAU?
A. In greater detail, he ordered the Second Fleet under Admiral KURITA to PALAU, and Admiral OZAWA's Fleet to Singapore for training.

Q. Were these decisions made at TRUK approved by Central Headquarters or the Naval General Staff prior to his departure?
A. It was specifically for the purpose of getting the approval of Central Headquarters to this new distribution that he came to TOKYO, and the approval was readily given, not only by Central Headquarters, but generally approved by both the Army and Navy - the Navy in particular deciding to concentrate all their force in this region; and it was decided that the strengthening of our forces there should be completed by June.

Q. That is, in the MARIANAS?
A. PALAU and west of the CAROLINES.

Q. It was recognized, at this time, that the MARSHALLS were lost. Is that correct?
A. Yes.

Q. How much would you say that the effort at RABAUL to hold on the SOLOMONS contributed to the loss of the MARSHALLS?
A. Because of the insistence at RABAUL that the SOLOMONS should be kept under our control at all costs, its air strength had been maintained at the highest level possible; but there came a time where that reinforcement could not be continued. There is no question that the concentration of our air strength at RABAUL weakened defenses at other points, especially at TRUK, which, as already mentioned, was practically empty at one time. The defenses of the MARSHALLS had been started somewhat earlier and we thought the landing force there was adequate. However, the loss of air strength at RABAUL, which we had intended should be used later around MARSHALLS, had the effect of weakening our effort at MARSHALLS considerably.

Q. Whose insistence was it that the RABAUL-SOLOMON Area should be held at all cost, and what was Admiral KOGA's attitude towards this?
A. It was the idea of Imperial General Headquarters that RABAUL and the region thereabouts should be defended to the last. Admiral KOGA was in agreement as regards the necessity of holding it to the last, but not to the extent of throwing everything into it. His contention was that it should be held as long as possible with what forces they had there.

Q. Did the staff consider that the Army was contributing its share in the defense of the RABAUL position, or was the logical responsibility principally naval?
A. The idea that RABAUL should be taken and held as an out-post originated with the Navy, but the Army readily fell in line with that idea and cooperated; so that the operation there was one of joint Army and Navy responsibility.

Q. You have frequently pointed out the decisive nature of the loss of naval air strength in the RABAUL Area. What comment do you make on the suggestion that the air strength for that operation should have been furnished by the Army rather than the Navy?
A. The general agreement between the Army and the Navy in the Imperial General Headquarters regarding RABAUL and that region was that the Navy should supply most of the air strength including land-based planes. However, by that time we lost so heavily it became necessary to send carrier-based planes there. The Army had sent some planes to RABAUL, perhaps less than one-fifth of the number of Navy planes there. The Army, however, was not able to effect replacement of the planes which they sent to RABAUL, so all subsequent reinforcement had to come from the Navy side. The Army was engaged over a very wide front where their planes were in great need, especially in such distant places as BURMA, so the Navy fully understood the difficulty the Army was facing there, and understood that it was not possible for the Army to do more than it was doing at RABAUL.

Q. You stated that the Fleet was moved out of TRUK about 10 February. This, of course, was before the conference in TOKYO. What was the reason for that early movement of the Fleet?

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A. By that time your landing operations in the MARSHALLS had already commenced so that the new strategic position was quite clear to us. The movement out of TRUK on 10 February was, therefore, made for two reasons: first, the feeling that the preparation for the next stage should be made as quickly as possible; and second, it was anticipated that if the fleet were to remain in TRUK, it would be subjected to almost certain destruction if attacked by your Task Force, since it had virtually no air support.

Q. A photo reconnaissance of TRUK was made in early February, my Marine Corps planes. What the fact of that flight known to you, and did it somewhat influence the subsequent movement?
A. Yes, we knew that LIBERATORS made a reconnaissance flight over the island, and that strengthened our feeling that the Fleet, if allowed to remain there, would be subject to attack from your Task Force in the near future; and, consequently, to that extent, served to speed up our withdrawal from that island.

Q. Why then was the sizeable amount of merchant shipping left in TRUK?
A. Some of those merchant ships were those which were engaged in sending supplies to RABAUL. All had been subjected to attacks from your planes, and although there were many there, many of them were so badly damaged as not to be operational.

Q. What groups participated in the staff conference in TOKYO after Admiral KOGA's arrival there?
A. Since there were many subjects to be discussed in detail regarding what airplanes should be sent, ship movements, questions of supplies and so forth, he brought the whole of his staff to confer with practically the full staff of the Naval Section of the Imperial General Staff. Admiral KOGA had one or two meetings with the Chiefs of the Naval Staff and the Navy Ministers, but did not take any part or attend the staff discussions.

Q. What were the important high level decisions arrived at in these conferences?
A. The decision of primary importance made at that conference was the adoption in principle of Admiral KOGA's plan; namely, that we must absolutely hold the line of defense between the MARIANAS and West CAROLINES, and that the necessary defensive preparation for that must be completed by June. To that end it was decided to concentrate the whole of the naval strength in that region, also to bring in a new 31st Army composed of three divisions and to build necessary airfields and coastal defense works. I advanced the view that if we were to hold that line, it would be necessary to concentrate in that area not only the Navy's air force but also the full air force of the Army. Unfortunately, my contention was not accepted by the Army, but they agreed that they would hold themselves ready to give their support when subsequent developments should make such support necessary. I left TOKYO with the request that the Army's full air strength should also be concentrated in that area.

Q. What reasons did the Army advance for not giving full support to that plan?
A. I did not discuss this subject direct with the Army authorities. It was carried through the Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters, but the reason given was that since the Army was carrying on operations over such a wide flung front, they could not interrupt their operations on any of those fronts without seriously affecting subsequent developments. But should it develop that a decisive engagement was to take place in the CAROLINES and MARIANAS region, then they would come to the assistance with their air force. Actually, however, that assistance never came.

Q. I assume that the conferees received reports of the Task Force strikes on TRUK on 16 and 17 February. What was the nature of the reports they received at Headquarters?
A. Generally speaking, the feeling of the conferees when they got this news was that what they had anticipated had come to pass. In other words, there was no great surprise. One thing that hurt about the attack on TRUK was the fact that a combat corps, numbering 50 or 60 planes which, with a little more training, could be sent out to the front, was completely wiped out there. Although we lost a considerable number of supply ships in the harbor, that was not seriously felt because the routes on which they would subsequently have been employed were virtually cut off anyway. There was one other effect of this TRUK attack which might be mentioned, and that is, we had started strengthening the line of defense on the island beginning in 1944 and it was scheduled for completion by June. When we received this first attack we went to work in earnest to build up the defense, with the result that it was completed in about one month. Upon completion of the works around the middle of April, the local command informed the fleet that thereafter they would take care of themselves. What the outcome would have been if they received such an attack, I do not know.

Q. This strength then included some additional troops?
A. In addition to a slight increase in the number of naval personnel, one and a half Army divisions numbering about 30,000.

Q. Was that in January or February?
A. They trickled in, beginning January and finishing by the end of March, but the main strength, I believe, came early in February.

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Q. What, if any, decisions were made at the conference with respect to RABAUL?
A. The decision made at that time regarding RABAUL was the stand should be made and with the strength on hand, not to send any more reinforcements. In connection with that decision, there came a report from the Army and Navy senior officers in RABAUL that they felt that they could put up a good fight on their own in a conflict.

Q. On the arrival at PALAU at the end of February, what was the defensive strength there, and were any immediate steps taken at Admiral KOGA's initiation to improve the situation?
A. At that time, three decisions had been taken in TOKYO. The first was to increase the air strength. The First Air Fleet was organized and already training. That fleet was brought under Admiral KOGA's command, and was shortly to be sent to the MARIANAS. This southward movement began about 20 February and received attacks as soon as it got there. Second, to increase the Army strength in that region, principally by bringing reinforcements from the Chinese fronts. Thus was organized the 31st Army and its headquarters was soon established in the south. Necessary measures were taken for rushing material for construction of various defensive works, airfields, etc. The third decision was that local naval commanders should be appointed, all to operate under the CinC Central PACIFIC Area Fleet, who was Vice-Admiral NAGUMO. These newly appointed commanding officers arrived at the various southern points between the end of February and early part of March. As already suggested, the defenses in this region at the time of Admiral KOGA's arrival were extremely weak, owing to the fact that until that time this region had been looked upon as constituting the inner line.

Q. What were the effects, if any, of the Task Force strike on the MARIANAS on 22 February?
A. The newly-organized First Air Fleet began its southward movement on the 20th and was expected to arrive on the 22nd or 23rd, but owing to bad weather conditions only a part of it got away on schedule, so that the number which had arrived by the time of the Task Force attack was probably less than 100, including 18 fighters and the rest being medium land-based planes, reconnaissance planes, and bombers. As this attack occurred while our planes were in the course of their movement to the south, and were not expecting an attack, they were not able to put up a good fight, although they were considered to be crack units. Of this newly-trained fleet, approximately one-half of that number was lost, and since this took place when we were just commencing to strengthen our defenses there, the loss was a considerable blow.

Q. Were there any further changes in plan in consequence of this attack?
A. When Admiral KOGA proceeded to PALAU, he announced his decision to hold that line until death. You will recall that the decision of the Imperial General Headquarters was that it must absolutely be held; and Admiral KOGA's feeling was that should that line be lost, there would be no further chance for JAPAN. To that end, he chose two bases from which he would guide our operations. If the next strike should come north, he would command from SAIPAN. If the strike should be directed southward, he would command from DAVAO. Whichever the direction, he was determined to make his last stand and consequently to die at either SAIPAN or DAVAO in defending this line. One reason for choosing land bases from which to guide the operations was that there was a decision to change from a decisive naval engagement to an engagement in which land-based air forces would constitute the main strength, but with the fleet units cooperating as fully as possible.

Q. That concept being based to a large extent on the lack of air groups trained for operation from carriers?
A. Yes, that is exactly the reason for the change in plan. As I mentioned earlier, it took 6 months for training of carrier-based plane pilots, and it was not until May 1944 that replacements had been completed for the carriers that were first used in June. I do not exactly remember the date but, by that time, Admiral KOGA was already dead, and in this June engagement Admiral OZAWA was commanding.

Q. Were there any significant operations or events connected with the fleet during that last month of March and prior to the appearance of the Task Force?
A. I do not think that there was anything worth mentioning in the way of fleet operations at that time. We concentrated on strengthening the defense along that line.

Q. What directives were issued or what action was taken when the American Task Force was first picked up approaching PALAU near the end of March?
A. The first information regarding the approach of the Task Force was brought by scouting planes from TRUK on the 28th and repeated on the 29th, but since the number of reconnaissance planes was small, we could not learn from that source whether they had seen the whole Task Force or only a part. By noon of the 29th, we estimated that the Task Force attack would begin on the 30th; so all the ships, including merchant ships, were moved out and the Second Fleet was ordered to stand by ready for action. As already stated, we could not judge on the basis of information at hand whether this would be a repetition of earlier brief air attacks or if it was the beginning of a massive scale advance towards what we called the last line of defense; so the order was issued for each local commander to defend with such force as he had locally and to watch developments. Should the enemy thrust be concentrated in any one locality, the subsequent concentrations would be ordered.

Q. Briefly, what were the results and what were the effects of the Task Force strike on PALAU on 31 March?

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A. On the morning of the 30th, the situation suggested that we might have a Task Force attack on PALAU, and an air raid did take place on PALAU by part of the Task Force air force. Our scouting planes in the MARIANAS and West CAROLINES went out but reported that they saw nothing in the morning; but in the afternoon of that day, it was reported that a large transport group was proceeding westward from the ADMIRALTY Islands. We therefore estimated that no attack was intended against the MARIANAS, but rather against the Western CAROLINES, which would constitute the southern part of the area to which Admiral KOGA referred as the line of defense. In other words, that your Task Force might undertake a landing in Western NEW GUINEA. That estimate was furnished on the basis of two facts - that on the 30th a part of the Task Force which attacked PALAU kept on going westward, and that this large transport group was seen proceeding west from the ADMIRALTIES.

Q. What subsequently developed?
A. The measures adopted by Admiral KOGA to meet this new development were as follows: first, most of the fighter planes in the MARIANAS were moved to PALAU, but the attack planes were left behind because an attack could be made from that position. Second, Admiral OZAWA's training fleet - air fleet in SINGAPORE, was ordered to proceed to DAVAO by 2 April, because these planes, although not sufficiently trained for effective use in support of fleet operations, could be used from land bases. It was intended that from DAVAO these planes should proceed further south to be used against the landing anticipated in the western part of NEW GUINEA. Admiral KOGA himself, in pursuance of his plan to command and guide the operations from a central position in the southern area in case the next American thrust should be directed southward, went to DAVAO on the evening of 31 March, leaving the command in the MARIANAS and Western CAROLINES to Vice Admiral NAGUMO, CinC Central PACIFIC Fleet. It was in the course of this flight to DAVAO on the evening of the 31st that he met death in the air accident. Regarding the air combat and results, the majority of the planes that participated in the air combat belonged to the First Air Fleet, and as those planes had been fairly well-trained, Admiral KOGA himself placed considerable reliance on them, but as it turned out the results did not come up to his expectations. The fighters that were sent out from PALAU were virtually wiped out. The other planes were hardly more successful, and the anticipated landing in the south did not materialize, so that the operations upon which Admiral KOGA had staked his very life ended in utter failure.

Q. Describe briefly the arrangements for the movement of the staff, and the result of those flights.
A. The original plan was that Headquarters should be in SAIPAN in case the major American thrust should be in the region of the MARIANAS and Western CAROLINES, and in DAVAO in case of a thrust further south. Plans had been made as to where the planes and personnel should be obtained in both cases. Admiral KOGA decided, in view of the situation prevailing on the evening of the 30th, to move to DAVAO. For this trip three planes were called from SAIPAN, the first two arriving just after the air raid on PALAU had ended, the third coming somewhat delayed. The first two planes left on the evening of the 31st but both failed to reach their destination. One was lost in a storm at sea, the other crashed in the region of CEBU. The third, which was much delayed in departure actually took off about 0300 on the morning of the 31st, and was the only one arriving at its destination.

Q. What was the cause of the crash of the second?
A. I was on this second plane with 14 staff officers. The pilot was not able to discover CEBU itself, and when at a point about six miles south of CEBU, he decided to make an emergency landing at a small town there. As the moon had just gone down, the sudden darkness caused the pilot to misjudge the altitude and so crashed from an altitude of 50 meters. This sudden darkness plus the fact that the pilot was worn out, I believe, caused the crash. The exact time of this crash was 0200, 1 April.

Q. Departure having been made from PALAU at what time?
A. About 9 o'clock of the previous evening. Ordinarily, we should have arrived at DAVAO by midnight.

Q. And what were weather conditions en route?
A. On the way the plane encountered a low pressure area which we avoided by going to the right. The weather conditions in and around CEBU were excellent.

Q. And it was because of having circled to the north the extra distance that you were delayed, and caused the pilot to land at CEBU instead of proceeding to DAVAO?
A. I pointed out that we should proceed to MANILA, and when we started, we had sufficient fuel to make that distance. But as we tried on the way to make more than ordinary speed, there was heavy consumption of fuel, so that by the time we arrived at CEBU, we thought it was better to land there.

Q. The two planes departed about the same time and heard nothing about or from the first plane?
A. It was originally planned for the first and second planes to take off simultaneously and fly in formation. Just before taking off, there was an air raid alert, which later proved to be a false alarm, but that alert made us give up the idea of taking off together, and that was the last we saw of each other. We never got together again.

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Q. Will you state the results of the crash?
A. When I received the warning that an emergency landing would have to be made, I went forward in the plane and stated that I didn't think this was CEBU. I had been there before, but the pilot said this was it and that we would make an emergency landing. It was unfortunate that the Navigation Air Staff Officer aboard had become somewhat groggy from lack of oxygen because of the high altitude, and was not in a mental position to give a sound judgment. When the plane crashed, I sank and when I came up the gasoline on the surface of the sea was burning. Fortunately, I was outside of the burning area, and those who came up outside the burning area were saved. I swam for about eight and a half hours before being picked up. The others saved with me were Captain YAMAMOTO of the Staff, one warrant officer and eight petty officers and sailors. When I came to the surface, I luckily found a seat cushion which was afloat.

Q. This was a four-engined flying boat? Kawanishi?
A. Yes, Captain YAMAMOTO later joined the Surface Task Force as Operations Staff Officer, and I believe that Captain YAMAMOTO was lost with Admiral ITO in the operations shortly after the beginning of the OKINAWA Campaign. The others, all members of the plane crew, had come from SAIPAN and were returned there after the rescue. I believe that they were all lost at the time that we lost SAIPAN.

Q. Will you now relate your own movements from the point of the crash until you completed your sick leave?
A. The crash occurred around 0230 in the morning, and from where I had crashed, when it became daylight, I saw a chimney of the Asano Cement Plant, and hence felt it was in fairly safe territory. This cement plant was located about six miles south of CEBU. The actual position of the crash was 4 kilometers off-shore, we started to swim, but progress was slow because of the strong cross current. The young members of the crew, however, were much stronger and reached shore ahead of me. As I continued swimming shoreward, two or three canoes came out to me, but I hesitated to be taken on because I was not sure whether they were friends or enemies. I finally decided to take a chance and be rescued, since I had just about reached the limit of my physical strength. When I was taken ashore, I did not see any of the members of the crew, but there were five or six natives who immediately surrounded me and told me to follow them. I went with them into the mountains. The atmosphere there was such that I feared we would be killed, whether by sword or gun I could not say, but I had about given up hope. The situation was especially difficult as the English spoken was bad on both sides, and we had a hard time making out what the other was trying to say. It was late in the afternoon when we got there, and about three hours afterwards there arrived a native non-commissioned officer who spoke fairly good English, and who said: "We thought you had a pistol with you when you landed. What have you done with it?" He apparently wanted to get the pistol. I explained the circumstances of the trip and the accident. When they learned that, contrary to their belief, our plane had not come to attack the island or the natives, they made me wait several hours, and then suddenly their attitude changed. They offered to take me to a hospital, seeing that I was badly injured. I asked them what would be done with the others, Captain YAMAMOTO and the crew members. The reply was that they didn't know, but that they would probably follow me. I was placed on a simple, primitive stretcher, was carried through the mountains for seven days, and on the eighth day, which was 8 April, I was carried into a fairly good native home where there were two Filipino doctors and nurses to attend to me. I was in a very weakened condition with the wounds having festered, and running a fever of around 104°. Then there came to this home a Lieutenant-Colonel KOOSHING, who said that he had control of CEBU, and that as long as I was in his hands, I was safe. This Lieutenant-Colonel, who was a mining engineer, and who had been to JAPAN several times, where he had many Japanese friends, told me not to worry, but to stay there until I was well again, and supplied the other members with me with rice and other necessary provisions. One day, the Lieutenant-Colonel brought with him his wife and his child of about 10. The wife was a Filipino. The boy offered me some wafers which I ate, and seeing this they said: "If you can eat all that, you are getting much better." The lady made some coffee for me. All this while I was still abed and weak. At midnight of the 9th, KOOSHING came to me suddenly, saying that there had arrived some JAPANESE Army men to recover the party and they were causing trouble to the natives. He promised to release me and my party if I would send word to the Army that they should not kill or injure the natives. Captain YAMAMOTO sent a message through by KOOSHING, to which the Army apparently agreed, so that I was again placed on a stretcher and taken to CEBU. During all this time I was not subjected to questioning nor grilling. Apparently, they guessed that I was of a considerable rank, and KOOSHING used to address me as General. I did not think it necessary to correct him as to the title. Looking back on this experience, I believe that it was my miraculous luck that I was saved. The home where I was taken was in the mountains only about 10 kilometers back of CEBU. The distance which the natives said they could cover in one hour by foot, required twenty-four hours with the stretcher.

At CEBU I rested for two days, and a Staff Officer was sent from MANILA to take me back. I left CEBU on the 15th by plane for MANILA, and flew from MANILA to TOKYO on the 20th. At the time I arrived at TOKYO, I was still in such shape that I could not move about without assistance. It was not until the Staff Officer arrived from MANILA that I heard of Admiral KOGA's death. Until then, I thought that my plane was the only one that had been lost. It was believed in TOKYO that I had also been killed, and although they had received information regarding some Japanese who had crashed in the neighboring mountains, the truth was not

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learned at TOKYO until 12 April. My rescue by the Army force resulted not as a result of a search made by the Army on the basis of any information regarding my party, but because they happened to come there in the course of their periodical mopping up operations around the island. After submitting the report of the situation, it was decided that Admiral KOGA's death should be kept secret for the time being, and to guarantee the secrecy, I was assigned a house near the Togo Shrine and was told to rest up there. I was there from 20 April to 15 May. Meantime, Admiral TOYODA had been named KOGA's successor and Admiral KUSAKA as my successor. Gradually, however, the facts became known, so on the 13 May, I was told to return home, and on 15 June, I was assigned as CinC Second Air Fleet.

Q. What was the stated reason for the secrecy with respect to the death of Admiral KOGA?
A. I was more or less in confinement in this secret resident so I am not certain as to the exact reason for this secrecy. But I believe that the reasons was out of consideration for the effect which the information would have on the Allied side rather than from any consideration of the domestic reaction. In other words, they wanted to give the new Commander-in-Chief sufficient time in which to be able to exercise his command effectively over his fleet before the enemy should become aware that a change had been made.

Q. Admiral, will you give me a brief personal evaluation of Admiral KOGA as a Fleet Commander; what were his particular strengths or weaknesses?
A. I was a Section Chief at the time that Admiral KOGA was Deputy Chief in the Navy General Staff. This was for a period of about one and a half years. Through that association I know that Admiral KOGA was conservative and cool, particularly when compared with YAMAMOTO who was an extremely colorful officer. However, Admiral KOGA settled things in logical manner. From the very beginning, he insisted on the one decisive action, first with ships, and later with shore-based planes. Under the circumstances, this strategy seemed to be the only logical one. As a Commander-in-Chief of a great fleet, he was not up to YAMAMOTO's standard, as a matter of fact, it was said not only in Navy circles, but by all the people as well, that there could be only one YAMAMOTO and nobody could take his place. KOGA was quite strong willed. KOGA was very frank when alone with me, and remarked on occasion that Admiral YAMAMOTO died at exactly the right time and he envied him that fact. Admiral KOGA was a native of SAGA Prefecture and the tradition of the SAGA SAMURAI was that a fighter should select the time and place of his death, and the earlier in battle the better. In BUSHIDO, the way of the warrior is to die. Consequently, there is no question but that, in his decision to hold the last line of defense, he meant he was determined to die there, irrespective of the chances of success of the plan. Admiral KOGA took over just when the offensive stage was coming to a close and before preparations were made for the defensive stage and, hence, it was a very difficult period. He was waiting very anxiously for completion of the defensive preparations which was scheduled for June. I think that the order in which they were actually appointed - that is, YAMAMOTO, KOGA, TOYODA - was the appropriate order. In the sense that YAMAMOTO was by far the outstanding person, for the job; and that when the number one Admiral died, the man next fitted for the position was KOGA; and when he died, then the third man in order of fitness was TOYODA.

Q. Admiral KOGA had set up the MARIANAS-PALAU line as the last line of defense. What was your personal view of the position when the MARIANAS were occupied?
A. I personally agreed with him, not merely because I was under his orders, that the defense of this line was absolutely indispensable. Fighting to the last man night have been possible, but I felt certain that if this line once were broken, there would be no subsequent recovery of our defensive power. The original Japanese plan must have been to fight to the very last and so it actually ended. But my personal feeling all through was that if that line should be broken there would be no further chance of success. The loss of the MARIANAS ISLANDS was, therefore, a heavy spiritual blow to me. I had neither a plan for nor confidence in recovery of those islands. Though the loss of the MARIANAS was a spiritual blow to me, this does not mean that there was any decrease in my will to fight, for I had been determined from the beginning to fight until dead. It did mean, however, that after that loss I could see no chance for our success.

Q. What would have been your action at that point were you to have been in control? Would you have initiated steps for a negotiated peace, or what?
A. This is the first time that such a question has ever been put to me. The possibility of being in such a position never occurred to me before, and hence I am hardly prepared to give an answer. Being a soldier, I was determined to fight until dead; consequently, I believe, that as a Navy officer I would have continued the war. But if, as your question implies, I were to be given control even of political questions involved, then because the question has come so suddenly, I wouldn't venture to offer an answer. I can say, however, definitely, that my will to fight was not affected.

Q. In viewing that move across the PACIFIC, MARSHALLS-GILBERTS, through the MARIANAS, what was the principal reason that the Americans could accomplish that?
A. As Chief of Staff to Admiral KOGA who was interested in the defense of the MARIANAS-CAROLINES

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line, I was personally greatly worried lest the next American thrust be directed against the MARIANAS. Others thought that the next American thrust would be directed further south, more in the direction of the NEW GUINEA Area. Admiral KOGA, I think, was more or less in agreement with me; and for that reason he favored fleet operations from SAIPAN. American attack against MARIANAS would have been a heavy blow to us because of its being closer to the heart of JAPAN. One reason for my worry regarding this possibility was the fact that I did not have confidence in our ability to complete defense preparations by June, as scheduled. This doubt I based upon our past production performance. The determination to defend this line to the last, irrespective of chances of success, was well enough; but for the reason already stated, I felt that the chance of success was very poor. In addition to the probable failure to complete the defensive preparations by June, there was the fear that the Army air support might not come when needed. Moreover, I was afraid that the weakness of our defense along that line was known to you either through decoding of our messages or through reconnaissance, and I still have the feeling that you had the facts on the situation. At the time of the loss of the MARIANAS in June, general feeling was still prevailing that your main attack would be further south of PALAU to the NEW GUINEA region. Good indication of that trend of thought is to be found in the fact that even at the time when your attack on the MARIANAS began, the majority of our air strength had been concentrated down south. When the attack on the MARIANAS began, we had to try to bring the air strength northward in a great hurry.

Q. What was the reason for the concentrated interest on the south; what was the reason for the belief that the American effort would come there?
A. There appears to have been no sound basis for that view. Even those holding that view felt that the American Forces would proceed as far north as the MARIANAS in time. But since the regions further south would be easier to obtain, you would take the easiest first and then come northward step by step, each new step providing a new base for your next step. In other words, I think it was based more or less on wishful thinking. The reason for my taking the opposite view, namely, that a direct thrust would be undertaken against the MARIANAS, was that it would be the most effective step against JAPAN from a strategic standpoint, and in view of the strength you had, not impossible.

Q. What strength specifically is referred to?
A. I have in mind forces you had when taking the MARSHALLS Area in January, and I felt that if that force could be continued in the thrust against the MARIANAS it could not be successfully resisted by us since our fleet was without adequate carrier planes, hence we had no effective defense. In spite of this, the majority opinion, both in TOKYO and in the fleet, was that your next thrust would come further south. All of this, however, transported while I was on sick leave so I am not in a position to make very authoritative statements on the situation that prevailed at that time.

Q. You refer now to American naval strength, air strength, amphibious strength in this move west. Do you speak of long range planes? What is the principal strength referred to here?
A. In that statement, I did not mean the very forces which you used against MARSHALLS. What I meant was a force of similar proportions. Considered in the light of the relatively small objective, you brought a tremendous number of ships for that operation. The figure by you was far more than we had ever imagined. Moreover, you sent some 60,000 men. If you had brought a force of similar proportions against MARIANAS, it is certain that, with defense preparations having started only in March, successful resistance would have been impossible. In other words, such a force would have been overwhelming.

Q. You refer to the Striking Force ahead and the large Amphibious Force following behind - the combination of these things. Is it the form of that attack, the power of the Striking Force and the powerful Amphibious Force?
A. Personally, I put emphasis on the quantity rather than on the method employed.

Q. In view of the situation after the MARIANAS had been taken, what is your comment as to the necessity for the subsequent operations against PALAU which started in mid-September?
A. We looked upon your operation against PALAU as a step preparatory to the PHILIPPINES Operation, for use as an intermediate supply base. We did not believe that the step was indispensable as a step preparatory to the PHILIPPINES Operation. In other words, we believed that you could have carried out the PHILIPPINES Operation without the intermediate step. We had a force in PALAU to be sure, but we had no intention of an all-out defense of the island, nor of increasing its air force, nor of augmenting the number of ships there. We were, then, concentrating everything on the SHO-GO Operation which was to come next.

Q. Again looking at the operation from the MARSHALLS to the MARIANAS, do you think it would have been possible to defend that area wholly by the deployment of land-based air on the many islands; and if so, what numbers of aircraft would have been involved?
A. In order to defend that line by use of land-based planes alone, I think that it would have been necessary for us to maintain, constantly, at least three times the combined number of the carrier-based and land-based planes. For JAPAN, such a thing was out of the question. We might have managed to reach that proportion at some

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one time, but we could certainly not have maintained it for any length of time, especially in view of the fact that fighting had to be carried on under bad weather conditions and sometimes at night. In other words, we could not have defended that without strong support from fleet planes.

Early Stages of the War

Q. In the original concept at the beginning of the war, were the various forces given definite final objectives or merely limited objectives, with a view to subsequent orders depending on the progress of the campaign?
A. The original order given to Admiral YAMAMOTO by the Imperial General Headquarters contained two main parts: one, destruction of the enemy fleet; two, coordination with the Army in capturing, and gaining control of the southern areas. With regard to the first point, as in the case of the RUSSO-JAPANESE War when Admiral TOGO was ordered to destroy the RUSSIAN Fleet without any detailed instructions as to how or where that was to be done, steps and methods to be employed for the destruction of the enemy fleet were left to Admiral YAMAMOTO's discretion. He was to draw up the plan of operation by estimating the enemy strength in the light of the strength which he had available himself. As regards the second point, the Army, of course, was to carry out the work of occupation. The purpose of that was less strategic than economic and political, the object being principally to gain control of the raw materials in the south. The duty of the Navy in that connection was to support the Army effort both with its fleet and its land-based air force. Lest there be misunderstanding on the point, I wish to say that though Admiral YAMAMOTO was assigned this specific duty of planning and executing the destruction of the enemy fleet according to his own discretion, he could not activate any plan without the approval of the Imperial General Headquarters. I cannot recall that any line was fixed to designate the limits of ocean surface to be secured; I do recall, however, that lands to be occupied were definitely fixed.

Q. Initially, what was the farthest fixed position to which the advance in the north was limited?
A. In the north, the ALEUTIANS, including ATTU and KISKA, but I believe that DUTCH HARBOR was left to fleet discretion. In the south RABAUL was designated from the beginning; and the SOLOMONS and MIDWAY were added later.

Q. This would then be called the first established line - ATTU and KISKA (possibly DUTCH HARBOR), WAKE, RABAUL and so on west? We might accept that as a first line?
A. Yes, include the GILBERTS in that line. That was the first line for occupation but this did not restrict naval activity.

Q. Then the move into the Western ALEUTIANS in June 1942 was actually in completion of this initial plan, even though delayed somewhat?
A. I wish to make a correction, the question of including KISKA and ATTU in the original program was only considered, but it was not adopted at that time. It was added at the same time MIDWAY was brought into this line.

Q. In May 1942, Japanese forces were in the SOLOMONS. Was this the first move beyond the original line? If so, what was its intent?
A. I believe that this was the first instance in which we went beyond the original line, and that move was made, I believe, because the local command at RABAUL felt that the occupation of the SOLOMONS was essential to the maintenance of our hold on RABAUL which was a point on our original line.

Q. That, of course, was an Imperial General Staff decision?
A. Since that was in the nature of an addition to the regular duty already assigned to the fleet it must have been issued as an Imperial General Headquarters order; probably recommended by RABAUL, approved by Imperial General Headquarters and issued in the form of an order.

Q. What was the intention as to the extent of the advance in that direction?
A. Taking of RABAUL, in the first place, was a part of the Navy plan. At first there was one section of opinion which favored taking only as far as SHORTLAND, but later it was extended over the entire SOLOMONS. There was also another section favoring extension to NEW HEBRIDES with the object of cutting off communications between the UNITED STATES and AUSTRALIA, but the section that favored taking the whole SOLOMONS Group prevailed.

Q. Was there, at a later date, any further planned extension toward the southeast? Any attempted plan?
A. Yes, the idea was considered of taking NEW HEBRIDES and even of proceeding to AUSTRALIA, but those plans were never attempted or incorporated into an order.

Q. Who initiated the proposal to make an amphibious occupation of PORT MORESBY; was it primarily Army or Navy interest?
A. I don't remember the circumstances exactly, but believe it was probably the Navy; because in the operations centered about RABAUL, the Navy was taking the initiative in most cases. After RABAUL was taken and subsequent operations were extended it became more and more clear that a broad area would have to be occupied

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in order to secure RABAUL. Just exactly who made the original proposal, I do not know, but it is certain that the demand originated at RABAUL, probably on the Navy side, and was approved by Central Authorities. When the decision to take PORT MORESBY was made, the Army reaction to it was that it would be quite simply to occupy PORT MORESBY by a sea-borne operation.

Q. What was the effect of the Battle of the CORAL Sea on that operation, and what new plans were evolved?
A. My memory is rather hazy on this subject, also, but I believe that the results obtained in the CORAL SEA did not come up to the anticipations of the Central Authorities, as we had to pull out after a single engagement. It had been hoped that the result of this engagement would enable us to open up the situation there more advantageously. However, I don't believe that our authorities saw any need of changing subsequent plans as a result of the engagement in the CORAL SEA.

Q. Then the subsequent movement of the Army troops over the OWEN STANLEY Range was still primarily to serve the Navy's purpose; that is, a continuation of the Navy's insistence that PORT MORESBY was next?
A. It was not so much in pursuance of Navy plan as a joint plan, because, at that time, there was complete agreement between Army and Navy on the southward push. The Army thought that the mountains could be very easily crossed. Back of that thought was an erroneous impression on the part of the Japanese Army that the U.S. Army presented no serious problem; in other words, the Army estimated the U.S. Army much too lightly; that applies also to the Australian Army. Our Army learned this truth only after the reverses at GUADALCANAL and the SOLOMONS. This under-estimation of U.S. and Australian Armies led to the belief that even after we had lost GUADALCANAL, that that position could be easily recovered with perhaps as small a force as 500 crack troops. The same idea was behind the Army belief that the crossing of the OWEN STANLEY Range would be a simple operation.

Q. When was the decision reached to expand the perimeter to include MIDWAY, and what were the reasons therefor?
A. The taking of MIDWAY was a part of the fleet desire. From the outset, the fleet wanted to take MIDWAY even if subsequent developments caused its loss. I believe the idea originated with Admiral YAMAMOTO that the fleet wished to take it even if subsequent developments should necessitate giving it up again. The Imperial General Staff, however, was opposed to the idea at first because the disadvantages of holding MIDWAY, especially in the way of supply, would outweigh the advantages. It had always been a policy of the Japanese Navy to hold the fleet in waters relatively close to home to meet the enemy there in surface interception operations, the object being to engage the enemy in areas most advantageous for us. But as the operations in the first stage of the war were so successful as to even exceed expectations and as the fleet again submitted its plan for taking MIDWAY with details of the plan, especially with regard to the reasons for the necessity of taking it and the chances of success of the operation, the Imperial Staff at this time gave its support. The Army also fell in line and offered to send troops for occupation. As this was an addition to the original plan of operations it was issued as a new Imperial General Headquarters order. By way of summary, it might be stated the purpose of this operation for taking MIDWAY was to utilize it as a base for future advances, and at the same time to prevent its being used by the enemy as a base. The Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral NAGANO, had full confidence in Admiral YAMAMOTO's judgment, and was always willing to trust his judgment in respect to fleet operations. he appeared to have the feeling that if Admiral YAMAMOTO said that a certain plan promised success he would be willing to let Admiral YAMAMOTO proceed with its execution. While there was discussion of this plan between the fleet and authorities in the General Staff, what really led to Admiral NAGANO giving his final consent to the carrying out of this plan was the fact he always had full confidence in the CinC of the Fleet.

Q. About what date was the additional order issued?
A. I don't remember the exact date but believe it was just prior to commencement of the operation. Since the fleet had studied this operation very closely, they were in a position to put the plan into operation immediately once it was issued.

Q. You made a suggestion of further forward advances. Did the Naval General Staff act on its own initiative or did it receive from Admiral YAMAMOTO plans to go on beyond MIDWAY? If so, what was the nature of those plans?
A. It would probably be more accurate to say that one of the purposes for taking MIDWAY was to use it as a base for subsequent operations rather than for further advance. No doubt the fleet had been studying the possibility for further advances even to HAWAII, but doesn't appear to have been able to draw up a plan that would promise success, and the Imperial General Staff had been opposed from the beginning to extending the line too far. I am certain that there was no definite adoption of a plan, at that time, to go beyond MIDWAY. From some time prior to this, the Naval General Staff had been considering the question of operations toward HAWAII as a problem reserved for a subsequent time, a time when our fleet should have destroyed the American Fleet. However, the General Staff had not transmitted this idea to the fleet yet.

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Q. What were the effects of the Battle of MIDWAY, 4-6 June 1942, and what new plans, if any, were evolved directly as a result of that action?
A. The result of the MIDWAY engagement was a most serious blow to our Navy. Admiral YAMAMOTO's basic policy had been to engage the enemy in a decisive fleet engagement. He was at the same time an advocate of using air power, including the use of land-based air forces. In undertaking the capture of MIDWAY, he, no doubt, planned to use MIDWAY as a base for just such a fleet engagement; but as a result of this serious set-back at MIDWAY, he was probably forced to give up the hope of holding such a fleet engagement a great distance from home. The effect of the MIDWAY Battle was to greatly restrict the area in which such a fleet engagement could be carried out. The damage we suffered there was so great that the result was concealed from our own public. It is only now that the truth is coming out, and I believe it is giving rise to a considerable problem because of the previous concealment.

Q. The concealment was to avoid effects on civilian morale?
A. I believe that the real figures were concealed from everybody except those in the Imperial General Staff and the two service ministers; in other words, people who absolutely had to know the truth. The concealment from the rest of the nation was of course to prevent disappointment, loss of hope, etc. That is the purpose. It was domestic rather than exterior.

Q. It would appear that a loss so significant would require important changes in over-all plans; was that the case? What was the nature of the changes?
A. I believe that, heavy as this loss was, it did not cause any direct change in the basic policy of the Imperial General Staff which had left to the fleet the decision as to the manner and method which its duties were to be performed - said duties being destruction of the enemy fleet and occupation and control of the raw materials area in the south. As already stated, the MIDWAY Operation had the effect of greatly restricting the area in which the decisive engagement with the enemy fleet could be advantageously carried out. In other words, the result of the MIDWAY engagement was to force Admiral YAMAMOTO to the decision that this decisive battle would have to be fought in waters relatively close to home.

Q. Aside from operational plans, did the engagement result in changes in the building program of ships, or the relative weight given to aircraft production or the training program, principally in regard to air?
A. As a result of the setback at MIDWAY, there was no change in opinion as regards the necessity and importance of carriers. But as regards future changes in ship building, there arose a split of opinion. One school emphasized that we must have large numbers of carriers, even though they be of very simple construction, just a steel frame with a deck to serve as take-off runway being considered sufficient. One prominent advocate of this idea was the late Admiral ONOSHI. The other school emphasized the need of strengthening the armor, that carriers must be made less vulnerable against bombing. In the end, the latter school carried the day, and this led to conversion of carriers already in hand and to changes of design in future construction, the changes being aimed to strengthen the decks, to equip the holds with anti-fire facilities, etc. One other effect of the MIDWAY Operation was a change in surface strategy. Ever since the HAWAIIAN Operations at the beginning of the war, officers attached to task forces centered about carriers had the idea that such task forces could go anywhere with impunity. This school, therefore, received a serious setback and realized that such task forces were relatively vulnerable against land-based air forces (sic), and that engagement with such land-based air forces could not be successfully carried out unless with greater fleet strength.

Q. At this point, subsequent to the MIDWAY Operation, how would you define or indicate the spheres of influence or primary interest of the Army or of the Navy?
A. Very broadly speaking, the Navy's principal interest was in the east and there the whole naval strength and interest was concentrated. In that area, the Navy took the initiative even in land operations. That is not to say that the Army followed the Navy in those operations reluctantly; they came willingly enough. The Army was interested chiefly in the regions to the south and southwest. In those regions, the Army was interested principally in questions of military administration, which is connected up directly with the question of getting raw materials, etc. In fact, they appeared at times even to have forgotten the necessity of continuing the military operations. The reason for the Navy's interest and operations in the eastern area was to occupy that area and to use it as a base for operations against the enemy who, it was felt, would come to the southern area in time.

Q. Shortly before the GUADALCANAL landing, specifically about mid-July 1942, how would you divide Army and Navy interest in the RABAUL, SOLOMONS and NEW GUINEA Areas, if there can be a line of demarcation?
A. The plan of occupying that region came originally from the Navy. To this plan the Army agreed readily enough, and both sent reinforcements to strengthen their positions there. At first, there was no great difference in the degree of interest which the two services had, but there was a difference later in that the Navy thought that the region might become the position where the decisive engagements would take place. The Army, on the contrary, thought that this was but one small phase, at least until the loss of GUADALCANAL. After that time, however, the Army realized its mistake, but it was never as consistent as the Navy in sending reinforcements

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to strengthen the positions. The Army General Staff appears to have been of the opinion, for much the same reasons as the Navy, that this region was a very important one, but the Army Department objected to the view from the standpoint of difficulty in sending armaments and supplies, and for this reason there wasn't a constant flow to that region from the Army. I believe that an agreement was made in TOKYO, probably after the loss of GUADALCANAL, that in NEW GUINEA the Army should be the mainstay and in the SOLOMONS the Navy.

Q. Why did the Naval General Staff feel that the general areas of NEW GUINEA and the SOLOMONS would be the location of decisive operations?
A. The GUADALCANAL Operation marked the first Allied counter-thrust against territories which we had occupied, and the Navy felt that that counter-thrust must not be allowed to succeed, because should the Americans succeed they would gain confidence and continue pushing against other areas which we had occupied. In order to prevent such a development, the Navy was willing to stake everything on a decisive fight in that area. It was in that sense the idea generally had the support of the Army General Staff; the difficulty, as already stated, arose from the Army Department.

Q. When the landings were first made on GUADALCANAL, 7 August, what specifically was the re-estimate of the situation in TOKYO as to immediate American plans?
A. Since the landing at GUADALCANAL gave you the first base for the Allied counter-thrust against JAPAN, we thought that, with that as the first base, you would begin operations to retake all of the region centered about RABAUL, and this is exactly the direction the subsequent operations did proceed. When the landing began at GUADALCANAL, the Navy section of the Imperial General Headquarters insisted strongly that all of the three battalions of naval forces then stationed at RABAUL should be sent at once to support the troops at GUADALCANAL. The Army, however, said no, that since they happened to have crack units at that time who were on their way from JAVA to JAPAN, these could be sent there instead, and this was done. I still believe that we should have attempted the other plan of sending the three battalions from RABAUL. The reason for my still thinking that we made a mistake in not sending the naval force from RABAUL which were not very strong units, while those which were on their way home from JAVA were crack troops, is that it had been my experience in CHINA that when troops were on their way home after completion of fighting, their morale was inclined to be reduced, and I felt the same way about the so called crack troops on their way home from JAVA. They might have been good while the fighting was going on, but when the fight was over, there is bound to be a let down in spirit. The Army had planned to send these troops back to JAPAN because of the Army view that the beginning of the occupation marked the completion of the fighting; after that time, it was simply a question of maintaining order and military administration.

Q. About three weeks after the initial landing on GUADALCANAL, on 26 August, Japanese forces landed at MILNE Bay; was that a diversionary effort associated with the defense of GUADALCANAL, or did it have any other relationship?
A. Perhaps not entirely disconnected with the GUADALCANAL Operation, but I don't think there was any diversionary purpose involved. The direct reason for the MILNE Bay landing was to gain a base necessary in the NEW GUINEA Operations. It was felt that the Allied forces would come along the hump and we needed a base to prevent operations along that hump.

Q. On 17 August 1942, American naval forces made a raid on MAKIN Island from a submarine. Did the staff attach any significance to that operation?
A. We didn't attach much importance to it because it wasn't very significant, merely an attempt from submarines to destroy land equipment.

Q. In the SOLOMONS Campaign, subsequent to the landing on 7 August, there was a long series of surface engagements and air operations extending over a period of the next four or five months. I would like your comment as to the point in which air operations were so favorable or unfavorable that they required a change in basic plans here in TOKYO.
A. The change in plan in that region was made after the failure of our second attempt to recover GUADALCANAL sometime in October, I don't remember the exact date. Until that time, the Army was very confident. As you will recall, when the first attempt was made with the troops on their way back from JAVA, it proved to be an utter failure. The Army attributed that failure to lack of numbers; so when the second attempt was made, it was decided to increase the number of troops. Both the Army and Navy hoped this time to succeed in recovering GUADALCANAL, but that again proved a complete failure. It was then decided to abandon GUADALCANAL, and we had great difficulty in withdrawing our remaining forces there.

Q. What was the principal reason as reported to TOKYO, for the difficulty in withdrawing troops?
A. The principal difficulty came from the fact that your established air bases on the island had interfered with our shipping, transports, etc., and prevented our sending food and supplies to the troops until such a time as they could be placed on transports. Added to that, there was occasional activity on the part of your surface units interfering

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with our shipping. The problem of sending provisions there was so difficult at times that we used submarines for the purpose. I look back upon the SOLOMONS fight with great regret today; I regret that the Navy allowed itself to be drawn along by the Army in the belief that GUADALCANAL could be easily recaptured by Army troops; and that after the failure of the first effort, we allowed ourselves to be dragged deeper and deeper into the mire and to lose forces which we needed badly in other operations later on. One serious blow to the Navy was loss of many destroyers there.

Q. Looking back at the whole RABAUL-SOLOMONS Campaign, until after RABAUL had been by-passed, what is the significance of that operation in connection with the whole Japanese war operations; how vital was it to your war effort?
A. If we had put into the SOLOMONS Campaign, from the very beginning, the large forces which we actually lost by the end of the campaign, I believe it would have been far more successful. Even had we not been able to retain that area, we could, in losing it, have inflicted very great damage against the enemy. The sending of our troops little by little was extremely poor tactics. We had an agreement between the Army and Navy on broad general principals, but had difficulty in getting together on details. Compared with the small results obtained in this campaign, our losses were extremely heavy, and the effect of this loss was felt in the subsequent stage of the war; namely, the second phase when Admiral KOGA came into the picture, the period when our preparations, equipment, etc. were probably at the lowest level, that low level having been reached as a result of the failure in the SOLOMONS.

Q. Was there any particular significance in the NEW GUINEA Operations which were proceeding concurrently?
A. It had been decided that the Army should take the lead in the NEW GUINEA Operations, but after a certain period the Army decided to discontinue sending reinforcements and let those who were already there fight it out. Consequently, the remaining troops had a very bad time of it. The total loss as compared with the complete strength of the Army was, of course, not significant, and the Navy while engaged principally in the SOLOMONS Operations did extend some support to the Army operations in NEW GUINEA. The morale effect of the NEW GUINEA Operations was to disillusion the Army regarding the weakness of the American and Australian troops. However, I do not believe that the effect of this operation in the entire war picture was very significant.

Q. What was the approximate date when responsibility was defined as to the Army in NEW GUINEA and the Navy in the SOLOMONS?
A. I don't remember the exact time, but believe it was just after the loss of GUADALCANAL.

Q. When was the Army decision made to cease support of the NEW GUINEA Operations?
A. I don't remember the date even approximately; it may have been around May or June 1943. The reason for that decision was that the situation in the eastern part of NEW GUINEA was becoming more and more disadvantageous to us. The operations around MORESBY were increasing in difficulty with the result that our forces were continually withdrawing, and this withdrawal coming like an avalanche could not be effectively stopped by sending new forces. Therefore, the Imperial General Headquarters decided that the operations in Eastern NEW GUINEA should be continued by the troops who were already there, and that our effort on the island would thereafter be concentrated on the western half of the island where new forces would be sent.

Q. Looking back on the war as a whole, were the operations in the ALEUTIANS, from beginning to end, of any significance in their effect on the net result?
A. I believe that it can be said definitely that the northern operations were not of much significance in the light of the entire war.

Q. Correspondingly with respect to the Army operations in CHINA; by this I mean subsequent to the initiation of the war and occupation of preliminary positions?
A. The continuation of the Army operations in CHINA meant that a very large force was drawn into that territory, and, hence, this was distinctly disadvantageous from the standpoint of the war in the PACIFIC. The effect was that the Army was set deeper and deeper into the mire; hence, the CHINA War should not have been started in the first place. Looking at it from another angle, it might be said that the fact that we got dragged deeper and deeper into the mire might be cited as one cause for the PACIFIC War.

Q. What, if any, significance could be attached to the military operations in the southern resources area after the initial occupation, significance to the ultimate result of the war?
A. I would point to the BURMA Operations, which also proved to be a failure, as having considerable effect upon the entire war. The Army undertook the BURMA Operation with the idea of protecting CHINA, French INDO-CHINA and SIAM from the flank. It was a continuance of the operations in CHINA, and ending as it did in failure, I believe that its effect on the entire war effort was considerable.

Q. What effect did the Army operations in MANCHURIA, or the Army occupation in MANCHURIA have, if any?

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A. Because of the need of guarding against Soviet RUSSIA, we had always kept stationed our best troops, both land and air, in MANCHURIA. As need arose for new forces in the various southern areas, these crack troops were taken out of MANCHURIA and sent to those southern regions, being replaced in MANCHURIA by new men with the idea of maintaining a constant number in the north against RUSSIA. If those crack troops could have been employed in the southern areas from the start, we could certainly have fought this war far more advantageously even though we might not have been winners in the end. Therefore, the occupation of MANCHURIA by the Army throughout the period of this war had an effect of considerable importance upon the war.

Q. What would you say was the decisive theater of the war and why?
A. The general area in the PACIFIC where the naval engagements between the Japanese Navy and American Navy were fought, and of that area and operation I would point to SAIPAN in particular.

Q. What were the decisive forces in the war?
A. If I were to give the decisive factors and the order of their importance, I would place first, the Air Force; second, Surface Force; third, land forces. That is not to say you could drop out any one of them. They must all be there in that order.

Q. With respect to air, what particular employment throughout the period of the war was decisive?
A. I would place long-range bombing and with it attacking planes as the most important aspect of the air force. I draw the analogy of fleet gunnery - the ship whose guns have the longest range always enjoys a definite advantage over a vessel which has shorter range. In fleet engagements it is not always possible to take that advantage, but in case of the air force, the side that has the longest range bombers is in a position to strike at the heart of the enemy country without itself being bombed. By advancing little by little they can always reach a point where bombing of the home country will be possible. Throughout the war neither JAPAN nor GERMANY was able to bomb your country once. On the contrary, you did that at will against both countries because of the longer range of your attacking planes.

Q. To clarify the long-range bomber and the attack planes, you don't mean that they bombed JAPAN from the United States? Please clarify the attacking planes.
A. By attack planes I mean attack planes of any kind, because even short-range attack planes, by moving up the bases toward the enemy, can reach the enemy country and can be used effectively. In a little more detail, I think that dive-bombing is not so important now and for the future, since you have developed facilities for finding a target. It would be advantageous to use bigger and more bombs; in other words, planes of large capacity. I think that horizontal-bombing serves the purpose and that dive-bombing is not essential.

Q. At the time of the occupation of the MARIANAS, had JAPAN been seriously affected by long-range bombing; and if so, when?
A. The only raids of any importance prior to the occupation of MARIANAS were the raids against YAWATA, OMURA and NAGASAKI from continental CHINA.

Q. Earlier you spoke of the principal theater of the war as being in the PACIFIC, and we progressed by stages to the breaking of the final defense line, MARIANAS and PALAU. How do you associate that with long-range bombing?
A. In the earlier stages of the war, B-17's proved most effective, since by their constant scouting and search they disrupted our communication during the NEW GUINEA and SOLOMONS Operations, even more so than did your submarines. That period was followed by one in which the B-24's played a similar part, perhaps to even greater degree. Then came the attackers. Finally, the kind which proved most effective and most to be feared were the B-29's because of their long range and large bomb carrying capacity. This is sort of a chronological order throughout the period. I feel that the most effective part of the air force was that provided by your Task Force carriers, because their attack could be moved about at will with the movement of the Task Force.

Q. Was that throughout the entire period of the war?
A. Yes, covering the entire period of the war, I think the Task Forces were most effective. The reason for placing Task Forces in top position is that their attacks came oftener, planes came in greater numbers and obtained some results in addition to that of destruction by bombing.

Q. What do you mean in addition to that of destruction by bombing?
A. By other results, I mean that in addition to bombing, which is of course most effective, a Task Force carries fighters which strafe with machine guns and engage in dog-fights to down our planes; also, it has artillery fire from ship's guns.

Q. You have several times mentioned phases of the war. How do you divide the war into phases?
A. This division into phases was an arbitrary one adopted merely for sake of convenience. However, such a division had always been contemplated and was always in the minds of the Navy General Staff from earlier years. The first phase operation was the occupation of the raw materials area to the south. The second phase was after

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the change from offensive in taking this area to the defensive of the occupied area. In addition, the fleet attempted a third phase which covered the period between the two already mentioned; namely, the period of stabilization of the occupied area immediately after occupation and prior to the beginning of the defensive operations. So the actual order became: first phase - occupation, second phase - stabilization, third phase - defensive. Admiral YAMAMOTO commanded the fleet through the first phase and the early part of the second phase, Admiral KOGA was in command through the latter part of the second phase and the early part of the third phase, and Admiral TOYODA followed through the last part of the third phase.

Q. What in your opinion was the turning point of the war, that is, when operations began going against you?
A. I think the first big turning point was MIDWAY, and the second the loss of GUADALCANAL. After that we were on the defensive.

Q. At what point would you say that the chance of ultimate success was definitely doubtful; in other words, what was the critical point when the possibility of success was limited.
A. I felt definitely that there was no chance of ultimate success when we lost the MARIANAS in June 1944. I, along with most naval officers, felt all along that final success was extremely difficult. That is why we were all determined to fight to the last; irrespective of the chances for success. As stated so many times, such was the spirit in which we carried out the operations in the SOLOMONS, NEW GUINEA and any areas to the south; but with the loss of the MARIANAS last June, I felt that the last chance had slipped from us definitely. The fact that I realized that, however, does not mean that it had any effect upon our determination or will to fight.

Q. I would like a brief comment on the results and effectiveness of the American submarine campaign.
A. One very serious mistake we had made with regard to the allied submarine was that we had long considered that our submarines, including personnel, training, etc., were the best in the world. That opinion was held not only by submarine officers but by other officers as well. Owing to the relatively small number of submarines, it was, of course, not expected that they should take the principal role in naval operations. They would still be auxiliary, but we thought they would prove a far more effective weapon than they were. The actual developments were a very big disappointment. On the other hand, we had looked very lightly upon the Allied submarines. The reason for that view was that, apart from JAPAN, GERMANY was the only power which relied heavily on submarines, and even GERMANY used them principally against shipping. So we thought that the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN would use their submarines against our shipping in cutting off communication lines and, hence, they were not likely to prove very serious, although we did not lose sight of the fact that, because of the relatively large number that you had, they could do considerable damage against shipping. In other words, we had over-estimated our submarines, and under-estimated the Allied submarines. The principal reason for the failure of our submarines to come up to expectations was probably the inferiority in armament, equipment, experience, and electronic equipment. It must be stated as a fact that the results obtained by your submarines against our naval craft and against our shipping far exceeded anything we had expected, and it served to weaken our fighting strength and to speed up the termination of hostilities, though to what extent, I am not prepared to say.

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Interrogation NAV NO. 116
USSBS NO. 601

JAPANESE LAND-BASED AIR OPERATIONS - CELEBES AND RABAUL AREA

TOKYO 28 November 1945

Interrogation of: Commander NOMURA, Ryosuke, IJN (Ret.); Staff Air Operations officer of the 23rd Air Flotilla during the Japanese occupation of the CELEBES; with the Eleventh Air Fleet at RABAUL from November 1942 until July 1943.

Interrogator: Commander T.H. Moorer, USN.

SUMMARY

Commander NOMURA discusses air operations during the invasion of the CELEBES and during the RABAUL Campaign. General information is furnished relative to movement of air units, aircraft losses, pilot morale and other operational difficulties.

NARRATIVE
Celebes

The 23rd Air Flotilla, attached to the Eleventh Air Fleet, was based at TAKAO on 8 December 1941. Two fighter groups (110 planes) and one bomber group (50 planes) were assigned the 23rd Air Flotilla. The primary mission of the Eleventh Air Fleet at the outbreak of war was to totally destroy the American Air Force in the PHILIPPINES. It was planned for the 21st Air Flotilla to attack CAVITE and furnish air protection for FORMOSA, and for the 23rd Air Flotilla to attack CLARK Field and destroy American aircraft on the ground by a surprise attack. In order to effect surprise, the take-off from TAKAO was scheduled for sunrise, but due to a heavy fog on the morning of 8 December, it was delayed until 1015. Because of the delay, it was greatly feared that the American aircraft would initiate the first attack. This fear was increased at 0800 when an enemy broadcast was intercepted indicating that an attack was being considered and that the B-17's would arrive over FORMOSA at 1010. At 1010, a Japanese Army plane falsely reported the approach of B-17's and, expecting the worst, the Japanese donned gas masks and otherwise prepared for the attack. Immediately thereafter, all Japanese aircraft were launched and proceeded to the PHILIPPINES to attack as originally planned. They were greatly surprised to find the American aircraft lined up on the field, and proceeded with the attacks which destroyed an estimated 45 bombers and 5 fighters.

After this initial success the Eleventh Air Fleet continued their strikes on the American Air Forces. Within three days the American resistance began to decrease, and by 18 December resistance had virtually disappeared.

On 26 December, the 23rd Air Flotilla moved to JOLO and established a fighter base in preparation for the Japanese push along the east coast of BORNEO into JAVA. On the same day, the Japanese transports were attacked by an estimated six American flying-boats, which were intercepted by fighters whose pilots reported one PBY destroyed and three heavily damaged. The PBY that was shot down fell in the water close to the docks and sank immediately. No bodies of the crew were recovered. (Note: Commander NOMURA is undoubtedly referring to an attack by PBY-4's of Patrol Wing Ten, operating from AMBON. It is probable that the plane which fell near the docks was that of the flight leader, Lieutenant Hastings, USN, class of 1933, now missing in action).

The Japanese ships at JOLO received no serious damage.

As the Japanese continued to move south, the 23rd Air Flotilla established fighter bases at TARAKAN, BALIKPAPAN, BALI and KOEPANG, in that order, while the bombers were established at KENDARI, MAKASSAR and BALIKPAPAN. At the same time, the 21st Air Flotilla operated east of the CELEBES from bases at MENADO, KENDARI, AMBON, and KOEPANG.

During the invasion of the PHILIPPINES and DUTCH EAST INDIES, the greatest combat losses were suffered during engagements with the B-17's equipped with high powered tail guns. Out of 160 planes, 88 were lost by the 23rd Air Flotilla by 1 March 1942. Combat losses accounted for 20%, 30% were worn out and scrapped, and the remaining 50% were operational losses; mainly, because of very poor runways. A total of 40 replacements were received from FORMOSA during the operation.

It is the opinion of Commander NOMURA that the outstanding weakness evident during the Japanese Naval land based air operations was that of aircraft logistics. The supply system was too slow and failed completely to meet the needs of fast moving air operations. In addition the supply officers were old narrow thinking and

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incompetent and even after learning a bitter lesson in the first months of the war they seemed incapable of effecting the necessary reorganization of the supply system.

RABAUL

The Naval land-based aircraft losses in the RABAUL-SOLOMONS-NEW GUINEA Areas were extremely high and finally resulted in the destruction of the cream of the Naval Air Forces. The high losses are attributed in the order named to: (1) Superiority of American fighter aircraft; (2) Breakdown of Japanese aircraft supply system; (3) Inability of the Japanese to replace experienced pilots and maintenance personnel.

As a result of the high losses the absence of a pilot rotation system and the withdrawal from GUADALCANAL the morale of the Japanese pilots rapidly declined after February 1943. On several occasions the pilots were guilty of gross exaggeration of damage inflicted and finally it was necessary to station watches at several points in order to verify pilot reports. Although these exaggerated reports were not used as a basis for planning they were given to the press who was encouraged by the Commander of the Eleventh Air Fleet to give the reports wide publicity. The pilots continually discussed the relative merits of the Japanese and American aircraft and were convinced in their own mind that they were flying greatly inferior aircraft. In the words of Commander NOMURA the Japanese pilots "had a horror of American fighters". It was generally considered that the Zero fighter was about equal to the P-40 and F4F but no match for the F4U and the F6F which they particularly disliked. An attempt was made to supply recreational facilities but lack of motor transport prevented full use of the rest camps available.

After the heavy losses in January 1943 about 45 VF and 60 VB carrier pilots from the Third Fleet were ordered to RABAUL to operate from land bases. About 30% of these pilots were killed before they were withdrawn to TRUK in April 1943.

In regard to air operations over the KYUSHU Area Commander NOMURA furnished the following information.

(1) The U.S. Navy pilots were superior in skill and daring to the U.S. Army pilots but the P-51 was considered the best fighter, particularly at high altitude.

(2) A very large part of the U.S. Army and Navy fighter effort was expended on decoy aircraft which were present at the ratio of 4 to 1.

(3) The B-29 strikes on KYUSHU fields, along with carrier fighter sweeps and night heckler missions, seriously interfered with Kamikaze attacks against OKINAWA.

(4) On the morning of 15 August, Vice Admiral UGAKI, Commander of the Fifth Air Fleet, led a Special Attack Force against U.S. transports at OKINAWA - results unknown.

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Interrogation NAV NO. 117
USSBS NO. 602

JAPANESE NAVAL AIR FORCE TRAINING

TOKYO 28 November 1945

Interrogation of: Commander TERAI, Yoshimori, IJN; served at the Japanese Navy Department and Naval General Staff from June 1942 to end of the war.

Interrogated by: Lt. Cmdr. R.P. AIKIN, USNR.

SUMMARY

Commander TERAI explained the various phases of the Japanese Naval Air Force training program before the war and the changes which were made subsequently. Elimination of the advanced combat training phase by certain candidates, during the summer and fall of 1943, has heretofore been erroneously attributed to an anticipated shortage of aviation gasoline by the High Command. No shortage of avgas then existed or was immediately expected according to Commander TERAI, who stated that when First Air Fleet was being organized, in the early summer of 1943, the Commander in Chief preferred to give his air personnel combat training under his own supervision. Therefore, those assigned to First Air Fleet (about 20% of the candidates completing elementary, intermendiate [sic] training) skipped advanced combat training and were assigned directly to operational units of First Air Fleet. This policy was abandoned early the following year, principally because operational losses were excessive, and the advanced combat training phase was restored.

TRANSCRIPT

Until December 1940, the Japanese Naval Air Force training program consisted of the following phases:

1. Elementary or basic training for 30 hours in Type-3 trainers or Type-90 seaplane trainers. Following completion, candidates went to:
2. Intermediate training using Type-90 land trainers and Type-93 (WILLOW). After 40 hours, trainees moved to:
3. Advanced combat training where combat and obsolete combat type aircraft were employed. 30 hours flight time in ZEKES, CLAUDES, KATES, VALS, ALFS, PETES, and NELLS was required before candidates were assigned to:
4. Operational units. If selected for shipborne air groups, personnel had another 50 hours training before leaving operational units.

In December 1940, elementary and intermediate training were combined but total flight time of the two reduced by 10 hours.

When First Air Fleet was being organized during the last half of 1943, approximately 20% of those completing elementary/intermediate training were transferred directly to operational units under that command, skipping the advanced combat training phase. Those selected were the most promising candidates. CinC First Air Fleet preferred to have those assigned to his command trained in combat type aircraft directly under his supervision, believing that this would result ultimately in a better trained and integrated organization. Frequently crews "got into bad habits" during advanced combat training and the CinC First Air Fleet wanted to avoid this.

In the spring of 1944 the "skipping" of advanced combat training was stopped by the Naval General Staff and restored for all trainees because, (1) operational losses were excessive, (2) the longer period of training in the newer combat type planes consumed more aviation gasoline than training in the less modern aircraft assigned to advanced combat training units and (3) tactical units were then beginning to employ new plane types such as GEORGE, JILL, JUDY, MYRT, and FRANCES which were "too hot" for any but experienced pilots to fly.

Until the conclusion of the MARIANAS Campaign, training commands used aviation gasoline without restriction as to quantity. Subsequently, in anticipation of future shortages, Naval General Staff allocated aviation gasoline for training purposes to Combined Fleet which in turn distributed it among the training commands. Monthly allocations were in gradually diminishing amounts. Commander TERAI described the aviation gasoline position with respect to training as "acute" by late autumn 1944. At the end of the war the critical shortage of aviation gasoline had reduced training time to 15 hours monthly.

Commander TERAI was of the opinion that the Japanese Army Air Force commenced reducing aviation gasoline for training purposes earlier than the Navy, probably during the spring of 1944. The JAAF began to accumulate aviation gasoline stocks in CHINA, MANCHURIA and JAPAN at that time.

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Interrogation NAV NO. 118
USSBS NO. 606

ALEUTIAN CAMPAIGN
JAPANESE SECOND MOBILE FORCE AND THE KISKA GARRISON

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 20 December 1945

Interrogation of: Lieutenant (j.g.) Wylie M. HUNT, USNR; co-pilot of a Navy PBY search plane on patrol southwest of DUTCH HARBOR on the day of the first Japanese carrier raid. He and two crew members were rescued from a life raft by the Japanese heavy cruiser TAKAO after his plane was shot down by the raiding force's carrier fighter cover.
William C. HOUSE, AerM1/c USN; senior petty officer in charge of the U.S. Aerological Detail, KISKA Island. HOUSE stayed in hiding in the hills of KISKA for about SO days until forced by hunger and cold to give himself up. He remained on the island until 20 September 1942.

Interrogated by: Captain J.S. RUSSELL, USN.

SUMMARY

The movements of the Japanese Second Mobile Force which attacked DUTCH HARBOR are generally confirmed as is the Japanese lack of intelligence on airfields in the vicinity of DUTCH HARBOR. In the second interrogation some dates, times, units and operations of the Japanese KISKA occupation force are given together with an impression of early U.S. bombing and the Japanese casualties they incurred.

TRANSCRIPT

Lieut. (jg) HUNT

Q. Will you please tell us in your own words the story of your scouting mission from UMNAK on the morning of 3 June 1942?
A. Our take off time was 0300 on 3 June, course approximately 210°, ground speed about 130 knots; heavy overcast, squalls and light rain. We flew until about 0500 at which time we were attacked by Japanese fighter planes covering a carrier of an attacking force. We were searching by radar and had had no indication of the enemy's presence before the attack. Our starboard engine was shot out in the first attack and our plane set on fire. We were flying at about 1,000 ft., overcast at about 1500 ft. Several fighters made one pass apiece at us. Our course was approximately down wind, but a turn was made and we landed into the wind. The pilot Lieut. (jg) CUSICK received one bullet through his arm. He and the enlisted pilot made the landing. The bow hatch and the tunnel hatch were both open and we did not have time to close them before landing. As a result, immediately upon landing, the plane began to fill rapidly with water and sank a very few minutes after landing. We estimated our position to be 200 miles, bearing 210° from UMNAK Field. The plane captain and the remainder of the crew got out the large seven man life raft and attempted to launch this raft. I stopped and picked up the small two man life raft and launched it. I then assisted the first pilot away from the burning plane and into the raft. After we were aboard the raft, we saw that the crew were having trouble getting the large raft launched. In the small raft, besides Lieut. (jg) CUSICK and myself, were BROWN S1c, third mechanic of the plane and CREAMER AOM3c, gunner. The large raft had bullet holes in it and would not float so two more men swam over and hung on to the side of the two man raft. These men were the plane captain, SILER, and the enlisted pilot, MORRISON. SILER stayed with our raft for a few minutes and then, seeing the large raft still afloat, swam back to it and tried once again to make it seaworthy. He was unable to do so and as we were drifting quite rapidly with the high wind, he was unable to reach us again. MORRISON remained holding to the side of the raft for approximately one hour before he died of exposure. Lieut. (jg) CUSICK died from his wound and the cold about one hour after MORRISON. The three of us left in the raft drifted for approximately five hours more, until about noon, at which time we were sighted by a Japanese cruiser operating with the attacking force.

It steamed over and picked us up. (Note: Although not established by Lieut. (jg) HUNT, this was the heavy cruiser TAKAO). The cruiser which picked us up, I recognized as a heavy cruiser with five turrets.

The three of us were in pretty bad shape at the time we were picked up due to the cold. BROWN was almost unconscious in the water. The Japs threw a line down, which CREAMER secured around BROWN's waist and the latter was hauled up to the deck of the cruiser by the Japanese crew. CREAMER and I made our own way up a steel ladder which they lowered to us. I was able to get up the ladder until my waist was even with the deck and then couldn't get any further. As soon as we were aboard ship, we were given a hot bath. Our clothing was removed and kept and we were dressed in Japanese clothing. We were then taken below deck. We were given hot

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food and drink (hot saki and hot milk). A doctor examined each of us. We were then given blankets and a place to lie down. Our compartment below deck was fairly large sized with a partition in the center. We were kept apart with three guards standing continuous watch so that we could not talk to one another. I was kept on one side of the partition and the two enlisted men on the other, who were themselves separated by a canvas partition. The two crew members were then allowed to go to sleep. I was permitted to rest for about an hour, at the end of which time three Japanese officers came down and began asking me questions. At this time they were particularly interested in knowing how many planes we had in the DUTCH HARBOR Area, how many ships and of what class there were in the vicinity, whether or not we had advance notice of their coming, and the location of dispersal points for the planes in the area. I had been in the DUTCH HARBOR Area for a period of only about one week and pleaded ignorance to all the questions they asked. This interrogation lasted for about three hours. I was then permitted to go to sleep, but was awakened again about 1900 for another seige of about the same duration and covering the same subjects. The following day, questions were repeated through most of the day.

On the third day, I was left alone until shortly after noon. At this time, a Japanese lieutenant commander aviator came down and began asking me questions. He told me that he was from one of the aircraft carriers and that he had participated in both of the attacks upon DUTCH HARBOR. I gathered from his conversation that he had been in the flight which was jumped by Army fighters over UMNAK. He appeared to be enraged over this. He started out by cuffing me about the head several times with his fists and striking me with a stick he carried. He then told me that I must tell where the Army planes which had attacked them that morning were coming from. I insisted I did not know, that I did not know the Army had a landing strip in the DUTCH HARBOR Area. He persisted in his questions and abuses for about thirty minutes. He then left and a short time later some of the ship's officers came down and took the two enlisted men of my plane crew, who had been in the room with me, away to some other part of the ship.

They then tied me down in a chair with a rope about my neck and with two Japanese sailors with fixed bayonets standing on either side, they handed me a slip of paper with three questions written On it. The first question was: How many Fighter Planes are there in the DUTCH HARBOR Area and where are they based? Second question: What is the strength of the American Surface Units in the DUTCH HARBOR Area? Third question: How many patrol planes are there in the DUTCH HARBOR Area and where are the dispersal bases at which they are kept? I was told that I must answer these questions or be killed. I answered that I could not tell them the answers to these questions as I did not know. I was then untied, blind-folded, and taken up on the weather deck. A lead weight was tied around my waist and I was led out upon a small platform extending from the side of the ship out over the water. The blindfold was then removed from my eyes and the same slip of paper, with the questions which they wanted answered written upon it, was handed to me. I was told that if I did not answer the questions I would be shoved over the side. I asked the interpreter if there was a priest or minister aboard ship; that I would like to see him if there was. He sent for his dictionary to look up the words and then told me that there was no priest nor minister aboard ship. I then told them that I did not know the answers to the questions that they had asked. Upon this reply the interrogating officer left and a few minutes later returned and told me they were convinced I was telling the truth and that I would not be killed. During the rest of my stay on board ship until the 25th of June, (east longitude date), I was treated quite well.

We arrived at OMINATO on the 24th of June, (ELD), and stayed on board ship until about 2100 on the 25th, at which time we were taken to the railroad station and put on a train which took us to the OFUNA interrogation camp near TOKYO.

Q. Have you any idea of the cruiser's employment while you were on board?
A. Yes. It seemed to me that we cruised about in the ALEUTIAN vicinity for about five days.

After about five days we apparently joined up with some other units of a Japanese fleet of carriers, cruisers and destroyers. I couldn't tell what the size of the force was since I had only an occasional glimpse through a porthole.

Q. What were your movements during your time in JAPAN?
A. I was kept at OFUNA seven months and was then transferred to YOKOHAMA Branch Camp #2. I stayed there five months and then was moved to ZENTSUJI Prison Camp on the island of SHIKOKU, where I stayed until June 1945. This camp was then broken up and all the American officers were transferred to the ROKUROSHI Prison Camp on HONSHU Island, not far from FUKUI and ONO where we were when the war ended.

W.C. HOUSE, Aer M1/c

Q. Will you please tell me about your capture on KISKA and what you saw while still on the Island?
A. At about 0214, 7 June 1942 (west longitude date, zone plus 11 time), the Jap landing force came around NORTH HEAD and opened fire. They were using 13 mm machine guns. The bullets sprayed through our quarters for a time and then stopped. We burned our codes and evacuated. As we were going up the hills behind the weather station we were fired at twice more, but we took cover in a ravine. We soon got above the cloud level

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and into the fog. Occasionally from our position we could see, through breaks in the clouds, different parts of the island and part of the harbor. As we got near the top of the ridge we could see the landing force to the east of us. They had made prisoners of two of the men, a pharmacist's mate and a cook, men by the names of COFFIELD and McCANDLESS. The other eight of us split up as we went up the ravine. I got separated from the rest and was alone from this time on.

Q. Where did you go?
A. I spent the day in a ravine northwest of KISKA Harbor. That evening I came on down to a point just west of REYNARD Cove. Some Japanese troops came in from a gunboat and took up positions near me that night. I thought they were too close, so I moved inland and stayed for about ten days a half mile up in the hills west of REYNARD Cove.

Q. DQ you know the name of the gunboat?
A. No sir, it was just a small gunboat, a patrol boat. The first PBY came over on Thursday (I remember Sunday was the 7th. We were keeping west longitude dates.) It was mid-morning - I had no watch, but I would estimate the time as being about 10 o'clock - and then later that day there were three more PBYs that came in from the northeast. The planes used two approaches, one through the pass from the west, the other down the island from the volcano. The first PBY was very lucky to get out. He didn't expect to see anyone, I don't believe, and if the Japs had ever opened up on him it would have been too bad as he was flying low. I never thought he would get through but he did. There was a ship sunk in the harbor at KISKA. I don't know just when it was.

Q. Do you know the name of the ship?
A. No sir. It's still there. The mast was the only part of it above water when I left.

Q. Did you see her sink?
A. No, she was already sunk when I went in to the harbor area the latter part of July, but the bow was still out of water. By the time I left, in September, she had settled completely and just the mast was out. I stayed in hiding in the hills inshore of REYNARD Cove about ten days, but as the Japs fired at the planes making approaches from the northeast, there was too much shrapnel falling around my area, so I moved. We had some food and clothing and stuff cached in a tent in a ravine, north-northwest of the weather station. I started off for this cache and by the time I got to the vicinity of the cache it was dark. There was a machine gun position somewhere nearby. I found many footprints and cigarette butts so gave up the idea of finding the cache. In the harbor area I could see many Japanese walking around and working on buildings so I came over the hills to the west side of the pass. It was raining, so I went into a cave in a hill on the north slope of the pass. There was a small lake there with two streams running out of it. I stayed in this area until 26 July. It was from about 17 June to 26 July that I stayed in the vicinity of the cave and lake, and during that time I could see the B-17's coming over. About July the Japs brought in "Zeros" on floats, - about seven. Approximately the third night after we first saw the Japs, they brought in about six flying boats. Well, it was on the 26th of July that I decided my situation was hopeless and I gave myself up.

Q. What did you do for food while you were in hiding?
A. Just munched on grass and worms and whatever I could pick up. I think it was 1515, 26 July, TOKYO time and date, when I gave myself up. When I came in there was a gunboat off shore at the main camp, and the Japanese were at their air raid stations. One B-17 was coming in so they left me with a sentry while they manned their guns. There was no anti-aircraft fire. After securing from air alert they took me to the main camp. I was not interrogated that day. They gave me some soup, beans and rice. The next day a doctor came to my place of confinement and looked me over. He told me that the other nine men of the U.S. weather station had been captured and already sent to JAPAN. I was confined in the old power house. After about two weeks they decided I should work.

Q. Where did you work?
A. I worked around the camp digging sod for camouflage. I peeled off sod and put it on the roofs of buildings. I think it was about 12 August that we had a surface bombardment from U.S. ships. They alerted and manned all their guns and kept all their people away from the barracks and out in the hills for two or three days following the bombardment. About the 16th of August some B-17's laid several strings of bombs probably 100 pounders. The bombs did very little damage because the ground was so soft. Craters about 5 feet wide and 30 inches deep were made. Air raids quieted down to a B-17 coming over when it was a nice day, but they never seemed to hit anything. They would just splash water on a ship when they dropped bombs, it seemed.

At one time in August I counted thirty-four ships in KISKA Harbor. Two were cruisers and about eight or so destroyers. The Japanese operated about seven large submarines from a tender, the LYONS MARU.

Q. How many midget submarines?
A. I never saw them.

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Q. When did you leave KISKA?
A. That was on 20 September. On 12 September we saw a P-38 come over. It dove through the over-cast right over the signal tower and the Japs on the tower saw it and leaped off. About the 13th, leaflets were dropped saying the garrison would be bombed out. On the morning of the 15th I was shoveling sand on a truck. I started work about 8 o'clock and about 0815 a raid started. We went off in the hills and when we came back I saw that it was a good bombing. The holes were about eight feet across and about four or five feet deep.

Q. You didn't know at that time that we had established a field at ADAK?
A. I had an idea but I wasn't sure.

Q. Tell me what you know of the raid on 15 September?
A. The first wave came over at about 0815, three waves followed in rapid succession. Several storage houses and the power house I was sleeping in were hit. An air-raid shelter where the radio men were staying was caved in.

On the afternoon of 20 September I was put aboard the NAGATA MARU, an ex-NYK liner.

Q. What size was it?
A. About 8 or 10,000 tons.

Q. Was she a passenger or cargo ship?
A. Cargo.

Q. What did she bring?
A. She brought troops and some Aleuts to KISKA in July, stayed around all summer and then brought troops from KISKA to ATTU in September. I think the ship got in about 12 September. I think the ship got in about 12 September because they were in the harbor when the big raid came.

Q. Did the NAGATA MARU burn coal or oil?
A. She was a coal burner, speed about 9 knots. She sailed alone for JAPAN that night via South Pass. We went west to the KAMCHATKA Peninsula and then down the west side of the KURILES.

Q. At what port did you first stop?
A. We stopped at OTARU, HOKKAIDO.

Q. What did you do at OTARU?
A. The Aleuts were discharged, 39 of them, and we took on coal. From there we went to HAKODATE and stayed all night, anchored inside the harbor. The next morning we went out with a convoy of about six ships escorted by corvettes. The escorts dropped depth charges at about 1000 as we went through TSUGARU Straits. We anchored every night from there on, traveling only during daylight. We came in to YOKOSUKA but I was kept in the hold. I was taken ashore at about 1000, 6 August, after I had been blindfolded. We went by electric train to OFUNA. It was a Naval Interrogation Camp. There I was interrogated only once. On 22 January I was taken to YOKOHAMA and lived in a warehouse opposite the OSANA shipyards. I worked at the Mitsubishi shipyards in down-town YOKOHAMA.

Q. How long were you in that area?
A. Until May 1944. During the spring of 1943, the LYONS MARU came into dry dock. I tried to start a conversation with some of the sailors and one or two talked. They had evidently just left KISKA but I couldn't get much out of them.

Q. Any damage to the LYONS MARU?
A. No sir. I looked it over thoroughly. There was no evidence of shrapnel or bombs. I left YOKOHAMA on 12 May 1945 and arrived at KAMAISHI 14 May. I went to work in the Nippon Steel Company mill in the rolling section. On 14 July 1945 the mill was shelled and put out of commission. From then on we spent our time digging out water mains, installing water lines and telephone lines. The second bombardment was similar to the first. Of about 200 prisoners of war, we lost about 32 men. The Japanese wouldn't let us get out of the yard during these bombardments. We had to keep working. I took shelter in the foundation of the rolling mill. The U.S.S. RESCUE came in to KAMAISHI Harbor and picked us up 15 September.

Q. Can you give me an estimate of the numbers and types of planes the Japanese used at KISKA?
A. Early in July, I saw the first seaplane fighter fly over my hideout. They were then just testing them out. After that they kept two float fighters in the air all the time as pickets. Before those airborne came down, two more went up and carried on. Shortly after 26 July, there were eight float fighters and about two float reconnaissance planes in KISKA Harbor. The reconnaissance planes did very little after the fighters came in. They would just take off and hide until after the fighting was over.

Q. What was the maximum number of flying boats you saw?
A. About seven of them.

696691 O - 46 - 17

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Q. Tell me anything you know about how they operated?
A. They would take off about dawn and return at 4 or 5 o'clock in the afternoon. They were patrolling all the time.

Q. What do you know of the damage to the flying boats? Can you remember any specific cases of sinking?
A. A storm washed one on the beach. The rest just disappeared. When I left in September this wrecked one was still on the beach and one flying around. There was one Jap pilot who seemed to be the hero of the float fighters. He was supposed to have shot down two B-17's while there.

Q. Could you make a guess on Japanese personnel killed?
A. About 100 around where I was. On 15 September there were 40 or 50 including some brought off the ships, sailors I guess.

Q. Can you say anything more about Japanese ships in KISKA?
A. Not much more than I have said before. There were several gunboats used for patrolling the harbor and offshore. About 5 August a ship came in with about 5 float fighters on it. It stayed in port only a few days. The NAGATA MARU was used as a shuttle ship between ATTU and KISKA during the summer. Her crew were merchant marine plus about 40 Navy men in gun crew, searchlight and signal details. She carried a 5 inch gun on the bow, about a 3 inch gun on the stern and a big searchlight on the bridge. She had 110 torpedoes and no seaplanes.

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JAPANESE NOTES OF BATTLES

TOKYO 14 November 1945

Interrogation of: Captain WATANABE, Y., IJN; Gunnery Officer on Admiral YAMAMOTO's staff, CinC Second Fleet at MIDWAY Battle, June 1942; member of Military Affairs and Naval Headquarters staffs, 1945.

Interrogated by: Captain C. SHANDS, USN.

SUMMARY

The following notes of battles from CinC Combined Fleet staff log submitted by Captain WATANABE, IJN; Gunnery and Landing Force Officer, Staff CinC Combined Fleet (Admiral YAMAMOTO). All times (-9).

NARRATION

MIDWAY Action 4-6 June 1942

27 May 0600 Departed HASHIRASHIMA, INLAND SEA near KURE.

3 June 1030 Mobile force broke radio silence and sends out signals to change course.
Proceeding through fog from 1000 the 2nd to 2300 the 3rd.

4 June 1510 Detect what is believed to be enemy plane signals in near vicinity. At 0900 the 3rd and 2330 the 4th,
AKAGI detects similar signals.

5 June 0130 36 fighters and 36 bombers take off to attack MIDWAY. 0600 Return.
0130-0200 Air Searches.
After 0230, made contact with 2 or 3 enemy patrol planes.
0400-0650 Enemy planes torpedo attack carriers. No damage sustained.
0428 Enemy surface force sighted by Japanese scout plane.
0500 One carrier sighted by search airplane. In process of refitting with #80 torpedoes. Delay caused
by shifting from bombs to torpedoes. Lost chance to hit American carriers.
0725 30 enemy planes attack. AKAGI, KAGA and SORYU burning.
0758 6 fighters and 18 bomber planes of the HIRYO take off for attack on American carriers. One
carrier of ENTERPRISE class severely damaged. One heavy cruiser seriously damaged. One large
carrier sunk.
1413 Our aircraft reported enemy task force proceeding east, leaving one large carrier behind smoking.
1403 HIRYU damaged by dive-bomber attack.
2355 MIDWAY Occupation cancelled by despatch from Admiral YAMAMOTO. (This was discussed
by all members of Staff. Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral UGAKI, convinced Admiral YAMAMOTO to
turn back. Remainder of staff divided in opinion whether to turn back or try to capture without aircraft).

CORAL SEA Action 4-8 May 1942

4 May About 80 enemy carrier planes attack TULAGI between 0630 and 1315.

5 May See no enemy.
3 enemy B-17's attack MO (PORT MORESBY) Occupation Force. No hits.

6 May Discover striking force at 0810.
Enemy B-17's sight MO (PORT MORESBY) Occupation Force.

7 May 3 B-17's attack transports at 0550, no damage; aircraft of CarDiv 5 discovers large tanker and mistake it
for carrier at 0530; Float Recco sights striking force at 0640; SHOHO sunk at 0935; 12 bombers and 15
attack planes of CarDiv 5 take off at 1430 but fail to sight enemy; RABAUL Air Flot 25 cooperates in
attack and sinks 1 battleship, severely damages 1 battleship, sinks (unconfirmed) 1 cruiser.

8 May CarDiv 5 SHOKAKU receives 3 #250 bomb hits at 0940; at 09201 large enemy carrier (LEXINGTON)
sunk, 1 medium carrier (YORKTOWN) sunk, and 1 BB or cruiser left burning.

SOLOMONS Action 23-25 August 1942

7 August 30 enemy transports arrive at GUADALCANAL.

16 August 1800 Mobile Force departs INLAND SEA.
(0) General Command.
Main Unit: CinC Combined Fleet.

--539--

Supporting Force: Advance Force CinC Second Fleet.
   Mobile Force CinC Third Fleet.
Mobile Force Command.
Main Unit: CinC Third Fleet. SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU
      CarDiv 1 (less RYUJO) 1 DesDiv
      2 DD's.
Advance Unit: Comdr. 11th Division 11th Div. CHIKUMA, 7th Div, (less MOGAMI under repair)
      10th Div. (less 2 DesDivs plus 1 DesDiv)
Detached Unit: Comdr. 8th Division. 8th Div (less CHIKUMA) RYUJO, 2 DD's.

20 August 1255 Enemy carrier sighted. Mobile Force cancels call at TRUK and proceed to south to intercept.
   0600 Mobile Force refuels.
   0900 20 enemy carrier planes land at GUADALCANAL DesRon 2, remaining elements of ICHIKI
   Detachment, and YOKOSUKA 5th Special Landing Force (700 Army - 800 Marines) scheduled to
   effect landings on GUADALCANAL on the 24th.

23 August 1625 Aircraft carrier's course reversed. Course 330 due to delay in landing force.

24 August 0200 DesRon 2 Detached Unit heads for attack on GUADALCANAL. Main Unit reverses course,
   course 150.
   0415 First searches carrier aircraft. Enemy not sighted.
   0837 Enemy patrol plane contacts our main unit.
   1228 Large enemy force sighted by cruiser plane.
   1420 Two enemy task forces sighted and attacked. 1 carrier severely damaged and burning (HORNET
   afire, sunk). ENTERPRISE damaged. 2 carriers severely damaged and burning. 2nd phase
   of attack. Japanese planes fail to find U.S. Fleet and return to ships.
   1543 Enemy not sighted.
   1308 Two bombers attacked SHOKAKU. No damage sustained. Night attacks scheduled by carriers
   cancelled due to bad weather.
   1300 RYUJO sinks due to dive bomb (10 hits).
   2200 Night destroyer attacks cancelled. Withdrawing.

( ) 10 Kil. ( ) (o)   ( ) (o) ( )
SUZUYA   KUMANO   KIRISHIMA   : NAGARA   HIEI   CHIKUMA  
:
10 Kilometers
: 2 DD's
(-) SHOKAKU
5 Kilometers : 2 DD's
(-) ZUIKAKU

Battle of SANTA CRUZ Island 26 October 1942
(South PACIFIC Action)

Command Channel
   Advance Force Main Unit: CinC Second Fleet CruDiv 4, CruDiv 5 (less HAGURO) DesRon 2,
         DesRon 24, CarDiv 2 (JUNYO, HIYO)
   Forward Attack Unit: Comdr. BatDiv 3, BatDiv 3, DesDiv 15, DesDiv 2.
   Mobile Force CinC Third Fleet Third Fleet (less a part) 6 DD's, KUNIKAWA MARU

11 October Sortie from TRUK.
   CruDiv 6 (AOBA, KAKO, FURUTAKA) and 2 DD's bombard.
   Battle of SAVO Island.

13 October 2 or 3 enemy carriers, 2 battleships, 5 to 7 cruisers and 6 to 8 DD's sighted South GUADALCANAL
   by seaplanes from RUSSELL and RENNEL Islands.
   BatDiv 3 shells GUADALCANAL. (HARUNA and KIRISHIMA) - All planes on GUADAL-
   CANAL believed destroyed.

14 October One enemy patrol plane contacted and shot down by CV-VF. Search plane sighted 1 enemy battleship,
   1 cruiser and 3 destroyers south of GUADALCANAL - convoy.

15 October Landings by high-speed transport unit land troops Y day (about X plus 6 days). All-out attack
   scheduled for 21st.
   One cruiser sunk by carrier aircraft. Attack phase #1.
   One cruiser moderately damaged. One transport heavily damaged. One transport slightly damaged.

--540--

 Attack phase #2.
   Our transport force makes landing on GUADALCANAL.

16 October Search aircraft sighted enemy near RENNEL Island. 1 carrier, 2 cruisers, 8 DD's, 3 battleships,
6 cruisers, 7 destroyers.

17 October Operations to crush enemy reinforcement force.
   18 fighters and 18 attack planes to GUADALCANAL.
   10 attack planes to hit ships anchored at LUNGGA.

19 October Y day set 22 October. Postponed by Army request - not ready.

20 October No intelligence on the enemy forces.

21 October Y day set for 23 October. Postponed by Army again.
   Following sighted by search aircraft in RENNEL Area:
   1 battleship, 2 cruisers.
   1 battleship, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers.

22 October HIYO, flagship of CarDiv 2, develops mechanical trouble. Proceeds to TRUK. Flag shifted to JUNYO.

23 October Enemy patrol plane makes contact with CHIKUMA.
   Y day postponed one day by Army request.
   2 battleships, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers sighted by search planes at RENNEL Island.

24 October Some refueling. Despatch sent to Army at GUADALCANAL that if general attack was not made
   immediately Navy would leave scene due to lack of fuel and food. Army does not appreciate Navy
   problem.
   Search planes sighted enemy near RENNEL Island.
   Enemy judged to consist of 5 battleships, 3 cruisers and 19 destroyers.

25 October 0020 Received report that Army had captured GUADALCANAL at 2100 the 24th. Sent planes from
   carriers to investigate. Army report false.
   0500 Reported by Army that airfield not yet captured.
   0815 U.S. patrol plane sights our mobile force.
   1300 Raided by 6 B-17's. No damage sustained.
   1130 2 battleships, 4 cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 12 destroyers sighted by search planes in RENNEL
   Area.
   Army scheduled to attack and break through at 1900/25, but failed in attempt.

26 October 0050 Patrol plane drops bomb in vicinity of ZUIKAKU. No hits.
   0130 Mobile force reverses course and heads north at 24 knots.
   0345 Dawn. Double searches, take-off at 0215 and 0245.
   0450 Enemy task force sighted by search planes bearing 125° - distance 210.
   0655 Attack on enemy #1 Task Force. 1 carrier (HORNET) burning, 1 heavy cruiser sunk (?),
   1 light cruiser, 4 DD's (1 DD sunk and 1 DD severely damaged).
   0540 ZUIHO afire from dive bomber attack.
   0820-0900 2nd attack, phase #2. U.S. Task Force #2 attacked. 1 carrier (U.S.) severely damaged,
   1 battleship (U.S.) sunk, 2 heavy cruisers (U.S.) and 1 heavy cruiser severely damaged, 8 destroyers
   (U.S.) - 2 DD's severely damaged.

Combat record of Advance Force (JUNYO).
   0920 Planes of CarDiv 2 sighted and attacked Task Force #3. 1 carrier (ENTERPRISE) sunk,
   2 heavy cruisers - 1 heavy cruiser damaged, 1 light cruiser damaged and several destroyers.
   0727 SHOKAKU hit by dive bombers and afire. Fire under control at 1230.
   1310 Planes of CarDiv 2 (JUNYO) attacked U.S. Task Force #3.
   1 carrier listing to starboard, 3 cruisers - 1 cruiser severely damaged, 1 light cruiser severely damaged,
   six destroyers.
   1345 Planes of CarDiv 1 (SHOKAKU) attacked U.S. Task Force #3.
   1 carrier burning, 2 cruisers - 1 cruiser severely damaged, 7 destroyers.
   1510 Planes of CarDiv 2 (JUNYO) attacked Task Force #3.
   1 carrier afire and listing, 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 6 destroyers.

--541--

Chart of advance force.
Chart of advance force.

Command Channels

MIDWAY
General Command Admiral YAMAMOTO

MAIN BODY (Admiral YAMAMOTO)
   BatDiv 1 - YAMATO, MATSU, NAGATO
   *BatDiv 2 - ISE, HYUGA, FUSO, YAMASHIRO
   *CruDiv 9 - KITAGAMI, OI
   *DesRon 3 - SENDAI, 12DD's
      ZUIHO, 1 DD
   No.1 Supply Group - NARUTO, TOEI-MARU, 1 DD.
   *No. 2 Supply Group - SACREMENT-MARU, TORA-MARU
    *Screening Force for ALEUTIANS.

AIR FORCE (Admiral NAGUMO)
   CarDiv 1 - AKAGI, KAGA
   CarDiv 2 - HIRYU, SORYU
   CruDiv 8 - TONE, CHIKUMA
   BatDiv 3 (2nd Section) HARUNA, KIRISHIMA
   DesDiv 10 - NAGARA, 16 DD's.
   No.1 Supply Group - KYOKUTO-MARU, SHINKOKU-MARU, TOHO-MARU, NIPPON-MARU,
      KOKUYO-MARU.
   No.2 Supply Group - NAICHIRO-MARU, No.2, KYOEI-MARU, HOKO-MARU.

--542--

TRANSPORT OCCUPATION FORCE (Admiral KONDO)
  MAIN BODY
   CruDiv 4 - ATAGO, CHOKAI
   *BatDiv 3 - KONGO, HIEI
   DesRon 4 - NAKA, 16 DD's
   Supply Group - 3 Transports
    &mbsp;*Later acted as support force to Screening Force in ALEUTIANS.

  LANDING FORCE
   DesRon 2 - JINTSU, 12 DD's, 1 Torpedo Boat, 16 Transports, 1 Subchaser, 1 Patrol Boat and 1 Minesweeper.
      Marines, about 1500 - Sand I.
      Soldiers, about 1000 - Eastern I.
      Air Field making Force.
      Surveying Force.

  SUPPORTING FORCE
   KUMANO, SUZUYA, MOGAMI, MIKUMA, 4 DD's, 1 Transport.

  AIR FORCE
   11th Air Flotilla - CHITOSE, TOKISHA, KAMIKAWA-MARU, 1 DD, 1 Patrol Boat
      Marines, about 50 - Cure I.

  BASE AIR FORCE
   24th Air Flot. (MARSHALL)
   26th Air Flot. (MARCUS)
      36 Fighters, 9 Land-attack planes, 6 Flying boats.

ATTU-KISKA FORCE (Admiral HOSOGAYA)
   Flag 5th Fleet - NACHI, 2 DD's
   CarDiv 4 - RYUJO, JUNYO
   CruDiv 4 - (2nd Section) TAKAO, MAYA, 3 DD's, 1 Transport
   1st DesDiv - 4 DD's (ATTU)
   CruDiv 21 - KISO, TAMA (KISKA)
   SubRon 1 - ? Submarines
   SubTenDiv - KUNIKAWA-MARU, 1 DD
   Base Air Force - 4 Land attack planes, 4 Transports
   Patrol Group - 22 submarines

DETACHMENT FROM MAIN BODY AS ALEUTIAN SCREENING FORCE
   BatDiv 2 - ISE, HYUGA, FUSO, YAMASHIRO
   CruDiv 9 - KITAGAMI, OI
   DesRon 3 - SENDAI, 1 DD
      ZUIHO,1 DD
   No.2 Supply Group - SACREMENT-MARU, TORA-MARU, 1 DD.

LATE SUPPORT FOR ATTU-KISKA Group
   BatDiv 3 - KONGO, HIEI, 4 DD, 1 Carrier (ZUIKAKU or ZUIHO?)

COMMAND CHANNELS AT THE BEGINNING OF WAR
General Command (Admiral YAMAMOTO)
PEARL HARBOR ACTION GROUP (Admiral NAGUMO)

CARRIER GROUP
   CarDiv 1 - AKAGI, KAGA
   CarDiv 2 - S0RYU, HIRYU
   CarDiv 5 - ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU

PROTECTION GROUP
   DesRon 1 - ABUKUMA, DesDiv 17, DesDiv 18, 1 DD
   BatDiv 3 - KONGO, HIEI
   CruDiv 8 - TONE, CHIKUMA
   SubDiv 2 - 3 Submarines
   DesDiv 8 - 2 DD's, MIDWAY Bombardment

--543--

SUPPLY GROUP
   No.1 Supply Group - 5 Transports
   No.2 Supply Group - 3 Transports

SUBMARINE GROUP
   Sixth Fleet - KATORI
   SubRon 1 - YASUKUNI-MARU, 10 Submarines
   SubRon 2 - SANTOS-MARU, 8 Submarines
   SubRon 3 - TAIGEI, 10 Submarines

SOUTH SEA ACTION GROUP (Admiral KONDO)

MAIN BODY
   CruDiv 4 - ATAGO, CHOKAI
   BatDiv 3 - HARUNA, KIRISHIMA
   CarDiv 4 - RYUJO, JUNYO
   DesDiv 3 - 4 DD's

PHILIPPINE FORCE
   CruDiv 16 - ASHIGARA, NAGARA, KUMA
   Des Ron 5 - NATORI, DesDiv 5, DesDiv 22
   CarDiv 12 - NOTORO, KAMIKAWA-MARU
   1st Base Force
   2nd Base Force
   CruDiv 5 - (NACHI), HAGURO, MYOKO
   DesRon 2 - JINTSU, DesDiv 8, DesDiv 15, DesDiv 16, DesDiv 18
   DesRon 4 - NAKA, DesDiv 2, DesDiv 4, DesDiv 9, DesDiv 24

MALIE FORCE
   Southern Expeditionery Force
      KASHII, SHUMUSHU
      Ninth Base Force
      Eleventh Special Base Force
      CruDiv 7 - MOGAMI, MIKUMA, SUZUYA, KUMANO
      DesRon 3 - SENDAI, DesDiv 11, DesDiv 12, DesDiv 19, DesDiv 20

BASE AIR FORCE
   Eleventh Air Fleet - TSUDOM, 36 Med. Land Attack Planes, 27 Med. Land Attack Planes
   21 Air Flot. - SOKTRAN, 27 Land Attack Planes, 6 Land Recco planes
   22 Air Flot. - SAIGON, 36 Med. Land Attack Planes, 12?
   23 Air Flot. - FORMOSA, Fighters, Medium Land Attack Planes

SUBMARINE FORCE
   SubRon 4 - KINU, SubDiv 18, SubDiv 19, SubDiv 21, NAGOYA-MARU
   SubRon 5 - YURA, SubDiv 28, SubDiv 29, SubDiv 30, RIO DE JANEIRO-MARU
   SubRon 6 - CHOGEI, SubDiv 9, SubDiv 13

MINE FORCE
   MineLayerDiv 17 - ITSUKUSHIMA, YAEYAMA

MAIN BODY (Admiral YAMAMOTO)
   BatDiv 1 - YAMATO, MUTSU, NAGATO
   BatDiv 2 - ISE, HYUGA, FUSO, YAMASHIRO
   CarDiv 3 - HOSHO, ZUIHO, 2 DD's
   Marine 7th Division.

NORTHERN DEFENSE GROUP (Admiral HOSOGAYA)

FIFTH FLEET
   CruDiv 21 - NACHI, SAGI, HATO, KISO, TAMA
   CruDiv 22 - 2 Transports
   Seventh Base Force

--544--

SOUTH EASTERN DEFENSE GROUP (Admiral INOUE)

FOURTH FLEET
   (GUAM Action Group)
   (WAKE Action Group)
   KASHIMA
   CruDiv 18 - TENRYU, TATSUTA
   CruDiv 19 - OKINOSHIMA, TOKIWA, TSUGARU
   DesRon 6 - UBARI, DesDiv 29, DesDiv 30
   Sub Ron 7 - JINGEI, DesDiv 26, SubDiv 27, SubDiv 33
   24th Air Flot. - CHITOSE Base Air Force, YOKOHAMA Base Air Force, KAMOI, GOSHU-MARU
   3rd Base Force
   4th Base Force
   5th Base Force
   6th Base Force
   Marine 1 Division

CORAL SEA ACTION
General Command Admiral INOUE

MAIN BODY
   KASHIMA, TOKIWA, 1 DD, KIYOKAWA-MARU

CARRIER FORCE
   CruDiv 5 - HAGURO, MYOKO
   CarDiv 5 - SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU, 2 DD's, DesDiv 27, DesDiv 7, TOHO-MARU

LANDING FORCE
   CruDiv 18 - TENRYU, TATSUTA
   CruDiv 6 - AOBA, KINUGASA, KAKO, FURUTAKA,
   DesRon 6 - YUBARI, DesDiv 29, DesDiv 30.
   SHOHO
   One Escort Unit, One Minesweeper Div, TSUGARU, KAMIKAWA-MARU, KIYOKAWA-MARU

BASE AIR FORCE
   25th Air Flot.

SUBMARINE GROUP
   SubRon 8 - 8 Submarines

--545--

BIOGRAPHIES OF INTERROGATED OFFICIALS

ABE, Tokuma, Captain, IJN.
Nav No. 110

ABE's twenty-three years of service as a permanent officer included six years duty in submarines and in antisubmarine warfare. During World War II all his duties were with naval escort forces including staff work ashore and command of a coast defense squadron. He evinced considerable interest in U.S. submarine operations and expressed very positive opinions regarding the rapid progress in development of U.S. submarines and the training of their crews. He also pointed out the deficiencies in Japanese defensive measures and lack of coordination among units responsible for protection of shipping. He appeared to have a good general knowledge of the campaign against Japanese shipping but did not recall many details.

Submarine and anti-submarine 1926-1932
Senior Staff Officer,
Defense Unit
SASEBO
 
December 1941-
October 1942
Senior Staff Officer,
22nd Base Force
BALIKPAPAN  
 
November 1942-
February 1944
Senior Staff Officer,
#4 Surface Escort and OKINAWA Base Force  
  February 1944-
January 1945
Commanding Officer,
22nd Coast Defense Squadron
South
CHINA SEA
January 1945-
August 1945

AMAGI, Takahisa, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No.1

AMAGI served 21 years in the regular Navy and was a pilot of 2,500 hours experience. He was Air Officer on the HIRYU (CV) at PEARL HARBOR and later Air Officer on the KAGA (CV) at the Battle of MIDWAY, 4-6 June 1942. Following the sinking of the KAGA, he served as a member of the Naval Air Service Headquarters Staff where he was in charge of aircraft carrier flight deck installations. From May 1944 until the end of the war he served as Commanding Officer of the 634th Air Group.

He was the first Japanese Naval Officer interrogated by this group following the surrender of Japan. As such he was reticent to volunteer information but answered direct questions without hesitation. His statements were confirmed by subsequent interrogations.

Air Officer, HIRYU (CV) First Air Fleet 1941-1942
Air Officer, KAGA (CV) First Air Fleet 1942
Staff, Naval Air Service Hdqs.   TOKYO 1942-1944
Commanding Officer,
634th Air Group
  1944-1945

AOKI, Taijiro, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No.4

AOKI was a regular naval officer, non-pilot, of 32 years active duty following his graduation from the Naval Academy at ETAJIMA in 1910. At the outbreak of the war he was serving as Commanding Officer of a Naval Aviation Training School at TSUCHIURA. In April 1942 he was ordered to command the aircraft carrier AKAGI (CV) and was so serving when it was sunk at the Battle of MIDWAY, 4-6 June 1942. Following this action he was ordered as Commanding Officer of the KURE Naval Arsenal. In October 1942 he retired from active service.

Although this officer readily but conservatively answered all questions, his knowledge of the conduct of the war appeared limited to the brief 20 month period at sea prior to being retired.

Commanding Officer,
N.A.S. TSUCHIURA  
  1940-1942
 
Commanding Officer,
AKAGI (CV)
1942
Commanding Officer,
Naval Arsenal
KURE   1942
Retired 1942

--546--

ARICHIKA, Rokuji, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 73

ARICHIKA was a regular officer of 23 years service. He had specialized in torpedoes and torpedo tactics. As Chief of Staff of the First Destroyer Squadron he engaged in all the principal naval operations in the ALEUTIAN Campaign. He had a buoyant and energetic personality and evinced pride in and thorough knowledge of his profession. What success the Japanese had in supplying the ATTU and KISKA Garrisons through the ever tightening United States air and sea blockade was largely due to his planning. He planned and took part in the successful evacuation of the KISKA Garrison. He was known and respected by practically all the Japanese Officers interrogated on the subject of the ALEUTIANS Operations. He presented an accurate and detailed account of those operations.

Chief of Staff, 1st Destroyer
Squadron, ABUKUMA (F)
  December 1941-
November 1943
Staff, OSAKA Guard
District
OSAKA
 
November 1943-
September 1944
Staff, No.2, Special
Attack Corps, (Suicide Boats)  
HIKARI   
 
September 1944-
November 1945

CHIHAYA, Masatake, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 49

CHIHAYA was a permanent officer of 18 years service. During World War II he was assigned principally to staff duties and attended the Naval War College.

MUSASHI (BB)
 
December 1941-
September 1942  
Staff, 11th Squadron TRUK &
SOLOMONS
September 1942-
November 1942
Naval War College
 
TOKYO
 
August 1943-
February 1944
Staff, 4th Advanced
Southern Fleet
AMBON
 
March 1944-
February 1945
Staff, Combined Naval Fleet  
 
TOKYO
 
February 1945-
September 1945
Personnel Bureau,
Navy Department
TOKYO
 
September 1945

DOI, Yasumi, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 52 & 92

DOI has served 17 years in the regular Navy, specializing in gunnery. In 1942 he was a member of the Army-Navy Total War Research Institute to study economic problems of the war. In March 1943 he was ordered as Gunnery Officer on the staff of the Commander, Southeastern Area Fleet, located in RABAUL. In this position he was responsible for the anti-aircraft defense and ordnance supply of the naval airfields in the RABAUL-SOLOMONS-BISMARK Area. He was also concerned with the mining operations. Since demobilization DOI has been serving as a member of the House of Peers.

This officer answered all questions freely and accurately, although he appeared critical of the Japanese Army's efforts in the defense of the SOLOMONS. (This attitude was also in evidence among other officers that were stationed in this area during the SOLOMOMS Campaign).

Gunnery Officer, AOBA (CA)
 
 
 
November 1941-
March 1942
Army-Naval Total War
Research Institute
  March 1942-
March 1943
Staff Gunnery Officer,
Southeastern Area Fleet
RABAUL  
 
March 1943-
March 1945
Staff Officer
Bureau of Military Affairs
TOKYO
 
March 1945-
August 1945

--547--

FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav Nos.6, 29, 87 and 99

FUCHIDA served 25 years in the regular Navy. An aviator with 3000 hours in the air, FUCHIDA aboard AKAGI, was in command of the air groups of CarDiv I from August 1941 until July 1942. Wounded during the Battle of MIDWAY, he was hospitalized for approximately one year, then in June 1943 made senior staff officer, 1st Air Fleet at KANOYA, and, subsequently, when 1st Air Fleet moved to the MARIANAS, at TINIAN. In April 1944, FUCHIDA was transferred to OYODO as Staff Officer (Air Operations) of Combined Fleet. When Fleet Headquarters moved ashore to HIYOSHI in September 1944 he continued as Staff Officer (Air Operations) until the end of the war. FUCHIDA answered questions frankly and carefully. He was considered one of the most lucrative sources of information and a reliable witness.

Commanding Officer, Air
Group CarDiv I
 
 
August 1941-
July 1942
Hospitalized August 1942-
May 1943
Senior Staff Officer,
1st Air Fleet
June 1943-
March 1944
Staff Officer
(Air Operations),
Combined Fleet
April 1944-
August 1945

FUJII, Kazumi, Lieutenant Colonel, I.J.A.
Nav No. 84

FUJII was a regular Army Officer of 12 years service. A graduate of the Military Academy as an infantry officer, he went later to the Army Staff College and specialized in air staff work although not himself an aviator. As a Staff Officer of the Northern Area Army and of the KISKA Army garrison he had an intimate knowledge of Army forces in the ALEUTIANS, as well as planning for Army airfields in that area. He was intelligent, thorough and cooperative. His account was believed accurate both generally and in detail.

Staff Officer,
MANCHURIAN Air Force
SHINKYO
MANCHURIA
December 1940-
January 1942
Staff, Officer, Northern
Area Army
SAPPORO
HOKKAIDO
January 1942-
October 1942
Staff Officer, KISKA
Army Garrison
KISKA
 
October 1942-
August 1943
Staff Officer, Northern
Area Army
SAPPORO
 
August 1943-
October 1943
Staff Officer, (Supplies),
Army General Headquarters
TOKYO
 
October 1943-
July 1945
Staff Officer, (Supplies,
Communications and Maintenance),
6th Air Army
TOKYO
 
 
July 1945-
November 1945
 

FUJIMORI, Yasuo, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No.108

FUJIMORI served 17 years as a permanent naval officer in the Imperial Japanese Navy. During the early part of the war he commanded the RO-60 submarine doing defense patrol east of the MARSHALLS. He then took command of the minelaying submarine I-121. In June 1943 he was assigned to the Naval General Staff and was still there at the end of the war.

FUJITA, Masamichi, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 14 and 81

FUJITA served 20 years in the regular Navy. As Gunnery Officer of the Second Fleet he participated in the invasion of the PHILIPPINES and NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. He was familiar with the general planning of the above campaign more than any other officer. FUJITA seemed to be unable to comprehend the fact that Japan had been destroyed. He can best be described as the "Ashly Wilkes" of Japan.

Staff, Second Fleet  
 
 
PHILIPPINES
NETHERLANDS  
EAST INDIES
June 1941-
June 1942
 
Bureau of Military
Affairs
TOKYO
 
June 1942-
August 1945

--548--

FUKAMIZU, J., Commander, I.J.N.
Nav Nos. 50 and 86

FUKAMIZU served 17 years in the regular Navy. From December 1941 until June 1942 he was a supply officer on the staff of the 21st Air Flotilla. For the next six months, FUKAMIZU was attached to the staff of the Southwest Area Fleet also as a supply officer. Thereafter until the end of the war, he was in charge of the 1st Section of the 1st Department of Naval Air Headquarters, TOKYO, which was charged with the allocation of aircraft to tactical and training commands at the direction of the Naval General Staff. FUKAMIZU answered questions frankly and directly, and was considered a very reliable source of information.

Supply Officer, Staff
21st Air Flotilla
  December 1941
June 1942
Supply Officer, Staff
Southwest Area Fleet
  July 1942-
December 1943
Chief, 1st Section, 1st
Department, Naval Air  
Headquarters
TOKYO  
 
 
January 1943-
August 1945

FUKUDOME, Shigeru, Vice Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 115

The experience of Admiral FUKUDOME particularly fitted him as an authority on high level planning and operations during the entire period from pre-war planning through the loss of the PHILIPPINES. He was intelligent, talked freely, and appeared as being a markedly superior Japanese Officer. Although understood English he conversed through an interpreter.

The high regard in which the British held this officer is illustrated by the fact that he was fully entrusted with the repatriation of Japanese nationals in the SINGAPORE Area, a duty to which the Supreme Commander, Allied Forces Southeast Asia requested the earliest return of this officer.

Chief of Staff,
Combined Fleet
January 1940-
April 1941
Chief of 1st Section,
(Plans and Operation)
Naval General Staff
April 1941-
May 1943
 
Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet
 
May 1943-
March 1944
Commanding Officer, 2nd Air Fleet  
 
July 1944-
January 1945
CinC Tenth Area Fleet
 
January 1945-
End of War

GENDA, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 112

GENDA was an aviator of broad experience, intelligent and alert. He was of the younger school of officers, inclined to criticize freely, and perhaps associated with the earlier radical groups. He appeared to have considerable Filipino blood.

Staff, 1st Air Fleet
 
December 1941-
June 1942
Air Officer, ZUIKAKU (CV)  
 
July 1942-
September 1942
Staff, 11th Air Fleet
 
September 1942-
November 1942
Imperial Headquarters
 
TOKYO  
 
November 1942-
January 1945
Commanding Officer,
Air Group 343rd (VF)
January 1945-
End of War

--549--

HASHIMOTO, Shigefusa, Commander, I.J.N
Nav No. 25

HASHIMOTO was a regular officer of 19 years service. As Navigation and Communication Officer on the Staff of Commander Fifth Fleet, and later with the Staff of Commander Northeast Area Fleet, he was well informed on the operations in the North PACIFIC from November 1942 until the conclusion of hostilities. He was intelligent and cooperative, and his information was generally quite accurate.

Russian Intelligence,
Naval Headquarters
TOKYO
 
November 1940-
November 1942
Navigation and Communication
Fifth Fleet Staff
  November 1942
January 1944
Intelligence, Naval
Headquarters
TOKYO
 
June 1944-
November 1944
Staff, Northeast Area Fleet
 
CHITOSE
 
November 1944-
February 1945
Staff, OMINATO Guard District  
 
OMINATO  
 
February 1945-
August 1945
Intelligence,
Naval Headquarters
TOKYO
 
August 1945-
October 1945

HORIUCHI, Shigetada, Rear Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 47

HORIUCHI was a permanent officer of 31 years service. His principal war time combat experience was in the First Southern Advance Fleet in the latter half of 1942 and with air protection of convoys during the last eight months of the war.

Naval Attache
 
INDO CHINA  
 
December 1941-
June 1942
Staff, First Southern
Advance Fleet
  June 1942-
November 1942
Chief of 1st Section,
Navy Department
TOKYO
 
November 1942-
May 1944
Chief of Staff, 1st Escort Fleet,  
Navy Department
TOKYO
 
May 1944-
December 1944
Commanding Officer,
90lst Air Group
FORMOSA
 
January 1945-
September 1945

IHARA, Mitsugo, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 68

IHARA has served 20 years in the regular Navy. As Gunnery Officer he served on the Staff of the Third Fleet during the invasion of NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES and on the Staff of the Second Fleet during the MIDWAY and SOLOMONS actions. Subsequently he has served as Naval Aide to Prime Minister SUZUKI and Prime Minister HIGASHI. He was intelligent, well groomed, and accurate and concise in answers to all questions.

Staff, Third Fleet
 
 
PHILIPPINE,
NETHERLANDS  
EAST INDIES
December 1941-
July 1942
 
Staff, Second Fleet
 
MIDWAY,
SOLOMONS
July 1942-
April 1943
Navy Department Training Section  
 
TOKYO
 
April 1943-
April 1945
Prime Minister's Aide (SUZUKI)
 
TOKYO
 
April 1945-
August 1945
Prime Minister's Aide (HIGASHI)
 
TOKYO
 
August 1945-
September 1945

--550--

INOGUCHI, Rikihei, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 12

INOGUCHI was an officer of 23 years service, and although not himself an aviator, he spent the last year and a half of the war in aviation activities. In August 1944 he became Chief of Staff of the First Air Fleet in the PHILIPPINES, the unit which first employed organized suicide tactics. INOGUCHI was a difficult witness, attempting continually to take charge of the interview and to return to the discussion of his favorite subject, the philosophy of Kamikaze. His testimony, although of limited interest, was considered credible.

Gunnery Aviation
Commanding Officer, 153rd Air Corps
 
NEW GUINEA  
 
February 1944-
June 1944
Senior Staff Officer, 23rd Air Squadron  
 
CELEBES
 
July 1944-
August 1944
Chief of Staff, 1st Air Fleet
 
PHILIPPINES
FORMOSA
August 1944-
March 1945

INOUE, Isamu, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 66

INOUE served 21 years in the regular Navy. During this period he specialized in aircraft communications. He was Air Officer on the CHITOSE (CVE) in the Transport Force at the Battle of MIDWAY, and in the Detached Unit at the Battle of Eastern SOLOMONS, 23-25 August 1945. Although this officer was in only minor action he appeared reticent about providing information concerning his ship. However the information obtained was verified by official documents.

Training Department, Air Headquarters TOKYO    1939-1941
Air Officer, CHITOSE(CVE) 1941-1942
Staff Officer, Naval Base YOKOSUKA 1942-1944
Commanding Officer, YOKOSUKA Air Group 1944-1945
Staff Officer, 10th Air Fleet 1945
Staff Officer, 15th Combined Air Group 1945

ISAWA, Yutaka, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 19

ISAWA was a regular officer with 20 years experience. He was aboard the HARUNA during the invasion of the PHILIPPINES and the Battle of MIDWAY. He later served in a destroyer squadron in the SOLOMONS Area. He was cooperative and well informed and his information regarding the activities of the Second Fleet proved to be substantially accurate.

HARUNA (Gunnery)
PHILIPPINES   
MIDWAY
December 1941-
October 1942
2nd Destroyer Squadron   
SOLOMONS
October 1942-
May 1943
Naval Academy
ETA JIMA
May 1943-
March 1944
Navy Department
TOKYO
March 1944-
March 1945
5th Air Fleet
KYUSHU
March 1945-
August 1945

ISHIHARA, Kawakita, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 17

ISHIHARA served 24 years in the regular Navy. As a member of the Staff of the Third Fleet in 1941 he actively participated in the detailed planning required for the intricate invasion of the PHILIPPINES and NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, and later aboard the flagship ASHIGARA he witnessed the execution of the above plans. After completion of the occupation of JAVA, ISHIHARA returned to TOKYO where

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he was attached to GUMMU KYAKU, Military Affairs Bureau of Navy Ministry. He was frank and quick witted and furnished accurate information upon request.

Staff, Third Fleet
 
 
PHILIPPINES,
NETHERLANDS   
EAST INDIES
June 1940-
April 1941
 
Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry   

TOKYO

April 1941-
August

ITO, Sukemitsu, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 23

ITO was a regular officer of 26 years service and also a naval aviator of 3,000 hours flight time. As Commanding Officer of a 6-plane flying boat unit of the TOKO Squadron he moved into KISKA the day following the initial landing, and conducted air searches and a few bombing missions during the early part of the KISKA occupation. His unit was withdrawn on 17 August 1942, after 3 planes were put out of commission by U.S. naval bombardment. He was well qualified to speak on conditions for the operation of flying boats in summer in the Western ALEUTIANS. His recollection of details was reasonably accurate.

Staff Officer,
1st Naval Air Technical Arsenal
YOKOSUKA
December 1941-
January 1942
Commanding Officer,
TOKO Seaplane Group
YOKOHAMA   
February 1942-
March 1943
Personnel Officer,
Naval Air Headquarters
TOKYO
April 1943-
June 1945
Commanding Officer, 724th Air Group   
MISAWA
July 1945-
September 1945

ITO, Taisuke, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 24

ITO was a regular officer of 21 years service and also a naval aviator of 2,000 hours flight time. His position as Air Officer on the Staff of the Fifth Fleet made him particularly qualified to provide information on the initial planning for the occupation of the Western ALEUTIANS and the early operations after the occupation took place. ITO was intelligent and cooperative and quite well informed on the major points of the campaign. Since he spoke entirely from memory, and had visited the ALEUTIANS only once, he could not provide details.

Air Officer, Fifth Fleet Staff
 
PARAMUSHIRO   
 
August 1941-
November 1942
Board of Awards, Naval Headquarters   
 
TOKYO
 
November 1942-
May 1944
Air Officer, Central Pacific Staff
 
SAIPAN
 
May 1944
June 1944
Senior Staff Officer, 61st Air Flotilla
 
PELELIU
 
June 1944-
July 1944
Hospitalized
 
YOKOSUKA
 
August 1944-
September 1944
Senior Staff Officer, 2nd Air Fleet
 
FUJISAWA
 
September 1944-
November 1944
1st Section, Naval Personnel Bureau
 
TOKYO
 
November 1944-
October 1945

KAMIDE, S., Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 74

KAMIDE served 28 years in the regular Japanese Navy. He was a pilot with over 2,000 hours flying time. Most of his war service was devoted to convoy coverage by aircraft in the FORMOSA Area. As Commanding Officer of the 901st Air Group he was associated with anti-submarine aircraft equipment and tactics with which

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he was thoroughly familiar. All information requested was furnished in a straight forward manner and later proved substantially accurate.

Commanding Officer, Kashima Air Flotilla   
 
KASUMIGAURA   
 
December 1941-
August 1942
Naval Air Headquarters
 
TOKYO
 
August 1942-
September 1943
Commanding Officer, 901st Air Group   
 
TATEYAMA
 
September 1943-
December 1944
Staff, 901st Air Group
 
SANKI
 
December 1944-
August 1945

KANAI, K., Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 40

KANAI was a regular naval officer, non-pilot, of 23 years active duty. At the outbreak of the war he headed the First Section of the First Department of the KOKUHOMBU; his assignment, the allocation and distribution of aircraft to combat units. In May 1943 he was ordered to RABAUL to head the General Affairs of the Southeast Air Depot of the 11th Air Flotilla.

This officer quietly and conservatively answered the questions put to him. He was reluctant to give estimates on non-combat attrition rates due to the fact that he had to rely entirely on memory.

Head of 1st Section of 1st Department,
Koku Hombu
TOKYO
 
July 1941-
May 1943
Head of General Affairs of Southeastern
Air Depot, 11th Air Flotilla
RABAUL
 
May 1943-
April 1944
Head of Supply Department, KISARAZU   
 
KISARAZU
 
May 1944-
July 1945
Commanding Officer, 1001st Air Group
 
SUZUKA
 
July 1945-
October 1945
Attached to YOKOSUKA Naval Base YOKOSUKA    October 1945

KANEKO, Rinsuke, Colonel, I.J.A.
Nav No. 94

KANEKO served 18 years in the regular Army. Almost all of his wartime service was in the RABAUL-NEW GUINEA areas where he was a member of the Staff of the 4th Air Army. Although apparently well informed and willing to give accurate answers to all direct questions his manner was quite different from that of most Japanese Naval Officers. He refused to "warm up" and remained tense at all times. He exerted considerable effort towards behaving as a conquered man and was continually bowing from the waist, standing at attention and acting as though he expected a slap or kick momentarily.

Japanese Embassy
 
PERU
 
December 1941-
January 1942
Army Air Headquarters
 
TOKYO
 
January 1942-
June 1943
Staff, 8th Area Army
 
RABAUL
 
July 1943-
August 1943
Staff, 4th Air Army
 
RABAUL   
WEWAK
August 1943-
September 1944
MANILA Army Air Depot    MANILA
 
September 1944-
January 1945
Army Affairs Ministry
 
TOKYO
 
January 1945-
August 1945

696691 O - 46 - 16

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KATO, Kenkichi, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 83

KATO served 29 years in the regular Navy. He served as the Executive Officer of the CHOKAI (CA) at the Battle of MIDWAY, and SAVO Island and as Executive Officer of the MUSASHI (BB) when it was sunk in LEYTE Gulf. Following these actions he was assigned duty ashore during the remainder of the war. He presented a detailed description of the above actions from memory. This information has been verified in other interrogations.

Executive Officer, CHOKAI (CA) 1941-1942
Executive Officer, MUSASHI (BB) 1942-1944
Staff, KURE Guard Unit Executive Officer
Naval Barracks
KURE
 :
1944-1945
 :

KATSUMATA, Seize, Rear Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 31

KATSUMATA served 27 years in the regular Navy. His wartime duties were chiefly with Air Groups. He appeared to answer questions to the best of his ability but his knowledge of the subjects upon which he was interrogated was limited.

Head Instructor, Naval Mechanical and
Engineering School
December 1941-
September 1942
Hospitalized
 
September 1942-
March 1943
Commanding Officer, SAGAMINO Air Group   
 
April 1943-
March 1944
Commanding Officer, 18th Combined
Air Group
April 1944-
February 1945
Commanding Officer, 22nd Combined
Air Group
March 1945-
July 1945
Commanding Officer, 101st Air Flotilla
 
July 1945-
10 October 1945

KAWABE, Torashiro, Lieutenant General, I.J.A.
Nav No. 98

KAWABE was of that group, probably predominating in senior Army positions, who felt the war should have been carried on "to the very end" in the hope that heavy casualties to U.S. landing forces would result in peace terms better than unconditional surrender.

While he spoke freely and was obviously intelligent and able, KAWABE displayed a limited understanding of sea power and appreciation of the problems of war other than on the continent and in MANCHURIA. This narrow view was likewise probably shared by the bulk of JAPAN'S Army officers. KAWABE understood English fairly well, but conversed in his native tongue.

Chief, General Affairs Section,
Army Bureau Aeronautics
December 1941-
April 1943
Commander, Air Army
 
MANCHURIA   
 
May 1943-
August 1944
Deputy Chief, Army Bureau Aeronautics   
 
August 1944-
April 1945
Deputy Chief, Army General Staff
 
April 1945-
End of War.

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KAWAGUCHI, Susumu, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No.2

KAWAGUCHI served 24 years in the regular Navy. He was an aircraft pilot and specialist in aircraft gunnery. During this interview KAWAGUCHI answered all questions within his knowledge in a precise manner. Unfortunately his action experience was limited to the Battle of MIDWAY. The accuracy of his information has been substantiated by later interrogations.

Air Officer, HIRYU (CV)
 
March 1942-
June 1942
Executive Officer,
Naval Air Station
KANOYA   
 
June 1942-
September 1942
Commanding Officer,
Naval Air Station
KANOYA
 
October 1942-
November 1944
Additional Duty in Ordnance   
Test Flight Department,
Naval Technical Air
Arsenal
1942-1944



Ordnance Officer, Staff, Air
High Command Headquarters,
Navy Department
November 1944-
1945

KIJIMA, Kikunori, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 106

KIJIMA served 24 years in the regular Navy. During 1941 and 1942 he served as Chief of Staff of the Sixth Cruiser Squadron, on the AOBA (CA), Flagship. During this period he was present at the occupation of WAKE Island, GUAM, RABAUL, Battle of the CORAL SEA and the Battle of Cape ESPERANCE. KIJIMA was extremely tense and reticent during the interrogation, although the information obtained has subsequently been found to be correct. In checking upon his attitude and veracity of statements it was reported by other Japanese Naval Officers that he had a good service reputation. However he considered the defeat of the Sixth Cruiser Squadron and the death of Admiral GOTO at the Battle of Cape ESPERANCE to be his responsibility. In view of this mishap and its contribution to the defeat of Japan, he was contemplating atonement through Hara Kiri.

Chief of Staff, Sixth Cruiser Squadron 1941-1942
Chief of Staff, Third Cruiser Squadron    1942-1943
Construction Department TOKYO    1943-1945

KOMOTO, H., Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 71

KOMOTO served 20 years in the regular Navy. He was an active pilot with 1,500 hours in the air. As Flight Leader of the 753rd Air Group and later as Operations Officer on the Staff of the 23rd Air Flotilla he participated in most of the Naval land-based air operations in the CELEBES and Western NEW GUINEA Areas from February 1943 until July 1944. He was well acquainted with the above theatre and furnished accurate and detailed information upon request.

Personnel Bureau
 
TOKYO
 
October 1940-
January 1943
Flight Leader, 753rd Air Group   
 
CELEBES
 
February 1943-
June 1943
Staff, 23rd Air Flotilla
 
CELEBES
 
June 1943-
July 1944
Flight Leader
 
KASUNUGAURA   
 
July 1944-
June 1945
Military Affairs Bureau
 
TOKYO
 
June 1945-
August 1945

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KOMURA, Keizo, Rear Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 106

KOMURA served 32 years in the regular Navy. While Commanding Officer of the CHIKUMA (CA) he provided cruiser escort for the aircraft carriers at the Battle of MIDWAY, the battleships at the Battle of the Eastern SOLOMONS and at SANTA CRUZ. In the latter action he was wounded when his ship was damaged by dive-bombers. This officer was of unusual Japanese stature, being about six feet tall and weighing approximately 220 pounds. He had a rather domineering attitude towards other Japanese in his presence and arrogance towards the interrogator, although this attitude was not continued throughout the interrogation. His aide constantly checked his statements by official documents. The information obtained agreed with other testimony.

Commanding Officer, CHIKUMA (CA) 1941-1942
Commanding Officer, FUZO (BB) 1942-1943
Commanding Officer, MUSASHI (BB) 1943
Chief of Staff, Third Fleet
(First Task Force Fleet)
1943-1944
 
Commanding Officer, 1st Air Flotilla 1944
Commanding Officer, 2nd Torpedo Flotilla 1944-1945
Chief of Staff, YOKOSUKA Naval Base 1945

KOYAMA, Tadashi, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 85

KOYAMA served 25 years in the regular Navy. As Chief of Staff of the 6th Destroyer Squadron he participated in the planning and operations incident to the Japanese Capture of Wake Island. During the closing months of the war he was Commanding Officer of the 16th Special Attack Force which was a one-man torpedo unit. KOYAMA was very cooperative and his answers to questions were both accurate and complete.

Chief of Staff
6th Destroyer Squadron
MARSHALL ISLAND  
 
June 1941-
December 1942
Naval Technical Headquarters
 
TOKYO
 
January 1942-
April 1945
Commanding Officer, 16th
Special Attack Force
ARASHI
 
April 1945-
August 1945

KOYANAGI, Tomiji, Rear Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 35

KOYANAGI served 30 years in the regular Navy. During the first twelve months of the war he was Commanding Officer of the battleship KONGO, flagship of Battleship Division 3 which was then under the command of Vice Admiral Takeo KURITA. Promoted Rear Admiral in November 1942, KOYANAGI commanded a destroyer squadron until July 1943 when he became Chief of Staff to Admiral KURITA, then CinC Second Fleet. Severely wounded by fragments from a near miss on 26 October, he returned to duty only with the end of the war. KOYANAGI answered questions frankly and directly and was considered a reliable witness.

Commanding Officer, KONGO (BB)
 
  August 1941-
December 1942
2nd Torpedo Squadron
 
December 1942-
January 1943
10th Squadron
 
  January 1943-
June 1943
Chief of Staff, Second Fleet
 
July 1943-
November 1944
Hospital and Rest
 
  November 1944-
August 1945
Principal of Navy Torpedo College  
 
YOKOSUKA  
August 1945-
September 1945
YOKOSUKA Naval District
 
YOKOSUKA
September 1945

--556--

KURITA, Takeo, Vice Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 90

KURITA served 38 years in the regular Navy. As Rear Admiral he was in command of Cruiser Division 7 from September 1940 to July 1942. Promoted Vice Admiral, he then commanded Battleship Division 3 until July 1943 when he became CinC Second Fleet, in which capacity he took part in the battles of June and October 1944. When interrogated, KURITA appeared somewhat on the defensive, giving only the briefest of replies prior to the discussion of the actual engagement of the 25th. In some instances his memory for details such as times, cruising dispositions, etc. appeared to be inaccurate.

Commanding Officer, 7th Cruiser Division
 
September 1940-
July 1942
Commanding Officer, 3rd Battleship Division  
 
July 1942-
July 1943
CinC Second Fleet
 
July 1943-
December 1944
President Naval Academy
 
December 1944-
End of War

KUWAHARA, Tadao, Commander, I.J.N.R.
Nav No. 51, 53

KUWAHARA in peace time served as Captain of a large N.Y.K. passenger ship on the transPacific run to SAN FRANCISCO. He served in the Navy for 37 months of World War II as navigator of two vessels and as Commanding Officer of an escort vessel engaged in protection of convoys. This officer appeared to have a good memory and referred to a personal note book for many of the details given during interrogation.

Chief Navigator, CHUYO (CVE)
 
Central PACIFIC
 
August 1942-
February 1943
Chief Navigator, ASAKA MARU  
 
ALEUTIANS
 
February 1943-
December 1943
Student of A. S. W. School
 
KURIHAMA
 
January 1944-
April 1944
Commanding Officer,
Sub-chaser #33
JAPAN to MARIANA  
 
April 1944-July 1944
 
Chief Technician and later
Commanding Officer,
UKURU (escort)
CHINA SEAS

July 1944-February 1945

Office of Military Affairs
Merchant Crew recruiting
TOKYO
February 1945-
August 1945

MATSUDA, Chiaki, Rear Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 69

MATSUDA served 32 years in the regular Navy. Although his experience had been predominantly battleships, he was assigned in May 1944 to command of Carrier Division 4, composed of JUNYO, RYUJO, and the converted battleships ISE and HYUGA, which command he held until the division was disbanded in March 1945. MATSUDA was an exceedingly agreeable and cooperative witness and his testimony was considered generally accurate, although there was perhaps some effort at self justification in the account of the movements of ISE and HYUGA on the night of 24-25 October.

Commanding Officer, SETTSU (target ship)
 
February 1940-
February 1942
Commanding Officer, HYUGA (BB)
 
February 1942-
December 1942
Commanding Officer, YAMATO (BB)
 
December 1942-
September 1943
Attached to Naval General Staff
 
September 1943-
April 1944
Commanding Officer, 4th Aircraft Squadron
 
May 1944-
February 1945
Commanding Officer, YOKOSUKA Naval Air  
Corps
February 1945-
September 1945

--557--

MATSUURA, Goro, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 30

MATSUURA was an officer of 17 years service in the regular Navy and a naval aviator with 1800 hours flying time. Almost his entire service in World War II was spent on Staffs of various Air Commands and in Naval Headquarters, TOKYO.

Staff, Third Fleet
 
 
PHILIPPINES,
NETHERLANDS  
EAST INDIES
December 1941-
December 1942
 
Student, Naval War College
 
December 1942-
May 1943
Air Corps
 
TINIAN
 
June 1943-
September 1943
Staff, 22nd Air Flotilla
 
MARSHALLS,
MARIANAS
October 1943-
February 1944
Staff, Central PACIFIC Area Fleet   MARIANAS
 
March 1944-
May 1944
Staff, 1st Air Fleet
 
MARIANAS-
PHILIPPINES  
June 1944-
August 1944
Staff, Navy General Headquarters
 
TOKYO
 
September 1944-
March 1945
Staff, Combined Fleet
 
TOKYO
 
April 1945-
August 1945

MATSUYAMA, Mitsaharu, Rear Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 57, 61

MATSUYAMA was an officer of 37 years service in the regular Navy. His activities during World War II were largely concerned with escort and protection of shipping. He commanded escort groups in the BISMARKS in the later part of 1942 and in the South CHINA SEA in 1944. He witnessed the First Battle of SAVO Island as an observer.

Chief, Naval Barracks and Garrison Group  
 
KURE
 
August 1941-
June 1942
Commanding Officer, 18th Battle Corps
 
Eastern NEW GUINEA  
 
June 1942-
January 1943
Director, Gunnery School
 
TATEYAMA
 
January 1943-
November 1943
Navy General Headquarters
 
TOKYO
 
November 1943-
April 1944
Commanding Officer, 7th Escort Group  
 
South CHINA SEA
 
April 1944-
December 1944
Member, Grand Escort Fleet
 
TOKYO
 
December 1944-
May 1945
Commanding Officer, 105th Battle Corps
 
May 1945-
September 1945

MATSUZAKI, Akira, Rear Admiral I.J.N.
Nav No. 59, 105

MATSUZAKI was a regular officer with 30 years experience. As Chief of Staff of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet at SOERABAJA and later as Chief of Staff of OSAKA Naval Station he had an opportunity to become

--558--

very familiar with the defensive phases of mine warfare. He was extremely cooperative and made every effort to furnish in accurate detail all information requested.

Officer in Charge, 1st Section
General Affairs Section, Naval
Technical Department
TOKYO
 
 
November 1942-
April 1943
 
Chief of Staff, Second Southern
Expeditionary Fleet
SOERABAJA  
 
April 1943-
February 1945
Chief of Staff, OSAKA Naval Station  
 
OSAKA
 
February 1945-
August 1945

MINAMI, Rokuemon, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 62

MINAMI served 20 years in the regular Navy. He saw active duty as commander of a destroyer squadron and from 1944 to end of war was Senior Staff Officer of the First Escort Fleet with headquarters at TAKAO and later MOJI. At MOJI he was also charged with the defense of SHIMONESEKI Straits against minelaying B-29's. MINAMI was intelligent and cooperative and answered all questions quickly and accurately.

Navy Department, Military
Affairs Bureau
TOKYO  
 
December 1941-
December 1943
Commander, 10th Destroyer Squadron
 
TRUK
 
January 1944-
November 1944
Staff, First Escort Fleet
 
TAKAO
 
December 1944-
February 1945
Staff, First Escort Fleet and Seventh Fleet  
 
MOJI
 
February 1945-
August 1945

MIURA, Kintaro, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 21

MIURA was a regular officer of 15 years service and also a naval aviator of 2,500 hours flight time. He participated in the early float plane operations from KISKA as air officer of the seaplane carrier KAMIKAWA MARU. He returned to the North PACIFIC as Staff Air officer of the Fifth Fleet and the 12th Air Fleet. He witnessed the KOMANDORSKIS action as a Staff Officer aboard the NACHI. While MIURA had valuable knowledge of many of the ALEUTIAN Operations it was proved that he made positive statements about details upon which his memory was incorrect, - examples were: an error of two hours in the time of the KOMANDORSKI engagement, the number of destroyers present which were 4 instead of 6, the number of ships engaged in the KISKA evacuation, and his statement that these ships had no radar. He spoke freely, but tended to minimize damage to both Japanese and U.S. Forces.

Air Officer, KAMIKAWA MARU (CVS)
 
December 1941-
December 1942
Staff, Fifth Fleet
 
North PACIFIC  
 
December 1942-
August 1942
Staff, 12th Air Fleet
 
North PACIFIC
 
August 1943-
March 1944
Senior Officer, USA Air Group
 
March 1944-
August 1944
Staff, 25th Air Squadron
 
OKINAWA
 
August 1944-
October 1944
Staff, 2nd Air Fleet
 
PHILIPPINES
 
October 1944-
December 1944
Staff, 12th Air Fleet
 
HOKKAIDO
 
December 1944-
June 1945
Senior Officer, YOKOSUKA Air Group  
 
MISAWA
 
June 1945-
October 1945

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MIWA, Shigeyoshi, Vice Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 72

MIWA, a submarine specialist, served 35 years in the Navy. After commanding a submarine squadron for the first five months of the war, he had duty ashore until July 1944 when he became CinC, Sixth Fleet in which post he had operational control of the Japanese submarine force. MIWA appeared cooperative, capable, and sincere, answering all questions without reluctance with the single exception of those which had political implications.

Commanding Officer,
3rd Submarine Squadron
SAEKI
 
November 1940-
April 1942
Sick
 
May 1942-
December 1942
Chief, 7th Section Technical Headquarters  
 
TOKYO  
 
December 1942-
April 1943
Commanding Officer, Submarine Section,
Navy Ministry
TOKYO
 
May 1943-
July 1944
Commander in Chief, Sixth Fleet
 
KURE
 
July 1944-
May 1945
Attached to General Staff
(Gunreibu Officer)
TOKYO
 
May 1945-
September 1945

MIYAMOTO, T., Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 32

MIYAMOTO served 18 years in the regular Navy. As a Staff Officer of the Second Fleet he performed gunnery duties, and was aboard the YAMATO during the abortive attempt of this group to attack U.S. Forces at OKINAWA in early April. Upon return to JAPAN as a survivor he was assigned to the Training Bureau of the Navy Department and remained there until the end of the war. MIYAMOTO gave an excellent eye-witness account of the sinking of the YAMATO and the actions involving this group.

Commanding Officer, KINUGASA (CA)  
 
December 1941-
June 1942
Staff, 2nd Air Fleet
 
June 1942-
June 1943
Naval Staff College (Student)
 
July 1943-
March 1944
Staff, Second Fleet
 
March 1944-
April 1944
Assigned to Training Bureau of  
Navy Department
April 1944-
End of War

MIYAZAKI, Takashi, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 97

MIYAZAKI served 21 years in the regular Navy. He was an observer with over 2,000 hours flight time. He was in RABAUL during the violent air action in 1942 and 1943 and is thoroughly familiar with all phases of the Japanese naval land-based air effort. He answered all questions readily and accurately and appeared anxious to furnish all information possible.

Naval Air Station
 
KASUMIGAURA  
 
December 1941-
September 1942
Commanding Officer, 4th Air Squadron  
 
RABAUL
 
September 1942-
March 1943
Staff, 25th Air Flotilla
 
RABAUL
 
March 1943-
November 1944
Technical Department
 
YOKOSUKA
 
March 1944-
February 1945
Staff, 5th Air Fleet
 
KANOYA
 
February 1945-
August 1945

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MIZUTANI, Katsuji, Commander, I.J.N.R.
Nav No. 111

MIZUTANI, who had civilian experience as a former chief officer and master of N.Y.K. vessels, served throughout World War II as commanding officer of various escort vessels. His recollection of details of various air and submarine attacks was excellent and his answers to questions were carefully considered. He spoke fair English.

Commanding Officer, No. 3 Chaser
 
East CHINA SEA
 
April 1941-
December 1943
Commanding Officer, No.4 Coastal Escort
 
MARIANAS, South  
HONSHU
April 1944-
February 1945
Commanding Officer, No. 112 Chaser Group  
 
OWASE
 
April 1945-
August 1945

MORI, Kokichi, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 58

MORI, who had 15 years service in the Navy, specialized in destroyers and in March 1944 was assigned to the Staff of Commander in Chief Fifth Fleet as Torpedo Officer. In this capacity he took part in the abortive effort of the Fifth Fleet in the Battle of SURIGAO Strait. MORI appeared competent, intelligent, and helpful, with an excellent memory for detail.

Captain, MUTSUKI (DD)
 
December 1941-
August 1942
Staff, 16th Squadron
 
August 1942-
February 1943
Captain, SAWAKAZE (DD)  
 
March 1943-
May 1943
Student, Naval Staff College
 
May 1943-
February 1944
Staff, Fifth Fleet
 
February 1944-
February 1945
Navy Headquarters
 
February 1945-
September 1945

MUKAI, Nifumi, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 22

MUKAI was a regular officer of 20 years service. He commanded No.3 Special Naval Landing Force which first occupied KISKA Island, and remained as Senior Officer of the Naval Defense Force when the garrison expanded. He was present at the final evacuation of the island, hence his experience spans the entire period during which the Japanese were at KISKA. He spoke frankly and with interest. His recollection of details was reasonably accurate.

Commanding Officer, S.N.L.F.
 
KISKA
 
May 1942-
30 June 1942
Senior Officer, Defense Force  
 
KISKA
 
July 1942-
July 1943
Senior Officer, Defense Force
 
KURILES  
 
August 1943-
April 1944
Commanding Officer,
AINOURA Naval Barracks
SASEBO
 
April 1944-
October 1945

NABESHIMA, Shunsaku, Rear Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 96

NABESHIMA's most important assignments during World War II were command of the heavy cruiser MAYA during the first year and Chief of Staff, Fourth Fleet between December 1942 and December 1943. In the latter

--561--

position he was engaged in strengthening JAPAN's Central PACIFIC defenses against U.S. invasion of the GILBERTS and MARSHALLS.

Although familiar with the general plan and major steps taken for defense of those islands he was unable to recollect a number of important details.

Commanding Officer, MAYA (CA)
 
September 1941-
December 1942
Chief of Staff, Fourth Fleet
 
TRUK
 
December 1942-
December 1943
Officer in Charge, Anti-Sub Warfare School  
 
YOKOSUKA
 
January 1944-
May 1944
Commanding Officer,
SHIKOKU Area Naval District
TAKAMATSU  
 
June 1944-
October 1945

NAGANO, Osami, Fleet Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 80

As his duties would indicate, NAGANO was probably the most authoritative senior naval officer surviving the war. In common with most naval men of his background and experience, he expressed initial opposition to the war and to the Three Power Pact, and decried the (Army) practice of service personnel participating in politics.

NAGANO was thoroughly co-operative, was keenly alert and intelligent, and seemed anxious to develop American friendship. He understood English readily, but normally preferred discussion through an interpreter.

Chief Delegate, London Travel Conference 1935
Navy Minister, HIROTA Cabinet
 
May 1936-
June 1937
Commander in Chief, First & Combined Fleets   December 1937
Chief, Naval General Staff
 
April 1941-
February 1944
Supreme Naval Advisor to Emperor
 
February 1944-
End of War

NAKAJIMA, Chikataka, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 34 and 100

NAKAJIMA had 19 years of service in the regular Navy. Most of his service in World War II was in communication, intelligence and planning duties. On the Staff, Second and Combined Fleets his specific duties were assembling intelligence, preparing estimates of the enemy's capabilities and intentions and presenting this material to the staff as a basis for discussion. During interrogation he gave the impression of being an alert observer and conversant with the factors and discussions which influenced major decisions in Japanese naval planning.

Staff, Second Fleet, AT AGO (F)
 
December 1941-
July 1942
Staff, Third Fleet, ZUIKAKU & SHOKAKU (F)  
 
July 1942-
October 1943
Staff, Combined Fleet, MASASHI (F)
 
November 1943-
August 1945

NISHIKAWA, Lieutenant Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 66

NISHIKAWA served about 8 years in the regular Navy. At the Battle of MIDWAY he was Gunnery Officer of the MOGAMI (CA) which was damaged by dive-bombers. Information obtained from this officer was later verified by the Commanding Officer of the MOGAMI.

Gunnery Officer, MOGAMI (CA)   1941-1943
Gunnery Officer, IWATE (OCA) 1943-1945

NISHINO, Shigeru, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 79

NISHINO had 18 years of naval service. During the greater part of the war he commanded destroyers. As he was the only surviving commanding officer of the force under Vice Admiral NISHIMURA which attempted to force the southern entrance to LEYTE Gulf on the morning of 25 October 1944, his testimony is of particular

--562--

if fortuitous value. NISHINO appeared greatly flattered by being summoned for interrogation, and answered all questions to the best of his ability. His testimony was considered generally reliable.

Commanding Officer, TSUGA (DD)
 
December 1941-
July 1942
Executive Officer, TAKAO Guard Unit
 
July 1942-
November 1943
Commanding Officer, SHIGURE (DD)
 
December 1943-
November 1944
Commanding Officer, NATSUZUKI (DD)  
 
February 1945
to Present

NOMURA, Kichisaburo, Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 90

NOMURA was an extremely capable individual, versed in history and foreign affairs, and apparently completely frank in discussing the past and current troubles in Japan. He had long been accepted as pro-American, and it was perhaps for this reason that he was sent as Ambassador to the UNITED STATES in 1941, at the instigation of senior naval officers who hoped for success of his mission in avoiding war.

NOMURA had a very good understanding of English and preferred to discuss matters in that language, but his pronunciation sometimes left a good deal to be desired.

Naval Attache, UNITED STATES 1916-1918
Attended WASHINGTON Naval Conference   1921
Varied duties on Naval General Staff 1921
Councilor, Supreme War Council 1933-1937
Foreign Minister, ABE Cabinet 1939
Ambassador, UNITED STATES
Repatriated
March 1941-
July 1942
Ambassador-at-large
 
July 1942-
December 1942
Appointed to Privy Council May 1945

NOMURA, Ryosuke, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 116

NOMURA served seventeen years in the regular Navy. He is a pilot with 3,200 hours flight time. During the entire war he was attached to operating air units ranging from KENDARI to RABAUL to KYUSHU. He was thoroughly familiar with all air phases of the war including the Kamikaze attacks on OKINAWA for which he did the daily planning. He also planned the suicide attack on ULITHI and attacks against the BUNKER HILL and other carriers. He was an alert and intelligent officer and showed a keen professional interest in all technical and operational matters pertaining to aviation.

23rd Air Flotilla
 
 
 
TAKAO, JOLO,  
TARAKAN,
BALIKPAPAN,
KENDARI
June 1941-
November 1942
 
 
11th Air Fleet
 
RABAUL
 
November 1942-
June 1943
Naval Academy
 
TOKYO
 
June 1943-
March 1944
Air Technical Dept.  
 
TOKYO
 
March 1944-
August 1944
51st Air Group
 
KYUSHU
 
August 1944-
November 1944
25th Air Group
 
KYUSHU
 
November 1944-
February 1945
5th Air Fleet
 
KYUSHU
 
February 1945-
June 1945
72nd Air Group
 
KYUSHU
 
June 1945-
August 1945

--563--

OHARA, Hisashi, Captain I.J.N.
Nav No. 39

OHARA served twenty-three years in the regular Navy. He was Executive Officer on the SORYU (CV) and was wounded when it was sunk at the Battle of MIDWAY, 4 June 1942. During interrogation he was a stolid individual but answered all questions in a direct manner. Information obtained has been verified through other interrogations or documents. Upon being released from the hospital following the MIDWAY action he was assigned to shore duty only.

Hydraulic Bureau, Navy Department 1941
Executive Officer, SORYU (CV) 1942
Hospital 1942
Hydraulic Bureau, Navy Department 1942-1943
Southern Sea Route Department SOERABAJA 1943-1945
Navigation Instructor, Naval College   YOKOSUKA 1945

OHMAE, Toshikazu, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 36, 38, 42, 43, 95, 109

OHMAE was a most prolific source of information on all phases of the war, both operational and planning information. His wide background of experience together with his intelligence and insight into naval operations and planning, made him the most reliable and accurate source of information developed in JAPAN. He was quite eager in making available all source of information and most frank in his comments and opinions.

OHMAE was the guiding spirit behind the Naval Research Department of the Navy Ministry, which department furnished the bulk of the information obtained by the Naval Analysis Division.

Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Department  
 
1939-
June 1942
Senior Staff Officer,
Southwest Fleet at RABAUL
June 1942-
December 1943
Senior Staff Officer, Third Fleet,  
later Chief of Staff
December 1943-
November 1944
Member, Naval General Staff
(Operational planning)
January 1945-
End of war.

OI, Atsushi, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 11 and 102

OI's 25 years of Naval service included training at the Naval War College and numerous assignments to staff duty. He acquired thorough familiarity with the Japanese organization for control and protection of shipping during World War II through his work on the Staff of Combined Escort Forces from its organization in November 1943 until the war's end.

Bureau of Personnel, Navy Department
 
TOKYO
 
March 1941-
March 1943
Staff, 21st Minor Base Force
 
SOERABAJA  
 
23 March 1943-
25 June 1943
Naval General Staff
 
TOKYO
 
2 July 1943-
14 November 1943
Staff, Combined Escort Forces
 
TOKYO
 
15 November 1943-
21 September 1945
Bureau of Military Affairs, Navy Department  
 
TOKYO
 
22 September 1945
 

OKAMOTO, T. Lieutenant Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 48, 63

OKAMOTO was a naval aviator of 12 years service and 2600 hours flying experience. He performed aviation duties afloat and ashore during World War II, served in CHINA and the MARIANAS and during the latter part of the war was staff officer of the First Escort Fleet and at the General Headquarters for Naval Escort in

--564--

TOKYO. He is familiar with procedures used in air protection of convoys and the employment of the Japanese Magnetic Air-borne Detector.

Senior Aviator
 
NAGATO and HIEI  
 
December 1941-
August 1942
Naval Air Corps
 
SHANGHAI
 
September 1942-
March 1943
Staff, 1st Squadron
 
MALAY, SAIPAN
 
April 1943-
July 1943
Staff, 1st Task Force, ZUIKAKU (F)  
 
August 1943-
October 1943
Staff, First Escort Fleet
 
MALAY, JAPAN
 
November 1943-
June 1944
Headquarters, Naval Escort Forces
 
TOKYO
 
July 1944-
August 1945

OKUMIYA, Masatake, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No.8, 16, 20, 27, 93

OKUMIYA was experienced, intelligent and logical. His professional interest and enthusiasm were combined with accuracy, frankness and a knowledge of detail which made him an excellent source of information. He was for 14 years a commissioned officer in the regular Navy, served for the last 12 years as a naval aviator logging 2,000 hours of flight time. After 2 years service on a light cruiser and destroyer, he learned to fly. Thereafter he served in carrier air groups, on board carriers, and on carrier air staffs.

Division Officer, YOKOSUKA Air Group   1939-1941
Aviation Instructor,
KASUMIGAURA Air Station
1941-1942
 
Air Staff Officer, 4th and 2nd Air Flotilla 1942-1944
Air Staff Officer, Naval General Staff
 
July 1944-
October 1945
Air Staff Officer, RYUJO ALEUTIANS   June 1942
Air Operation Officer
Staff, 2nd Flying Squadron
RABAUL
 
August 1942-
February 1944
Air Intelligence Office, Japanese
Naval Historical Research Department
TOKYO
 
August 1945
 

OKUNO, Y., Lieutenant (jg) I.J.N.
Nav No. 56

OKUNO left his studies at the Imperial University, TOKYO, in the middle of his third college year and commenced naval flight training in December 1943. He received about 75 hours flight time in training and was then sent to the First Escort Fleet Air Squadron. His total combat flight experience of about 200 hours was gained in missions connected with the protection of shipping in the South CHINA SEA. In April 1945, the remnants of his squadron were incorporated in the Special Attack Corps.

Flight Training
 
December 1943-
October 1944
Naval Aviator, 1st Escort Fleet Air Squadron  
 
FORMOSA
 
October 1944-
December 1944
Fleet Air Squadron
 
HONGKONG
 
December 1944-
February 1945
Fleet Air Squadron
 
AMOY & SHANGHAI   February 1945-
April 1945
Special Attack Corps
 
KYUSHU
 
April 1945-
August 1945

--565--

OMORI, Sentaro, Vice Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 78

OMARI was a regular officer of 30 years service. As Commander, 1st Destroyer Squadron he engaged in the planning for and the occupation of the Western ALEUTIANS. With regard to the ALEUTIAN Operations he evinced an accurate general knowledge of the campaign, but his memory of times and dates was not as accurate as those of his Chief of Staff, Captain ARICHIKA. He was Commander, 5th Cruiser Division and Officer in Tactical Command during the night cruiser action at EMPRESS AUGUSTA Bay, 1-2 November 1943. He drew from memory a track chart of this action which was accurate in detail.

Commander, 1st Destroyer Squadron
 
PEARL HARBOR  
ALEUTIANS
October 1940-
October 1942
Commander, 5th Cruiser Division, MYOKO (F)  
 
October 1942-
November 1943
Head of Torpedo School
 
YOKOSUKA
 
November 1943-
August 1945

OTANI, Tonosuke, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 51

OTANI, one of the youngest generation of Japanese naval officers, has had 17 years service. During the war he specialized in communications until August 1943 when he became Operations Officer on the Staff, Second Fleet. A cooperative witness, OTANI was believed on the whole to offer reliable testimony. He was obviously somewhat impatient of the traditionalist views of his seniors and certain that his uncorroborated statements should be taken with reserve.

5th Air Group
 
September 1941-
September 1942
Navy Staff College  
 
October 1942-
May 1943
12th Air Fleet
 
May 1943-
July 1943
Staff, Second Fleet
 
August 1943-
December 1944
Navy Department
 
December 1944-
end of war

OZAWA, Tokusaburo, Vice Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 55

OZAWA was one of the most experienced officers of the Japanese Navy, having held major commands afloat since well before the outbreak of war. In November 1942 he became CinC Third Fleet, and from March to September 1944, as CinC First Mobile Fleet, he had command over the Second Fleet as well. He was thus in overall command at the Battle of the PHILIPPINE SEA, and commanded the Japanese Northern Force in the Battle for LEYTE Gulf. OZAWA was an officer of impressive personality, dignified presence, and thoughtful habit of mind. While his memory for fine detail was not always precise his opinions were considered of the highest value.

Professor, Naval Academy 1935
Commanding Officer, Maya (CL) 1935
Commanding Officer, Haruna (BB) 1936-1937
Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet 1937-1938
Commanding Officer, Cruiser Squadron
Principal of Torpedo School
1938-1940
 
Commanding Officer, First Air Squadron
Commanding Officer, Battle Squadron
1940-1941
 
Commanding Officer, Dispatched Fleet to South  
Staff, Navy General Headquarters
1941-
July 1942
CinC Third Fleet
CinC Task Force with Third Fleet
November 1942-
March 1944
Vice Chief, Navy General Headquarters
CinC, Combined Fleet
November 1944-
May 1945

--566--

SASAKI, Akira Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 91

SASAKI was a former Assistant Naval Attache (air) at WASHINGTON about 1930. He offered no particular interest beyond details of duty stations, as given.

Staff, Combined Fleet
 
November 1941-
November 1942
Naval Staff College
 
November 1942-
March 1944
Staff, 12th Air Force
 
March 1943-
October 1943
YOKOSUKA Air Group  
 
March 1944-
July 1944
Staff, 3rd Air Fleet
 
July 1944-
End of War

SEKINO, H., Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No.8

SEKINO was an officer of 20 years experience in the regular Navy. He had specialized in communications and had had extensive Staff duty. He was Communication Officer on the Staff, 6th Cruiser Squadron on board the AOBA (CA), escorting the SHOHO (CV) when it was sunk in the Battle of the CORAL SEA, 7 May 1942. Although not very familiar with air operations, this officer willingly answered all questions without reserve. The accuracy of his statements from memory have subsequently been found quite correct when compared with official documents.

Communication Officer Staff,
6th Cruiser Squadron
October 1940-
June 1942
Communication Officer Staff,
11th Battleship Squadron
June-
December 1942
Communication Officer Staff, 25th Base Force
 
December 1942-
July 1943
Naval Staff College
 
July 1943-
September 1944
Communication Officer Staff, 2nd Air Fleet 1944-1945
Communication Officer TAISHA Air Base 1945
Communication Officer Staff, Combined Fleet  
 
10 August 1945 to
28 December 1945

SHIBATA, Bunzo, Captain
Nav No. 88

SHIBATA was an experienced naval aviator who had a considerable amount of command duty in operational units throughout the war. He was well informed and very interested in all phases of land-based aviation. He was cooperative to a high degree and answered all questions in a direct and intelligent manner.

Senior Staff Officer, 21st Air Flotilla
 
FORMOSA
 
December 1941-
March 1942
Staff, 26th Air Flotilla
 
KISARAZU
 
March 1942-
August 1942
Staff, 26th Air Flotilla
 
RABAUL
 
August 1942-
November 1942
YOKOSUKA Air Group
 
YOKOSUKA
 
January 1943-
March 1943
Commanding Officer, TOYOHASHI Air Group  
 
TOYOHASHI  
 
March 1943-
February 1944
Commanding Officer, 762nd Air Group
 
KANOYA
 
February 1944-
July 1944

--567--

Staff, 2nd Air Fleet
 
KYUSHU
 
July 1944-
December 1944
Commanding Officer, OMURA Air Group
 
OMURA
 
January 1945-
May 1945
Commanding Officer, NAGOYA Air Group  
 
NAGOYA
 
May 1945-
July 1945
Commanding Officer, MEIJI Air Group
 
MEIJI
 
July 1945-
end of war

SHIBATA, Otokichi, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 66, 107

SHIBATA served 20 years in the regular Navy as a line officer. At the Battle of MIDWAY he was Navigator of the SUZUYA (CA), operating in the 7th Cruiser Division. Following this assignment he served on several Escort Fleet Staffs, and was cognizant of convoy problems and losses. Although his ship had not been attacked, he displayed a professional knowledge of other ships of his division which had been damaged. His statements have been verified through other interrogations and official records.

Navigator, SUZUYA (CA) 1941-1942
Staff, Southwest Area Fleet, ASHIGARA (F)   1942-1943
Navy Department TOKYO 1943-1944
Staff, First Escort Fleet TAKAO, MOJI   1944-1945
Staff, Shipping Department UJIMA 1945

SHIKI, Tsuneo, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 82

SHTKI was a regular officer of 20 years service. He was assigned to duty in the Bureau of Naval Personnel during the war except for the period from November 1942 to August 1944 when he was Senior Staff Officer of the Second Fleet. He was present at RABAUL when units of the Second and Third Fleets received damage from the carrier aircraft raid on 5 November 1943.

Bureau of Personnel
 
TOKYO
 
7 December 1941-
November 1942
Senior Staff Officer, Second Fleet  
 
Central PACIFIC  
 
November 1942-
14 August 1944
Bureau of Personnel
 
TOKYO
 
14 August 1944-
15 August 1945

SHIMADA, Koichi, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 67

SHIMADA was a regular officer of 18 years service. He was not a naval aviator but had served as a naval aviation observer. As Air Officer on the Staff, Northeast Area Fleet from March 1944 to November 1944 he was well informed on the air bases and employment of units of the 12th Air Fleet in the North PACIFIC during that period. SHIMADA was cooperative and thorough in giving information. He spoke from memory, but took some time and pains to produce the table of employment of air units given in the record of interrogation.

Staff, 11th Air Fleet
 
FORMOSA
 
December 1941-
November 1942
Student, Staff College
 
TOKYO
 
November 1942-
May 1943
Staff, Combined Fleet, MUSASHI (F)
 
May 1943-
March 1944
Air Officer, Staff, Northeast Area Fleet  
 
CHITOSE
SHIMUSHU
March 1944-
November 1944
Air Officer Staff, Southwest Area Fleet
 
PHILIPPINES  
 
November 1944-
February 1945
Air Officer Staff, South Area Army
 
SAIGON
 
February 1945-
May 1945
General Affairs Section,
Naval Air Headquarters
TOKYO
 
May 1945-
October 1945

--568--

SHIMADA, Masuda, Major, I.J.A.
Nav No. 103

SHIMADA was a graduate of the Japanese Military Academy and Army War College. He served as Staff Officer throughout the war and was a member of the Military Affairs Section of the Army Headquarters in TOKYO. He presented a concise report concerning the deployment of Japanese Army troops in the KURILES. SHIMADA was intelligent, cooperative and painstaking in detail.

SHIMANOUCHI, Momochio, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 104

SHIMANOUCHI served 17 years in the regular Navy. From March 1944 he was a member of the Staff, 16th Cruiser Division, composed of the AOBA (F), OI, KINU and ASHIGARA. He participated in operations in the PHILIPPINE Area as well as the "KON" Operation which was an unsuccessful attempt to reinforce BIAK. He furnished a complete and detailed description of the above operation including the track chart.

Navy Department, Personnel Section  
 
TOKYO
 
December 1941-
March 1943
Staff, 16th CruDiv
 
PHILIPPINE  
 
March 1943-
October 1944
Naval Academy
 
ETA JIMA
 
October 1944-
October 1945

SHIRAICHI, Kayutaka, Vice Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No.7

SHIRAICHI served 42 years in the regular Navy. As Chief of Staff of Admiral KONDO, Commander of the Second Fleet, he participated in the initial invasions of the PHILIPPINES, NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES and MALAYA as well as the Battle of MIDWAY, and various operations in the SOLOMONS Area. Later as commander of the Seventh Cruiser Squadron he participated in the defense of the PHILIPPINES in 1944. Although undoubtedly a man of wide experience and general knowledge, SHIRAICHI appeared to be a broken and sad old man. He continually gazed into space and seemed unable to concentrate. He was not considered a good subject for interrogation.

Chief of Staff, Second Fleet
 
PHILIPPINES
MIDWAY, SOLOMONS  
December 1941-
March 1943
Naval Staff Academy
 
TOKYO
 
March 1943-
September 1943
Commanding Officer, 7th Cruiser Squadron  
 
PHILIPPINES
 
September 1943-
October 1944
Chief of Merchant Crews
 
TOKYO
 
October 1944-
August 1945

SOGAWA, Kiyoshi, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 102

SOGAWA had 17 years experience as a regular Naval officer. He served in destroyers prior to the war including one tour as commanding officer in 1940. The first year of the war was spent as a staff officer of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station from which he was transferred to the Naval General Staff in November 1942. His duties during the entire war were concerned with escort and protection of shipping.

Commanding Officer, HARUKAZE (DD)  
 
April 1940-
November 1940
Staff Officer
 
YOKOSUKA  
 
July 1941-
November 1942
Naval General Staff
 
TOKYO
 
November 1942-
October 1945

SOJI, Akira, Rear Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 83, 101

SOJI served 30 years in the regular Navy. As Commanding Officer of the MOGAMI he participated in the invasion of JAVA, (including the sinking of the USS HOUSTON and HMAS PERTH), the Battle of MIDWAY, where the MOGAMI suffered damage from a collision as well as from dive bombers, and SOLOMONS

696691 O - 46 - 19

--569--

Operations. Later as Commanding Officer of the NACHI he operated in the North PACIFIC. He was commissioned a Rear Admiral on 1 May 1944 and assigned duty as Commander of the First Transportation Corps with the responsibility of transporting supplies from FORMOSA to the PHILIPPINES. He returned to TOKYO in April 1945. SOJI appeared vigorous and athletic for a man of his age and although at times he was unable to remember exact details of engagements he attempted to furnish accurate and complete information upon request.

Commanding Officer, MOGAMI
 
JAVA, MIDWAY  
SOLOMONS
December 1941-
November 1942
Commanding Officer, NACHI
 
North PACIFIC
 
November 1942-
September 1943
Chief of Staff, Naval Station
 
MAIZURU
 
September 1944-
April 1945
Commanding Officer, 1st Transportation Corps  
 
FORMOSA
 
September 1944-
April 1945
Chief of Meteorological Department
 
TOKYO
 
April 1945-
August 1945

SONOKAWA, Kameo, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 77

SONOKAWA served 22 years in the regular Navy. He was an experienced combat pilot with over 2,000 hours flying time. He was in command of the GENZAN Air Group when it participated in the attacks resulting in the sinking of the REPULSE and PRINCE OF WALES. This same unit had previously conducted operations in the CHINA Theatre and was highly trained in night and day bombing and torpedo work. SONOKAWA appeared to be exceptionally intelligent and well aware of the situation in general. He was eager to ask as well as answer questions of a professional nature and furnished accurate and interesting information.

Commanding Officer, GENZAN Air Group  
 
KOREA
SAIGON
September 1941-
April 1942
Commanding Officer, TAKAO Air Group
 
TAKAO
 
April 1942-
February 1943
Staff, Naval Air Headquarters
 
TOKYO
 
February 1943-
August 1944
Staff, 23rd Air Flotilla
 
KENDARI
 
August 1944-
February 1945
Yokosuka Naval Station
 
YOKOSUKA   February 1945-
April 1945
Commanding Officer, 210th Air Group
 
NAGOYA
 
April 1945-
August 1945
Staff, 32nd Air Flotilla
 
OITA
 
August 1945-
September 1945

SUGITA, Binzo, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No.5

SUGITA served 23 years in the regular Navy. During the beginning of the war he was assigned battleship and cruiser duty as well as staff duty with the Combined Escort Fleet. He was familiar with mine warfare problems and furnished frank and accurate answers to questions.

NAGATO, First Fleet
 
December 1941-
November 1942
CHOKAI
 
RABAUL
 
November 1942-
November 1943
Combined Escort Fleet  
 
TOKYO   
 
November 1943-
August 1945

SUGITA, Ichiji, Colonel, I.J.A.
Nav No. 113

SUGITA was on the Staff, 8th Area Army at RABAUL, and embarked in an escort vessel of the convoy engaged in the so-called Battle of BISMARK SEA, 3 March 1943.

--570--

TADENUMO, Saburo, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 54

TADENUMO served 16 years in the regular Navy. His entire career was devoted to research and development of mines and mine countermeasures. Prior to May 1945 he was an instructor at YOKOSUKA Mine Warfare School and subsequently he was actively engaged in Mine sweeping of the INLAND SEA. TADENUMO was very cooperative and in addition to specific information he also furnished an interesting paper containing his opinion of the American mining effort.

YOKOSUKA Mine Depot
 
YOKOSUKA
 
1937-
May 1945
Staff, KURE Mine Squadron  
(SOHAI SENTAI)
INLAND SEA  
 
May 1945-
August 1945

TAKAHASHI, Chihaya, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 15

TAKAHASHI served 27 years in the regular Navy. He was a naval officer of wide experience as a pilot with 2,000 hours flying time. As Chief of Staff, 11th Air Fleet he was charged with operations in the PHILIPPINE, CELEBES and MALAYA Areas at the outbreak of war in 1941. He also served as Senior Staff Officer, 3rd and 5th Air Fleets in 1945 when the threat of invasion of the Japanese homeland became imminent. Although TAKAHASHI answered direct questions in what later proved to be an accurate manner he did not "warm up" and did not prove to be a good subject for interrogation.

Staff Officer, 11th Air Fleet
 
 
 
 
FORMOSA,
PHILIPPINES,
NETHERLANDS  
EAST INDIES,
INDIA
May 1941-
December 1942
 
 
 
Senior Member, Naval Aeronautic Bureau  
 
TOKYO
 
January 1943-
June 1945
Senior Staff Officer, 5th Air Fleet
 
KYUSHU
 
June 1945-
August 1945
Senior Staff Officer, 3rd Air Fleet KWANTO August 1945

TAKATA, Toshitane, Rear Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 64

Staff Officer, Third Fleet
 
November 1942-
May 1943
Headquarters, Combined Fleet
 
May 1943-
December 1943
Naval General Staff
 
December 1943-
September 1944
Assistant Chief of Staff, Naval General Staff  
 
September 1944-
May 1945
Vice Chief, Naval Affairs Bureau,
Navy Ministry
May 1945-
End of War

TAMURA, Kyuze, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No.5, 26, 65

TAMURA served 25 years in the regular Navy. After graduating from the Naval Academy at ETA JIMA he continued his studies at the Imperial University, TOKYO where he majored in physics. Almost all of his naval career has been devoted to research and technical development and in this field he excelled. During the war he was Chief of the Mine Section of the Naval Technical Department, a post which he was still holding pending successful sweeping of Japanese ports. In addition to the above duty, TAMURA was assistant Naval Attache in ROME (1940-1941) and visited GERMANY and the UNITED STATES. He was well educated, frank and cooperative and was a fertile source of information regarding all phases of mine warfare.

Chief of Mine Section,
Naval Technical Department  
TOKYO  
 
1941-1945
 

--571--

TANKAKA, Roji, Lieutenant Colonel, I.J.A.
Nav No. 114

TANKAKA was interrogated only as to air strength figures at RABAUL, on which subject he apparently was well informed.

Military Affairs Section, War Ministry   April 1941-
September 1942
Staff, Eighth Area Army
 
RABAUL  
 
September 1942-
September 1943
Army General Staff
 
September 1943-
End of War

TERAI, Yoshimori, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 89, 117

TERAI served 17 years in the regular Navy. At the beginning of the war he was an Air Attache at the Japanese Embassy, WASHINGTON. Repatriated on GRIPSHOLM, TERAI was assigned duties at the Navy Department and Naval General Staff from June 1942 until the end of the war. His duties concerned training and allocations of pilots to the Naval Air Force through Naval Air Headquarters. TERAl answered questions frankly and directly. He was considered a reliable witness.

Air Attache, Japanese Embassy
 
WASHINGTON, D.C.  
 
December 1941-
May 1942
Navy Department and Naval General Staff  
 
June 1942-
August 1945

TOGA, Hiroshi, Major, I.J.A.
Nav No. 28

TOGA served for 9 years in the regular Army. He was able to give but little information on the activities of the 10th Air Division, and his information was not considered too reliable.

57th Infantry Regiment MANCHURIA 1941
Student, Army Military Academy   
 
TOYAMA
 
January 1942-
November 1943
Instructor, Army Officer's School
 
TOYOOKA
 
December 1943-
July 1944
Staff Officer, 10th Air Division
 
July 1944-
End of War

TOKUNO, Hiroshi, Lieutenant Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 18, 33

TOKUNO was an officer of the regular Navy and had seven years of duty in which he specialized in anti-aircraft gunnery. He knew very little about fleet plans or policies but possessed a detailed knowledge of his duties as a gunnery officer in the fleet during the war. He was Anti-aircraft Battery Officer on the KIRISHIMA (BB) with the carrier force at the Battle of MIDWAY and was wounded on that vessel when it was sunk in a night action at GUADALCANAL, 14 November 1942. A few months later he was again wounded while serving as Gunnery Officer on the MINEGUMO (DD) when it was sunk at KOLOMBANGARA. Following this action he served as Executive Officer of the Naval Unit at MILLE where he was subjected to frequent bombing attacks. During interrogations this officer appeared nervous but answered all questions readily and without hesitation. His statements concerning damages received have been confirmed by official documents.

Assistant Gunnery Officer,
Anti-Aircraft Battery Officer, KIRISHIMA (BB)  
1941-1942
 
Gunnery Officer, MINEGUMO (DD) 1942-1943
Gunnery Officer, SASEBO Naval Station 1943
Executive Officer, MILLE Naval Garrison 1943-1945

--572--

TOYAMA, Yasumi, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 60

TOYAMA served 21 years in the regular Navy. As Chief of Staff on the JINTSU (CL), Flagship of the Second Destroyer Squadron, he escorted the Transport Force at the Battle of MIDWAY. In August 1942, he was again in the JINTSU when damaged by dive-bombers while escorting transports in the Battle of the Eastern SOLOMONS. At TASSAFARONGA, 30 November 1942, he was Chief of Staff, Second Destroyer Squadron during the night destroyer action. He exhibited an accurate memory for details of these actions which he checked by means of several personal notebooks. The veracity of his statements has subsequently been proved correct through official documents. He readily volunteered pertinent information concerning these actions, while at the same time displayed unusual professional interest in the actions of the opposing American forces.

Chief of Staff, Second Torpedo Squadron   1941-1943
Naval Technical Department TOKYO 1943-1944
Staff, Imperial Headquarters TOKYO   1944-1945
Commanding Officer,
KASUMIGAURA Airbase
1945
 

TOYODA, Soemu, Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 75

Highly intelligent and widely informed, TOYODA was one more of the group of senior naval officers who apparently made strong efforts to prevent war with the UNITED STATES. He was an excellent contact for discussion of high level planning and operations. On the subject of Army policies and cooperation he became a very severe critic, and with a first rate presentation of his case.

He understood, but did not speak English.

Commanding Officer, KURE Naval District
  
September 1941-
November 1942
Member, Supreme War Council November 1942
Commanding Officer, YOKOSUKA Naval District  
 
May 1943-
May 1944
CinC Combined Fleet
 
May 1944-
May 1945
CinC Overall Naval Command May 1945
Chief of Naval General Staff
 
May 1945-
End of War

TSUDA, Hiroaki, Captain, I.J.N.
(TSUGAWA)
Nav No. 66

TSUDA, served 22 years in the regular Navy. He was Navigator of the HYUGA (BB) at the Battle of MIDWAY and later Navigator of the YAMATO (BB) during the Battle of the PHILIPPINES, 25-26 October 1944. He was very cooperative throughout the interrogation and assisted, by means of a personal notebook, in checking previously submitted navigation track charts of the actions in which he participated.

Navigator, HYUGA (BB) 1941-1943
Navigator, YAMATO (BB)   1943-1945
Hydrographic Officer TOKYO   1945

UKITA, Nobuye, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 83

UKITA served in the regular Navy for a period of 26 years. He was Gunnery Officer of the KONGO (BB) at the Battle of MIDWAY, GUADALCANAL, and the Battle of SANTA CRUZ in October 1942. He answered all questions willingly and thoroughly although sometimes referred to a personal note book. The information presented has been verified through other interrogations and official documents.

Gunnery Officer, KONGO (BB) 1941-1942
Personnel Officer, Naval Ministry   TOKYO   1942-1945

--573--

WATANABE, Yasuji, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 13

WATANABE was an officer of 25 years experience in the regular Navy. He specialized in gunnery and served as Gunnery Officer on several staffs including that of Admiral YAMAMOTO, CinC Combined Fleet, 1940-43. During the PEARL HARBOR attack and the Battle of MIDWAY, he was with Admiral YAMAMOTO. Subsequent to these battles he also served as Landing Force Officer on the Combined Fleet Staff. He had an excellent service reputation among other Japanese Naval Officers. During interrogations he was most helpful in providing information and operation plans of the Combined Fleet. Outside sources have substantiated this information. He spoke very good English and all interrogations were conducted in that language.

Instructor, Gunnery College YOKOSUKA   1937-1938
Staff, 7th Cruiser Squadron 1938-1939
Staff, Second Fleet 1939-1940
Staff Gunnery Officer, Combined Fleet   1940-1943
Member of Council, Military Affairs,
Navy Department
1943-1945
 
Staff, Supreme Headquarters TOKYO 1945

WENEKER, Paul H., Vice Admiral, German Navy
Nav No. 70

From personal acquaintance prior to the war (1935-37), the interrogator knew WENEKER as a smooth and tactful attache of the German Embassy in TOKYO, spreading the Nazi doctrine in the manner common to all German diplomatic missions at that time. However, he appeared to cooperate actively with his colleagues of other nationalities in exchanging information on the Japanese. He worked in full accord with his military opposite, Colonel OTT, then Military Attache and later (as Major General) the German Ambassador to JAPAN.

Ambassador OTT had a definite falling out with the Nazi regime in 1944, as a consequence of which he resigned and went to PEKIN to live as a private citizen. WENEKER has expressed an apparent corresponding reluctance to return to Germany "until the present situation is greatly clarified." This fact, coupled with his long and close association with General OTT, suggests that WENEKER is not too fully imbued with Nazi ideology.

WENEKER spoke with apparent frankness and gave a very favorable impression of his desire to cooperate.

German Naval Attache to JAPAN    1937
Returned to Germany to command
DEUTCHLAND (BB)
1937-
February 1940
German Naval Attache to JAPAN
 
February 1940-
End of War

YAMAGUCHI, Meriyoshi, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 44

YAMAGUCHI was an officer of 20 years service and a naval aviator with 2000 hours in the air. During the war he held a succession of staff positions in air commands. From August 1944 to January 1945 he was on the Staff, Second Air Fleet which was based successively in FORMOSA and the PHILIPPINES. YAMAGUCHI was entirely cooperative, sometimes it was feared to the extent of inventing answers in order to be helpful rather than confessing ignorance of the questions at issue.

Staff, Fourth Fleet
 
South PACIFIC
 
December 1941-
September 1942
Teacher of Training Air Corps
 
October 1942-
May 1943
Senior Member, 202nd Air Corps  
 
NETHERLANDS  
EAST INDIES
June 1943-
March 1944
Staff, 2nd Air Fleet
 
PHILIPPINES
 
August 1944-
January 1945
1st Technical Arsenal
 
February 1945-
End of War

--574--

YAMAMOTO, Tadashi, Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 109

YAMAMOTO served 14 years in the regular Navy and participated in practically every destroyer action in the SOLOMON Area in 1942-43. He was finally wounded in December 1943 and was hospitalized in JAPAN until March 1945.

YAMAMOTO appeared very intelligent and was most cooperative during the interrogation. Although he was able to answer most of the questions from memory he referred to official documents for tables of organizations and damage incurred by ships. His statements and tables have subsequently been checked by the Japanese Naval Historical Research Department and found to be correct.

Staff, Communication Officer and Adjutant,  
2nd Destroyer Squadron
RABAUL
 
1941-1943
 
Staff Operations Officer,
2nd & 3rd Destroyer Squadron
RABAUL
 
1943
 
Hospital patient JAPAN 1943-1945
Staff Operations Officer,
4th KUSUMOKI Corps
1945
 
Liaison Officer, US-Japanese Prefecture
 
WAKAYAMA  
 
1945
  (Peace Time)

YAMAOKA, Mineo, Captain, I.J.N.
Nav No. 10

YAMAOKA was an officer of 27 years active duty in the regular Navy. He had considerable experience on the staffs of commanders of aircraft divisions during the war. Although a non-pilot he displayed unusual knowledge of carrier aircraft operations. He answered all questions knowingly and without hesitation.

Executive Officer, HIRYU (CV)
 
September 1941-
February 1942
Operations Officer, Staff, 5th Air Flotilla
 
February 1942-
June 1943
Operations and Engineering Officer,
Staff, 2nd Air Flotilla
June 1943-
July 1944
Instructor, Naval Staff College
 
July 1944-
December 1944
Staff Officer, Naval General Headquarters   
 
January 1945-
July 1945
Staff Officer, Headquarters, Combined Fleet  
 
July 1945-
October 1945
Staff Officer, Naval Ministry October 1945

YASUMOTA, Shisei, Lieutenant Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 45

YASUMOTA, a regular naval officer of 7 years service, gained all his war time sea experience in convoy escort duties as Commanding Officer of the escort vessel SHIOKAZE and as a Staff Officer, 103rd Escort Squadron of the Seventh Fleet. His personal experiences included several attacks by U.S. submarines and one attack by U.S. Army aircraft. He remembered in detail the circumstances of the various attacks and was particularly impressed by the manner in which our submarines operated offensively in restricted waters. His escort experience extended over the South CHINA SEA and in the waters near JAPAN during the latter part of the war.

Commanding Officer, SHIOKAZE (escort vessel)  
1st Escort Fleet
March 1944-
May 1945
Staff Officer, 103rd Escort Squadron
(TSUSHIMA Straits)
May 1945-
August 1945

--575--

YATSUI, Noriteru, Lieutenant Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 37

YATSUI served 8 years in the regular Navy. He was navigator of the cruiser OI at the time she was sunk by a submarine in the South CHINA SEA in July 1944. He spent the remainder of the war as Staff Officer, 7th Escort Convoy. In this assignment he accompanied two convoys to ORMOC Bay in November 1944 each of which sustained losses by air attacks. He was wounded in the destructive two day carrier aircraft strike on shipping at HONG KONG, 15-16 January 1945. YATSUI was able to recall many important details of the various attacks and the accuracy of his memory was verified in subsequent interrogations.

TSUCHIURA Naval Air Corps    TSUCHIURA 1941-1942
Adjutant, South East Area Fleet 1942-1943
Student, Navigation School
 
YOKOSUKA
 
June 1943-
October 1943
Navigation Officer, OI (CL)
 
November 1943-
July 1944
Staff, 7th Escort Convoy
 
South CHINA SEA,  
PHILIPPINES
September 1944-
January 1945

YONAI, Mitsumasa, Admiral, I.J.N.
Nav No. 76

Prior to entering political activity, YONAI had a broad experience of active sea duty, coupled with foreign assignments, ultimately (1936) becoming CinC of the Combined and First Fleets. He is certainly one of the strong men of present day JAPAN, intelligent, forceful, and straightforward. His pro-American and anti-war tendencies are reported to have kept him out of responsible positions throughout the war until defeat was inevitable, when he joined the "peace" cabinet of SUZUKI.

YONAI understood English very well, and spoke fairly readily, but prefered to confer in Japanese.

Navy Minister, HAYASHI Cabinet
 
February 1937-
June 1937
Navy Minister, KANOYE Cabinet
 
June 1937-
January 1939
Navy Minister, HIRANUMA Cabinet
 
January 1940-
July 1940
Appointed Member, Supreme Military Council   August 1937
Premier
 
January 1940-
July 1940
Deputy Premier and Navy Minister,
KOISO Cabinet
July 1944
 
Navy Minister, SUZUKI Cabinet April 1945

YUNOKI, S., Lieutenant Commander, I.J.N.
Nav No. 46

YUNOKI served 8 years in the regular Navy. At the Battle of MIDWAY he served as Gunnery Officer of a destroyer escorting the Transport Force. At the Battle of GUADALCANAL, 12 November 1942, he was Officer in Charge, Main Battery Fire Control (Spotter) of the HIEI (BB) when that ship was sunk. Following that assignment he served as Gunnery Officer at MUNDA. This officer specialized in gunnery and gave the impression of being very capable. He readily answered questions from memory, the names and dates of vessels sunk were verified from official documents at a later date. During this interrogation he displayed unusual curiosity in the operations of the U.S. Forces during the actions in which he was present.

Gunnery Officer, Second Destroyer Squadron    1941-1942
Main Battery Spotter, HIEI (BB) 1942
Gunnery Officer
 
 
MUNDA,
KOLOMBANGARA,    
BUIN
1942-1944
 
 

U.S. Government Printing Office: O - 1946

--576--

[END]

Published: Wed Apr 08 12:55:28 EDT 2020