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KOREAN WAR

U.S. Pacific  Fleet Operations

Comander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Interim Evaluation Report No. 1 

Covering Period

25 June to 15 November 1950

Volume 1 

PDF version [19,274 KB] 

COPY NO. 41

 

KOREAN WAR

U.S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATIONS

 

Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Interim Evaluation Report No. 1

 

Covering Period

25 June to 15 November 1950

VOLUME I

 

[DECLASSIFIED]

14ND-CINCPACFLT-35 (Rev. 2-26-51)

Navy – Pearl Harbor, T.H.

KOREAN WAR

U.S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATIONS

* ** ** ** ** ** ** *

COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT NO. 1

COVERING PERIOD 25 JUNE TO 15 NOVEMBER 1950

PREFACE

   Main Report, Volume I, reading time 50 minutes, is provided to give the reader a quick view of the most important factors in the Korean War applicable to the Navy and Marine Corps.
   The fifty-three (53) project studies contained in Volumes II to X inclusive provide studies of a functional nature as noted by their titles.
   The thirty-seven (37) chronological narratives in Volumes XI to XVI inclusive are those submitted by type and operational commanders and provide, in addition to the narratives, the problems faced by these commanders.

 

i

KOREAN WAR

U.S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATIONS

***********

COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

INTERIM EVALUATIN REPORT NO. 1

COVERING PERIOD 25 JUNE TO 15 NOVEMBER 1950

T-A-B-L-E   O-F   C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S

 

1. MAIN REPORT

    Foreword
    Introduction
    Major Features of the War in Korea
----------

VOLUME  I
2. LIST OF MAJOR EVENTS IN CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE VOLUME 1A

3. COMPILATION OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
    INDEX OF INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT NO. 1.

----------

 

4. PROJECT STUDIES 

I. COMBAT OPERATIONS SECTION

   A. Naval Air (Other than Marine Air)

       1.  Organization
       2.  Operations

           a. Fast Carrier
           b. Escort Carrier
           c. Close Air Support
           d. Interdiction
           e. Attack
           f. Air Defense
           g. ASW
           h. Anti-Mine
           i. Patrol Squadrons
           j. Helicopters


      3.  Personnel

      4.  Training

      5.  Air Intelligence

      6.  Logistics

      7.  Equipment

      8.  Bases
---------- 

VOLUME II

  B. MARINE AIR 

      1.  Organization

      2.  Operations

         a.  Close Air Support
         b.  Air Defense
         c.  Air Transport
         d.  Helicopter
         e.  Observation

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VOLUME III

      3.  Personnel

      4.  Training

      5.  (Blank)

      6.  Logistics

      7.  Equipment
---------- 

 

    C.  AMPHIBIOUS AND GROUND

        1.  (Blank)

        2.  Attack Force

        3.  Landing Force (Including Land Operations of FMF Units and Air)

        4.  Air Support

        5.  Naval Gunfire Support

---------- 

   VOUME IV

    D.  SURFACE AND COVERING

         1.  Shore Bombardment

         2.  Blockade & Escort Operations

         3.  Submarine

         4.  Air Defense & ASW

    E. MINE WARFARE

----------

VOLUME V

ll.   SUPPORTING OPERATINS SECTION

   A.   LOGISITICS

        1.  Surface

        2.  Underway Replenishment

        3.  Shipping Support (By other than Pacific Fleet Forces)

        4.  Air Lift

        5.  Fleet Marine Force

----------

 

   VOLUME VI

   B. COMMUNICATIONS 

   C. INTELLIGENCE

   D. MEDICAL

---------- 

VOLUME VII

III. MAJOR COMMAND RELATIONS SECTION 

---------- 

VOLUME VIII

IV. PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION  

---------- 

VOLUME IX

V. EVALUATION OF WEAPONS SYSTEM SECTION 

 1. Fast Carrier Task Forces

 2. Support Carrier Task Forces

VOLUME X

iii 

            3. Air Defense

            4. Amphibious Attack Forces

            5. Fleet Marine Forces

            6. Blockade Forces

            7. Convoy Escort Forces

            8. Naval Bombardment Forces

            9. Mine Countermeasures

----------

5.   ANNEXES

(A) COMNAVFE – Staff History, 25 June – 15 November 1950

(B) COMSEVENTHFLT Conf ltr rrr/F1 A12 Ser 0181 dated 4 December 1950 (Subj: Chronological narrative of the Seventh Fleet related to the Korean War)

(C) COMFAIRJAP Conf  ltr  CFAJ/11/h A9 Ser: 096 dtd 24 November 1950 (Subj: Commander Fleet Air, Japan Evaluation Report, submission of)

(D) COMFAIRWING 6 Secret ltr CFAW-6/A9-8 10/JRC: asc  Ser  0066 dated 28 November 1950 (Subj: Evaluation Report; Submission of – Enclosure, PATRON SIX Narrative)

(E) CO USS GARDINERS BAY Conf ltr AVP39/A16 FGR: rlr Ser 044 dated 2 December 1950 (Subj: Korean War Historical Chronological Narrative and Comments on Experiences)

(F) CO USS CURTISS CONF ltr 3: WAC: fht AV-4/A12 Ser 051 dtd 22 Nov 1950 (Subj: Evaluation Report, submission of)

(G) CO PATRON 42 Conf ltr VP-42/A9-8 RLD: cn Ser 048 dtd 25 Nov 1950 (Subj: Evaluation Report; Submission of)

(H) CO PATRON 47 Conf ltr FVP-47/A9-8/ks Ser 031 dtd 25 Nov 1950 (Subj: Special Historical Report; submission of)

(I) FASRON 11 – Narrative (Conf) – undated

(J) FASRON 120 – Conf Chronological Report – undated

(K) NAF, Yokosuka – Conf Chronological Narrative – undated

(L) VU- 5 Det. Japan Conf 1 December (Subj: Historical Report; Submission of)

(M) Commander Fleet Activities, Japan-Korea Conf ltr Ser 0183 dtd 6 Dec 1950 (Subj: Narrative of Fleet Activities, Japan-Korea, for the period 25 June to 1 November 1950)

(N) COMTRACOMPAC Conf ltr A12 (30)/Ser: 0449 dtd 21 Nov 1950 (Subj: Historical Narrative of COMTRACOMPAC ACTIVITES)

(O) Commander Underway Training Element Japan Conf ltr UTE 3923/jg A9 Ser 081 dtd 15 Nov 1950 (Subj: Historical information, submission of)

(P) COMFLTTRAGRUSWESTPAC-UTE  (Underway Training Element) SUBIC Conf  ltr HBL: chb A12 Ser 058 dtd 17 Nov 1950 (Subj: Historical Information; Submission of)

(Q-1) COM UN Blockading and Escort Force (CTG 95.9) Conf ltr A9-8 Ser 039 of 6 Mar 1951 (Subj: Evaluation Information)

VOLUME XI

iv

 

   (Q-2)  COMCRUDIV-3 Conf Ser 057 of 22 Nov 1950 (Subj: History of Task Groups 96.5 and 95.2 while under command of COMCRUDIV-3 during the United Nations Police Action in Korea)

----------

 
ANNEXES  

   (R) CTF-77 (Report Air Operations) (Informal Copy)

   (S) COMCARDIV 15 (Restricted) – Narrative of participation in the Korean Campaign (Part 1 – 1 July – 15 November 1950)

---------- 

VOLUME XII 
ANNEXES  VOLUME XIII

   (T) COMAIRPAC Conf ltr FF12-5/A11 ser 30/01302 dtd 22 Nov 1950: (Subj: Air Force, Pacific Fleet Evaluation Report, Part 1, forwarding of)

   (U) COMAIRPAC Conf ltr FF12-5/A11 ser 30/01365 dtd 5 Dec 1950 (Subj: Air Force, Pacific Fleet Evaluation Report, Part II, forwarding of)
---------- 

 
ANNEXES VOLUME XIV

   (V) COMADCOMPHIBPAC Conf ltr ser 0106 dtd 20 Jan 1951 – Chronological Narrative Report

   (W) FLOGAIRWINGPAC Conf (undtd) Chronological Historical Report, Part 1 – Technical, Part ll)

   (X) PACRESFLT Conf ltr (30-3n) A10 ser 0229 dtd 21 Nov 1950 (Subj: Chronological Narrative of Pacific Reserve Fleet activities during the period 24 June – 15 Nov 1950 (Inclusive) related to or affected by the Korean War)

   (Y) Confidential Report of Hydrographic Office Representatives on Special Trip to Far East from 9 November to 26 November 1950 to study Map and Chart Problems arising out of the Korean Hostilities

   (Z) FMFPAC Secret Report of Activities from 25 June 1950 to the Amphibious Assault at Inchon

   (AA) COMPHIBGRU ONE (CTF 90) Secret Ser 002 of 17 Jan 1951 – Report COMPHIBGRU-1 (CTF 90) report of operations for period 25 June 1950 to 1 Jan 1951

   (BB) Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Conf ltr A9-1/JLM/44b Ser 076 dtd 24 Nov 1950 (Subj: Historical Report; Submission of)

   (CC) 1st Marine Air Wing, FMFPAC, Report Operations in Korea, 24 November 1950

  (DD) Headquarters 1st Marine Division (REINF). FMFPAC, Conf Special Report, Period 1 August – 15 November

---------- 

 
ANNEXES  VOLUME XV
   (EE) COMSERVPAC Secret ltr 10: rag A1 Ser 0091 dtd 21 Nov 1950 (Subj: “Evaluation of Logistic Requirements and operations, other than air”, forwarding of – Historical Section, Phase l – Statistics, Phase ll – Major Lessons and Features)
---------- 
 
ANNEXES  VOLUME XVI

   (FF) COMWESTSEAFRON Conf ltr WSF: 08:fg A12 Ser 0329 dtd 22 Nov 1950 (Subj: Chronological narrative of Western Sea Frontier activities related to or affected by the Korean War, Part I – Historical)

  (GG) DEPCOMSTSPAC Conf ltr MSTSP-21 Ce A12 Ser 0190 dtd 20 Nov 1950 (Subj: MSTSP Chronological Narrative of Activity as affected by Korean War)

 

v

(HH) DEPCOMSTSWESTPAC Secret ltr MSTSWP-2-mn A12 Ser 0068 dtd 1 Dec 1950 (Subj: Evaluation Report; Part I– Historical Narrative)

(II)  DEPCOM3TSMIDPAC Conf ltr MSTS-MidPac: 00:gs A9 Ser 35-50 dtd 21 Nov 1950 (Subj: Evaluation Report Report No. 1)

(JJ) COMSUBPAC Secret ltr Ser 00011 of 28 Nov 1950 (Subj: Submarine operations in Korean War; report of (Part 1) (and COMSUBPAC Conf ltr Ser 0762 of 11 Dec 1950 (Subj: COMSUBPAC Ser 00011 of 28 Nov 1950; Downgrading of))

(KK) COMCRUDESPAC Conf ltr FF4-5/FF4-9 A16-1 Serial 0107 dated 4 February 1951 (Subj: Readiness of destroyers departing for Far East areas)

vi

KOREAN WAR

U.S. PACIFI FLEET OPERATIONS

****

COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT NO. 1

COVERING PERIOD

25 JUNE TO 15 NOVEMBER 1950

****

MAIN REPORT

A 1

KOREAN WAR

U.S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATIONS

*************

COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT NO. 1

COVERING PERIOD 25 JUNE TO 15 NOVEMBER 1950

VOLUME I

C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S

 

  1. MAIN REPORT

    Foreword

    Introduction

    Major Features of the War in Korea

FOREWORD

A-2

PACIFIC FLEET INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT


Foreword


      This Interim Evaluation Report was prepared under the guidance and supervision of CINCPACFLT, in accordance with CNO Confidential ltr OPO3D; ly, Ser 015P03D dtd 20 Sept 1950. In general, this report covers the period from the beginning of Korean hostilities, 25 June 1950 to 15 November 1950, but takes cognizance of major actions subsequent to the latter date until approximately 31 December 1950.

      To the best of knowledge, no precedent existed for an overall concurrent evaluation of a major military effort in the Navy and o organization within the Navy existed nor were personnel trained to undertake such a task.


     Interpretation of the basic directive for the evaluation of the Korean War effort, lead to the conclusion that three courses should be followed. These were:

     a. A recording in detail of what happened within the various naval operational and administrative commands in the Pacific.

     b. Establishing the difficulties, deficiencies, and problems as well as the successes of the various naval commands of the Pacific.

     c. The undertaking of detailed staff studies of functional components of the Navy with the view of submitting constructive recommendations for improvement.

          In undertaking these tasks, the basic concept was held that it was the Navy’s responsibility that its own house be in order and that it was neither the Navy’s responsibility nor right to extend beyond those perimeters into other services except where naval operations were adversely affected.

     Additionally it was not considered within the purview of the basic directive to inquire into national policy nor major strategy, nor to become involved in detailed technical matters for the administration of which adequate machinery already existed.

      Accordingly, the major evaluation efforts have been concentrated upon systems that combined, represent the naval contribution to the national military potential.

Continuing Evaluation
      CNO’s basic directive provides for a continuing evaluation of the Korean War effort. Based on the concepts outlined above it is considered that the Interim report and its various enclosures submitted herewith outline the major areas of deficiency requiring correction or improvement as well as indicating those areas of successful development that warrant maximum military exploitation. Accordingly, it is currently contemplated that the continuing phases of the evaluation will consist of assembling narratives of various naval commands in the pacific, conducting a continuing review of the conclusions and recommendations submitted in this interim report in the light of subsequent events, and the making of a limited number of technical staff studies bordering on the OEG type, plus special project studies that may be warranted by subsequent events.


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INTRODUCTION


A-3

Introduction


     The chronological narratives of the various commands of the Pacific Fleet and the naval Forces Far East appended hereto contain a wealth of information as to what happened  when it happened, and the problems and difficulties experienced by those commands.

     The various project studies included within this report cover a multitude of subjects including Intelligence, Communications, Close Air Support, and others of considerable importance to the effectiveness of the naval service as a whole. Each of these reports contains its own conclusions and recommendations.

     To the date of this report, the Korean War was peculiar in that there was no effective enemy opposition on the seas, in the air or by submarines. During the months of November and December, 1950, the principal opponents were the Chinese Communists, whose Manchurian base enjoyed immunity from attack although openly providing support and bases for active offensive operations against the United Nations.

     Because of these unusual circumstances and the type of military operations resulting, it is recognize3d that had any of these major factors been changed, an entirely different type of conflict might have ensued. Therefore, there exists a marked hesitancy to attempt to outline major lessons growing out of the Korean War that would be applicable to future conflicts less circumscribed than the present Korean War. However, there have been developed to date certain major features that warrant very careful consideration as signposts for the future.


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MAJOR FEATURES OF THE WAR IN KOREA

 

A-4

PACIFIC FLEET INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT
Major Features of the War in Korea


A.    PATTERN OF WAR
       The Russian Nation from the time of Napoleon has evinced a high degree of aptitude for irregular and guerrilla warfare on land and later, defensive mining of seaports.  These methods on land were developed during periods of military adversity, and generally have resulted in ultimate military victory over what were considered relatively superior forces.  The Soviets trained the North Korean Army, which demonstrated high capability in irregular guerrilla warfare as well as a high degree of effectiveness in more orthodox types of military action.  The Soviets are presumed to have given training to Chinese Red Communist Armies who have utilized the same types of tactics with considerable effectiveness.  Chinese Communist engaging the French in Indo China have been using similar tactics successfully.

       It appears reasonable to assume that Soviet trained satellite nations as well as the Soviets themselves will again use such tactics when forced to do so.

       U.S. Naval forces, particularly Navy and Marine Air, should make every effort to develop ways and means of countering such actions particularly with interdiction weapons and techniques that will tend to reduce the necessity for major engagements between ground forces.

B.    SEA POWER, AIR POWER AND GROUND POWER
       Sea Power, Air Power, Ground Power, Amphibious Operations and the Marines all have been topics of serious military discussion since World War II.   Modern schools of thought have deprecated sea power, amphibious operations and the Marine Corps and have exalted the potentialities of air power. None of the extremist versions of the modern school of thought have been substantiated by actual fighting in Korea.

       Under the guise of economy and peacetime roles and missions, naval forces and the Marine Corps have been reduced to dangerously low levels with the Marines largely relegated to garrison tasks in War Plans.  The future of amphibious operations has been denied.  Perhaps if any major lessons have evolved from the Korean War, the most important are the complete fallacy of these modern schools of thought.

      There were no war plans for the commitment of the United States forces in Korea.  Nevertheless we were committed.  The traditional policy of the Navy of maintaining balanced forces in ships, aircraft and the Marine Corps has been proven eminently sound.

C.    SEA POWER AND AIR POWER
       Sea power and air power have one major characteristic in common in major wars. Each strives to eliminate or reduce to relative impotence its military counterpart in order that its full weight may be used against the enemy during the exploitation stage.

       The first seven months of the Korean War have been peculiar in that neither the sea power nor the air power of the United Nations forces have faced the necessity of eliminating their military counterparts. As a result, the full exploitation stage was available to the navies and the air forces of the United Nations from the onset of the Korean War.  Had serious opposition been met, particularly in the form of submarine warfare and air warfare, the nature of the Korean War undoubtedly would have been entirely different, but since this opposition did not occur, the Korean War constituted in effect an almost perfect laboratory for the test of exploitation abilities of both sea and air power as they currently exist.

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Sea Power
    Sea Power again reaffirmed its vital importance to the United States by enabling the projection of much of the military strength that it had in readiness overseas against North Korean forces.  It not only permitted the projection of our ground and air forces against the enemy in numbers that would have been impossible by any other method, but it also directly exerted its own considerable power in the form of withering ship gunfire support, marine ground action and naval and marine air action.  It completely eliminated the possibility of enemy surface action against Japan and Formosa.  It played a vital supporting role for both our ground and air forces. It transported to the combat area approximately 98% of the tonnage required to support our United Nation forces in action.  It did not win, nor was it expected to win, the Korean War.  However, it did enhance the military effectiveness of both our ground and air forces to an incalculable degree.  Without sea power, the United Nations effort in Korea could not have taken place. 

Air Power
    The United Nations air power in Korea consisted almost totally of Air Force, Navy and Marine air augmented by a relatively few number of military aircraft of Great Britain, Australia and South Africa.  It was supported by some commercial air support across the Pacific Ocean.  In general, air power constituted a supporting arm to the ground forces.  In that capacity, it was extremely important.   In the first seven months of the Korean War, however, air power, enjoying almost complete freedom of skies, was unable to prevent military reverses to our ground forces, generally was unable to deny enemy territory to enemy usage, locate or detect the development of large enemy concentration on the ground, or to isolate a battlefield.

Ground Power
    During the first seven months of the Korean War, the tide of war was determined by the success or reverses of our ground forces.  Both the North Korean and the Chinese Communist Armies clearly demonstrated their ability to support themselves, concentrate and engage in major ground battles in spite of the best overall efforts of the United Nations air power.

D.    AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
      In the Korean War to date, the Navy again demonstrated the incalculable value of amphibious operations.   The withdrawal of an isolated and surrounded ROK division from Pohang without casualty during the early Pusan perimeter defense was little known or recognized, but, defended by the guns of the fleet, an implacable enemy was kept at bay and an entire division of our allies was saved and redeployed within our lines for further combat.

     The Inchon amphibious assault landing of the 1st Marine Division on 15 September 1950 changed the entire aspect of the war against the North Koreans within a matter of a few days after the landing.  The North Korean organized effort, on the verge of success of completely over-running the Pusan perimeter, completely collapsed.  It was only the subsequent intervention of the Chinese Communist Red Armies that prevented the complete occupation of Korea and the cessation of hostilities.  This historic landing, changing as it did the whole course of a war against the North Koreans, opened new vistas of strategy to many military leaders previously limited in vision to purely ground operations. 

     The equally historic Hungnam evacuation was an amphibious operation in reverse.  CINCUNC determined as a matter of military strategy to evacuate northeast Korea.  As the major part of the forces in this operation, under the guns and the aircraft of the fleet, the 3rd and 7th divisions of the U.S. Army and the 1st Division of the U.S. Marine Corps as well as approximately 91,000 refugees were evacuated without the loss of a man or a single useful piece of equipment.  No corresponding operation exists in modern military history.  

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E.   MARINES
      The story of the Marine expansion, hasty deployment from the United States to Korea and their subsequent amazing exploits in the first seven months of the Korean War adds new lustre   to the proud traditions of the Marine  Corps.  Within a month’s time and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade consisting of approximately 5,000 officers and men was organized and deployed some six thousand miles away and committed to combat in Korea.  Within less than six weeks additional time, this brigade participated in three major actions, twice prevented a break-through that threatened the complete collapse of the Pusan perimeter, and in effect destroyed two entire North Korean divisions as effective military units, causing casualties estimated to be approximately twice the Marines’ original strength.  Upon completion of this amazing series of actions, this brigade reembarked in Navy amphibious ships prepared to participate in the Inchon amphibious landing. 

       In the meantime the remaining portions of the 1st Marine Division based on the West Coast of the United States numbered less than 3,500 officers and men.  Within six weeks time this organization expanded more than three times its original strength from 105 posts and stations in the United States, from 22nd Marine Division units, and from its organized reserve.  It constituted the only assault force in the Inchon landing.  Later this same division, deployed to the Chosin Reservoir area in northeast Korea, decisively defeated and eliminated as a military organization six Chinese Communist Red divisions and detachments of four more divisions. Throughout this period neither the early 1st Provisional Marine Brigade nor later the 1st Marine Division ever retreated.  As a matter of routine they advanced in the face of superior numbers and when directed by superior authority to withdraw for strategic reasons, they withdrew as intact fighting organizations with all of their usable equipment and wounded. 

      No descriptive superlatives can add to the tradition of the Marines as a fighting military organization.

F.    INTELLIGENCE
       Intelligence was either inadequate or, if adequate, improperly evaluated as to the original intentions of the North Koreans to attack the Republic of Korea and of the Chinese Communist Government to invade Korea and assume the brunt of the military effort when defeat of the North Koreans appeared imminent. 

       The difficulty of obtaining intelligence information from behind the iron curtain is widely recognized.  However, in the Korean War the two major hostile participants, the North Koreans and the Chinese Communist Reds, are actually engaged in civil war in each of their respective countries.  With civil war existing between the North and South Koreans and between the Chinese Communist Reds and the Chinese Nationalist Government, much valuable information should be forthcoming from friendly elements of these two nationalities.  Judging from results of the past, more effort should be expended on collection of intelligence from these sources.  A concerted effort must be made to obtain advance information of the enemy’s  intentions. Both the North Koreans and the Chinese Reds have displayed great adeptness at moving by night and supporting large bodies of men, in numbers sufficient to cause sever reverses to United Nations ground forces.  To date the Untied Nations Ari Forces, consisting of the United Sates Air Forces, Navy and Marine Air as well as small detachments from other nations, enjoying almost complete freedom of the skies have been unable to obtain tactical intelligence of the location or movements of hostile forces on an effective scale.  The equipment and techniques necessary in obtaining such tactical intelligence are apparently completely inadequate at the present time.  Recognizing that we may face such tactics on a much greater scale at any time, major research effort should be devoted to the solution of this problem.

      The Far East Command is a “joint” command. At the beginning of the hostilities in Korea, the naval component of the Far East Command was negligible in size and staff, whereas the Army component, being the service designated to head up the joint command, maintained a large and functioning staff Intelligence organization. Although the staff of the Commander Naval Forces Far East progressively grew in size, there remained a general tendency for the Navy to rely upon GHQ G-2 for much


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intelligence essential to naval operations.  There also existed on the part of GHQ G-2 a tendency to subordinate and channel the efforts of the intelligence sections of the Navy and FEAF staff’s into G-2 and to promulgate from G-2 such intelligence information as G-2 considered necessary for the benefit of the other services.  The principle should be impressed upon naval personnel that naval intelligence staffs are basically responsible to naval command to provide essential intelligence necessary for naval operations.

    Combat air intelligence for the Navy was totally inadequate during the first few months of the campaign and still is well below acceptable levels.   Ships and Air Groups lack trained combat intelligence officers.  There is no experienced senior combat intelligence officer in the entire theatre to coordinate combat air intelligence efforts. 

    Although South Korea was occupied by U.S. forces for four years following World War II, there was almost no intelligence available of the type required by amphibious forces.  This should serve as a lesson for the future.

G. SHIPPING

   Although marginal in quantity, purely naval shipping for the resupply of naval surface forces functioned in a highly satisfactory manner under the control of COMSERVPAC and his subordinate echelons.

   Support shipping for all the services in the Far East theater,  a naval responsibility delegated to MSTS, was not efficiently operated due to factors beyond the control of MSTS.  Excessive port times in both Japanese and Korean ports were experienced through no fault of naval administration.   U.S. efforts in this regard were no improvement over World War II standards.

   The control of MSTS shipping between ports in the Pacific and Far East was a function of MSTS.  In accordance with the MSTS charter policy of delivery of cargo “Free on board” at port of destination, the control of this shipping for all practical purposes passed to the terminal operator,  generally a U.S. Army port organization, for all loading and discharging operations. 

   The estimated delay in time charter ship turnarounds due to all causes in Japan and Korea between 1 September and 15 November, the period when excessive delays were experienced due to the heavy concentration of shipping in the Far East, was 4328 ship days.  This loss represented sufficient shipping to lift 17% of total major cargo requirements from U.S.A. Japan during the period of 24 July to 15 November 1950.
   The basic causes for this delay in the turnarounds are considered to be the following:

    a. The lack of adequate port facilities in Korea.
    b. The lack of adequate stevedoring personnel and equipment to unload ships.
    c. The lack of adequate personnel, transportation and organization to efficiently move unloaded cargoes to dumps.
    d. The lack of adequate roads and railroads in Korea to properly handle Army logistics, resulting in the need for coastal shipping for Army support.
    e. The lack of sufficient numbers of efficient amphibious shipping types such as LST’s to handle the coastal shipping problem.
    f.  Unrealistic scheduling of the arrival of resupply shipping in objective area.

In addition to the above basic causes there were, or [sic] course, numerous problems growing out of the interpretation at various staff levels among the services as to service authority and responsibility with regard to shipping.  The Army in Korea set up the requirements for supplies and exhibited an inclination to specify how many and what types of ships should deliver these supplies but displayed inadequate sense of responsibility for the unloading of ships and as to the resultant delays in turn-around time.  In addition, there was frequently indicated the desire to use shipping as floating warehouses.  The Navy is on somewhat delicate ground in criticizing this tendency too  severely since the Navy itself sponsors mobile support for its own forces. 


6

     The Congress of the United States authorized and appropriated funds for the construction of 50 fast (20 knot) merchant marine ships as a part of the overall rearmament program.  This additional speed will be quite valuable from anti-submarine defense point of view and will reduce steaming time between ports.  The full advantage of the additional speed and greater cargo capacity will not be realized unless shipping turn-around is improved.  In connection with turn-around time, it should be recognized that the techniques and methods affecting expeditious loading and unloading in large ports with extensive docks and other facilities will not apply to shipping terminals lacking such facilities.  In shipping, as in other endeavors, responsibility must be accompanied by positive authority to ensure that responsibility being discharge.  The impression is generally held that the Navy (MSTS) has the responsibility for controlling the shipping for all three services.  In actuality, at the present time, the Navy has only the responsibility to provide the ships and to control the ships between ports.  After arrival in port the Navy has little control at the present time over how ships will be unloaded or whether they will be unloaded or not, regardless of the effect this will have on the over-all shipping problem.  A full and mutual understanding between the Navy (including MSTS) and the other services as concerns the exact responsibilities of each and full acceptance of responsibility for turn-around time of shipping will be mandatory if we are to attain improvement in future operations.  Such understanding does not now exist.  Although it is recognized that responsibility for port operations in Army ports and cargo handling now required by shipper or consignee is not   a desirable or proper burden for the Navy, it is felt that much can be done within the following recommendations:


    a. Undertake at Department of Defense level further study and review of the problems brought out in this report.
    b. Initiate at Department of Defense level a program of indoctrination in the requirements to improve shipping utilization.
    c. Initiate at Department of Defense level directives which will insure that shipping priorities and requirements within a Unified Command are handled in a section of a Joint Staff in which all services are represented. 
    d. Promulgate at Department of Defense level directives which will clarify the responsibilities for unloading MSTS shipping in amphibious operations.
                 
    In connection with Navy Shipping responsibility, the following considerations are pertinent:



   a.  It should be recognized and plans made accordingly that during war it will be necessary to send shipping to ports or open roadsteads in which fixed port facilities are limited or nil.
   b.  A certain amount of floating storage in many instances will be essential for support of the ground forces.  It would be desirable to utilize the slow liberty type for this purpose. 
   c.  In many instances in support of ground forces, coastal shipping and trans-shipping will be essential.
   d.  Quick turn-around time cannot be effected unless adequate stevedoring and optimum equipment is available.

The shipping delays in the Far East during the Korean War demonstrated need for recognition of these basic considerations.  It may be assumed that these considerations will be valid in other parts of the world lacking adequate port facilities in the event of war.


H. COMMUNICATIONS
During  the first four months of hostilities, naval communications in the Far East area approached a chaotic state.  Within every major naval command in the Far East and at Guam, large backlogs of classified dispatches developed, causing serious delays in delivery of important operational information and orders.  The volume of traffic was so great that top naval commander frequently could give attention only to action dispatches and little or none to information dispatches.  These traffic jams had a snowball effect in the tendency on the part of all dispatch originators to assign higher and higher precedence and classification to their outgoing dispatches in the hope that such action would assure preferential treatment.  It had,


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of course, the opposite cumulative effect in making practically all dispatch traffic of the same top priority.

   Communications personnel were unable to determine among the mass of incoming encrypted dispatches which were important and which were not. With the fairly  rapid buildup of naval forces in the Far East coupled with the critical military situation in Korea, a large buildup in traffic was to be expected.  It is probable that this buildup could have been handled to a reasonable degree by naval forces had it not been for the additional back-breaking load of traffic thrown into the naval communications system by the Army and the Air Force.  Literally, these service do not speak the same language as the Navy in terms of conciseness, assignment of precedence and classification of dispatches.  A fairly reasonable state of affairs in naval communications in the Far East was not reached until COMNAVFE took steps to reduce the volume of Army and Air Force traffic on naval circuits.  By far the greatest volume of Army and Air Force traffic on naval circuits originated from the intelligence branches of those services at various levels with each higher echelon originating new dispatches with the same basic and frequently unimportant information.

   It should be recognized that these difficulties will be repeated in other theaters involving joint operations unless the Navy is prepared to assig liaison officers to Army and Air Force commands to advise those commands as to what information is of value to the naval service or to arrange to receive all incoming intelligence from Army and Air Force sources ad to screen and condense this information for further  distribution to naval commands. 

I.    AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND MARINE AIRCRAFT

      During the greater part of the first six months of the Korean War, Marine fighter-bomber squadrons operated from two escort carriers.  The primary mission of these ship based Marine squadrons was close air support, augmenting the efforts of shore based Marine fighter-bomber squadrons.  The operation of these squadrons in their close air support mission was very effective, although the munitions carrying capacity of the F4U, with which these squadrons were equipped  was one half or less capacity of the F4U, with which these squadrons were equipped was one half or less per airplane than Navy dive bombers.   In this regard, however, the F4U’s were greatly superior in load carrying ability to jets.  During periods of low wind the take-off ability of the F4U loaded as a fighter-bomber for close air support missions was marginal and in a few instances, it was necessary to further reduce the munitions load to assure safe take-off ability.

     At the present time all Marine day combat squadrons in the Far East are equipped with F4U’s with the exception of one squadron that received jets during the latter part of November 1950.  All Navy fighter production for the past year or more has been of the jet type.  None of the jets can operate from CVE’s.  as the present inventory of F4U’s is depleted it will be necessary for the Marines to adopt dive bombers to continue their close air support functions in addition to jets for air combat missions.

     Since neither the current dive bomber, the AD, nor any of the current or forseeable jet aircraft can operate from the CVE in its present form, and since CVE’s constitute a large percentage of the carrier decks for future emergency, it will be necessary to re-evaluate our planned policies and programs for ship based close air support in the light of the numbers and types of CV, CVL and CVE which can be made available, and their compatibility for operations with the numbers and types of aircraft available and in the procurement program.

J.  AIR INTERDICTION

    There is widespread misconception as to the difference between the terms of air interdiction and armed reconnaissance.  Air interdiction requires that the air effort be sufficiently continuous to prevent the assembly of hostile concentrations, reinforcement and logistic support against friendly forces.  Armed reconnaissance on the contrary promotes intermittent or sporadic search for and attacks on targets of opportunity.

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     During the first six months of the war in Korea, the greater part of Marine air effort both shore and ship based was devoted to close air support.  Some effort was devoted to so called air interdiction.   Most of the effort of the fat carrier forces was devoted to so called air interdiction that in actual fact was armed reconnaissance.  The box score of Navy air effort devoted to so called air interdiction was impressive but the combined results of all of the services in this effort was by no means decisive as evidenced by the fact that our ground forces met with frequent military reverses at the hands of their ground opponents. 

     Based on the results in Korea, it must be assumed that neither the techniques nor equipment of either the Navy or the Air Force is adequate to produce real air interdiction at the present time.   At no time was air alone ever able to interdict a single  battlefield against the clever tactics used by both the North Koreans and Chinese Communists of moving large forces by night and utilizing highly effective concealment by day. 

     It is commonly accepted that the United Nations ground forces will face a severe numerical disadvantage against Soviet and satellite ground forces if we become involved in a general war.  Under those circumstances it is reasonable to assume that in a large scale war, naval air will be called upon to provide assistance to the ground forces both in the way of close air support and interdiction.  If that assumption is valid, then it is most important that intensive research by undertaken by the Air Force or  the Navy, or both, in an effort to develop[ positive means of locating concealed troops and equipment by day and moving troops and equipment by night. 

K.    CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
      Close air support has been a highly controversial subject among the Air Force, Army, Marines and Navy.  The underlying causes of this controversy are believed to involve the question of semantics and fundamental differences in concept between the Air Force on one hand and the Navy and Marines on the other. 

      The semantics differences are easily described.  The term “close air support” as used by the Air Force generally applies to a type of operation considered by the Marines and Navy to be “deep support”.  The operations considered by the Marines and Navy to be “close support” is generally not engaged in the Air Force.  Broadly speaking, the two sides of this controversy believe that each is providing close air support, neither understanding the terms as used by the other. 

      The essential difference in concept between the two sides of this controversy are that the Air Force believes “mosquito airplanes” are competent to find the target and control attack on those targets.  Technically the request for close air support by the Army evolves from the ground forces, but the actual procedures are such that in general the “mosquito” is largely on his own. 

      The Marine-Navy concept on the other hand provides that front line ground troops through the medium of Tactical Air Control Parties designate the targets and control the strikes.   The Marine-Navy system does not reject the employment of air observers in close air support operations.  However, the Marine-Navy proponents insist that the air observer (mosquito), if used, be used only as the extension of the eyes of the forward ground controllers and under ground controller authority. 

      The Marine-Navy system of close air support has proven its effectiveness under visual flight conditions.  It has not been particularly effective during darkness and conditions of limited visibility.  As in air interdiction considerable effort should be devoted to the development of around the clock air support capabilities. 

      The opinion persists that the difference between the Air Force and the Marine-Navy proponents of close air support cannot be resolved until each use terminology with the same meaning and a common concept is adopted governing the tactical air control of close air support missions. 

      The Marine-Navy close air support system has produced positive beneficial results over protracted periods of time. It has produced high customer satisfaction

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on the part of Marine ground  forces.   The Marines and the Navy should continue to adhere to their system until a better system can be developed.  Under no circumstances should the present system employed by the Air Force be adopted by the Navy and Marines.

    Navy aircraft in the fast carriers undertook numerous close air support missions under both the Air Force system of control and the Marine system of control.  Under Air Force control, Navy close air support missions were rarely effective. Under the Marine system of control, Navy close air support missions were very effective. 

    Up to the month of December 1950, Marine air squadrons were not provided with jets in the Korean War.  All of the fast carriers engaged in the Korean War were equipped with at least one squadron of jets with the exception of one ship.  As compared with the dive bombers of the fast carrier task forces, jets were highly inefficient in munitions carrying ability and endurance on station.  For those reasons, jets were almost never assigned to close air support tasks.  No current American jet aircraft is considered comparable to the current Navy dive bombers for close air support tasks. 

L. LIMITATION OF TF 77 AIR OPERATIONS
During the first six months of the Korean War, Task Force 77 consisted of from 1 to 4 CV-9 class carriers with one cruiser and normally one battleship in the supporting group and a screen of destroyers.  Throughout this period and under the conditions existing in Korea, the CV-9 carriers of this task force were able to operate the three basic types of airplanes assigned to the air groups quite effectively.  The three basic types of airplanes assigned to the air groups were the AD, F4U and the F9F jet fighter.  The marginal takeoff factor of safety existing in the CVE’s under low wind conditions did not apply to the airplanes operating from the fast carriers. 

    There existed two potentially serious Task Force deficiencies had the tempo of war operations increased materially.  These were the low effective intercept ranges of task force radar for air defense purposes and the frequency of gasoline replenishment required by the fast carriers. 

    By actual test over a period of two weeks during the middle of November 1950, the best performance of the Task Force as a whole was a detection of 60% of raids (friendly) at 50 miles range.  The Task Force was operating in circular formation without the use of pickets or airborne early warning aircraft.  None of the ships in the Task Force were equipped with AN/SPS-6B model radar during the period of this test.  Had the threat of air attack been serious it must be assumed that both pickets and airborne early warning aircraft would have been utilized.  However, even utilizing pickets and AEW, the effective range of the shipboard air search radar is entirely inadequate for interception of jet aircraft approaching at high altitude. 

    Reports of two destroyers equipped with model AN/SPS-6B radar indicate detection ranges between two and three times the average of Task Force 77.  While the ranges obtained by these two destroyers may be appreciably better than can be expected in normal service, the reliability of detection of the AN/SPS-6B model radar is appreciably superior to that of the radars currently installed in the ships of Task Force 77. 

    Replacement of existing radar sets with AN/SPS-6B radar should be effected at an early date if the full capability of carrier based jet fighters for interception are to be realized. 

    The second deficiency that was clearly defined was the replenishment requirement of aviation gasoline by the fat carriers.  The normal replenishment rate of the carriers was one day out of three thus automatically reducing the average availability of strength by 1/3.  This is in direct contrast with the corresponding replenishment requirement of CVE’s which was one day in 8 or 9.  The loss of 1/3 of the effective combat strength of fast carriers in the operating zone is excessive, especially in view of the trend in close support and interdiction operations toward requiring aircraft on station around the clock.  To some extent this same comment


10

is applicable in any type of fast carrier operations in which the carriers are confined to restricted waters.  Carriers are more vulnerable to air and submarine attack while replenishing fuel, ammunition and stores. 

   This deficiency points to the early need of appreciably increasing the gasoline capacity of the CV-9 class carriers.

M.  MINES
   Up through November 1950 10 United Nations ships were sunk or damaged by enemy mines in the Korean Campaign.  In contrast with this number only five United Nations ships were sunk or damaged by enemy gunfire or bombs.  All naval vessels in the foregoing numbers were of the destroyer type or smaller. 

   The first enemy mines were discovered off Chinnampo on the northwest coast of Korea on 4 September 1950.  Intelligence indicates that the major minefields later encountered by UN ships were laid commencing in early September.  Some 4,000 mines were shipped by rail through Wonsan.  The preparation and laying of the mines at Wonsan were done under Soviet supervision according to intelligence reports.  Those laid on the northwest Korean coast were handled entirely by North Koreans.  The mine laid were predominantly of the chemical horned type moored mine and the magnetic bottom mine.  No hydrostatic pressure mines were discovered.

   The enemy mine fields  were cleverly  and effectively laid including moored mines in shallow water within six feet of the surface which made neutralization of the mine field very difficult and dangerous.  Primitive and inexpensive but highly effective methods of laying these fields were utilized.  Fortunately, the North Koreans had not undertaken extensive mining in time to affect the amphibious landing at Inchon on 15 September 1950.  Subsequent to that date enemy mines in North Korea had the effect of delaying shipping logistic support to the 8th Army by denying the use of Chinnampo until after minesweeping had been effected, delayed the administrative landing at Wonsan by five days and required the clearance of the ports of Hungnam and Chongjin before these locations could be used by our shipping.  In addition the mine threat forced our naval gunfire support ships outside the 100 fathom cure on the east coast and mineable waters on the west coast of Korea.

   Due to the great difference in depth of water and tides between the east and west coasts of Korea, mine clearance was appreciably easier on the west coast than on the east coast.

   Primarily due to the Navy’s austerity program during the preceding years, the naval weapons system for mine countermeasures in the Pacific Ocean was totally inadequate.  When the first North Korean mine was discovered there was no mine force type commander or staff experienced in mine counter-measures in the Pacific.  Active minesweepers in commission were very limited in number and those based on the west coast of the United States were employed principally in other than mine type operations.  Experienced minesweeping personnel were difficult to find.  Rapid reactivation subsequent to September 1950 plus use of Japanese minesweepers improved this situation to an extent that permitted coping with the North Korean minefield to an acceptable degree in November 1950.  The expansion of forces and organizations in the Pacific currently underway will further improve this situation but much larger expansion will have to take place before the Pacific Fleet is prepared for major war operations. 

   Numerous deficiencies in present minesweeping equipment and material were noted during the Korean operations.  There were no mine locator ships in the Pacific.  None of our surface ships, and only four of our submarines, were provided with mine detector equipment to enable them to avoid mines.

   An innovation of the Korean campaign was the use of patrol seaplanes and helicopters for the location and destruction of mines and the use of aircraft to drop bombs and depth charges for counter-mining purposes.  The location and destruction of mines by gunfire was quite effective and warrants continuation of this procedure in the future.  The counter-mining of mines by bombs was ineffective and the counter-mining of mines by depth charges only slightly better.

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     Our present concept of operations for minefield clearance in offensive operations and the clearance of enemy mines from friendly ports will establish requirements for extremely large forces in the event of a general war.  These requirements will be so great that it appears highly desirable to turn to research now in the effort to design new and economical approaches to the problem.

N. HELICOPTERS
    One of the few new tools that has made its presence felt in the Korean War is the helicopter.  For broad utility purposes, helicopters compare somewhat with the appearance of the jeep in the last war. 

    The helicopter itself has not been employed extensively in offensive military operations, but its utilization  in support operations  of many kinds has been so great as to assure its continuing requirement over extremely wide fields of employment in naval and ground warfare.  Its important uses have included the following:


     a. As a plane guard during carrier takeoffs and landings.
     b. As quick and easy transportation between ships of a task group and ship to shore movements thus reducing considerable requirements for courier duty on the part of destroyers.
     c. As an airborne spotting platform for sip gunfire spotting.
     d. For rescue purposes frequently behind enemy held lines ashore.
     e. As an ambulance.
     f.  As a conveyance for the rapid deployment of patrols in ground warfare and for the servicing of these patrols with food and ammunition.
     g. As a courier plane between various ground stations.
     h. As an observation platform for ground observation.
     i.  Locating mines in minefields.


    It is difficult to determine which of the above operations have the greater military value.  From time to time depending upon the military situation, each of the various utilization assume the greatest importance for the time being.  Collectively, they make the helicopter of such great value as to warrant a permanent place in the list of essential military equipment of both ground and sea forces. 

    In addition to the above employments, there exists a widespread conviction that this type of aircraft will become of considerable military value when developed to the point of permitting the deployment of troops from ship to shore in amphibious landings or from point to point not readily reached by surface transportation in ground warfare.

   The speed and ease of transportation in helicopters as evidenced by its employment in Korea has created a widespread requirement for helicopter landing platforms on numerous types of ships.  These types extend to all combatant naval vessels having sufficient size to permit a landing platform, to hospital ships from direct delivery of seriously wounded, to amphibious command ships, various types of underway replenishment ships and LST’s or similar ships for work in minefield clearance and various types of spotting during amphibious landing operations. 

   The helicopter has established itself as an essential item of military equipment.  At the same time, its operational limitations and the need of improvements have made themselves clearly outlined.  The helicopter is a relatively fragile aircraft that needs considerable improvement in ruggedness.  In addition it requires from four to five times as much maintenance per flight hour as the standard carrier aircraft.  The models in service are exhausting to the pilot and permit almost no night or weather flying.  Added to these shortcomings are the limited endurance and weight lifting capacity of current models, particularly at altitude.

   In spite of these clearly recognized shortcomings, the helicopter even at its present state of development is a recognized “must” for many types of operations.  The number of useful purposes to which it may be pointed make it imperative that in future helicopter designs, the helicopter itself be so prototyped that it can be employed in as many different types of operations as practicable, using packaged equipment as necessary for any particular type of operation.


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O.  ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AND AIR DEFENSE
     There were no hostile submarine operations during the first six months of the Korean
War.  As a result, there were no operating lessons learned or deficiencies noted that are not already matters of knowledge to CNO.  Had submarine warfare broken out, it is certain that the entire aspects of the war would have changed since our resources, principally in destroyers and destroyer escort types and means for harbor and ort protection were totally inadequate to face an all out submarine campaign.

        No effective enemy air opposition developed.  Accordingly, our air defense measures were not tested in combat. Air defense measures were used to a partial degree in the form of maintaining circular anti-aircraft cruising formations at sea with day combat air patrols.  Combat air patrols were also maintained over amphibious concentrations of shipping.  However, radar picket ships and airborne early warning airplanes generally were not used for air defense purposes.  Small Task Units of naval vessels and shipping operated along the Korean coasts away from fighter air cover. 

        The IFF situation was poor.  The Mark 3 IFF used by United Nations aircraft has been compromised.  Friendly aircraft frequently failed to use their IFF in the vicinity of our surface forces causing many unnecessary alarms. 

P.     PUBLIC INFORMATION


        In few fields of endeavor were the naval forces in the Far East less prepared for war operations than in public information.  During the first month or six weeks of the Korean War so little space in the press and time on the radio were given to naval operations as to leave doubt that the Navy was actively engaged against the North Koreans.  The reason for this is quite simple.  There was almost a total lack of public information personnel in the theater while at the same time operational commanders were engulfed in urgent operations.  At that time, the public information personnel in the Far East consisted of one Lieutenant on the Staff of COMNAVFE assisted by a newly graduated journalist and one Commander on temporary duty on the Staff of Commander Seventh Fleet assisted by a journalist and an unqualified photographer.  This small force coupled with the communications log jam that immediately developed were able to accomplish very little during the early hectic days of the war. 

       Personnel-wise the situation gradually improved and with it came increased public information press and radio coverage as to the Navy’s accomplishments in the combat zone.  At the present time, the public information service from the Far East is generally quite satisfactory. 

       The Navy’s first major operation, the amphibious landing at Inchon, and later the planned amphibious landing at Wonsan were badly marred by serious differences with representatives of the press as to treatment extended to them and facilities offered them for the transmission of their news stories.  Several of these gentlemen were vindictive toward the Navy and showed no reticence about stating that one way to make the Navy realize its mistreatment of the press was to keep news of naval operations out of the press. 

       Groups of press correspondents are like other groups of men.  Most are reasonable but a few are unreasonable and arbitrary.  Navy personnel must learn to be broad minded in their relations with the press and to maintain good relations with this group.

          A number of deficiencies of various kinds combined to create the unsatisfactory relations with the press at Inchon and Wonsan.  One of the major deficiencies in this regard was largely unavoidable under the circumstances since there were inadequate accommodations in the limited amphibious shipping available.  Closely related to the lack of accommodations was the lack of radio circuits available to handle press traffic.  These deficiencies combined with a lack of tact on the part of some naval personnel in contact with the press p representatives and lack of public information officers to assist the correspondents resulted in the development of poor

13

Relations.  It seems probable that these same complications will rise again in each major operation that the Navy attempts to undertake as long as correspondents must be crowded aboard the important combat ships in the operation.  With a rising level of combat readiness in both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, active press ships with those Fleets appear to be the best solution to prevent recurrences. 

          There still appears to exist an apathy on the party of numbers of naval officers as to individual responsibility toward the building of good will between the public and the naval service.  Increased educational effort in this regard and tangible acknowledgement by appropriate marking of fitness reports appears to be warranted. 

Q.       NAVAL STAFFS AND PERSONNEL

          In almost every phase of naval operations during the first six months of the Korean War, the result of the sever austerity of personnel forced upon the Navy during the last several years is clearly evidenced.  The buildup of new staffs, the necessary augmentation of existing staffs and augmentation of personnel for the operating forces was a haphazard affair constantly lagging behind the need. 

         The recall to active duty of Reserves to fill immediate needs is not the answer.  Reserves, officers and enlisted, cannot in justice to them be expected to step directly from civilian life into full scale military operations.  As a group they require a transition and training period in the rear areas.  Judging from the buildup that occurred in the Pacific and Far East, the Navy’s available cushion of trained officers and men is inadequate to meet unexpected emergencies without severe strain. 

R.      MAJOR AREAS OF DEFICIENCY
         In attempting this evaluation of the Navy’s participation in the Korean War, wide coverage has been given to almost every phase of expansion in the Far East and to all major functions performed by the Navy in that area.  This coverage has been handled in some detail in the project studies included in the following sections of this report together with the chronological narratives of various commanders of the Pacific Fleet and the Far East.  Included in the project studies are a large number of conclusions and recommendations of varying importance in the over-all picture.  It appears desirable to boil these conclusions and recommendations down at this point to indicate major areas of deficiencies.  These follow: 

 Conclusion 1:

     Plans for hostilities in the Far East apparently did not visualize a limited action, without general mobilization, of the scope developing from the so-called ‘Police Action” in Korea.

 Recommendation 1:

     Conduct a continuing examination for “Koreas” in other parts of the world.  Prepare tentative plans on a priority basis for such other “Koreas”.

 Conclusion 2:

     The provision of qualified and trained personnel (particularly staff personnel) lagged well behind requirements in the Far East. 

 Recommendation 2:

     Develop plans for the provision of adequate initial personnel and increments of necessary trained personnel to implement the plans in recommendation #1, allowing adequate lead time
 for necessary specialized training.

  Conclusion 3:

      Equipment and techniques do not exist at the present time for successful air interdiction of enemy ground forces.


14

Recommendation 3:

   Undertake with the Air Force or unilaterally a research program for the development of new equipment and techniques to permit successful interdiction of ground forces.

Conclusion 4:

   Our present methods of clearing enemy minefields is entirely to slow and expensive in forces required. 

Recommendation 4:

   Undertake a research program to develop new and relatively economical methods for the rapid destruction of minefields. 

Conclusion 5:

   The anti-submarine forces and harbor defenses in the Pacific and the Far East would have been inadequate to cope with the outbreak of a submarine campaign. 

Recommendation 5:

   Expand anti-submarine forces as practicable.  Assign top priority to the plans for harbor defense and for reactivation of anti-submarine forces in the event of the outbreak of a major war. 

Conclusion 6:

   The handling of shipping in the Far East theatre with regard to turn around time of ships was no improvement over World War II standards.  The type of delays experienced would be extremely serious in the event of a World War. 

Recommendation 6:

   Undertake at Department of Defense level with representation form all services a thorough study of shipping utilization in the Korean Campaign, with the objectives of preparing directives which will establish basic concepts, ensure Joint Staff cognizance over shipping in Unified Command theatres, strengthen MSTS position, and emphasize responsibilities of shipper and consignee services. 

Conclusion 7:

   The landplane patrol squadron is currently not organized or equipped for deployment to advanced airfields that are under other than Navy control or support except for conditions of total mobilization.

Recommendation 7:

   Develop the necessary supporting organization for patrol landplane squadrons which will allow them to be deployed to advanced airfields under other than Navy control or support during conditions of limited action such as existed in Korea. 

S. REMARKS

    In conducting a detailed examination of a major naval effort such as Korea, it was inevitable that a large number of deficiencies in plans, organizations and functions would be uncovered.  Such was the case in the current evaluation of naval effort in Korea. 

     Lest the large number of conclusions and recommendations developed in connection with this evaluation lead to a misunderstanding of the Navy’s total effort in that area, it is desired to emphasize most strongly that in spite of shortages and deficiencies of many kinds, the Navy’s overall accomplishments in the Far East were of a very high order.  There was no indication at any time, formal or informal,


15
 

on the part of the Commander in Chief, Far East or of his major subordinate commanders that the Navy’s performance was not of the highest order.  On the contrary because  of the “can do” spirit continuously displayed by naval and Marine forces, there was and is considerable danger that the high command and top commanders of Army and Ari Force in that theatre might expect the impossible form the Navy in any situation that might develop. 

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*****
[END VOLUME I]
       

DECLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

KOREAN WAR

U.S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATIONS

 

Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Iterim Evaluation Report No. 1

 

Period

25 June to 15 November 1950

 

VOLUME II

 

DECLASSIFIED

14ND-CINCPACFLT-35 (Rev. 2-26-51)

Navy--Pearl Harbor, T.H.  

DECLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

 

VOLUME ll

C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S

 

2. LIST OF MAJOR EVENTS IN CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE---15

3. COMPILATION OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS---21 

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

KOREAN WAR

U. S. Pacific Fleet Operations

Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet

Interim Evaluation Report No. 1

Period

25 June to 15 November 1950

MAJOR EVENTS OF THE KOREAN WAR IN CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE

 

 

 

Major Events of the Korean War in Chronological Sequence                                   15

 

 

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED 

(BLANK) 

CONFIDENTIAL

MAJOR EVENTS OF THE KOREAN WAR IN CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE

East Longitude Dates

25 June 1950

Announcement on radio by North Koreans of their invasion of South Korea made at 1200K. 

U. S. fighter planes of 8th Fighter Group fired on by small North Korean convoy at 37° 50’N. - 129° 40’E. off coast of South Korea at approximately 1700K.

ROK Navy patrol craft (PC 701) sank an armed North Korean steamer with 600 troops, 18 miles off Pusan. This was first naval surface action of war.

26 June 1950 700 Americans and friendly foreign national evacuated from Seoul via Inchon to Japan by sea under direction of COMNAVFE. Escorted by USS MANSFIELD (DD 728) and USS DE HAVEN (DD 727).
27 June 1950 As directed by CINCPACFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT (VADM STRUBLE) at Buckner Bay, Okinawa, reported for duty to CINCFE (Gen. MAC ARTHUR).

President Truman ordered Naval and Air Forces in Far East to support operations of South Korean Forces and directed Seventh Fleet to take steps to prevent an invasion of Formosa.

North Koreans captured Seoul.
28 June 1950

UN Security Council ordered military sanctions against North Korea.

British Admiralty placed Royal Naval units in Japanese waters at disposal of COMNAVFE (VADM JOY). COMNAVFE requested British ships to rendezvous at Buckner Bay, Okinawa.

29 June 1950

USS JUNEAU (CLAA 119) took shore targets under fire in vicinity of Samchok, Korea; first significant naval gunfire support mission of Korean War.

Anti-submarine Warfare patrol off Sasebo area formed.

1 July 1950

CINCPACFLT formed Task Force Yoke (ships assembled on West Coast of U. S. and at Pearl Harbor for Korean campaign) under RADM BOONE.

COMNAVFE authorized COMSEVENTHFLT to continue strikes after 3 July as practicable.

COMANVFE discontinue routine ASW patrols of Sasebo area until further notices.

3 July 1950

Planes of Seventh Fleet and British FES ships under over-all command of VADM STRUBLE (COMSEVENTHFLT) began carrier operations off west coast of North Korea as ordered by COMNAVFE on 30 June.

5 July 1950

COMNAVFE placed his operational order 50 in effect implementing President Truman’s order for a blockade of the Korean Coast

7 July 1950

UN Security Council appointed General MacArthur Supreme Commander of UN Forces in Korea.

CONFIDENTIAL

15

CONFIDENTIAL

9 July 1950

CDR Michael J. L. LUOSEY took command of ROK Navy.

10 July 1950

As directed by COMNAVFE naval blockade extended to include ports of Wonsan and Chinnampo. CNO directed CINCPACFLT to sail Task Force Yoke when ready.

11 July 1950

CNO authorized activation of ships from the Reserve Fleet. NK Prisoner of War reported mines laid vicinity of Chongjin.

12 July 1950

 

First increments of 1st Marine Brigade sailed for Far East from San Diego.

 

COMNAVFE set up Naval Air Japan as temporary organization for all naval aeronautical activities in Japan.

 

14 July 1950

 

COMNAVFE authorized attacks on unidentified submarines in self defense or when offensive action against our forces was indicated.

 

Main body of 1st Marine Brigade sailed from San Diego with approximately 6,000 troops.

 

15 July 1950

 

Task Force 90 transported two RCTs of the First Calvary Division from Tokyo Bay to Pohangdong via Inland Sea and shimonoseki strait.

 

Frigate (PF) activation program began at Yokosuka.

 

18 July 1950

 

First Calvary Division (RCT 5 and 8; 10,027 troops) landed administratively at 0715I by CTF 90 at Pohang-dong.

 

18-19 July 1950

 

Carrier based planes from Seventh Fleet destroyed North Korean airfields, railroads, factories and oil refinery at Wonsan. Other targets at Hungham, Hamburg, Numpyong destroyed or damaged.

 

19 July 1950

 

First Navy plane shot down by North Koreans.

 

23 July 1950

 

USS BOXER (CV 21) arrived Yokosuka in eight days sixteen hours from Alameda established trans-Pacific record in delivering a load of F-51 airplanes, equipment and personnel for the Air Force.

 

24 July 1950

 

COMNAVFE established Escort Element (CTE 96.50) under CAPT A. D. H. JAY, RN, consisting of HMS BLACK SWAN (PF), HMS HART (PF), and HMS SHOALHAVEN (PF).

 

27 July 1950

 

COMNAVFE directed harassing and demolition raids by CTF 90 utilizing UDT and Marine reconnaissance personnel against selected North Korean east coast military objectives.

 

29 July 1950

 

First shipment 6”.6 Anti-tank aircraft rockets (ATAR); developed by Navy at NOTS Inyokern for the Air Force, delivered to the latter.

 

30 July 1950

 

CTF 90 completed Pohang administrative landing.

 
1 August 1950  

2nd Infantry Division landed at PUSAN.

 

COMNAVFE ordered two CVE’s (USS SICILY (CVE-118) and USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)) with assigned DD types to provide close air support to UN land forces in Korea.

 

USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) reported to COM7THFLT for duty.

 

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2 August 1950 

1st Marine Provisional Brigade began landing at PUSAN 

3 August 1950 

Marine Fighter Squadron 214, embarked in USS SICILY, attacked at Chinju with rockets and incendiary bombs – first action for Marine Carrier based air. 

3-5 August 1950 

Marine infantry in vicinity of Masan-Changwon on combat patrol aided by helicopter. First instance of this type of aircraft being used to carry rations and water and to evacuate personnel. 

4 August 1950 

Fleet Air Wing 6, commissioned and given operational control of all American and British patrol squadrons located in Japan-Korea area.

 

7 August 1950 

1st Marine Brigade launched attack southwest toward Kossong, 1st Marine Brigade became involved in action for first time.

 
8 August 1950  Fleet Air Japan (COMFAIRJAP) established by COMNAVFE, replacing NAVAL AIR JAPAN. 

11 August 1950 

HMS WARRIOR (CVL) and HMS OCEAN (CVL) joined British and American Forces in Korea.

 

12 August 1950 

Marines advanced to Sachon and to Changwon.

 

14 August 1950 

Marine Brigade moved into assembly area at Maryang.

 

15-16 August 1950 

First successful series of night raids on Korean East Coast by a landing party composed of a Navy underwater demolition team and U. S. Marines embarked in USS BASS (APD 124); railroad bridges and tunnels destroyed.

 

16 August 1950

 

1st Marine Brigade began to move to Yonson, CNO ordered 7th Marines to Far East.

 

Navy Task Element (TE 96.51) successfully completed the evacuation of the entire 3rd ROK Division from a position south of Yongdok.

 

17 August 1950

 

First elements of 1st Marine Division sailed from West Coast for Korea.

 

Marines began first battle of Naktong River Bulge.

 

18 August 1950

 

ROK Marines under cover of Korean Navy guns landed and captured city of Tangyong.

 

20 August 1950

 

CINCUNC ordered capture of Inchon-Seoul area by amphibious assault using RCT’s 1 and 5, 1st Marine Division.

 

21 August 1950

 

Carrier based planes of TF 77 (VALLEY FORGET (CV-45) and PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)) set new record with 202 sorties in one day in Pyongyang area.

 

22 August 1950

 

CNO, Adm Forrest SHERMAN broke his flag in USS ROCHESTER at Sasebo.

 

1 September 1950

 

Korean Reds continued offensive toward PUSAN; MASAN threatened; SONGSAN fell; Marines and Second Army Division counter-attacked

 

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DECLASSIFIED

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SECURITY INFORMATION

 

KOREAN WAR

U.S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATIONS

 

Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Interim Evaluation Report No. 1

Period

25 June to 15 November 1950

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 

Compilation of Conclusions and Recommendations-----21

DECLASSIFIED

 

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONTENTS

 

  Conclusions  Recommendations 
Main Report. Major Areas of Deficiency  22  22 

 

Project Studies

I.A.1. Naval Air Organization.......... 24 ...  25
I.A.2.a. Naval Air Operations, Fast Carrier.......... 26 ... 27
I.A.2.b. Naval Air Operations, Escort Carrier.......... 28 ...   29
I.A.2.c. Naval Air Operations, Close Air Support.......... 30 ...   31
I.A.2.d. Naval Air Operations, Interdiction.......... 32 ...   33
I.A.2.e. Naval Air Operations, Attack.......... 34...  35
I.A.2.f. Naval Air Operations, Air Defense.......... 36...  37
I.A.2.g. Naval Air Operations, A. S. W........... 38 ... 39
I.A.2.h. Naval Air Operations, Anti-Mine.......... 40 ... 41
I.A.2.i. Naval Air Operations, Patrol Squadrons.......... 42...  43
I.A.2.j. Naval Air Operations, Helicopter.......... 44 ... 45
I.A.3. Naval Air, Personnel.......... 46...  47
I.A.4. Naval Air, Training.......... 48...  50
I.A.5. Naval Air, Intelligence.......... 51...  52
I.A.6. Naval Air, Logistics.......... 53...  54
I.A.7. Naval Air, Equipment.......... 55...  57
I.A.8. Naval Air, Bases.......... 58...  59
I.B.1. Marine Air, Organization.......... 60...  62
I.B.2.a. Marine Air, Close Air Support.......... 63...  64
I.B.2.b. Marine Air, Air Defense.......... 65...  66
I.B.2.c. Marine Air, Air Transport.......... 67...  68
I.B.2.d. Marine Air, Helicopter.......... 69...  70
I.B.2.e. Marine Air, Observation.......... 71...  72
I.B.3. Marine Air, Personnel.......... 73...  74
I.B.4. Marine Air, Training.......... 75...  76
I.A.6. Marine Air, Logistics.......... 77...  78
I.B.7. Marine Air, Equipment.......... 79...  80
I.C.1 (BLANK)
I.C.2. Amphibious & Ground, Attack Force.......... 81...  83
I.C.3. Amphibious & Ground, Landing Force.......... 85...  88
I.C.4. Amphibious & Ground, Air Support.......... 90...  91
I.C.5. Amphibious & Ground, Naval Gunfire Support.......... 92...  93
I.D.1 Surface & Covering, Shore Bombardment.......... 94...  95
I.D.2. Surface & Covering, Blockade & Escort.......... 96...  97
I.D.3. Surface & Covering, Submarine.......... 98...  99
I.D.4. Surface & Covering, Air Defense & A. S. W........... 100...  101
I.E. Mine Warfare.......... 102...  104
II.A.1. Logistics, Surface Lift.......... 110...  115
II.A.2. Logistics, Underway Replenishment.......... 120...  121
II.A.3. Logistics, Shipping Support.......... 122...  125
II.A.4. Logistics, Air Lift.......... 128...  131
II.A.5. Logistics, Fleet Marine Force.......... 134...  135
II.B. Communications.......... 136...  143
II.C. Intelligence.......... 148...  150
II.D. Medical.......... 152...  154
IV. Public Information.......... 157...  158

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MAJOR AREAS OF DEFICIENCY

Conclusion 1:

Plans for hostilities in the Far East apparently did not visualize a limited action, without general mobilization, of the scope developing from the so-called ‘Police Action’ in Korea.

Recommendation 1:

Conduct a continuing examination for “Koreas” in other parts of the world. Prepare tentative plans on a priority basis for such other “Koreas”.

Conclusion 2:

The provision of qualified and trained personnel (particularly staff personnel) lagged well behind requirements in the Far East.

Recommendation 2:

Develop plans for the provision of adequate initial personnel and increments of necessary trained personnel to implement the plans in recommendation #1, allowing adequate lead time for necessary specialized training.

Conclusion 3:

Equipment and techniques do not exist at the present time for successful air interdiction of enemy ground forces.

Recommendation 3:

Undertake with the Air Force or unilaterally a research program for the development of new equipment and techniques to permit successful interdiction of ground forces.

Conclusion 4:

Our present methods of clearing enemy minefields is entirely too slow and expensive in forces required.

Recommendation 4:

Undertake a research program to develop new and relatively economical methods for the rapid destruction of minefields.

Conclusion 5:

The anti-submarine forces and harbor defenses in the Pacific and the East would have been inadequate to cope with the outbreak of a submarine campaign.

Recommendation 5:

Expand anti-submarine forces as practicable. Assign top priority to the plans for harbor defense and for reactivation of anti-submarine forces in event of the outbreak of a major war.

Conclusion 6:

The handling of shipping in the Far East theater with regard to turn around time of ships was no improvement over World War II standards. The type of delays experienced would be extremely serious in the event of a World War.

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Recommendation 6:

Undertake at Department of Defense level with representation from all services a thorough study of shipping utilization in the Korean Campaign, with the objectives of preparing directives which will establish basic concepts, ensure Joint Staff cognizance over shipping in Unified Command theatres, strengthen MSTS position, and emphasize responsibilities of shipper and consignee services.

Conclusion 7:

The landplane patrol squadron is currently not organized or equipped for deployment to advanced airfields that are under other than Navy control or support except for conditions of total mobilization.

Recommendation 7:

Develop the necessary supporting organization for patrol landplane squadrons which will allow them to be deployed to advanced airfields under other than Navy control or support during conditions of limited action such as existed in Korea.

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PROJECT I.A.1. – ORGANIZATION, Naval Air (Other than Marine Air)

CONCLUSIONS

1. Pre-June 1950 plans for a shore based naval air organization in Japan proved to be inadequate for the requirements of the Korean operation.

2. As a result of the deficiencies in plans mentioned above, the buildup of an adequate shore based naval air organization under COMNAVFE continuously lagged behind the requirements.

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PROJECT I.A.1. – ORGANIZATION, Naval Air (Other than Marine Air)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A plan should be evolved for the establishment of shore based naval air organizations, similar to those of COMFAIRJAP and COMFAIRWING SIX, to be established in the danger spots of the world as they develop. This should include stock-piling of necessary material, equipment and literature, etc., to provide for the rapid establishment of one or more staffs such as COMFAIRJAP and COMFAIRWING SIX in the event of further emergency.

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PROJECT I.A.2.a. – FAST CARRIER, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

 

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Fast Carrier Force accomplished the missions assigned satisfactorily.

2. The optimum number of aircraft per carrier, with present type distribution and Korean missions is approximately 85.

3. Division of an air group embarked in a CV-9 class carrier into more than three squadrons plus a special mission airplane unit is highly undesirable for combat operations for the reasons discussed in the body of this report.

4. The Administration of special purpose units aboard ship is not satisfactory at present.

5. Division between squadrons and ship of responsibility for maintenance of embarked airplanes is not clearly defined in current Navy Department instructions.

6. Carrier squadrons strongly prefer to have clear and complete responsibility for, and authority over, shipboard maintenance of their embarked airplanes.

7. Assignment to squadrons of responsibility for, and authority over, shipboard maintenance of their embarked airplanes was found to be the best solution to maintenance problems posed by carrier operations of the Korean campaign.

8. Essex Class Carriers can sustain 120 to 140 sorties per day each lasting three hours in the case of the propeller type airplanes, or one and one half hours in the case of jets, if replenished each third day.

9. The maximum reported ammunition expenditure of 77 tons per day is not an index of the delivery capability of the Essex Class Carrier because of the special operations involved. The delivery limit is some figure well above 77 tons per day.

10. Systematic pre-strike and post-strike photographic coverage was not obtained. This would have been of great value for the damage assessment, would have provided a needed measure of the effectiveness of the efforts of the Task Force, and would have spurred pilots to improve their accuracy.

11. Round the clock operations imposed a heavy load on carrier crews.

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PROJECT I.A.2.a. – FAST CARRIER, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air) 

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Make a study of carrier air group organization to determine the optimum division into squadrons for embarked combat operations, giving approximate consideration to training requirements and other factors.

2. Further study on the administration of special purpose units should be made.

3. Clarify Navy Department instructions regarding division between squadrons and ship of responsibility for maintenance of embarked airplanes.

4. Provide a planned program of pre-strike and post-strike photo coverage, analyzing damage inflicted, bombing accuracy, and individual pilot performance.

5. Continue studies to determine the optimum means for increasing night capabilities of carrier forces.

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PROJECT I.A.2.b. – ESCORT CARRIER, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

CONCLUSIONS

1. There was no employment during Korean operations up to 15 November 1950 of the escort carrier as an Anti-Submarine weapon. Therefore no conclusion can be reached as to its continued suitability for ASW purposes.

2. The Korean Action has emphasized certain limitation of the present CVE which will seriously affect its ability to operate the aircraft becoming available in the foreseeable future to Marine and Navy squadrons for close support of amphibious landings.

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PROJECT I.A.2.b. – ESCORT CARRIER, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air) 

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Re-study the employment of the CVE in future war giving consideration to the relationships among the following factors”

a. The numbers of CV’s and CVE’s in the active fleets, the reserve fleets and the new construction program.

b. The types of aircraft including assault helicopters which can be operated effectively from the CVE and the number of these types available now and in a representative future period.

c. The concept and expected techniques of carrier air support in amphibious assault landings in future war.

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PROJECT I.A.2.c. – CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air) 

CONCLUSIONS

1. That, when employed under the Marine Corps – Navy close air support system, Naval carrier aircraft consistently rendered effective close air support in Korean operations.

2. That when employed under other systems of control those systems displayed weakness which resulted in largely unsatisfactory utilization of air strength available for close air support.

3. A wide discrepancy exists between the interruption of the term “close air support” by the Navy – Marine Corps and by the Air Force.

4. That while communications and inadequate grid charts were responsible in part of this unsatisfactory utilization, the great weakness of other systems of close air support lies in the fact that they fail to vest control of aircraft in front-line ground forces for whom the support is intended.

5. That an urgent need exists to standardize close air support, doctrines and techniques throughout the armed forces of the United States and, if possible, the United Nations.

6. A program to make a reality of night and all-weather close support operations should be given high priority.

7. Basically, in the Army – Air Force close air support system, the concept involves an airborne controller who determines targets by aerial observation without close liaison with the supported ground troops. This is diametrically opposed to the Navy – Marine Corps system, the concept of which is that specific targets are attacked upon the request and under the direction of the frontline units of the supported ground organization.

8. Until a reconciliation of concept of close air support occurs between the Navy – Marine Corps on one hand and the Army – Air Force on the other, no standardization of close air support doctrines and techniques can occur with the armed forces of the United States.

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PROJECT I.A.2.c. – CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That standardization of close air support techniques be effected by Departmental Action in such a manner as to provide (a) front-line ground control of close support aircraft and (b) a communication system fully capable of meeting the requirements of joint operations.

2. That the concepts underlying Marine – Navy close air support to be retained with compromise.

3. That consideration be given to greater utilization of close air support training capabilities of the Amphibious Training Centers, Little Creek, Virginia and Coronado, California or to the establishment of a new air support training center (at a suitable air station such as El Centro under Marine command, for the purpose of effecting standardized training of all U. S. forces in air-surface operations.

4. That the practice of inter-service assignment of officers and men of the armed services be expanded in order to effect close and more harmonious understanding in joint operations.

5. That existing or planned programs to attain effective night and all weather close support operations be given a high priority.

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PROJECT I.A.2.d. – INTERDICTION, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

CONCLUSIONS

1. In Korea, Air Interdiction Operations were conducted under the nearly ideal conditions of meager air opposition and flak. They were conducted against an enemy capable of living off the land, and whose essential logistic requirements in tons per day are probably less than one-tenth those of an equal American force. Under these conditions, interdiction failed sufficiently to deny the enemy of his supply routers from Manchuria and Siberia. Moreover, the Chinese Communists were able to conduct their November reinforcement in North Korea, thereby changing the entire aspect of the war.

2. To be even moderately effective, interdiction against forces such as were encountered in Korea, must be maintained on a continuous 24 hour a day basis.

3. Interdiction operations, to be successful, must be conducted in accordance with a fully worked out overall central plan and cannot be prosecuted properly on a sporadic day to day uncoordinated basis.

4. Many of the air operations which the Navy regarded as interdiction were more properly armed reconnaissance.

5. The Navy can look forward to types of war techni ques, on the part of the enemy in the future, similar to those encountered in Korea, and should exert every to develop systems, techniques and equipment to make interdiction effective.

6. Our photo interpretation teams were inadequate to provide the best information that might have been obtained with present equipment and techniques.

7. Our present technical equipment and the systems that are now in existence are inadequate to locate concealed enemy positions by day or positions and movements by night.

8. With a pattern of war similar to that encountered in Korea, we must be mentally and operationally prepared to conduct extended campaign from carrier based aircraft extending over day and night periods.

9. Our carrier task forces should be of such size as t permit continuous day and night operations over extended periods of time without subjecting our ship based personnel to excessive exhaustion as a result of continuation of operations of this type.

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PROJECT I.A.2.d. – INTERDICTION, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That air interdiction not be relied upon to provide absolute denial to the enemy of his lines of communication and supply. Air interdiction is relative, at least, and will not completely deter an enemy of the type we are now fighting over terrain of the found in Korea.

2. Future interdiction operations should provide for aircraft over the target area at night as well as during the day.

3. A Joint Service Interdiction staff section, with qualified and experienced officers having no other duties, should prepare the plans for future interdiction operations. Once approved, these plans should be followed by all services, each service making a contribution along the line where its abilities can be most effectively utilized.

4. The distinction between Interdiction and Armed Reconnaissance should be brought to the attention of the Naval Aeronautical organization and the difference between these two missions clearly established.

5. We should deploy a heavy photographic squadron with an interpretation team to provide for the maximum photo intelligence for prompt relay to operational commanders.

6. We should immediately undertake an extensive research program to find better ways, means, systems and techniques and the development of equipment which will enable the location of enemy forces day and night, whether on the move or in fixed concealment.

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PROJECT I.A.2.e. – ATTACK, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

CONCLUSIONS

1. Much more general employment of pre-strike and post-strike photographic coverage is required for purposes of damage assessment and for improvement of accuracy and delivery.

2. An air group of the present composition is capable of routine missions to a radius two hundred twenty (220) nautical miles with effective attack loads, performance of the CORSAIR being the limiting factor.

3. It is practicable to provide jet fighter cover rendezvousing with the attack group at a short distance from the target area, remaining with the group until retirement.

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PROJECT I.A.2.e. – ATTACK, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Provide planned pre-strike and post-strike photographic coverage for all air attack operations.

2. Replace the CORSAIR with AD’s for attack missions as discussed in the study of Naval Air Equipment.

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PROJECT I.A.2.f. – AIR DEFENSE, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

CONCLUSIONS

1. In combat operations against satellite nations, initial air opposition may not be of the same standard as either Soviet or our own air operations. On the other hand, reinforcement by Soviet aircraft, and even Soviet pilots is an ever present possibility which must be faced.

2. Notwithstanding well laid plans for control of air defense to be passed ashore upon the successful execution of an amphibious landing, unforeseen exigencies may delay establishment of the shore Tactical Air Direction Center. A delay similar to that encountered at Wonsan may happen again.

3. Officers and enlisted personnel assigned to CIC were inadequate in numbers for effective conduct of combat operations.

4. The present situation for identification of aircraft is unsatisfactory.

5. CIC’s techniques have not been developed to a completely satisfactory point with respect to interior communications. Delay in transmission of information to the flag and commanding officers may again prove fatal as it did on at least one occasion during World War II.

6. The performance of SPS-6B radar equipment has been outstanding.

7. VHF communication channel assignments emphasized close air support and amphibious requirements at the expense of air defense. In the event of determined aerial opposition, such a policy could result in jammed air defense channels with resultant complications.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PROJECT I.A.2.f. – AIR DEFENSE, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That air defense measures in naval forces in combat areas not be relaxed even through effective air opposition in Korea had thus far been lacking.

2. That during amphibious operations, AGC, BB, CA/CL, DD/DDR/DDE and other vessels capable for such duty in the event of the delay in establishment on the shore Tactical Air Defense Center.

3. That officer and enlisted allowances for ships deployed to potentially active areas be more realistically planned in order to provide adequate personnel for effective combat operations.

4. That the replacement of MK 3 IFF by MK IFF be expedited all possible in order to shorten then “twilight” period when two systems will be in use.

5. That OPNAV initiates a study of the interior communications doctrine prescribed in effective publications concerning CIC with a view toward the improvement of this doctrine.

6. That SPS-6B radar equipment be installed in combatant ships with high priority.

7. That air defense communications requirements be given more consideration in future planned amphibious operations in order that the necessary channels required for this use may be provided.

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PROJECT I.A.2.g. – ASW, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

CONCLUSIONS

1. Within the limitations of the five (5) –S configurated aircraft assigned each squadron, the PBM Squadrons now operating in the Far East are trained and ready for any demands that may be made upon them in ASW Operations.

2. he VA (W) and VA (N) units of the Fast Carrier Task Force were inadequately trained for ASW missions at the time of their deployment from West Coast bases. The lack of training opportunities in the forward area prevented overcoming this handicap.

3. The Requirements for Intelligence for ASW in the operating units had not been fully provided to the outbreak of hostilities.

4. A need exists for closer liaison between surface units engaged in ASW and air units similarly engaged.

5. If the Soviets had unleashed an unlimited submarine campaign at any time up to now, the Naval Air ASW organization would have been unable to handle it because of insufficient forces available and because of the poor material condition of the ASW equipment.

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PROJECT I.A.2.g. – ASW, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. VP 42 and 47 should be held intact in so far as possible in order that the know-how which they have acquired concerning ASW operations not be lost.

2. Review adequacy of equipment for ASP purposes and insure that deployed crews are adequately trained.

3. Provide a ground organization within the operating squadrons to meet the requirements for intelligence for ASW.

4. Provide greater contact between surface and air commanders engaged in ASW. Supervision of this contact should be furnished by the Force Commander. Provide for the interchange of officers on a temporary basis between then naval air and surface units.

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PROJECT I.A.2.h. – ANTI-MINE, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

 

CONCLUSIONS

1. Prior to the discovery of mines in the area, intelligence relative to the time, locations and methods of enemy mining operations was lacking.

2. Intelligence was developed through captured enemy documents and material, and interrogation of enemy prisoners.

3. It is probable that some mining activity was observed by patrol aircraft during coastal reconnaissance but was not interpreted as such.

4. If an effective air intelligence organization had existed in the area at the time the activity was observed it is possible that it would have been interpreted correctly.

5. Once the presence of mines was known, anti-mine search and reconnaissance operations conducted by patrol aircraft independently and in coordination with mine-sweepers was effective.

6. The employment of helicopters in coordination with mine-sweepers in the development of mine fields was effective.

7. Counter-mining with depth bombs by patrol aircraft and general purpose bombs by carrier aircraft was not effective. However, it has possibilities as evidenced by the relatively more successful effort made by patrol aircraft on 28 and 29 November.

8. Strafing with machine gun fire proved to be the most effective method of destruction of mines by aircraft.

9. Little training other than familiarization is necessary for aircraft personnel to become reasonably proficient in the detection of mines and their destruction by strafing.

10. Training of patrol aircraft personnel in recognition of mining operations by surface craft is needed.

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PROJECT I.A.2.h. – ANTI-MINING, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

 RECOMMENDATIONS

 1. Assign trained air intelligence, including photo-interpretation personnel to units which are expected to engage in such operations.

2. Include the following in the training program of patrol squadron and helicopter personnel.

    a. General familiarization with surface mining methods and techniques.

    b. General familiarization with mine-sweeping methods and techniques.

   c. Exercises with mine-sweepers.

 3. Give high priority to research in anti-mining by aircraft including helicopters.

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PROJECT I.A.2.i. – PATROL QUADRONS, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

 CONCLUSIONS

1. The patrol squadrons satisfactorily performed the missions assigned to them in the Korean War.

2. The greater part of the operational effort of the patrol squadrons was devoted to ASW. In the absence of proven enemy submarine opposition, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of this effort.

3. The development of the Korean War has been the excellent performance of patrol planes in aerial mine search and destruction.

4. Although only an occasional employment, patrol planes have demonstrated their ability to spot, if so required.

5. The material condition of the ASW equipment in patrol planes is not being maintained at its optimum, partly because of lack of need to use it.

6. The landplane patrol squadron under present naval concept is not organized or equipped for deployment except in relation to supporting elements such as the Fasron and the air station or acorn. This concept does not provide adequate mobility for the landbased patrol squadron under conditions such as existed in Korea.

7. The shortage of qualified communication personnel in the wing staff and in the squadrons was a contributing factor in preventing the full effectiveness and capabilities of aerial search and reconnaissance missions from being realized.

8. The concept of the naval requirements for mobile seaplane squadrons supported by AV and AVP was proved valid.

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PROJECT I.A.2.i. – PATROL QUADRONS, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Navy department should consider the assignment of an additional mission to patrol plane squadrons, the search and destruction of mines.

2. Consideration should be given to the assignment of a secondary mission to patrol planes of spotting.

3. ASW equipment in patrol planes should be brought up to peak operating condition, in anticipation of a possible future submarine offensive. –S configurations should be fully completed. Adequate maintenance facilities and maintenance personnel should be assigned to insure proper operation of all installed ASW equipment.

4. Review the concept of mobility of the landplane patrol and relationship between Patron, Fasron and established air station or acorn with a view to improving the mobility of the VPML.

5. Adequate transport and utility squadrons should be made available in any active area of combat operations in order that patrol squadrons will not be diverted from their combatant operations to logistic support missions.

6. A minimum of one landplane and one seaplane patrol squadron should be in readiness in each Fleet for deployment on 10 days notice and prepared for operations from a seadrome, and Air Force Base, or a Naval Air Facility, as the circumstances may dictate. Such squadrons should be completely provided with maintenance personnel, ammunition, spare parts kits, vehicles and field equipment as an integral and organic part of the squadron.

7. Assign qualified communication personnel in sufficient numbers to wing staffs and squadrons in forward areas to insure that the full effectiveness and capabilities of aerial search and reconnaissance missions can be realized.

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PROJECT I.A.2.j. – HELICOPTER, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

CONCLUSIONS

1. Helicopters significantly increase the ability of military forces in accomplishment of many types of missions.

2. The helicopter has great value in anti-mine operations.

3. Evacuation of wounded would be facilitated if the helicopter could proceed directly to the hospital ship.

4. Helicopter maintenance requirements are much greater than those of fixed wing aircraft.

5. Principal development requirements are as listed under “Recommendations”.

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PROJECT I.A.2.j. – HELICOPTER, Operations, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Review allowance of helicopter for carrier, battleship, and cruiser types.

2. Procure sufficient helicopters to meet the above requirement, plus those needed for other naval activities and the Marines, plus logistic support requirements.

3. Provide helicopter landing platforms in hospital ships.

4. Develop equipment and techniques for optimum location of mines by helicopter, and for their destruction when located.

5. In future helicopter development include:

    a. Improved reliability, reduced maintenance.

    b. Greater endurance and/or payload.

    c. Facilities for night and instrument flying.

    d. Some protection against small arms fire.

    e. Simpler control.

    f. Less critical load balancing requirement.

    g. Versatility in equipment carried.

    h. Accommodation for casualties in stretchers.

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PROJECT I.A.3. – PERSONNEL, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

CONCLUSIONS

1. Officer Personnel

    a. The basic allowance of the staffs, ships, squadrons and shore establishments in commission at the outbreak of hostilities were inadequate to carry on sustained combat operations or in the case of shore establishments to support those operations.

    b. The necessity for augmenting staffs from 80% to 100%, ships from 20% to 50% and squadrons from 50% to 100% over their basic allowances, is evidence that the basic allowances are unrealistic and inadequate for meeting emergencies.

    c. The speed of augmentation was inadequate considering the fact that after four and one-half months the augmented allowances still were not filled.

    d. Aviation officers of adequate rank and qualifications should be included in non-aviation staffs as Air Officers; in the Operations, Plans and Intelligence Divisions of the staffs of those major commands whose missions call for exercise of operational control over, or close coordination with air elements.

    e. The staffs of COMFAIRJAP and COMFAIRWING SIX had an insufficient number of officers on board upon commissioning to carry out their functions efficiently.

    f. The overall shortage of qualified CIC, Communication, Air Intelligence and Photo-Interpretation Officers, calls for an intensified training program to qualify officers for those billets.

    g. It is necessary that aviation ground officers be readily available to be assigned to carrier air groups and patrol squadrons in combat to carry out Administrative, Manteca and Air Intelligence duties.

    h. In numerous cases officers who did not have the necessary qualifications or were of below average ability were assigned to staffs in the area.

2. Enlisted Personnel

    a. The basic allowances of the staffs, ships, squadrons and shore establishments in commission at the outbreak of hostilities were inadequate to carry on sustained combat operations or in the case of shore establishments to support those operations.

    b. The necessity of augmenting staffs from 39% to 95% and ships from 25% to 80% over their basic allowances is evidence that the basic allowances for staffs and ships are unrealistic and inadequate for meeting emergencies.

    c. The speed of augmentation was inadequate considering the fact that after four and one-half months the augmented allowances still were not filled.

    d. The overall shortage of first and second class petty officers in the engineering, electronics, supply and administrative or clerical rates calls for an intensified training program to qualify men for advancement in those ratings.

    e. The staffs of COMFAIRJAP and COMFAIRWING SIX  had an insufficient number of men on board upon commissioning to carry out their functions efficiently.

    f. In numerous cases men who did not have the necessary qualifications or were of below average ability were assigned to staffs in the area.

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PROJECT I.A.3. – PERSONNEL, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that:

    a. All Air Force Pacific Fleet Staffs, ships, air groups and squadrons be brought up to the present augmented allowances as soon as possible.

    b. Aviation officers of adequate rank and qualifications be assigned as Air Officers; or in the Operations, Plans and Intelligence Divisions of the staffs of those major commands whose missions call for exercise of operational control over, or close coordination with air elements.

    c. Inaugurate an intensified training program to qualify officers for Communications, CIC, Air Intelligence and Photo-Interpretation duties.

    d. Inaugurate an intensified training program to qualify men for advancement in rating in the engineering, electronics, supply and clerical rates.

    e. Screen all officer and enlisted personnel thoroughly prior to assigning them to staffs in the combat area.

    f. When and if a staff is established in a forward or combat area insure that a full allowance of qualified officer and enlisted personnel are actually on board upon commissioning.

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PROJECT I.A.4. – TRAINING, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

CONCLUSIONS

1. Considering the budgetary limitations and personnel instability that existed during the fiscal year 1950, ships and squadrons attained as high a state of operational readiness as could be expected prior to participation in the Korean Action.

2. Considering the continuation of the Korean Action and the unsettled future existing more concentrated training programs are desirable for both ships and squadrons in order to attain combat readiness in the minimum practicable time.

3. All fast carriers, escort carriers and tenders performed satisfactorily all operations required of them in the Korean Action.

4. The lack of determined submarine and air opposition precludes firmly establishing the adequacy of training for general war received by the fast carriers, escort carriers and tenders engaged in the action during the period of this report. Their operational performance indicates that within the limitations of their basic peacetime allowances of personnel they were adequately trained. However, these allowances were inadequate to carry on sustained combat operations. The resulting necessity for augmenting officer personnel from 20% to 50% and enlisted personnel from 25% to 80% after ships were in combat, or had completed the major portion of their training, would make the existence of a satisfactory degree of readiness for general war doubtful in the majority of ships at the time of their deployment.

5. Fast carrier squadrons performed the majority of missions assigned in a satisfactory manner; were especially effective in close air support when employed under the Marine Corps/Navy control system, and were adequately trained for the Korean Action. However, certain conditions were encountered and missions assigned which normally could not be foreseen, but should be considered in future training plans. They are as follows:

    a. Pilots encountered difficulty in recognizing small, camouflaged and defiladed targets, and in successfully delivering attacks against them from the low altitudes and employing the shallow dives imposed by low ceilings and terrain.

    b. It was necessary on many occasions for pilots to perform close air support missions under the Air Force/Army control system.

    c. The unfamiliarity of the majority of pilots with gunfire spotting procedures caused poor results on many of these missions.

6. The adequacy of training of the fast carrier squadrons for general war cannot be firmly established principally because of the lack of determined air opposition and adequate photographic coverage for assessing weapon accuracy. However, the low average degree of reported readiness, caused primarily by budgetary limitations and high personnel turnover interfering with the training program, raises considerable doubt that a satisfactory degree of readiness for general war was attained.

7. VF (N) and VA (N) units were not employed extensively enough to assess the adequacy of their training in night and all-weather missions. However, the need became evident for research and development of equipment, methods and techniques; and subsequent training of all-weather units, to provide around-the-clock and all-weather interdiction and close air support.

8. VA (N) and VA (W) units were not adequately trained for ASW.

9. The inadequate pre-strike and post-strike photographic coverage and the

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PROJECT I.A.4. – TRAINING, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

evidence of poor flight and camera techniques in some photographs received by COMNAVFE raises doubt as to the adequacy of training received by the VF (P) units.

10. Helicopters performed all the missions assigned in an excellent manner; were adequately trained for the Korean Action, and for all missions that can now be foreseen for them to perform in a general war.

11. Patrol squadrons performed all the missions assigned them in a satisfactory manner. Their performance in mine search and destruction was excellent and they were adequately trained for the Korean Action. In the absence of proven enemy submarine opposition their effectiveness in that department cannot be assessed. However, from their performance in this action on all missions, and their high state of initial readiness, it is evident they were adequately trained for general war.

12. There was no perceptible difference in the combat performance of AIRPAC and AIRLANT units. Carriers and squadrons operated together with no difficulty and no loss in effectiveness; thereby indicating no undesirable differences in training methods and standards between the two commands.

13. The inadequacy of officer and enlisted peacetime allowances resulted in a critical shortage of qualified personnel for the performance of certain duties necessary to carry on combat operations. This same personnel austerity prevented individual commands from deriving maximum benefit from training schools and facilities. Practically all training was necessarily done “one the job”.

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PROJECT I.A.4. – TRAINING, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The cognizant divisions or sections under the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Bureau of Personnel and the Type Commander make a strong effort to stabilize personnel at authorized allowances during the training periods and combat tours or forward deployment of ships and squadrons. In the event that such stabilization is not practicable provide operationally trained reliefs for key squadron personnel and fully qualified officers and men as reliefs for key ship personnel.

2. Concentrate the training programs of ships and squadrons in order to attain combat readiness in the minimum practicable time.

3. Include in the training program for all fast carrier pilots the following:

    a. Qualification in close air support missions under Marine/Navy system of control including operations with Marine ground forces Marine TACP’s.

    b. Familiarization with Air Force/Army system of control.

    c. Discovery and recognition of small, camouflaged and defiladed targets.

    d. Bomb, rocket, strafing and Napalm attacks against these targets from relatively low altitudes and utilizing shallow dives, in addition to the conventional types of attack.

4. Include in the training program of patrol squadrons and helicopters:

    a. General familiarization with surface mining methods and techniques.

    b. General familiarization with mine-sweeping methods and techniques.

    c. Exercise with mine-sweepers.

5. Include in the training program of each fast carrier group and patrol squadron qualification of a small number of otherwise experienced pilots in air spotting for surface gunfire.

6. Assign priorities to the training recommended in 3, 4 and 5, that are consistent with the priority of the squadrons missions.

7. Emphasize night and all-weather training in close air support and interdiction commensurate with the capabilities of the equipment.

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PROJECT I.A.5. – AIR INTELLIGENCE, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

CONCLUSIONS

1. Due to the lack of qualified officers an effective naval air intelligence organization did not exist in the Japan-Korea area at the outbreak of hostilities.

2. Procurement and assignment of qualified officers later allowed the formation of relatively adequate organization in the staff of COMNAVFE and throughout the Fast Carrier Task Force, but were of insufficient number to supply the needs of COMFAIRJAP, FAIRWING SIX and the Escort Carrier Task Group.

3. Personnel and organization were adequate in the 1st MAW during the entire period.

4. Basic information and materials available in the area were inadequate for the conduct of naval air operations.

5. Neither visual, nor photographic air reconnaissance provided adequate pilot briefing material for the conduct of attack and interdiction missions conducted by the fast carrier and Marine squadrons, or for assessment of damage resulting therefrom.

6. For close air support operations the information supplied for pilot briefing was inadequate.

7. Information supplied the patrol squadrons was not always sufficiently complete and up to date to allow adequate pre-flight briefing of pilots.

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PROJECT I.A.5. – AIR INTELLIGENCE, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Bring all Air Force Pacific Fleet staffs, ships, air groups and squadrons up to their augmented allowances of air intelligence and photo interpretation personnel as soon as possible, giving first priority to units in the combat area.

2. Establish a program for the procurement and training of aviation ground officers to fill the air intelligence needs of the Pacific Fleet.

3. Give consideration to the inclusion of naval aviators of adequate rank and experience in this program for the purpose of ultimate assignment to air intelligence duties on force and fleet staffs.

4. Establish naval facilities for the rapid supply of maps and charts, and the processing of photography, needed for naval air intelligence purposes in the Japan-Korea area and in areas of probably future operations.

5. Establish training programs in Navy and Marine squadrons in familiarization of potential trouble areas, recognition of ship, aircraft and ground targets and other related air intelligence subjects.

6. Include sufficient photographic aircraft in the complements of carriers deployed to the forward areas to insure adequate photographic coverage to fulfill air intelligence needs.

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PROJECT I.A.6. – LOGISTICS, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

CONCLUSIONS

1. Operations were not hampered to any serious degree by lack of aviation supplies.

2. Logistic requirements should be given careful consideration in operational planning to assure reasonable logistic support.

3. Logistic support should remain mobile to the maximum practicable extent especially through the use of aviation supple vessels.

4. The landplane patrol squadron under present naval concept is not organized or equipped for deployment except in relation to supporting elements such as the FASron and the air station or acorn. This concept does not provide adequate mobility for the landbased patrol squadron under conditions such as existed in Korea.

5. FASRON allowances should include a complete allowance of Section “G” shop equipment to assure reasonable mobility.

6. Establishment of an airplane pool at a point unnecessarily remote from the users, as at Guam, is undesirable.

7. Supply of airplanes, although tight at times, was generally satisfactory.

8. Supply of aircraft engines likewise was generally satisfactory.

9. Exploitation of air transportation is extremely valuable in assuring satisfactory outfitting of aviation type vessels, and avoidance of AOGs (grounded airplanes).

10. In addition to its other function, the Fleet Logistic Air Wing performed a valuable service in supporting aviation type ships, which frequently are remote from established MATS routes.

11. An air transportation system for distribution of items in the operating area is necessary.

12. Airplane courier service to carrier group is necessary to provide logistic support.

13. The need for cargo airplane bases or landing stripes close to all major naval bases has been demonstrated. Lack of such imposes a severe handicap on logistics and administrative operation. Seaplane or amphibian support is a less satisfactory alternative.

14. Transportation of airplanes to the forward area was satisfactory.

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PROJECT I.A.6. – LOGISTICS, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Continue to implement philosophy of mobile support.

2. Review the concept of mobility of the landplane patrol squadron and the relationship between PatRon, FASRon and established air station or acorn with a view of improving the mobility of the VPML.

3. Revise aviation Circular Letter 100-49 to provide FASRons allowances of ship equipment irrespective of their bases.

4. Maintain airplane pools at location as close as practicable to the users.

5. Maintain Fleet Logistic Air Wing service for support for aviation type ships.

6. Assure that an air transportation system exists for local coverage of the operating area.

7. Provide shore based courier service to operating carrier groups.

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PROJECT I.A.7. – EQUIPMENT, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

CONCLUSIONS

1. There were no defects in carriers, airplanes or equipment which prevented the accomplishment of missions assigned in the Korean operations during this report period.

2. The aviation fuel capacity of ESSEX class carriers is inadequate.

3. The CVE is only marginally satisfactory for basing Corsairs for close support employment.

4. Catapults in ESSEX class carriers were only marginally adequate for launching F9F-2 and -3 airplanes.

5. Aircraft fueling and de-fueling provisions in ESSEX class carriers are inadequate in delivery rates.

6. The time required for replenishing aviation fuel is roughly double that required for replenishing black oil.

7. Assignment of carrier space to air groups should be re-examined and adjusted if necessary.

8. The ARV ships FABIUS (ARVA-5) AVENTINUS (ARVE-3) arrived in the Far East too late for evaluation during the present report period.

9. Korea employment of the F9F did not justify installation of rockets in that model.

10. The F9F is not satisfactory close air support airplane, as compared with the AD and Corsair.

11. F9F combat losses were not excessive; no requirement for added armor was indicated.

12. The weight of the F9F-2 and -3 is excessive as compared with thrust available.

13. The Corsair airplane is excessively vulnerable especially in the lubricating oil system.

14. The Corsair has been rendered obsolescent as a fighter by the F9F and other jet fighters, and as an attack airplane by the AD.

15. Cruising speed of the AD while equal to that of the Corsair is too low for convenient close escort by jet fighters.

16. AD effectiveness in operations such as those required in Korea would be greatly enhanced by addition of two more 20 MM guns.

17. While Helicopters proved to be of great value, need for improvements in pay load, endurance, instrument flight capabilities, and protection indicated.

18. Helicopters require considerably more maintenance effort than fixed wing airplanes due to their complexity and fragility.

19. The value of Napalm under conditions such as those encountered in Korea justifies development of a special Napalm tank.

20. No reliable evaluation of ATAR’s was possible during this report period.

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PROJECT I.A.7. (Cont’d)

21. Incidence of hung rockets is high, many of these becoming detached on landing aboard ship.

22. Use of the toss bomb sight in the AD in Korea was not sufficient in itself to justify specification of this sight. However, experiences in Korea is not considered conclusive.

23. Loss rates of ADs were not sufficient to justify addition of armor at the expense of payload.

24. There is a requirement for a search and rescue aircraft to recover air crews in the water at distances up to 150 miles from the ship.

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PROJECT I.A.7. – EQUIPMENT, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Expedite the 27A carrier conversion program in order to provide added aviation fuel capacity, added catapult launching energy, and other improvements.

2. Provide carriers with launching capacity greater than that of the present CVEs for close air support squadrons.

3. Increase rate of fueling and de-fueling airplanes in ESSEX class carriers.

4. Modify present ESSEX class carriers to double aviation gas replenishment rate.

5.  Type Commander review assignment of carrier spaces to air groups.

6. At high priority provide a carrier fighter capable of combatting contemporary developments of the MIG-15 type jet fighters.

7. Permanently remove HVAR rocket provisions from F9F and similar jet fighters.

8. Make no sacrifice in F9F or other similar fighters to provide close air support features.

9. Make no addition of armor to the F9F.

10. If practicable decrease the weight of the F9F-2 and -3 by a means other than removing fuel; add items of significant weight only with compensating decreases.

11. Continue the installation of armor plate for oil coolers, and oil cooler by-pass valves, in Corsair airplanes.

12. Replace Corsairs with jet fighters to the extent that fighters are required, and with ADs to meet attack requirements.

13. Develop and procure attack airplanes with cruising characteristics suitable for escort by jet fighters.

14. Increase the forward fixed battery of the AD to four 20 MM guns.

15. Develop new helicopters which provide greater payload or endurance or both, instrument flight capabilities, and some measure of protection.

16. In new helicopter development, attempt to achieve greater sturdiness.

17. Develop an inexpensive easily stowed tank suitable for Napalm use to be distributed by the Service Force in the same manner as ammunition.

18. Provide great assurance of discharging all rockets, or provide a positive means of releasing hung rockets in flight, or provide greater security of the rockets on the racks; or possibly two or three of these measures.

19. Assure adequate training in use and maintenance of the toss bomb sight in the AD prior to deployment of AD squadrons.

20. Make no increase in armor protection in the AD.

21. Provide a rescue aircraft, perhaps a version of a production helicopter type, suitable for rescue of aircrews in the water at distances up to 150 miles from the carrier.

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CONFIDENTIAL

PROJECT I.A.8. – BASES, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

CONCLUSIONS

1. At the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950, the U. S. Navy was faced with a problem of augmenting Naval air forces in the Western Pacific.

2. Naval air facilities available at the beginning of hostilities consisted of one (1) activity with accommodations for limited seaplane operations and storage. No land plane facilities under Navy control were available in Japan. The problem of acquisition of air facilities became an immediate and pressing one.

3. Use of certain Air Force facilities under temporary agreement subject to change or cancellation emphasized the need for base facilities under Navy control.

4. A lack of Naval air staff personnel in the Western Pacific made it necessary to operate with make-shift and interim staffs at a very critical period. This lack of staff personnel further complicated the air base problem.

5. The need for an aviation supply facility in Japan to meet wartime operational needs imposed an additional base requirement on Naval Air in the Western Pacific.

6. A shortage of FASRON personnel in the Western Pacific further complicated the air base problem by requiring already relatively small detachments to be further sub-divided to provide support for Naval air units deployed among various Air Force facilities.

7. The lack of a land plane facility adjacent to Sasebo Naval Base imposed severe restrictions on movement of both personnel and cargo to and from this vital area.

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PROJECT I.A.8. – BASES, Naval Air (Other Than Marine Air)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. As a matter of policy, the U. S. Navy should retain emergency rights to facilities relinquished to other services in the areas where forced economies or other reasons require their inactivation as Naval facilities.

2. To the extent permitted by the peace treaty when made, Naval Air should maintain both NAF Yokosuka and NAS Atsugi in their present or projected status to insure the continued availability of air bases for Naval use.

3. Naval staffs should include sufficient Naval air personnel to insure continued evaluation of Naval Air problems and timely action for their solution.

4. As a planning policy, land-plane facilities in close proximity to major fleet bases should be provided wherever practicable.

5. The possibility of improving deployment and advanced base operating capabilities of Fleet Air Wing elements should be considered.

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CONFIDENTIAL

PROJECT I.B.1. – ORGANIZATION, Marine Air

CONCLUSIONS

General

1. While the Marine Corps is primarily an amphibious force it is also a force being with a highly developed readiness. In future emergencies, as in Korea, Marine ground and air units may expect to be deployed and committed quickly wherever they are needed and whether or not the operation is amphibious. Marine aviation therefore must be organized and equipped to support our ground forces in overland operations extending beyond amphibious beachheads.

2. The ability of the First Marine Aircraft Wing to organize, equip and embark Marine air units for the Far East within ten (10) days after receipt of the directive demonstrates the soundness of the overall organizational and command structure of Fleet Marine Force air units.

3. The immediate redeployment of air units to combat operations from both land and carrier bases, within a matter of days after their arrival in Japan attests to the basic soundness of their individual organizational structure. Their combat performance in support of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and other elements of the Eight U. S. Army during the Pusan perimeter operations further supports this conclusion.

4. The participation of Marine air units (MAG-33, Reinf.) in the Inchon amphibious assault, providing close air support continuously with two (2) squadrons CVE based and initiating air support operations from KIMPO airfield three (3) days after after its seizure by the 5th Marne’s further certifies the soundness in the organizational make up of the Marine Aircraft Group as well as the Squadrons.


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PROJECT I.B.1. – ORGANIZATION, Marine Air

SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS

1. The rapid deployment of air units into airfields as soon after seizure as possible as accomplished at both KIMPO and WONSAN, supported initially by airlift, demonstrates a continuing need for transport elements organic to the Marine aviation organization.

2. The increased tempo of deployment of Marine air units experienced throughout the Korean campaign indicates a trend in tactical employment. Initial readiness plus flexibility of movement are becoming increasingly important organizational characteristics.

3. Movement of tactical air units into newly seized airfields created an immediate and urgent need for air base elements to set up and operate the airfield and its facilities.

4. Marine air units employed on airfields close in rear of fighting ground elements will continue to face an airfield perimeter security problem over and beyond the internal security of their own area.

5. Marine Divisions will continue to experience the need for an air support section operating in close proximity to and directly with the Division Commander and his staff. Marine Air Wings will continue to experience the need for an overall air control agency operating in close proximity to and directly with the Wing.

6. The doctrines presently in use in amphibious operations under which control is initially exercised by the naval commander afloat and later passes to the ground commander ashore is sound.

7. The doctrine imposing the highest air echelon in the area (Fifth Air Force) in the operational chain of command between the ground commander (CG, X Corps) and the supporting air commander (CG, 1st MAW) creates a cumbersome system and contravenes proven principles of air-ground team work as employed by the Marine Corps.

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PROJECT I.B.1. – ORGANIZATION, Marine Air

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Although Marine air units were successful in their frequent and rapid redeployment made necessary by the changing ground situation, the Marine Corps must continue to examine the weight and composition of its tactical air units with a view toward improving Marine aviation’s ability to redeploy its tactical squadrons to bases afloat or ashore.

2. Although the present organization of Group Headquarters and Service Squadrons provides personnel for limited air base functions, the Marine Corps should examine airbase operation requirements in the light of experiences in Korea,

3. Any plan envisaging the early employment of Marine air units on forward airfields must include provisions for perimeter defense airfields.

4. The entire concept of employment of the Marine Air Control Group and its subordinate elements in conjunction with the existing control system for close air support should be examined and consideration given to the thought that an element similar in nature to the air support section of a Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron (MTACS) be made organic to each Marine Division and an overall air control agency including an element similar to the air defense section of MTACS be made organic to each Marine Aircraft Wing. This recommendation has as its basis the concept that air support

5. The Marines Corps must insist on retention of the direct interlocking relationships established between the Marine ground commander and his Marines supporting air commander. When and if employed in conjunction with U. S. Air Forces and U. S. Army ground forces in addition to our own fleet Marine forces, the same interlocking relationships should be maintained.

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PROJECT I.B.2.a. – CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, Marine Air

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Marine Corps Close Air Support system again has been proved to be sound and effective.

2. Marine Corps joint air-ground training has ensured effectual utilization of the Marine Close Air Support system.

3. There is evidence that further training effort could profitably be devoted to Battalion – Squadron exercises.

4. Night and all-weather close air support technique is an area in which much remains to be done.

5. The ratio of one support squadron to one battalion of infantry is appropriate for amphibious forces.

6. The jet aircraft is, at present not the most suitable type for close support of ground forces.

7. Marine carrier-based groups can perform their missions most effectively when based aboard CV type carriers.

8. There are certain deficiencies in inter-service and intra-service communications.

9. The requirement exists for a close air support system, common to all U. N. forces, based on front-line ground control.

10. The practice of breaking up air-ground teams geared to operate together is inimical to the efficient employment of such units and contravenes the intent of the National Security Act which so constituted them.

11. There is a widespread and serious lack of understanding of approved air-ground terminology throughout the military forces of the United Nations.

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PROJECT I.B.2.a. – CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, Marine Air

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That joint air ground training of Marine Corps units be continued at all levels and expanded at squadron-battalion level.

2. That efforts to develop all-weather, all-visibility close air support equipment and techniques be vigorously pursued.

3. That the ratio of supporting squadrons to amphibious troops be established at a figure of one squadron per battalion of infantry employed, based on presently assigned aircraft types.

4. That present and immediate future aircraft for close support be of of reciprocating engine type, but that efforts be continued to develop a versatile turbo-propelled aircraft capable of efficient performance of air attack and air defense missions.

5. That CV type carriers be made available for Marine squadrons when carrier based.

6. That the deficiencies in the status of inter-service and intra-service communications be thoroughly explored by specially qualified personnel on a UN wide basis and an adequate solution presented to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

7. That a basic doctrine for close air support, founded on the principle of front-line ground control, be formulated and presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff application by all UN forces.

8. That every effort in future engagements be made to retain the tactical unity of organizations so constituted as to be geared to operate together and supplement each other in joint air-ground operations.

9. That terminology promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning airground operations be disseminated widely enough to ensure complete understanding by all branches of the service.

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PROJECT I.B.2.b. – Combat Operations Section, Marine Air, Operations Air Defense

CONCLUSIONS

1. Air defense in Korea was largely subordinated to other air operations.

2. Air defense provisions, while more than adequate for expected opposition, would have been dangerously weak against a powerful air opponent.

3. Throughout operations in Korea considerable reliance was placed on continuous availability of Naval air defense control and warning facilities.

4. Quantitative and qualitative deficiencies in Marine Corps air defense control equipment would seriously endanger success of operations against an enemy with a high air potential.

5. Jet fighter aircraft are essential to adequate air defense against a jet equipped air power.

6. Auxiliary duties, such as perimeter defense, were assumed by air defense control units and detracted from their effectiveness.

7. It was essential to improvise co-ordination of air defense activities at Wonsan between

facilities afloat and those ashore.

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PROJECT I.B.2.b. – Combat Operations Section, Marine Air, Operations Air Defense

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That Marine Corps air defense capabilities be based on the requirement for complete self-sufficiency once command has passed ashore.

2. That specific deficiencies in Marine air defense equipment, both ground and air, be rectified as soon as practicable.

3. That a unit of appropriate size be attached to Marine air organization for ground defense purposes in combat.

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PROJECT I.B.2.c. – AIR TRANSPORT, Marine Air

CONCLUSIONS

1. The ready availability of airlift for both personnel and supplies is becoming increasingly important to the Marine Corps.

2. Marine air transport elements are organized trained and equipped to perform their primary mission of providing airlift and air supply for units of the Fleet Marine Force.

3. By virtue of being prepared to perform their primary missions, Marine air transport has a capability of providing air transport service for another Marine Corps units and Naval activities when such services are not met by normal air transport facilities. This, in effect, becomes a secondary mission.

4. Initially Marine air transport squadrons of AIRFMPAC were employed entirely in trans-Pacific airlift under the operational control of CINCPACFLT. As such Marines furnished over 50% of the R5D aircraft involved.

5. VMR-152 with ten (10) R5D aircraft operated in the Far East from Itami AFB Japan under the operational control of the FEAF Combat Cargo Command. As such Marines furnished less than 5% of the total aircraft involved. Most of the loading and unloading of Marine aircraft involved in Combat Cargo Command missions was accomplished by Combat Cargo Command personnel.

6. The participation of Marine air transports in the trans-Pacific airlift constituted employment in their secondary mission, that of providing air transport service when such services are not met by normal transport facilities.

7. Marine air transport units employed in the trans-Pacific airlift were so employed because an urgent need for additional airlift existed and because they were equipped with aircraft capable of efficient trans-Pacific employment. This diversion of VMR elements from their primary missions appears justified.

8. Trans-Pacific airlift contributed appreciably to the support of Fleet Marine Forces in the Far East.

9. The rapid deployment of tactical aircraft into newly seized airfields as practiced by Marine air units in Korea placed heavy reliance on air transport for airlift of personnel and air supply.

10. These air transport requirements were met by a combination of FEAF Combat Cargo Command Support, a utilization of Marine R5D’s in excess of Combat Cargo Command requirements and a utilization of administrative transport aircraft organic to Group and Wing Headquarters.

11. The contribution of the ten (10) Marine air transport aircraft to the overall Combat Cargo Command effort was relatively small. The requirements for Marine Air Transports to operate under control of FEAF Combat Cargo Command deprived the CG First MARAIWING of certain flexible air logistic support which normally is an integral part of his command.

12. Marine air transport units experienced a shortage of qualified transport crews for maximum utilization of aircraft. This may indicate a need for inactive Marine air reserve personnel qualified and available in emergencies to augment the VMR program.

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PROJECT I.B.2.c. – AIR TRANSPORT, Marine Air

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Marine air transport units organic to the Fleet Marine Force air organization should normally be retained in Marine Aviation to insure ready availability of airlift.

2. The Marine Corps should emphasize the training of both ground and air units in air movement and air supply. Particular emphasis should be placed on exercises requiring rapid deployment of air units with initial support furnished by air transport.

3. It should be remembered that the employment of Marine Air Transports in the Korean emergency to date has been almost totally in the field of TRANSPAC Operations. Any contemplated changes or modifications in VMR tables of organization or equipment should continue to consider the primary mission of VMR squadrons and not consider Korean employment as normal.

4. The employment of Marine air transport units should follow a policy that provides:

a. That VMR units are retained under Marine Corps control and are utilized in their primary mission of providing airlift and air supply for units of Fleet Marine Forces.

b. That when additional airlift beyond the capacity of Marine air transports is required requests will be made for same to outside agencies.

c. That when the capacity of Marine air transport units exceeds Marine requirements, this lift will be made available to outside agencies on request.

5. The Marine Corps should consider the advisability of including in its organization at appropriate level a nucleus of personnel trained and specially equipped for the rapid and efficient loading and unloading of transport aircraft.

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PROJECT I.B.2.d. – HELICOPTERS, Marine Air

CONCLUSIONS

1. The versatility and usability of the helicopter as a military vehicle under combat operations was proved in Korea to such an extent that the concept of its employment as a vehicle for ship to shore movement in amphibious operations is supported.

2. Its limitations, such as vulnerability to ground fire, maintenance requirements, high altitude performance, and the like, were not excessive in Korea.

3. A need continues for a helicopter capable of transporting a larger pay load a longer distance.

4. Requests for helicopter evacuation of wounded should be passed through medical channels insofar as possible.

5. Combat helicopters, including assault helicopters should be adaptable to quick conversion to ambulance purposes.

6. Facilities for night maintenance of helicopters should be provided VMO squadrons.

7. Lack of landing facilities aboard hospital ships seriously reduce the effectiveness of helicopter evacuation.

8. Centralized control of helicopters at division level is sound practice under normal tactical conditions.

9. The practice of placing helicopter services of VMO squadron at the disposal of other units than Marine Corps organizations, except under emergency conditions, seriously overtaxes the capabilities of VMO squadrons to perform their assigned missions.

10. The helicopters, because of its high initial as well as upkeep cost, should not be considered as a substitute for light observation or liaison type aircraft. Some of the tasks previously considered within the sphere of the OY have been better performed by the H03S, notably those within the liaison category. Others, according to reports, should be retained for the OY, the general functions of which are discussed in I.B.2.e. of the overall report.

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PROJECT I.B.2.d. – HELICOPTERS, Marine Air

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the helicopter program of the Marine Corps be expanded as rapidly as practicable to provide required assault air lift capabilities.

2. That evacuation doctrine require that requests for helicopter evacuation of wounded pass through medical channels insofar as possible.

3. That combat helicopters, including assault helicopters, be equipped for rapid conversion to ambulance purpose.

4. That facilities for night maintenance of helicopters be provided VMO squadrons.

5. That helicopter landing facilities be constructed on hospital ships including those employed during assault phases of amphibious operations.

6. That control of helicopters be centralized at Division level.

7. That Marine Corps helicopter capabilities be reserved for utilization by the units a VMO squadron is constituted to support.

8. The helicopters and conventional type observation aircraft be assigned in appropriate numbers to Marine Observation Squadrons.

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PROJECT I.B.2.e. – OBSERVATION, Operations, Marine Air

CONCLUSIONS

1. Because tactical and gunnery observers operate with, and in practice are billeted and messed with the VMO Unit, they might logically become an integral part of the observation squadron.

2. The landing force in amphibious assault requires a mobile operating base for its observation unit until such time as conditions permit shore-based operations.

3. Tactical Air Observers provided a valuable link between Tactical Air Control Parties and attack aircraft in close support operations.

4. VMO employment by the Division, was sufficiently broad to warrant giving consideration to placing it directly under Division headquarters for operational control.

5. The practice of night aircraft maintenance indicated deficiencies in equipment authorized VMO units.

6. A definite requirement exists for an improved observation type aircraft.

7. Observation type aircraft can be more successfully employed if equipped to communicate adequately on both medium high and very high frequencies.

8. Because of frequent operations from temporary airfields, VMO units require some form of base radio equipment.

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PROJECT I.B.2.e. – OBSERVATION, Operations, Marine Air

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That consideration be given to establishing in VMO units an air observer section for the purpose of providing the parent ground organization with tactical and gunnery observers as required.

2. That careful consideration be given to supplying a mobile operating base for Marine observation units during amphibious operations.

3. That Tactical Air Observers be included in the Close Air Support System of the Marine Corps.

4. That the advisability of placing the VMO unit directly under Division headquarters be given thorough consideration.

5. That VMO units be fully equipped to perform night maintenance of assigned aircraft.

6. That an improved observation type aircraft be provided VMO units.

7. That VMO aircraft be equipped to communicate adequately on medium high and very high frequencies and, when required, on ultra high bands.

8. That VMO units be equipped with adequate, easily transportable, base radio equipment.

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PROJECT I.B.3. – PERSONNEL, Marine Air, Combat Operations

CONCLUSIONS

1. Peacetime economy measures necessitated personnel strength reductions in Marine Air Units. These reductions, when magnified by the requirement for rapid deployment of “ready-to-go” Marine Air units to the Far East, posed serious personnel problems affecting the entire Marine Air Organization.

2. While the personnel strengths of peacetime tables of organization of Marine Air units are adequate for training, expansion and limited emergency deployment, they do not lend themselves to sustained combat operations.

3. In any emergency deployment of peacetime Marine Corps Air units, a requirement for rapid minute personnel build-up will have to be met, if these peacetime units are expected to engage in sustained combat operations.

4. To meet readiness requirements, the Marine Corps must maintain a Marine Air Reserve in a high state of unit and individual combat readiness. This requires the inclusion of significant numbers of officers and men who have had previous experience with Marine Corps Aviation.

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PROJECT I.B.3. – PERSONNEL, Marine Air, Combat Operations

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. If peacetime restrictions continue to force the adoption of tables of organization with seriously reduced personnel strengths, plans for deploying units should provide for build-up to war strength prior to actually engaging in combat operations.

2. The Marine Corps must continue to maintain strong organized air reserve. This requires a program that will insure the feeding into organized a steady flow of young pilots and aviation enlisted personnel.

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PROJECT I.B.4. – TRAINING, Marine Air

CONCLUSIONS

1. Marine Air training of regulars and reserves in all essential respects adequately met the requirements imposed by operations in Korea.

2. Minor areas have been revealed in which Marine air training may be improved.

3. More extensive and varied training conditions should be developed in order to realistically train pilots and ground controllers in target location, identification, and attack.

4. More accent should be placed on training of realistic small close air support flights with battalion Tactical Air Control Parties.

5. Additional emphasis should be placed on low level work to ensure maximum effectiveness of close air support as now practiced under conditions of low ceiling and reduced visibility.

6. Survival, and escape and evasion training is an area which requires continuous emphasis.

7. Marine carrier-based squadrons were of extreme value, demonstrating a continued need to keep Marine squadrons in a state of constant readiness for carrier operations.

8. The accent on close air support in Korea has produced a tendency to neglect other air support functions, notable control of the air.

9. The policy of rotating officers through all billets is a highly effective method of insuring readiness for expansion. However, war-time requirements may reduce the scope of this policy considerably.

10. Operations revealed the inability of Marine squadrons to render effective close support to the desired degree under night and all-weather conditions.

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Published: Fri Feb 15 09:31:31 EST 2019