Naval History and Heritage Command

Operations Staff, British Admiralty, to First Sea Lord Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe

MEMORANDUM FOR FIRST SEA LORD.

          The United States Navy Department intends to co-operate with the Allied Navies to the maximum of its ability, but it is convinced that effective co-operation is dependent upon:-

          (a) A mutually acceptable plan of operations.

          (b) A thorough investigation of the material and

     personnel requirements for the conduct of such operations.

          These items divide logically into parts as follows:-

(Sd.) H.T. Mayo,1

Admiral, U.S. Navy,

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

          Admiral Mayo is desirous of taking back with him a statement drawn up in reply to the attached paper [above].

          The War Staff should prepare a paper in reply to his questions.

     Question 1. – Should be answered in considerable detail under the following headings:-

     The policy relating to the employment of the Grand Fleet.

     The policy of Blockade and the vessels employed.

     The mining policy.

     The policy in regard to the Belgian Coast.

     The policy in the Mediterranean, and the manner in which our vessels are employed to carry out that policy.

     The policy in the East Indies, China, East Africa, and other foreign stations.

     The policy pursued in regards to the defence of Trade, including the Convoy system and the various Coastal Patrols.

     The offensive policy against enemy submarines, exclusive of the anti-submarine mining policy.

     The aerial policy should be included under each of the headings with which it is concerned.

     The policy in regard to Scandinavian countries and in Holland should also be touched upon.

     Further assistance desired from the United States from available forces or resources are as follows:-

(1) Four coal-burning battleships of the “DREADNOUGHT” type, to replace 3 or 4 Grand Fleet “DREADNOUGHT” Battleships which it is desired to send to foreign waters to relieve older battleships which are being paid off for want of personnel.

(2) An increase in the number of Destroyers, in order to enlarge the Convoy system and to provide better protection for each Convoy.

(3). An increase in the number of Convoy Cruisers for the same reason.

(4). An increase in the number of Patrol craft, Tugs &c. for anti-submarine work.

(5). The rapid building of merchant ships.

          In reply to Question 2:-

     The possible change in Blockade policy, due to the adoption by the United States of a system of licensing should be touched upon;

     The possible changes in mining policy die to the introduction of a new type of mine, should be mentioned;

     The increase in the offensive policy against submarines made possible later on by an increase in the number of anti-submarine vessels and of anti-submarine appliances, should be stated;

      The co-operation with the Army in the Mediterranean consequent on certain offensive operations in prospect, should be touched upon, as well as the closer anti-submarine policy hoped for in the Adriatic.

     The possibility of close offensive action in German waters and in the Baltic should also be mentioned.

          The further assistance desired from the United States in carrying out possible changes in policy might occur under the heading of large supply of mines – if a successful type of mine is evolved;

          An increase in the Destroyer force in British waters to enable a more offensive policy against submarines in the North Sea to be adopted;

          An increase in Patrol craft to watch a possible minefield laid in northern waters;

          The assistance in the shape of minelayers from the United States, &c.

          Under the heading (3) the following subjects might be touched upon:-

     The policy of possible close offensive in German waters instead of including this under Question 2, mentioning that this policy is dependent upon very extensive Air reconnaissance which cannot be carried out in the immediate future;

     A close mining policy instead of under 2, because this awaits the supply of suitable mines.

     Similarly the mining policy in northern waters might be transferred to Question 3.

     The action contemplated if Germany sends out cruisers or other vessels as raiders. (Point out their coal difficulties, etc.).