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Naval History and Heritage Command

Naval History and Heritage Command

Planning Committee, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, to Admiral William S. Benson, Chief of Naval Operations

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON

10 February 1919.

From: Planning Committee.

To:   Chief of Naval Operations.

SUBJECT:  Expeditious return of Troops.

Reference:  (a)  Operations’ Plan of 14 November 1918, re. safe and expeditious return of troops.1

Inclosure:  (a)  Copy of letter from Commander Cruiser &   Transport Force, dated 3 February 1919.

            (b)  Copy of letter, Commander Cruiser & Transport Force, dated 7 February 1919.2

FOREWARD:

     1.   The expeditious return of troops to the United States is a matter of first importance, not only to the Navy and War Departments, but to the country at large, both for reasons of economy, and in a broader sense as regards its affect on the morale of the American people.

NUMBER OF TROOPS INVOLVED:

     2.   The following table is based upon conditions which should exist on March 1, 1919:

Troops transported to Europe,

2,079,000

Casualties not to be returned to United States (about)

 

____79,000

 

2,000,000

Army of Occupation, the return of which we need not immediately be concerned with, approximately,

 

 

____500,000

 

1,500,000

Embarked for United States up to 31 January, approximately,

 

____225,000

 

1,275,000

To be returned during February under present conditions,

 

____175,000

 

1,100,000

     3.   It is estimated, therefore, that on March 1, 1919, there will be in France approximately 1,100,000 men to be returned to the United States. Aside from the greater question of policy as affecting the morale, the matter of the outlay of funds from the Treasury, required to maintain this Army, is of great importance.

     4.   It is estimated that including pay and subsistence of officers and men, an approximate sum of $100.00 per man per month is required. This represents an output of approximately $100,000,000 per month. The importance also of discharging these men in order that they may resume their pre-war labors and become productive agents, can not be over-estimated.

     5.   The big task of transporting troops from France to the United States has been assigned to the Navy. In addition to the transports, every available Naval vessel is engaged in this work. Battleships and cruisers employed on this duty are prevented from carrying out such training as will fit them for the purposes for which they are designed, and it is very important to complete this operation as soon as possible in order that they can resume their proper status.

     6.   A further matter of consideration in connection with this operation is the great advantage accruing in completing it before bad weather sets in in the fall. Weather conditions at sea should receive most serious consideration as affecting not only the speed with which the work is carried out, but also the comfort of the personnel.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION:

     7.   The rate at which troops can be returned to the United States is dependent upon -

(a)  Rate of transportation to points of embarkation.

(b)  Facilities for embarkation and disembarkation of troops.

(c)  Ships available for troop transportation.

(d)  Facilities available for expeditiously making necessary repairs on vessels engaged in transport service.

(e)  The supply of skilled personnel for officers and crews of vessels engaged in transportation of troops.

(a) – RATE OF TRANSPORTATION TO POINTS OF EMBARKATION:

     8.   As regards (a), from data supplied by the Army, it is estimated that from 300,000 to 400,000 men per month can be transported to the points of embarkation, and therefore no additional facilities in this respect are required in connection with this operation.

(b) – FACILITIES FOR EMBARKATION AND DISEMBARKATION OF TROOPS:

     9.   As regards (b), the port facilities in some of the ports of embarkation are limited, but by giving preference to transports, these facilities will suffice to carry out the work required of them, without causing delay.

(c) – SHIPS AVAILABLE FOR TROOP TRANSPORTATION:

     10.  As regards (c), the following vessels could be made available by March 1, 1919:

1st. – Vessels of Transport Force,

40

2nd. – Battleships and Cruisers,

24

3rd. – Cargo vessels converting for troop transports,

32

4th. – Foreign Vessels, operating under contract, (?)

 

     11.  The troop carrying capacity of these various class of vessels is estimated as follows:

1st. – Vessels of Transport Force,

135,000

2nd. – Battleships and Cruisers,

30,000

3rd. – Various converted Cargo Vessels,

75,000

4th. – Foreign Vessels operating under contract,

____(?)__

Total,

240,000

 

     12.  These estimates do not include the overloading of transports. The method of overloading transports was put into operation in connection with sending troops abroad, and was very successful. This would give the vessels of the transport force an estimated excess capacity of about 27,000 men. In reference (a) it was recommended that this plan be adopted, as it would result in the transportation of a greater number of troops, notwithstanding the fact that transports overloaded in this way would have to proceed by a more southerly and therefore longer, route. In going by the southerly route, however, west bound vessels should avoid head winds and weather and adverse currents. By taking these matters into consideration, it is estimated that only one or two days longer would be required for the westbound trip when proceeding by this route. In other words, about 5% additional time will be added to the “cycle” and 20 to 30% excess troops will be carried. This would result in a net gain of about 15 to 25% in the number of troops carried by transports during the month, and it is believed that the discomforts caused by the large number of men on board would be counterbalanced by the comforts obtained by proceeding via the southerly route with smoother seas and warmer climate.

     13.  Assuming most favorable conditions of operation, the vessels given above should average a cycle of 35 days. This result was accomplished during the war, and there is no reason why this record should not be maintained, provided proper action is taken in the matter. If this cycle could be maintained, it would give a monthly capacity of 206,000 men. The cycles of converted cargo carriers will probably be nearer 40 days, but by adopting methods to effect the most efficient system for operation of transports, the cycle taken by these vessels should be reduced below 35, and an effective average of 35 maintained for all classes of vessels.

     14.  This is based on the assumption that <converted> Cargo Carriers will be used exclusively as Troop Transports. It is understood that it is proposed to use these converted cargo carriers for transporting cargo also. This would result in a cycle of about 60 days for these vessels, or in a monthly decrease of about 25,000 troops. In view of the fact that there seems to be space for cargo purposes in other vessels, it would seem unwise to utilize the converted cargo carriers in this way, except possibly for the first trip, where the cargo could be put on board during the period of conversion.

     15.  In addition to the 206,000 monthly capacity referred to above, it is estimated that facilities are available for transporting fully 45,000 men per month in foreign vessels under contract. This makes a total monthly capacity, beginning March 1, of 251,000 men. During March, additional cargo vessels will be converted which will have an estimated capacity of about 24,000 men. Also four Mine Carriers will be converted, which will have an estimated capacity of 8,000 men. Hence, beginning April 1, there should be facilities available for transporting about 275,000 men per month.

     16.  If proper action is taken to carry out this operation, it appears that the return of the total number of troops, except those designated as the Army of Occupation, can be completed by August 1, 1919.

     17.  It will be noted that the above estimates have been made without taking into consideration the use of German vessels, which are reported as being available for this purpose. Practically no further information is at hand in regard to the material condition of these vessels, or the time that would be required to put them into operation. In view of the scarcity of copper and other materials in Germany during the war, it seems probable that these vessels have been robbed of all non-ferrous material for war purposes. In such event, it is believed that these vessels can not be placed in operation in time to be of much assistance in the transportation of troops. In view also of personnel conditions, which will be discussed later, it may be impracticable to man these vessels without interfering with the operation of the vessels considered in the foregoing estimates.

(d) – FACILITIES AVAILABLE FOR EXPEDITIOUSLY MAKING NECESSARY REPAIRS ON VESSELS ENGAGED IN TRANSPORT SERVICE:

     18.  As regards (d), conditions are very far from satisfactory. The repairs to vessels of the transport force require from two to three times the number of days estimated. This is due to labor conditions, abolition of Sunday and overtime work, employment of repair facilities for private work, and the general reaction due to the end of hostilities. It is necessary that some immediate action be taken to remedy existing conditions as regards unnecessary delays in effecting repairs to transports. In general, battleships and cruisers engaged in the transportation of troops, are operating on schedule, and minor repairs which become necessary for these vessels are being successfully cared for by the ship’s force, Navy Yards and a repair ship. As these vessels have regular officers who are familiar with the regulations for the care and upkeep of vessels, it is possible to keep the machinery in good condition with the ship’s force, unless some major item of repair becomes necessary.

     19.  The work required to convert cargo vessels into troop ships is being carried out under the direction of the War Department, under lump sum contracts. It is believed that these alterations can be carried out more expeditiously than at present. The repair facilities in ports of call in this country are limited. The Navy, the Army, the Shipping Board and private owners are all making demands upon these facilities. Unless the demands of these various activities can be properly coordinated, the vital work of preparation for the transportation of troops will be neglected. In this connection attention is invited to inclosure (b).   

     20.  The three branches of the Government, the Army, Navy, and Shipping Board, are at present practically competing for the facilities of outside ship yards. Private interests are in competition against all three of these.

     21.  The Army are having their work done under lump sum contracts, awards being made to the lowest satisfactory bidder.

     22.  The Navy is using the Cost Plus System, and just how the Shipping Board is handling its work is not known. It is known, however, that in Army and Shipping Board contracts, the eight hour clause is ignored,and unlimited Sunday and overtime work is being done. The Navy is enforcing strictly the eight hour clause, and no Sunday work is allowed. The Navy has, however, authorized an increase of 10% for night shifts on dry dock work.

     23.  The evils that have grown up through the authorization during the war of unlimited Sunday and overtime work, at high rates of pay, are well known, and the demoralizing effect is deplored by Employers and Labor Leaders alike.

     24.  Through the abuse of such authorization the Government has suffered great financial loss.

     25.  Overtime is not advocated for any work, except in docking vessels where the necessary work cannot be completed in the regular eight hours, but could be finished in from two to four hours extra, and sufficient personnel is not available to work in shifts.

     26.  The present Cost Plus System for effecting extensive repairs to Naval vessels results in many cases in slowing down the work. The incentive is not such as to induce a repair plant to put its best workmen on the job. Poor workmen with longer time make larger profits. Private ship owners frequently offer a bonus for rapid work, and they place no restrictions on Sunday and overtime. This results in the repair plant putting its best men on private work, in order that a big bonus may be received by the company, with greatly increased payments to the men.

     27.  All employers are in favor of working shifts. There are two serious drawbacks to using night shifts at present:-

1st. -    The lack of skilled mechanics – This may be remedied in time.

2nd. -    The workmen object to working at night without additional pay to compensate for additional expense and inconvenience. This may be eliminated by agreeing on a percentage increase for night shifts.

     28.  It is generally conceded that a third shift working from about midnight to 8 a.m. is only about 25% efficient and all agree that this is only practicable for shop gangs and as a last resort for outside repair work.

     29.  Opinions as to the proper percentage additional that should be paid for night shifts vary from 10% to 50%, but the majority seem to agree that if a General Conference could be arranged between all interested parties, this including labor leaders, an agreement to abolish overtime and Sunday work could be reached, together with the general establishment of full eight hour night shifts at an increase of about 20% over day wages. This should be made to apply to Navy Yards as well as outside plants.

     30.  While the Cost Plus System has its drawbacks where extensive repairs to vessels are to be undertaken, it is especially advantageous in cases of minor repairs where time is of first consideration.

     31.  The best form of contract is one in which a fixed price or lump sum is named. Whenever possible work should be done under this form of contract. When this method is followed, there will be some little delay in starting work on vessels, on account of the time required for preparing specifications and receiving bids. The loss of time in starting work will, however, in all probability be more than offset by the gain of time for execution of the work whenever the work requires more than from twelve to fifteen days. It will frequently, however, be the case that vessels require work of a very minor nature covering only some few days time. In such cases it will not be practicable to adopt the “Lump Sum” contract method, and the “Cost Plus” contract, as is now being used extensively, or some modification thereof, must be resorted to. It is believed possible to obtain some improvement in results that obtain under the present “Cost Plus” contract method if procedure along the following lines can be obtained. 

     32.  Have the several ship repair plants to submit lists containing definite hourly rates for labor and unit prices for materials most commonly used in connection with repairs. These rates for labor and material would, of course, include the yards’ overhead, and the rates furnished would hold good for a certain definite period of time. The method contemplated is one frequently used in ship docking plants, where in addition to the fixed rates per ton covering docking, the company furnishes fixed rates for labor and materials used for work done while the vessel is in dock. The special advantage of a method such as that proposed above, is that the feature of competition is obtained and there is less incentive for delay in completing work than exists under the present “Cost Plus” contract.

     33.  The facilities at the U. S. Navy Yards are being fully used for various purposes, all of which are important. The efficient system in vogue at these yards in peace times in regard to the preparation of plans, including drawings, of work to be undertaken, is based upon sound reasons of economy, but involves the necessary delay required for preparation of plans and estimates.

     34.  The Managers of private repair plants available for assisting in this important work, are as a rule patriotic citizens, and their efforts to assist in every way during the war have been untiring. During the war, the facilities of many of these private shipyards were utilized exclusively for government work, and it is known that very large profits were made.

     35.  It is natural for these concerns to feel that now, as the war is over, they should avoid Government work and devote their time to private work, which offers better remuneration. It is essential that all officials connected with the industrial activities of ports of call of transports, should be brought to realize that it is of the first importance to the country at large for them to continue their efforts to assist the Government in this great work of returning to the United States as soon as possible, the soldiers that were sent across the seas to fight this country’s battles.

     36.  If the managers of these plants can not be made to appreciate the fact that it is their duty, notwithstanding the additional difficulties involved, to give preference to expediting repair work on transports, they should be given to understand that the country is still on a war basis, and that the President3 is authorized to take drastic action if necessary, to compel their best cooperation.

     37.  At present time private contractors are adverse to undertaking work for the Navy. One reason for this is that due to the complicated system of cost accounting, as required by General Order 447, this entails a great amount of additional work and office space, and the consequent annoyances. The execution of this Order has been suspended, and the Order should be rescinded.

(e) – THE SUPPLY OF SKILLED PERSONNEL FOR OFFICERS AND CREWS OF VESSELS ENGAGED IN TRANSPORTATION OF TROOPS.

     38.  As regards (e), the situation is most serious. Due to the cessation of hostilities, urgent requests for discharge have been submitted by officers and men who entered the service during the war. It has been necessary to grant many of these requests, and unless some emphatic action is taken immediately, the personnel situation will prevent the successful carrying out of this operation.      

     39.  The total number of men in the Navy and Naval Reserve Force in spite of demobilization is sufficient to man vessels mentioned for transport duty. However, these men are not properly distributed in rating and notwithstanding the most urgent efforts that have been made to retain men of certain ratings who are necessary in connection with this operation, there are not now available sufficient firemen, enginemen, water tenders, machinist mates, and certain other special ratings to meetthe needs of this service. This condition was realized at the beginning of demobilization, but in view of the fact that dependency of family was considered one of the most urgent reasons for granting discharges, and that the men filling these special ratings were older men and more frequently in this class, a large percentage of them have obtained their discharges.

     40.  In this connection, attention is invited to inclosure (a), in which the Commander of Cruiser and Transport Force reports the seriousness of the personnel situation in the 3rd Naval District.

     41.  In order to supply proper crews to the vessels designated for transporting troops, it may be necessary to reduce the crews of certain vessels, and remove naval personnel entirely from others. The personnel question is now so critical that immediate action should be taken with the Shipping Board to get them to furnish crews for all cargo ships operating on the Shipping Board’s account. There are 79 of these vessels now being operated by Naval crews and it is expected that demands will be made on the Navy for crews for 16 more vessels of this class.

     42.  Certain numbers of men of the Navy are being retained abroad, and assembled in this country for the purpose of supplying crews to the German vessels, which are to be taken over by the Shipping Board. If it develops that the material condition of these vessels is such that they can not be gotten ready in time to be utilized to advantage transporting troops, it would seem unwise to divert Naval personnel, so vitally needed for vessels actually transporting troops, to this purpose at this time. The release of these men would help the situation.

     43.  In addition to the above, the Navy operates 283 Shipping Board cargo vessels for the Army and Navy accounts. The crews of these cargo vessels are composed chiefly of Naval Reservists, and are officered to a large extent by officers of the Naval Reserve Force, who were in the Merchant Service prior to the war. This employment in cargo vessels is not generally attractive to enlisted men, as most of them enlisted in anticipation of actual military service during the war,and are not amenable to the life on board these vessels, which is generally in accord with the usual Merchant ship practice. In view of the need in the Navy for men for more important duties, and the effect of this employment on the general morale of the enlisted force, arrangements should be made by the Shipping Board to take over and operate with merchant crews all cargo carriers as soon as conditions will permit.

     44.  The following estimates in regard to personnel deficiencies are submitted:

(a) – NUMBER OF MEN OF ENGINEERS FORCE AND OF SPECIAL RATINGS REQUIRED TO MAN ALL VESSELS OF TRANSPORT FORCE, INCLUDING 53 CONVERTED CARGO CARRIERS, WITH DEFICIENCIES IN EACH RATING.

 

No. Required.

No. Short.

Yeomen

1138

500

Commissary Stewards

195

75

Ship’s Cooks

1210

500

Masters-at-Arms

1937

600

Shipfitters

150

50

Carpenter’s Mates

307

175

Machinist’s Mates

887

500

Enginemen

1216

650

Water Tenders

823

400

Boilermakers

131

75

Coppersmiths

64

40

Firemen

7394

2000

Electricians (General)

653

250

Officer’s Cooks

350

175

Officer’s Stewards

__504__

__300__

Total

16959

6290

(b) – NUMBER OF ENGINEERS FORCE AND SPECIAL RATINGS REQUIRED TO MAN GERMAN VESSELS, WHICH IT IS PROPOSED TO FIT OUT AS TROOP TRANSPORTS, WITH DEFICIENCIES IN EACH RATING:

 

No. Required.

No. Short.

Yeomen

800

750

Commissary Stewards

175

150

Ship’s Cooks

675

600

Masters-at-Arms

1625

400

Shipfitters

175

150

Carpenter’s Mates

200

200

Machinist’s Mates

950

900

Enginemen

1100

1000

Water Tenders

800

600

Boilermakers

100

75

Coppersmiths

75

50

Firemen

8075

7000

Electricians (General)

550

500

Officer’s Cooks

250

250

Officer’s Stewards

__325__

__325__

Total

15875

12930

(c) NUMBER OF MEN OF ENGINEERING FORCE AND SPECIAL RATINGS, NOW ON BOARD CARGO VESSELS OPERATED FOR THE SHIPPING BOARD.

 

__No.__

Yeomen

316

Commissary Stewards

79

Ship’s cooks

158

Mess attendants

316

Shipfitters

--

Carpenter’s mates

79

Electricians (general)

--

Officer’s Cooks

79

Officer’s Stewards

158

Coppersmiths

--

Machinist’s Mates

316

Enginemen

395

Water Tenders

158

Boilermakers

79

Firemen

___711

Total

2844

 

(d) NUMBER OF MEN OF ENGINEERS FORCE AND SPECIAL RATINGS, REQUIRED TO MAN ADDITIONAL CARGO VESSELS FOR SHIPPING BOARD, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUESTS OF THAT BOARD:

 

__No.__

Yeomen

76

Commissary Stewards

19

Ship’s cooks

38

Mess attendants

76

Shipfitters

--

Carpenter’s Mates

19

Electricians (General)

--

Officer’s Cooks

19

Officer’s Stewards

38

Coppersmiths

--

Machinist’s Mates

76

Enginemen

95

Water Tenders

38

Boilermakers

19

Firemen

___171

Total

684

(e) NUMBER OF MEN OF ENGINEERS FORCE AND SPECIAL RATINGS, NOW ON BOARD CARGO VESSELS OPERATED FOR THE ARMY AND NAVY ACCOUNT:

 

__No.__

Yeomen

1132

Commissary Stewards

283

Ship’s Cooks

566

Mess Attendants

1132

Shipfitters

--

Carpenter’s mates

283

Electricians (General)

--

Officer’s Cooks

283

Officer’s Stewards

566

Coppersmiths

--

Machinist’s Mates

1132

Enginemen

1415

Water Tenders

566

Boilermakers

283

Firemen

___2547

Total

10188

     45.  In order to increase the number of troops transported per month, it has been necessary to use working parties from Naval stations on shore to assist in getting the transports ready to leave on their return voyage.

     46.  When it is realized that a delay of two or three days in cycle of the transports causes a reduction of ten to fifteen thousand troops per month, it is apparent that every effort should be made to shorten the stay in port of these vessels and give them every assistance possible to expedite their readiness for sea.

     47.  In accordance with the terms of the present Naval Bill, all Naval Reservists, amounting to about 160,000 (except those who volunteer to serve afloat), must beplaced on inactive duty when peace is signed. If this Act becomes a law, the consequences will be serious. If a limited number of Naval Reservists can be retained to carry out vitally important duties connected with the shore establishments, and release men of the regular navy of special ratings for duty in connection with the transportation of troops, it will materially assist in the operations.

      48. The personnel of the accounting system under the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts is composed chiefly of members of the Naval Reserve Force. If these trained men are allowed to go on inactive duty before proper provisions are made to replace them by civilians experts, it is obliged to involve a delay in payment of the Government. This will cause much dissatisfaction on the part of the contractors.  

     49.  The effects of the clause in the Naval Bill which requires the Navy Department to discharge men with an honorable discharge who enlisted during the war for a period of four years, provided they request such discharge prior to July 1, 1919, are evidently not realized by its authors. This would offer a bonus to all regular service men excepting those whose enlistments or re-enlistments did not take place during the period of the war to obtain their discharge whether or not it was their desire to remain in the Naval service, and would produce a chaotic condition as far as personnel was concerned for a period of four months. It is estimated that 100,000 men would be discharged in consequence of this clause. If peace should be signed by July 1, 1919, the discharge of these men and the placing of the Naval Reserve Force on inactive duty would reduce the Naval personnel to about 50,000, which would be about one fourth of the number actually required for essential purposes.

DECISION:

     50.  To consider the “Safe and expeditious return of troops,” as the immediate and important mission of the United States Navy.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

     51.  The following definite recommendations are submitted:

GENERAL:

     (a) Employ suitable means (by publicity, etc.), to cause not only the persons directly connected with this operation, but the whole American people to appreciate the fact that a very difficult and important duty has been assigned to the Navy in connection with the expeditious return of troops. Public opinion should be such that men who have enlisted in the Navy should feel compelled to remain until this important duty is completed.

     (b) Supply the Commander of the Cruiser and Transport Force with a copy of this plan and direct him to submit any recommendations that he may have to make, tending to the greater efficiency of the transport service.

     (c) Recommend to the Army that the method of carrying an excess number of troops on troop transports be adopted as soon as possible, in view of the fact that this will result in from 15 to 25% more troops being carried by transports with very little loss of time.

     (d) Recommend to the Army that cargo carriers, converted for troop ships, be utilized exclusively for transporting troops, except possibly during the first voyage when cargo can be placed on board during the period of conversion.

     (e) Indoctrinate ships’ officers and personnel assigned to transports and converted troop ships in regard to the necessity of taking proper action as regards the care and upkeep of their vessels. Necessary action should be taken to see that ships’ officers are fully aware of the responsibility placed upon them in this respect by the U. S. Naval Regulations.

     (f) In cooperation with the Shipping Board, arrange a system whereby repair work on troop transports can be given precedence over all work ofthe Shipping Board.

     (g) Take up immediately by despatch with Admiral Sims,4the question of inspection of German vessels which are to be manned by Naval crews, for the purpose of ascertaining how many of these vessels are in such material condition as to permit of their being used advantageously in connection with the transportation of troops, with a view of utilizing available Naval personnel to the best advantage.

     (h). That the Shipping Board be requested to supply crews for all German vessels which cannot be utilized to advantage in the transportation of troops.

MATERIAL:

     (i). Give instructions to the Commandants of all Naval Districts, and Commandants and Industrial Managers of Navy Yards, that their primary duty is to facilitate and expedite necessary repairs on vessels engaged in the transporting of troops, and that work of this nature should have priority over every other class of work, both at Navy Yards and private repair plants.

     (j). That no work should be undertaken which delays work on troop transports, unless by direct orders from the Navy Department.

     (k). That Commandants and Industrial Managers of Naval Districts be directed to submit recommendations, tending to increase the efficiency in effecting repairs to troop transports.

     (l). That a conference of the representatives of the Army, Navy, Shipping Board, private repair plants, and Labor leaders be held, to effect an agreement in regard to methods of handling repairs, with a view of coming to a decision, in order that the same procedure may be followed in all cases.

     (m). That overtime work be prohibited by all and that some system of working two shifts in all classes of work, with a payment of a bonus of about 20% to the men doing the night shift be adopted. It is believed that this action would expedite repairs and therefore result in actual economy to the Government.

     (n). That in effecting repairs, Commandants and Industrial Managers have authority to use the Cost Plus System, or any other equitable form of contract that may be most advantageous for the particular work involved.

     (o). That Commandants and Industrial Managers be supplied with such additional experienced personnel as they may require to assist in the inspection and expedition of work in troop transports, especially where much of this work is done in private yards.

     (p). Abolish General Order No. 447.

PERSONNEL:

     (q). Issue instructions that no officers and men of the Navy or Naval Reserve Force whose services are required in connection with this operation, be discharged until after the troops have been returned.

     (r). Arrange a conference with representatives of the Shipping Board, with a view of turning back to them as soon as possible, all cargo carriers now operated by the Navy for Shipping Board’s account.

     (s). Request Shipping Board to take over as rapidly as possible the operation of cargo vessels, now operated by the Navy for the Army account.

     (t). Request Shipping Board to arrange for the return as soon as possible to their owners, of all Dutch Ships, except those used in the transportation of troops, in order that the Naval personnel now assigned to these vessels can be used for troop transports.

     (u). That a special circular be prepared by the Bureau of Navigation and sent to all men of the ratings needed, who have recently been discharged from the Service, informing them regarding the urgent need for their services, and appealing to their patriotism to induce them to return to active service, to assist in this operation.

     (v). That the most urgent efforts be made to expedite recruiting in the Navy.

     (w). That a plan be carefully worked out in consultation with the Commander of the Cruiser and Transport Force, whereby additional men may be assigned to vessels transporting troops, to be available at the ports of departure in the United States, to save time in preparing these vessels for sea, and providing for a system of training men for required ratings, and a policy of granting leave to some of the personnel not actually required for operation, during the absence of vessels from their home ports.

     (x). That if suitable arrangements can be made for assigning engineering force to transports for training, vessels of Battleship Force One that are not assigned to duty in transporting troops, and Destroyer Flotillas “A” and “B” be placed in reserve and the number of men of the ratings desired for transports, be temporarily reduced to a minimum.

     (y). That the most efficient officer and enlisted personnel be assigned to duty in vessels transporting troops, in order that these vessels may be operated and maintained to the greatest advantage.

     (z). That the Navy Department take immediate action to inform Congress regarding the necessity of retaining a certain number of officers and enlisted men of the U. S. Naval Reserve Force at shore establishments after the signing of Peace, and to urge the insertion in the Naval Bill of a clause, authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to take action in this matter at his discretion, and appropriating a certain sum for the payment of such personnel.

     (aa). That the Navy Department take the necessary action to inform Congress in regard to the disastrous effect which would result in the passage of that clause of the Bill which makes it obligatory upon the part of the Navy Department to discharge upon their own request, all men who enlisted during the war for a period of four years.

___J. T. Tomkins______________

Captain, U.S. Navy.          

___W.G. Du Bose_______________

Captain, U.S.Navy,           

(Construction Corps)    

___J. K. Taussig______________

Captain, U.S. Navy.          

___W. G. Mitchell_____________

Captain, U.S.Navy.           

___A. L. Bristol______________

Commander, U.S. Navy         

___B. Bruce._________________

Lt. Commander, U.S. Navy.    

Source Note: D, DNA, RG 45, Entry 517B. Document identifier “Op-35-HJB.” appears on the upper-left side of the first page.

Footnote 1: This plan has not been found, although Opnav discussed the safe return of troops in two cables to separate cables to Benson on that date. See: Opnav to Benson and Opnav to Benson, 14 November 1918. The Planning Section for U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters also submitted a plan for demobilizing American troops in Europe that discussed returning them to the U.S. See: Planning Section Memo, 14 November 1918.

Footnote 2: These two cables have not been found. The Commander, Cruiser and Transport Force was RAdm. Albert Gleaves.

Footnote 3: Woodrow Wilson.

Footnote 4: VAdm. William S. Sims, Commander, United States Naval Forces Operating in European Waters.

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