Commander Paul Foley and L. I. Thomas to Edward N. Hurley, Chairman, United States Shipping Board
Subject Copy. File No. <46-4-1>
Cablegram Sent 8 March 1918 WHH
To Opnav Washington Serial No. 4845
Prep. by D.R.
V E R Y S E C R E T
Following for Hurley with copy for Requa Oil Division Fuel Administration begins.
Admiralty have submitted revised position as of March 1st together with estimate for twelve months ending February 28th 1919. Statement which is confined to fuel oil shows:
FIRST. Stock at Home and Mediterranean bases March 1st not including bunkers in British and American Naval units 1,177,000 tons.
SECOND. Estimated monthly expenditures (Tabulate figures)
March ...............333,000 tons
The above figures include:
(a) British consumption Home and Mediterranean Fleets.
(b) American Naval units operating in U. K. 25,000 tons monthly.
(c) Issues to French and Italian depots 14,500 tons monthly.
(d) Losses in fuel oil through war and marine risk estimated at 30,000 tons monthly.
(e) Total (b) (c) (d) 69,500 tons.
THIRD. To determine three months reserve established by Admiralty use following formula:
(a) From specified monthly figures as above deduct 30,000 tons representing estimated monthly losses. Also deduct 14,500 tons representing issues to French and Italian depots. Total deduction 44,500 tons monthly. Multiply results thus obtain
ted by three.
(b) Add to result in (a) 90,000 tons representing reserve for increased fleet mobility.
(c) Add to (b) 225,000 tons representing an estimated quantity regarded as nontransferable from storage points to Naval Bases.
(d) Example. Established reserve March 31st 1,180,500 tons as per statement submitted to us.
FOURTH. British Government have given orders establishing priority for March loading of grain over double bottom fuel oil shipments. Assuming no double bottom fuel oil is loaded from America during March but thereafter continued in British vessels as in the past: also, that American tankers referred to in telegram 4294 are left in British service then it is estimated April losses will be recovered and on May 31st stocks will amount to 1,196,500 tons approaching approximately established May 31st reserve figure of 1,204,500 tons.
FIFTH. If American tankers are withdrawn but double bottom loadings resumed after March, then on July 31st stocks are estimated at 1,245,000 tons against established reserve figure of 1,231,500 tons.
SIXTH. If double bottom shipments in British vessels are not renewed after March but American tankers previously specified are retained in British service, stocks at end of March will amount to 1,219,000 tons against established reserve of 1,180,000 tons thereafter receding to 931,000 tons on February 28th 1919.
SEVENTH. If double bottom shipments in British vessels entirely cease and American tankers previously specified now withdrawn then stocks will drop steadily after March 31st to an estimate of 799,000 tons on February 28th 1919.
EIGHTH. In connection with revised statement which has been most carefully examined and discussed we would observe:
(a) Allowance for fuel oil losses 30,000 tons monthly.
Having regard to heavy losses during
April 1917 .................29,489 tons
May 1917 ...................29,529 "
and February 1918 ..............23,753 "
of fuel oil and to possibility of increased submarine activity Admiralty Navy Staff consider this figure should be used.
The actual losses of Admiralty fuel oil in British tankers and double bottoms in all areas for year ending February 28th 1918 has amounted to an average of only 13,200 tons per month. If losses for next year do not exceed those of last year then stocks for year should increase 200,000 tons over figures shown on statement.
(b) Losses in tank steamers calculated at 25,000 tons cargo capacity monthly. This is to cover sinkings on all services maintained by British tank steamers and no allowance for sinkings will be included in estimates for services other than Admiralty. This figure represents the considered figure of theAdmiralty Naval War Staff, having regard to following sinkings:
April . 1917. . . . . . . . . .47,500 cargo capacity tons.
May 1917 . . . . . . . . . . . 36,000 " " "
February 1918. . . . . . . . . .20,600 " " "
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . .104,100 " " "
Actual losses all British tank steamers for year ending February 28th ascertained to be 16,500 tons per month.
(c) Statement provides for 16 2/3 percent of assigned tank steamers, British and American, being inefficient as a result of prolonged repairs the time for which is not included in journey. This figure represents such inefficient tonnage as of March 1st and understand same is a correct average for year. Have explained urgent necessity of repairs being effected with least possible delay which is fully recognized. We are informed tank steamer repairs have been given first priority being bracketed with repairs to naval units. Repairs have priority over new construction.
(d) No action has been taken with respect to Eastern reroutings per our Statement “X” of February 4th but we are informed certain proposals will be laid before us shortly.
Signed Foley and Thomas. 4845.