Oral History of Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret.)
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Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret.)

Peter Swartz was born and raised in Providence, Rhode Island, the grandson of Jewish immigrants from eastern Europe. His father was wounded in combat during World War II while serving in General George Patton's Third Army in its drive across France, was awarded a Bronze Star, and later owned and managed small businesses. His mother was a homemaker.

Captain Swartz served for over 27 years as a U.S. Navy officer, primarily as a specialist in strategy, plans, and policy. Early in his career, at Naval Amphibious School, Coronado, he helped train Navy personnel heading to advisory and other counter-insurgency assignments in Vietnam. He subsequently volunteered for two tours in-country himself: first as a political warfare advisor in the Republic of Vietnam Navy's Fourth Coastal Zone, operating from An Thoi on Phu Quoc Island on Swift boats, “Yabuta” junks, U.S. Coast Guard cutters, and U.S. Army “Bird Dog” aircraft; and later in Saigon on the staff of Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., as Naval Forces Vietnam staff psychological operations officer and Naval Advisory Group Vietnam staff political warfare advisor. He helped conceive, direct, and implement innovative programs to reduce Vietnamese navy desertions by improving Vietnamese navy sailor welfare—the so-called pigs-and-chickens program. Building on his experience working with U.S. Navy sailors and the Vietnamese navy, he was assigned to the Bureau of Naval Personnel in Washington, where he drafted the Zumwalt-era Navy's initial Race Relations Education instruction. He also helped set up and manage Navy intercultural relations programs from Washington, and then London, in support of the Navy's effort to homeport more of its ships forward overseas. Captain Swartz also served as plank-owning executive officer of the Navy's Human Resource Management Center London.

This was followed by two Pentagon tours as an action officer in the Navy's Strategy, Plans and Policy Division (OP-60). Among other duties, Captain Swartz organized and participated substantively in high-level U.S. Navy flag officer staff policy talks with the British Royal Navy, the Federal German navy, the Royal Dutch Navy, and the Portuguese navy, and initiated similar talks with the French navy. Throughout the 1980s, he played a leading role in conceptualizing, drafting, and disseminating the Navy's Maritime Strategy, serving successive Chiefs of Naval Operations and in Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's Office of Program Appraisal (OPA). Captain Swartz was particularly active in stimulating others to write and speak on U.S. naval strategy, fostering discussions and creating a significant literature both inside and outside the Navy.

In his first joint military assignment, Captain Swartz was director of Defense Operations for the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels. There, he worked to shift a U.S. Air Force tactical fighter wing from Spain to Italy; helped to disseminate NATO's Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS); and resisted a Soviet propaganda offensive advocating naval arms control measures that would hamstring allied efforts at sea—just as the Berlin Wall was coming down and the Warsaw Pact began to unravel. He completed his service on active duty as a special assistant to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell.
during and after the first Gulf War, contributing to numerous memoranda, talking papers, speeches, articles, histories, testimony, and joint doctrinal publications, and helping to initiate Joint Forces Quarterly (JFQ) magazine.

Following his retirement from the Navy in 1993, Captain Swartz joined CNA as a naval analyst and remained there for more than a quarter of a century, retiring in 2019 from full-time analytical, management, and consulting work as a principal research scientist, Strategy and Policy Analysis Program director, and analyst directly supporting Navy policy and strategy offices. He still continues his affiliation with CNA in a part-time, on-call status.

His work at CNA drew lessons for contemporary U.S. Navy decision makers and staffs from the historical development and implementation of past Navy concepts, policies, strategy, operations, organization, international and inter-service relationships, and doctrine. He analyzed alternative global fleet deployment models; lessons learned from past Navy homeland defense, counter-piracy, and irregular warfare operations; the Navy’s role in the evolution of the Unified Command Plan (UCP); and relationships between Navy strategy, programming, and budgeting. He drafted many classified and unclassified documents and briefings; published several public conference papers, journal articles, book chapters, and books; chaired or participated in numerous conference panels; was interviewed by oral historians; and—notably—assisted and mentored numerous shipmates and colleagues in conceptualizing and writing their own presentations and publications.

Captain Swartz served from 1985 to 1987 on the Secretary of the Navy’s Advisory Committee on Naval History and, from 2006 to the present, on the Naval War College Review editorial board. From 2008 through 2019, he was a founding co-chair of the unofficial off-the-record Strategy Discussion Group (SDG), of which he remains a member. In 2019, he was interviewed on his career in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (“A Naval Strategist Speaks”). In 2020, he was a co-recipient of the annual Naval Historical Foundation Commodore Dudley W. Knox Naval History Lifetime Achievement Award medal, and a Festschrift was published in his honor by many of his colleagues and mentees (“Conceptualizing Maritime & Naval Strategy” [Nomos]).

Peter Swartz was the first member of his family to graduate from college. He holds a B.A. in International Relations with Honors from Brown University, an M.A. in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins University’s Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and an M.Phil. in Political Science from Columbia University. He also spent a year at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as a Navy Federal Executive Fellow (FEF). Conversant in French and Vietnamese, he lives with his wife of over 49 years, the former Nguyen Thi Tho (Thúy), in Burke, Virginia. They travel extensively. Their daughter, Diana, lives in Notting Hill, London, with her family, and is a governance consultant to international non-profit organizations. Their son, Daniel, lives in Washington, DC’s Penn Quarter and is a well-known society photojournalist.
RYAN PEEKS: It’s 10:45 on 24 July 2019. I’m Ryan Peaks.

JUSTIN BLANTON: Justin Blanton.

PEEKS: …and we’re here to do an oral history with...

PETER SWARTZ: Peter Swartz.

PEEKS: Thank you. For the record, could you describe your current position and duties?

SWARTZ: My current position is part-time on-call analyst at CNA, Center for Naval Analyses, which is the Navy’s and the Marine Corps’ federally funded research and development center—we’re located over in Arlington. Up until just four months ago, I was the middle manager there running the Strategy and Policy Program and I was also the advisor to OPNAV [Office of the Chief of Naval Operations] N50 and N51, the strategy and policy shops, and I was a full-time analyst, so I did all of that. I also did some Marine Corps work, but right now much of that is maturing; I work no more than one day a week now.

PEEKS: So, you’ve had an unusual career as a naval officer: Could you briefly take us through your career—did you find that your unorthodox path either helped or hindered you along the way?

SWARTZ: Well, the unorthodox path goes something like this—and I’ll try to be as brief as I can on this. I was in the Navy for a long time and did a lot of things.

Anyway, I attended Brown University. I was in naval ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps]—there’s a story about that: My father had been a PFC in the infantry in World War II, got shot up pretty bad, wounded, came back, had tried very hard not to go in, but had to go in anyway. He was determined that his son was going to be an officer and was going to be in the Navy, where they had clean sheets, and not in the infantry. It was one of the very last things that he made me do and it turned out that it changed my whole life. So, anyway, I was in ROTC. I was an international relations major (that’s important, I think, for what comes later). I wasn’t interested in a naval career. Didn’t think that was going to happen. Thought it was a good idea to go in for two years, which was all the commitment that I had. I asked for an extension of my studies so I could go and get a master’s degree at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies [SAIS] in Washington, which is another IR [international relations] degree, which I got as a lieutenant junior grade, never having been an ensign, really.

I showed up at the Naval Amphibious School, Coronado, as an instructor in the school that was training everybody going to Vietnam. You’ll notice that I had never been to Vietnam, so I was the only member of the faculty that hadn’t been to Vietnam and I taught the “socio-political” stuff. I taught Buddhism. I taught...
Vietnamese Catholicism. I taught political stuff and then gradually—because it turned out that I was a pretty good teacher—I wound up being a course director and I did a whole bunch of other things as well.

So, the upshot of all of that was I couldn't stand it anymore, being the only guy there who had never been to the place that I was telling people about every day, [people] who were on their way to the country, so I volunteered for Vietnam. I was there for a year and a half. At first, I was in the field as a political warfare advisor with the Vietnamese navy, working for a succession of American advisors, but also for then-Commander Do Kiem. Kiem is pretty important later on, not in my life, but in the history of the country and of his country because he's the guy that brought the Vietnamese navy fleet out to the Philippines in 1975. We still correspond periodically. He was a great man.

Anyway, I got ordered to Saigon after several months of doing that in the field. I didn't want to go to Saigon. I tell the story a lot: I was asked why. I said, first of all, the place is a fleshpot. All of you guys have got girlfriends. I didn't come over here to get a girlfriend. I might add that within a month, I'd met Thuý and, as you'll notice, the girlfriend evolved into my wife and we've been together ever since and it turned out to be the best thing that ever happened to me, but at the time I was resistant. Second of all, I didn't want to go to Saigon because it was staff duty and I didn't want a staff job. I was in operations, I was on the boats. I was happy doing that, [but] what I discovered after a few months was, I was goddamn good at Navy staff work. Most people in the Navy aren't good at staff work because nobody cares [and] because it's all about operations. I wasn't as good an operator as I would have liked to have been, but I was a much better staff officer and I learned in Saigon that if I had any interest in—if there was anything I was going to do in the Navy—it would probably be on a staff, which was going to be pretty hard, not at sea. And, then the third thing was I didn't want to go to Saigon because it was all full of Annapolis graduates. I'd been to a “real” school. I had no interest in hanging around with a bunch of lifers. But it turned out that lifers had personalities and characteristics that I really enjoyed working with and, more importantly, working for, and I stuck it out and I'm very proud and happy I got to contribute to, I don't know, a few generations now of Annapolis graduates.

So, anyway, there was that and as a result of that I met—and we had things to do with each other —the [naval] commander in Vietnam at the time, which was Admiral [Emo R.] Zumwalt [Jr.]. Zumwalt invited me to stay on and I came back to Washington and worked in the Intercultural Relations Program that he was starting up around the world to back up his overseas home-porting program. I opened up management billets for the program in Norfolk, Honolulu, and London, and I came home one evening and said to Thuý, “How would you like to go to London? It's an open billet. I just created it and people think well of me and they'll send me there.” So the lieutenant commander billet brought me in as a lieutenant. I assumed I'd never get promoted to lieutenant commander, so we'll leave London after two years no matter what it says on the orders because I'll be thrown out. We'll get $15,000 in severance pay and I'll go to law school or join the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], which were things that I was looking at at the time. Thuý said fine. So we
went to London, had a great time, had a daughter, traveled around Europe, traveled all around England and I got promoted.

This was cataclysmic. The $15,000 went away. I had to extend for two more years—for one more year on top of a three-year tour, so it was going to be four years in London, which we didn't want. We'd already squeezed everything we wanted to get out of London in two years. And, what was I going to do in the Navy? And a very wise man whom I was working for, Captain Steve van Westendorp (a fellow Brown graduate), said go write to the Navy and ask them. They're the guys who promoted you. And so he helped me craft a letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel saying, "What's my future? You just promoted me. What do I do?" (I just told you my career pattern; it doesn't sound like anything that you've ever heard so far in a naval officer). Well, there were a lot of interesting stories about this, but the letter came back saying you can either be in political-military strategic affairs as a subspecialist because that's what your educational background is. Or, you can stay in human resources management, which is where the intercultural relations program was, and deal with drug abuse and race relations. (I had written the Navy race relations education instruction in a previous life when I was in Washington, and so on.) I said that's really not a choice for me: I'd love to be whatever the hell that is—a political-military strategic planning guy. And, then my boss told me brilliant idea number two: "You tell them you want to be assigned right away to something called OP-60. If they say 'yes,' that means they're serious. But if they say 'no,' that means they're not serious, and get out."

And they said "yes." And so, I got orders to OP-60. We had to stay in London the next few years, so three years. That really wasn't onerous, since I now had some sense of what was going on. I showed up in OP-60 and I worked on strategy. It's what N3/N5 does now, and N50 is the descendent of OP-60. I worked on NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] work, supported and helped run a lot of allied bilateral policy meetings, and—most importantly—I met a whole lot of other people who were just like me, who knew all this stuff, many of whom had Ph.D.s that the Navy had given them, but they also went to sea. I was dumb-founded that there were such people, and I thought that these were the guys I wanted to spend the rest of my life dealing with, I really enjoyed that.

And, then somebody said (I think it was Commander—later Rear Admiral—Phil Dur at the time, later rear admiral), "You ought to get more schooling." I said that the last thing in the world I needed was more school. I need good jobs. He said, "You're in a good job. You can't get a better job than what you're doing right now. Go back to school." So, I went to Columbia (there are lots of stories about how that happened). And, while I was at Columbia, I was promoted to commander! So, that was an assured full career. I could serve for another couple of tours and then get out, and meanwhile I was supposed to be getting a Ph.D.. I did a huge amount of research. I did a lot of hobnobbing with top professors. I took great courses from superb people. But, at the end of the day, I never finished the dissertation. But much of the research for the dissertation informed what I wound up doing later and, as a matter of fact, continues to inform what lots of other historians are using today, because the notes I took and the outlines I made and the appendices I
drew up are used by Corbin Williamson and by John Hattendorf and by all kinds of Navy history folks. So, it turned out to be a significant contribution anyway. To Thuý’s chagrin, I made her live in New York for two years and I never got the Ph.D., and right now I’m sitting being interviewed opposite two Ph.D.s. But to me, I just thought it was kind of cool that I’d made commander, given what I just told you my background was.

So, I was ordered right back to OP-60. I had already been pretty experienced and now I was very experienced and I’d learned all this stuff and, at this time, there was something starting off that two colleagues of mine had written, a briefing called the Maritime Strategy. This was in the early 1980s and this briefing won prizes. They were briefing it around and it was beginning to drive the programming and it had the favor of the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, but Admiral [Arthur S.] Moreau [Jr.], who was then OP-06, the three-star, the Ops Dep [Operations Deputy]—what’s now N3/N5—wanted to do much more with it and he assigned Captain Roger Barnett and Commander Peter Swartz to be the people who would do that. And so we, standing on Lieutenant Commander Stan Weeks’s and Commander Spence Johnson’s shoulders, created the thing that most people know of as the Maritime Strategy, which was a SECRET briefing and later turned into a SECRET document, and [was] later scrubbed by colleagues, Commander Robby Harris and Captain Linton Brooks, into the unclassified version of the Maritime Strategy.

And so, during all of that period in the ’80s, I was involved in various things having to do with the Maritime Strategy, either directly or indirectly, and I used, I like to think, most of the background that I had. Then, after two years back in OP-60, I was ordered up to the Secretary of the Navy’s Office of Program Appraisal [OPA]. I had never met him, never had much to do with him, and frankly had very little use for him at the time because I was all about horsing up the uniformed service and trying to support the uniformed guys. As it turned out, Lehman thought well of me and I thought well of working for him. It was a fun two years in OPA and, while I was there, I was promoted again. So now I was a captain! I still haven't told you anything yet that sounds like a Navy career pattern, right? But I probably wasn't going to be an admiral. So, I could stop working myself to death in Washington and do something good.

The first thing I did was take a stab at completing the dissertation by taking a year as the Navy Federal Executive Fellow [FEF] at CSIS [Center for Strategic and International Studies]. That didn't work out so well, because I kept being hauled back to the Pentagon by Vice Admiral Hank Mustin, the new OP-06, who knew me (we'd known each other for years). And, I was only allowed to go to CSIS about three months late, because Rear Admiral Jerry Johnson in OPA wouldn't let me go. Then, I had to report early to my next job because the guy who I was relieving had just been selected for major command and was being yanked out early. So therefore I didn't have anywhere near the time that I needed to finish the dissertation, and off I went to the next job.

The next job was a job that then–Rear Admiral Hank Mauz, a mentor of mine from years ago, had told me about: "You know, if you’re ever in a situation where you’ve got your choice, what you want to be is in
the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels.” He said, “It’s joint. It’s whole-of government. It’s all about the allies. It’s the perfect pol-mil strategic planning job. But a job like that isn’t going to make you a higher rank, so you can’t do it until you’ve already reached your highest rank.” Well, captain was two higher ranks than I ever thought I was going to be, so that was the time to take the job. I went in and interviewed with the head of the Defense part of the mission, Dr. Larry Legere, a famed U.S. Army retired colonel who had been General Maxwell Taylor’s jumpmaster over in Normandy and was an awesome guy. We interviewed and he said, “Well, why should I take you?” And I said, “Because you’re already taking my colleague, Captain Ray Conrad, who was the Navy’s foremost NATO expert, and if you take me, you also get one of the second-best NATO experts in the Navy. And that’s why you should take me.” So he took me.

We spent three years in Brussels, the Berlin Wall came down, the Soviets started to crumble, and we were right there during all of that. It was an extraordinary time for the family (we’d had a second child by then). It was a wonderful time for the family. It was a great job. And, ah, so now what? Well, I wanted to go back to the Navy staff and be a captain on that staff that I so enjoyed. But that didn’t work out: There are some people who don’t like me, and one of those people who didn’t like me was in a position of power at that time and so the Navy staff was closed to me. Okay, so what was I going to do? So, I went to see my colleague, who was also my mentor, an extremely senior officer, Admiral Jim Hogg, who was the U.S. MILREP [Military Representative] at the U.S. Military Delegation to NATO in Brussels and said, “What do you think?” And he said, “Well, I’m going to Washington. I’ll come back and get you a job.” So, he came back and said, “You’re going to be special assistant to the Chairman of [the] Joint Chiefs of Staff. So I said, “Eww joint, I don’t want to do joint.” He said, “Okay, you’ve got 24 hours to decide on this, Peter—this is a big deal.” So, I made a bunch of calls and I got a lot of responses from my friends in Washington like, “Hey, you know, if you don’t want that job, please let me know.” Turns out there was this Army general who—I’d spent my time in Europe, I hadn’t really paid attention to him. His name was Colin Powell, and I was going to wind up working for him, which to me sounded like working for just some other Army general.

Well, of course, that didn't turn out to be exactly the case. I took the job, special assistant to General Powell, for two years. An extraordinary human being, an extraordinary guy, and stacked up very favorably with two of the legendary people that I mentioned that I’d worked for already, Admiral Zumwalt and SECNAV John Lehman. General Powell was just a wonderful, wonderful human being and a great officer. Not an expert on maritime affairs, I would say, though. (We’ll talk about that later. He would probably have a few unkind remarks to say about me, too, along those lines, also.)

But anyway, it was a terrific tour. And, after a couple of years of it, it looked like it was going to be a continued terrific tour, but it had plateaued and it was time to start thinking about what to do next. I said to Thuý, “What do we want to do?” She said, “What’s open to you?” I said, “I could be an attaché somewhere.” She said, “You just got back from Brussels. We just spent three years overseas. One kid has just finished high school and the other kid’s entering high school. Let’s stabilize the family.” I said, “Okay, I could be a
professor of naval science.” She said, “I lived on a campus for two years at Columbia with you. That was fine. I don’t want to live on a campus again.” I said, “Okay, so it looks like it’s time to get out.” So, I went to see General Powell.

Oh, meanwhile, a very important part of this story, I guess, is that, as a captain, I was now up for promotion to flag rank because these things happen, you know, in an up-or-out system. And so, I went in to see General Powell and said I’m up for flag this year. He nodded, went about his business, whatever, and about a month later he called me in and said, “Sit down.” He said, “I was just up talking to Frank.” That would be Admiral Kelso, the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] and a former boss and mentor of mine. “Peter, it’s not going to happen. They’re throwing people out, SERBing [Selective Early Retirement Board] people. You made captain because we were expanding and they snuck you in. Now, we’re cutting bone. We’re cutting muscle. So you’re not going to be an admiral.”

I came home and told Thuý and she was livid, of course: “This admiral’s a fool and this other admiral is a dolt and this other admiral did this, that, and the other. And you, you’ve worked so hard, and so on.” (She was a great Navy wife.) My response was—and I still believe this—“Just think about what’s just happened: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and not just any Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—has just had a conversation with the Chief of Naval Operations, the head of the Navy, about me, whom they know personally and who supports them. And, while it didn’t come out the way you would have liked it to have come out, wow! I mean who does that? Wow!” So, I went out on a real high as far as I was concerned. Big retirement ceremony. General Powell officiated. I’m under no illusions as to why everybody came. They didn’t come to see me. They came to see him. But, it was terrific anyway.

But, before all that, he had said, “You know, you’ve got to go someplace to decompress. You can’t just stay here on the Joint Staff. You’ll go nuts and then you’ll fall off a cliff when you retire and wake up in the morning and not know what the hell you’re doing.” I said, “Are you mad at me? Should I stay on?” He said, “No. I’m just telling you the facts of life. I’ve seen this many times. You need a job that you can coast in, for a few months anyway.” So, because of the rarified atmosphere in which I lived at that time, I went up to see the Secretary of the Navy and his EA, whom I knew. And, they said, “Why don’t you go to CNA?” And I said, “Terrific. Great idea.” So, I was assigned as one of the naval officers at CNA for a few months. I had a real job to do there, but one that enabled me to stand at a Xerox machine and copy my medical record and do all of the other mundane things that you should do before getting out, especially from a high-pressure job. And, I did that and I kind of liked it at CNA, and I eventually applied, went through the normal rigmarole that you go through. I was accepted, I later learned, by the skin of my teeth. They decided that a guy whom they regarded as the Navy’s chief propagandist had no place in an objective analytic organization. I told them, “Just try me,” and so they did. Like I said, I wound up a middle manager and had a retirement ceremony earlier this year presided over by the president of the company and the last three-star whom I supported in the Pentagon. So, it worked out. I stayed at CNA for over 25 years.
So, that's the answer to the first part of the question which was, “Tell me about the career.” The second part was, “Did you find that your unorthodox path either helped or hindered you?” The answer is that it helped me because I never failed at anything. I was never a guy who had washed out of this school or couldn't fly airplanes, or whose eyes went bad, or anything. I had none of the negatives that other people had. I just had this weird career pattern in which I jumped from job to job and made myself useful, not to just one guy or one clique. I wasn't an inner-circle Zumwalt guy who was going to get purged right after Admiral Zumwalt left. I wasn't an inner-circle Lehman guy who was going to get purged right after Lehman left. So I was useful— and loyal—to many different kinds of leaders. Another subtle aspect of it is that, not having a warfare specialty, I was equally ignorant of everything. I wasn't part of any community and one of the things that I learned was that members of communities knew as little about other communities as I did. Submarine officers didn't know anything about naval aviation any more than I did and I didn't have their biases, but I had their need to learn and to expand and to grow, which is why some submarine officers expand and grow and become fleet commanders and CNOs. I was able to learn and grow, too, but absent any tug by any one community or any bias by the community because I was in political-military affairs and strategy. I had to learn it all equally and be fair and objective across the board, across the whole Navy, internal to the Navy. And so, yes, I would say that my background suited me just fine. End of second answer.

PEEKS: So, you mentioned during the last answer that the Navy sent you to graduate school twice and in non-technical fields, too. How did that affect your intellectual development?

SWARTZ: Oh, immensely, and I was extraordinarily useful because I'd been to civilian schools and I knew—because of my having been to those schools—I knew academics and I knew foreign service officers, and I knew people in the government and on the Hill whom I otherwise never would have known because they were my classmates or my professors or they were graduate teaching assistants or whatever, and so I kept all of that up. I mean, I—Professor Bob Jervis at Columbia is still a friend. Many of the professors that I dealt with have died, of course: Bob Osgood at SAIS; Lea Williams at Brown; Warner Schilling, who was a god to me up at Columbia. So, it was very, very useful to have been to schools of that caliber, taught by professors of that caliber.

Now, I can't say that everybody agreed with everything. One of the things I learned there was that nobody read or knew much about the Navy. If you were in a graduate program in National Security Affairs when I was, in 1960s and 1970s, you learned about nuclear weapons—so you learned there were submarines with nuclear weapons—but that was about all. And, you learned deterrence theory and you learned a great deal about nuclear deterrence, which in the Navy is only one of many, many things that the Navy is involved in. And I learned a lot about the Fulda Gap and the balance on the NATO Central Front, and tanks, and armies, and escalation, and theater nuclear weapons in Germany. And I'm going, “What the hell about the Navy?” And the answer pretty much was, “Well, we don't know much about the Navy other than the fact it's taking money out of all these other things that we're really more interested in.” And that the Navy's very
obstreperous and even nasty—“defiant” is the right word. That’s something I later learned from General Powell: He said, “In the Army, we think of the three services as ‘the defiant,’ ‘the devious,’ and ‘the dumb.’” He said, “We’re the dumb ones, the Air Force are the devious ones, and you guys are the defiant ones.”

Well, that had been pretty much academia’s idea of us and, of course, General Powell had been to the National War College and had read academic books that confirmed that, like [Rand analyst] Carl Builder’s—in my view, execrable—*The Masks of War* and Morton Halperin’s *Bureaucratic Politics [and Foreign Policy]*. I studied under Halperin at Columbia, and so on and … There was no real Navy literature. They’d give you some [Alfred Thayer] Mahan, which is unreadable, especially if you were an operator. I can read him now after all this training. And, there were Vince Davis’s books and Bernard Brodie, who was this great god of nuclear theory, but whose books on Navy strategy sort of ended around the battle for Tarawa in 1943. They weren’t speaking to somebody living in the 1970s and yet he was still making money off of them by a third edition, and a fourth edition, and a fifth edition, and whatever. There was nothing there and yet I had just come from a place where we thought strategic thoughts and did things and so on. So, that was another thing I learned in graduate school: Navy strategy was the dog that didn’t bark. And, that’s one of the reasons why I’ve been on a warpath ever since to help create a literature that people should be able to study now to learn about Navy strategy and policy. Did that do what you wanted on that question?

**PEEKS:** Yes, absolutely.

**BLANTON:** Definitely. Just to make sure that we have our terms straight for the remainder of the interview, how would you define the word “strategy”?

**SWARTZ:** Because I’m kind of a meat-and-potatoes guy and I work with a bunch of operators, I just say it’s what we have to do and how we propose to go about doing it, given the resources and constraints and the threats that we have to face—that’s the strategy. Broad brush in general, we—everybody, the whole organization—what it has to do, not just one little piece of it, and how we fit into the larger strategic world. So, that’s strategy for me. I mean, if the director of Navy strategy, Bruce Stubbs, were sitting right here, he’d say, “So, you mean ends, ways, and means?” And I’d say, “Yeah, but that doesn’t resonate.” What I just said resonates, all right. So, that’s what I think strategy is.

**PEEKS:** During your career, I guess this is a two-part question, how did you see your role as a strategy specialist in the Navy and was that in line with big Navy’s definition of the role?

**SWARTZ:** So, I think I saw my role as, and I think I mentioned this, trying to help the whole Navy understand what the whole Navy was supposed to do and how it was supposed to do it, organized in a coherent manner, and exposing uncertainties and difficulties for us to overcome and try to accomplish, and also showing a context where the Navy fits into the larger whole-of-government joint and allied scheme. And then, I think the point that I had already made—I saw my role as encouraging a literature. There was a shelf to read on nuclear deterrence. There wasn’t a shelf to read on maritime stuff and what there was was
pretty thin gruel. And, there is a shelf today thanks to the Naval War College Press and thanks to all of the colleagues that I've worked with who've done this sort of thing. Captain Pete Haynes's book [*Toward a New Maritime Strategy: American Naval Thinking in the Post–Cold War World*], for example, is one of the latest, and Dr. Steve Wills at CNA is going to have a book out soon, and these are all the product of my and other people's urging. Oh, and then the Naval Historical Center [now NHHC], Mike Palmer, this all started with Naval Historical Center: Mike Palmer's, what was it?—*Origins of the Maritime Strategy*—because we didn't have anything like that before. And, then riposte and rebuttals, and “Hey, he left out …”—all of that started to fill in the holes ever since then. Richard Hegmann's dissertation, “In Search of Strategy,” and so on.

Anyway, so I saw myself as being somebody who could encourage the rest of the Navy to do this. The strategy is the Navy's, it's the CNO's, and it's specifically OP-06's in terms of owning it and wanting it and pushing it, but my job was to help, and that was what I tried to do. I have no idea what the Navy's official definition of my role as a strategist was. We're not the Army. The Navy is looser; the Navy's not as well organized. That's one of the reasons why I guess I enjoyed it and why I was able to dance between the raindrops in a way that I probably couldn't have in another service, even though nobody could do what I did exactly.

**BLANTON:** So, were there any mentors or superiors who were especially influential in pushing you to pursue strategy development as the focus of your career?

**SWARTZ:** Absolutely! Mentors is how I did what I did. It wouldn't have happened otherwise. When I was at Coronado, a lieutenant commander, an ex-enlisted named Walt Baker who had just come back from Vietnam, gave me a lot of rope to become the teacher, and the briefer, and the researcher, and the guy who could talk—who I became. One day I was lecturing in the base theater to a bunch of guys going to Vietnam—picture that, right?—enlisted, officers; they're going to Vietnam. They're worried they're going to die and here's this JG [lieutenant junior grade] with one National Defense [Service] Ribbon standing up haranguing them about something. After that, a chief who was working in the office came over to me and said, “Mr. Swartz, you went to Brown University.” I said, “Yeah, I did.” “You sound like you went to Brown University. You want to talk to those guys? Stop sounding like you went to Brown University!” I'll never forget this guy. And, under Walt Baker and his people I learned how to not sound like I went to Brown University and how to talk to a room, how to keep awake an entire room full of sailors talking about “population and resources control,” or “environmental improvement,” or “psychological operations,” who are on their way to be stevedores or boat advisors or whatever in Vietnam. Ah, so that was Walt Baker and his gang.

When I got to Vietnam, I worked for an incredible officer, Commander John Walker, a Princeton graduate. I attracted the attention and worked for a guy I loved and admired and respected, Captain Chick Rauch, who was the senior naval advisor. And, of course, I met Admiral Zumwalt and his foil, Captain Emmett Tidd, later Vice Admiral Emmett Tidd, father of Admiral Kurt Tidd, who just retired, and another Admiral Tidd who was the Chief of Chaplains. Anyway, I met these guys and they were all helpful.
When I got to London, as I mentioned, if Captain Steve van Westendorp hadn't given me the advice that he gave me, I never would have done what I did and it never would have happened, and so I’m grateful to him. I'm also grateful to the guy who signed the letter back from the Bureau [of Personnel]—I left that part out. So, the guy from the Bureau who sent the letter back saying, “You could be a strategist if your performance merits and there's no reason why you can't have a successful Navy career”—see how I memorized that? It was signed by a guy I had never heard of, a rear admiral, who was head of officer distribution. His name was Carl Trost. The future CNO. So, every time I was up for a promotion, I would just send a letter to the president of the board saying, “I know this is part of my jacket and you've seen it, but I just want to make sure that you don't miss it, this letter signed by the head of Officer Distribution back in the day that says that if I do a good job there's no reason why I can't have a successful career.” He didn't say I'd be promoted, but hey.

So, yeah, I benefitted from OP-60. When I got to OP-60, (and I didn't realize how this worked until much later), in those days—we'll talk about this—OP-60 vetted the officers that came to them. They were in daily contact with the Bureau as to what kind of officers came, and a package of me and Captain Ace Lyons [later Admiral James A. Lyons, Jr.] went before Rear Admiral Paddock [John F. Paddock, Jr.], who was OP-60 at the time, as to whether or not we should be accepted. Captain, later Commodore, Mike McCaffrey told me the story years later: He was the guy who built the package and sent it in recommending that Captain Ace Lyons and Lieutenant Commander Peter Swartz be accepted. I said, “You're kidding!” He said, “That's true.” Lyons obviously became a mentor when I got there. I've got all the scar tissue to prove all of that. He could be a difficult guy, but he was smarter than hell and his strategic instincts were sound and imaginative—many of them were so imaginative that others thought that he would get us in to war. He was eventually fired, but he was a four-star when he was fired. Not bad.

I met Rear Admiral Bob Hanks, Rear Admiral Bob Hilton, then–Rear Admiral [James B.] Stockdale (I've got Stockdale stories). Lieutenant Commander, later Admiral, Phil Dur; Lieutenant Commander Jim Stark, later rear admiral; Admiral Art Moreau, who chose me to be the Maritime Strategy guy; Commander—later Admiral—Hank Mauz; and, of course, Captain Roger Barnett, who taught me strategy when we were writing the Maritime Strategy. At Columbia, Professors Warner Schilling and Bob Jervis. All of my colleagues in OP-60—when I went to OPA I met then–Rear Admiral Walt Piotti—and then Rear Admirals Frank Kelso and Jerry Johnson. I had already worked for Admiral Johnson down in OP-60. And then, when I was at CSIS, I already mentioned Admiral Mustin jerking me around and back. In Brussels, Larry Legere, then–Brigadier General Tom Montgomery, U.S. Army, certainly Admiral Hogg and my colleague Captain Ray Conrad, whom I mentioned, and then finally on the Joint Staff, General Powell, of course, and Admiral Dave Jeremiah, who was the Vice Chairman, and then-Captain (later Admiral) Greg Johnson.

So, I sort of had a motto (which I taught people at CNA, especially when I was a boss), which was, “My bosses work for me.” That's why they exist: They've got stripes, they've got stars, they've got power, they've
got money, they've got all kinds of things that I don't have and I've gotta play them like violins and use them like an orchestra, and use them to get done what needs to be done. And they, you know, if they trust you and are willing, then because they haven't enough time to do everything they want to do, but they might let you do some of these things. So, it was a two-way street, but I think mentoring was central to what I did. The Bureau and its formal plans for a career pattern and everything were so peripheral to my career as to be almost non-existent, and, of course, my detailers resented that. So, to the extent that I had any problems in the Navy, many of them were with the Bureau or detailers, who would say, “Well, you can't do that.” And, I'd call some guy and say, “Hey, can I do that?” He'd say, “Sure, who's telling you, you can't?” I'd say, “The Bureau.” He'd say, “Screw the Bureau.” So, yeah, mentors were big stuff for me.

PEEKS: So following up on that, earlier you mentioned that you managed to work for a lot of, sort of very strong-minded, controversial folks without having, I'll put it bluntly, without having their opponents kind of take revenge on you afterwards, did...

SWARTZ: I had some opponents take revenge on me afterward. I mean, like I said, I had internally to the Navy, I had folks that didn't agree with things that I did and didn't want me around when they were in a position of authority. Obviously, I had other people who did, right? And, not being on the Navy staff and instead being on General Powell's staff, after the Goldwater-Nichols Act passed, looking back at it in retrospect, I was out of my mind to want to go back in the Navy, but I didn't know that. I was still on a “Gee, I want to get back to the Navy, share with them all this that I've learned at NATO,” kick, and so on. I'm not answering your question—I just picked up on one phrase.

PEEKS: So, how did you manage to, I believe what you said earlier, you managed to work for Zumwalt without being seen as sort of a Zumwalt acolyte, or for Lehman without being able to be seen as a Lehman acolyte, how did you—was that something you intentionally did in trying to position yourself or was it just something that came naturally?

SWARTZ: I don't know.

PEEKS: Okay.

SWARTZ: I know it's what I did—I was never in the inner, inner circle of any of these guys. So I was not Roger Duter, who was Lehman's flight instructor and who sat next to me in OPA. I was not John Pieno, XO [executive officer] of a carrier and a trusted friend of his. I was not one of his bubbas who flew with him in A-6s. I wasn't Captain (later Admiral and Ambassador) Joe Prueher, who was his pilot whenever they went off on an exercise or something together. I was never that close to John Lehman that way.

Likewise, I was never one of the Zumwalt, the main Zumwalt guys—I wasn't Chick Rauch, I wasn't Emmett Tidd, and I wasn't a surface warfare officer, so that when the reaction set in after Zumwalt, there weren't knives coming out for me. I was both low and off to the side. I was in London. As a matter of fact, Admiral
Rauch called me up from DC and said, “Hey, I hear you have a letter back here, is there anything I can do?” And I said, “Yes sir, there is. You can stay as far away from that letter as you possibly can. I need the system to answer me. I need some guy I don’t even know.” And, look what happened: The guy I never knew was a guy named Trost.

So—and Powell, okay, and that could be frustrating. I was his special assistant, I saw him, I don’t know, three times a day. I went to his staff meetings, I had one-on-ones with him, I was at his house, I worked for him on weekends, and had to come over to his house and we did stuff on the floor. We did stuff on the hood of the Volvos that he was working on in the garage when it was freezing. But I was not Rich Armitage. I wasn’t Marybelle Batcher, I wasn’t Larry Wilkerson. I wasn’t really part of an inner circle there. And, so maybe it’s a personality quirk of mine, I mean maybe somebody is trying to tell you something as these things go on, but I wasn’t so closely identified to any of these guys that bad things were going to happen to me.

Except maybe I was. Like I say, the guy that didn’t want me back in OPNAV, and I was never chosen to be an EA [executive assistant] or a special assistant or any of that until the very end working for Powell, so I don’t know. Part of it was I was never a crony, but I was a staff officer who did good staff work. And I was thinking—and while I was working—and I never thought about this before—while I was working for these guys, with the possible exception of General Powell, I was looking at the whole thing. I mean, when I was working for Zumwalt, yes, I was working for him, but I was trying to win the whole war. And yes, later I was working for CNO Admiral [James D.] Watkins, but I was trying to write strategy for the whole Navy and I had that holistic view. I was never on the personal staff of Admiral Watkins or Admiral [Thomas B.] Hayward. They didn’t know who the hell I was, but I drafted the strategy that they used and when their people had to make it theirs, they used my draft.

BLANTON: So, during the ’70s, what steps was the Navy, as an institution, taking to create a cadre of strategy-conversant officers?

SWARTZ: They were taking wonderful steps that gave me my entire life and all of my friends and some of my enemies, and my whole reason for being. It was terrific. Legendarily, CNO Admiral Arleigh Burke had things to do with this, but I didn’t know any of that stuff. I mean, when I was in Vietnam and in London, I was a lieutenant and lieutenant commander, and had a lieutenant and lieutenant commander’s eye view of things. When I hit the Pentagon, which was 1976, this was already in place.

First, there were lots of folks with excellent and appropriate education: The Navy was sending four or five students a year to Fletcher and they were spitting out master’s degrees in international politics from Fletcher, international law and diplomacy, whatever Fletcher called their degree, and several Ph.D.s. So, Jim Stark was a Ph.D., and others who were friends of mine were Ph.D.s from Fletcher. Many, many master’s degrees and the idea was they would all wind up in relevant shops like OP-60; maybe OP-00K, the people
who ran the CNO Executive Panel; maybe OP-965, which did the Extended Planning Annex and the Long Range Planning for the programmers on the programming side; maybe a teaching gig at the Naval War College. So, the Fletcher program created this “Fletcher mafia” within the Navy who were in like-minded or similar billets and they all more or less knew each other, and they had a handshake and all of that. And, then there were a lot more, though, who went to other schools: There was me, who went to SAIS, and Phil Dur and Jay Prout who went to Harvard, and a whole bunch of guys who went to the University of Washington—then-Commander Pat Roth, Lieutenant Commander Dottie Lins, and others. The head of the strategy branch while I was gone at Columbia was a guy [named] Captain Bill Garrett. He was a Ph.D. from SAIS. So, the Navy was allowing more than just me—lots of people—to have this terrific educational opportunity. Now it was a much bigger Navy and a much bigger officer corps, and OP-60 wanted these people actively and had a history of gaining them in their shop.

A second aspect, besides the education, was experience. When I came to OP-60 the first time, I was working with a whole bunch of people that had been there before—it was full of people who had been there before. Admiral Lyons was on his second or third tour. He was a captain then, and he was a guy, Lyons, you know, who had a certain persona: Seagoing bus driver, knuckle-dragging Neanderthal. But Lyons had been to the National War College and the Naval War College, and been a strategy action officer and an aide in OPNAV before he ever became a Navy planner as a captain. No Navy captains today have that kind of background in N3/N5. Now, some are not bad: Stuart Munsch, Rhodes Scholar, White House Fellow, repeat tours in N3/N5, for example. But there aren’t very many like there used to be.

**PEEKS:** What changed?

**SWARTZ:** Well, Steve Wills wrote a whole dissertation about this and they’re going to publish it as a book. The three pillars of the Navy as an institution creating a cadre were, first, the higher education. (There was a lot of it, and at quality places, good schools, good education.) Second, repeat tours in OP-60 or similar organizations, so you were in 60 once and then you went to 00K or you were in 965 and then went to 60, like Jim Stark and Roger Barnett did; or you were back to back in 60 like I was, but I wasn’t the only guy that did that. Typically, captains I met there on my first tour had been action officers and had had my job earlier there. And then, third, a Bureau that was responsive to OP-60 demand signals. And, an OP-60 that had a demand signal. So, that was what the institution was. Now, there was coding of billets and coding of your name and there were lists. The Bureau never paid attention to any of that crap. Left to their own devices, they never would have done any of that stuff. Left to their own devices now, they don’t do it today. But in those days, those were the three pillars.

And so, consequently, the bottom line is that I swam in that water. Those were my colleagues, the guys that sat next to me were: Jim Stark with his Ph.D. from Fletcher—he’d also spent two years—he was an Olmsted fellow, I think—he’d spent two years in—somewhere in Austria and spoke fluent German. Ray Conrad had been to the German war college, which involved a year of language, too, so two years. Who else went to
the German war college? Bill Fogarty, Dave Chandler. So those were the people I served with and learned from—and they'd all had these experiences and they were all together in one office, and so the synergy was terrific.

When I was writing the Maritime Strategy, I had sitting right next to me the guy that otherwise would have been writing the Maritime Strategy, my “rival,” except we were good friends: Commander—later Rear Admiral—Tom Marfiak. He had a master’s from Fletcher, had done an Olmsted [fellowship] in France, and spoke fluent French. When he rolled out to become a speech writer for SECDEF Weinberger, Commander Obie O’Brien came in to replace him. He was an A-6 driver (very strange to have a tailhook aviator in the shop), but he also had been an Olmsted or at the French naval war college or both, spoke fluent French, as well as being a TACAIR [tactical air] guy. So, the Navy did that for me and I was able to do the synthesizing that I did because I had all that resource all around me. I still do and now I’m a resource for other people: you [laughter]!

BLANTON: Absolutely.

SWARTZ: Let me just build on that last point for a second. I take very seriously the importance of me being a mentor to anybody junior. It’s harder now because you don’t just walk into a room in OPNAV and everybody says, “Oh, he’s here,” you know. Instead, you walk into the room and they go, “Who’s here?” “Peter Swartz.” “What’s that?” “He did strategy.” “What’s that?” “Well, it’s the name over your door, it’s what you do.” “Yeah, I just answer the mail. I don’t have any particular expertise. I was in, say, logistics, in the job I had before that and yeah, I was in a war college, I went to the Army War College.” Back in the day, it wasn’t like that. That’s what it’s more like now. It was different. And, then the flags, holy cow! I mean, [Admiral Harry D.] Train [Jr.], Moorer, [Admiral William J.] Crowe, Hanks, Hilton, [Rear Admiral Ronald J.] Kurth, Packer, [Rear Admiral William T.] Pendley: These guys were experts! Moreau, Lyons: They were all different from each other—Larson. And, there was a community, reinforced by education and experience. You can see I get really wound up on this particular point [laughter]. But it did exist. It was amorphous. It was catch as catch can. It was the Navy. It wasn’t the Army. But you know, it produced.

PEEKS: Any more on this section, Justin, or…?

BLANTON: I don’t think so.

PEEKS: So, switching back to the—you mentioned earlier that you played a major role in the development of the Maritime Strategy in the 1980s—could you please describe how you got involved in that process and your contributions?

SWARTZ: So, how I got involved in it is interesting, I reflected on that. I got involved in it by having all that education that I had before and by being in OP-60 for a tour before that—a full tour, three long, busy years. And, I’d been to Brown, SAIS, and Columbia. So therefore. I had been exposed to the paucity of literature
and I read what there was—Vince Davis, Bernard Brodie—but I’d also watched the 1970s and was a small part of the various progenitors of the Maritime Strategy. So, I knew about Zumwalt’s Project SIXTY. I was part of the people programs at that time and so the strategy part hadn’t really affected me, but I knew of it. I knew what it was. I knew it was important. I certainly knew about CNO Admiral [James L.] Holloway’s NWP-1 [Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy] because Commander Joe Strasser, who helped Holloway write it, was sitting three doors down from me or whatever, and I knew about what was in there. I knew about “Sea Strike” because I was part of the OP-60 guys who were ushered into a Pentagon briefing theater to hear Captain Jim Patton, who’d come all the way from Hawaii to brief us on Admiral Hayward’s then-heretical idea about forward operations against the Soviet Union’s Far East. I knew of John Lehman as a consultant. I might have even met him once because he was working for Admiral Holloway, and he had a desk—I think in OP-965—and I was down there a lot learning from Lieutenant Commander Jim Stark and Commander Norm Mosher, and the other smart folks down there.

And, then we had the whole Carter administration imbroglio of, “You guys are just going to haul stuff across the Atlantic and we’re not even so sure that we need you to do that and your only function right now is to be a source of funding for the Army on the Fulda Gap.” I was part of the group that was fighting valiantly against that crap. I was a junior member of that group and I sat at Captain Ace Lyons’s knee on all of that. I knew about CNA and worked with CNA. I was aware of the starting up of the SSG [Strategic Studies Group] up in Newport and I had one good friend who was helping start that, Ken McGruther, who was another one of these OP-60 mafia guys. His BA was from Dartmouth and his MA was from Brown. He was particularly well connected at the War College and then in OPNAV, especially with then–Rear Admiral Moreau. He took my place in OPNAV when I was at Columbia and then went to the War College after that.

So, that’s what I knew and did. So, when Roger Barnett and Art Moreau said, “We want you to draft it,” I’d already been exposed to all of that. It wasn’t like—as is almost always the case now, right? I just walked in the door and somebody said, “Lucky you, you’re going to be the guy that writes the next Maritime Strategy,” and I go, “Oh boy, that’s great, what’s that?” I knew what it was. I knew what I would do if I had to write it. I was in a whole room full of people that knew what they would if they had to write it. Tom Marfiak would have known what to do, might have done it a little different. Jim Stark would have known what to do, if he got it. Roger Barnett could have done it without me, right? So, how did I get involved? I was already involved. By all the things that we just talked about, as was the whole community that I was in, and so on. I—and all the rest of us—had been groomed for this.

So, then the proximate way how I got involved was that Commander Harlan Ullman in OP-965, who was a Fletcher Ph.D. and had taught at National War College (and taught Lieutenant Colonel Colin Powell, which is why he knew to recommend Peter Swartz later on, eight tours later to work for Powell. Harlan and I were already acquaintances, right?) So, Harlan Ullman (at least I think it was him—it may have been someone else) drafted a memo for Admiral Small, the VCNO [Vice Chief of Naval Operations], at Small’s direction,
saying OP-60 ought to write a strategy front piece to the Navy POM [Program Objective Memorandum] build because OPNAV was getting beaten up by the new Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, for not having strategy drive the Navy and he [Lehman] said strategy should drive the Navy. (Of course, we believed at the time that Lehman had pulled 600 ships out of thin air and now he's looking for justification because we were cynical, but he thought OP-06 should write this strategy.) And, Small signed that out and, as I said, Stan Weeks and Spence Johnson got the job. By then, I was back in the office from Columbia, but I wasn't doing that stuff directly, but I was supporting them and helping them. So, that was the proximate origin of the task to write the briefing. It was to set up the POM and get the Secretary off OPNAV's back. It did that, but, of course, it later became much more than that.

So, my contribution was the second iteration of the Maritime Strategy, building on what Stan and Spence had done the previous year, which had gotten wild and rave notices and great approval, including from Lehman and the CNO. Vice Admiral Moreau, the new OP-06, was taking notes, saying, “Okay, now I want to use the new intelligence on the Soviets, I want to use this. I want to use that. I want to be a lot more—and differently—joint than the first [iteration] was,” and so on and so forth. Also, Stan recommended to Roger that I take over for him when he went to sea, and I’d told Roger earlier that I wanted an important job. So, based on my own background and desires, based on what Roger taught me, based on what Admiral Moreau wanted, and Stan’s recommendation, my contribution as the second guy doing this—with Roger—was multifaceted, including framing a rigorous outline, but an easy one that real Navy operators could understand. My target audience was the Navy officer corps. I wasn't the guy who was going to change Navy strategy. Who the hell was going to listen to me, right? I had a few more ribbons now. Staying in Vietnam for two tours was great. I had a chest full of ribbons, most of which were Vietnamese, but hey, that added to my luster, because I did not wear a warfare community specialty device, ever.

So, anyway, rigorous outline: The Maritime Strategy became divided into sections on peacetime, crises, and war. I can do this in my sleep, now: peace/crisis/war. Let's talk about peacetime deployment and forward presence, what Admiral Watkins called a “violent peace” (I think maybe his OP-00K, Captain Jake Stewart, may have coined the phrase). Then, let's talk about what we do in responding to crises. Now war. Global, conventional war. The war section had three phases: “Transition to War” (Phase 1), “Seizing the Initiative” (Phase 2), and then “Carrying the Fight to the Enemy.” The Sunday punch. Knock the crap out of them (Phase 3). And then, finally, “Uncertainties”: Why the story I just told you probably will come a cropper and what are all the things we’ve got to do to hedge against that: What if we got the Soviets wrong? What if the French aren't with us? What if the Chinese are neutral? What if the Japanese hunker down? What if we don't get the reserves, right? Okay these are just some of the things that will make the thing fall apart. What do we do about all of that? Okay, so that was the outline of the Maritime Strategy. It was thought through carefully—it was not accidental, right?
Oh, and we parsed the three-phase war by “warfare area”: ASW [anti-submarine warfare], AAW [anti-air warfare], ASuW [anti-surface warfare], strike, amphibious, mine warfare, electronic warfare, special warfare, et cetera, so as to downplay the role of the individual platforms—carriers, for example—based on Holloway’s reaction in NWP-I to Zumwalt that I’ve spoken about with you, on the Navy’s new tactical “Composite Warfare Commander” [CWC] battle group command and control system, and the organization and mission of OP-095, which I’ll discuss later.

Anyway, Roger was really big on the “Uncertainties,” and he was right. He used to say that it was the most important part of the whole strategy. Not the story the strategy told, but all the uncertainties. My own personal contributions very much were also in the joint arena and the allied arena, the early offensive, integrating the intelligence—the new intelligence—into it, and the maps. Roger and I, we went round and round on which kind of maps and how many maps. We settled on always using the same standardized global map projection. We were overruled by Admiral Lyons once, because he wanted one particular map showing submarine sinkings in World War II, [which] were in the wrong places as far as we were concerned, and weren’t helping his argument any, so we had to crop his map a bit to be able to fit it into the story. But all our other maps were aimed at the Soviet Union. This wasn’t all accidental. They were the target, and we were coming at them from all sides. We tried many different formats. We looked at Stan and Spence’s format and critiqued it. We sat down on Saturday sessions, much to Thuý’s chagrin, with Admiral Moreau in his office to talk about alternative ways of presenting it. And so, we came up with a presentation method that we thought was sound and that was mine, essentially.

And, we hitched it to the next step in the formal OPNAV POM build. That was important. I found out what the next step in the POM build was. I said, “I’ve got to say something that these guys can use. If I don’t parse it the way they can use it, they won’t use it. The whole purpose of doing this is not to have a stand-alone briefing on strategy that you take away from it whatever the hell you want to take away from it and OP-06 is brilliant and that’s that. No, the whole point of this thing is to set up the next step in the POM process.” This was, in 1982, the Warfare Appraisal series process, at that time the responsibility of OP-095. And they broke their appraisals down by warfare areas, Admiral Holloway’s and CWC’s warfare areas: ASW, AAW, ASuW, et cetera. So I said, “I’m going to break my description of the strategy down that way, too, so that each one of their briefers can stand up and say, for example, “Here’s slide 26—or whatever—from Peter’s brief. You remember he said that the ASW campaign was going to look like this. Okay. I’m here to spend an hour now telling you the eakes of the ASW campaign and how the airplanes play, and how the SOSUS plays, and how the submarines play, and how the surface ships play, and so on and so forth,” all keying off that ASW slide in the strategy presentation.

Alright, so we did that deliberately and I collaborated with a commander, later captain named Mike McDevitt in OP-095. (Later on, when he retired as a rear admiral, he came over to CNA to join me and became my boss at CNA for a while. We’re still colleagues.) And, he knew about what we were doing and...
understood it because he'd studied naval history on the graduate level and had been on the SSG, and the SSG knew what we were doing, and he knew that strategy is supposed to drive things 'cause he'd just been on the Strategic Studies Group, and so he was amenable and receptive (and if you know Mike McDevitt, you know he's not amenable and receptive to everything, but he was amenable and receptive to that), and so we were able to fit what we were doing with the next step in the POM. Now, if you went and talked to the “real POM builders,” who worked the follow-on steps, it was, “We never paid attention to those guys either, alright?” But that was a bridge too far. I wasn't able to leapfrog over the next step to the next step after that. That was OP-095’s job. But we did make sure that what we did meshed with what OP-095 was going to do with it. That worked: OP-095 used OP-06’s strategy product in their work on appraising the Navy’s warfare areas.

And, the other thing that I did was I briefed. So, you’ve already figured out I like to talk. This is a good thing if you’re a briefer and it’s a good thing if you’re briefing strategy. And you’re hearing lots of Anglo-Saxon root words, not Greek and Roman root words, because of that chief back in Coronado telling me how to speak in the base theater, and not sound like I went to Brown University, right? And so, I briefed this thing up a storm. And, every time I briefed it, I went with Jim Stark or Roger Barnett (incidentally, another Brown grad and a great briefer), or somebody or Tom Marfiak, and they were taking notes and we'd have a washup after every brief. And we briefed it three times a week, and sometimes they'd brief it and sometimes Roger would brief it, and sometimes Admiral Moreau or another flag officer would brief it. And we'd come back and say, “Okay, we didn't answer that question very well. How do we fix it so that we have the next version of the brief capture things better?” And we briefed some tough audiences. We went to Carlisle. We briefed the Army. Now, the Army figured this was all being done to pick the Army’s pocket. To their way of thinking, the Navy understood what it was supposed to do, which was convoy escort, and the Navy was trying to weasel out of it, and the Reagan administration was allowing that to happen, and that bordered on the treasonous, because all their equipment was going to get sunk by Soviet submarines on the way across. And so, Carlisle was always a tough audience and I made sure—for, I think, three years straight—that I briefed Carlisle. I mean, it was a terrible venue, but we'd come back afterwards and say, “Okay, they said this. What do we answer to that?” And that helped us sharpen our game.

By this time, we were done. And Roger came in and said, “The admirals want it on a piece of paper. They don’t want any more briefing slides, they want a document.” I said, “Yeah, but—,” and he said, “Peter, it’s got to be stopped right now. No more tweaks. No more changes. A document.” We were ready. We could do that, and it was tight, and it was a good argument. So, I did that. I also did the bibliography. I traced what was going on in the public domain, the debates, and when somebody was writing something against the strategy, I highlighted that and I sent it around to the people that needed to know, and I tried to make sure that I understood how to rebut that.
And, I started helping to create the literature. Mike Palmer, sitting where you’re sitting right now, said to me “Hey, I want to do something, I just got here at the NHC [Naval Historical Center],” he said. “I was thinking about doing something on CNO Admiral Forrest Sherman.” And I said, “Yeah, let’s talk about that.” And out of that came Mike’s Origins of the Maritime Strategy, a key part of the supporting literature I was trying to build, plus Mike’s Clancy-esque war fiction books. Also, I went to a Navy history symposium at Annapolis and this retired businessman stood up and said, “My name is Ed Miller and I’m researching a thing called War Plan Orange [War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945]. Let me tell you all about it.” And, I’m sitting there going, “Heck, that’s what I do. Who is he and what Navy is he talking about?” And I got really tight with Ed Miller at that time because he was writing about what we were doing except 50 to 60 years ago. It was terrific and we became big fans of what he was doing.

I also never, if you’ve noticed already, bad-mouthed the people that came before me. Now, this is unheard of in the strategy business. What happened later was: “Those people, ha! They wrote From the Sea, we’re going to write Forward . . . From the Sea, we’re going to write against Forward . . . From the Sea, we’re going to write Backward . . . From the Sea.” To me, that approach was dead wrong. Co-opt them! You don’t want your predecessors peeing inside your tent from the outside. You want them peeing from inside your tent to the outside with you. Don’t do that.” And so we—Stan was at sea, Spence was at sea, when they were back from sea we brought them in. We didn’t want them going around saying, “Hey, these guys wrecked what we did,” and so on and so forth. We wanted them part of the gang. And, when I left—you can ask Thuý—Captain Larry Seaquist came down from Newport to head up OP-603. He was all full of piss and vinegar from his time at the SSG and he was going to be the new broom, sweeping clean and everything. I put up with all of that because I wanted him and me to be tight for the sake of the continuity of the strategy. And it worked. Larry and I were on the phone again just last week. We bonded, and the strategy and the Navy were the better for it.

We kept this thing going through the whole ’80s. Three CNOs. Nobody came in and said, “I’m going to trash what the last guy did and come up with a new thing,” right? Hayward, Watkins, Trost. Trost was no friend of OP-06 and he was certainly no friend of Ace Lyons or John Lehman, right, to say the least. But he was onboard with the Maritime Strategy. I briefed him a few times when he was OP-090, sitting in the front of the audience: him, Admiral Lee Baggett or Admiral Jim Hogg (OP-095), and Admiral Moreau or Lyons (OP-06, my boss). Trost was OP-090 for a long time, four years. He was always in that seat. So he got it. That continuity was really important. I mean, it took the collapse of the Soviet Union to break it and the arrival, as we might talk about, of Goldwater-Nichols.

So, that’s kind of how I got involved and then what did I think my special contributions were. But it took a village, I mean it was a team, but we had a team, an educated and experienced team of smart guys and we knew how to reach out to the Naval Historical Center, to CNA, to Newport, and to other places, like
Fletcher. And most of us then took the strategy back to sea with us (I was the exception there) or to joint or allied jobs.

PEEKS: So looking at the secondary literature from the 1980s and statements from the period made before Congress, made in the press, it seems like the Maritime Strategy has meant and means different things to different people. Could you explain what the Maritime Strategy was from your perspective, and the goals and intentions of its framers?

SWARTZ: That’s a fair and important question. The Maritime Strategy was a lot bigger than me and it was a lot bigger than what I saw and what I did, and I know a lot more about it now looking back at it and having talked to people than I knew at the time, when I was immersed in it and doing it. So yes, it meant different things to different people, I think. What did it mean to me and the people I was around? We were trying to educate the officer corps, we were targeting the Navy. We were living off the 1978 event that happened in the Carter administration, when Randy Jayne, a very distinguished U.S. Air Force combat veteran fighter pilot with a Ph.D., an Air National Guardsman, and a director for defense programs in the Carter Office of Management and Budget, got up in front of a whole room full of admirals at a Current Strategy Forum in Newport and read them the riot act for not having their act together and not knowing what they were doing. And, Navy consultant John Lehman was sitting in the audience. He writes about this in his book Command of the Seas. He said to himself, “Boy, this outfit’s in trouble. The admirals are all sitting on their hands and putting up with this.” Well, I’ll tell you, Lieutenant Commander Swartz never had travel money to go to Newport, but he and Lieutenant Commander Stark and Lieutenant Commander Dur and Commander Mauz and all our colleagues in OP-60 were sitting back in their trenches in the Pentagon hearing the reports and reading—oh, there were reporters there, so this was in the Baltimore Sun, the Washington Post—we were reading the reports and saying, “You’ve got to be kidding me! We know the answer! If we had been there, we would have stood up and just stuffed our rhetorical fists right down his throat and told him the Navy has its act together: “Here’s what we’re going to do, here’s how we’re going to do it!” So, based on that experience, which, as you can see, is still very vivid in my mind, and it was vivid in somebody else’s mind whom I didn’t even know at the time, John Lehman’s, right? I mean, it was quite an event, and reading the press reports, it was quite an event. I wanted to educate Navy officers so that they wouldn’t sit on their hands when they were being attacked by some goddamn Air Force guy masquerading as a civilian and taking money away from the Navy that should have been spent to enable the nation’s naval power because we were doing good stuff.

My other objective was to deter the Soviets. So, how much do you tell the Soviets about the strategy? Well, enough to give them pause and not enough to give away secrets, and that was always a problem and an issue. But, what I was trying to do with those two things, which were sometimes antithetical, because if you’re trying to educate the Navy officer corps you want to tell them the way it really is, and if you’re trying to deter the Soviets, there’s some things you want to keep from them or try to bluff them on.
Admiral Small’s objective [was] related but different: He was trying to get the Secretary off OPNAV’s back and to have strategy really drive the POM, which for me, as you could tell, was sort of one of the many things that I thought I had to do, but I would say that was central to him. He was a great man, the VCNO. John Lehman and he didn’t get along on programmatic issues, but on strategy they were aligned.

Lyons and Mustin wanted to scare the crap out of the Soviets, and make sure they knew that if they came outside they’d die. They believed that and that’s what they wanted to do, and there were lots of people who worked for them who wanted to do that, too.

The submarine force: The force said, “We’re doing this anyway, we were always going to do this. There’s nothing in here that’s new. What’s new is people talking about it. You’re not supposed to talk about any of this stuff.”

I think for most people in the Navy it was a sensible approach on how you use the U.S. Navy’s offensive power to deter and defeat the Soviets. But that wasn’t very different from Holloway or Zumwalt—it was different from Zumwalt regarding the need for more big carriers—but it wasn’t very different from Holloway or others: “I’ve got this aircraft carrier. It’s loaded with all these airplanes, new airplanes now, I got F-14s, right? And new weapons, right? I’ve got Phoenix. And I’m not going to let the Soviets get anywhere near close to an aircraft carrier, with that, and therefore our A-6s are going to knock the crap out of anything that we want.”

And then, of course, what did the Maritime Strategy mean to the Army? It was all programmatic. It was bureaucratic infighting. It was the Navy “trying to take money from me. It’s Navy’s turn now that Carter is out.” They never could rise above—I never found anybody—[Colonel] Harry Summers, I guess, maybe toward the end of his life, an exception—I never found anybody in the Army who thought otherwise. Some in the Air Force got it, some didn’t. Some were more like the Army. Certainly everybody at PACAF [Pacific Air Force] got it. PACAF had no meaning outside the Maritime Strategy. The whole rest of the Air Force were focused on (just like I used to study, right?) nukes and the Fulda Gap, except they weren’t concerned with the ground operation, they were going to go strike.

And then there were a whole bunch of people who thought the Navy was wrong and so they thought the Maritime Strategy was evil: John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, academics like that, Ambassador Bob Komer, the retired, unreconstructed Carterite. Ron Kurth, famous excellent Russia expert and Navy admiral said, “Peter, we’re never going to fight the Soviets, what the hell? What we’re doing is steam round the world doing this and doing that and putting out fires, and that’s where we’ve got to put our money and our focus and our brains to, not this. This isn’t going to happen.” I had to respond, “Yes, sir, but the policy says that a big war with the Soviets is what we are directed to program and budget for, not a small-wars Navy”—kind of the same era we’re in today, right?
So yeah, it meant different things to different people. It was much bigger than what we in OP-603 were doing. There were other nodes that thought *they* were doing the Maritime Strategy and that *they* were the center. The way I tell the story, this is sounding very, very OP-60 centric, right? Well, that's how I looked at it. But, if you were talking to SSG alumni, especially from the first couple of SSGs (Bob Murray, John Hanley, Bill Owens, Art Cebrowski, Skip Armstrong, Mike McDevitt, et cetera), they'd all tell you that the main seat of development of the Maritime Strategy was in the SSG. The SSG was trooping around and talking to all the four-stars all around the world and socializing these ideas, and I was keeping in touch with them—and Stan [Weeks] before me was keeping in touch with them—to know what it was that they were doing, but they thought they were the centerpiece.

And, years later, I got to sit down with alumni of the old ATP, the Advanced Technology Panel, super secret. They *knew* that *they* were the Maritime Strategy, and that what we were doing at the “Secret” level and even the TS [TOP SECRET] level in the war plans was—to them—fiction and PR: “What we are doing with the new intel, real-world operations that you can't know anything about and real-world plans that you don't know anything about. That's the Maritime Strategy. And it probably will never really be declassified what the Maritime Strategy really was about.” So, if Alf Andreasen were sitting here, he would say something like that. [Captain] Dave Rosenberg, who's written that highly classified history, would sit and nod and say, “Okay, that's enough, you can't say anymore.” Former DNI [Director of Naval Intelligence] Rear Admiral Tom Brooks would sit and smile and not say anything.

So, what was the connection between that and what I was doing? I didn't have any of those tickets. I went every once in a while up to the spaces in double OP-009-whatever-they-were, the intelligence shop, hit the buzzer, the green door would open, and I'd say I'd like to speak with Captain Bill Manthorpe. Captain Manthorpe would come out—or maybe by then he was a civilian, Dr. Manthorpe—I'd say, “Hey, this is what I've been writing.” He'd say, “Okay, I'll take a look.” I'd get a call from the yeoman later saying, “Okay, you can pick it up now,” I saw it had some chicken scratchings on it, not identified from whom or why: “Change this, delete that, this all looks okay, add that.” That's how I made sure that I was not doing anything that was not copacetic with whatever was going on behind the green door. But, there was a green door and those guys will tell you *they* were the Maritime Strategy, but I can't tell you that, because I don't know. Talk to Dave Rosenberg. The closest we ever came to letting anybody know what was going on is that chapter in Chris Ford and Rosenberg's book, *The Admiral’s Advantage*, and that thing went through all kinds of clearances in order to come out. That's still the best thing out, the only thing out really.

So, those are some different perspectives on the Maritime Strategy, as I've understood them.

**PEEKS:** So, kind of what you got to at the end on the intel side—if you could talk about it at the unclass [unclassified] level—what role did then-recent developments in policy, technology tactics, intelligence, or other fields have in the development of the Maritime Strategy?
There was great effect, alright, because four years before, during the Carter administration, the technology was falling in to place, the tactics were starting to fall in to place, but there were lots of people, especially in the Navy, who didn't think we could pull this off: “We're going to die. You know if we do this we're dead, we can't do this.” That's not the way it felt in the ’80s because, as John Lehman points out in his latest book, the Carter administration didn't slow down putting new systems in to the fleet. They slowed down some, like Trident—but what they did do was they cut way back on the quantity of what was actually purchased. But we now had F-14s and a guy like Art Cebrowski, who shows up in the SSG, has just come from an F-14 Navy for the first time in his life, alongside a guy like Bill Owens, who has just had command of a Los Angeles class [attack submarine, SSN-688]. Well, there never used to be a Los Angeles class and he had command of one. He has a very different mindset about what he could do with a submarine than the guys that had been there before, who had had command of diesel boats or the earlier classes of nuclear attack submarines.

So, it was a lot of stuff that came in: The LHDs came into the fleet. A lot of stuff came into the fleet in the ’70s, and guys were rolling back in to OPNAV and back into other positions having just had command or served on these things. Commander Mike McDevitt had just come back from a Spruance [DD-963]. Well, there hadn't been a Spruance before and he could do ASW things that he couldn't have done before on an ASW ship (with Jay Prout as his XO, my colleague and Stan Weeks's in OP-603). So, we knew each other and we had this recent experience (not me, yeah, I had a new class of pencil!), but they had this recent experience of this stuff coming in and there was a lot of it, the new systems that came in in the ’70s. The Nimitz-class carrier came in in the ’70s. It was hard to remember how new it was (you remember because you're writing about it), but, I mean, to me it's still brand new, you know. And, the Nimitz was quite a thing compared to what had come before, I mean the endurance and sortie rate and so on that you could do with it. And, we were on the cusp of new systems: Tomahawk, AEGIS, VLS, whew! And they were just coming in, not when I was writing, but they were coming to the fleet right afterwards, but you could taste it then. And so you were mentally on a roll and that very, very positive attitude about the hardware that you had or were about to get, plus Reagan and Lehman saying, “Well, I'm not going to buy just two of them, I'm going to buy 16. I'm not going to buy five of these, I'm going to buy eight, right?” Wow, grand opportunity! I get a Spruance or an LHD or a whatever, a Nimitz [CVN-68], whatever, so this was heavy stuff. So, that's on the system side and I believe that had an effect.

Tactics: Well, okay, the air battles: What are we going to do about all those Backfires coming at the fleet? Well, we got the hardware, but what are the tactics? So Outer Air Battle, the development of all that. Chainsaw and other tactics. CNA was heavily involved in that. And, strike warfare. The creation of the Super-CAG [carrier air wing commander] and Strike University [now Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center] were part of this. New kinds of fighter and strike tactics, and a new place to hone those strike tactics, Strike U, copying off Top Gun [former U.S. Navy Fighter Weapons School, now part of
Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center]. Top Gun itself was still pretty new then, too, in those days.

We were also looking at the Air Force and the Army, and they were doing some neat stuff. Army had AirLand Battle and so there was a revolution going on in the Army, and Air Force had introduced AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System], and AWACS was cleaning up the battlefield. AWACS was terrific, and we were using AWACS, the Air Force AWACS, and we had our own new E-2Cs.

The Marines were using the Maritime Strategy to illustrate why they needed the systems they wanted, especially the V-22, the LCAC [landing craft, air cushion] and the AAAV [advanced amphibious assault vehicle]. LCAC came in. The V-22 eventually came in. AAAV proved an acquisition disaster. They were pushing for all that, because what they wanted was more reach in their amphibious assaults, which were part of the strategy.

Under-ice operations by the submarines: Not a new idea—again, if I had a submarine officer here, he'd say, “Peter, I was practicing under ice in 1957,” or whenever. But, they were doing it and they were honing it, and we had stopped building submarines with under-ice capability because we wanted the speed (that was the Los Angeles class). And then, as the strategy kicked in, then the reverse happened: The program started being driven by the strategy and the improved Los Angeles class was invented, this time with an under-ice capability.

So, back to tactics: I guess there were general tactical principles, like Attack-at-Source (“Why am I hitting the Backfire? Why aren't I hitting the Kola [Peninsula] where the Backfire flies from?” “We're not allowed to.” “But, if I were allowed to, could I? And shouldn't they know that I could if I would?”) So there were issues there: Shooting the archers, not the arrows. Yes, Phalanx is fine, but if you're busy trying to stop the missile as it's coming right at you and it's feet away, it would have been much better to have knocked out the Backfire 300 miles away and that's why you've got the F-14 and the tankers and the E-2Cs to help.

Cover and deception: You couldn't do any of this if you couldn't trick them. If they knew where you were—I mean naval warfare, much of what it's about, is finding the guy, and so we didn't want to be found. So, there was tremendous development in things that we can't talk about here, but electronics, jamming systems on ships, systems on aircraft, special kinds of aircraft, decoys, and so on were all part of that. SEAD [suppression of enemy air defenses] using electronic means. All of that was developed and, by developing it, it gave us a shot at pulling off the strategy. E.g.: You're briefing the strategy. This guy in the audience says, “I just came from the fleet. We just figured out how to do that. We can do that.” Instead of all sitting there, going, “That's OP-60 baloney, Peter, we can't do that,” which is what it would have sounded like in years previous.

And then the submariners: The constant bottom-up pressure for a forward offensive strategy by the submariners, who didn't give a damn about the Carter administration or this or that or the other. This is my view of them. I'm not accusing them of treason. They had a submarine and its job was to go as far forward
as possible and kill everything it could find, especially other submarines, and that was going to include boomers [ballistic missile submarines], whether or not the policy was to kill boomers or not kill boomers or whatever. How the hell were you going to differentiate, anyway? And, Soviet boomers had attack capabilities, too. The practice of ASW, of their submarine tactics, had just continued right through all of this.

So, the interrelationship between the development of the technology, the development of the tactics, and the development of the strategy was there. They were feeding each other.
PEEKS: Okay, it’s about 1:25 on 24 July 2019. I’m Ryan Peeks.

BLANTON: Justin Blanton.

PEEKS: And this is the second part of our oral history with …

SWARTZ: Peter Swartz.

PEEKS: So, Peter, when we stopped earlier this afternoon, we were in the middle of discussing the Maritime Strategy, and the next question on our list concerns the role of Secretary Lehman. We were wondering if you could discuss the role Secretary Lehman played in developing the Maritime Strategy, and was there a connection between it and his 600-ship target for Navy force structure?

SWARTZ: Important questions. So, to most people most of the time, John Lehman was the Maritime Strategy and that still is what you see referred to in the literature and so on, but, as I’ve already pointed out, the Maritime Strategy was a lot of things and it involved a lot of elements; it way transcended him. On the other hand, there are those people in Navy uniforms who said, “It’s ours. He had nothing to do with it. He came in, shot his mouth off, wanted 600 ships and left. He really wasn’t very important at all.” And then, there’s sort of a range of views in-between. My view is that he was involved. He wasn’t the whole story, but he was involved in a couple of important ways.

Number one, during the ’70s, during the Carter Administration, he developed himself, using the advice of then-Captain Ace Lyons and others, into a naval expert. I can’t say, I don’t know whether he was aiming to be the Secretary of the Navy at the time, but he certainly was aiming to be a naval expert. He had already made himself an expert at the deckplates level. He was a lieutenant commander and then he was a commander in the Naval Reserve, he flew as a BN, bombardier navigator, in A-6s. He relished going on active duty, which he did periodically, and flying. This started back when the Vietnam War was in full cry and he made at least one sortie that I recall, in which he landed in Vietnam and was involved in some sort of Vietnam operation.

So, he developed himself as a Navy expert and, during the Carter administration, was involved in advocating for the Navy. He wrote the book on aircraft carriers. He did that as a contractor under contract to the Navy. I’m not sure it says that in the book (many books don’t), but he was published, I think, by CSIS and he was an advisor and a consultant to Admiral Holloway. So, he’d been thinking about, talking about, discussing, and writing about Navy strategy well before he became the Secretary of the Navy. Oh, and this is in his book Oceans Ventured: He talks about the dinner at the Black Pearl Restaurant in Newport in the ’70s between him and, let me try to get this right, [Under Secretary of the Navy R. James] Woolsey, [Secretary
of the Navy W. Graham Claytor—maybe Claytor wasn't there—and Bing West, in which he sketched out a Norwegian Sea campaign on the back of one of the napkins, and he regards that as the origins of thinking about the Maritime Strategy (Hattendorf writes about this, too). He also was involved in the development of Sea Plan 2000, which was one of the antecedents of the Maritime Strategy in the 1970s.

When he became the Secretary of the Navy, then, having thought a great deal about strategy, written about it, and being by now pretty proficient in what he thought was Navy strategy and should be Navy strategy, he declared that the Navy needed a strategy and, fortuitously, it had one: It was what he said it was, as Secretary. And, he did that in a series of [speeches], press conferences, articles and testimony, and so on all through 1981 and 1982, his first year in office. His message was not really codified for a couple of years, but when it was codified, when you look back at it, you could see he developed a very, very clear—and I was a codifier by then—clear, three-part message.

The message was: “First, you need a strategy. President Reagan has a strategy—an overall National Strategy—and I as Secretary of the Navy and the Navy as an institution have a Maritime Strategy.” He borrowed the lingo from the discussions of Britain and continental strategy and maritime strategy. There were those that didn't believe that was applicable, some that did. By the time I came along, it was moot. Everybody was calling it the Maritime Strategy, and that's what it was. You needed a strategy and he had one and he wrote several things and made several speeches and gave testimony about what he thought the strategy was, and it was a strategy that was global, but mostly he talked about the Norwegian Sea. It was a strategy that was forward, it was against the Soviets, it was aggressive, and the centerpiece of it were carrier battle groups.

Second, the way he discussed it: “In order to carry out that strategy, I need 600 ships. That's the bare minimum, but we might be able to pull this off if you guys give me 600 ships.” This was the theme of the testimony. “You shouldn't give it to anybody who doesn't have a strategy. You should give the money to somebody that has a strategy, and we in the Navy have a strategy. It's sound, it's valid, it's been validated by war games and exercises and so on, and that's what you should do.”

Third: “Moreover, 600 ships cost a lot of money. I get it—I'm going to save you money. This strategy and this 600-ship Navy is affordable: through two-carrier buys, getting rid of layers of bureaucracy, competition wherever it could possibly be, no gold plating, no bells and whistles.” You guys are navalists, tell me a program that was innovative and revolutionary that was instituted by John Lehman? Nothing comes immediately to mind. That's because he wasn't chasing rainbows. He wasn't there in order to come up with the next wiz-bang thing 20 years from now. He was about systems there on the ground right now, in the water: “This is what we're going to do against the Soviets and I need more ships now and I need more money now, and I'm going to save you money by the way in which I'm going to procure those ships and aircraft.”
That was his three-part message: strategy, 600 ships, affordability. So, to that extent, he was definitely involved in shaping the strategy, his own declaratory message, and his view—which he still feels—that if you haven't got a strategy, you're out of Schlitz. “You need a strategy and, by God, we've got one.”

Now, the connection between the 600-ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy was contentious. First of all, the slogan “600 ships” predated much—but not all—of the writing and speaking about the strategy and, in fact, given our system, when you go up to the Hill to get the money to get the ships to implement the strategy, you have to tie the strategy to the ships and the money, whereas there were other people back in the Pentagon that said you don't need more than 600 ships to do it. My colleague Commander Harlan Ullman in OP-965 said that then and got fired for his trouble, got out of the Navy: “You're never going to get the 600 ships, it's not going to happen, the country can't afford it, I don't care about all of your affordability measures, you're not going to be able to do it.” He and the Secretary certainly parted ways on that. So did the CNO, Admiral Watkins. They shut down Harlan's shop, which was 965, a shop I had mentioned earlier as being one of the seedbeds of strategy and policy and smart guys from Fletcher, and so on. Commander Steve Woodall, who got his Ph.D. from Catholic University, was another really smart guy who was in the shop at that time, in Harlan's shop. His Ph.D. dissertation talks about this issue.

Larry Seaquist, who followed me and Roger Barnett on the strategy desk in OP-60, maintained that there was no linkage whatsoever between the 600-ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy: Strategy was strategy and wasn't linked to the number of ships you had, and [he] decried anybody who sought to justify 600 ships by using the strategy. So, different people had different views on all of this. Lehman's view was pretty clear, and I got to be the guy who spelled it out and fed it back to him: “This is what you believe?” He said, “Yeah, let's do this: the strategy. Need 600 ships for the strategy. Need affordability measures in order to be able to get the 600 ships.” That was his message as I understood it.

Another aspect of this was that my zeal for making this the Navy officer corps' strategy ran right into the theology of “this strategy is John Lehman's 'Sermon on the Mount' tablets that he's brought down from the mountain. This is given to you by John Lehman,” which he did very little to diffuse with remarks that he would make like, “You guys are lucky I didn't become Secretary of the Air Force,” and so on. Yes, he still does have a pretty healthy ego, and he has a lot to have a healthy ego about. He's pretty good. But, before I went to work for him, I was no fan of his overwhelming presence in the discussion of Maritime Strategy because it ran counter to what I was trying to do re: the Navy officer corps. I thought that to the extent that it was his and Republican and Reaganite, then it was partisan and therefore not something that I could get involved in, working in OPNAV—and not something that the Navy should advocate. So, for example, for an effect of my handiwork, when it came time to publish the special issue of Proceedings in 1986, you’ll notice that the first entry in my “Contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography” is a Hayward article, not a Lehman speech; and, if you take a look at the pictures that adorn it, you’ll notice that the first big pictures are of Admiral Watkins and Admiral Hayward, and then there's a smaller picture of John Lehman, even
though he wrote one of the lead articles. That's because Fred Rainbow and I arranged things that way. Fred Rainbow was the editor-in-chief of *Proceedings*, and he and I were in each other’s pockets at that time. The overwhelming association of the strategy with Lehman by some ran headlong into my desire to make sure that I was using the TACAIR guys, the submarine guys, all of the uniformed communities, roping everybody in, showing how they fit and all of that.

And, another aspect of Lehman that I only learned about relatively recently, but which is highly topical, is the thing I mentioned on the way over to the other building before: He decided to write a book a few years ago on exercises at sea and the Maritime Strategy, and he called me up and asked me for some help. I said “yes” and that’s all in the book. The book came out just last year and it's *Oceans Ventured*. What I had not realized until I got involved in it was how deeply he felt about the importance of the exercises. To me, what had been important was the declaratory policy and the speeches and so on, the Global War Game up at Newport, the activities in the SSG, et cetera. Well, of course! I was a staff puke. I didn't go to sea. But, that was *not* Lehman's view. Lehman's view was that the very *centerpiece* of the strategy had been the exercises, and the book title *Oceans Ventured* is a takeoff, of course, on the title of the first exercise, *Ocean Venture*, in 1981, in which he and Admiral Lyons were involved—Lyons as the fleet commander —to go to sea and demonstrate to the Soviets *at sea*, not by some speech that his speech writer wrote (or some speech that he wrote, because he wrote a lot of his own speeches), or by some staff work that I did buried down in some trench in OP-06.

His main method of communicating with the Soviets was by U.S. Navy warships at sea *doing* things. I had never really realized and certainly never internalized it, until I got involved with the book and I discovered how deeply he was involved in that. He was involved in the choosing of aggressive admirals to go to sea and do things, hence the salience of Lyons, Mustin, [Vice Admiral Jerry O.] Tuttle, and others—Kelso, who he regarded as a very aggressive submarine commander, et cetera.

And, that was another aspect of the strategy that goes hand and hand with that: He was still also a commander in the Naval Reserve. And, as such, he *participated* in these same exercises: He *flew* in them. When they were making simulated strikes on the Kola [Peninsula], which he was speaking about before the Congress, he was actually *in the cockpit* next to Joe Prueher simulating bombing the Kola off some fjord in Norway. He was personally flying there.

And, then the last point I’ll make on Lehman and the Maritime Strategy was, when the Soviets started to crumble, he fell off the Maritime Strategy, way before the CNO, who was a man who didn't like him and who he didn't like either, Admiral Trost. He said, as a private citizen again just reading the newspapers in early 1990, “Okay, they’re finished. They’re toast and we ought to be using the reserves more”—remember, he’s a reservist—“and we ought to be doing this and we ought to be doing that, we have to put more work in the reserves, and we should be less aggressive.” I don't remember the exact words, but he said this in at least a couple of venues. The CNO went nuts. Admiral Trost said—and he said this publicly—“Hasn't he
been watching what they're doing? Hasn't he—how can he possibly say things like that?” Admiral Trost went to the very end of his tour, which was the middle of 1990, believing in his heart of hearts—and he still believes it for all I know—that nothing had changed fundamentally on the Soviet side. They were throwing new construction ships in the water. They had seven carriers built or under construction, and he was going, “What do I do with that? Perestroika and Glasnost and peace and freedom and all of that, I'm not seeing it. I'm seeing seven carriers built or under construction.” Kelso fell off immediately when he first became CNO, so the break point was very clear then, but for several months, Lehman and Trost had been sparring, and Lehman had already fallen off the strategy.

There's probably a lot more that can be said about Secretary Lehman and the strategy, but those were the thoughts that I thought might be helpful.

PEEKS: So, following up on what you said—and this is kind of a delicate question—but you mentioned Admiral Hayward, you mentioned Admiral Trost, and they had well-publicized issues with Secretary Lehman and they certainly weren't the only senior admirals who did as well—from where you sat in OPNAV and the Secretariat, what, if any, friction between Lehman and the senior leadership of the Navy, what did that look like? Did that affect Navy staff’s ability to do its job?

SWARTZ: Probably, but it didn't affect me very much, and the reason is because there was very little daylight between Lehman and the flags when it came to the Maritime Strategy. The daylight between them was in programs and budgets like the F/A-18 and how much it should cost and who should build it and how fast should the rate be and how it should be configured. The issues had to do with tradeoffs between this and that, the platform shops wanting to put bells and whistles on a new construction and Lehman saying, “No, I want to get it in the water.” There were huge programmatic issues between Lehman and many of the senior flags on programs, F/A-18 being a major one. But not in the area that I toiled in. This came out when he and I were talking about the book and he would say something about some admiral and I'd say, “But not the Maritime Strategy, sir. He did X or Y or Z or he wrote this.” And Lehman would say, “He did?” And I said, “Yeah, you were fighting with him over programatics. That's what Secretaries of the Navy and the Navy staff do. I get it. You did it a lot more than other people because you were you. But on the strategy, I didn't see very much difference among you all.”

I was working in an area in which the enemy were the Soviets, the enemy was some folks on the Hill, the enemy was in academia, the enemy was in the Army. The enemy was those people in OPNAV that worried, “We're all going to going to die!” But the senior admirals didn't think so. There is a very famous quote from Admiral [Stansfield] Turner, who was a great opponent of the Maritime Strategy, Carter's guy, a former Second Fleet commander, NATO CINCSOUTH, and Carter's director of the CIA. Then later, when the Reagan administration came in, he lambasted the Maritime Strategy and, at the end of a letter to Foreign Affairs magazine, said, "I have yet to find one admiral who believes that the U.S. Navy would even attempt it.” And, I thought it was a great line. I used it all the time. Every time I'd quote an admiral, I'd say, “Here's
another admiral who Admiral Turner never met. And here's another admiral who Admiral Turner never met. I had a whole collection of admirals who Admiral Turner never met. They were all pretty much together on the strategy. Programs? Flag selection? Often not so much.

And, here's the last point about Lehman, which actually answers a question you'd asked me earlier on: “What did you learn that surprised you?” I said, first of all, I didn't know the salience of at-sea operations. And it fits, because the essence of the U.S. Navy is at-sea operations, not crap that scribes like me write. The U.S. Navy is about operations. The Navy’s operational, so why wouldn't at-sea operations be the centerpiece of the strategy? But, I only came to that in retrospect because I was so immersed at the time in the paperwork side of things, the testimony and meetings and briefings and games, and so on. Second big surprise was him and the A-6 on the exercises: I hadn't known that he'd help set up an exercise at the policy level and then go participate in it himself at the tactical level. That was way cool, I thought. Again, the importance of operations.

The third surprise that I had, which was probably more important, is what I call the “Lehman/Lyons inversion.” So, Admiral Lyons was famous for being this “crony”—somebody who Lehman unjustifiably picked up from lower ranks and kept promoting and so on and so forth, and Lyons and he were neighbors and, over the fence, they would gab and blow in each other's ears and all of that. One of the things that I learned—and I actually bounced this off of each of them separately, not together—is that was all crap. The influential guy was Lyons. Lyons taught Lehman and made Lehman, Lehman. Lyons had an amazing strategic and operational mind. And, when I asked him, “When did you start thinking about this stuff?,” his answer was, “When I was an ensign at Suez.” Suez, right? 1956! “What were you doing then?” And so, he would tell the story. Lyons is a guy who had been thinking about how fleets should attack the Soviets since he was an ensign, and he was a skilled operator at sea and he was well known as a superb and astute Navy operator.

The second part of Lyons, though, I already mentioned earlier, as an example of something else, was that he had also spent a year at the National War College, a year at the Naval War College, had been an action officer in OP-60, planner in OP-60, junior flag officer in OP-60, then went down to the Joint Staff as a flag officer. By the time he was somebody whom Lehman could do things for, he was already a two-star, which he had done by himself (and with a boost from then–Vice Admiral Crowe), not by Lehman doing anything, and was already extraordinarily experienced in the Navy as a strategic warrior. He thought at a strategic and operational level, as well as tactical. He taught many of the rest of us. He taught John Lehman, Hank Mustin, Hank Mauz, Phil Dur, Peter Swartz, Pat Roth, Jim Stark, Dick Marcinko, and lots of other people. And, he was famously abrasive. We all had a lot of scar tissue. He had, not uniquely in the Navy, ways of teaching you that weren't as painless as others, but he was good at what he was.

And he—which I didn't realize, but I finally put it together—he'd be beating me up in the morning in the late 1970s for some damn fool thing I had done down in the “Tiger Cage” trying to resist some Air Force
officer, who was trying to walk all over me over some issue during the Carter Administration, and then for lunch he'd be over at the Metropolitan Club with this consultant John Lehman, filling his ear with what was going on. Lyons created and made Secretary John Lehman every bit as much as Secretary Lehman created Admiral Ace Lyons. And the cherry on the whipped cream on the frosting on the cake was when I went in to Admiral Crowe's oral history, and learned that that was Crowe's view as well. (Crowe had mentored Lyons up to the two star-level, but then later they had a major falling out, which was written about in David Crist's book *The Twilight War*, on the Navy in the Middle East.)

**PEEKS:** So, sticking with the Maritime Strategy and even before Goldwater-Nichols, strategy and operational plans: I mean, they're the province of the combatant commanders, the Joint Staff, OSD—how did the Navy Department attempt to get other stakeholders to buy in to its new strategy and how successful were those efforts?

**SWARTZ:** Well, this was—much of what I'm talking about is before Goldwater-Nichols and even after Goldwater-Nichols. Goldwater-Nichols really didn't kick in until Powell, which is what, '89? So, this is all before all of that and before Desert Storm. So, the Navy said, we thought, and I still believe, that the Maritime Strategy was really the *maritime component* to the National Military Strategy. That's how we always presented it. Now, there might have been some people who presented it differently, but certainly myself and Roger Barnett, Admiral Moreau—I can't remember: I'd say that Admiral Lyons did that, I'm not sure that Secretary Lehman did it, but we certainly always presented it as the maritime component to the National Military Strategy. And, in the strategy briefings and documents we cited—and we went through all the national documents, the NSDDs [National Security Decision Directives] and the Defense Guidance and the JSCP [Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan], so on and so forth, and pulled stuff out. In OP-06, that's what you did, you contributed to joint documents, and so we knew what was in them and we knew what we liked in them and we knew what we didn't like in them, and so we knew how to hitch ourselves to them and embed ourselves in them.

The strategy itself, as I mentioned earlier, included discussion of how TACAIR played, how AWACS played, how the Air Force tankers played, how the Army played, what the Army was doing, Hawk [anti-air missile] batteries in Iceland, things that were helpful on the flanks that we could use them for, Air Force space systems, Air Force strategic lift that we needed (and we needed a lot of it), Air Force tactical fighters in Iceland were all part of the Maritime Strategy, they're all in there. As a matter of fact, by contrast, you won't see any Navy in the Army's AirLand Battle and you won't see any Navy—except decried and, “Gee, we're not sure what they were actually doing”—in Air Force aerospace doctrine from that period, but you see a lot of positive Air Force and Army references in the Maritime Strategy. That was by design. That was Peter Swartz and Ace Lyons and Roger Barnett.

And, I can remember briefing the strategy internal to Navy with the big three sitting in front of me—OP-095, 090, 06, Baggett, Trost, Lyons—and me putting up the slide on Air Force TACAIR and explaining the
Air Force laydown and what we expected them to do. Admiral Baggett erupted out of his chair and asked me why was I shilling for the Air Force? “What are we doing?” And, I remember Lyons getting up and cleaning his clock and defending me and protecting me as I was taking all these arrows from this three-star.

Yeah, the strategy was allied, it was Army, it was Air Force, and nobody noticed. Now, why was that? Well in part because at the very same time that we were doing this, and we had this strategy and it was avowedly joint and allied in our view and we built that into the briefing, we were also simultaneously fighting like hell against Goldwater-Nichols. And, so what everybody “knew” was that “the Navy’s against jointness, so how could the Maritime Stra ...” —if you didn't actually read it, which nobody in the other services actually did, right?— “so how could the Maritime Strategy—be joint?” asked the chatterers. But, if you go in to the documents you’ll see —because I drew the maps, wrote the pictures, wrote the copy—that the Air Force and the Army were given their due.

When Admiral Watkins decided to go public with the strategy in January of ’86 in Proceedings, I was talking to Fred Rainbow about pictures. So we, Fred and I, were looking at pictures and I said that we’ve got to get some Air Force and Army pictures. He said fine, so he went to wherever he goes for Air Force pictures and he got AWACS aircraft and tankers refueling Navy F-14s and all kinds of appropriate stuff. So, then he went to the Army. They slammed the door. “No. The Maritime Strategy is a Navy budgetary ploy, why would we support that?” So, there are no pictures in the special issue of the U.S. Army, even though I wanted to show Army Hawk batteries in Iceland. He was told not to do it, got his hands slapped for it, and didn’t do it. The Army was [against] it even though we talked positively about the Army in the Maritime Strategy.

Admiral Bill Pendley, Admiral T. J. Johnson, and other admirals really felt strongly about this. They understood that what had happened was that we in the Navy had now broken the code on how to present how you fight the war. The joint system had reduced everything to pablum. (Well, partly that was because the Navy wanted it to be pablum, because we didn’t want to be told what to do by the joint system, same with the other services, except the Army. The Army wanted to control the joint system. The Navy just wanted to be out of it.) But, we couldn't bring the other services around. I attended meetings, I wasn’t central to it. I sat in the wings. But, I had been in other efforts where we were trying to get the Army and the Air Force on board on this thing. I said, “You know, we can take the framework of the Maritime Strategy and hang you guys on to it and develop further what you guys have done instead of just on one slide, following the same construct: peacetime, crisis, war, Phase 1, Phase 2, Phase 3, warfare areas, uncertainties. We can do this. We know the power of that presentation. That’s a lot better than showing 15 joint ’ilities listed with ‘we’re mobile and strategic’ and audiences falling asleep listening to all of this stuff.”

But they wouldn't bite, especially the Army. Wouldn't come up with it. There's a speech originally by Admiral Bill Pendley, published later as a book chapter, in which he talks about the Maritime Strategy and AirLand Battle and the synergies and how we could and should and would work together. But it never went anywhere. Now, the Joint Staff despised the Maritime Strategy. Commander Terry Sheffield, who was down...
in the Joint Staff, was one of the despisers. He took the traditional Joint Staff view that the only people who can do strategy are in the joint system, and we were out of bounds. That was the view of the joint system. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, was Admiral Crowe, and while he hadn’t been really sympathetic to the Maritime Strategy when he was CINCPAC, another joint job, he wasn’t going to throttle it, either. So, we didn’t get a great deal of pushback where it mattered, and we just did what we thought we had to do. And, we announced that we were talking about the maritime component of the National Military Strategy, not a separate strategy that was not part of The National Military Strategy. But yes, the Joint Staff was unsupportive generally. The COCOM [combatant command] staffs, we didn’t have a lot to do with except LANTCOM and PACOM, and when we talked to Navy officers on their staffs, they were copacetic. The SSG had more interactions with COCOM staffs.

Oh, one thing that’s important: When Stan and Spence were writing their first draft, a completely separate thing happened bureaucratically. General [James W.] Vessey [Jr.] took over as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs under Reagan and Vessey called in all the—they were called CINCs then—all the CINCs, and said I want your concepts of operations as to how you’re going to fight the big war with the Soviets. And so, CINCPAC, which was Admiral [Robert L. J.] Long, had to do that and CINCLANT, which was Admiral Train, I think, and CINCEUR, General [Bernard W.] Rogers, and CINC this and CINC that, all had to do that. We had those briefings. Stan and Spence had those briefings and, using the LANTCOM briefing and the PACOM briefing, they were able to create the document that they created. They couldn’t use the EUCOM briefing because General Rogers barely mentioned the Navy in his briefing, but they had a CINCUSNAVEUR concept of operations that they could use,

So a year or two before I was involved in it, that was the dynamic. And so, when I took over and went through all of that stuff that Stan and Spence had gathered, plus all the relevant CINC war plans, it became clear to me that Admiral Long had broken the code 100 percent on how to present his strategy. That's where we got peacetime presence, crisis, and then phases 1, 2, and 3, and depicted on a map and so on. Of course, he had the longest timelines and could do that. In the Eastern Med [Mediterranean], phases 1, 2, and 3 all happened on the same day, right? In the Pacific, it was going to take weeks, so he could lay it out. But I said, “Alright, we’ll lay that out, but we’ll collapse it for the Med,” and so we borrowed the PACOM brief as the basis for part of the Maritime Strategy that we wrote and so, in that sense, we were in cahoots with at least those two COCOMs. We always had points of contact at PACFLT, LANTFLT, and NAVEUR staffs to talk to. There was a Maritime Strategy action officer there. So, Mitch Brown was the commander at NAVEUR, Pete Rice was the captain at LANTFLT, and I just don’t remember who we talked to in the Pacific, but we were using the basic Pacific stuff. I later discovered that Admiral Long's EA, Captain Ted Baker (who later became the Rear Admiral Baker of the . . . From the Sea's Navy force capability study lore, right?)—he was the guy who had drafted that original Admiral Long brief, I learned later.
So that's what we know. How joint the strategy was, was a never-ending issue (I wouldn't say “struggle”), but when I went to NATO and briefed the Maritime Strategy constantly for the three years I was in Brussels, I would get sniped at by the occasional Air Force officer or the occasional Army officer over it—we especially continued to be beyond the pale as far as the Army guys were concerned.

BLANTON: So, could you discuss how the Maritime Strategy was disseminated outside of the Department of Defense?

SWARTZ: Yeah. Every which way. First of all, it was my firm belief, Roger's firm belief, and I believe Admiral Moreau's firm belief, that the *lingua franca*, the way to get anybody's attention in the building, the way to do anything, was through a SECRET brief. That's how people talk to each other in the Pentagon. Unclass? “Real men don't do unclass, you know.” TS? Too hard, got to sign for it, go in a special room. Codeword? Even worse. The SECRET briefing is the central vehicle for how the Pentagon communicates with itself and therefore the basic Maritime Strategy had to be a SECRET briefing. (We later will talk about “Well, what happened in the '90s, when we had an incessant stream of unclassified documents?” Beats the heck out of me why, right? This year the Strategy is finally SECRET again.) But we in the 1980s were clear that the Strategy had to be a Secret briefing., Again, I was standing on the shoulders of Stan and Spence, whose briefing was also SECRET. TS was too hard. TS was the war plans and so you were suddenly criticized: “Well, you guys are describing war plans.” “No, no, we've dumbed down the war plans. We've gone to the war plans and we've gone to the SECRET annex or the concept of ops, which is SECRET, and we've used that, we haven't used TS.” We didn't care whether a plan called for, say, three carriers at such and such a point on D+9. That was TS. What we cared about was the general thrust and intent of the commander and what he was trying to do. That was usually unclass, CONFIDENTIAL, or SECRET.

So the SECRET briefing was the basis. That's what we used to brief within the Department of Defense, and we had a very, very robust program. In my files, one of the schedules is there, in which I listed all the briefings we gave. You can just see we briefed up a storm, so that was the basis.

Then, you had all of these articles on our strategy that were coming out of Secretary Lehman in *Strategic Review* and so on in 1981, and then the Komer-Turner-Lehman fight on the pages of *Foreign Affairs* in 1982. We weren't involved in that at all. That was all being done by Secretary Lehman and his speechwriters and his brilliant counselor Harvey Sicherman and so on, and that was being disseminated and fought over publicly. And then, it was starting to appear in the unclass testimony by the flag officers and by Lehman. Now, they were singing from similar song sheets—since they all thought similarly—but not the same because there were was no same unclass public song sheet. And then, Stan and Spence wrote their SECRET briefing and we did our upgraded SECRET briefing, and we said, “Look at this, we got it. Everybody ought to be doing what we're telling them to do, because we got it wired and we've incorporated everybody else's stuff. We got Lehman wired. We got Lehman into the briefing. So we could do it.” Well, some guys wanted to just keep doing what they were doing, especially the Secretary, and the testimony was what it was. We had
an agreed classified argument that most in the Navy had started using, but not an accepted unclass—and therefore public—version.

Enter Captain Linton Brooks, who had emerged as a major conceptualizer and spokesman for the Maritime Strategy on the OPNAV staff. Smartest guy in the Navy, originally not a big fan of the Maritime Strategy, and then became a big fan of the Maritime Strategy. Captain, submarine officer, nuclear guy, great guy, mentor of mine. Linton—and Stan Weeks, too—went up to a conference at the Naval War College in the spring of 1985, and the War College also invited this academic wunderkind named John Mearsheimer, who was fresh out of graduate school and was lambasting the Maritime Strategy left and right as being escalatory, dangerous, crazy. (He just did this again, incidentally, a few months ago, same exact speech in the same exact room, as near as I can tell, same vivid language, same histrionic gestures.) Linton and John debated the strategy. Linton came back to DC and said to CNO Admiral Watkins—because he was working for Watkins directly at the time, you know—“I think it’s time we standardize and go public with this thing. We ought to. Keeping it inside the SECRET lifelines and ceding the wider public to Secretary Lehman and the occasional uncoordinated testimony isn’t the way to go.”

At the same time that was happening, Les Aspin, Democrat [congressman from Wisconsin], no friend of Republicans, was the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and he wanted to hold a hearing on the Maritime Strategy. While he didn’t know or care a lot about naval forces, he’d heard that this was a controversial issue and that there were a bunch of people that he could line up like Komer and Turner and others, who would come in and say bad things about it, and so he wanted to do this. The head of the Sea Power Subcommittee under him was also a Democrat, but a very strong pro-Navy Democrat, Representative Charlie Bennett from Jacksonville [Florida]—funny thing about how that works—and Bennett (and Jacksonville) were very much on the side of Lehman and the Navy when it came to the strategy. He said, “This is my job, not your job, Les, I’ll run the hearings.” And so, he set it up so that Lehman, Watkins, and General P. X. Kelley, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, would come on up to the Hill and brief the strategy. I believe (I’m not certain) that’s the first time that the three of them ever sat down and heard the strategy and its relationship to the 600-ship Navy briefed in front of them from soup to nuts by each other, and including the amphib section for the Marines—being quiet and not throwing rocks at them in an internal Navy briefing or whatever. I was there. I believe they saw the power of the unclass strategy brief when Watkins briefed [it], Kelley briefed the amphibious component of it, and Lehman briefed the 600-ship Navy and affordability as an add-on to the strategy, and they saw the whole thing come together and they went, “Wow, have we got something!” I was there (I had been part of the Navy’s preparation for the hearing). It was terrific!

PEEKS: What year was this?

SWARTZ: Eighty-five, and that brief is in my papers. It’s unclass, it’s around, I’ve got copies of it at home, even.
So, then CNO Watkins, who had sat through the whole thing now—remember he's not been a major player and I haven't mentioned him a lot, I didn't have anything to do with him—Watkins, having sat through that and listened to Linton and responding as well to what other influences were on him (remember, the ATP was doing something that I wouldn't have even known about—because he certainly knew about that). Watkins said, “We'll go public,” went to the U.S. Naval Institute CEO, Captain (Ret.) Jim Barber, who in turn went to this new editor-in-chief of *Proceedings* that he had, Fred Rainbow, and said, “We're going to do this.” Rainbow said, “No, this is Navy propaganda, we're not a propaganda organ.” He lost. He and I became best friends during this entire period. And so, Lehman got wind of this—I was working for Lehman by then, so maybe through me—and said to Watkins, “Well, if you're going to write, I'm going to write.” Watkins wasn't very happy with that. He wanted his own article. He didn't want an article with Lehman. I looked at that and I said, “Hell, we need General Kelley in on this, too. We need the Commandant of the Marine Corps. This is departmental.” Lehman said, “Yeah, let's get Kelley.” I don't think Watkins was really happy about that either, but we got Kelley.

Oh, that was yet another antecedent: We'd been working with the Marines on the strategy all along. One of the Marines we'd been working with was in their programming shop and one was in their strategy shop. The strategy Marine was a close colleague of mine, a lieutenant colonel named Tom Wilkerson, who later appears strongly in the 1990s story as well. And, in the programming shop there was a major named Hugh O'Donnell, and so he was privy to all this stuff too. He'd sit through the briefings, the murder boards, the drafts, and all of that, and he wrote a paper on the Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy Norwegian Sea campaign for a night school MA course he was taking at Georgetown. His professor was Phil Karber, who was a famous defense consultant at that time, and Karber said, “Well, why don't you submit this to *Proceedings*?” So, in September of '85, O'Donnell published a “Northern Flank Maritime Offensive” in *Proceedings* [that] scooped Watkins.

So, you could see what's building, I only know of three things and probably the ATP: There was Linton Brooks and Mearsheimer; and there was the testimony up on the Hill; and there was Hugh O'Donnell's article, among other public utterances. The pressure was building that we had to say something authoritative publicly. So, Watkins commissioned, not OP-06 (even though that's where it belonged, much to the chagrin of the guys in OP-06), but OP-00K, his little private special shop, to write his article. Luckily, luckily, luckily, we had done such a good job of coordinating and cooperating across the Navy staff that the special staff didn't say, “Right, and we never thought it was any good, the stuff that they were doing in OP-06, anyway,” which is a normal thing that 00K might say. Instead, they said, “We'll track with what they've got.” So, it came out and actually resembled what was in the classified document, and the guys that wrote it were—again—part of this informal educated and experienced strategic community: Captain Linton Brooks wrote the nuclear parts, Commander Robby Harris wrote the conventional parts (that's when Robby and I started going head-to-head at times. Our head-to-head has obviously blossomed into something much more. I'm
going to his wedding anniversary on Saturday with Thuý, but at the time we were rival shops, but it all came together nicely).

And, I said to Lehman, probably through the OPA admiral (I never had anything to do with Lehman personally, but the admiral saw him four or five times a day), I said, “So, we ought to have the Commandant of the Coast Guard also.” Answer: “The Coast Guard? You’ve got to be kidding me!” So I lost on that one, I didn't get the Coast Guard Commandant, but it would have been neat—and the right thing to do—but it didn't happen, anyway. The Coast Guard, in fact, played heavily in the Maritime Strategy.

And so, the unclass Maritime Strategy “white paper” public issue came out in January of ’86 as a special insert to Proceedings—and that was, of course, the main way in which we disseminated the strategy. That’s what the strategy means to 90 percent of the readers.

Meanwhile, we were also furiously creating this literature that we were trying to support the strategy with. I had watched what the Army was doing with their AirLand Battle. Not only were they writing a field manual on AirLand Battle, but then they had commissioned this historian, John Romjue, to write the book [American Army Doctrine in the Post–Cold War] about how they came up with the manual. And I went, “Why don't we do that?” By that time, Captain Larry Seaquist was in the saddle as OP-603. He got Admiral Lyons (OP-06) to send a letter up to Newport to Rear Admiral Ron Kurth, who was an OP-06 alumnus with all of us, and now was the president up at Newport. He wisely gave the job to John Hattendorf and that's how the Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy book was written. It was SECRET. John based an unclass article on it in 1988, and it was declassified and publicly released in 2004. So, we started writing down all the stuff I'm talking to you about, thanks to that. And then, when John published his declassified version, he included my bibliography in it. Rainbow had included my bibliography in the special issue in 1986 and so all of this stuff starts coming together, and we wound up with a document and supporting literature then that we would go toe-to-toe with just about anybody publicizing.

But, the academics weren't buying it. They were hostile. So we said, “Okay, how about we write an academically respectable, heavily footnoted, peer-reviewed article in the premier journal of the international relations/national security profession—International Security?” So, that’s the origins of Linton Brooks’s article countering John Mearsheimer’s article that appeared in International Security and later as a book chapter, “Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy.” So, if you were an academic, you weren't interested in the Naval Institute Proceedings. To you, it's like All Hands: a propaganda rag for the Navy. By being in International Security, we made the big time. Linton was certainly the primary author, but if you'll look, you’ll see the names in the footnote are, you know, saying I give special thanks to Rear Admiral Bill Pendley, Captains Tom Daly, Mike Hughes and Peter Swartz, Lieutenant Commander Joe Benkert, and CNA's Brad Dismukes. Again, it was a team effort, by the appropriately educated and experienced community of Navy strategists.
So, bottom line of the answer to your question was: We did it SECRET, we went to unclass, it was fragmented at first, then it got unified, then we had to reach higher and go to academia and that's pretty much how—

Oh, the final thing was, so John Collins, who was a brilliant, irascible, retired Army colonel, had a job up at CRS, Congressional Research Service. He was fit to be tied at the Naval Institute article and he wrote a scathing letter to the editor of Proceedings saying (in effect), “I’ve got 20 questions for the Navy about this goddamn Maritime Strategy of yours.” And we said, “Throw us in the briar patch. We can do this. Thank you, John!” We went to Fred Rainbow and said, “Hey, we got a letter coming signed by Rear Admiral Bill Pendley, crafted mostly by him, but also Linton, me, whoever.” And, we answered all of his 20 questions. So the son of a bitch came back with more questions. We said, “Terrific, we can do that, too,” and we did, mainly written and signed by Admiral Pendley.

And so, the complete *oeuvre* of the Maritime Strategy, I would say, it's kind of like in the Jewish holy books you know, you have the Torah and then the Talmud and the Mishnah and the Gemara. Alright, so these Pendley books, articles, letters actually, letters to the editor, really should be there as an appendix of the Maritime Strategy, they were so important. We noticed that John Collins did not have a third set of questions to ask us, so we thought we'd won, plus we'd been given the opportunity to get out on the street with our response to an Army-tinged critique of the strategy, and we thought that was terrific.

Did that—oh, you asked about Congress. The strategy wasn't a big deal in the Congress. It wasn't a major issue—Goldwater-Nichols was, though, right? It was a big deal for Sam Nunn, who was the leading Democrat. Nunn didn't know jack about the Navy and didn't want to know jack about the Navy. The guys that write about Sea Strike, and Jim Patton in particular, and Admiral Hayward back in the Pacific are gaga over the fact that they got to brief it to Sam Nunn, and he nodded his head and they claimed that that brought him over to their side. He certainly didn't come over to any Navy side when I was in his presence. He was attacking John Lehman left and right. So [were] Ted Kennedy and numerous other Democrats. So were their staffs. So was Bill Lynn. I mean, that's what Democrats did. Also, there was the Military Reform Caucus, of which Senator Gary Hart was probably the most vociferous on Navy issues. But it wasn't fatal. I mean, they didn't have the power in the Senate till late in the decade; and the Republicans did.

And then, we were on a roll. So the next CNO was Admiral Carl Trost, the so-called archenemy of John Lehman and vice versa. He wrote three articles in *Proceedings* on the Maritime Strategy — continuing to create a supporting literature—we later codified and had published by the Naval War College Press alongside the earlier strategy versions. So, that's how we got the word out. I think I'm dry on that one now.

**PEEKS:** So, I think we've touched on a bit of this before, but can we just get your sense of what made the Maritime Strategy so prominent compared to subsequent and indeed previous Navy strategy and policy initiatives?
SWARTZ: Well, first of all, it was a perfect storm. All kinds of things came together. You had Hayward inventing the SSG, you had Moreau and Hilton stocking OP-60 deliberately with the likes of me and Roger Barnett and Ken McGruther and Bill Center and everybody else—Stan Weeks and everybody that wound up in the shop. You had Lehman coming in as the Secretary, you had Reagan providing the top cover, saying, “It’s morning in America and we’re going to beef up the forces and America’s not going to take it anymore and, Soviets, we’re going to put you on the defensive,” and all of that. You had whatever the hell was going on in the ATP. You had the changes in Navy intelligence on the Soviets—we really knew what they thought, we thought, and we integrated that into the strategy—so all of that was going on at the same time. Oh, and you had the creation of Strike U and Outer Air Battle and things happening at the tactical level and so on. Nobody else afterward had that. I mean, since then, you don’t have an administration that favors the Navy or a Secretary of the Navy as passionate and activist and thoughtful as Lehman. It didn't all come together ever again like that—and it didn’t come together before that either, so that was part of it.

Another part of it was, as I just said, I honestly believe that “we broke the code.” We knew how to present Navy strategy in a way that was compelling and truthful, and guys that came afterwards said, “We can’t do it like they did it in the days of the Maritime Strategy because first of all, that doesn’t showcase ‘me.’” Again, I was not big on that. If I had done that to Stan Weeks or he had done that to me, the thing would have collapsed. The point was not to do that. And Larry Seaquist and me and all of that, yes, there was rivalry, but there wasn't out-and-out warfare and there wasn't ignoring—“Well, if it was in their strategy, then we’re not going to put it in our strategy.” We didn't have that. They have that all the time nowadays: “Well, CNO X put out this, so now new CNO Y is in here. “I’m [Secretary of the Navy] John Dalton, a Democrat, and every day I come out of my office and I see this picture of [Secretary of the Navy] Sean O’Keefe, a Republican, with . . . From the Sea in his pocket, I need one too.” That was one impetus for Forward…From the Sea.

There are several examples of all of that, many of which I can’t relate. We weren't in that mode and that was a reason why we were successful.

Third main reason: SECRET briefing. To be compelling within the lifelines. And, to be compelling outside meant it had to be compelling within the lifelines first (my view), not something that the guy who just deals with the outside writes. No, it had to be the strategy that we use in the inside and the outside. That’s what made it powerful and so it had to be SECRET and had to be a briefing because that’s how the Navy talks to itself. But they say, “Nobody does briefings any more, come on, we write prose, we’re all sitting at our own keyboards now, you guys didn’t have that back then, you had yeomen and all of that. SECRET briefings, how you talk to yourself, that’s how you determine the budget, that’s not how you ought to portray the strategy.” So, they don’t do that anymore. They want to write prose and do it unclass and it becomes something separate and other and different, and not as effective. So, these are my views on that.

The other thing we had, well, I guess I already mentioned it, was the continuity. Three CNOs, five generations of action officers, and we stayed with a similar message and we can reach back and say we had a
pedigree of Sea Strike, Sea Plan 2000, early OP-603, and other antecedents of the strategy, and we had the SSG doing what it was doing, so we had that continuity all through the decade. I mean, it took the collapse of the Soviet Union to knock it off its pedestal. Not bad.

And then, CNO Admiral Kelso pulled the plug on the name. Now, he had a different problem. It was 1990–91. The Navy was on the ropes: Desert Storm. Maritime Strategy dead. “Okay,” he said, “I’m putting it up on the shelf and I’ll take it down if I need it. Right now we need a Navy policy.” I would not have done that, I would have said we're changing our strategy, the world is changing, so we're changing with it. Here's our strategy now. But, they didn't do that and so the word “strategy” became an anathema. And, of course, he was trying to be real joint and so he was buying into the “services don't do strategy” line of the Joint Staff. Now, his situation was: He's a CNO. He's a four-star. He's a member of the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] and he's up against Powell. I ain't going to second-guess his ability to get stuff done, right? But when he pulled the plug on the name and on the very concept of the Navy having a strategy, that gave “strategy” sort of a bad name in the Navy and you had to call it something else—concept of operations, this, that, the other. And then, people started critiquing the old Maritime Strategy and saying, “Well, you know, it wasn't really a strategy anyway, the way Peter is talking. It was an OPLAN.” Okay, guilty as charged. I don't know what the hell it was. I know it was effective and we called it strategy.

We told a story. I learned that, later on when I did war games, one of the reasons why war games are so effective as a teaching device and, as you know, you internalize stuff from participating, is because the scenario in the war game tells a story and stories are powerful. And, we told a story: “You start off in peace and then all hell breaks loose and there's a crisis and then there's a war and the war starts, you've got guys mobilizing and transporting themselves and then bullets start to fly, and then, finally, you kill them. Oh, and then—hey, here's all the problems with the story I just told you.” So, that was a story, that was a powerful message.

Some of this other stuff, man, you read it, I mean none of this is a page turner, but I mean you really don't want to turn that page on some of this other stuff. You know: The 9 “-ilities” and the 7 “-isms” and the 14 characteristics and the 9 opportunities and the 4 challenges. Who can keep that stuff straight? Ours, I thought we could keep straight. So, yeah, I think that's it.

BLANTON: So, the narrative is one of the reasons why you're able to convey...?

SWARTZ: I mean, you're asking me and that's my view. Others would tell different stories about that. But, I think you were right, you were very judicious, the word you used, what made it so “prominent.” I mean you didn't say “successful” or “good” or whatever, yeah: “prominent.” I believe those were the characteristics and I had a lot to do with some of those, so I'm invested in that as well.

The Russians paid attention. That was another thing that made it prominent, because one of the raps on the Navy was, “The Russians don't care, they're a bunch of army guys and all they do is ground ops.” So, why
are they building a big navy?” “Well, that's because of Admiral [of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergey G.] Gorshkov.” “Well nice, that's a good out. But isn't he a Russian, right?” And so, he's building this giant navy and he's got seven carriers built or under construction and 14 different classes of submarines and this and that and the other, and you're telling me that they're just a bunch of army officers and not paying attention?

And then, we dug into it and, as you could see in the Lehman book, Gorbachev thought about carriers all the time. [Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal Sergey] Akhromeyev had pictures of carriers on his wall. I mean, who knew that they were as worried about carriers?—well, they were. Now, maybe they were signaling to us because they were trying to restrain us through naval arms control in the late '80s. I believe that was a direct outcome of the Maritime Strategy. Others may analyze it differently. But, they couldn't constrain us lots of other ways and they couldn't beat us or compete with us. And, our message to them was that we were going to do this anyway: “Stop telling us we're going to die. We're not going to die. You're going to die. We're going to do this anyway.” “Here's Admiral Mustin. Do you think he thinks he's going to die?” “We're going to put him out in front of you to talk to you.” So, the Russians got the message and they were worried. Now, they then went to the exchequer and said, “Hey, we need more money,” and [General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail S.] Gorbachev said, “Hey, I can't do this;” and lots of larger forces were at work all across that. But, the fact that the Russians were noticing was part of the argument. I don't know if the Russians or the Chinese noticed anything that the Navy's done, written, or said since 1989. I say that seriously. I simply don't know. But, there are people at CNA and Newport and PG School, as well as OPNAV, who know that sort of thing.

BLANTON: So, given what you've just said here, do you think the Navy Department—could the Navy Department produce something as comprehensive and detailed as the Maritime Strategy today? Why or why not?

SWARTZ: “Yes, they can,” said Peter to every single successive strategy officer and shop in OPNAV from about 1993 through last February. And finally, I got so frustrated by it that Captain (Ret.) John Byron and I coauthored an article, we were so upset, in the early '90s about what the Navy ought to do in Proceedings, which came out the same month that the Navy finally published . . . From The Sea. Finally, I got so frustrated, and I couldn't get anybody to fund it or anything, so I was invited to a conference in 2013 by Sebastian [Bruns] in Berlin, and I said, “Okay, I want to do my speech and my chapter on “American Naval Policy, Strategy, Plans, and Operations in the Second Decade of the 21st Century” using the outline of the 1980s Maritime Strategy. I'm going to show people how it can be done.”

PEEKS: Just to be clear, we're talking about Dr. Sebastian Bruns?

SWARTZ: Yes, Dr. Sebastian Bruns, University of Kiel.

PEEKS: Okay.
SWARTZ: Whose own book was, again, part of the literature that I strove to create, along with Randy [Papadopoulos] and John Sherwood. I certainly share credit on that score.

So I wrote the chapter. I said “it’s going to be twice as long as anybody else's chapter, is that alright?” He said, “Sure.” So I did. It's buried in a 2016 Routledge volume [Routledge Handbook of Naval Strategy and Security], which costs about $200 and therefore will be read by nobody or one guy. Here, we got two! Alright! Alright [laughter]! So, that's that and then I said to CNA, “Hey, you didn't pay for this and you didn't pay me for this or anything, but can we publish this thing so I can get it distributed other than by Routledge?” And, I got permission from Routledge. So the answer to your question is this [shows American Naval Policy, Strategy, Plans and Operations in the Second Decade of the 21st Century], re-published by CNA in January 2017. Now, the problem with that is it was a speech and a book chapter and a CNA report. Unlike the Maritime Strategy of the '80s, it's not full of slides, it doesn't have the charts and I'm aware of that, but I tried to follow the outline, and it's unclass because of the nature of it. So, despite the fact it's got two enormous strikes against it—no maps and unclass—it nevertheless is the closest I've been able to come to “Here guys, this is what you ought to do.” And I wrote it for the guys in OPNAV who were writing CS-21R [A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready] (which is itself already obsolete), but they allege that they used it and read it and so on. That really sought to apply principles of the Maritime Strategy to a later period, 2013–17.

I also—before that, though, about 10 years ago—put out a CNA document that sort of said, “Well, if you're going to write any of this stuff, what ought you to think about, not only based on my experience with the Maritime Strategy, but my experience with all you other guys that have followed the Maritime Strategy?” And so this [shows U.S. Navy Capstone Strategy, Policy, Vision and Concept Documents: What to Consider Before You Write One] came out in March 2009 and they do still use this in the Pentagon and at NWDC because I've seen it dog-eared on people's desks.

So, the answer to your question, “Could the Navy department produce something like that?” is “Sure. I wrote one in 2014. No maps though.” These maps, not SECRET, should be SECRET. Also, I wrote a guidebook in 2009 that sometimes gets used, and I've helped and worked with a lot of other guys to create a literature so that other people can do things.

BLANTON: And, this one's published in the edited volume in 2016 by Routledge?

SWARTZ: Yep. And in a 2017 CNA document as well.

BLANTON: That's right.

SWARTZ: Yeah, it says so in the CNA document. I was punctilious about [it], I didn't want to incur the wrath of Routledge or Sebastian. That's why it took so long to get out, but, anyway, they did, Routledge said
sure. I was surprised. People at CNA thought they were going to reject me out of hand. But, they probably said, “Now, who's going to read a CNA document?” They didn't regard that as a threat.

PEEKS: Do you think that the changes in the way that the Department of Defense is administered and changes in the relationship between the services and central Department of Defense since the early '80s would allow for something as comprehensive as the Maritime Strategy to be written? I guess in the sense of you can write it, but is the Navy department structurally capable?

SWARTZ: Curveball, new question, right? Okay. Yeah, as long as you keep in mind that the subtitle of what you're writing is the maritime component of the National Military Strategy and then you've embedded yourself in it. Naval power is unique and special, and therefore different from our ground power and land-based air power because it uses the sea, which has a different legal regime and a different physical makeup and is totally globally interconnected with itself all over the globe, and that makes naval power and the proper exploitation of it different and special. And so, there is a reason why you should codify that specialness and unique aspect someplace, also because that's how you ask for money and that's how you spend money, given the bureaucratic makeup of the country, but you're still part of the National Military Strategy. Bob Komer did this. He disingenuously set up the strawman of, “You guys are against us. You guys are going against the National Strategy.” And, of course we were, at the operational level, because we wanted to conduct operations that we believed would carry out the National Strategy better, and that he didn't want us to conduct, and therefore we wanted to buy gear that he didn't want us to buy to do that.

But, we believed that we were performing an essential task within the National Military Strategy, whether we were arguing with Carter, which was pushing against a closed door, or arguing in the Reagan administration where we were pushing against an open door, that—yup—we can exert power from the sea. Where are good places to do that? Well, NATO flanks, Pacific. Why? Well, because they are composed of this, that, and the other. What forces would you then use? Well, we'd use forces that were at sea. Well, that's going to be dangerous, they're going to die. Okay, so we're going to have to defend and protect those forces. We're going through the same discussions again right now. So, we need the next generation's AEGIS, Tomahawk, “aha” moment, that will put things right again or maybe we won't get there. But, it should be possible to be able to discuss the fact that you've got a unique set of systems—the Navy—operating in a unique area as part of the larger National Military Strategy—I did that, I don't see that it's difficult.

What's dishonest, of course, is what Komer did. Read his book, what was it—Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense? [laughter]. And, that was another thing we did with the pictures: Fred and I. We did that on purpose. We deliberately peppered the special issue with pictures of allies. So, the next thing from Komer, which was predictable, I forget what it was, but he predictably rose to our bait. Either I answered or I wrote for somebody to answer, I/we said—as preplanned: “You know, we would have expected more from Ambassador Komer and we would have expected that he would have actually read the document, and even if he hadn't read the document, we would have thought that he would have looked at least at the pictures,
but obviously he didn't even do that.” That was in my mind to do as we were developing the special issue because I knew he would do that. Anyway, we wrote that in the ripostes to Komer that we would use ever since, because he wouldn't go away.

**PEEKS:** So, before we change subjects, is there anything you wish we would have asked about Maritime Strategy or your work in the Pentagon in the 1980s?

**SWARTZ:** I thought about that. I just want to reiterate how much of a team effort and perfect storm it was. Many different strands and lots of appropriately educated and experienced people involved, moving more or less in the same direction, and we didn't touch a lot in this interview on some of the aspects: The intel and the anti-SSBN campaign, the ATP—but they were very important—SSG, Global War Game, Naval War College, PG School, CNA, Naval Institute conferences, exercises, Top Gun, Strike U, all of these elements—NATO, et cetera. NATO had a simultaneous drill on strategy that came up with a thing called the *Concept of Maritime Operations* [CONMAROPS]. The guy that provided the U.S. Navy input to that was a guy named Commander Ray Conrad, the Navy's leading NATO expert at that time. He sat next to me in OP-603. We made sure that what we were doing in the Maritime Strategy folded the allies in correctly and what the allies were writing was the way we wanted it written. Both Ray and I wound up in Brussels a few years later serving on the same staff, dealing with the same allies. We didn't talk a lot about that in this interview, but all of these strands intertwined to make a very, very strong line.

The other thing that I thought of, though, which really was different that we haven't talked about, had to do with the lessons of history, and I bring that up just because you guys are historians. So, I didn't know a lot about this, but a book came out in 1986 by a leading Soviet writer named Ginrikh Trofimenko and it was called *The U.S. Military Doctrine*, and he went on and on and on and on about how you could see the roots of the nefarious U.S. Maritime Strategy in Mahan's nefarious book *The Problem of Asia*. So, I looked at that and I said, "What the hell is *The Problem of Asia*?" I had never heard of it, but then again why would I have heard of it? I wasn't a historian. So, I called up John Hattendorf or somebody and said, “You ever heard of this?” He said, “Sure.” I said, “What’s in it?” He said, “Don't know. Never read it.” Or, “Can't remember,” or something like that. So, I went over to the Navy Library—this is a true story—I went over to the Navy Library, went downstairs, found their copy, blew the dust off it, checked its library card and saw that nobody had taken it out in years, looked through it, and said, “Well, I’ll be damned, Mahan has just told us how to put Russia in a box.” I had never known that. I never found another American that would ever know that. No, that's not true, I did come across somebody once who said yes, yes, he knew that.

But, the Russians like Trofimenko “knew” that we knew our history—and of course we didn’t— because they bought in to Carl Builder's baloney that the U.S. Navy is nothing but based on tradition—whereas U.S. Navy people actually mostly don't know their traditions at all. But Builder didn't know that because he went to the Naval Academy and then didn't stay in the Navy, so therefore he never knew that the only place that beat that into you is the Naval Academy. And, Trofimenko didn't know that. Anyway, Mahan said in
The Problem of Asia that to take on Russia, you need a land and sea component, you need alliances, you’ve got to do it globally, you need a strong land power to fix the Russians on the ground and so we had one (I forget who his was, Germany or Japan or somebody) and so forth, and then maritime power takes over and you come at Russia from all sides. Anyway. I’m reading this in Mahan—no foolin’!—and Trofimenko had spotted it and we didn’t know, but he thought we did. We don’t read Mahan enough. He read Mahan.

Then, there was a literature that was starting about the Crimean War. The new literature featured the operations in the Baltic. The Baltic? It was a Crimean War, right? Crimea is not in the Baltic. Turns out, the Crimean War was misnamed. The Crimean War was a global war against the Russians, right?—by a group of allies, naval allies, France, Britain, Turkey. They attacked in the Baltic against the forts guarding Saint Petersburg, they attacked them in Crimea, they attacked Petropavlovsk. I drew a map that looked like the Maritime Strategy and it was the Crimean War. Dave Rosenberg made me take it down and said don’t use historical references because everybody accuses the Navy of looking backward, you don’t want to tie it to history, so I didn’t, but I have the roughs of maps that I used the day he did that.

Then, there was the Salonica Front in World War I. Franchet d’Espèrey, the French commander, drove all the way from Salonica all through the Balkans, wound up in Budapest, and was on his way to Vienna when the Armistice was declared. It was a flanking operation that was knocking the crap out of the back door of the Central Powers in World War I. There was also our own intervention in Russia in 1918 and 1922, a case study in how not to do it. Global, allied, and a complete joke, a hodgepodge, a mess. And then, finally, World War II, with the Soviets not engaged in the Pacific and not wanting to be engaged in the Pacific until they were done with Germany, and only then moved to the Pacific. In the Maritime Strategy, we were going to hit them at all sides at the same time including the Pacific and so we started studying that stuff.

And we then, because of our experience with John Romjue’s work on AirLand Battle, we started goosing the Rosenbergs and Hattendorfs and Palmers of the world to write about the Maritime Strategy, and they all did. Dave wrote a brilliant essay as part of a Hattendorf and James Goldrick anthology up at Newport [Mahan is Not Enough]. Hattendorf wrote The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy and Mike Palmer wrote Origins of the Maritime Strategy, and that started the literature snowball. We roped Ed Miller and his War Plan Orange work in at the same time. And so, we didn’t cover that in this interview, but I thought I would mention it just because you guys are historians. We didn’t—we weren’t cognizant of this. If I had been, I would have argued against Dave a little more strongly and in some audiences used the history—when I was in Europe, I did, I played the history card. But, I took his point that you were playing into the hands of people like what is it, SECDEF McNamara and his alleged retort to CNO Admiral Anderson in the Navy Command Center: “I don’t give a damn what John Paul Jones would have done.” You know. During the Cuban Missile Crisis. It’s a famous line. Dave didn’t want us to be accused of looking backward.
BLANTON: Now, switching to questions focusing on your later career: In your May 2019 Proceedings interview we discussed a little earlier, you mentioned that you were in Brussels when the Berlin Wall fell. How long did it take for planning to catch up with events in Eastern Europe and Russia?

SWARTZ: I didn't see it all, so this is just through a soda straw. I don't feel confident in making generalizations, but my cop-out, or at least my view, is that it varied. Air Force General Lee Butler, two-star, deputy J5, goes over to National Defense University in May of 1988 and says, “They’re finished. We need a whole new paradigm. They’re gone.” He later discovers that Lieutenant General Colin Powell, about the same time, as the President's National Security Advisor, came to the same conclusion. By early '88, the handwriting was on the wall for some people and two very important people: Lee Butler, who later becomes the J5 and still later becomes the guy who closes SAC [Strategic Air Command] and opens Strategic Command, and General Powell.

On the other hand, you had CNO Admiral Carl Trost, who we have a paper trail on, that until the day he walked out of the door and handed the baton over to Admiral Kelso, believed that much of this was a sham and that the nation was wrong in letting its guard down. SECDEF Cheney was of that mind, too, very much so, which you can read in the Cheney literature. I mean, all during '88, '89, '90, '91 there were those who said, “This can’t be happening. It’s the Soviet Union, I mean, come on.” And then, you would look at certain indicators and Trost would look at the building program and say, “They’ve built or are building seven carriers.” Now, what was going on, obviously, in retrospect, was a welfare program for workers, to keep everybody employed, but how do you tell the difference between building a carrier as a welfare program and building a carrier as a weapon system, he didn't know.

So, I think during that period—oh, and then you have the Soviet naval arms control campaign going on right until the last days of the Union in which they were pushing to constrain both sides’ navies, and we're going, “So you constrain your Navy. So what? So we constrain our Navy, and we’re finished.” So, you saw that and I was involved right up until the time I left Brussels in opposing the naval arms control campaign because that was going on. Thuý and I went down to Versailles and I debated Eric Grove in the Hall of Battles, I think it was—the Hall of Battles, God, it was amazing! One of the high points of my career, a whole room of NATO delegates and ambassadors, and I’m standing up debating a guy in the Hall of Battles, which we had to walk through the Hall of Mirrors to get to. The Hall of Battles in Versailles. That was a kick. But anyway, so I think it varied.

Some became believers and some weren’t, I mean, by ’91 the Soviet Union collapsed and that was clear, but even before then when the Warsaw Pact was unravelling. And, if you were the U.S. Navy, you had never focused on Pact [navies] anyway. You know, I mean the East German and Polish [navies] were something that the Germans and the Danes were going to take care of and the Turks were going to take care of the Black Sea, so you weren’t involved with the satellites very much at all. The Soviets hadn't collapsed yet, and that’s where all the power was, so we hadn't seen that yet until the Soviet Union itself collapsed, so that took
a while. And, when did I become a believer? I guess when I went to work for—it was situational, it had to do with—when I went to work for Powell, then I was, I was Powell's guy, or one of Powell's guys.

PEEKS: So, that transition away from the Cold War, what did that look like when you were working for General Powell?

SWARTZ: Well, lots of dissonance. Powell had a very clear new vision and part of his vision was the fact that he believed that he needed a new clear vision and that the services—if they played their normal game—were going to fail and that only strong leadership by him (which he could exercise because Goldwater-Nichols had given him that, those tools, and because he was good and he had great self-confidence and a lot to be self-confident about) could pull this off and drag the services kicking and screaming with him because the Soviets were finished and we were going to get big budget cuts, and if we, the military, did not control those cuts, then they, every member in the Congress and so on, were going to control the budget cuts and that would be bad.

And, I followed him faithfully for two years in that vision, but my vision was of a global Navy that could be used and swung around and so on, and that certainly didn't jibe with any of his Army instincts. I mean he was in the Army. To the Army, the Navy is something that's on your flanks and in your rear and overhead, and if it's doing its own thing that's scary because you're going to die and if they're going off to Norway or going down to Italy or doing whatever the hell they want in the Atlantic, God knows, and not showing up where you want them over you and not on your flanks directly, that's wrong, and you need a general officer in charge to get the Navy to do what it should do. And, if you find that their stuff is unsuited to do that, then don't fund the bastards and fund me. That's what Korea looks like to the Army, that's what Europe looks like to the Army, the Army I know, which is a peninsula-oriented ground Army, with flanks, rear, overhead: That's what they believe the Navy is supposed to cover for them, and they worry the Navy won't.

General Powell was a genius and a wonderful man, but he was also an Army officer, and so working for General Powell of course was fantastic because he was such an extraordinary human being and such an extraordinary officer, but my thinking and my way of doing things never really meshed well with him or General Butler or the other true believers who were almost all—I can't think of a Navy one—Army and Air Force that were on the Joint Staff at the time. He had some very good Navy officers on the Joint Staff at the time, mostly embedded in his J3 shop, and Admiral Dave Jeremiah was his Vice Chairman. He had one smart Navy action officer dealing with the Brits in his J5 shop, that was Lieutenant Commander Frank Pandolfe, who later became Vice Admiral Pandolfe and special assistant to a subsequent Chairman. So, he and I never had any real disconnects. We had one issue that I'll tell you about later. But I don't think we ever really totally gelled either. I was loyal, I was good, I helped do what he wanted, but my heart wasn't into creating an Atlantic Command that would subsume a Navy that would be subordinate to a general who was focused on Europe and the Middle East. I'd seen what had happened in Europe, the dismantlement of
the Atlantic Command and the creation of USA Command: Admiral Paul David Miller was big on that. Captain Peter Swartz was never big on that.

So we—it was a great tour, but I wasn't really doing what I wanted. Had I been unfettered by my allegiance to a great man, I would have done things differently, I think. So for me, it was a transition, also. The Soviet Union had gone away, and that jerked a lot of people around. Look at all the people spilling out of graduate school at that time with Russian language skills, right? Flooding into the CIA. How’s your Arabic? So yeah, anyway, I look back at it fondly, I made some good friends, worked with some terrific people, respected General Powell and General Butler considerably, but it wasn't my world, and some of the things that drove me—like how do you use naval systems? How do you use the advantages that you get from maneuvering at sea?—they don't motivate an Army officer or an Air Force officer at all, I've discovered.

PEEKS: So what impact did this viewpoint of Powell’s have on his proposals for a post–Cold War force structure? Because if you look, for example, at Admiral Kelso's USNI oral history, he was less than thrilled at the process that led to the Base Force structure targets.

SWARTZ: Powell was unwilling, to say the least, to leave it up to the services to come up with their own plan. He believed that the services would—and he believed that the Navy did under Trost—stonewall, saying, “We can't take any cuts.” And that's what CMC [Commandant of the Marine Corps] General Al Gray did. The Marine Corps did that and the National Guard did that. Marine Corps and the National Guard said, “Well, now that the world changed, we should be plussed up, not down. We, the National Guard, are all about homeland defense and low-level stuff. That's what we do and we don't take any cuts, we're still going to have disasters on the Mississippi and we're still going to have the need for riot control in wherever, yeah, we don't take any cuts.” And Al Gray said, “In this new world, it's all about intervening in the Third World, Soviets are finished.” (But, hey—and this was an outright lie—it was followed by the Marine Corps consistently saying through the ’90s, right: “We weren't involved in the Maritime Strategy [laughter]. We had nothing to do with going against the Russians. We're your Third World 911 force, so we get plussed-up. You can't cut us.”) Powell's view was, “You stand in the line with everybody else,” and Al Gray and the National Guard were proving what he feared and, of course, [they] made end runs around the Pentagon to the Congress, which both the Marines and the National Guard are good at because that's why there is the Marine Corps and National Guard today.

When it came to the Army, he had to beat up CSA [Chief of Staff of the Army] General [Carl E.] Vuono something fierce, but, at the end of the day, General Vuono got beat up and the Army is used to thinking of “feast/famine, feast/famine,” and “War comes, we plus up and then [at the] end of war we have to skinny down,” and that's what happens. Navy was arguing like the Marine Corps, and I would have argued that, I would have written that: “But hey, now that it’s all about intervening in the Third World, then yeah, you should cut the Army, and you should cut the Air Force, but why would you cut the Navy, which is your premier intervention force, along with the Marine Corps?” I probably would have written something along
those lines and the Navy was thinking along those lines. And, Powell said, “Okay, I’m not going to be able to rely on the services. They’re going to come in and say, “Yeah, I’ll take a cut, I’ll take a 1 percent cut and you leave my crown jewels alone. So, you won’t cut any tanks, you won’t cut any carriers, and you won’t cut any B-52 bombers,” or whatever the crown jewel was of the Air Force. There was a fight going on in the Air Force and the fighter pilots were taking over, so maybe they said “You won’t cut any F-15s.”

And Powell said, “No, I’ve got a J8 now, I can play in this game. J8: Build me a Base Force.” And, not only that: Powell—and he didn’t do this because of me, but he had the same view, maybe he did it because of Romjue—I’m going to document what I’m doing, too. So you want to read one of [Dr. Lorna] Jaffe’s monographs [The Development of the Base Force, 1989–1992], which was commissioned by Powell, to make sure that there was an in-house recounting of what he did and how he did it, and then it’s all the other stuff that tells you, too —if you read Butler’s memoir, Uncommon Cause, which I have read recently, look up in the index, look up “Trost.” Okay, so you turn to page 500 (huge two-volume thing), turn to page 527, “Carl Trost sat stone-faced.” Okay. Look up “Kelso”: “Admiral Kelso didn’t say a word.” Right. So, Powell thought—his view was that the other services were stonewalling. Air Force, Navy—Air Force was in trouble because they had lost—CSAF [Chief of Staff of the Air Force] General Mike Dugan had been fired because he said something stupid to the Israelis about the Iraq War, so the Air Force was in disarray. The Navy was grumpy. Powell said, “I’m going to do it myself. So, I’m going to do the Base Force.” I mean, Lorna Jaffe is a good historian. She worked her tail off (and I helped on that document) and so, yes, I would commend you to Lorna Jaffe’s Base Force history as to what that was all about.

But, his view was that he had to use the power that he had, because otherwise, left to their own devices, the services would muck it up. And, of course the services’ view was, “We should be doing this. I’m the guy who understands air power,” or, “I’m the guy who understands naval power.” “I should be doing that. Don’t tell me I’m the guy that’s going to muck it up. I am the only guy that really understands it.” “Okay, so make my deadlines and conform to my framework.” “Well, I don’t like your framework.” “Then I haven’t got time for that baloney. Meanwhile, I’ve got awfully bright Navy officers sitting down in my J8 now because Goldwater-Nichols did that.” Look at the guys sitting down there: Commander Joe Sestak and who’s down there, Don Pilling was there and Denny Blair, and Connie Lautenbacher was there, I forgot who it was, and Vern Clark was there and Grog Johnson was there. I mean, amazing Navy officers were down in the Joint Staff, largely in the J3 shop, but also in the J8 shop, and so he had his own Navy programmers.

I’ll tell you one anecdote, though (I may be repeating myself): So, when I first went to work for Powell, something he said or something I heard in his presence or something didn’t sound right to me, so I wrote him a memo. I was a special assistant, so that’s what I do, I figured. So I wrote a memo and said, “Dear General Powell, you said this and that or somebody said this and that, my view on it is dah, dah, dah.” So, I got a thing back right away from him saying, “Peter, you’re not my naval advisor. My naval advisor’s name is Frank Kelso, right? I have a naval advisor. When I need naval advice that’s where I go.” And then, there was
something else at the end of it, signed CP. So, sheesh, okay, well, I learned the rules right away: I’m not his naval advisor. Don’t tell him anything about the Navy he doesn’t want to know, alright. So I sent him a note back saying, “Picking myself up off the floor, blah, blah, blah,” and then I said something, this and that. So he sent me a note back—this all took about three days, right?—he sent me a note back saying, “That’s a good place to be, the floor, you have no place to go but up,” which diffused it, right? The guy is a genius. The guy is really good and so that was that. That’s Part A of the story.

Part B of the story was [that] I later told the story, as you can imagine I would have, when I paid a call on Admiral Kelso and also when I paid a call on the Vice Chairman, Admiral Dave Jeremiah. (Kelso had been—Kelso and Thuý were washing dishes together one night at a party, I remember—he had been my boss at OPA.) So I went up to see Admiral Kelso, who was a great guy, and told him the story. He looked at me and said, “He doesn’t listen to me. You just keep doing exactly what it is that you’re doing.” He said, “Don’t stop.” And Jeremiah told me the same thing. I knew Admiral Jeremiah, too, who had been the Navy’s most astute programmer and had relieved Admiral Ace Lyons as CINCPACFLT and run PACEX ’89, the last great at-sea exercise of the Maritime Strategy.

So yeah, he—I worked on a lot of the stuff, I helped him on speeches, I helped Lieutenant Colonel Pete Herrly on Joint Pub 1, and Bob Doughty in establishing JFQ [Joint Forces Quarterly]. I was the guy that established JFQ magazine, because I said to Powell, “You know, you don’t have a magazine. Everybody else—the Navy’s got a magazine, Air Force has got a magazine, a couple, Army’s got a couple of magazines—but you don’t have a magazine.” So I went over to National Defense University and found some guys and said we’re going to have a magazine. I brought back a sample to General Powell and said, “Here’s what the magazine looks like. They want it to be the joint version of International Security.” And he said to me, “I don’t want the joint version of International Security. That’s for the monks. I want the joint version of Naval Institute Proceedings, which I read every month.” Boy, did I make Fred Rainbow’s day when I told him that! And so, that’s why JFQ looks the way it does. Anyway, it was a great tour. I helped Lorna, as I said, writing the Base Force history, noticed that [Powell], too, was creating the secondary literature. No fool. Smart man. Learned a huge amount from him. Plus, he was a good guy.
Part III
The Challenges of the 1990s—After the Maritime Strategy

BLANTON: I’m Dr. Justin Blanton. I’m here with Dr. Ryan Peeks. We are interviewing Peter Swartz, and today is the 21st of August 2019.

PEEKS: Peter, at the end of our last interview session we had gotten to the early 1990s, we were starting to talk about the Base Force and other changes that came at the end of the Cold War, so I guess to start us off, from where you sat working for General Powell, what did the development of the Base Force look like? How did that process look from up close?

SWARTZ: It looked pretty much the way Dr. Lorna Jaffe wrote it up in her history, and the reason for that was one of the 4,000 clever things that I watched Colin Powell do every day. He got it: that part of the armor that you needed to create around any policy was a history that would create a buzz in academia, and so he commissioned Lorna, an excellent historian on his staff, to track what was going on with the Base Force. So, if you were to take a look at Lorna’s history and then if you were going to take a look at General Lee Butler’s memoirs, which came out a couple of years ago, that’s it. Also, Colonel Don Snider’s 1993 “Strategy, Forces and Budgets.” There’s not much more to say than that. Powell had a vision, he thought about it a great deal when he was at the National Security Council and when he was the head of Forces Command, and he hit the ground running when he came back to Washington as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Bottom-line belief of Colin Powell was: The Soviet Union is finished. It’s gone. (Not a bottom-line belief of Admiral Carl Trost, the CNO. Not a bottom-line belief of Dick Cheney, the Secretary of Defense, Powell’s boss. But, certainly a strongly held belief by Powell).

Okay, so what comes next? Powell’s an Army officer. He knows his history. What happens next is the military gets destroyed. The Army gets dismantled after every war, right? Revolution, 1812, Mexican, Civil War, World War I, World War II: Everybody gets demobilized. Vietnam, I was part of that, too—I watched the Army throw good people out, who wanted to stay in the Army, in droves. Powell was convinced and felt very strongly that the military should bring that force down itself without a lot of political “help.” Who was this “military” that he was talking about? It was him: He was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who had just been given expanded authority under Goldwater-Nichols. He saw that expanded authority in a way that his predecessor Admiral Crowe did not. Crowe was a transitional figure. Crowe did some things. But it wasn’t the same as Powell, who figured out that one of his main tasks was to bring the force down the way it should be bought down—in other words, the way he thought it should be bought down. He had the ability to do that. He could do what he wanted with the Joint Staff, something the Chairman couldn’t do before because the Joint Staff used to work for the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body, not the Chairman, so it had been full of all kinds of compromises and log rolling and so on. It also had been full of naval officers who weren’t going anywhere in their careers. Navy didn’t send its best and brightest to the Joint Staff—there were
some exceptions and certainly the flag officers were exceptions. But, for the troops, if you were a mid-grade Navy officer with a bent for pol-mil or strategic planning work, you wanted to be in OP-60 if you were interested in this stuff. You didn't want to be in J5. That all changed with Goldwater-Nichols. So now, you had a powerful Joint Staff, packed with front-running Navy officers, because, I mean, you had to go there if you wanted to be promoted. And, General Powell commissioned that staff—his staff—to develop with him this Base Force construct.

Now, alongside the Base Force construct came—in his mind—a restructuring of the Unified Command Plan [UCP], and I think General Lee Butler's memoir probably goes into this more than Lorna's. I'm trying to remember. Then, there's a history of the UCP that's been put out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff historian's office that covers this as well, by one of Lorna's colleagues. And so, General Powell had this idea that there should be an Atlantic Force, a Pacific Force, a Strategic Force, what was the other one? An Intervention Force? I'm not remembering it right now, but Lorna gets it all right, as does Butler. The more I heard General Powell talk about the European Force, the Atlantic Force, it was EUCOM [European Command] and CENTCOM [Central Command], and it was ground-heavy and it would be run by the Army. Now, he would, if he were sitting here, he'd say, “No, I never said anything like that.” I certainly inferred that that was what he was talking about, though. The Pacific, that would go to the Navy. He never thought very much of the Pacific. He was an Army guy. He was thinking about Europe and the Middle East. In the Strategic Force, the Navy and the Air Force would be folded together. This had been anathema to the Navy ever since the 1950s, that the Navy and Air Force strategic forces should be under one command. They wanted the strategic submarines to belong to the fleets, which they did, the boomers. And then, there was the—I forget what the Intervention Force was, that's not because it was unimportant, it just means my memory is fading.

So, that was his construct and I looked at that and I said, “You've gutted the Atlantic.” He said, “There’s nothing going on in the Atlantic.” I said, “But the beauty in naval forces is that this is the chance to create a global naval command in which you could have an Ernie King that could move naval forces.” (And, see USMC Colonel Phil Ridderhof’s “Organizing to Control the Global Maritime Commons” from 2011 for more on this line of thinking.) This was exactly what he didn't want to hear. So, we weren't on the same song sheet on that, but he planned to restructure the Unified Command Plan, bring the force down the way the military thought it ought to be brought down, and he spent a lot of time bringing CSA General Vuono on board. He never brought the Navy and the Air Force onboard, but they went along anyway. He just steam-rolled them, especially Trost and Kelso, his CNOs. Trost resisted in vain and Kelso joined in resignation.

Oh, and he created a document, Joint Pub 1: Joint Doctrine for the Armed Forces, an overarching doctrine, which was his baby. Army Colonel Pete Herrly was the drafter of that, and I worked with Pete. So, we had a number of initiatives and he had several documents, the Joint National Military Strategy, whatever, he had various outlets, so in terms of documents both public and internal Secret documents, trying to restructure the Unified Command Plan, trying to bring the force down and having a staff, a really sharp staff, even Navy
guys were good on it: Vern Clark, Connie Lautenbacher. Who else was down there? Grog Johnson, Denny Blair. I mean, it went on and on, there were a lot. Joe Sestak. There were lots of good people down there.

A small thing that I did: He got a letter once from, I think it was Bob Doughty, at the time a famous Army historian, who reminded him that he didn't have a journal, that the Navy had the *Proceedings* (which Powell loved, he was a huge fan of *Proceedings*, he thought it was the God of all military journals, he read it even as an Army officer) and the Marine Corps had the *Gazette*, and the Army and Air Force had journals. But there was no joint journal. So, I was tapped to start *JFQ*, which I did. And the model that he wanted to use was *Proceedings*, which is why *JFQ* is glossy and has lots of pictures. He wanted something that could be read on the flight line, read on the mess decks, read in the wardrooms, not something that would only be read by the people who he called the “monks,” which were people like me. And so, he did that, with me helping.

Notice what he's done: He's created the secondary literature that goes along as body armor for all of his initiatives, which was the same idea that I gave you during the last time we talked, of what I had been trying to do in an earlier time and more parochially for naval power and maritime power. He recognized that. He didn't do any of that because I told him to or suggested it. He did it because he was smart—when I saw him doing what he was doing, I just had to smile because he was doing the right thing and I think maybe it's an Army thing. Back when they invented AirLand Battle, they had John Romjue write the history of inventing AirLand Battle and that really struck me. That's why we had—Captain Larry Seaquist and I had—John Hattendorf write the history of the development of the Maritime Strategy exactly on that model. Later, I went down and worked for Powell and there he is, with Lorna writing histories of what he did on the Base Force.

He had a lot of other small initiatives, like the Buffalo Soldiers Monument out at Fort Leavenworth that he pushed hard. He had been doing that for years. He was an extraordinary guy and he is an extraordinary guy, and watching him in action, and how he did things and why he did things and when he did things, was good. He and I got along fine. He had a very negative history with John Lehman, with Ace Lyons, with people whom I did not have a negative history with, but we got over all of that. He was tight with Dr./Commander (Ret.) Harlan Ullman, his old professor at National War College, [with] whom I was not. Harlan was sometimes his entrée into the Navy. I drafted many of General Powell's speeches, including speeches advocating changing the Unified Command Plan. I knew who I worked for, but, on the other hand, I tried to get it modified, not successfully. He was who he was, and his first name was certainly “General,” in my view. So, I don't know if that's answering where you wanted this to go, that particular question to go, but ...

**PEEKS:** Oh, definitely, definitely.
SWARTZ: I wasn't central to anything on his staff. Earlier, when we were talking about things going on in the Navy, I was occasionally central to some of the events. I wasn't peripheral either, and I was formally part of an inner circle, but I wasn't in the central part of the inner circle, like Lieutenant Colonel, later Colonel, Larry Wilkerson who became his chief of staff over at State. We shared the same office and did the same sorts of work, but Larry had come with him from Forces Command, and Larry was very bright and energetic and had been a Naval War College graduate and knew a lot about the Navy, so he'd stayed on, he had been on the faculty at the Naval War College, as well. So, in none of these areas was I a vital guy on his staff, but I was useful and important and had good things to do, and stayed for a full two-year tour working closely for him.

Then, there were the letters: So, if you recall back in that time, Powell was a rock star. He transcended being just a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Everyone was talking about him running for President and all of this. So he used to get mail: He got bags and bags of mail every day. So, picture the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff now getting bags and bags of Powell fan mail every day, and Powell said, “Every one of these will be answered.” (He wasn't trying to make himself look good. He was trying to show that the U.S. military was responsive to the American people.) And, we set up a system in the Joint Staff in which, all over the staff, people had to respond, either “I'm writing for General Powell” or for his signature, and Powell would sign them himself. I mean, his hand would get tired doing that, but he was very conscious of the importance of all this.

Some of these letters were really tough: “Dear General Powell, I live in South Chicago, people are doing drugs right outside my window, there's gunfire in the streets, and I just saw you on television and thought you were a great guy, and I just wanted to write to you and tell you that, even though I'm living in hell, I really respect what you're doing.” Okay, so that letter that goes back to her is going to be up on her wall for the rest of her life. This is a heavy responsibility as to how you respond to something like that. You've got the opportunity to give her a boost and change her life for the better. But it's just a letter and you've never met her and so on and so forth. I got to do those. Not all of them. I got to do some. Larry got to do some. That was a demanding part of the job: boiling it all right down to a personal relationship with somebody you've never met and imploring her, “Don't do drugs, stay in school, thanks for writing me, please feel free to correspond all the time,” and then get the language down to a level in which it's conversational with a kid who's just written that, to be signed by the most famous man in America. So, I remember that clearly about the job.

Then, there were the speeches: He gave a lot of speeches. So, he had, like, three speechwriters. I was one. No Chairman has three speechwriters. But he did, and he needed them. Also, he took his speeches extremely seriously: Eight drafts for the VFW or somebody like that, 12 drafts if it was to the Council on Foreign Relations or somebody like that. He was very conscious of the importance of his speeches, and the speeches sometimes were turned into articles and so on. All of that going on. This guy was a superb, superb, superb
soldier. I can't say enough good things about him. Nevertheless, professionally he wasn't on my wavelength when it came to naval matters. The relationship was fine, but professionally it wasn't like working for John Lehman or Bud Zumwalt or Ace Lyons. He was an Army officer and Army officers look at total big global strategic pictures differently in my personal experience. Did we talk about that? Peter's view on how Army officers look at things? We did that before?

PEEKS: Yes.

SWARTZ: Alright, then we won't do it again.

PEEKS: So turning to Powell's “naval advisor,” Admiral Kelso ...

SWARTZ: Yes.

PEEKS: In Admiral Kelso's USNI oral history, he says that at the end of the Cold War, he and Powell arrived at a similar top line for the Navy's force structure, about 450 ships, but [Kelso] had no idea how Powell arrived at that number and disagreed intensely with some of the margins within that 450. So, in a situation like the JCS at the end of the Cold War, where it's dominated by Powell, how did Kelso or Jeremiah try to dissent, try to get some of the particulars of the plan changed?

SWARTZ: So the easy answer to that is, I don't know. It wasn't my circuit and I tried to stay out of their business and they didn't muck with me very much, although we were friends and colleagues as the earlier conversation indicated. Powell had a powerhouse J8, which included mega-smart Navy guys, like Commander Joe Sestak. (There's a 2016 Naval War College Review article that Steve Wills wrote that starts off with a vignette about me and Joe Sestak [“The Effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 on Naval Strategy, 1987–1994”]). Alright, so Sestak was there and there were others, Denny Blair was down in there. I'm not going to get the sequence right. Connie Lautenbacher. I mean, some of the Navy's main programmers were there in the Joint Staff and I find it hard to believe that the Navy Staff, the programmers, the OP-090 guys, didn't have some sort of pipeline down there, I mean that's what you did and if somebody else is messing with you, PA&E [Program Analysis and Evaluation], or somebody, then you want a mole in PA&E or something. So, my guess is that there was discussion going on. My guess also is that the tenor at the time was, “Hey, but the Joint Staff is always going to win.” And, the Navy had a process and it was moving way too slow and there were going to be compromises made between the “Barons.” I wasn't part of this, so I'm not an expert on it.

And, Kelso was presiding over bringing the fleet down, which is harder than presiding over expanding it, in order to give everybody their due—the submariners and the surface guys and the aviators—and the way the Navy had to work and then try to figure out what warfare at sea was going to look like in the future. The Navy was already starting. There were people in the Navy who were starting to stir and worry about China and a resurgent Soviet Union. Powell wasn't worried about China or the resurgent Soviet Union at all. He
thought the Soviet Union was ruined and we were looking at the wrong thing. So, I’ll bet that there was
cross-talk on the staffs and that the Navy staff knew more about what was going on than might be reflected
in some of these things. But, at the end of the day, it was Powell and J8 and the Base Force and his number,
and “I can't wait for that. I can't wait for the Navy POM process to lugubriously, you know, roll along, and
then we'll compromise that with the Air Force and the Army. Goldwater-Nichols says that I’ve got it and I’m
going to run with it.” However, not all elbows and knees. I mean, he’s a nice guy, so people didn’t hate him or
anything. But, he was able through his skills to just get it done. Navy, Army, Air Force, all wound up falling
in line, sullenly, but falling in line, because he’d say, “You got a better idea?” And they'd answer, “Well, let me
take this back to the staff.” “I need it by Tuesday.” “Well, we can't assemble a staff by Tuesday.” “Well, then
too bad because I’ve got to get it done now.” That’s what I remember the times were like.

Couple of exceptions: Al Gray was the Commandant of the Marine Corps and a person who’s full of energy,
full of brains, and striving mightily and succeeding in making the Marine Corps a true coequal service of
all the other services. This is a Marine Corps that had never had a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, a Marine
Corps that was only a member of the JCS on matters of particular interest to the Marine Corps according
to law up until very recently, a Marine Corps that had never had a CINC [combatant commander] until, I
think, General Crist at CENTCOM, and a Marine Corps that had no service components of its own in any
of these unified commands, right? The Fleet Marine Force senior guy on Navy service component staffs was
a colonel. He was on the staff of an admiral and he was the guy who advised the admiral on Marine affairs,
but he wasn’t a component commander. There was no MARFOREUR or MARFORPAC, MARFORLANT,
nothing like that.

CMC General Gray decried all that…. Plus, he said that, “If the Soviet Union is gone, but we're going to be
up against—as you say Colin—Kim Il Sung, Fidel Castro”—who else were the bad guys at the time? Gaddafi,
Saddam Hussein—“that’s why you need a Marine Corps, I should get plussed up, you don’t cut me, I’m the
guy who doesn't get cut.” Powell said, “You stand in line with everybody else.” Remember, he’s an Army
officer listening to this, right. And Gray said, “No, I don’t.” Gray made end runs around the building to the
Congress, as the Marines do, and he and the joint system and Powell had some difficulty arriving at what
the proper number was for the Marine Corps.

Same thing happened with the National Guard. One of the interesting things that I always observed in
dealing with the Army over the years is that the Marine Corps lives in mortal fear that the Army is going
to swallow it up because they cherry-pick the data and see that the Army doesn’t understand why there’s
a Marine Corps. Actually, in my experience, the Army doesn't give a damn about the Marine Corps. The
Marine Corps is small potatoes to them and they work with the Marines when they have to. What the Army
cares about is the National Guard. The Army cares about the Army Reserve. The Army Guard and the Army
Reserve are larger than the active force, right? Their problem is how do you integrate all of that together.
That's serious business. Dealing with the Marines, by contrast, is easy. Marines? They look at it as, “Oh my
God, it’s us and the Army.” Actually, the Army barely notices the Marines half the time. Their problem is, “What do I do with the Guard?” Desert Storm and all that. Remember the era that we’re in: Desert Storm and “what do we do with the Guard.” “Well, they’ve got to get trained up.” By the time they were trained up, the war was over. Bad taste in the mouth of the Guard and so on. Of course, the Guard lives in congressional offices. I mean, it’s no shock that anybody in the Guard goes to the Hill for anything: They exist because of the Hill, and the Guard wouldn’t take the cuts either. So, there were cuts, and you’d have to go into the real history to see that. I may be wrong in some particulars, but I was giving you the general sense of how things went.

So, the Navy was part of all of that and Powell just blew right by Trost’s antipathy. Remember, Trost was a superb Navy programmer, ran OP-090 for four years during the Reagan buildup, hated Lehman and Lehman hated him, but a very competent officer. I briefed him many times on the Maritime Strategy. He was on board with the strategy and along comes Powell with all this new legal authority and a part of the legal authority is precedents and so on. Well, Powell was creating his own precedents as he was going along. He’d given it a lot of thought and he was an active guy.

PEEKS: This has been mentioned a couple of times, we haven’t drilled down into it, but in the middle of this Cold War drawdown process, there’s Desert Shield/Desert Storm. What impact did that have on long-term strategy and planning?

SWARTZ: It had a lot of impact. So the Navy comes out of Desert Storm upset and bitter. The Navy went into Desert Storm at the height of its feeling good about itself, right? The Navy of 1989: PACEX ’89, the big exercise of the Maritime Strategy, we’ve broken the code on how to deal with the Soviet Union, everything else is going to be a lesser included case; we’re almost at 600 ships; we lost Lehman, he resigned or was pushed out or whatever the right story is; we went through [Secretary of the Navy James H.] Webb [Jr.] who was a digression; now we’ve got Will Ball as the Secretary and then Larry Garrett, all pro-naval kinds of guys; the administration is looking good on the Navy; Reagan certainly did, now we’ve got George H. W. Bush, who is a former Navy war hero. Navy is feeling great.

Then Desert Storm/Desert Shield came along and—holy cow—Goldwater-Nichols kicks in. “You know,” the Navy said, “we’re ready to sit down with you guys in the Air Force and talk about how we’re going to fight the war. We’ll take this part and you take this part. That’s what we did in Korea. That’s what we did in Vietnam. And that’s what we’ll do here. So we’ve got to figure out where to put the line.” Air Force says, “Navy, you haven’t been reading your joint doctrine. Joint doctrine says there will be one unified air combat commander”—I forget what the lingo was—“and you’re part of it and we’re part of it and Army aviation and Marine Corps aviation …”—“No way,” says Al Gray, and there was a big fight going on about Marine aviation. But, meanwhile the Navy is having its own problems and issues with the Air Force. And so both, they did what they normally do: The Navy went to the CINC and explained how it ought to be and the CINC went to the Chairman. So the CINC is [General H. Norman] Schwarzkopf, an Army officer and the
Chairman is Powell, and they say, “Joint doctrine rules. Joint doctrine wins. And you know what, Navy? If you can't play by joint rules which you have signed off on, but totally ignored”—this isn't a direct quote, this is me talking—“we'll do it without you.”

Whoa! So, the Navy got to be part of a doctrinal system it had not practiced for or thought about except to resist when it was busy being written, and had ignored after it was written, because the Navy didn't pay very much attention to doctrine, although the Army lives by doctrine. So, we're talking about two Army officers who are the joint commanders and an Air Force commander who is copacetic with them and they understand what he's trying to do, so the Navy limps along doing it, with people also grousing that the Navy commander was on board his flagship. “Why is he there? Why isn't he in headquarters with all the rest of us?” “Well, because he's running the fleet and the fleet is run out of a flagship.” “Well, okay, but the Navy isn't on the team.”

So, all the other guys are in Riyadh and the Navy guy is in Bahrain or wherever he was. It just went on and on like that. And then, the famous air tasking order fiasco where the joint air tasking order is developed by the joint command in Riyadh, staffed by Air Force officers and a few Navy, but the Navy hasn't scampered enough front runners out there in Riyadh and there's not enough of them and so on, and they don't know the doctrine anyway and then paper copies have to be flown out physically to the carriers (and, admittedly, to some USAF bases as well) because the Navy does not have the communications gear to be able to handle the electrons. So, all of that and there's a lot more going on too, I mean the Air Force was also ahead of the Navy in deployment of precision-guided munitions.

There's a lot of stuff like that. Navy comes out of Desert Storm saying, “What the hell happened? Train wreck!” This is the same Navy that went into Desert Storm that I just described, you know, at the absolute peak of its form: “Hey, this great, super-cool Maritime Strategy we got, the way we do things: What's the centerpiece of our operations? Carrier aviation. And, the way we run carrier aviation now has to be integrated, not subsumed or sub-tasked out or whatever, but integrated with the Air Force, usually under an Air Force commander?” So all of that is stirring.

Then there's doctrine: I've mentioned the word “doctrine” about five or six times. There was never a Navy conversation since John Paul Jones in which anybody ever mentioned doctrine five or six times, right? As Wayne Hughes said in all of his tactics books, the Navy is “wary of doctrine.” The Navy understands that when you're out there and you're all alone and you're out in the ocean and some situation is going to come up and it's going to be the commanding officer's judgement, not doctrine, and those situations are going to far outweigh anything that you need doctrine for. There's a whole literature on Navy aviation mishaps that says, “Yes, and that cost us pilots' lives because you need doctrine in order to safely be able to launch, recover, and fly the airplane, and if you're ignoring doctrine you're going to die and we had terrible accidents,” but that's another whole story. So, doctrine has now become important.
So, what does the Navy have for doctrine? Well, we've got a grab bag of Navy pubs and some are important and some aren't. Was the Maritime Strategy part of the doctrinal system? No. Why? Well, because it wasn't. Was there any doctrinal pub? Yeah, NWP-1 that had been put out by Admiral Holloway on strategy, Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy. Well, why didn't we just update that? Well, because we didn't, because that's how the Navy operated. And so, the Navy had to figure out what it thought about doctrine. Admiral Kelso invented a Naval Doctrine Command with the Marines and that was another whole set of issues. The old strategy was obviously inoperative.

Meanwhile, of course, the Soviet Union is imploding before our very eyes, so the fact that you could do raids on the Kola is not very useful (of course, today everything comes around, it's 2019), but in those days it looked like everything we looked to do didn't matter and it was going to be a new world. A world in which the only guy that had a fleet of submarines we had to worry about was the Soviets and they wererusting by the dozens. So, what did you need ASW for and why was the nation invested in it? And, we were hugely invested in ASW: P-3s, SSNs, the SOSUS net, and all the intel. I mean it was, “Whoa!”

It was the double whammy or triple whammy of Goldwater-Nichols, end of the Soviet Union, and the experience of Desert Storm, which were all interrelated, and, yes, had a strong effect on Navy strategy and policy. So, the Navy scampered and they came out with a document called The Way Ahead, which I was always a big fan of. It was signed by the Secretary, Larry Garrett, the CNO, Admiral Kelso, and the Commandant, General Gray, and nobody ever read it except me and about five or six other people. It didn't go anywhere or do anything. It was signed by the Navy command structure, but the war was on and nobody noticed. And so, they started again and tried to come up with what eventually became . . . From the Sea, and there's a whole literature written, some of which I've contributed to, about how that got done, and what . . . From the Sea said and didn't say and all of that.

Meanwhile, Admiral Kelso had come out with Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare and he was also pushing something called Total Quality Leadership (TQL), which was a spinoff of Total Quality Management (TQM) that American management guru W. Edwards Deming had—I don't know if “invented” is the right word, but had consolidated—which was his view of the way the Japanese economy ran and so on, and Kelso was an apostle of that and tried to put that in the Navy. TQM said that what you needed for that was overarching policy, so he wrote and published a Navy Policy Book. So, the Navy's got a policy book signed by the CNO and a doctrinal pub signed by the CNO and I forget what they called it—they didn't call it a strategy because he didn't want a strategy because the strategy was that bad old thing that Peter and those other guys had worked on that didn't do us much good any more—whatever the hell they called it—a “white paper,” I think, and a “combined vision.” It was . . . From the Sea and it was the most famous of all of that, and then there still was The Way Ahead, which was never rescinded. So that's four capstone documents in four years. One CNO. Quite a change from the 1980s, when we had one—periodically updated—Maritime Strategy for almost a decade, with three successive CNOs.
Oh, and then troubles all over the Navy: Tailhook. Chaining the midshipman to the urinal at the Naval Academy. Lehman's right arm, Paisley, turns out to be a crook and goes to jail, in Operation Ill Wind. Lehman isn't touched by that, but this is his Assistant Secretary for RE&S [Research, Engineering and Systems]. And what's the main event for the Navy always? Carrier strike. What's our airplane? The obsolescent A-6. What are we going to have to replace it? The A-12. A-12 turns out to be the worst-managed program in the history of the Pentagon and is cancelled by SECDEF Cheney. So, the main thing that the Navy does, which is deliver bombs on target from carriers at sea, it doesn't have an airplane to do that for the future. It has the F/A-18, but it's got short legs. It's not the right airplane. It would have to be redesigned, which it was eventually, and we got the F/A-18 E/F, but … All of this is going on at the same time and I've forgotten something—oh: the Iowa [BB-61] explosion! Boom! So we're going to recommission the battleships. We do and one of the turrets blows up and the Navy Investigative Service decides that it was because of a disgruntled homosexual sailor and his family goes crazy and says that's baloney, that isn't the case, and so on.

So everything's a problem and everything's a scandal. The '90s are not good. Oh, and the Marine Corps wants a divorce, right? They want their own coequal service components and they get them. So, now the Navy guy—instead of going back to his office, the Navy admiral, and calling a subordinate colonel in—now when he was sitting at the components' meeting, a Marine general was sitting right next to him as a coequal. So all of that is going on at the same time. It was hard. Oh, and all your best guys are down on the Joint Staff. They're not in OPNAV. You got a good programmer? You think he's going to be an admiral? You send him to the J8. You never would have done that before. You would have groomed him up on the Navy staff, in repeat tours. You got a guy that you think is going to be the next strategy guru? He's in the J5 or maybe he's in the J8, like Commander Joe Sestak. He's not in OP-60. Later, maybe he'll come, but he probably won't get a repeat tour in OP-60. So all of that's going on at the same time.

PEEKS: You mentioned . . . From the Sea and those sort of documents that came out right after Desert Shield/Desert Storm. . . . From the Sea is the one that seems to have had the biggest, longest-lasting impact on the Navy and, I guess, well, two-part question: One, I guess, do you agree with that assessment of … From the Sea, and two, if so, what made it more enduring than The Way Ahead and documents of that nature?

SWARTZ: On one level, you're right, and I think that's because of "document fatigue." I think that most analysts that got into it—and you're talking to the main analyst who got into it—we're appalled at the fact that when you wound up adding it all up, you discovered that the Navy had come up with 35 separate capstone documents since 1970. Only the Maritime Strategy era—which was about eight years or so, let's say from say '81 through '89—that was pretty consistent. They called it the same thing and it had the same outline and it had the same underpinnings, conceptual underpinnings, but all these other things were all different. Nobody could keep track of them. If you had been in the Pentagon in the 80s and you then went to sea and
came back, it was the same old Maritime Strategy you remembered from your earlier tour except now it had been updated. But, if you had been in the Pentagon in the 90s and you went to sea after . . . From the Sea came out, then when you came back you discovered that . . . From the Sea was defunct and now it was supposed to be Forward . . . From the Sea. But meanwhile, it was a new CNO because Boorda had gone and so therefore the new CNO—there was a new article out signed by him called “Anytime, Anywhere.” Is that replacing Forward . . . From the Sea? I think . . . From the Sea stayed on the books because nobody—having done it, being the guy who finally did it [in the CNA Capstone Strategy Series]—nobody had the stamina or the time or the funding to slice through all that stuff and figure out what was what.

So, in retrospect looking back, there was the Maritime Strategy era and then the . . . From the Sea era, so that’s at the 10,000-foot level. But, when you came back you had a new CNO and you had a new Secretary and you really had to slave everything to that new document, and so there was a constant scampering to change around everything you were doing to be justified by the new document that had just come out. And so, people were busy and trying seriously to use each document as they came along. They answered the mail for the day. I mean a new guy comes in and says, “I don't want to do what the old guy did, I want to do what I want to do,” everybody saluted and said, “Yes sir.” Many people saluted, it's not just the Marine Corps, many people saluted and said “yes sir” and we'll work on that and here you go.

And, these people were smart and they worked hard. I mean, think about it: Phil Cullom, Joe Bouchard, Sam Tangredi, Joe Sestak, Frank Pandolfe, Craig Faller, Navy strategists of the ’90s. I’m leaving some people out and I shouldn't, but that’s who comes to mind quickly. These are very gifted guys, certainly as gifted as those of us that played in the ’80s, and the flags used them to write these documents, and so on. Kurt Tidd. Jim Stavridis. I don't know who else I’m slighting in that era. But, the Navy is going through all those hard times that I just talked about. You’ve got new CNOs coming and going, some not under great circumstances (like [Admiral Jeremy M.] Boorda taking his own life and [Admiral Jay L.] Johnson comes in, fleets up from being the VCNO) and nobody is happy with the previous guy's stuff.

And the world keeps changing, you know: Saddam Hussein, in or out. The Kim family: one guy dies and another guy takes over. Gaddafi’s mercurial ups and downs. And so on. Also, watching China: So the Navy’s watching China and there’s always guys in the Navy during the ’90s watching China. The Naval War College set up a center to watch China. CNA set up a center to watch China. And, the Navy itself is watching China. But, nobody else is watching China. Bill Clinton isn't watching China the same way the Navy is, right? Nor is George W. Bush.

Folks are in disarray and they’re struggling to put stuff on paper. They’re painting this moving train and coming up with document after document after document and so, if you read John Hattendorf’s edited volume U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s, first of all it’s thick: Half of it is one of Rear Admiral Joe Sestak's documents, in which he's trying to get his arms around the whole Navy. His action officer for that is a
commander named Craig Faller, now Admiral Faller, four stars, runs SOUTHCOM. And, the Navy is downsizing. We're throwing out perfectly good destroyers, P-3s, all kinds of stuff, submarines.

Another dynamic that's going on, of course, while all this is going on is: Back in the ’80s when we were doing the Maritime Strategy and I’d go down and brief it to the Joint Staff, Joint Staff colonels (I wasn’t paying attention to the Navy guys there) would be sitting there like this looking at me, like, “Son, you have no business writing the strategy. That’s the job of us, like any other joint strategic document.” And I would say, “Yes, but your joint strategic documents are either pablum or log rolling. This is different. And, what we ought to do is just sit down and have an interservice—let’s not call it joint—strategy based on the Maritime Strategy. You can easily add the Army and the Air Force in to it—they’re already there—and have a global multi-service approach.” They’d say, “We don’t do multiservice. We do joint and it’s got to go through the joint system and Goldwater-Nichols just gave us a shot in the arm.” And I’d answer, “We’re not going to do that. I didn’t come down here to give you either the pablum or log rolling. That’s not what we’re doing.” So, that was going on in the ’80s.

What was going on in the ’90s? Same briefing. Navy would go down to give the briefing. Joint Staff guys, which now include front–running Navy guys sitting there, going, “That’s baloney, you have no business doing that, that’s not yours, you can’t call it strategy and I’m going to have the Chairman write a letter to the CNO saying that you can’t call it strategy.” So, the climate is very different, the word “strategy” disappears. Kelso said so in his testimony when he became CNO, “I don’t need a strategy, I need a policy. We’ve got a strategy. It’s up on the shelf. If we ever need it again we can take it down.”

Incidentally, I once got a call a couple of years ago from a retired captain, old friend of mine, now senior Navy civilian, Chris Melhuish—head strategy guy at Fleet Forces Command—and he asked me if I had copies of the old Maritime Strategy and NATO CONMAROPS, and if I could send them to him (which I did). And, that’s my date. I have it written down, the date at home (it’s 9 March 2017). I said that’s the date that he took it down off the shelf. It was that phone call—the date the Maritime Strategy came back down off the shelf again.

So, writing this stuff in that climate was hard and these smart guys were doing it and, of course, by then, I’m out and I’m at CNA and some of these guys want my help or the help of my colleagues and some don’t. And that is what it was like.

PEEKS: So in this whole process, did Kelso’s changes to OPNAV organization have an effect or was that just sort of shuffling the deck chairs?

SWARTZ: Well, yes. The Kelso reorganization was part of all of this and it’s interesting. Kelso, of course, had been an articulator of and proponent of the Maritime Strategy in the ’80’s. And, certainly then-Commander Bill Owens, on SSG 1 in Newport from 1981 to 1982, considered that his effort up there was the Maritime Strategy, that he and Art Cebrowski, and Bob Murray the director of the SSG, and Ken McGruther, my
colleague strategist, and John Hanley, who then was a contractor, that—yes—they at the SSG were the Maritime Strategy and the concepts they came up with for the Battle of the Atlantic, in the North Atlantic, Northeast Atlantic, were the heart of the entire Maritime Strategy (so much so that there was a sense of rivalry between the SSG and OP-603 as to who did what to whom and I still bear some of the minor scars from that era).

Okay, why is this important? Because in 1990 whatever it was, [1991] or [1992], while … From the Sea was being drafted—and I don't recall Bill Owens played a major role in that, but he says he did, and maybe it's true—Kelso decided to change the whole Navy staff and to change the whole Navy programming system from a competitive to a consensual system. Now remember, the way the Navy programmed was set up on a competitive basis. There were warfare community barons. The barons institutionally weren't supposed to like each other and they were engaged in a zero-sum game in which, if one guy got money, the other guy lost money. And, that competition was refined by Zumwalt into three mega-barons—surface, air, and submarine—and that was continued through Zumwalt's successors and all during the Maritime Strategy era, and CNOs struggled with bridging over these barons. Zumwalt did it through his Project SIXTY and the institution of a powerful “honest broker,” OP-090, primus inter pares, a three-star. Holloway did it with NWP-1 and his own tweaking of the system. Hayward came in and created another overarching, cross-cutting directorate headed up by a three-star who was the director of Naval Warfare, OP-095. Who's after that? Watkins kept that, didn't change it very much.

Trost kept it, too. Didn't change it very much. He had been OP-090 and thought the system worked fine and it was highly competitive. As a matter of fact, CNA has interviews that Tom Hone did with Kelso and with Trost, in which you can hear them both (he didn't do it together), but when you read them both they're very instructive, because Trost was saying, “That's how we do it in the Navy and it's fine, it works, it's a competitive system, I was an honest broker, I acted as an honest broker, but meanwhile the competition went on and the CNO made the decision and that's how we do it.” It's a highly competitive system, it's very American, it's competitive, it's republican, it's the way things ought to be and it nested certainly with the views of John Lehman, who was big on competition.

Kelso was a different guy (and interestingly, Lehman's guy). Kelso said, “That's crazy. The Air Force doesn't do it that way. The Army doesn't do it that way. Nobody does it that way except us. We've got to build consensus and our institutions are designed for a competitive structure—for a competitive environment and they reinforce all the bad things about competition, and we need a consensual approach.” And so, Kelso had his agent, by now a three-star, brilliant submarine officer, Bill Owens, and he said, “Bill, you're going to do this for me, oh, and we've got to cut a whole lot of admirals because we're downsizing in the '90s and so, having all these barons hanging around the Pentagon, we got to get rid of some of them, either that or we cut admirals in the fleet.” “No, no, let's cut the Pentagon.”
Okay, so they abolished the directorate of Naval Warfare completely. They consolidated all of the barons under N8. They downgraded them to two-stars instead of three-stars. And, they said “We’ve got to have a ‘Super 8.’ The N8 is going to be in charge of everything. No more barons. The barons are going to operate under him, but his approach is going to be consensual, not competitive.” This, in practice, meant interminable Saturday and Sunday meetings by the two-stars and one-stars with Owens ramming everything through them. So, it depends on whom you talk to. Some people said it wasn’t consensual. It was just everybody doing what Bill Owens wanted, right? And other people said, “No, no, it was really consensual.” So, there’s literature on that as well.

But, in doing so and making all the barons under N8, it made N8 easily the most powerful three-star on the staff.

So what about OP-06? Well first of all, we’ve got to change all the nomenclature and make them N3/N5 cause we’re “joint-izing” everything and, second of all, we don’t really need an N5 because we’re getting all this pushback from everybody saying that N5 is strategy and planning, but that’s all done jointly now. What we need is an N3, so we should all have strong operators, not necessarily strong planners, in those jobs, in N3/N5. And so, you can see where this is headed: N3/N5 is being downgraded by a number of pressures. The people that are supposed to be in N3/N5, they’re now down on the Joint Staff, so it’s a weaker staff. It’s designed that way by the guys who created Goldwater-Nichols. Meanwhile, Bill Owens has got all the marbles and he’s obviously got the ear of the CNO. Now, the N3/N5 was [Leighton] “Snuffy” Smith. No slouch, alright? People didn't go down fighting. It’s not some turkey that’s in there. The N3/N5 had real jobs, and real things, and there were really important people who worked there during that time, as I mentioned some of them, Joe Bouchard, Sam Tangredi, smart guys, but they were up against an N8 juggernaut that was deliberately created.

The POM build began with Bill Owens and one of the things Bill Owens did, was revive systems analysis in the Navy. So did Kelso. Systems and campaign analysis had been under a cloud because Lehman was unhappy and Watkins was unhappy and Small was unhappy, and systems analysis was downgraded. That all changed. Owens said, “I want N81 to run the show at the beginning of the POM build.” Well, for the previous eight years, it had been a Maritime Strategy presentation that opened the POM build because everything was supposed to be strategy-based allegedly and that was Lehman’s mantra, and, for that matter, that was shared by Hayward and Small and Trost. But it wasn’t shared by Owens and Kelso. So, what happened to starting off the POM with an OP-06 presentation, N3/N5? It went away. “We got . . . From the Sea. Are you going to use that?” “Yeah, that's . . . From the Sea. That does what it does, whatever it does. Meanwhile we got a POM to build, with lots of campaign analysis, so there's no time in the schedule for a . . . From the Sea briefing, let alone for a flag officer discussion of what it means for the POM and budget. And besides, . . . From the Sea is unclass, so not to be taken too seriously.” So, that was going on also.
Looking back at it, the late ‘70s and the ‘80s [were] sort of the high point of OP-06, a high point of OP-06 influence on the Navy staff, and that declined during the ‘90s. And, the irony of course is that it’s declined in part because of the vast power accruing to a guy, Bill Owens, who had wrapped himself in the flag of the Maritime Strategy back in 1981–82, before the first draft of a Maritime Strategy brief to kick off the fall 1982 POM build had even been written in OP-06.

PEEKS: This is going to sound—I’m not quite sure how to formulate this—but you’ve just talked about how the rise of the programmers and the downgrading of N3/N5 changes the process of developing Navy strategy. Did it have an impact on the substance of Navy strategy and policy?

SWARTZ: In general, broad-brush terms, very general broad-brush, I would maintain the answer is “no.” Specifics, “yes.” Specific threats were different. Specific weapon systems were more salient in one era than another. But, in general, the U.S. Navy was still the U.S. Navy. Global. Joint (the way the Navy likes to be joint, which is coordinated, not integrated. But, we became a lot more integrated just because it was the law of the land). Forward.

Combat-credible forward presence replaced the Maritime Strategy as the underpinning for the Navy. It always had been part of the Maritime Strategy too, but now it consumed the Maritime Strategy: You keep as much stuff as you could possibly get away with, ready, as far forward as you can, near the world’s trouble spots, and sure enough they’ll find things to do, which, of course, they did. We’ll keep a full-up fleet in the Middle East and a full-up fleet in WESTPAC. We haven’t got enough ships any more to keep one in the Med, but during the ’90s, when the Yugoslav mess went, we had to take stuff away from the Pacific and Middle East in order to feed the Med. But, once the various Yugoslav problems resolved themselves, the carrier strike group and the amphibs were yanked out of the Med to go elsewhere because we had a much smaller fleet. That was a constant and, when I did my study on Navy strategy from 1970 through 2010 [CNA Capstone Strategy Series], I have a section in there where I talked about constants. Some things changed and some things didn’t. I don’t have it in front of me, but there is a place to go to see them—remember, the way I did the study was the same way I did the Maritime Strategy: It was murder-boarded to death by lots of people, so it had lots of input—not just me—by design, so I think it’s probably pretty correct.

Combat-credible forward presence in two hubs, as much as you can get out there, was the strategy, and of course what the Navy did was it wound up breaking the force, but it didn’t know that at the time. This was the thing it was delivering to the country, and “Please don’t cut us anymore because we’re delivering something to you, look, we’re really straining, we got ships out there now, we got rid of all the old rules and they’re out there for nine months at a time and we’re really stroking, because we need to be there.” That was central to all of these documents—offensive, aggressive. “Why are they out there?” “Well, because they can smack somebody right away.” To me, that runs in our U.S. Navy blood—I mean, that’s John Paul Jones. Where does he fight? He fights off Yorkshire. He doesn’t fight off Montauk or the VACAPES [Virginia
Capes]. You've heard me say this. But, why is he so iconic? In part because of that. He was forward. He took the battle right away to the Brits' coast. “What the hell is he doing fighting the Brits off their own coast?” “They’re the number-one sea power.” “And he invaded Britain?” “Yes.” So, that's us and I think that continues through all of this, so there's some continuity there. Anything else on that?

PEEKS: I don't think so, no. So temporally we've gotten to the end of your career in the Navy, so could you—and we've got lots of questions about this—could you briefly describe your post-retirement career?

SWARTZ: You already know that I can't briefly do anything [laughter].

BLANTON: We have time.

SWARTZ: So, I'm working for General Powell and it's a great job and I'm working for a great guy and I still have some links in the Navy, but they're very senior links, they're not so much with the troops anymore because these guys grew up with me, so I'm dealing with Secretary Garrett and also I'm working for Powell and that opens a lot of doors. I'm working with Secretary Garrett and Admiral Kelso, as opposed to the action officers. So, it's all terrific. And now, it's time for me to get looked at for promotion to flag rank. But, that wasn't going to happen. I told you that story.

PEEKS: I don't know if you did it on record.

SWARTZ: Well, here it is again: So, I go in to see General Powell and tell him, “Hey, I’m up for flag this year.” He thanks me. He calls me in a couple of weeks later, sits me down, and says, “Peter, it’s not going to happen. I was just up talking to Frank about you and we’ve agreed that there’s no space, no room, Navy is being forced to lose so many numbers this year. We’re downsizing rapidly, there’s only a tiny number of people that are going to get promoted and it’s not your time, so that’s how it is.” So, I come home and I tell Thuý. Thuý is furious, of course, being a good Navy wife, and she cites all of the admirals she knows who she thinks are idiots, most of whom she's correct on, and says, “Well, how could this have happened?” and so on, and, “You’re so smart, you worked so hard!” But, my attitude was different. My attitude was: “Just think about what just happened. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and not just any Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—has just had a conversation about me with the Chief of Naval Operations. You know, if anybody had ever told me 10 years prior to that that such an event could possibly have taken place, I would have told them they were out of their mind.” I said, “I did okay.”

So, I'm not going to be an admiral, I'm going to be a captain. Well, where are we going to go, what are we going to do? A guy who didn't like me was up on the Navy staff as a flag officer. I'm not going back to the Navy staff. A guy who doesn't like me is in a position to make that not happen. So, okay, stay on the Joint Staff, keep working for Powell? I said, “Well, it’s the same old same old, I mean it's terrific same old same old, but it is the same.” Professor of naval science somewhere? Thuý says, “We lived on a campus for two years at Columbia, I lived on a campus. That was enough.” I said, “Fine, we're not going to do that again.” I said,
“Okay, naval attaché somewhere? I could probably get almost any place.” Thuý said, “We just got back from Brussels for three years. The kids are in an American high school, junior high, whatever. We're not going to yank them out of school again and send them overseas and have their education all screwed up.”

I said, “You know, I guess it’s about time for me to get out. Huh—I hadn't thought about it before.”

So, I went in and saw General Powell again. Went in and saw the boss. The boss said, “I think it’s about time for you to get out.” I said, “Now, wait a minute, you're not mad at me or anything?” He said, “No, I think you’ve done it right and I share that with you. No, you’re fine. You're okay. Look at your fitness reports. They’re glowing, signed by Colin Powell. But, it makes sense to me.” “I said, “I don't know what I’m going to do.” He said, “Well, of course you don’t. I’m going to find some place on the staff for you to hide while you can decompress a bit.” “General, there are no places on your staff where anybody can “hide and decompress.” Do you have any idea how hard everybody works?” He was going to send me to the J5. I said, “Why don't you send me to the J3?” I said, “You have no idea how hard everybody works down there. That's a terrible thing to say, that I should go down there to decompress. My current job working for you is easier than what my colleagues do in in the J5.” He said, “Alright, well, go find yourself a job…. but I’ll tell you, if you just keep working for me like you’re working right now, and then you just fall off a cliff at the end … that's a bad way to start your next career.” He said. “You need to decompress somewhere and I’m giving you the opportunity.”

Okay. So I went up and saw Secretary Garrett’s EA, Norm Ray (a good friend and a future vice admiral). He used to be a big ASW guy in the Maritime Strategy era. Anyway, he said, “Why don't you go over to CNA for a few months?” I’d been at CNA a long time ago and I'd used CNA when I was developing the Maritime Strategy. I was familiar with it, and I said, “Okay.” So, I went over to CNA and talked to the—remember, I’m in uniform—so I’m talking to the head Navy guy (there used to be 12 Navy guys over at CNA) and it wasn't going to cost anybody anything, billets or whatever, because “the Secretary of the Navy said,” and so he said, “Yeah, I’ll take you on.”

And so, I left Powell’s employ three months before I retired, or two months or something like that, and went over to CNA for two or three months. I remember I was standing there at the Xerox machine copying my medical records, saying Powell was a smart man and geez, who knew that I had to spend a day copying my medical records? He did. When was I going to get to do that on the Joint Staff? Anyway, I went to CNA … and started talking to people. It seemed congenial and I got involved in some projects while continuing to liaise with folks in the Pentagon.

Oh, and then I retired and went back to the Pentagon and we had a big ceremony. General Powell officiated. I was under no illusion as to why all the heavies came: They came to see Powell, not to see me. But, that was okay. And, we had a great ceremony in the Pentagon in February, I remember. And then, we had a party at home—Thuý threw a hell of a party for everybody. I picked up a couple of contracts at CNA and a couple of
contracts on the outside and was doing stuff, and decided to apply full-time at CNA. I went through their normal battery of hiring procedures, nothing special. Nobody at CNA thought I was any good because what I’ve just described, in their eyes, was “chief Navy propagandist, which is not what we do. We tell truth to power. You used to be power. You used to throw us out because you didn’t like our truth. Now the shoe’s on the other foot.”

So, I was hired on probation at CNA and I said, “Try me—you’ll see,” and I wound up staying there over 25 years, had the president of the company preside over my retirement there. I did a lot of work supporting N3/N5 and their various perambulations. I supported conceptualizing and crafting many, but not all, of the Navy documents that came out during this period. I had conversations, like I’m having with you, with many of them that talk about how things were, how things should be, how they could use the past and help the future. I did the big study on Navy deployment policy. I came up with my idea that the Navy’s intense “operational-ness” was the essence of the Navy, not “tradition,” and therefore I was at war with the shade of Carl Builder and his wrongheaded Masks of War ever since. I did the big strategy study analyzing every single one of these documents from 1970 to 2010 [CNA Capstone Strategy Series] and then another one for the 2015 document [The Origins and development of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2015)] in 2017. I helped revive riverine warfare in the Navy. That was the most fun, cool thing that I did when I was at CNA [Renewal of Navy’s Riverine Capability: A Preliminary Examination of Past, Current and Future Capabilities]. My old Vietnamese navy commander, Captain Do Kiem, came up from New Orleans to help. He was a refugee. He was the quintessential refugee. Big success in his new life in the U.S. Wrote a book about it. He was the guy who had brought the Vietnamese navy out of Saigon, out of Vietnam to the Philippines, in 1975. He came up to lecture all these wide-eyed U.S. Navy officers about riverine warfare at a big conference in Annapolis that I helped put on.

So, I had a wonderful career in the Navy and a wonderful career at CNA. I even survived both of my joint tours, which were both ringers. I mean, if you’re going to have a joint tour, having one of them in Brussels on a NATO staff while the Soviet Union is imploding and having another working for General Colin Powell, United States Army, that’s a wonderful way to be joint. And, I had a great time at CNA, stayed close to the Navy, but wasn’t in the Navy. That turned out to be exactly the niche that I liked. I agreed with CNA that we’re supposed to do objective analysis, not propaganda, and turned down studies for the Navy when I thought they already knew the answer and just wanted either my personal or CNA’s company imprimatur on them. It was good. And, now I’m in my dotage doing an oral history with the NHHC, one of the primary resources and supporting agencies that made me what I became.

**PEEKS:** So, just because we don’t know who’s going to be listening to these recordings in the future, could you just, for the record, tell us what CNA does as an organization?

**SWARTZ:** Oh okay, sure. So, there is a species of organization that’s called an FFRDC, Federally Funded Research and Development Center, the first of which was CNA itself, except it had a different name back in
World War II. The idea in World War II was that the Germans were busy sinking merchant ships and the U.S. Navy was hunting German submarines all over the Atlantic to try to kill them, so they weren't sinking merchant ships, and they weren't doing very well, and part of the reason they weren't doing very well was they didn't understand the physics and the analysis that needed to go into finding and killing a German submarine. But, scientists knew this stuff and mathematicians knew this stuff and statisticians knew this stuff, and so the Navy mobilized a group of scientists and said, “[We] want you to apply the scientific method to the problem of killing submarines.” They did this very well and the Navy kept the organization on and eventually it, along with some sister organizations like the RAND Corporation and IDA, Institute for Defense Analysis, became what are now called Federally Funded Research and Development Centers.

There are three studies-and-analysis FFRDCs. One is the FFRDC for the Navy Department, Navy and Marine Corps. That's CNA. One is the FFRDC for the Air Force, the Army, and OSD (actually it's three separate organizations under an umbrella) and that's RAND. One is the FFRDC for the military intelligence community, the COCOMs, the combatant commanders and the Joint Staff, and that's IDA, the Institute for Defense Analysis. How that works is that every year the Congress, as part of the defense budget, authorizes and appropriates an amount of money to fund the FFRDCs and gives it to the Pentagon. An office in OSD adjudicates who gets what and passes it out and makes the rules as to how FFRDCs should operate and then gives it to the recipient services, the Army, OSD, whatever, and tells them, “Go ye forth and find an FFRDC and use this money to use them.” Well, they usually go forward and find the same guys they’ve been using, but the contracts are renewed and changed every five years, so it's not stale. I think there's a contract renewal coming up next year at CNA with the Department of the Navy.

And, the idea is that you’re so close to the Navy that you're allowed to sit in on meetings with admirals and generals. You're sort of part of the staff, but they don't sign your fitness reports, they don't control your promotions. If they don't like a study, they don't like a study, and they don't use it, but they can't come back at you. And, the idea is to have an organization that does that—and a not-for-profit organization, so we're not SAIC or SPA or the other for-profit organizations—but we have a regularized relationship with the service, unlike CSBA, for example, or CSIS, which are nonprofit think tanks, but work on a piecemeal basis constantly. They don't have this continuous contract.

What this does in my world is it means that the N3/N5s of the world in Europe and in the Pentagon and at PACFLT and at NAVSOUTH and at NAVCENT and so on, who don't have much budget money, they're able to tap into this pot of money through a system that the Navy sets up every year on how many studies CNA will do and which ones. An OPNAV office solicits bids from all over the Navy. Of course, there're many more that come in than there're resources for, and so there has to be an adjudication process in the Pentagon and OPNAV (which there is), and then that determines what our study plan is for the coming year. So we're not-for-profit, focused on the Navy and Marine Corps, funded by the Congress and the Pentagon, and designed to be objective in a way that analysts in the Pentagon wearing a uniform are considered maybe
not able to be as much. That’s who we are and what we do. I think it’s about 600 people, half of whom are full-time analysts and the other half are all the support staff that we need and part-time guys, like me now.

And, we are sometimes come to by other people. A good example is when the Congress was pushing a Department of Space, not a Space Command or Service, but a Department of Space, and got a lot of pushback from the Pentagon, a lot of pushback from the Air Force. Congress said, “I'll tell you what, we're not getting anywhere with you guys, so as part of the defense authorization or appropriation bill of whenever … the Pentagon should take a FFRDC, not Air Force-affiliated”—so that meant not RAND—“and have them do a study of what a Department would be like. We recognize the fact that nobody at the Pentagon wants this, but we want an objective analysis by somebody who doesn't have a dog in the fight.” And so, CNA got that assignment, so we were doing a study that was essentially about Air Force equities. Likewise, when the Navy wants a carrier-justification study, they sometimes go to RAND, just so that they can say, “Here's the Air Force's FFRDC and they said this.” So, we're not exclusively working with the Navy and Marine Corps and we go out and we bring in studies from all over the place, but our core focus is on naval studies and our core expertise is Navy. For example, our China shop has a couple of guys who really know a lot about the PLAN, but there's more people over there that—they all read Chinese, they understand the PLA, they understand the PRC—hey understand big China stuff beyond just the PLAN. Our Russia guys are the same way.

So, that’s who FFRDCs are. CNA is an FFRDC. It’s in the Navy firmament. We’re a unique organization. We're not a contractor and we're not like the War College or Postgraduate School, although those are our close colleagues. We deal with them all the time. The SDG [Strategy Discussion Group] is a network of all of us that CNA helped invent (I was the CNA guy who helped invent it) to rope in the for-profit, the not-for-profit, the inside-the-building, and the outside-the-building people who are interested in Navy strategy and policy.

PEEKS: So, you just mentioned the SDG, could you elaborate on that, expand that a bit?

SWARTZ: So, it ties into the strategy aspect of this. So, in 2005, after Admiral Vern Clark was the CNO, Admiral Mike Mullen was chosen to be his successor. Mike Mullen was a former N8, Mike Mullen was a programmer, I think his academic stuff was all science and technology of some type, and he became the CNO and he said, “I think we need a strategy.” Everybody was like, “Oh, we don't do strategy anymore.” But he said, “I do strategy. In my last job I was over in Naples and I had to be the guy who worried about Yugoslavia in my NATO hat and I had to worry about Europe, and I needed strategy and my staff wasn't equipped as well as I hoped it would be. I brought one member of my staff back with me, Commander Wayne Porter, my strategist, and I want a strategy. You, N3/N5, John Morgan, write me a strategy.” Morgan said, “Got it. We're going to have a strategy.”
And Morgan said, “The way you do it is you cast a wide net. You create a whole lot of buzz about strategy.” So, he cast a wide net and created a whole lot of buzz about strategy. He went to NHHC and said, “Write me, whatever.” He came to CNA and said, “Run me a conference.” He came to Lockheed Martin and said, “Run me a workshop.” He went to Johns Hopkins’s APL [Applied Physics Laboratory] and said, “Do me war games.” He went to the Naval War College. Et cetera, et cetera. So, there was all of this activity and there was money. We all got money and we all did stuff. We did war games and we wrote think pieces and organized debates. We had conferences and meetings and seminars and then . . . the strategy finally came out, and all that activity stopped. Bryan McGrath and John Morgan’s CS21: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power came out. In 2007. It said that the job of the Navy was to support globalization and to facilitate the fantastic global world economy, especially the enormous amount of trade that was increasing exponentially, and which benefited the U.S. and U.S. national security greatly.

The following month, the economy collapsed, and trade shriveled. It was bad luck, and bad timing. Moreover, all the Navy money went away for all of these workshops and war games and everything else. And so, the multi-organizational naval network that had helped create the strategy unraveled.

So, one day, retired Captain Robby Harris from Lockheed Martin, retired Captain Dick Diamond from Raytheon, and retired Captain Peter Swartz from CNA were having lunch together, as was their wont periodically. And, we said, “This is lousy. We don’t get to see each other anymore professionally except over lunch in some terrible restaurant in Rosslyn,” but it was all good. We decided then and there to rekindle and reestablish that sense of community among Navy strategy and policy guys. It didn’t matter what office they were in or even if they were working for a for-profit contractor. We had all that and now we’ve lost it again. And, I know I was the guy who said, “You know, we’re in the Navy. We’re not in the Army. We don’t have to wait for somebody to write the doctrine. The way Navy guys do stuff is, they just do it. So let’s do it. Do we need money?” Robby said, “No, I can get a room. What else do we need? ”Well, get a room and we’ll invite the guys we know.” “And what are we going to talk about?” “Well, retired Captain [Robert] ‘Barney’ Rubel, a dean up at Newport, just got this new paper up. We’re going to talk about Barney Rubel’s paper and we’ll invite whoever.” So, we had 20 guys we invited, had 20 guys there, only one guy in uniform, Rear Admiral Bill Burke. The rest of us were all either retired or civilian outsiders of various types, and we talked strategy and policy. Bob Work was there. And, a couple of guys went out and bought some pizza out of their own pockets for the rest of us.

So break, break, from that first meeting in 2008 until today there are now more than 1,000 people on the list, not 20, and we get about somewhere between 50 and 100 attendees at any one session (more than that if the meeting is virtual). Now, 50 or 100 out of 1,000 is a very small number, but 50 to 100 to talk about Navy strategy and policy twice a month by folks that do that all day for a living, and then come in and do it at night again and leave their spouses and leave their children and all and soccer games and all of that. Not too shabby. We obviously scratched an itch. People call all the time, “Hey, I’d like to join,” and we do what I
just did with you. We say, “Hey, you’re the kind of guy we want, we think maybe you could really contribute, which we do, and we think also you might gain from it, because we're trying to keep this thing going.” And, you have been there, so you know it works and we've even attracted arguably the two top Congressional Navy analysts in town and maybe in the world, Ronald O'Rourke from CRS and Eric Labs from CBO [Congressional Budget Office].

And so, Eric Labs and Ronald O'Rourke are always there. Eric's got smaller children, I guess, so he used to not make as many meetings as Ron, but they're growing, so he comes more now and this is terrific, because these are the guys that do the analysis for the Hill and they get to share with us, and we get to share with them. You can hear a pin drop every time Ronald O'Rourke stands up to speak and everybody is straining to hear because he's so good and he's been in this business for so long and he really is objective, but he's sympathetic to the Navy. So, for that alone it's worth coming. And, we also get Trip Barber who used to run Navy program analysis for 10 years in the Pentagon and has been in the analysis business for, I don't know, 30 years. We're going to get the Commandant [of the Marine Corps]. We sometimes get the CNO. We got the First Sea Lord once. So, the word gets around. That's what the SDG is, unclass, no press, totally off the record.

And, we still eat pizza bought for us by a few of the members out of their own pockets every time we meet.

PEEKS: I think this might be a good place to pause for lunch, if that's alright with everyone?

SWARTZ: Sure.
Part IV
Post-Retirement: A View from Outside

PEEKS: Alright, it is about 12:05 on 21 August 2019, I’m Ryan Peeks.

BLANTON: Justin Blanton.

PEEKS: And, we're doing the fourth of four interview sessions with Peter Swartz. Peter, picking up from where we left off before lunch, you talked a bit about shifting over to CNA and the role of CNA. Turning more to your role—you stayed in the world of Navy strategy after you left the Navy—how did you conceive of your role at CNA and how was that different from your role when you were still in the service?

SWARTZ: So, I got to help, I wasn't central to anything, I wasn't the Navy's Maritime Strategy anything anymore and that was okay. I got to support other people, generally younger, some of my age, by now those guys were flag officers and I did it within the framework of how CNA supports the Navy, and I did some extra things as well, obviously, because the SDG was extra. So, in terms of how CNA helps the Navy, I did two of the things that CNA does. Number one, I participated in formal studies. So, that means that I tried to interest people in the Navy into having me do a study. I tried to shape it so that it would get through the bureaucracy in OPNAV above and beyond the people I was dealing with [to] who really wanted it and then, if I were lucky, it was approved and then I got to do the study. So, if everything worked out, that's how that would work and I did a few things that were like that, or I participated and supported some other study director on a piece of it. So, for example, my work on riverine [warfare], which had to do with the history of the U.S. Navy and riverine operations, was folded into a larger CNA study supporting the revival of riverine warfare [Renewal of Navy's Riverine Capability: A Preliminary Examination of Past, Current and Future Capabilities]. I was doing that working for retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel Bob Benbow, a fellow CNA analyst.

On the other hand, the study I did on tracing the deployment history of the Navy [Sea Changes: Transforming the U.S. Navy Deployment Strategy, 1775–2002] and the study I did on Navy strategy from 1970 to 2010 [CNA Capstone Strategy Series], those were things that I went out and convinced somebody that they ought to want and they said okay, I want this, and get them to put money against it or get them to have the Navy in its normal system put money against it, and then I did those studies. And, maybe I had an assistant or two, or maybe I did it myself. So, that's one thing I did, studies, right? If there were enough of those around that dealt with strategy, I did them. But, if nobody wanted me to do a study, which occasionally happened, because that's the nature of the business, I got out of my comfort zone and did whatever else needed doing. I did a study on force protection and barbed wire and intruder devices in bases in Italy. I went out and helped close up a place that I had helped open years ago as a lieutenant, which was Naval Support Activity La Maddalena. There's an interesting story about that. So, I did other studies that were out
of my lane, just because I was an analyst lying around and needed work and nobody in my lane wanted me in the Navy at that time. That sort of worked on a sine curve. So, that's very structured and you have to do something within a certain pot of money. You've got a sponsor. Invariably, the guy who gave you the money isn't the guy you deliver the study to because of the way the Navy turns over, and so invariably there would be a hiccup. You would get: “Why did you do this? Who wanted you to do this? What did he want?” That's the nature of the study business.

But, the second thing I did complemented the first: CNA has a program called CNA Analyst, in which you're assigned to a particular OPNAV shop or Headquarters Marine Corps shop, and I was the guy for about 15 years (it's unusual for it to be that long, it's usually two or three and then somebody else takes it, but I jealously guarded it). I was the CNA Analyst to N50 and N51 and N5I, the strategy and policy shop or shops in OPNAV. In other words, I was the CNA guy who was the single point-of-contact belly button to push if you were in the same shop that I used to work in for five years on two separate tours when I was on active duty. I had a certain amount of money that I could spend on that and I could spend no more than that. In that “level of effort” support role, the phone would ring and somebody would ask me a question and I would get to research it and get back to them. I got to participate in drafting and writing things, murder-boarding, helping people brief admirals, coming over and telling them how it used to be, and posit different options and ways for them. I did that for a whole string of N50 and N51 and N5I guys who are all a blur to me now. Toward the end, I supported SES Bruce Stubbs as head of the strategy division, and Rear Admiral Will Pennington when he became the head of 5i and they invented that division. He had the Russia portfolio, the China portfolio, the Arctic, relations with the other services, nuclear strategy and policy, all of the Navy policy stuff that he presides over, and foreign navy engagement (because they took the international engagement shop, took away the flag officer, and so put that under him as well).

I got to do all of that and I shared when I needed to back at CNA, because I didn't have expertise in all those fields. Someone would call me and I'd call the appropriate CNA guy and I'd say, “I've got a couple of hours you can charge to this number. Please go over to the Pentagon and see Mary Ann Gworek, who's their Arctic person, about the purchase of Greenland,” or whatever, and I was able to vector all of the resources at CNA toward any specific problem there. And then also, I advised Bruce Stubbs, who was then the head of N50 (Navy Strategy) and a retired Coast Guard captain who I had known for years. Bruce and I probably communicated once a day, I was probably in his office once a week. I attended staff meetings, so again that's different from what most outside contractors do. Well, it's different from what outside consultants do who are on a piece-work basis, but, of course, by now, contractors are all over the Pentagon, and so there were contractors there because they were assigned to the shop full time (like Mary Ann Gworek, for example, and her predecessor).

So, those were the two kinds of things I did: formal studies and CNA analyst “level of effort” work. I did not go to the field. I did not have a CNA field assignment, which is a significant and high-quality program
at CNA that distinguishes us from other FFRDCs and contractors and think tanks. I stayed in Washington. That was unusual, but it suited what I wanted to do and nobody ever made any noises about me having to go to the field. I did get to travel a lot in support of various studies, however, and sometimes as a CNA analyst. I became a manager twice, so that sucked up a lot of time both times that I was a manager, in which I was not doing studies and I was not advising N50/51. I had somebody else doing that and my job was to worry about how much money they were all spending and why weren't they bringing in studies and arguing more broadly for a broad swath of studies and also supporting the guy who supports the Marine Corps on what they were doing, plus hiring, developing, mentoring, evaluating, promoting, and sometimes firing staff.

So, management part time, formal studies (some of which were lots of fun and people are still using), and then the day-to-day business of supporting Bruce Stubbs and Rear Admiral Pennington and all of their predecessors, which included names I've just mentioned, like Phil Dur, who had been a close colleague of mine when I was a lieutenant commander and just starting in the strategy business, but later became a CNA customer of mine when he was a two-star admiral in OP-06B or whatever—N3/N5B. I supported Stuart Munsch when he was a captain running the strategy shop and I supported Stuart Munsch six months ago when he was the prospective N7 and the acting N3/N5 and on his way to three stars, which he's got now. Captain Joe Bouchard, Captain Sam Tangredi, these are all officers who I supported at CNA. Now, they're all out or doing something else. Tangredi is up at Newport. Joe is, I think, in Norfolk. And Kurt Tidd, Joe Sestak, Craig Faller, who's now a four-star: All of those were guys I supported when they were commanders.

And, “support” meaning I answered questions, made suggestions, participated in meetings, helped write things, murder-boarded things, scrubbed drafts, those kinds of things. So, that's what I did. I got to help, I wrote what I thought, I gave advice. U.S. Navy–Marine Corps relations became a topic that I became expert in and supported the Marine Corps on, not the Navy. The Navy didn't care or they didn't ask me. Maybe somebody cared in the Navy (the few amphibs do). But, the Marine Corps cared and so I had quite a discussion with them. Then, there was the whole deployment strategies piece on the operational nature of the Navy, and my study of Navy history through the particular lens that I looked through—[Sea Changes: Transforming the U.S. Navy Deployment Strategy, 1775–2002] that was all done on CNA's Navy money.

I wrote my own paper on Navy strategy as a conference paper, book chapter, and CNA report, as I related earlier. Sometimes, I took on work outside CNA. Regarding outside work, what would happen is I'd get invited (that happened to many of us, not just me. We were at CNA and we're known quantities and we'd be invited) to conferences. Sometimes people would even pay for us to show up at the conference and they'd expect us to write a paper, and sometimes they would pay us $500 or so as an honorarium to write the paper. (Although it doesn't take $500 worth of your time to write a paper; it takes a lot more than that.) So, you would go to these things and occasionally CNA would pay for the travel, occasionally the Navy would, occasionally the sponsor would, but you'd wind up writing the paper on your own. The paper I did on U.S.
Navy strategy that I did for Sebastian's [Bruns] conference in Berlin in 2014, which became the U.S. Navy chapter in his Routledge volume, we then asked Routledge for permission and they said “yes,” and so we republished it also as a CNA document, which I think I have probably sent you. You said you want to see what I think of the Navy today through the lens of 30 years ago when I got my mental framework of how I think about the Navy: This is that document. So, I got to do that. The riverine study for the U.S. Navy was terrific. It was lots of fun and useful.

And, I continued to foster the literature on Navy strategy. If somebody were writing something that had something to do with naval strategy, people knew to call me up and ask, “Hey, can you help?” I’m doing that now, with Captain Bryan Leese’s dissertation on Navy intel. I’m helping him now as we speak and—also, oh, terrific, a jewel, I recommend it: Commander/Dr. Claude Berube’s dissertation on the Andrew Jackson administration and the Navy. He did—I think he did, I’m not a professional historian—I think he did a hell of a job. He knew to get the context and set the stage. It’s very, very broad. He talks about what was going on in the United States in terms of literature and newspapers and literacy, which is how the Navy ideas got spread and why this was a particular time, because there was an explosion of literature. I didn’t know that. He paints Jackson very differently than almost everybody, including myself, had painted Jackson. Anyway, so I helped on that. Were you there the night I had him present to the SDG? So anyway, we had him come over and talk to the SDG and I rated mention in his dissertation because of that. He was astounded that anybody cared, and I was astounded that people didn’t care.

The rebirth of COMSECONDFLT: That was something else I got heavily involved in. So, you could do outside work at CNA: I would go to CNA and say, “You know, I’ve just been asked to go this conference and write a paper and they’re gonna pay me an honorarium of $1,000 or whatever. Is that okay?” And, CNA would do whatever they did and said “yes.” I followed the rules and nobody ever turned me down at CNA, I don’t think.

I never asked for anything that I knew that they would turn me down on. One day, I went to CNA and said, “Former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman wants me to help him on his book. Can I do that?” And they said “yes.” So, I got to help John Lehman on Oceans Ventured, and what that did was to fill all of my weekends and nights with researching going back to the 1980s. So, I was always this guy who would drag you back to the 1980s, but now I was mega-tiresome. I mean, I was doing that all night and all weekend, reaching back to the ‘80s, helping John reconstruct the ‘80s. And, while I was researching and he was writing, the Russians hit Georgia and then the Russians took over Crimea and the Russians started a war in the Donets and everybody got concerned with the Russians and they took a look at the Atlantic and . . . there was no U.S. Atlantic Fleet or Command. The Atlantic had stopped being a theater. It had all these lines drawn on it: Oh, this part is the seaward approaches to SOUTHCOM and this part is the seaward approaches to NORTHCOM and this part is part of EUCOM and this part is part of AFRICOM, and that was the Atlantic.
Of course, if you were going to deter or fight Russians, given their unified naval power in the Atlantic, that's pretty stupid.

So, the Navy in its wisdom—and I was a bit player in all of that—decided to resurrect the Second Fleet. Except nobody knew what the hell a Second Fleet was. At night, I was writing about the Second Fleet in the '80s and, in the day, people were asking me: “Did you ever hear of the Second Fleet?” And so, it all converged in this past six months. So, for about two or three years, I was heavily involved both in reconstructing what we did in the '80s for Lehman and then applying it to the Navy problem today in the Atlantic. So, that was stuff I did that was good, and I left CNA on a real high, because this thing that I knew that was arcane and historic was suddenly mega-topical: CNA was hiring Russia experts up the wazoo to sit alongside all the China experts, Newport created a Russia center to be right next to its China center. A new Russia shop was there in OPNAV. And, I fostered that relationship among all of those elements, making sure that CNA was supporting OPNAV and that CNA was supporting Newport and vice versa, as well as ensuring the right people knew what was in John Lehman's book, and helping him determine what should be in the book.

So, that's what I did at CNA.

PEEKS: Actually, the reestablishment of Second Fleet has been a topic of interest for us here. Is there anything else you can say about that process, I mean, I guess, given that we're in an unclassified space, was there any particular event at sea that drove the impetus to recreate Second Fleet or was it a response to things happening on land?

SWARTZ: I think—I was a bit player in this and this may not be accurate, but from what I saw, what happened was the nation and then the Pentagon said, “Oh, we've got a Russia problem.” Remember, up until now, the Navy had been engaging like mad with the Russians: “Oh Russians, wouldn't you like to come to this exercise? Oh Russians, wouldn't you like to come to this war game? Wouldn't you like to have this exchange program?” and so on and so forth, and so U.S. Navy exercises were full of Russians and we were inviting them to things and so on. Then came, “Oh, oh, they’re the enemy now, or an adversary or potential adversary.” Well, the Navy just wasn't organized to deal with that. We had Naval Forces Europe, which was also Naval Forces Africa, where there were all kind of things that the Navy was doing, but it had almost no forces. It had four missile destroyers and they were relatively recently based in Rota and they were there to do missile defense against Iran. They had a flagship, which was mostly civilian. They had a staff in Naples that was about five Cold War staffs collapsed into one that ran all of that. It had a couple of planes at Sigonella, It had closed a whole lot of bases in the UK, closed bases in Germany, closed the base at La Maddalena in Sardinia, and still had bases in Crete and in Italy and in Rota, but they were mostly used as supporting waystations on the way to the Middle East.
Well, how would you go about going against the Russians? Well, I’ll take my submarines at CINCUSNAVEUR, whatever it’s called now, COMNAVEUR, except I don’t have any submarines. Submarines all belong to Norfolk. Oh, carriers all belong to Norfolk. Everything belongs to Norfolk. Nothing belongs to the guy in Europe except these few bits and pieces. But, there’s a whole flipping fleet in Norfolk. Well, it’s not called a fleet anymore, it’s a subsection of a staff on—well, wait a minute, that’s not the right way to do it. How did they used to do it? Well there was a fleet in Norfolk, the U.S. Second Fleet, and it had a warfighting task and it would do that warfighting task if there were a war and they would practice doing it, and also contribute to deterrence and presence if there weren’t a war. Oh, well, maybe we ought to do that again. I mean that’s really how a number of things came together. But, it was basically Russia and the Crimea that did that, and then Russia had a navy. Well, where was that navy? Well, they had a little bit in the Black Sea, had a little bit in the Baltic, had a little bit in the Pacific, and had a whole lot up in the Kola Peninsula. Well, how are we going to deal with that?

Almost all the U.S. Navy’s Atlantic forces were in Norfolk. Not only had we disestablished Second Fleet, we had disestablished SACLANT and the Striking Fleet Atlantic, so the NATO guys had no idea how to plan for coordinating with the United States in the event that a carrier is being sent up off, say, Norway. Wonderful! Who the hell in Norway knows how to liaison with a carrier? Well, back in the days of the Cold War, lots of people knew. The Norwegian air force knew and the Norwegian foreign office and the Norwegian navy certainly knew, and there were combined NATO commands all along Norway, and there was a Norwegian presence at SACEUR and a Norwegian presence in SACLANT. All that stuff had gone away. None of those people existed anymore. They didn’t know how to do anything. The carrier comes up in a big exercise last year off Norway and so they wanted to liaison with guys on the beach. Who do they liaise with? Well, I guess the Norwegian navy. Well, I talked to the Norwegian navy: Can you get this and that and can we get landing privileges at the airport? The airport doesn’t belong to the Norwegian air force anymore, it’s a civil aviation authority. Well, good, can you ring them up and ask them if they can do? Well, I’m a Norwegian, but I don’t know any of those people. Why would I? That’s the situation that they were in and so they had to figure out with today’s force levels, which are half what they use to be, and non-existent relationships that had atrophied and been canceled, how to build those relationships again, with a different Pentagon and a different President and different all of that.

A wonderful guy named Commander Ariel Klein was given the task in OPNAV of fixing that. He got little help from anybody because nobody had any idea about NATO or anything. Well, I did. But my data was all 30 years old. Mary Ellen Connell, whom I worked with at CNA, her data was 30 years old too. We were good on NATO, we used to be there at the U.S. Mission in NATO and I had written NATO into the Maritime Strategy and all of that, but that was a long time ago, so it wasn’t clear that what we knew would be relevant. But, we worked hard to support him and he became trusted and invaluable to his bosses. He also had to quit the Navy because he was flying the wrong kind of airplane and had been passed over and didn’t get command, and this and that and the other. We hired him in a heartbeat at CNA. He was terrific. He
started two weeks ago. He's working for my colleague Margaux Hoar. So, in that process, we became a very important, relevant, and necessary historical resource.

Another thing I did at CNA was make sure that when I left there would be no holes. So Nilanthi Samaranayake, my good friend and colleague and friend of Thuý's at CNA took over my management responsibilities and became the head of the Strategy Program. She's got her own substantive portfolio as a South Asia expert, arguably the South Asia expert in town. And, CNA also hired Steve Wills. Steve's dissertation was about the transition from the '80s to the '90s, and I'd been pumping Steve Wills up ever since I discovered him a long time ago. Seth Cropsey—actually, he discovered him—Seth Cropsey called me up and said, “Hey, there's a guy over here interviewing me for his dissertation and you really ought to talk to him.” And, I encouraged the dissertation, I helped him write it and then, when he finally became Dr. Wills and needed a job, I helped him get hired at CNA and he does lots of what I used to do, and then some. He's not me. I'm not him. But close enough. So, I made sure that this capability that I had built and established at CNA didn't just all go away. That's happened at CNA. I'd seen that happen. Gary Federici had been our Space guy. He was the most knowledgeable analyst in all of Washington on the Navy and Space. He then took a job in the Pentagon and then he tragically died, but he wasn't backed up by anybody at CNA, and so CNA had had all this Space capability because it had Gary and then it didn't have all this Space capability because it didn't have Gary. Neither CNA nor I wanted that to happen to the Strategy and Policy business, so I cultivated a lot of people and Steve turned out to be the very best and, in their wisdom, CNA hired him. I also hired and developed Josh Tallis, Vince Manzo—who's since gone to the State Department—Madison Estes, and Eleanore Douglas. They are superb, and so it's still a robust program—probably even more so. Josh Tallis, who worked for me largely as an analyst of maritime security issues, wanted to broaden his portfolio, so we sent him to the Norwegian Sea on a significant fleet exercise. He was terrific, learned a lot, became invaluable to the carrier strike group commander, and is now a major Navy and CNA strategy resource.

PEEKS: Turning back to our scheduled questions, with your work with N5, you've sort of had a unique vantage point on the Navy's strategy enterprise and so, since your retirement, how would you assess the Navy's efforts to nurture a cadre of strategy-minded officers?

SWARTZ: They went straight downhill. Well, no, that's not exactly true. The way you ask the question: The Navy continued to educate officers—very, very good officers—in the same subjects that I and my colleagues had been educated in and at some of the very same schools, most notably the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. (That's not where I went, but the heart of the Navy pol-mil enterprise when I knew it in '70 and '80 was Fletcher. Lots of people went to lots of other schools, but there was a Fletcher mafia and that was a mafia within a mafia, and it was helpful that it was a mafia within a mafia, because it gave some cohesion to all of us.) The Navy continues to educate. Right now, they've got guys in school learning about China and Russia and whatever. That part is continuing, I believe. Captain Joe Gagliano was probably the poster child
for that today, but there are other Joe Gaglianos that I’ve never heard of who are out there, I’m convinced. They crop up all the time.

But . . . when it comes to assigning these guys to a shop or related circle of shops, which used to happen routinely in the ’70s and ’80s, the Navy doesn’t do much. So, maybe one of those guys might wind up in N50 or N51, or maybe he won’t. Maybe there’s some guy who used to be in N51, who comes back again later as a captain (there is one right now, Rome Ruiz, who had been a lieutenant in the nuclear shop and now he’s the deputy to Admiral Will Pennington). Or not. What used to happen was that the OP-06 flag officers who were involved—and we have fewer of them now—used to call the Bureau all the time and scream for bodies—educated, experienced bodies. That dialogue almost doesn’t exist anymore, to my knowledge.

Now, I don’t know everything and I haven’t been in the Navy for years, and maybe if Bruce Stubbs was sitting here he’d say, “No, no, I was on the phone with the Bureau just the other day.” But I doubt it. And, the reason they could do that back then was because the people at the other end of the line at the Bureau knew that if they hassled the two-star or the captain who was calling for him, that pretty soon their boss’s boss, the three-star, the Chief of Naval Personnel, would get a call from Vice Admiral Bill Crowe or Vice Admiral Art Moreau or Vice Admiral Ace Lyons or Vice Admiral Chuck Larson as OP-06 saying, “I need X and he’s appropriately educated and experienced as a strategist, so why are you sending him to, say, N4?” And, that was the system and it worked, and that’s why you had all of these educated and experienced guys crammed into OP-603 in the 1980s: a combination of self-selection and the Bureau putting up with it and active recruiting by the flags who were in the business.

That created both the hard core of guys who were in OP-603 [and] the wider area of guys who were in OP-965 and OP-00K and related shops, and at Newport and Monterey, and so we all knew each other and it was a powerful network. It’s what gave the Navy the Maritime Strategy. Today, none of that happens, or almost none of it happens. Hyper-energetic Mark Montgomery, when he came in to be the head strategy guy in N3/ N5 as a captain, figured out that he couldn’t nudge the system. But, his shop had sponsorship of the FEF program, the Federal Executive Fellows, so he grabbed them and he created a little sub-system, whereby if you came out of CSIS or you came out of AEI or RAND or wherever the Federal Executive Fellows were sent, that he got a crack at them. He didn’t get them all, but he got some and that was useful because these guys had a broader outlook because of where they’d just been. So, Captain Geoffrey “Strain” Gage had been a FEF. Montgomery and his successors had me come in and lecture to all of the FEFs every year as part of their orientation, and I became their CNA point of contact and their reach-back guy, and also I got to flap my jaws about how things used to be in the ’80s and ought to be that way again and they got my stuff, and some of them, not all, but some of them would avail themselves of that during that tour, and so we’ve got sort of a quasi-network—and the SDG performs a socializing function, too. But, the heart of it should be the three-star picking up the phone and calling the Chief of Naval Personnel and saying, “I can’t run my shop
for the CNO and to further Navy equities without sub-specialists, and I’ve only got five out of 35 officers who are sub-specialists and that’s a lousy percentage and I need more.”

I don’t believe those conversations take place. One of the reasons they don’t take place (my theory) is that usually the three-star himself had never had a tour in N3/N5. He’s not Crowe, Moreau, Lyons, Joe Moorer, whoever. To him, his officers are interchangeable, and the questions he’s asked and the things he’s asked to do by the CNO are largely in his N3 hat, not his N5 hat, and in his policy hat, which is close to the N3, not to the N5. And so, he’s comfortable taking just normal competent fleet sailors who can do that kind of work. And, the idea that he’s going to have guys write strategy? He’s not asked for it by his Secretary as Lehman demanded from his CNOs. The CNO’s not being asked for it by his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman doesn’t need his advice on strategy because he’s got a Joint Staff to do it, some of whom are the very guys that the CNO should have on his staff, thinks Peter. But instead, they’re down in the J5 being socialized by sitting next to Army and Air Force officers, so they’re first-rate joint guys, but they don’t know Navy.

“Good,” Arch Barrett and Jim Locher would say. “I didn’t want them to know that. I want them to know Army and Air Force.” Back to my view: The Navy’s different. The medium is different. Water is different from land. The legal regime of water is different from land. Mobility is different. Et cetera. Therefore, the Navy’s different. There is a thing which is a separate body of knowledge called Maritime Strategy. It’s a component of the National Strategy. It’s not against it, but it’s got its own roots and its own reasons and its own raison d’être and its own expertise, and we’re shortchanging it and not using it right. We got rid of the Second Fleet, then we send everybody down to the Joint Staff. So, that’s one thing that happened

Other things happened, too: CNO Admiral Boorda said, “I don’t need a Strategic Studies Group up in Newport anymore that looks at strategy. But, I’m willing to take them and turn them into a bunch of innovation generators.” And, he hired retired Admiral Jim Hogg—my old mentor from Brussels, who had landed me the Powell gig—to change the SSG and make it become an innovation generator. That lasted until CNO Admiral Richardson tossed out the whole SSG. Okay, so that’s what happened to OP-603, and that’s what happened to the SSG. Then, there was Global War Game: Newport cancelled it. It came back a few years ago. My guess is that they look at the Chinese or the Russians. I don’t do that anymore, so I don’t know. But, I do know that back in the ’90s they stopped running global war games. Things weren’t global anymore. They were all regional, and you didn’t need a global war game to examine how to handle Saddam Hussein or Gaddafi or whoever. The big exercises, the big fleet exercises against submarine fleets? We got rid of the forces and got rid of the exercises. NATO staffs, over-staffed, just a waste of time? Get rid of all of them. NATO consolidated and got rid of all the staffs. So, the fleet staffs that knew strategy all contracted, and the relationship with the allies atrophied and went away. The exercises, war games, [and] strategy work at the SSG dwindled. If I keep thinking, I’ll think of the other elements that changed. I don’t know.
Are there equivalents in the ’90s and 2000s of you NHHC guys out in the fleet supporting a big Maritime Strategy exercise in the North Pacific? There was an NHC [Naval Historical Center] paper for an exercise in 1989 [U.S. Naval Experience in the North Pacific During World War II: Selected Documents] to provide the fleet with background for implementing the Maritime Strategy. Do we have that sort of stuff going on today?

**PEEKS:** Sort of.

**SWARTZ:** Good. Okay. Good. Then that’s all to the good that that’s going on. And then, of course, it has to compete with everything else NHHC is doing, I know that. But in the ’90s, the very elements that interacted, plus the interactions, went away. So yes, it’s different now due to the SSG change, the N51 change, Global War Game going away, and SECNAVs and CNOs no longer interested in enunciating a strategy. Oh, then there’s the Naval War College: The Bureau doesn’t send top officers to the Naval War College. The Army does. The Air Force does. The Navy doesn’t. So, you’ve got this crackerjack faculty teaching front-running Army and Air Force guys. Naval Postgraduate School: SECNAV John Lehman sent Seth Cropsey out to establish a chair in Maritime Strategy there so that every man, woman, and child at Naval Postgraduate School, whether they were studying physics or Double E [electrical engineering], or national security affairs, or whatever, would get “Maritime Strategied.” And we sent Commander/Dr. Jim Tritten, a naval carrier aviator and strategist, out to run that, followed by Mitch Brown, my CINCUSNAVEUR contact when I was writing the Maritime Strategy. So, these guys were professionals, with the right education and experience tours. Tritten had a Ph.D. from USC. Mitch had a master’s degree, but, more importantly, he had been deeply involved in creating and disseminating the Maritime Strategy in Europe and OP-603, and now out at Monterey. In the ’90s, Monterey cancelled that course, so that was that. Mitch got picked up by the Newport contingent out there that’s teaching JPME [Joint Professional Military Education], another secondary unintended effect of Goldwater-Nichols. They had to figure out how to squeeze JPME into what they were doing out there and things like a Maritime Strategy course fell by the wayside.

I already mentioned that N3/N5 no longer kicked off the POM build with a statement and discussion of strategy. And, far fewer follow-on tours—I mentioned that, too. Follow-on tours became a rarity, right? You did it once, and then that was it.

So all of that—the combined weight of all of that—meant that it wasn’t anything like when I walked in the door in OPNAV as a lieutenant commander in 1976, for Thuý to meet my new boss Captain Paul Skarlatos—a TACAIR guy and National War College grad—and have him tell her that there was no reason, if I had something I really, really, really needed to do, that I couldn’t leave work in the evening by six. By six! That’s if he’s got something he really, really needs to do. I see. Okay, yeah. We also worked long hours and it was hard. Yeah, it was all different.

**PEEKS:** I want to dig into one point that you mentioned and let’s see where this goes: You mentioned Boorda changing the mission of the SSG to look more at the technical side. I’d be curious to know if you
think that the, sort of—I'm trying to find the right word—but the sort of Owens-Cebrowski school of technological transformation, if that had a positive/negative/neutral/no impact on sort of the Navy's focus on strategy?

SWARTZ: I don't know, I guess, is the answer. The Navy is always a highly technical service. Guys have written fantastic books on that subject (most recently Scott Mobley up in Wisconsin, who just wrote *Progressives in Navy Blue*, which exhaustively goes into the roots of that, and how strategy and technology vied for the attention of the officer corps at the same time, in the late 19th century, and I'm reading this and going, "I know that dynamic!"). Lots of guys with high-tech smarts and high-tech educations also went into strategy and did well in the Navy. It's the nature of the Navy. (Not me personally. I'm an anomaly, I'm a strategy guy. I'm not a tech guy. But, everybody else in the Navy strategy community is a tech guy and a strategist.) Ace Lyons was a fantastic technician and a technologist when it came to cover and deception, in addition to being a strategist. John Lehman was an A-6 NFO [naval flight officer], as well as being a strategist. Captain Robby Harris was a strategist and helped Boorda design the “innovation generation SSG.” Owens and Cebrowski were chosen for their operational and technical smarts to be part of the SSG and became operators, and, to hear them tell it, strategists, indeed the top Navy strategists in the year they were in the SSG, and they carried that with them ever since. So, Hank Mauz, my mentor, was an engineer. Graduated from the Naval Academy and, I think, his PG school education was in electrical engineering and yet he was the foremost NATO strategist that the U.S. Navy produced during the time I was in the Navy. So guys can do both, but the balance kept changing over time and so on. It may be, but I don't think so, but it may have been that, without the big kick by Lehman saying, “You guys need a strategy,” maybe we wouldn't have had the strategy. Admirals Hayward and Small and Lyons and Moreau certainly pushed hard for it, and they were real active duty naval officers with technological smarts.

Back to CNO Admiral Boorda and the SSG as an innovation generator: Boorda figured that he was living in a different era and he was being beset on all sides for not being innovative enough. This is ironic. Today, we're sitting reading in the newspapers the Navy is being lambasted for the problems that the LCS is having and lambasted for the problems that the *Ford-class* [CVN-78] carrier had and the EMALS [electromagnetic aircraft launch system] and the landing gear and the catapults, because everything was new and innovative. But, at the time, the Navy was being lambasted for not being innovative *enough* and for just building the same-old, same-old destroyers and everything, and harangued, “This is our innovation moment, we're between enemies, this is when we should be striking out. So what if we fail?” Remember all that? I mean that was real in the ’90s.

And so, Boorda's trying to invent the arsenal ship. He's trying to think of how to do this, and, meanwhile, he's got all these legacy ships that he's got to throw away. How many does he throw away? That's his problem. He decides he needs an innovation generation think tank and he doesn't need a bunch of guys telling him anything about strategy, because what kind of strategy do you need against, again, using the Powell
phrase, Kim Jong Il and Saddam Hussein and Fidel Castro and Gaddafi? So, Boorda turns the SSG into an innovation generation think tank. I misspoke when I said it was only technical or implied that it was only technical. It wasn’t. You could have personnel innovation, you could have operational innovation, you could have tactical innovation, but he wanted innovation. He wanted somebody who was paid to think out of the box and yet was going to be able to bring the stuff back to the fleet, speak the fleet's language, come from the fleet, and go back to the fleet. So, he picked a fleet sailor to run it, Admiral Jim Hogg, who also had strategy chops (I worked with him in Brussels), and so the Navy changed the SSG to innovation. (But, if three CNO’s later, somebody had wanted innovation in strategy, they could have assigned that to the SSG and Hogg would have charged off and done that. No CNO ever wanted that, though.) They wanted innovative ideas generated on manpower, personnel, relations with the Marines every once in a while. But, mostly, what they wanted were concepts like directed energy, artificial intelligence, unmanned (unmanned was always big), different ways of manning ships because manpower was so expensive, and so on.

But, the fatal flaw, in Peter’s view, the flaw in the new innovation SSG model, was: Okay, the CNO Executive Panel—with Captain Robby Harris as the guy who was running it, when he was in uniform—the CNO Executive Panel, which CNO Admiral Richardson also cashiered later, had recommended that Boorda do just that with the SSG: Generate innovative concepts. But, they recommended it as the beginning of a process, in which, after the SSG had generated the innovative idea and concept and studied it and made some recommendations, the Navy would take the next steps in the process and they would analyze it, and then experiment and test, and then in the next step in the process after that would send it through the budgetary system, and then, finally, it would be approved and we would have an innovation.

But few, if any, of those other steps ever happened! What happened was that the SSG delivered its report to the CNO. The CNO said, “Yeah, this is real good,” Then he sent it out to a bunch of people. That’s how everything dies in the Navy. You know, you got programmers who looked at that and said, “What do I do with this? It’s not in the five-year defense plan or the six-year defense plan, or whatever the defense plan was in the particular year we’re talking about. And how do we program for this? Yeah, this is nice to know, but nothing more.” Most of the stuff went nowhere, although it didn’t deserve to go nowhere,

Actually, the initial concept reports went physically to lots of places. Admiral Hogg made sure of that. He was a great cheerleader for his products or his people's products. But, the other steps didn’t happen and when CNO Admiral Richardson got it on his desk—the report of the penultimate SSG—and asked, “What am I supposed to do with this? Who do I give it to? What happens with this?” All he heard in reply was crickets. And so, he said, “Well, I’m not the guy who can make this all happen? How do I do that? I’ve got 12 hot-shot captains sitting up in Newport (or however many there were and, by then, there were a whole bunch of commanders or lieutenant commanders from the Naval War College and from PG School who were fellows there) and all they’re doing is reading me in to this briefing I just got and this piece of paper I got here now, and then I’m supposed to do . . . what? There’s no system to run with it? Send them back
to the fleet. I need sailors who know what they’re doing in the fleet. I don’t need one more guy to give me another report.”

So, that was the end of the SSG. Maybe it’ll come back again in one of its two guises. There was sort of a third guise, too: Between the time that they were looking at strategy and operational art and the time Admiral Boorda changed them, CNO Admiral Kelso had them doing futures work—“Tell me what the future is going to look like.” Well, they did their best. They valiantly tried. They wrote futurology. So, that was another sort of a sub-phase of the first incarnation of the SSG before Boorda said, “What am I going to do with this future stargazing? I need innovative concepts generated.”

**PEEKS:** Justin, any questions?

**BLANTON:** I don’t think so.

**PEEKS:** So, talking about the 1990s—and we’ve touched on this a bit—but it’s become popular in some naval circles to blame the Navy’s post–Cold War leadership for many of the problems facing today’s service. I guess this is a multipart question: Is that interpretation of the 1990s constructive and, in your words, what happened to the Navy’s strategic enterprise in that decade?

**SWARTZ:** Okay, so I’ve already described what happened to the “Navy strategic enterprise.” All the elements collapsed and therefore the interrelationship among the elements collapsed, and it collapsed. Admiral Greenert was criticized for that collapse when he came in as the CNO by Representative Randy Forbes [R-VA], then head of the House Armed Services Committee’s Seapower Subcommittee, and other people. And so, he resurrected an “enterprise” with Jamie Foggo, who at that time was N3/N5B and a rear admiral. Admiral Foggo and I were close, of course, and so that was one of the times in which I was very close to the Pentagon, and so I was one of Foggo’s advisers on this, and Greenert and Foggo and many other people—and me as a bit player—revived the enterprise. The revival didn’t take as well as we would have liked, I think, but they did do that. But yes, as I pointed out earlier, the thing just collapsed in the ’90s. The question about the leaders and the flags: First of all, they had to manage all these horrors that were going on (remember Tailhook?)—oh, and they contributed to it. Boorda shoots himself, so Jay Johnson’s got that to deal with. The A-12 program has collapsed and the Navy doesn’t have a strike aircraft, and if it doesn’t have a strike aircraft, what the hell does it have? It’s got a force that’s optimized for ASW, so it got rid of all of that and so a whole lot of people now—major communities in the Navy—are upset because they don’t have anything to do. Submarines have reinvented themselves as C4ISR platforms instead of killers because there’s nothing to kill. That’s what the CNOs are grappling with. Many more than I just described. I once did a list and it was, like, two pages of horrible things that had happened to the Navy. Kind of like very recently, if you did it, too. In the ’90s, they had Tailhook and Paisley [procurement scandal], and today they’ve got Fat Leonard. So, they’re managing all of that.
Strategy wasn't the first thing on their minds or even the second or the third. That's not what they're being asked for by the Chairman, by their colleagues, by the Secretaries of the Navy. (SECNAV Donald Winter detested the 2007 CS21 strategy—this is getting ahead of ourselves, we're not in the '90s, we're in the 2000s—the Secretary of the Navy detested the strategy that Morgan came up with for Mullen and Roughead.) So, they had other things on their minds and, like I said, when they did need to go to N3/N5 it was because of operational things. Somebody in the Tank [the Joint Chiefs’ secure conference room] would ask for something, and the CNO, he'd better know why we sent this carrier rather then that carrier or why these people are having problems that we hadn't anticipated or whatever. And those are “N3” kinds of questions, not “N5” kinds of questions. I supported all of these guys. They were all working hard, they were all trying their best. They were patriotic. They were doing well for the Republic.

They were trying to save the Navy as they knew of it, but they were being whipsawed by the '90s—I mean, that was the nature of the '90s. The clarity that we have now (alleged clarity, which is” focus on the Chinese and the Russians”), we didn't have that, although the Navy to its credit always continued to focus on the Chinese when others didn’t. The Russians we wound up engaging with, although that turned out to be a dead end. We engaged with the Chinese, too, as part of dealing with them, but we looked at the Chinese and said, “That's the next great power. We're Britain and that's Holland. We're Britain and that's France. We're Britain and that's Spain. That's the challenger.” There was no requirement for them to do anything re. strategy. So, there was this war game, there was that cell established. Whatever. But what's our strategy to deal with it?

When SECDEF Gates gave the Navy a kick and told it to come up with an Air/Sea Battle concept with the Air Force, that was Gates focusing us on China finally, and that's after the '90s. The '90s was this mish-mash—and, as Kelso said, and this was the feeling in the Navy, “Well, we've got the Maritime Strategy up on the shelf. I don't remember what was in it anymore. I remember we had these big exercises, but we don't have any of the ships anymore, but yeah, we'll do that again when we need to. But, right now what I'm asked to do is what? Sail to the Persian Gulf and put bombs on target against Arabs or Afghans or Syrians or Iraqis or somebody, and if I can just keep pumping out guys to WESTPAC and the Indian Ocean because that's what we're being asked to do, and pump out the more guys I can and the more airplanes I can and the more sorties I can, that's what I'll do.”

“Of course, I don't know how to do ASW anymore and I don't know how to do ASuW and, while I'm ready to do AAW and I've got lots of AAW platforms, there really is no airplane coming at me or no missile coming at me. Nobody’s had experience doing that. My job is to support guys on the ground in the Middle East and put bombs on target as if I were an Air Force guy who's sitting right next to me because I've become joint and everything we do is now Navy/Air Force joint, so that's what I do. And, the Marines I have nothing to do with because they're on the ground with the Army doing that and I've drifted apart from the Marines in part because they wanted to drift apart for their own reasons and in part because, what's my requirement?
The Marines are on the ground and so therefore the ARGs [amphibious ready group] are empty. I don't have Marines riding around on my amphibs. I'm schlepping Malaysian marines around and doing all kinds of engagement stuff, yeah ...”

That's the '90s. Don't know if this answers your question, but it wasn't the most satisfying decade.

**PEEKS**: So, digging deeper with that, you've described the Navy as being very reactive in the 1990s and, so what ...

**SWARTZ**: Well, and so Boorda was—and I've described an attempt by Boorda to get ahead of that by having Hogg and his guys not be reactive and get ahead of all of that. That was his concept for the SSG. I didn't mean to interrupt.

**PEEKS**: No, no, no, it's fine, but I guess—so what are they, I guess, when we talk about the Navy being kind of reactive, what are they responding to, is this the different incentive structure set up by Goldwater-Nichols and they're responding to the joint staff, are they responding to administration priorities?

**SWARTZ**: Yeah, they're doing all of that.

**PEEKS**: Okay.

**SWARTZ**: Yeah, they're doing all of that, yeah. And they’re doing it in the U.S. Navy way. What's the U.S. Navy way? Global, allied, lots of engagement, forward, aggressive, offensive. What's the best way to solve that problem? Go bomb them. And, go bomb them. Don't wait for them to come bomb you—I mean the fundamentals of U.S. Navy thinking of how you use a Navy, I mean, here's a good example of that—so, I'm talking to a bunch of Navy types from the NATO Baltic littoral countries about the Russians in the Baltic, and they're talking about buying patrol craft and defending their ports, and, oh, “Woe is us, the Russian Baltic Fleet is going to do this and that to us, and this and that.” And, I'm listening to them and I say, “You guys”—even Germans are in the room—“you guys are out of your minds. That's [not] how you use a Navy. You're going to kill Russians! How are you going to get forward so they never get out of Saint Petersburg? So that they never get out of Kaliningrad? Now, what kind of Navy force do you need to do that, to keep them in their box?” “No,” they say, “you don't understand. The Russians are coming at us,” and I say, “You’re a navy. You go on the offense. That's what we're good at. That's what we do. We're not forts. You want to go forward.” And that just went right over their heads. And, I'm sitting there doing what I'm doing because I'm a creature of U.S. Navy thinking. That's how I think. I really believe this stuff. I really believe what I wrote. If that's Mahanian, then so be it, but that's what we should be doing and that's what they should've been doing, in my view at the time.

**PEEKS**: You also mentioned that the Navy was pretty early in focusing on China as a future competitor. Just to help us kind of nail down the timeline there, what years are we talking about when they start?
SWARTZ: I’ve got them at home, and I don’t have them here, but I’m thinking that the Naval War College starts hiring China experts (and converting Russia experts to China experts) in the 1990s and its center at Newport gets set up in 2006. For people who were worried about the Chinese, the thing that really hit them in the face was Tiananmen Square in 1989, when the Soviet Union is collapsing, the Warsaw Pact is collapsing, Yugoslavia is collapsing, and China ain’t collapsing. And, the Navy with its focus on the Pacific and interest in the Pacific has noticed this and it’s noticed it more than other institutions in parts of the government, and so it’s not a big surprise that Newport was trying to think out of the box and look forward and so on—at China. And, so they set up their cell.

In 1998, CNA set up its cell. Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mike McDevitt comes over from being president at the National War College and he believes in this, and he gets out of the Navy and comes over to CNA and sets up something called Project Asia at CNA. The company and the Navy give him a dollop of money to start studying Asia. And, what is there to study in Asia? The rise of China. And, Mike McDevitt’s pretty good at this because he’s an SSG alumnus, an OP-095 alumnus from the days of the Maritime Strategy, he understands how the Soviets thought, and so he’s able to use that as a framework to assess the Chinese. Are they going to be like the Imperial Japanese Navy—McDevitt’s a Georgetown-educated historian—or are they going to be like the Soviet Navy? And because that’s his thinking, he’s able to frame stuff.

Meanwhile in the Pentagon, Dave Rosenberg is preaching the gospel of “Hey, at the highest levels of classification, the Navy used to have an institution called the ATP—Advanced Technology Panel—which conceptualized and implemented a highly classified strand of the Maritime [Strategy].” Frankly, I never knew much about or had much—I knew about it, never got much insight as to what they were doing and so on, I just knew it was going on, and I sent them stuff to approve on occasion, without ever knowing why. And, as far as those guys were concerned, they were the Maritime Strategy, not me or the SSG. Maybe they’d grant the SSG a piece, because they had the tickets, they had the clearances, I didn’t. So all of the stuff that I’ve talked about, they didn’t care about because they were doing something else. Anyway, Rosenberg was telling people who would listen—and they did listen—“Hey, you ought to set up a cell of some type and you ought to use the very best intel and you’ve got to have guys that are really super cleared and you ought to be doing that.” What they did, how they did it, how that all evolved and everything, I haven’t a clue. Dave will know, but the point here is that there were some stirrings in OPNAV, and Dave was a major goad on that.

So, that’s what I know. I know CNA, I know Newport, I know Dave. Some of this stuff will be in my CNA background reports on The U.S. Navy in the World, 1990s and 2000s. I tried to throw everything but the kitchen sink into those volumes for posterity, so that if somebody ever would ask me a question, I had someplace to go to say, “Oh yeah, Newport, yeah.” When I get home I’ll send you the year. I’ll know it, it’ll say 2006, I’ve written it somewhere. I think the intel community was starting to turn toward China. The Navy was starting to send guys to school about it. You’d have to talk to some of the real China expert intel
guys like Captain [James] Fanell, who got out, and Captain [Dale] Rielage, who's somewhere in Washington now, I think, but they'll know how in their careers their organization started looking at the Chinese, because otherwise they were busy supporting aviators who were bombing Arabs and Afghans and chasing the Taliban and all of that. I mean, that's what naval intelligence was doing, like everybody else.

**PEEKS:** On the subject of Arabs and Afghans, from where you sat in CNA, what changes and strategy came in the wake of the September 11th attacks?

**SWARTZ:** Well, for the Navy, the big change came before that. It came with the bombing of the *Cole* [DDG-67]. The *Cole* was bombed the year before the 9/11 attacks and suddenly the Navy discovered that—on top of everything else—they had this huge force protection problem. I mean, of all these other things we've talked about, we haven't talked about force protection. The Navy's doing all this engagement, port visits all the time, allowing foreigners to tromp all over our ships, lots of dinners and lunches and everything. They're engaging like mad. Well, a guy comes in with a small boat and engages like mad with a bomb and blows a big hole in the side of the *Cole* and kills people, and suddenly a port visit isn't benign anymore. Now, the Navy's got to invest in barriers, small boats, small craft, and got to plus up the Naval Criminal Investigative Service [NCIS], telling them they've got to be overseas and cozy up to every police force in every port that the Navy goes into and so on. This is big stuff. This spills over into, “We've got to take care of our bases,” so this relates to my La Maddalena story, and that's why even *I* got involved in base protection.

When Naval Support Activity La Maddalena had been created in the early '70s under Admiral Zumwalt, it was *designed* for engagement. Zumwalt did not want to create a base in which the Americans huddled in a “Little America.” He had come from Vietnam. He knew the value of—he understood the *necessity*, not just the value, but the necessity—of getting along with the locals. We *had* to get along with the Vietnamese navy. I got along fine with the Vietnamese, in general. Some Americans got along less fine. I was part of the program in Vietnam under Zumwalt that tried to make sure that Americans stopped denigrating the Vietnamese and understood that we were there to help and this was important stuff, and it was just as important as putting bombs on target. So, Naval Support Activity in La Maddalena was designed for integration. The dental clinic was over here in the basement of this apartment building (this isn't all exactly right, but it illustrates the point). The medical clinic was over here in a grocery store. The headquarters of NSA was an apartment building owned by a lady, so that when you went up the stairs, I can remember this, if you went this way and rang the bell, you got the lady, and if you went up that way and rang the bell, you got Naval Support Activity La Maddalena. You open the apartment door and there was this big plaque and suddenly you were in a Navy office. And that was all by design: “Hey, we're good citizens, we're integrated, we're together, Americans, Italians.”

After the *Cole*, the Navy started looking at force protection: “Hey, how are you going to defend NSA La Maddalena?” And, I was part of the group that had to look at that. And, it was indefensible. You couldn't possibly. How would you do it? The wives are over here in the commissary and the husbands are over here
in the PX and the headquarters is over here and the waterfront is down there. It had been designed to be totally indefensible. So, the Navy closed it. So, bottom line: The Cole was the Navy's big wakeup, not 9/11. What the Navy had to do for 9/11 was support the operations in Afghanistan, which it did. So, it went off and did that and that's a hard place to support ships, because it's half way around the world and the ports aren't as good and the ports aren't in the right places, and so on. The ports kept getting better. (When I started in this business, Dubai was this fishing village. We didn't have the drydocks and other stuff, the facilities that are in the Gulf today.) But, the Navy did all it could to support U.S. Mideast operations. The Navy created, what's the program where the guys went off for individual tours—IAs?

PEEKS: The individual augmentees?

SWARTZ: Yes, IAs, whatever. So there was the IA program. Every office had to give. Every ship had to give, alright? “So gee, I just lost my yeoman because he's just been sent to Afghanistan to spell some Army guy so he can go out in the field.” So, the Navy was big on IAs, but IAs ripped the personnel system apart. It just created havoc everywhere. But, the Navy supported the nation on that.

Also, the Navy created the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command [NECC] and rediscovered low-level warfare. SEALs were gone. They were part of the joint Special Operations Command. But, between SEALs, which were no longer a part of the Navy operationally, and the next level up—which was a frigate—there was nothing in the middle. The Navy now had a bunch of force protection guys because of Cole. So, how do we translate that into, well, where the world's heading now? Well, it looks like we're going to be chasing Arabs around and Afghans around, and we might have to chase them around at sea. Piracy was starting to grow, so we created Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. That's when somebody got the bright idea that we're going to go back on rivers again: “Well, there are famous rivers in Iraq right? Yeah, well, okay, so we'll have to go on the rivers. Anybody here know anything about riverine warfare?” Well, I did, based on my Vietnam experience, so I became part of all that. Okay, so at CNA we did our big study and had this great conference—meetings and boats and all this stuff—on riverine warfare. My old Vietnamese boss, Captain Kiem, came up from New Orleans. We covered all that earlier.

So, the Navy tried to protect its own, but it had already started that with the Cole. It supported the Army, the guys on the ground, the best way it knew how, which was with carrier aviation. It supported the Marines to some extent, but once the Marines got on the ground and they began rotating in and out they didn't need to go by ship; they flew in. The Navy provided individual augmentees. The Navy created the NECC and combined the Seabees and the brand-new riverine guys. It created an NECC naval civil affairs group, which later was abolished. So, the Navy tried to plus up its own low-end warfare capability on the off-chance that maybe some of this stuff was going to spill over into green water, which it really didn't. So, that's what the Navy did. Probably something else if I thought of it. Again, my U.S. Navy in the World reports will have all of that.
So again, where’s the strategy in all of that? The strategy was: First of all, be joint, help your sister services do the maximum that you can, and second, go and stay far forward, as much as you can. We’re not trying to protect Norfolk, we’re trying to pummel some encampment out in the desert somewhere.

PEEKS: One last strategy question before we pivot back to some of your writings. At what point did the Navy shift focus from Iraq, Afghanistan, and terrorism toward concerns about rising Chinese naval power, hybrid warfare, Russia, any of the current buzzwords you’d like to use—were there any lessons that the Navy needed to relearn that had been set aside after the collapse of the Soviet Union?

SWARTZ: Okay, well, as I just said earlier, there were numerous lessons that the Navy had to relearn, because an entire generation had grown up in the Navy not knowing anything about the stuff we did in the Maritime Strategy. They didn’t know how to do the exercises, the war games, write the strategy, organize for it. They had to do it all over again, the Navy had to, and the Navy is still doing it. They’re not flailing and struggling, they’re doing it. The Navy’s pretty good, but they’re starting from scratch again because, for the whole generation that came in after the Soviet Union collapsed, there was no need for any of that, so they didn’t do any of that. They didn’t have it.

PEEKS: At what point did the Navy shift focus ...

SWARTZ: Oh, at what point? So, I would say, and I saw this at CNA, so I probably saw it better than most. I was watching the rise of the guys looking at China. Remember I’m part of the “intelligentsia” of the Navy and familiar with the idea of the rise and fall of empires and, you know, when we took over from the Brits and there were challengers and all of that. I was steeped in all of that stuff just like all of my colleagues and the other people that I talked to, and there were people in the Navy that thought that way. And so, the “China hedge,” which is what it started as, was always there. Remember: Tiananmen Square was in 1989, two years before the Soviet Union falls. So when the Navy was debating...From the Sea, Bill Manthorpe, one of the arch anti-Soviet guys of the Maritime Strategy era, comes in with something called the “Manthorpe Curve.” The Manthorpe Curve was a graph that depicts [that] every 30 years a great power tries to emerge and we’ve got to go smack them. So, right now, the last would-be great power is collapsing. So, in 30 years we’ve got to be ready. So, these are all the things we’ve got to do to be ready for the next guy who’s going to come in 30 years. And, he’s laughed out of the room. And, if you read Tom Barnett’s book, The Pentagon’s New Map, that’s steeped in the “end of history,” there’s never going to be a challenger, we’ve got to completely change the way we’ve been doing things, no more great power competition. And, there’s a section in there where he lambasts and laughs at the Manthorpe Curve. Well, of course I thought that the Manthorpe Curve was spot on. And it was.

There were Manthropes and Swartzes and others around saying, “China,” and they were always there. However, what you are being asked to do on a day-to-day basis was the Middle East, and there are some that would say that’s true today, yes, all this talk and all this new strategy. So, the Navy slowly, along with
the rest of the Pentagon, shifted to focusing on China from the start. But, there were always some who did this, believing it’s going to be China, but there were a couple—like real estate magnate Donald Trump—who said in 1987, “It's going to be Japan.” Or it's going to be a resurgent Soviet Union. So, there were China guys. They were around and they grew in power little by little, and they had their little nests in Newport and in CNA and in OPNAV to do that. But, it was the National Defense Strategy that came out last year, Secretary Mattis's defense strategy, that said, “Read my lips: It's all about great power competition.” And, the Navy said, “Finally I can disentangle from the Middle East, terrific!”

Except they’re not disentangled from the Middle East, so that's where they are right now. They've been told that it's all about great power competition. Is it? They're starting to program that way. However, you still need to supply the guys that are still out there fighting, and they’re still out there fighting, and they still need to be supported, and they haven't left Afghanistan yet. They haven't left Syria. There's still guys in Iraq. So, there are plenty of guys in the Marine Corps that believe this is all bogus—we're never going to fight Russians and we're never going to fight Chinese, but we're going to continue to fight in the Middle East—and they're being told to refocus on two things that don't matter, and they're going to lose the skills that they won, hard-earned skills that they won over the last generation, to go do the very thing they’ll be asked to do, which is go back in to the Middle East. Junior officer writings in the Marine Corps are full of that and the Commandant is cognizant of that, but he's been told, “Your near-peer competitor, he's no longer a near-peer competitor, he's now a potential adversary—a great power competitor.”

PEEKS: So, shifting tacks completely, [we] wanted to talk about some of your writing at CNA, specifically the...

SWARTZ: Yeah, I’m sorry I sent that [list of my writings] to you so late, but it didn't occur to me until I was busy doing something else—I was actually entering you into it—that I realized, I said, “Wait a minute, I should have showed these guys this thing.” I don’t know if it was of interest or not.

PEEKS: Oh, it is, and actually we got a copy from Randy Papadopoulos a couple weeks before our first session, but...

SWARTZ: Good. All right. You guys are way ahead of me.

PEEKS: One of your major projects was the U.S. Navy capstone strategy series. Could you explain how and why you wrote that?

SWARTZ: So, when John Morgan and Bryan McGrath were beginning to put together their Maritime Strategy, so-called, in 2005, one of the things that they did was they asked, or Robby Harris probably cajoled them into tasking Lockheed Martin (Robby’s firm) to run a workshop on Navy strategy. They gave him some money and Robby conceptualized and ran this great workshop, and Robby called me up and said, “I know you know a little bit about some of the other strategies. Could you put together a 45-minute brief on
the recent history of Navy strategy?” And, I said, “I guess,” and so, I got some money from somebody, and I wrote a briefing and it had 16 slides in it and I gave it to this workshop. I remember Robby and all these other guys sitting there at Lockheed Martin. And, I described Zumwalt’s Project SIXTY, maybe (or I didn’t), and I described NWP-1, I would have done that, and I described . . . From the Sea and Forward . . . From the Sea because I had participated in them. I worried that there was stuff before then, but I didn’t know very much about it, for example in the ’60s. And, of course, I knew a lot about the ’80s, as did Robby, so I talked about the Maritime Strategy and gave the briefing.

And, I was attacked from all over the room: “You forgot this and you forgot that and you didn’t address this and you didn’t address that.” I said, “Well, I’ll be damned, I didn’t even know about some of this stuff.” Robby asked me, “What about ‘Anytime, Anywhere?’” I said, “What the hell was ‘Anytime, Anywhere?’” He said, “It had been the motto of my destroyer squadron and it became the title of CNO Admiral Jay Johnson’s article in Proceedings.” And, I said, “I read the Proceedings every month, Robby, and, honest to God, I don’t remember that.” So, I had a lot of reactions like that and each time I said, “I don’t know,” then I went back and talked to Mike McDevitt or somebody—whoever I was working for at the time—and said, “We’re on to something. We ought to flesh it out”; 3,300 slides later, it had grown.

I had done it just like I had done the Maritime Strategy: I went around and murder-boarded it constantly, kept doing it, at all kinds of places. There was always a guy, I remember, like Robin Pirie, when I did it (he was the CNA vice president who had hired me and a former Under Secretary of the Navy). He raised his hand and said, “If you don’t tell me the economic background of what was going on in the budget at that time, then you haven’t told me what I need to know to understand that strategy,” and I forget which strategy that was. And then, I had guys say, “You left out the boomers,” or “You left out the Air Force,” or “You left out sealift.” And so, it just grew like Topsy, until I began to do it myself: “My God, what have I forgotten? I’ve left out the doctors. Well, to hell with the doctors. I left out shipbuilding. Well, I can’t leave out shipbuilding. I’ve got to do shipbuilding.” So, it just grew and grew and grew until, finally, it became something that was known as “The Doorstop” and it was two inches thick with 1,600 slides (there’s probably one lying around here somewhere). But, it still wasn’t done and I ran out of money and I ran out of time, and I went to see Bob Work, who was, by then, the Undersecretary of the Navy and who before that had been one of the 20 guys sitting around the table with me at that first SDG, and said, “I need some money to finish this,” and he said, “What do you need?” and I told him, and he gave me half of that and I went back to work on it. You can ask Thuý: Nights, weekends, I was always drawing slides.

I had a wonderful colleague at CNA, Karin Duggan, a graphic artist, who sat next to me and she turned my ideas into graphics and we created that. “The Doorstop” version had little posts in it, when it was two inches high. But, as I kept adding to it, I mean it couldn’t be just one publication anymore. It grew to be 3,300 slides, which was 1,650 pages, not counting several pages of text. So I broke it into 17 separate publications and that’s the origins of it. We published all 17, unclass, “Cleared for Public Release,” and posted them on
the CNA website as the “CNA Capstone Strategy Series.” Plus, we printed hard copies. People still ask me for individual copies, or sections of individual copies, or kluging together of sections from different volumes to make new volumes—you can do that with slides and computers easily. I did it all during writing this thing, and after. I'd say, “Hey, I'll send you this, I'll send you that,” because I've got it in there, and I can just pull it out.

That's really how I got involved in Navy–Marine Corps integration issues. Each of the four *U.S. Navy in the World* “decade” volumes had a background section on Navy relations with the Marine Corps, and then, I figured if I took all four of those and pulled them out of their respective documents and squeezed them together, I had a new document that was a history of Navy–Marine Corps relationships over 40 years.

Cool. So I showed it to the head of the US Marine program at CNA, Jonathan Geithner, and he said, “This is way cool,” and he showed it to CMC General Neller. So Neller said, “How come it stops at 2010?” and Jonathan said, “I don't know, because nobody asked for it or funded it,” and [Neller] said, “Well, update it;” so Jonathan and I wrote an up-to-date version, which the Corps is still using, under a new Commandant. So, it's a gift that keeps on giving. It's still going on.

**PEEKS:** Who was the intended audience for this, if there's any answer to that?

**SWARTZ:** Basically, for me, the way I look at things, it's the Navy officer corps. That's always my core intended audience. But, obviously, it has spinoffs and the way to reach the Navy officer corps is not just directly from me, but indirectly through you guys or other folks, so I'm happy to send it to anybody and explain it to anybody, because I know that once you get it, you might be able to reference it and use it. And, you're more credible in your fields than I am, so I'll use you guys, so that's why I vetted it over here at NHHC, briefed it over here. It could never be briefed again in its entirety now that it’s got 3,300 slides, but broken into pieces, it became useful. Somebody will ask me a question and I'll say, “Okay, look at page 22 of this particular volume.” I made sure that it was cleared for public release, but we had a couple of sections that Bob Work’s people took out. So with a couple of exceptions, the whole 3,300-slide shebang got printed.

**PEEKS:** So, I've always been curious [about] that—was there a conscious decision that you made to do that in slide format instead of in prose?

**SWARTZ:** Yes, it was supposed to be—the way it started—it was supposed to be in slide-and-text format, with the slide on the top of the page and text on the bottom. My ability to create slides outran my ability and time and money to create text. Some of the volumes have text in them. The volume on Navy–Air Force relationships does (that was in support of the Air/Sea Battle initiative). The volume *What to Consider before You Write One* does. A couple of them have that, but when we were all done with the slides, I said, “It'll take the rest of my life now to write out the text that goes to it and we don't have any more time. We ran out of money, we ran out of time, and I said we've got to cap it. 2010 is a good place to cap it. It's the end
of a decade. This is as far as I’ve gotten.” Also, people at CNA wanted me to move on to do other things. I became a manager. And so on. So, yes, it’s incomplete.

But I then turn around to all you guys and say “Okay, I’ve given you the skeleton, fill it in, go for it.” Sebastian Bruns did that. It was the origins of Sebastian’s dissertation and books, and of Pete Haynes’s dissertation and book. I gave them all of those slides and said, “Turn it into prose,” and they did—and then some. So, the real answer to the prose issue is “other people are doing it for me.” Sebastian, Pete Haynes, Steve Wills. I don’t know what Michael Haas is doing with it on his dissertation. It was the basis for Amund Lundesgaard’s dissertation in Oslo, too. Anyway, it’s for posterity to use. Obviously it’s not useful in some circumstances, but, of course, it’s easy to build briefs from it: Pulling slides out and putting together a brief is a piece of cake now. You just mix and match. That’s why I could do the Navy–Marine Corps paper. And, if somebody says, “You got anything on sealift?” I say, “Yes, I have a history of U.S. Navy sealift from 1970 to 2010”—you know, I just extract four sections and then squeeze them together. It takes five minutes to send it to somebody.

PEEKS: We’re just about out of time. I don’t know if we can get through all of the final questions, but I guess the first question that I want to ask is, looking back on your career, both the Navy portion and the CNA portion, how would you account for its success?

SWARTZ: I worked hard. I’m smart. I had a good education in this business, at Brown, at SAIS, and at Columbia. I had extraordinary experience tours: two tours in Vietnam, my first tour in OP-60 (in which I actually did some very useful things in their own right, but in retrospect was just the prelude to the Maritime Strategy). I attracted the eye of some important people who were helpful, three of whom were giants: Zumwalt, Lehman, Powell. But, many other great people. I got to work for some terrific officers, especially Commander John Walker in Vietnam, Captain Roger Barnett on the Maritime Strategy, et cetera, and they were superb role models. And, the peculiarities of my situation, where I was kept in the Navy even though I didn't have a “real” Navy career, wound up being an advantage in that I wasn’t associated with any one community and I was always the guy who was trying to figure out how it all fit together, which is something that most naval officers don't do until they’ve got three stars, and I was doing it as a junior officer, because I wasn’t aspiring to be captain of a ship (and therefore I didn't have to focus on the myriad elements of surface warfare) or be a CO of a squadron (and therefore I didn't need to know how to fly the airplane). I was always trying to get my arms around the whole Navy and I had been doing that since I was a midshipmen. So those all, I suppose, were the building blocks.

PEEKS: Following up on that, would you have any advice for young naval officers looking to follow a similar career path?

SWARTZ: Yeah, I’m trying—but let me finish up on the earlier thing. I knew I was leaving some things out.
First, I’ve got Thuý. I couldn’t have done any of that stuff without having an anchor at home who was exactly what I needed and wanted, the love of my life. That’s been part of it. And kids to be proud of. A joy being around. I wasn’t leaving work going, “Oh my God, now I have to go home to this harpy or harridan,” or whatever. I was anxious to go home and see Thuý and the kids. So, that was all good.

The second thing that I left out that was important was that I was surrounded by a superb group of fellow naval officers equally conversant in strategy and policy issues except they also went to sea and knew how to do those things. I don’t know if I would have been as successful in the other places that I was looking at when I was starting out in this business—CIA or the State Department or academia—but I came to really enjoy working with Navy officers. By contrast, I learned from dealing with Marines and Army guys and Air Force guys that I fit with Navy officers. For a guy who didn’t go to sea, I don’t know why that is, but it is. And so, the mentors, the bosses, the support I had at home, and the colleagues that I had: I think that’s what I would add, as to why I was successful.

One of the things that I didn’t do was hitch my star to one particular guy and he carried me. I never was “Powell’s guy,” or “Lehman’s guy,” or “Zumwalt’s guy.” There were always other people that were in the inner circles. I was sort of always in a second circle outside. I knew all those guys, but when the main guy left and the “Thermidorian Reactions” would kick in, and they started guillotining the guys who used to be on top, they always missed me because I was never—I wasn’t Zumwalt’s right arm, I wasn’t Powell’s right arm (Actually, nobody ever guillotined anybody working for Powell, I’ll bet. Powell was the exception. He was terrific.)—but I wasn’t a Zumwalt or Lehman guy who the knives were out for, so that was part of it, too. I was, however, “the Navy’s guy.” I had two joint tours, and served well in them, but I never stopped being “the Navy’s guy.”

Advice to other Navy officers, to try to replicate what I tried to do? I mean, it was so situational, but:

- Get a good education, one that’s relevant to what it is you’re trying to do;
- Have experience tours that teach you the craft of doing what you’re trying to do;
- Don’t be hyper-competitive. (I can name some names of folks who look down their nose at everybody else, and [are] always trying to slash and burn against everybody.) You’re not going to build the support group that way. There’s plenty of guys who are all elbows and knees. They’re successful largely because they’re good at sea, but I couldn’t have done what I did by being hyper-competitive and obnoxious to all of my peers, I tried to be helpful and collaborative;
- Again, exploit opportunities.

One of my techniques that I probably learned working for Zumwalt in Vietnam was: So, if they tell you to do something, the admiral wants it done. He doesn’t want to hear why it’s a bad idea. So, you’ve got to do what he told you and you’ve got to write it up. Once you’re done with that, though, now you’ve got the entrée to tell them why it was a stupid idea or why you’ve got a better idea or why you’ve got a second idea,
which is different from that “but as long as I’m here I’d like to …” So, that means you’ve got to do twice as much or three times as much work. So, you’re back to working hard. But, if you don’t do that, watch out—I watched John Lehman fire admirals who kept coming in telling him why something couldn’t be done. He didn’t want to hear that. Actually, I never saw him, I went through Kelso or Johnson or Piotti, but I would say, “Okay, here’s the answer to what he asked. Now, let me tell you why that was not the right question to ask and why this other question was the right question to ask.”

It’s one of the reasons why I fit in at CNA, because that’s a very CNA approach: You’ve got to get the question right. “I understand that you just asked that question. I understand that’s the one that you want the answer to, Admiral, and here’s a stab at it. But, the deeper I got into it, the more I realized that it wasn’t the right question. The right question is X, and here’s the beginnings of an answer to it. But, if you just keep going in saying, “Well, you didn’t ask me the right question, Admiral, so here, I went and did this other thing, which is better …,” that’s a good way to get fired. So, that’s part of it. Seize opportunities in the taskers you get to write what you think and what you believe, and push your ideas forward, but you’ve also got to answer the mail. Otherwise, the guy’s just going to get pissed off at you. This means you’ve got to work hard, and when you come home at 8 o’clock at night, you’ve got to have a wonderful woman and family waiting for you after that long day of giving the admiral what he wanted and then also giving the admiral what you thought he needed.

PEEKS: Alright, we’re almost out of time here, so final question, is there anything that we’ve not discussed that you’d like to touch on before we close?

SWARTZ: No, I think. I mean, this has been exhausting enough and thank you for all the good work you guys do. We didn’t touch a lot on my relationship with NHHC. It’s hard to do this without touching on it, but I drew on your predecessors and I’m happy now to be in the position where the thing is reversed and I can add to your experience and your store of knowledge for all the good work that you do, and, I mean, this book on the USN NORPAC experience during World War II that NHC did for PACEX 89 [U.S. Naval Experience in the North Pacific During World War II: Selected Documents]. I’ve just discovered it. I hadn’t known about it. I read about it and said, “I’ll be damned, I didn’t know that they did that. Good for the system, right? The system worked.”

Mike Palmer was my main point of contact at NHC who was doing that sort of thing, when I was drafting my version of the Maritime Strategy, before he left. So again, in the ‘80s, I mean, there was a community. Later, somebody in OPNAV got a hold of Mike after I knew him and after I left the office, and talked to Ron Spector or Dean Allard or somebody, and Mike was then assigned to OP-603 for, like, a year. He actually physically was over there, yeah, as part of his tour. I remember that. It wasn’t when I was working with him—when he did Origins of the Maritime Strategy—but after he did Origins. He was famous among the Navy strategy officers—and Mike was quick. He could write and he could write fast. He didn't procrastinate.
So, he was awfully good. I hope he's doing well. I haven't seen him in years. Maybe he'll be in Annapolis in September. I don't know.

**PEEKS:** Thank you very much for your time!

**BLANTON:** Thank you!

**SWARTZ:** Thank you for doing this.