The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor

VOLUME IV
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CHAPTER IV

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CHAPTER IV

PART A—HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS

(October 17, 1941 – November 20, 1941)

Advent of the Tojo Cabinet and Redoubling of Japanese Government’s Insistence Upon an Early Acceptance of Its Proposals.

1. Ambassador Nomura Complains of Lack of Coordination Between Japanese Foreign Office and Navy (October 18, 1941)

Following the change of government in Japan, Ambassador Nomura on October 18, 1941, offered his congratulations to the new Cabinet. At the same time, however, he pointed out that throughout the term of the former Japanese Cabinet he had been unable to accomplish anything through Japanese-American conversations. According to Ambassador Nomura, certain things which had taken place in spite of his personal recommendations had forced him to question his own value to a future Japanese government.

Since Minister Wakasugi and Mr. Iguchi were capable of handling negotiations, Ambassador Nomura requested that he be allowed to return to Japan in order to report personally on the existing Japanese-American situation and to receive instructions regarding future policies.1

Two days later, on October 20, 1941, Ambassador Nomura stated that, since his appointment to the post in the United States, there had existed a complete lack of coordination between the Japanese Navy Department and the Japanese Foreign Office.2

Referring again to Japanese-American problems, Ambassador Nomura emphasized that, although the United States might desire to avoid military action in the Pacific because it was already faced with war on the Atlantic front, America would still refuse to renounce its national policies even to effect a conciliation. In Ambassador Nomura’s opinion, China was primarily responsible for the present attitude of the United States toward Japan. For that reason, Ambassador Nomura had attempted to bring about a “modus vivendi” between the two countries, leaving out the China question entirely. But Secretary Hull had insisted that China was inseparably concerned with the stability of the Pacific. However, from a conversation with Lord Halifax, Ambassador Nomura learned that Great Britain agreed with Japan that a “modus vivendi” should be worked out in order to avoid a crisis in the Far East.

At the conclusion of his report, Ambassador Nomura re-emphasized his ineffective position as Ambassador from Japan possibly because of his lack of understanding of the principles of the present Japanese government.3 In fact, Ambassador Nomura frankly stated that he should have been asked to resign along with the members of the former Japanese Cabinet. In spite of the encouragement of Secretary Hull and other American statesmen who trusted his sincerity, Ambassador Nomura recognized that his lack of actual influence in Japan forced him to lead a hypocritical existence as Japanese Ambassador to the United States. Although not anxious “to flee from the field of battle”, Ambassador Nomura urged his government to order his recall.4

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2Appendix IV, No. 1. Hereafter Appendix IV will be referred to as IV, 1.
3IV, 2.
4Ibid.
"
2. Tokyo Refuses Ambassador Nomura’s Resignation (October 23, 1941)

After considering Ambassador Nomura’s report of the Japanese-American situation and his request for a transfer of duty, on October 23, 1941 Tokyo asked that Ambassador Nomura sacrifice his personal wishes and remain at his post. Assuring Ambassador Nomura that the Japanese government was relying completely upon his judgement, Tokyo stated that the policies of the Japanese government, determined by the outcome of these negotiations, would be based upon the information which Ambassador Nomura forwarded.5


Agreeing with Ambassador Nomura that the Japanese Embassy in Washington must be kept well informed on any changes of policy made in Tokyo, the Foreign Office assured the Japanese Ambassador that instructions had been unavoidably delayed because of the formation of a new Cabinet.6 Tokyo assured Ambassador Nomura, however, that the new Cabinet still retained the desire of the former Japanese government to adjust relations with the United States on an equitable basis. Yet, Ambassador Nomura was told that the Japanese government, having set forth its principles completely, could take no further action.

In order to emphasize Japan’s desire that a formal United States counter proposal to the Japanese document of September 25, 1941 be submitted, the Japanese government urged Ambassador Nomura to discuss this matter discreetly with American representatives.7

4. Ambassador Nomura Reports British-German Peace Rumors8

Realizing that the trend of events in Europe would affect the situation in the Pacific, Ambassador Nomura kept his government informed on developments in the war between Britain and Germany.

In the latter part of October, 1941 Ambassador Nomura was told that Germany was preparing to offer Great Britain generous peace terms. Since the British public was apparently satisfied with taking Ethiopia, Syria and Iraq, and since Lloyd George appeared to be gaining in popularity over Prime Minister Churchill, it was thought that Hitler’s offer of peace might be accepted. On the other hand, Ambassador Nomura believed that the English people would continue to place their trust in Prime Minister Churchill and that President Roosevelt, representing the United States government as a whole, would assist the British in withstanding German movements.

Yet, Ambassador Nomura felt it necessary to point out that up until this time his informant had believed in a German defeat while now he was convinced that Germany and Great Britain were ready to arrive at a satisfactory peace.9

5. Welles-Wakasugi Conversation (October 24, 1941)

a. Under Secretary Welles’ Report10

At his own request Mr. Wakasugi called upon Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles on October 24, 1941 to inform the United States government that the new Japanese Cabinet desired to continue the informal conversations with a view to resuming friendly diplomatic and economic relations.

Mr. Wakasugi then inquired whether the United States had any counter proposals to make to those offered by Tokyo on September 25, 1941. In reply, Mr. Welles pointed out that during
the past seven or eight months the United States government had earnestly endeavored to establish the basis for an equitable agreement between the two governments. However, recent statements made by prominent authorities of the Japanese army and navy and other parts of that government had created an atmosphere detrimental to the conclusion of such an agreement.11 The recent public statement made by an officer of the Japanese navy declaring that the Japanese navy was “itching to fight”12 had had an undesirable effect upon the American navy. Furthermore, Mr. Welles continued, the tone of articles and editorials appearing in Japanese newspapers created a serious obstacle to any satisfactory agreement which might be arrived at during the informal conversations.

In an attempt to show that the attitude of the United States government was not wholly conducive to peace, Minister Wakasugi stated that he had seen a statement by Secretary Knox indicating that because war between Japan and the United States was inevitable, the United States navy was forced to remain on twenty-four hour duty. In correcting this interpretation, Mr. Welles insisted that the statement attributed to Secretary Knox merely implied that the situation was such that some incident might possibly occur and consequently the United States navy must be prepared for an emergency. If the Japanese navy was willing to announce that “it was itching to fight” with the United States, Mr. Welles pointed out, the United States navy had to adopt precautionary measures. Although anxious to find a successful outcome to the present conversations, Under Secretary Welles said, the United States government must seriously consider the attitude of the Japanese press and public as a whole.

In answering Minister Wakasugi’s questions regarding American counter proposals to those offered by Japan on September 25, 1941, Mr. Welles stated that both he and Secretary Hull in previous conversations with Mr. Wakasugi had emphasized that the views of the United States government had been completely clarified in the communication handed to the Japanese government on June 21, 1941. Since another United States document was delivered to the Japanese Embassy on October 2, 1941, Mr. Welles did not feel that any further counter proposals would be forthcoming from his government. In fact, during the last conversation between Mr. Hull and Minister Wakasugi, the American Secretary of State had impressed upon the Japanese representative the benefits which Japan would derive from following those economic principles already laid down by the American government in the documents mentioned. Minister Wakasugi stated that he had transmitted the details of that conversation to his government but had received no opinions upon it from Tokyo.

As far back as April 1941, Minister Wakasugi declared, he had urged Ambassador Nomura to find a practical, concrete basis for an agreement with the United States on any phase of the situation affecting the Pacific. However, the interference of both American and Japanese gentlemen, introducing certain peace formulas without any authority from either government, had succeeded in complicating the situation. Since these unofficial, unauthorized documents had created misunderstandings, Minister Wakasugi suggested that a fresh approach to the situation be made by having both governments submit entirely new formulas, setting forth basic principles upon which to formulate peace. Mr. Welles stated that all the officials of the United States government would be willing to contribute any time and effort necessary to arrive at a satisfactory agreement.

11Ibid.
12Captain Hideo Hiraide, Director of the Naval Intelligence Section of Imperial Headquarters, Stated—“the Imperial Navy is itching for action when needed.” It is important to note here that the promotion of Premier Tojo to full General (New York Times, October 19, 1:6), and the statement of Naval Minister Shimada that the Japanese navy was ready for any situation, added to the existing martial atmosphere. (New York Times, October 20, 1941, 3:1, 3, 4.)
13The New York Times reported that Secretary Knox’s statement that a Japanese-American war was inevitable and the clash of the two countries only a few days ahead, was viewed in Japan as unfortunate. (October 25, 1941, 1:8).
From the standpoint of expediency, Mr. Welles felt it advisable to reach an agreement on the economic principles first. Therefore he was anxious to illustrate to the new Japanese Cabinet the practical advantages Japan would experience if Secretary Hull's economic policies were adopted. Mr. Welles pointed out that the abolition of such trade barriers as British Imperial preferences, Japan would be able to trade with Canada, Australia and New Zealand without danger of discrimination.

Mr. Wakasugi agreed wholeheartedly, but he insisted that a lack of natural resources made Japan the victim of economic aggression and encirclement. Under Secretary Welles returned that Japan's modern history up to the year 1930, a time when its relationship with both Great Britain and the United States was most friendly, showed Japan capable of becoming one of the great powers of the world. Mr. Welles continued that only Hitler's propaganda about the "have and have not nations" had caused Japan to adopt its aggressive policies. Disagreeing with Mr. Welles' conclusions, Minister Wakasugi asserted that Japan had pursued its own national determinations of policy regardless of Germany or Italy, and in spite of the liberal tendencies of Japan's younger generation. Nevertheless, Mr. Welles replied, Japan had allied itself officially and publicly with the Axis policies. Mr. Wakasugi made no comment, but turned the conversation to the Japanese-Chinese situation. In order that every approach be undertaken to settle this conflict, Minister Wakasugi suggested that Mr. Welles meet with the Chinese Ambassador and any other Chinese officials to discuss the problems in a purely unofficial manner. If President Roosevelt intended to mediate in the peace between Japan and China, Minister Wakasugi believed it advantageous to ascertain the attitude of the Chiang Kai-shek government. Since Under Secretary of State Welles did not feel authorized to give even a personal and unofficial response without careful consideration, he promised to discuss the suggestion in a future conversation with Mr. Wakasugi.

Although Minister Wakasugi made no reference to any plans for Ambassador Nomura's departure, he specifically stated that the conversations between the two governments would be resumed as soon as detailed instructions were forthcoming from Tokyo. After promising to notify Secretary Welles of any further instructions from his government without delay, Minister Wakasugi ended the conversation.14

b. Minister Wakasugi's Report

In compliance with Tokyo's instructions, Ambassador Nomura ordered Minister Wakasugi to continue his informal conversations with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles in a friendly fashion.15

Throughout the hour-long conversation with Mr. Welles, Minister Wakasugi attempted to explain that the new Japanese Cabinet, anxious for an immediate readjustment of relations, saw no reason why negotiations should not be concluded without further delay since the Japanese government had entirely clarified its principles. Minister Wakasugi then asked that the United States make a counter proposal to the Japanese document of September 25, 1941. Mr. Welles pointed out that the attitude of Japanese statesmen and newspapers was provoking the breach of diplomatic relations, and cited the example of the naval spokesman who said that "the Japanese navy is 'itching for action.'"16

In reply, Minister Wakasugi referred to the criticisms of Japan that Senator Pepper had made and to the speech of Secretary Knox, who was quoted as saying that a Japanese-American war was only a few days off. To convince Minister Wakasugi that this speech was merely intended as a morale-builder for the United States Navy, Mr. Welles said that Secretary Knox often used exaggerated terms to achieve this purpose. Furthermore, Mr. Welles blamed the
newspapers for placing too much emphasis on certain passages of the speech, thereby throwing the entire speech out of proportion.

In replying to Minister Wakasugi's request for an American counter proposal to the Japanese statement of September 25, 1941, Mr. Welles stated that the principles of his government were clearly set forth in the United States proposal of June 21, 1941. However, Mr. Welles felt that a solution could be effected if the wording of the American proposal of June 21, 1941 were adjusted to parallel that of the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941.

Since the mere consideration of each paragraph of past proposals would only result in the repetition of old arguments, Mr. Welles suggested that a general agreement be reached on the three major problems by means of a new short-cut formula. First of all, Under Secretary of State Welles continued, it would be necessary to work out some understanding with regard to commerce. At this point in the conversation Mr. Welles asked if Minister Wakasugi had transmitted Secretary Hull's proposal to his government. Minister Wakasugi assured Mr. Welles that he had done so. Mr. Welles then touched on the possibility of adjusting the United States and Japanese views toward the Tripartite Pact.

Finally, when Mr. Welles turned the discussion to the China question, Minister Wakasugi asked that United States authorities enumerate suggestions in the form of a proposal and submit them to the Japanese representatives during the next conversation.

Next Minister Wakasugi mentioned the matter of the two Japanese tankers and three ships of the NYK line. All arrangements for the sailing of these NYK vessels had been completed by the Treasury Department. However, with regard to the matter of the tankers, Mr. Welles said, the United States banking laws required strict investigation of all deposits. In view of the fact that the money allotted to these ships had been transferred to an account with the Yokohama Specie Bank and because of the United States' freezing order, it was impossible to release the funds either in cash or draft form. In an effort to maintain some degree of the former friendly Japanese-American trade relations, Mr. Welles promised that the State Department would assist in transferring the money through an American bank.

6. Tokyo Urges American Reply to Japanese Proposals

Anxious to receive the United States' reply to its proposals of September 25, 1941, the Foreign Office in Tokyo urged Ambassador Nomura to attempt to ascertain the United States' attitude through the continuation of the informal conversations. The Japanese government hoped that American views would be clarified during the Welles-Wakasugi talk on October 25, 1941.

In answering Ambassador Nomura's questions regarding a message sent by the Military General Staff, the Japanese government stated that the General Staff was studying the results of the Japanese-American negotiations in an attempt to establish a national basic policy.

7. Ambassador Nomura Confers with Admiral Pratt (October 25, 1941)

On October 27, 1941 Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo that on October 25 he had spoken with Admiral Pratt concerning the Japanese-American situation. At that time

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17 IV, 9.
18 IV, 10.
19 Ibid.
20 IV, 11.
21 IV, 12.
22 The State Department records no conversation between Under Secretary of State Welles and Minister Wakasugi on October 25, 1941.
23 IV, 7.
24 IV, 12.
25 IV, 13.
Admiral Pratt had admitted to Ambassador Nomura that economic warfare produced results as devastating as actual armed conflict.

In regard to open warfare between the two countries, however, Admiral Pratt expressed the opinion that war would not be declared should Japan's aggression in the Far East be limited to China. If Japan moved either northward or southward, Admiral Pratt warned, war between the United States and Japan might be declared, although the final decision would rest with President Roosevelt and Emperor Hirohito.

Agreeing that Secretary Knox's speech was unfortunate, Admiral Pratt stated that Japan should be considered when any magazine articles or radio speeches were written. In an attempt to give Ambassador Nomura a clear picture of the navy's attitude toward Japan, Admiral Pratt said that the views of Admiral Stark, who was actually the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and those of President Roosevelt coincided. Admiral Pratt continued by saying that President Roosevelt sincerely desired to maintain the peace and stability of the Pacific area, and that the views of Admiral Hart must be considered since he was a man of strong influence.

Referring then to the European war, Admiral Pratt said that Mr. Harriman, recently sent to Russia by the United States, had reported that Germany would be the victor in the German-Russian war and that Stalin was not even in a position to discuss peace.

Italy's status in the European war was a little unstable, according to Admiral Pratt; he did not feel that Italy could afford to seek a separate peace since it would put that country in a position similar to that of France.

In concluding his talk with Ambassador Nomura, Admiral Pratt said that the Atlantic should be saved for Great Britain and that Japan, in order to have a voice in the peace, should maintain its naval strength and avoid impairing its might on the seas.

8. Minister Wakasugi Reports on Status of Japanese-American Relations

Since Japanese-American relations were approaching a crisis, Minister Wakasugi felt it necessary to send Tokyo an informal report on the general attitude toward the Pacific situation which he had observed through numerous conferences with American representatives. The basic policy of the United States, according to Minister Wakasugi, was the desire to crush so-called "Hitlerism" throughout the world. In order to prevent the establishment of this new order through the force of arms, the United States set up Great Britain and China as a first line of national defense. Determined to plan for a long-term program of peace, the United States instructed its government and people that no local agreements concerning separate questions in the Pacific area could be drawn up with Japan. For that reason, Secretary Hull insisted upon a general understanding covering the entire Pacific area.

During the conversation between Mr. Wakasugi and Mr. Welles on October 24, 1941, the Under Secretary of State had made it clear that the United States would continue to advocate absolute non-discrimination for Japan, the United States, Britain, China, Australia and the Netherlands East Indies throughout the Pacific. Under this policy every nation offered to other countries opportunities equal to those existing between itself and its colonies. To this statement Minister Wakasugi replied that the United States presumed that Japan would develop French Indo-Chinese and Thai-sea areas in a monopolistic manner by means of military force. For that reason, the United States insisted that all countries be given equal access to the natural resources of French Indo-China and Thailand.

Referring next to the effect of the China problem on Japanese-American relations, Minister Wakasugi said that the United States would deal with it as only one phase of the "peace in the Pacific" issue. Furthermore, Minister Wakasugi reminded Tokyo that Secretary Hull

\[^{26}\text{Ibid.}\]
\[^{27}\text{IV, 14.}\]
had once stated to former Ambassador Saito that the United States would never war with Japan over China. On the other hand, China was relying solely upon the United States for aid in carrying on its warfare with Japan. Mr. T. V. Soong and other Chinese officials were negotiating with the Treasury Department to secure even greater financial assistance for their country. In view of the fact that China was entirely dependent upon the United States, it did not seem probable that the United States would cut off its aid to China.

Yet, in spite of the insistence of the United States to continue supplying China with the means for continuing its warfare with Japan, Mr. Welles, on October 24, 1941, had assured Minister Wakasugi that the United States would not be unreasonable in making demands upon Japan. Although the implications of his statement were not entirely clear to Minister Wakasugi, he felt that they could be interpreted as meaning that the United States would not insist that Japan withdraw its troops from China immediately. Regardless of any interpretation placed upon the statements made by American officials, however, it was apparent that Japanese-American relations were at a breaking-point.

Although the United States insisted that it was anxious to adjust conditions between the two countries, it was willing to effect an agreement only on the basis of its June 21 and October 22, 1941 proposals. Minister Wakasugi did not believe that the United States' informal conversations were means of gaining time, however, since American preparations in the event of war were already completed. At the same time, Minister Wakasugi did not expect that any further counter proposals would be forthcoming from the United States government nor that any concessions would be made. If Japan were to insist upon an immediate settlement of differences, Minister Wakasugi believed that all negotiations would be terminated. Therefore, he suggested that the Japanese government continue the informal conversations in a continued attempt to break down differences of opinion.

Minister Wakasugi asked that the new Japanese Cabinet inform him of its basic policies as speedily as possible in order that he might know what attitude to take in future conversations with American representatives.28

9. Ambassador Nomura Reveals American Attitude Toward Japan

The same day, October 29, 1941, Ambassador Nomura sent a similar report to his government, reporting on the general attitude seen throughout official circles regarding the present situation with Japan.29

Because the Middle West was populated by many Americans of German descent, this section of the country opposed war with Germany but favored a Japanese-American war. In reporting this condition to Mr. Kasai, Admiral Standley stated that Germany's propaganda had been very effective. The Editor of the Army-Navy Journal, had also expressed the opinion that German propaganda was largely responsible for the pro-German attitude of the Middle West.

Furthermore, Secretary Hull, speaking before Congress, pointed to the Tripartite Pact as an instrument to be used against the United States. By cutting off United States' aid to Great Britain, Germany hoped to push America's line of defense back to its shores. Although desiring peace, Secretary Hull felt that the United States must not exhibit weakness by consenting to the demands of the Axis powers. Secretary Hull felt that Tokyo, as well as Berlin, would increase its demands unless the United States built up a strength too powerful for either nation to face. Secretary Hull felt that Japan's attitude toward the Tripartite Pact would be largely determined by the outcome of the German-Russian war.

28Ibid.
29IV, 15.
In the report of Secretary Hull's speech, printed in the *New York Times* on October 28, 1941, Secretary Hull was quoted as saying that the situation was "very delicate and very changeable".

Ambassador Nomura had further learned from one of his representatives that Assistant Secretary of State, Breckenridge Long, had said that the United States would not be able to arrive at any agreement before November 15 when the Japanese Diet would meet.

In reporting Britain's attitude toward the Japanese-American situation, Lord Halifax said that although Great Britain would back the United States' policies in accordance with Prime Minister Churchill's speech, the British hoped that Japan would give the Pacific problems thorough study and arrive at a satisfactory answer. Lord Halifax declined to discuss British or American embargo restrictions on Japan. 30

10. Ambassador Grew's Report (October 25, 1941) 31

On October 25, 1941 Ambassador Grew, reporting the details of a conversation with a reliable Japanese informant, learned that while the Konoye Cabinet was in power, the Japanese Emperor had called a conference of the leading members of the Privy Council and the Japanese armed forces. When the representatives of the Japanese army and navy refused to give a definite indication that they were prepared to pursue a peaceful policy in their relations with the United States, the Japanese Emperor, following the progressive policy of his grandfather, Emperor Meiji, issued the unprecedented command that the armed forces obey his wishes. As a result of this action, a new Prime Minister in control of the army was necessarily selected and General Tojo, on the army active list, was appointed to the position.

In spite of the recent anti-American attitude of the Japanese press, the informant insisted that the present political leaders desired nothing more than an immediate adjustment of relations with the United States. In an endeavor to conclude the present conversations successfully, Mr. Togo, the new Foreign Minister, promised to resign his post if he failed in attaining this goal.

Even though the principal difficulty between the United States and Japan was the question of Japanese armed forces in China and French Indo-China, the Japanese informant felt that the leaders of his government would be able to settle the problems satisfactorily if Japan were not asked to remove all its troops immediately. For the first time in ten years, the informant continued, the political organization in Japan presented an opportunity for reorientation of policy and action. 32

In Ambassador Grew's own opinion, the Japanese leaders appeared willing to forsake any expansionists' plans for a workable understanding with the United States. At the present time, however, the Japanese press was commenting to a great extent on Secretary Knox's remarks regarding the United States' conviction that Japan's policy of expansion would eventually end in an unavoidable conflict with the United States. 33

Ambassador Grew pointed to his remarks made in a telegram sent to Secretary Hull on September 29, 1941 in which he stated that constructive results could be produced by a meeting of the leaders of the two governments if an agreement were reached in the preliminary discussions. At that time, Ambassador Grew believed that the United States would face a greatly increased risk of war if it would not take the present opportunity of halting Japan's aggressive program by continuing negotiations. Unless the United States placed a reasonable amount of confidence in Prince Konoye's objective and, in this way, created a new orientation in Japan which would eventually lead to an improvement in Japanese-American relations, the initial force and impetus of these informal conversations would be entirely lost. 34

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31 "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)" October 25, 1941, S.D. II, 697-698.
33 "Memorandum of Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)" October 25, 1941, S.D. II, 698-699.
34 "The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State", September 29, 1941, S.D. II, 648-650.
If the Japanese Emperor were actually engaged in the formulation of Japan’s policy, then Ambassador Grew was convinced that General Tojo and Foreign Minister Togo would probably produce more concrete concessions at future conversations. However, Ambassador Grew assured the American State Department that he would initiate nothing in his conversations in Tokyo without instructions.\(^35\)

Ambassador Grew referred again to his telegram of September 29, 1941, stating that unless the Japanese Emperor had taken his present active interest in the Japanese-American conversations, unbridled anti-American feeling would undoubtedly have sprung up throughout Japan, resulting in the formation of a military dictatorship lacking either the disposition or temperament to avoid war with the United States.\(^36\)

11. Grew-Togo Interview (October 30, 1941)

a. Ambassador Grew’s Report\(^37\)

At a reception for Mr. Shigenori Togo, the new Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Togo spoke of the deterioration of relations between the United States and Japan, emphasizing his desire to conclude quickly and successfully the informal conversations and requesting the continued cooperation of Ambassador Grew.

Urging the United States to face certain realities related to the stationing of Japanese armed forces in China, Mr. Togo pointed out that Russian troops were stationed in Outer Mongolia and the soldiery of other nations were maintained in certain areas of China. After assuring Foreign Minister Togo of his desire to cooperate, Ambassador Grew stated that the main conversations must necessarily take place in Washington because of President Roosevelt’s active interest in them. Nevertheless, parallel discussions in Tokyo would afford an opportunity for enlarging upon the views of the United States government regarding any changes of Japan’s attitude.

In the past, Ambassador Grew said, he had made it a practice to keep the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs well informed on the conversations in Washington as reported directly to him by Secretary Hull. By way of example, Ambassador Grew then presented Mr. Togo with a paraphrased report of Under Secretary of State Welles’ conversation with Minister Wakasugi on October 24, 1941. After Mr. Togo assured Ambassador Grew that he wanted to be kept informed on all correspondence relating to these conversations, the interview was ended.

Before leaving the Japanese office, Mr. Toshikazu Kase, who had acted as interpreter during the reception, told Ambassador Grew that he had been appointed the new Chief of the First Section of the American Bureau in the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Because of his long and pleasant association with Mr. Kase, Ambassador Grew expressed his approval of this appointment.\(^38\)

b. Foreign Minister Togo’s Report\(^39\)

On November 2, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo sent Ambassador Nomura a report of his reception for the Japanese diplomatic corps and his subsequent conversation with Ambassador Grew on October 30, 1941.

During the discussion with Ambassador Grew, Foreign Minister Togo had stated that during the six months of informal negotiations, Japanese-American relations had steadily grown worse. In order to arrive at a workable understanding, Foreign Minister Togo urged

\(^35\)"Memorandum of Comment by Ambassador in Japan (Grew)" October 25, 1941, S.D. II, 698–699.

\(^36\)"The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State", September 29, 1941, S.D. II, 648–649.

\(^37\)"Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", October 30, 1941, S.D. II, 699–700.

\(^38\)Ibid.

\(^39\)IV, 16–17.
the United States to view the oriental situation more realistically. By way of example the
Japanese Foreign Minister pointed out that there were other countries besides Japan with
occupation forces stationed in China. Although Outer Mongolia was actually a part of Chinese
territory, Russia concentrated large forces there. Therefore, the Japanese government could
not understand why the United States did not appreciate Japan's attitude toward evacuating
its troops. Ambassador Grew stated that he would like to continue amicable parleys between his
country and Japan.40

Foreign Minister Togo had already discussed the Utopian attitude of the United States
toward the Far Eastern situation with British Ambassador Craigie on October 26, 1941. At
that time, Foreign Minister Togo stated that the United States' policies were too theoretical
and offered small chance of settling Far Eastern problems. Insisting that the situation would
not permit further procrastination, Foreign Minister Togo urged Ambassador Craigie to
cooperate in improving Japanese-English-American relations in order to reestablish
and maintain world peace.41

12. Tokyo Questions Nomura on American Proposal
Since the Japanese government was concerned with the relationship between the proposals
submitted by the United States and Japan, it questioned Ambassador Nomura on November
1, 1941 on the exchange of official text. Tokyo wished more complete information on those
sections of the United States proposal submitted on June 21, 1941 which referred to the
European war, non-discrimination in trade and peace between Japan and China.42

According to a message which Ambassador Nomura had sent Tokyo in June 194143, it
appeared that the United States government's views differed widely from those held by
Japan, and that the United States refused to understand Japan's right for self defense. Al-
though the new Japanese Cabinet did not want to bring up old issues, it nevertheless requested
more complete information concerning the exchange of official notes between the two
countries.44

In reply, Ambassador Nomura stated that he had refused to relay the text of the American
proposals since the United States had not modified its demands or made any further
concessions and, therefore, the proposals issued by Japan and the United States differed
too greatly to effect any conciliation.45

13. New Japanese Cabinet Discusses Formulation of Policies
Since the formation of the new Japanese Cabinet on October 17, 1941, meetings had been
held with the Imperial Headquarters in order to determine the policies of the new government.

On November 2, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo notified Ambassador Nomura that a final
decision on the fundamental policy to be adopted would be reached on November 5, 1941
at the meeting of the Japanese Diet. In view of the fact that Japan was about to make its last
effort to improve relations with the United States, Foreign Minister Togo urged Ambassador
Nomura to handle all the problems with extreme care.46

The following day, Ambassador Nomura told the Japanese government that he would meet
with Secretary Hull in a few days and requested that he be advised of the Cabinet's decision
on policy before that time. If this were impossible, Ambassador Nomura asked that he be
instructed what points to emphasize when speaking with Secretary Hull.47

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40 IV, 16.
41 IV, 17.
42 IV, 18.
43 II, 78.
44 IV, 18.
45 IV, 19.
46 IV, 20.
47 IV, 21.

On November 3, 1941 Ambassador Grew was again visited by the same Japanese informant who had called on him on October 25, 1941. During a conversation with Foreign Minister Togo, the Japanese informant reported, he had learned that the Japanese Foreign Minister, Prime Minister and the Minister of the Navy had determined upon the maximum commitments which Japan could make in order to adjust its relations with the United States. This decision was given to the Japanese Emperor by the Prime Minister on the afternoon of November 2, 1941 and since Foreign Minister Togo anticipated that Ambassador Grew would call within a few days, it was expected that some conclusion would be reached before that time.

For the first time in many years the Japanese Foreign Minister had been able to assume certain obligations with the entire approval of the Prime Minister and, consequently, of the War, Navy and Home Ministries. Since the question of relations with the United States would necessarily have to be clarified before the Japanese Diet met on November 15, 1941, the Japanese informant believed that Foreign Minister Togo would request an interview with Ambassador Grew not later than November 7, 1941.

15. Ambassador Grew Reports on Situation in Japan

In a telegram to Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles on November 3, 1941, Ambassador Grew reported the attitude of the Japanese newspapers, citing an article from the Tokyo *Nichi-Nichi* which commented on a statement which the Japanese Embassy reportedly gave to the *New York Times* regarding the end of the Japanese-American economic war, under the banner headline “Empire Approaches Its Greatest Crisis.” Both the article and the accompanying editorial, according to Ambassador Grew, reflected the average Japanese sentiment.

Referring to the various other reports which he had made during the past several months, Ambassador Grew stated he had no substantial revisions to make upon any of them. However, there were certain points that he desired Secretary of State Hull and Under Secretary Welles to apply to future conversations with Japanese representatives. First of all, Ambassador Grew did not believe it was possible for Japan to disassociate its war with China from that being waged in Europe. Since political thought throughout Japan ranged from medieval to liberal ideas, events beyond the Japanese Empire itself determined what body of principles would predominate. For example, when the Germans were victorious in western Europe during the past year, Japan turned pro-Axis; yet with Germany’s failure to invade the British Isles and its attack upon the Soviet Union came the conviction in Japan that the Tripartite Alliance had been a serious mistake of Japanese diplomats.

Nevertheless, if Japan’s efforts to adjust relations with the United States and to conclude the war with China failed, a stronger Axis alliance could still be effected. Apparently leading American economists believed that the eventual exhaustion of Japan’s economic resources would end in the collapse of Japan’s militaristic power. However, Ambassador Grew pointed out that although the greater part of Japan’s commerce, industrial production and natural resources had been depleted as a result of America’s economic war, Japan could avoid complete collapse by forsaking the capitalistic system of economy. Therefore, Ambassador Grew did not believe that the imposition of a trade embargo and blockade would necessarily avert war in the Far East.

Ambassador Grew then referred to a telegram which he sent to the American State Department on September 12, 1940 in which he had warned that the Japanese army saw an

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48 "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)” November 3, 1941, S.D. II, 700, 701.
50 "The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State”—November 3, 1941, S.D. II, p. 701–704.
opportunity for expansion following German victories in Europe. As a result of policies which the Japanese government adopted, Ambassador Grew had advised the strong attitude subsequently adopted by the United States. However, while Japan was eventually forced to seek conciliation with the United States, if it were not reached in time, Japanese national temper and psychology would force it to risk hara-kiri rather than to yield to foreign economic pressure. When attempting to avert war, therefore, Ambassador Grew urged that the fibre and the temperament of the Japanese people themselves be kept in mind. Although stating merely his own personal opinion, Ambassador Grew felt that the continued imposition of drastic economic measures would, in the long run, be contrary to American national interests since it meant the breakdown of diplomacy. Ambassador Grew assured the State Department that he was not questioning the intentions or motives of the Roosevelt Administration, nor was he implying that the Department was pursuing an undeliberated diplomatic policy. He agreed that there should be no compromise with the principles America had laid down and, therefore, he dis not advocate any appeasement with Japan arrived at by forsaking these fundamental principles. At the same time, however, Ambassador Grew was certain that the methods of applying these basic principles were flexible. He particularly wished to correct any misconception of Japan's unpreparedness for war. He urged that the United States not underestimate Japan's obvious preparations to implement an alternate program in the event the conversations for peace failed. From the bellicose tone of the Japanese press and of several high officials it was obvious that Japan was capable of actions which might render armed warfare with the United States unavoidable. 52

16. Ambassador Kurusu Appointed Special Aide to Ambassador Nomura 53

After studying certain official papers in connection with his new position in the Japanese Embassy in Washington, Mr. Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese Ambassador to Germany, called on Ambassador Grew on November 4, 1941 before leaving for the United States.

As an endeavor to aid in the successful conclusion of the conversations in Washington, Mr. Kurusu was being sent by the new Japanese Cabinet as a special aide to Ambassador Nomura. Mr. Kurusu told Ambassador Grew that he was taking with him Mr. Shiroji Yuki, who was familiar with the developments in Washington as a result of his former position as Chief of the First Section of the American Bureau in the Japanese Foreign Office. 54

16-A. Japan Plans to Attack Hawaii on December 7, 1941—(November 5–7, 1941) 54a

Three weeks before Secretary Hull presented to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu his note of November 26, 1941, which some American commentators have described as the ultimatum which caused Japan to go to war, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet of the Japanese Navy, had issued orders that an advanced expeditionary force should attack Hawaii on December 8, 1941 (Japanese time) or December 7, 1941 (United States time). The plan of attack was issued on November 5, 1941, as Combined Fleet Ultras ecret Operation Order 1, 54b and the date of Y Day was established in Combined Fleet Ultras ecret Operation Order 2 of November 7, 1941. 54c
17. Ambassador Grew Receives Japanese Informant

At the request of Foreign Minister Togo, the leading Japanese informant again called on Ambassador Grew. Since the Japanese Foreign Minister did not feel that he could speak officially with the American Ambassador at this time, he had indirectly made the suggestion that the United States government continue the Washington conferences since the Tojo government had desired to extend the limits to which it would go in order to reach an agreement with the United States.

Expressing then his own personal opinion on the matter, the Japanese informant stated that since present conditions were having a calamitous effect upon Japan, his government was compelled to accept the views of the United States. Ambassador Grew, however, pointed to the violent tone of the Japanese press as seen in the editorial of the Japanese Times and Advertiser on November 5, 1941 which was known to express the attitudes of the Japanese Foreign Office. Another article appearing in the Nichi Nichi on November 6, 1941 accused the United States of talking like a harlot thereby complicating the adjustment of relations between the two countries. The Japanese informant promised to draw Mr. Togo's attention to the articles in question. Nevertheless, he insisted that too much attention should not be paid to the Japanese newspapers nor should the United States treat the Japanese people entirely as adults. Pointing out how the Germans had utilized this aspect of Japanese psychology to their own advantage, the Japanese informant stated that Japanese confidence could be gained easily by a friendly gesture or word. Irrespective of any future developments, the Japanese informant before leaving Ambassador Grew, urged once more that the informal conversations continue.

18. Japan's Attitude Toward Present Negotiations Made Known

By way of reply to Ambassador Nomura's request for information on the policies of the new Japanese Cabinet, Tokyo informed the Japanese Ambassador on November 4, 1941 that as a result of numerous conferences a counter proposal had been formulated and unanimously approved by the government and the new military high command. On November 5, 1941 this counter proposal, together with other basic policies, would be approved by the Japanese Diet.

Since domestic and foreign conditions made it necessary to conclude the present informal conferences successfully without delay, Japan was ready to submit these new counter proposals. However, these counter proposals would be the last the Japanese government intended to submit. Should these fail to achieve the desired goal, all further negotiations would end.

Because the Japanese government was anxious to conclude the conferences with the United States successfully, it had yielded to many of the demands of the United States, while, on the other hand, refusing to appreciate the position of Japan, the United States had made no concessions. As a result of this American attitude, the Japanese government and public suspected the sincerity of the United States. At the present time the patience of Japan was exhausted. If the existence and honor of Japan were threatened further, the Japanese government would take measures to defend them. As a last effort to show its friendship toward the United States, then, the Japanese government was submitting its proposals.

If the United States would only make a sincere attempt to establish peace in the Pacific, the entire world situation would be greatly aided. Tokyo promised to inform Ambassador Nomura immediately of the outcome of the meeting of the Japanese Diet in order that he

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55 "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", November 7, 1941. S.D.II, 705-706.
56 Ibid.
57 IV, 22.
58 IV, 23.
might confer with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. While Ambassador Nomura was discussing the problems with American representatives in Washington, Foreign Minister Togo would hold a conference with Ambassador Grew in Tokyo. Foreign Minister Togo emphasized that Ambassador Nomura must follow his instructions to the letter, giving no personal interpretation to any of them. 59

19. Japan Instructs Ambassador Nomura in Final Proposals

On November 4, 1941, the Japanese government sent Ambassador Nomura the revised final proposal in which Japan attempted to meet the demands of the United States government. 60 Explicit instructions for Ambassador Nomura to follow in presenting these proposals were inserted in this message. For example, Tokyo advised Ambassador Nomura that in any formal negotiation reached between Japan and the United States, the government was anxious to avoid incorporating guarantees of evacuating Japanese troops from French Indo-China upon the conclusion of the Chinese Incident.

The Japanese government expressed the opinion that the United States would agree with Japan's concessions regarding non-discrimination in commerce and the interpretation of its obligations under the Tripartite Pact. 60a However, the new Cabinet recognized that the question of evacuation would continue to present an obstacle to peace. Since the United States was opposed to Japanese troops in China, the Japanese government proposed to shift its troops and officials to other occupied areas in order to dispel American suspicion. Although Japan would call it “evacuation”, it was actually impossible for the Japanese government to recall its forces from China. Foreign Minister Togo asked that Ambassador Nomura euphemize the stationing of Japanese troops in China by insisting that unlimited occupation by no means meant perpetual occupation. Since Japan had been forced to make tremendous sacrifices during its four years war with China, its internal situation prevented Japan from making further concessions regarding the Chinese problem. 61

In the event that these new Japanese counter proposals did not meet with American approval, the Japanese government had prepared a subsequent plan considered by Japan as a last effort to prevent disaster in the Far East. 62

20. Ambassador Kurusu Leaves for Washington

In order to assist Ambassador Nomura in presenting these new Japanese counter proposals to the United States government, Japan sent Ambassador Kurusu to Washington. Since the Japanese Cabinet had given him no additional instructions concerning his post, it requested Ambassador Nomura to prepare him for the conferences with Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt. Ambassador Kurusu’s activities in the United States were to be kept strictly secret. 63

On November 5, 1941 Ambassador Kurusu and Secretary Yuki left for Shanghai. 64 Tokyo explained to Ambassador Nomura that these two representatives were being sent to Washington immediately in an attempt to show the United States that Japan sincerely desired to bring the present conferences to a successful conclusion. By giving Ambassador Nomura a clear picture of Japan’s internal situation, the new Japanese Cabinet hoped that he would be more fully equipped to carry out Tokyo's instructions. 65

59 IV, 24.
60 For text handed by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on November 10, 1941 see S.D. II, 715-717.
60a IV, 25-27.
61 IV, 28.
62 IV, 29. Ambassador Nomura did not present this alternate proposal to Secretary Hull until November 20, 1941. See S.D. II, 775-776.
63 IV, 30.
64 IV, 31.
65 IV, 32.
21. Japan Seeks Agreement with Britain and the Netherlands

Since Great Britain and the Netherlands had vast interests in the Far East, the Japanese government realized that some understanding would have to be reached with these countries. If an agreement were concluded with the United States alone, it could never be completely carried out without the cooperation of Britain and the Netherlands.

On November 4, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo requested that Ambassador Nomura impress American officials with this point. It was hoped that the United States would formulate an understanding which Great Britain and the Netherlands government could sign.66

Not quite certain of Tokyo’s attitude in this matter, Ambassador Nomura asked for further instructions on the following day. He wished to know whether Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies were expected to sign an official document with Japan at the same time that America did or if separate documents would be prepared for the British and the Dutch, or if the four countries would exchange official documents.67

22. Tokyo Receives English Translation of Proposals

In order to avoid discrepancies between the English text handed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Togo and the one presented to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura, Ambassador Nomura was sending the Foreign Ministry a complete translation of both Japanese counter proposals.68

At the same time he reminded the Foreign Minister that he had received instructions from Japan ordering him to make no personal interpretations of Japan’s latest counter proposals. For that reason, Ambassador Nomura was taking the utmost care in dealing with these proposals.69

On November 5, 1941, Ambassador Nomura forwarded these English translations to Japan.70

23. Japan To Avoid Ratified Treaty with United States

In order to avoid further delay in concluding peace negotiations, Tokyo wired Ambassador Nomura on November 5, 1941 that it preferred to avoid drawing up any treaty with the United States requiring the ratification of the Senate. The Japanese government believed that the United States might adopt “an executive agreement” requiring only the approval of President Roosevelt. Under present conditions, the Japanese government was convinced that speed was an essential factor in the present negotiations.71

Ambassador Nomura replied that the United States did not wish to place any agreement with Japan before the Senate for the constitutional two-thirds majority approval. As Mr. Hamilton and other American representatives had already stated, the United States government wished to leave any understanding between the two countries within the presidential jurisdiction.

In the proposal submitted by the United States on June 21, 1941, Ambassador Nomura pointed out, Article I mentioned “a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration”, and “mutual understanding and declaration of policy”. However, it might be difficult for the United States to keep an agreement with Japan secret because of its domestic politics.72

66IV, 33.
67IV, 34.
68IV, 35–36.
69Ibid.
70IV, 37–39.
71IV, 40.
72IV, 41.
24. Japanese Diet Accepts Cabinet's Counter Proposals

At the Japanese Imperial Conference on November 5, 1941, the Japanese counter proposals drawn up by the Foreign Ministry were approved. Therefore, Tokyo wired Ambassador Nomura further instructions concerning their delivery to the American government.

The Foreign Ministry instructed Ambassador Nomura to submit proposal “A” for discussion in spite of the fact that many of the terms in the last United States proposal had not met with Tokyo’s approval. If the United States objected too strongly to Proposal “A”, Ambassador Nomura was instructed to advise the Japanese Foreign Ministry and then, subsequently, offer proposal “B” to the United States.

Because the situation had become so critical and no further delay could be tolerated, the Japanese government informed Ambassador Nomura that it had made its final concession. However, it warned Ambassador Nomura to avoid giving the United States the impression that this proposal was actually Japan’s ultimatum.73

The Japanese government was certain that some agreement could be reached through the efforts of its representatives, the Foreign Minister continued, since the problem of self defense stemming from the Tripartite Treaty had been clarified to the United States’ satisfaction. American policies were set forth completely in the proposal of June 21, 1941 and had been answered by the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941; and the new Japanese Cabinet took it for granted that all further exchange of notes would be eliminated from the negotiations. The Foreign Minister urged Ambassador Nomura to make it clear to the United States that Japan wished to avoid the exchange of documents.74

Although Foreign Minister Togo realized the difficulty of culminating negotiations immediately, he urged Ambassador Nomura to complete all arrangements for the signing of a mutual agreement by November 25, 1941.75

25. Ambassador Nomura to Guard Secrecy of Conferences

In reply to Tokyo’s instructions, Ambassador Nomura informed the Japanese Ministry on November 5, 1941 that he would continue his efforts to bring about a satisfactory understanding. Toward this end, he planned to make arrangements for meeting with President Roosevelt in the near future.

In his own opinion, Ambassador Nomura felt that these conferences with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull should remain secret. However, if the Foreign Office desired that they be considered as official interviews, Ambassador Nomura promised to announce them to the public.76 The Japanese government agreed with Ambassador Nomura that the present informal conversations should remain secret. If the newspapers of either country were allowed to speculate on the questions discussed, at Ambassador Nomura’s conferences with President Roosevelt, the Foreign Ministry felt that the effectiveness of an informal agreement would be impaired. In fact, the Japanese government urged that Ambassador Nomura avoid publicity of any subsequent conferences with American officials.77

26. Japanese Newspapers Publicize Tokyo’s Proposals

In spite of the efforts of both governments to maintain the secrecy of these conferences, on November 5, 1941 Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo that the United States newspapers, through the Domei News Agency in Japan and the Times Advertiser, had learned...
that November 15, 1941 was the Japanese “deadline” for the successful conclusion of negotiations. In fact, these two newspaper syndicates, known to be the official press of the Japanese government and the Foreign Office, respectively, stated their intention to list the seven Japanese demands upon the United States.

Realizing that the Japanese government wished a favorable reception of its negotiations, Ambassador Nomura believed that the publication of such statements in Japanese newspapers would alienate American public opinion. Therefore, although appreciating the seriousness of Japan’s internal situation and the grave responsibility of Foreign Minister Togo’s position, Ambassador Nomura nevertheless urged that the Foreign Office censor the material given to Tokyo newspapers.78

27. Japanese and American Newspapers Impair Diplomatic Negotiations

In spite of censorship measures enforced by the Japanese Foreign Office, newspaper speculation on the outcome of the Japanese-American conversations continued to impair diplomatic negotiations. Even while Ambassador Kurusu was enroute to the United States to supplement Ambassador Nomura’s efforts for peace, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi was labeling America’s negotiations as a means of gaining time to complete military preparations against Japan.79

Conditions as reported by the New York Times, November 6, 1941 were so close to a crisis that the United States Congress voted to remain in session indefinitely.80

Apparently Washington newspapers did not place much faith in Mr. Kurusu’s appointment as advisor to Ambassador Nomura. In spite of Ambassador Nomura’s efforts to curtail unfavorable newspaper stories, he reported to Tokyo on November 6, 1941 that conjectures on the effect of Mr. Kurusu’s presence in Washington were being published constantly.81

If these stories once reached the Japanese public, Ambassador Nomura feared that conditions would become even more tense. In view of the Japanese internal situation, Ambassador Nomura urged that every precaution be taken to control the Japanese press and force them to follow an editorial policy in keeping with the tone of Japanese-American conversations.82

29. Hull-Nomura Conversation (November 7, 1941)

a. State Department’s Report84

Accompanied by Mr. Wakasugi, Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull’s apartment at his own request on November 7, 1941. Without permitting the Japanese Ambassador to state the purpose of his call, Secretary Hull immediately brought up the question of the three American missionaries interned by the Manchurian authorities at Harbin. Secretary Hull declared that similar situations, together with the extremist policies voiced in the Japanese press, made it difficult for the United States to continue normal diplomatic relations with Japan. When reports of anti-American activities were released in this country, Secretary Hull stated, people questioned the advisability of improving relations with Japan. Ambassador Nomura replied that until recently he had not received any instructions from the new Japanese Cabinet. However, he now had the authority to resume the conversations.

After deliberating on the various proposals for peace, particularly on the American draft of June 21, 1941, the new Japanese Cabinet had decided upon the maximum concessions it
would make in order to alleviate the situation in the Far East. Referring to the three principal questions upon which the respective views of the two countries had diverged, Ambassador Nomura said that it would not be difficult to reconcile the views concerning Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact and non-discrimination in international commercial relations. However, he was aware that some difficulties would arise out of Japan's desire to retain certain troops in North China and Inner Mongolia.

In view of the grave situation which might arise if any misunderstandings or misinterpretations of policies occurred at this time, Ambassador Nomura had asked for and received from his government an experienced diplomat, namely Mr. Kurusu, the former Ambassador to Germany. In view of Mr. Kurusu's Ambassadorial rank, Ambassador Nomura hoped that President Roosevelt would speak with him. At this point in the conversation, Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull a document prepared by the Japanese government in connection with its views on the withdrawal of Japanese forces from China and French Indo-China and the principle of non-discrimination. 85

With regard to the Japanese forces stationed in China as a result of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese government stated that it would be necessary to retain troops in specified areas in North China, Inner Mongolia and Hainan Island for a certain time after the restoration of peace between Japan and China. As soon as general peace was restored, however, the other forces would begin their withdrawal according to a separate agreement between Japan and China and this withdrawal would be completed within two years after the peace treaty. When an equitable basis was established in East Asia and the China affair settled, Japanese forces would be recalled from French Indo-China and, in this way, the territorial sovereignty of that country would be guaranteed.

With regard to the principle of commercial nondiscrimination, the Japanese government agreed to the application of this principle throughout the Pacific area, including China. It was understood at the same time, however, that the principle would be applied to the entire world. 86

After reading the document, Secretary Hull asked concerning the proportion of Japanese troops to be retained in the areas stated. In reply the Japanese Ambassador reminded Secretary Hull that, under the Boxer Protocol, Japan had the right to station troops in the Peiping and Tientsin areas. Since Soviet Russia maintained forces in Outer Mongolia, Japan desired to station enough of its own troops in Inner Mongolia to balance those of Russia. Without specifying the exact number of troops that Japan wished to retain in China, Ambassador Nomura began to discuss the armed forces maintained by other countries in China. He referred specifically to March 1927 when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek first entered Shanghai. As a result of that action the British had requested Japan to take joint action to prevent this measure. Yet, in spite of the fact that the Japanese had declined to interfere in Chinese affairs, they soon after became the object of a bitter Chinese boycott campaign. In discussing the Chinese question, Secretary Hull said that he had mentioned these exploratory conversations to the Chinese Ambassador but had not acquainted him with any of the points under discussion.

However, before entering into any formal negotiations with Japan, Secretary Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura that the United States planned to negotiate with the Chinese, British and Dutch. Secretary Hull asked Ambassador Nomura whether Japan would launch

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85 Ibid.
86 Document handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November 7, 1941, S.D. II, 709-710. For Japanese version of text sent to Ambassador Nomura on November 4, 1941 and decoded by American cryptanalysts see IV, 25-28. It is well to note the explicit terms in which the Japanese government instructs Ambassador Nomura on the presentation of these proposals. For English translation of Japanese proposals sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura, see IV, 37-39.
on a true new order in the Far East and, in this way, gain its leadership in the Pacific if the Chinese expressed an earnest desire to end the present war.

Referring again to the advantages derived by the United States from the renunciation of its aggressive policies in the Latin American countries, Secretary Hull expressed the conviction that Japan would derive trade advantages from the adoption of a similar policy in its relations with China. Secretary Hull hoped that some concrete agreement could be worked out on the question of Japanese relations with the Axis powers. Secretary Hull pointed out that the mere manifestation of the desire for peace might not be adequate if a new government came into power in Japan.

In view of the urgency of the internal situation in Japan, Ambassador Nomura requested that the American Department of State expedite the study of the document delivered on this day. Ambassador Nomura requested that he be allowed an interview with President Roosevelt. Stating that he would comply with the Ambassador's request, Secretary Hull then asked whether this document was to be viewed in conjunction with the previous Japanese documents which had been submitted. Replying in the affirmative, Ambassador Nomura mentioned the United States' document of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese document of September 25, 1941. Secretary Hull reminded him that the American document of October 2, 1941 was to be included in this category.

b. Ambassador Nomura's Report

After first scheduling an appointment with Secretary Hull for Minister Wakasugi and himself, and after ascertaining the phraseology and interpretation of his government's latest proposals, Ambassador Nomura visited Secretary Hull secretly on November 7, 1941.

During the conversation with Secretary Hull and Mr. Ballantine, Ambassador Nomura explained that he had been ordered to clarify his government's position to both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull in the hope of settling the various problems existing between Japan and the United States. In reply Secretary Hull commented that the two political factions at varying odds in the world today were threatening to throw all civilization into the chaos of anarchism. Therefore, Secretary Hull urged that American and Japanese representatives find a basis for maintaining peace in the Pacific. Ambassador Nomura took this opportunity to point out that agreements had been reached on two of the three outstanding Pacific problems. In regard to the third, the stationing of troops in China, the Japanese government was now prepared to make further concessions in order to meet the demands of the United States. Because of the conciliatory attitude of his government, Ambassador Nomura requested that the United States take a philosophical view toward the questions relating to the Far East.

In view of the critical domestic situation in Tokyo which had become more tense during the six months of informal conversations with the United States, Japan was now prepared to make the maximum number of possible concessions in order to bring the present negotiations to a satisfactory close. After these introductory remarks Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull the Japanese government's counter proposal.

After reading this document Secretary Hull showed indications of being satisfied with Japan's comments on America's desire for non-discrimination in commerce. However, Secretary Hull refused to commit himself regarding Japan's proposal for the withdrawal of troops, or toward Japan's attitude regarding the rights of self defense. Nevertheless, the
American Secretary of State did ask what proportion of Japanese troops would be withdrawn from China. Ambassador Nomura replied that Japan was willing to withdraw the greater number of its troops now stationed in China. Then the Japanese Ambassador went on to emphasize Japan's attitude toward "the right of self-defense." After examining the Japanese proposals more carefully, Secretary Hull said the United States government would be ready to give Japan its reply.94

At the same time, however, Secretary Hull continued, the United States representatives would consider it necessary to discuss the methods for maintaining peace in the Pacific with representatives of Great Britain, China and the Netherlands East Indies. From Secretary Hull's remarks Ambassador Nomura concluded that China had already been consulted regarding the matters relating to the settlement of its affairs in the Far East. As if to prove Ambassador Nomura's assumption Secretary Hull then inquired what Japan's attitude would be if the United States arranged for conversations between "the person of highest influence and integrity in China" with suitable Japanese representatives. Minister Wakasugi asked if the United States would first determine whether China desired to resume friendly relations with Japan. Since Secretary Hull claimed only to have thought of this suggestion during the day's conversation, he declined to expound on the theory. However, he requested that Ambassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi relay this proposal to their government and ascertain its attitude toward the matter.95

During this conversation Secretary Hull brought up the incident arising out of the imprisonment of American missionaries in Harbin. Reminding Ambassador Nomura that three Japanese Naval officers had been allowed to return to Tokyo, Secretary Hull stated that the United States government could not sympathize with Japan's unreasonable treatment of American citizens. Insisting that this incident involved only Manchurian officials and not the Japanese government, Ambassador Nomura, nevertheless, promised to refer the question to Tokyo with the request that suitable steps be taken to release the missionaries in question.96

30. Tokyo Re-emphasizes Policy of Self-Defense

After receiving Ambassador Nomura's report of his conversation with Secretary Hull, Tokyo asked the Japanese Ambassador in Washington if he had explained in detail Japan's views concerning the rights of self-defense.97 Foreign Minister Togo reminded Ambassador Nomura that he had elaborated on this Japanese policy in his earlier instructions concerning the Japanese counter-proposals. If this message had not reached Ambassador Nomura in time, Foreign Minister Togo requested that the Japanese Ambassador make certain to explain the matter fully to the American representatives.98

31. Mr. Horiuchi Arranges for Undelayed Delivery of Telegrams

In view of the urgency of the present American-Japanese negotiations Mr. Horiuchi, telegraphic clerk of the Japanese Embassy in Washington, felt it necessary to make certain provisions for the delivery of urgent telegraphic messages.99 On November 8, 1941 he informed the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo that with a crisis so near at hand all instructions between Tokyo and Washington must be received without any delay. By way of emphasizing his point Mr. Horiuchi reminded the Japanese Foreign office that at 9:56 p.m. on November 5, 1941 he had sent Ambassador Nomura's message relating to the English translations

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94IV, 54.
95IV, 55-56.
96IV, 57.
97IV, 58.
98Ibid.
99IV, 59.
of the Japanese counter proposals. It was presumed that this message reached Tokyo on November 6, 1941. However, the Japanese reply did not arrive in Washington until 8:20 a.m. Washington time, on November 7, 1941. Since Ambassador Nomura's appointment with Secretary Hull was scheduled for 9:00 a.m. on November 7, 1941, the Japanese Embassy was allowed only forty minutes in which to decode and revise the message. In view of the fact that all officials connected with the telegraphic office remained on duty all night when expecting an urgent message from Tokyo, Mr. Horiuchi requested that the Foreign Office send any reply over the wires immediately regardless of the hour. Formerly, Mr. Horiuchi continued, the telegraph company notified the Embassy whenever a "very urgent" telegram was received. Since the Japanese Foreign Office had recently changed the word to "kinqu" the delivery of many important messages had been delayed. In order to avoid this delay in the future, Mr. Horiuchi asked that all important telegrams be captioned "very urgent". In replying to Mr. Horiuchi's request the telegraphic section of the Foreign Office in Tokyo stated that in the future all messages headed by the words "kinqu" or "daiqu" were to be given the same handling by the telegraphic companies as those marked "very urgent". By way of explaining the delay in replying to Ambassador Nomura's message, Tokyo stated that unfavorable atmospheric conditions had held up the dispatch until 1734 on November 7, 1941.101

32. Foreign Ministry Bans Publication of Negotiations

Agreeing with Ambassador Nomura's request that secrecy be maintained throughout the Japanese-American negotiations,102 the Foreign Office stated that it would attempt to guide public opinion by censoring unfavorable comments regarding the present conversations.103 Furthermore, Tokyo promised that the contents of these negotiations would be kept from the press and that any information regarding the time of the Japanese-American conversations would be suppressed. Already the Japanese government had warned the Times that the publication of any contents capable of exciting anti-Japanese feeling in the United States would bring about dire consequences. While promising to curtail the activities of Japanese newspapers in Tokyo, the Foreign Office took the opportunity of pointing out security breaks in the newspapers throughout the United States. For example, the Domei office in Washington had already printed articles entirely out of keeping with Tokyo's policy of maintaining a calm and patient attitude toward the American conversations.104

To be more explicit Foreign Minister Togo referred to the Associated Press dispatch from Manila which quoted Ambassador Kurusu as stating, "I am going to Washington but I have no great hope for a successful conclusion to the negotiations."105 As a result of this newspaper report, the American public felt that no new compromise which Japan offered would be able to meet the demands of the United States.106

33. President Roosevelt Confers with Naval Leaders (November 7, 1941)

On November 8, 1941 Ambassador Nomura reported that on the previous day President Roosevelt had conferred secretly with Secretary of the Navy Knox, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, and other American naval leaders. Although uncertain of the actual purpose of the meeting, Ambassador Nomura surmised that President Roosevelt wished to discuss

102Ibid.
103Ibid., 60.
104Ibid., 47.
105Ibid., 61.
106Ibid.
107Ibid., 62; N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1941, 1:40.
108Ibid.
the latest Japanese counter proposals and to formulate a method of withdrawing American Marines from China.107

34. Japan Interested in Secretary Hull's Proposed Settlement of the China Affair

After carefully considering Ambassador Nomura's report on his conversations with Secretary Hull, the Japanese government exhibited great interest in Secretary Hull's proposed settlement of the China affair.108 In view of the fact that Secretary Hull had suggested that a high ranking Chinese official discuss Far Eastern problems with the Japanese representative, the Japanese government felt that the United States was now willing to permit Japan and China to settle their differences directly and without American interference. Naturally Tokyo expected that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would initiate the move for peace. Recognizing Secretary Hull's suggestion as a great contribution toward Sino-Japanese peace, Foreign Minister Togo urged Ambassador Nomura to secure more information on America's concrete plans for carrying the suggestion into effect.109

Foreign Minister Togo felt that the United States, as well as Japan, was fully aware of the importance of the Chinese question on Far Eastern peace. If the United States actually proposed to leave the settlement of peace terms up to the Japanese Chinese governments themselves, then Tokyo felt the question of withdrawing its troops from China could be left out of future negotiations with the United States. In this way not only could Japanese-Chinese peace be effected without further American interference, but the relations between Japan and the United States could be settled quickly and satisfactorily. Before going ahead with Secretary Hull's proposal, however, the Japanese government felt it necessary to secure a guarantee that the United States would not interfere with the peace terms established between Japan and China. This guarantee would naturally include the cessation of any American activities designed to aid Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in his war upon Tokyo. Naturally the Japanese government also expected that an agreement between Japan and the United States for the settlement of their respective problems in the Pacific would be signed without further delay.110

If Ambassador Nomura determined that Secretary Hull's suggestion was a workable one, then the Japanese Ambassador was to eliminate the stipulations regarding Japanese-Chinese peace from proposal A submitted to the American government; instead that section of proposal B, requesting that the United States refrain from any action detrimental to the establishment of peace between Japan and China, should be substituted in its place.111

In view of the fact that Foreign Minister Togo firmly believed the United States sincerely wished to establish an agreement between its government and Japan, he felt that Secretary Hull's proposal could be carried out. Nevertheless, the Japanese government insisted that its negotiations with the United States be brought to a satisfactory conclusion even before the Japanese-Chinese peace was concluded. Furthermore, Foreign Minister Togo re-emphasized the fact that the United States must cease all aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek during Japanese peace negotiations.111

35. Japan Seeks Facts on American-British Attitude Toward Axis

In order to determine the true facts concerning the existing international situation, the Japanese Vice-Chief of the General Staff on November 9, 1941 in a circular message to the

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107 IV, 63.
108 IV, 64.
109 Ibid.
110 IV, 65.
111 IV, 66.
Embassies abroad requested any and all information regarding the British and American attitude toward Japan and Germany.\footnote{This message was not translated until February 3, 1945.}

In order to determine to what extent Japan could go before the two Allies would open war on the Axis Powers, Tokyo asked for detailed information regarding American reciprocal relations with Japan and Germany and the military, political and economic union between the United States, Great Britain, China, Holland and Russia. Japan also wished to determine the influence that it had upon America, Great Britain and these other countries, and to see how greatly the Japanese-American negotiations had affected the international situation.

Since Japan was aware of the American and British increased defenses in the Pacific, Tokyo asked for an evaluation of the present situation regarding the expansion of the island bases scattered around the Pacific, the dispatch of additional American and British military strength to the South Pacific and to the Aleutians, and, finally, the movements of American and British troops in China, the southwest Pacific and in Japan.\footnote{Ibid.}

36. Grew-Togo Conversation (November 10, 1941)

\textit{a. Ambassador Grew's Report}\footnote{Ibid.}

During a meeting on November 10, 1941 at which Mr. Togo, Ambassador Grew, Conselor Dooman and Mr. Kase were present, the Japanese Foreign Minister referred to a conversation with the American Ambassador held on October 30, 1941 during which he had asserted his desire to maintain friendly relations between the United States and Japan.

After carefully studying the documents which had been passed by the representatives of the two countries thus far, Mr. Togo was more determined than ever to maintain peace in the Pacific. Keeping in mind that the object of the present Japanese Cabinet was to establish a “Greater East Asia”, as its contribution to world peace, Mr. Togo’s government had formulated new proposals and sent them to Ambassador Nomura as the basis for negotiations with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. At this point, Ambassador Grew emphasized that the conversations taking place between the two governments were “only preliminary and exploratory”. While not wishing to press the point, Mr. Togo stated that he felt the time had come for formal and official negotiations.

Then Mr. Togo thanked the American government through Ambassador Grew for the assistance which it had given Mr. Kurusu in his journey from Tokyo to Washington to take his place as advisor to Ambassador Nomura. Aware of Ambassador Grew’s previous efforts to re-establish friendly relations between Japan and the United States, Mr. Togo pledged his cooperation toward finding a compatible solution. Nevertheless, after reviewing the documents recording the conversations which had already taken place, Foreign Minister Togo believed that the United States lacked an adequate appreciation of the Far Eastern situation. While Secretary Hull was apparently aware, from his own statements, that Japan was a stabilizing force in the Far East, the attitude of the United States government as a whole did not support this fact. Foreign Minister Togo felt that the United States government must take into consideration that Japan had been at war with China for four and a half years and this had a strong bearing on the Pacific situation.\footnote{Ibid.} Foreign Minister Togo then recalled a conversation between Secretary Hull and Minister Wakasugi on October 16, 1941 during which Secretary Hull had remembered telling former Ambassador Saito that he recognized Japan as a stabilizing force and was prepared to express such recognition in an official manner.\footnote{Ibid.}
Although the Japanese government had repeatedly attempted to approach the American point of view during the past six months, Foreign Minister Togo did not believe that the United States had attempted in any way to study sympathetically Japan’s position. America was apparently unaware that the population of Japan had increased to approximately 100,000,000 and in order to support this increasing number of people it would be necessary to secure more raw materials. In order to offset this growing situation, further delay in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion to the present conversations could not be tolerated. Foreign Minister Togo urged that the United States government adopt a statesmanlike position by overcoming the major difficulties by the time the Japanese Diet met on November 15, 1941. Foreign Minister Togo continued by saying that the new Cabinet had arrived at the maximum number of concessions which Japan could make to the United States government.116 With this statement the Japanese Foreign Minister handed Ambassador Grew the new Japanese proposals117 and then commented upon them.

Although the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941 were based largely on those of the United States issued on June 21, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo recognized that it contained many unsatisfactory clauses with regard to both text and substance. Nevertheless, in order to expedite the present conversations, Foreign Minister Togo had used the Japanese draft of September 25, 1941 as the basis for those which he was now handing to Ambassador Grew. However, they contained certain modifications in order to meet the United States proposals as set forth in the American memorandum of October 2, 1941.118

In regard to the attitudes of both governments toward the European War, it was Foreign Minister Togo’s understanding that the views expressed in the Japanese draft of September 25, 1941 were agreeable to both governments. In the matter of commercial discrimination the Japanese government had expanded its concessions in these new proposals in order to meet the requirements set down by the United States. Recognizing that the question of Japanese troops in China remained the greatest obstacle to the successful conclusion of the conversations, the Japanese government, in spite of grave domestic problems, had made further concessions.

Since Japan realized that British interests in the Far East would be affected by the discussions between Japan and the United States, Foreign Minister Togo appreciated Secretary Hull’s desire to consult the British government. In fact, he hoped that the United States would persuade the British government to conclude an agreement with Japan along the same lines as the one being discussed between Japan and the United States.

At the conclusion of these observations on the new Japanese proposals, Foreign Minister Togo again urged that Ambassador Grew continue his cooperation toward a speedy end to the negotiations. Foreign Minister Togo felt that Tokyo should not merely duplicate the conversations taking place in Washington but should supplement exchanges of information already handled in the Washington conferences with the goal of expediting the progress of peace.

Ambassador Grew did not feel that he had the authority to debate at the present time the questions which would be discussed in Washington; however, he did raise three points pertinent to those discussions. Ambassador Grew disagreed with the idea that the United States government did not recognize the situation in the Far East. He felt that Ambassador Nomura in Washington and the Japanese Embassy as a whole had given the United States a very clear picture of the problems there. Foreign Minister Togo’s description of Japan as a “stabilizing force in East Asia” was, Ambassador Grew stated, open to very wide interpretation.

116 S.D. II, 710-714.
117 See “Document handed by Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November 7, 1941”, S.D. II, 709-710.
118 S.D. II, 710-714.
However, Ambassador Grew realized that Foreign Minister Togo's observation that Japan must have access to necessary supplies penetrated to the very center of the problem. Here Ambassador Grew took the opportunity to point out that Secretary Hull's peaceful program visualized for Japan a free flow of trade and commerce and the opening of new markets for its industries.

In reply, Foreign Minister Togo admitted that the Japanese Embassy had reported the Far Eastern situation accurately to the American State Department, but he still doubted whether the United States government appreciated its seriousness. By way of illustrating his point, Foreign Minister Togo referred to the Russian troops stationed in Outer Mongolia, recognized as part of China, and he remarked that no one had as yet objected to the presence of these troops. In answering Ambassador Grew's comment on the "interpretation of stabilizing force in East Asia", Foreign Minister Togo stated that it could be understood from a purely common sense point of view. In regard to Ambassador Grew's statements on the question of assuring raw materials to Japan, Foreign Minister Togo referred briefly to the economic pressure applied by the United States which had menaced the national existence of Japan to a far greater degree than the direct use of force. He warned of the possibility of Japan's being forced to measures of self-defense in order to overcome the effects of continued economic pressure. If the American government realized that Japan would collapse if forced to sacrifice the fruits of its protracted war with China, Foreign Minister Togo believed that the United States would conclude the conversations successfully without further delay.

Ambassador Grew pointed out that Japan could not hope to retain the fruits of aggression and, at the same time, propose the rejection of aggression and force. However, Foreign Minister Togo stated that Japan was not conducting an aggressive war with China. Then he insisted that under the plea of self-defense, the American government had resorted to measures far beyond those generally recognized by international law as defensive. Summing up his opinions, Foreign Minister Togo stated that theoretical talks should end and that conversations in the future should be pursued along realistic lines.

b. Foreign Minister Togo's Report

On November 10, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo met with Ambassador Grew and Counselor Dooman in order to inform the American representatives that after a conference between the Foreign Office and the military high command the Japanese government was now prepared to submit its final proposals. After examining the results of the negotiations between Japan and the United States so far, Foreign Minister Togo had come to the conclusion that the United States did not have a workable understanding of the far Eastern situation. In spite of the fact that Secretary Hull called Japan the stabilizing influence of the Pacific, Foreign Minister Togo said it was obvious from his other remarks that he did not fully appreciate Japan's actual status. Because the United States lacked this understanding it had refused to make any concessions whatsoever during the six months' long conversations with the Japanese representatives. Apparently the United States did not take into consideration the fact that Japan's population of 100,000,000 people was ever increasing, and it was necessary for them to obtain raw materials in order to maintain their existence. Urging the United States government to take all these points into consideration in future negotiations, Foreign Minister Togo stated emphatically that unless some change was evident in America's attitude the Japanese people as a whole would be forced to doubt the sincerity of the American government.
After these preliminary remarks Foreign Minister Togo handed Ambassador Grew the English text of the final Japanese counter proposals. In an attempt to clarify certain points contained in these proposals, Foreign Minister Togo said that his government believed it had set forth its attitude toward the European war fully in the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941. Therefore, it had seen no reason to elaborate on that point further in these present proposals. In regard to the policy of non-discrimination in commerce, Japan had made more liberal concessions in order to meet the demands of the United States. As a final attempt to reach an understanding regarding the important problem of Japanese troops in China the Japanese government had decided to make further compromises. In view of the liberal concessions made them, Foreign Minister Togo urged that the United States accept Japan's latest proposals and also induce Great Britain to sign a similar agreement with Japan. Since he had no instructions from Washington, Ambassador Grew declined to pass his opinion on the Japanese proposals. However, he did feel it necessary to point out to Foreign Minister Togo that the United States government had a very clear picture of the Oriental situation since he himself had submitted detailed reports. Furthermore, Ambassador Grew felt that the present negotiations were aimed at supplying Japan all the materials necessary to maintain an advantageous position in the Far East.

While expressing his appreciation of Ambassador Grew's cooperation, Foreign Minister Togo refuted the Ambassador's insistence that the present negotiations were designed to grant Japan a larger market for purchasing raw materials by pointing out that America's freezing regulations had placed such strong economic pressure on Japan that the Japanese people themselves were beginning to feel the need for effecting even stronger measures for self-defense. From the attitude of the United States toward China, Foreign Minister Togo continued, it was obvious that the American government wished to ignore the sacrifices that the Japanese people had been forced to make during the four and one-half years of warfare. In view of that fact, it would be suicidal for Japan to make such liberal concessions to China as the United States government desired. At this point in the conversation Consular Doorman interrupted Foreign Minister Togo to state that the United States could never accept the results of aggression. Foreign Minister Togo replied that the Japanese government had never considered its war with China one of aggression. Any military action taken by Japan in the Far East, he continued, had been merely in the interest of self-defense. Although not wishing to argue this point further, Foreign Minister Togo insisted that the United States had been wrongfully magnifying Japan's moves in the Pacific.

From the conversation Foreign Minister Togo concluded that the United States still considered that its negotiations with Japan were in the preliminary stage. Ambassador Grew had continually referred to them merely as "conversations". Foreign Minister Togo had stressed that by this time the conversations were well within the realm of "negotiations". Ambassador Grew was apparently satisfied with this term.

37. Ambassador Nomura Reveals America's Pessimistic Attitude Toward the Negotiations

From informal discussions with various American officials Ambassador Nomura came to the conclusion that America regarded its present negotiations with Japan in a pessimistic light.

On November 10, 1941 Ambassador Nomura sent a summary of the remarks of these Americans to the Foreign Office in Tokyo. As one example of America's attitude Ambassa-
dor Nomura pointed to a conversation between Frederick Moore, legal advisor to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, and Senator Thomas of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Moore had reported to Ambassador Nomura that the United States was prepared to fight if Japan made another invasion in the South Pacific. Not only was the American navy ready for action, but psychologically, the American people were expecting a war.

On the previous evening a member of President Roosevelt’s Cabinet had discussed the question of Japanese-American relations with Ambassador Nomura. In view of his friendship with the Japanese Ambassador, this unnamed Cabinet member stated frankly that the United States government was expecting another aggressive move on the part of Japan in the Far East within a few days. Because of this information neither President Roosevelt nor the United States government, as a whole, believed that Ambassador Kurusu’s arrival in the United States would be able to improve the present situation. In an attempt to offset this feeling Ambassador Nomura had explained that the Japanese people were forced to take some action because of the American freezing negotiations. Nevertheless, anxious to avoid a war with the United States, Japan desired an immediate agreement. Ambassador Nomura’s remarks, however, failed to convince the American Cabinet member.126

With the exception of the Daily News and the Hearst papers, Ambassador Nomura reported American newspapers and magazines held the opinion that the American people were more eager for war with Japan than with Germany. Ambassador Nomura firmly believed that the British government was using this American attitude to its own advantage by initiating negotiations for joint Anglo-American action in the Pacific. Ambassador Nomura reminded his government that at the present time Britain was forced to divert some of its fleet to the Pacific. Even in the event that President Roosevelt and other American statesmen did not desire to replace the British fleet in the Far East with American warships, Ambassador Nomura had it on good authority that the United States could not stop its aid to Britain since by this time it had become a question of saving American “face.” Ambassador Nomura concluded his report by stating that he was to confer with President Roosevelt and would submit a more detailed statement on the results of the conversation.127

38. Roosevelt-Nomura Conversation (November 10, 1941)

a. Secretary Hull’s Report128

Accompanied by Minister Wakasugi, Ambassador Nomura called on President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull on November 10, 1941. After a few preliminary remarks, Ambassador Nomura read the following communication from the Japanese government. He recalled to the American representatives’ minds that on September 25, 1941 the Japanese government made its last proposals. From the observations of the American State Department seen in the answering document of October 2, 1941, the Japanese government had determined that the present difficulties arose from three major points: (1) the application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations; (2) the attitude of the two governments toward the European War; (3) the question of the stationing and withdrawing of Japanese forces.

Ambassador Nomura stated that, in regard to the principle of non-discrimination, the Japanese government had now decided to agree to its application in all the Pacific areas including China, provided that the principle was similarly applied to the rest of the world. Since Secretary Hull had repeatedly stated that it was his long-cherished desire to apply the non-discriminatory principle to the whole world, Ambassador Nomura felt that the United States government would be gratified at Japan’s statement.

126 Ibid.
127 IV, 73.
On the second question regarding the European war, the Japanese government had proposed on September 25, 1941 that both governments be guided in their conduct by considerations of preservation and self-defense. However, Ambassador Nomura had been instructed to inquire whether the United States would give assurance that it had no intention of interpreting “preservation and self-defense” too liberally. On the basis of reciprocity, the Japanese government was willing to give similar reassurances. In the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941 it was stated that “in case the United States should participate in the European war, Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy and would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said interpretation”. Under the present circumstances, Japan could not make any further concessions in this matter for, unless there was mutual trust and confidence between Japan and the United States, a thousand words would not be a satisfactory assurance.128a

However, in regard to the stationing and withdrawal of Japanese forces, the government in Tokyo had decided to submit further guarantees. Japanese forces would be retained in specified areas of North China, Inner Mongolia and Hainan Island for a certain required time after the restoration of a Japanese-Chinese peace. The withdrawal of forces from the other parts of occupied China would be accomplished within two years after the establishment of peace and order. Ambassador Nomura emphasized, however, that the Japanese government had made a great many more concessions along these lines than previously. He hoped that the United States government would agree that the complete and immediate withdrawal of Japanese forces from all of China was impracticable at the present time. The recall of forces from French Indo-China would follow the firm establishment of equitable peace in East Asia by the settlement of the China affair.

After completing his observations on the concessions made by the new Japanese government, Ambassador Nomura read a statement which he had prepared. As viewed from the Japanese standpoint, Ambassador Nomura said, the United States government had shown little signs of reciprocating the concessions forwarded by Japan in an endeavor to terminate the six months of informal conversations successfully. Ambassador Nomura declared that for this reason certain factions in Japan viewed the true intentions of the United States government with skepticism. Japanese public opinion viewed the freezing of Japanese assets as economic warfare insomuch as it cut them off from the supply of materials vital to their industries. From reports of the growing intensity of the situation, Ambassador Nomura concluded that an amicable and satisfactory understanding must be arrived at without any unnecessary loss of time. In an effort to surmount the present difficulties, the Japanese government had submitted these new proposals. Ambassador Nomura was of the firm opinion that if some understanding were reached by the two countries, the psychological effect upon the Japanese people would be extremely favorable.128b

Ambassador Nomura then stated that Ambassador Kurusu had been sent to assist him in the present conversations and that parallel conversations would take place in Tokyo between Foreign Minister Togo and Ambassador Grew. Attempting to forestall any misinterpretations of the statements he had made, Ambassador Nomura asked that President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull forgive his transgression from the terminology of trained diplomats since his main objective was the establishment of peace.

In speaking of the present commercial policy which was unfavorable toward Japan, Ambassador Nomura mentioned the sea conference which had taken place between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. He complained that when Japan went

128a Ibid.
128b Ibid.
into Shantung, they were allowed to remain only some six years, at the end of which time they were forced to move out their troops.

As a means of establishing a basis for peace, stability and order in the Pacific area and, in the time to come, throughout the world, President Roosevelt said he believed it essential to lay practical emphasis on the sound philosophy of human welfare and that the exploratory conversations would achieve favorable results as the American government would expedite the conversations in accordance with the wishes of the Japanese government. However, President Roosevelt desired that Japan demonstrate its intention of pursuing a peaceful course instead of the aggressive one which it had been following up to the present time. Then President Roosevelt declared that during the age through which the world was passing, it was necessary to look one hundred years in the future. He referred to the extra-territorial costs and the unusual conditions which had been existing throughout China in the past thirty years and he stated that the Chinese government had gone through a new experience. Referring to Ambassador Nomura's statements regarding the Shantung problem, President Roosevelt pointed out that it had taken three years to dispose of that question while the Japanese-American conversations had consumed only six months.

Ambassador Nomura then dwelled briefly on the problem of getting the Japanese troops out of China by degrees, insisting that there would be neither annexation nor indemnity in doing so.

As the interview drew to a close, nothing was said about the time for the next conversation, however, Ambassador Nomura reminded President Roosevelt that Ambassador Kurusu was expected about Saturday, November 15, 1941, and although he had nothing new to add to the present discussion, Ambassador Nomura stated that Mr. Kurusu would assist him in future conversations. President Roosevelt assured the Japanese Ambassador that he expected to confer with Mr. Kurusu.129

b. Ambassador Nomura's Report

At a conference with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull held in a private room in the White House in order to avoid newspaper publicity, Ambassador Nomura explained to the American representatives Japan's final concessions toward peace.130

Ambassador Nomura began by saying that he had been unable to speak with Secretary Hull for almost three weeks,131 and ever since the resignation of Prince Konoye's Cabinet Ambassador Nomura had been hoping for an interview with President Roosevelt. Since the informal conversations had been in progress for almost six months the Japanese government at this time hoped for a quick settlement of all the Far Eastern problems. However, as the negotiations dragged on without any apparent progress, the Japanese people had become impatient. In view of the fact that the United States had refused to make any concessions equal to those made by Japan, the Japanese people were doubting America's sincerity. At the present time Japan's domestic situation was serious because the Japanese people were unable to obtain the supply of materials necessary to their industry. Here Ambassador Nomura stated that an economic blockade was as harmful to a country as a shooting war. Nevertheless, anxious to maintain peace in the Pacific, the Japanese government had continued the conversations with the United States representatives.132

As a final effort in obtaining its objective, the Japanese government had made a maximum number of concessions in its proposal to the United States.133

In response to these remarks President Roosevelt stated that the United States government also had as its main objective the establishment of peace in the Pacific based on the spirit

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129 Ibid.
130 IV, 74-76.
131 Note Ambassador Nomura's conversation with Secretary Hull on November 7, 1941.
132 IV, 76.
133 IV, 77.

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of fair play. Agreeing with the desire of the Japanese government to continue peace parleys, President Roosevelt said that the United States had two objectives in mind: one, the prevention of war and, two, the maintenance of a lasting peace.\footnote{IV, 75.}

Since the Japanese government appreciated the seriousness of the situation at this time, Ambassador Nomura continued, Ambassador Kurusu was being sent to the Embassy in Washington.

Ambassador Nomura then resumed his explanation of the latest Japanese counter proposals. He stated that these present proposals were based on the former Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941 and modified to meet the demands of the American government expressed in the United States proposals of October 2, 1941 as well as the opinions of Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles in subsequent conversations. In regard to the application of the non-discriminatory commercial policy in the entire Pacific area, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that his government had guaranteed the extension of this policy even to China. In view of the fact that Secretary Hull had continually spoken of his desire to see this commercial policy in practice throughout the world, the Japanese government was certain that its guarantees would meet with the approval of the United States. The attitude of the Japanese government toward the European war, as it had previously stated in its proposal of September 25, 1941, would be based on the need for “protection and self-defense.” However, Japan expected to receive a guarantee that the United States would not interpret these terms in too broad a sense. Unless, however, both governments placed unreserved confidence in each other, Ambassador Nomura said, no guarantee would be satisfactory.\footnote{IV, 77.}

In clarifying the third and most important issue between the two governments Ambassador Nomura stated that Japan was now prepared to establish the localities in China where it would be necessary to retain its troops, and also to guarantee the period of occupation. Although realizing that the United States desired to have Japanese forces withdrawn immediately, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that it would be impossible to effect such a move at the present time. However, he urged the United States to consider Japan’s concessions in the light of actual circumstances. Ambassador Nomura concluded his remarks by submitting Japan’s proposal regarding its troops in French Indo-China. After Ambassador Nomura had finished, President Roosevelt said that the whole world had fallen into a state of confusion because of the militaristic policies of certain countries. In an attempt to return to normalcy, the United States government has sought the establishment of peace and order in the Pacific. With that goal in mind President Roosevelt himself had assisted in the preliminary conversations in order to find a basis for such peace. Before going any further, however, President Roosevelt felt it necessary to receive a definite guarantee that the Japanese government intended to cease its aggression and adopt a peaceful course in the Far East.\footnote{IV, 78.}

In an attempt to abolish the economic limitations to which Japan referred, President Roosevelt continued, he had conferred with Prime Minister Churchill on the issue of non-discrimination. Both countries’ main objection to Germany was the fact that it followed a policy contrary to that idea while both Great Britain and the United States wished to apply the principle of non-discrimination to the entire world. Referring to the administration of President Taft when the United States had resorted to a policy of force in Cuba, President Roosevelt pointed out that America’s relations with the Latin American countries had been highly favorable. Once the United States had adopted a new and peaceful policy, relations

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{134}IV, 75.}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{135}IV, 77.}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{136}IV, 78.}
with those countries had improved. At this point Ambassador Nomura reminded President Roosevelt that America's economic pressure was now causing the anti-American attitude throughout Japan. President Roosevelt continued his remarks by stating that it was necessary to find a modus vivendi before a satisfactory conciliation could be worked out between the two countries. Ambassador Nomura interpreted this statement to mean that President Roosevelt desired a provisional agreement. As the conference drew to a close, President Roosevelt asked whether Ambassador Kurusu was bringing additional Japanese proposals from Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura replied that Mr. Kurusu's only reason for coming was to act as an assistant to the Japanese Ambassador. Since President Roosevelt was leaving for Warm Springs, Georgia, on November 15, 1941 to attend a Thanksgiving celebration there, he hoped for the opportunity of conversing with Ambassador Kurusu before his departure. 137


Because of an interruption, Ambassador Nomura had failed to make two points clear to Secretary Hull during the conversation earlier that morning. Therefore, Minister Wakasugi called upon Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine to make an appointment for Ambassador Nomura to see Secretary Hull either on the evening of November 10, 1941 or in the morning of November 11.

The first of the points to be discussed in the next conversation related to Japan's desire to reach some successful agreement before the Japanese Diet met on November 15, 1941. The second point was in connection with Secretary Hull's statement made on November 7, 1941 proposing the development of a new relationship between Japan and China by means of mutual pledges of conciliation and friendship.

Mr. Wakasugi said that the Japanese government was extremely interested in Hull's proposals and desired that he elaborate on them further. Mr. Ballantine promised to speak with Secretary Hull and relay his message to Minister Wakasugi. 139

40. Japan Doubts America's Awareness of the Critical Situation

From the fact that little progress had been made in the informal conversations, Foreign Minister Togo concluded that the United States did not appreciate how critical the situation in the Far East actually was. 140 In order to emphasize this fact Foreign Minister Togo urged Ambassador Nomura to speak to Secretary Hull and other American representatives in order to give them a clear picture of Japanese-American relations. As Foreign Minister Togo had stated in previous messages to the Japanese Ambassador, a settlement of some kind must be reached before November 25, 1941. The Japanese Parliament would begin its session on November 15, 1941 and before its meeting was concluded it would be necessary that Japan have on hand at least a tentative agreement with the United States. 141

41. The German Government Makes Demands on Japan

As Tokyo had informed Ambassador Nomura over a month ago the German government was demanding that Japan force the United States to cease its action against the Axis powers. Unless some definite measures were taken, Berlin warned, the German government would be
forced to convoke the Tripartite Pact, thus ending any negotiations between Japan and the United States.\textsuperscript{142}

Since the time of that first message from Berlin, the Japanese government had received two additional demands from the German government. However, Foreign Minister Togo had attempted to convince the German Ambassador on November 6, 1941 that Japan would be more likely to convince the United States that it should cease action against Germany after Japanese-American negotiations had been brought to a successful conclusion.\textsuperscript{143}

\textbf{42. Foreign Minister Togo Confers with Ambassador Craigie (November 11, 1941)}

Although Ambassador Craigie had called upon Foreign Minister Togo to discuss other business, the representative of the two countries turned the conversation to the subject of Japanese-American negotiations. Ambassador Craigie stated that the British government was not aware of the full details of those conversations under way in Washington. However, since the success of those negotiations would affect British interests in the Far East, the English government was naturally interested in their success. Once the United States and Japan had reached an agreement on the basic principles for peace and the two countries were ready for real negotiations, Great Britain wished to enter into an agreement with both the United States and Japan.\textsuperscript{144}

In reply Foreign Minister Togo stated that the matters under discussion between his government and the United States greatly affected England. It was the Japanese government’s desire that Great Britain enter into an agreement with both the United States and Japan at an appropriate time. Although not fully informed on the progress already made during these informal conversations, Ambassador Craigie said he assumed negotiations were still in the preliminary stages. By way of refuting this assumption Foreign Minister Togo pointed out that the Japanese had already handed the United States government its final proposal in an effort to bring the negotiations to a speedy close.\textsuperscript{145} At this point in the conversation Foreign Minister Togo took the opportunity to refer to a speech made by Prime Minister Churchill in which he issued a warning to Japan.\textsuperscript{146} Since the British Prime Minister had stated in the same speech that he knew nothing of the developments of the Japanese-American negotiations, Foreign Minister Togo suggested that in the future British statesmen find a basis for their remarks and not issue unfounded threats capable of forming a breach in Japanese-British diplomacy.

Turning the conversation back to the latest Japanese proposals, Foreign Minister Togo said that if the United States found them in accord with its own basic principles, an agreement could be reached within ten days. If, on the other hand, the United States refused to accept Japan’s terms, all negotiations would cease. In view of the fact that there were factions within Japan itself working against the re-establishment of Japanese-American and Japanese-British relations, Foreign Minister Togo felt it necessary to conclude an understanding without delay. Since the Japanese government had made the maximum concessions to date, only the attitude of Great Britain and the United States would stand in the way of peace. From Ambassador Craigie’s general attitude Foreign Minister Togo concluded that the British representative

\textsuperscript{142}III, 277.
\textsuperscript{143}IV, 81.
\textsuperscript{144}IV, 82.
\textsuperscript{145}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{146}At the luncheon of the Lord Mayor of London on November 10, 1941, the Prime Minister Churchill stated that Great Britain would declare war on Japan immediately if war broke out between the United States and Japan, \textit{New York Times}, November 11, 1941, 1:1, 2. The Japanese press replied to Prime Minister Churchill’s speech by saying it was “an outrageous but crafty British plot to involve the United States in a war in the Pacific for the protection of British interests.”
understood for the first time how critical the situation actually was. Ambassador Craigie promised to report the details of his conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister to the British government immediately. When reporting this conversation to Ambassador Nomura on November 11, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo pointed out that the United States government still considered the negotiations in the preliminary stage, and it was necessary that Ambassador Nomura correct this opinion.147

43. Ambassador Nomura Seeks Clarification of Tripartite Pact Issues

On November 11, 1941 Ambassador Nomura sent a message to the Japanese Foreign Office requesting clarification of certain details involving the Tripartite Pact. Ambassador Nomura asked whether Foreign Minister Togo in his conversation with Ambassador Grew has emphasized the point that the Japanese government assumed the United States agreed with Japan's definition of its obligations under the Tripartite Pact as set forth in the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941. Actually, however, Ambassador Nomura reminded the Foreign Minister that the United States' oral statement of October 2, 1941 indicated that America did not agree with this Japanese interpretation. During Minister Wakasugi's conversations with Under Secretary of States Welles it was merely noted that "the United States also gave indications that adjustments in this matter may be a possibility." Although both the United States and Japanese representatives were exchanging notes in spite of the fact that no definite decision had been made with regard to the Tripartite Pact issues, Ambassador Nomura wished these various points cleared up in order that no misunderstanding might arise from them.148

44. The Chinese Ambassador Confers with President Roosevelt

Ambassador Nomura reported on November 11, 1941 that the Chinese Ambassador to the United States had called on President Roosevelt on the previous day. Since the interview had lasted only two minutes, the purpose of the Chinese Ambassador's visit was probably to hand the American President a written document. Although unable to determine the contents of this document, Ambassador Nomura had passed on the scant information he had obtained to his government hoping that it might be of some value to them.149

45. Mr. Kase Calls on Ambassador Grew (November 12, 1941)

At the request of Foreign Minister Togo, Mr. Kase called on Ambassador Grew on November 12, 1941.150 Mr. Kase explained to Ambassador Grew that although Mr. Togo could not speak with complete freedom on certain subjects to the American representative, he nevertheless desired to give the United States a complete understanding of how the present situation affected the Japanese government. From the latest reports of Ambassador Nomura's conversations with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, Mr. Togo was deeply concerned about America's inadequate appreciation of the urgency of the situation.

Since the Japanese government had made the greatest possible concessions to the United States, Foreign Minister Togo considered official negotiations between Japan and the United States to be in their final stage. When Prime Minister Konoye's government had been in power, it had conducted the conversations with the support of the entire country but since no tangible progress had been made, Japanese public opinion regarded the United States' delay as a means of concealing preparations underway for the complete encirclement of Japan. Therefore, the present Japanese Cabinet had undertaken the task of reaching an agreement with the United States against much opposition and if any appreciable delay were encoun-

147IV, 82.
148IV, 83.
149IV, 84.
150"Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)" November 12, 1941, S.D. II, 719-722.
tered, a very critical state of affairs would result. Not only would Mr. Togo's official position be imperiled, but his very life would be at stake. Nevertheless, Mr. Kase added that Foreign Minister Togo had the courage to continue his attempts for the re-establishment of friendly relations between Japan and the United States fully aware of the consequences of failure.

Ambassador Grew remarked that Mr. Kase's observations were generally the same as those expressed by former Foreign Minister Toyoda and Prime Minister Konoye during former conversations. Mr. Kase insisted that there was considerable difference between the present situation and the previous one and again he emphasized the vital importance of concluding present negotiations successfully.151

At this point in the conversation, Ambassador Grew read Secretary Hull's report of the interview with Ambassador Nomura on November 7, 1941.152 After reading the report, Mr. Kase stated that Ambassador Nomura's details on the conversation were very similar.

Mr. Kase said that Foreign Minister Toyoda was especially interested in Secretary Hull's suggestion that the Chinese government might be willing to express a desire to seek peaceful cooperation with Japan. Since that suggestion was generally linked with the whole adjustment of the Pacific problem, Ambassador Grew felt that it would come under the cognizance of Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull.

Next, Mr. Kase inquired whether Ambassador Grew had received an account of the conversation between President Roosevelt and Ambassador Nomura held on November 10, 1941. Replying that there was probably little difference between that conversation and the one between the Japanese Ambassador and Secretary Hull on November 7, 1941, Ambassador Grew said that the American State Department had failed to send him that report as yet. Mr. Kase said that the conversations were entirely different in tone.

Ambassador Grew then handed Mr. Kase a copy of his report dealing with the interview with Foreign Minister Togo on November 10, 1941. After reading it over, Mr. Kase stated that the report was inaccurate in one sense since Mr. Togo had never stated that "he did not wish to press the point" regarding the transference of the informal conversations into "official negotiations". Although he did not contradict Mr. Kase, Ambassador Grew, in his report to the American State Department, pointed out that Counselor Dooman's notes taken during the conversation, revealed that Mr. Togo had actually made such a statement in Japanese.153

From this conversation with Mr. Kase, Ambassador Grew (in his personal comments forwarded to the State Department) noted that considerable doubt had been cast on the alleged message received from Foreign Minister Togo through the prominent Japanese informant on November 7, 1941.154 In this message Foreign Minister Togo had supposedly said that although he could not express himself with unrestrained freedom, he nevertheless, wished to make a suggestion. He said that the Tojo government had decided upon the maximum concessions that it would be willing to make in order to meet the desires of the United States. However, even if these concessions were regarded as inadequate by the United States, the Japanese government believed that the Washington conferences should continue.155 However, after talking with Mr. Kase, Ambassador Grew was convinced that the message received through the Japanese informant was misleading. Even at the time of its delivery, Ambassador Grew had been somewhat surprised at its contents, yet he had no grounds on which to question its accuracy. Although it appeared obvious even now that the Japanese government would prefer a continuation of the informal conversations to a complete breakdown of negotiations, nevertheless, Ambassador Grew appreciated the dangerous situation which would result if these

151Ibid.
154"Memorandum of Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)—November 12, 1941, S.D. II, 722.
155"Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)—November 7, 1941, S.D. II, 705.
conversations dragged on and produced no definite progress. While realizing that Japan must take the initiative in these conversations, Ambassador Grew did not feel authorized to say whether the Japanese proposals of November 7, 1941 constituted the maximum number of concessions that it would be willing to make.\footnote{156}

46. Ambassador Nomura Seeks English Translation of Proposal B

In view of the fact that Japanese-American relations had not progressed as a result of the Japanese proposals, it was evident that Ambassador Nomura would have to present the United States government with the alternate proposal B. In order that there might be no misunderstanding arising with the presentation of this proposal, Ambassador Nomura requested that Tokyo send him an English translation of this proposal immediately.\footnote{157}

47. Japanese Official Analyzes Roosevelt's Domestic and Foreign Strategy

On November 12, 1941 a Japanese intelligence official in Washington sent Tokyo a report on the Roosevelt administration’s method of dealing with the Japanese-American situation.\footnote{158}

In an effort to aid in the defeat of Germany President Roosevelt had inaugurated military, economic, and industrial measures which would eventually lead America into complete war. By assisting Great Britain it had already entered the conflict on the high seas. While the United States army was not yet equipped to fight a war with Germany on land, for the present, at least, the United States navy could engage German warships on the high seas. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that President Roosevelt had almost dictatorial powers in regard to Congress and the military officials, the American people were not in complete sympathy with his policies. For example, on November 10, 1941 the Times Herald had stated that Roosevelt was as much a dictator as Hitler or Stalin. Furthermore, the America First Committee was secretly working to impeach President Roosevelt. On October 30, 1941 at Madison Square Garden 8,000 members of the America First Committee gathered as a demonstration against the foreign policies of the present United States government.\footnote{158a}

In Washington a former American Ambassador demanded that President Roosevelt be forced to resign his position as President by means of a referendum. He even went so far as to state that President Roosevelt might easily die during this disastrous period in the nation’s history. This statement drew great applause from the audience. Apparently, the Japanese intelligence official went on to say, the move to impeach President Roosevelt was wide-spread and was initiated by many varying factions. An editorial in the Times Herald on November 4, 1941 warned that it would be impossible for Congress to impeach President Roosevelt because of the whip he held over the army and navy. Nevertheless, the editorial in this and other papers did mention the possibility of President Roosevelt’s being impeached at some time, and the Japanese intelligence official believed this to be extremely significant.

As an indication that the American people were not entirely behind President Roosevelt’s aid to Britain, the Japanese official cited the occurrence in Detroit when Ambassador Halifax was pelted with eggs. The American public as a whole had begun to view the prospect of war in its unprecedented aspects and after the sinking of the Reuben James the country received a great shock. Although President Roosevelt took advantage of this sinking to declare an unlimited national emergency, in his speech on October 27, 1941 he did not stress foreign questions but placed his emphasis almost entirely upon America’s internal problems.\footnote{159}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[156] S. D. II, 722.
\item[157] IV, 85.
\item[158] IV, 86
\item[158a] Ibid.
\item[159] IV, 87, DoD comment, name withheld.
\end{footnotes}
During the past few months even the attitude of Congress toward Roosevelt had been affected by public opinion. In spite of the fact that the Senate had approved the entrance of armed merchantmen into war zones, the actual victory was only by the small margin of fifty to thirty-seven. It was obvious then, that the people of the United States feared the German war machine. In general the American people believed that the Japanese were exhausted from their four years of war with China, and that, if war took place between Japan and the United States, Japan would quickly be defeated. If war were declared upon Japan, President Roosevelt could declare an unlimited emergency, disperse the America First Committee, and crush all opposition to his administration. The Japanese official believed that in time, President Roosevelt, using the Japanese as a tool, could even prepare the American people for a war with Germany, Japan’s ally.

Viewed from any aspect a Japanese-American war, according to the Japanese intelligence official, would be disastrous to Japan. Germany at the present time was anxious to conclude peace with England and should American aid to the British be slowed down Germany might possibly be able to accomplish this plan. It was doubtful whether Germany would let Japan stand in its way if the end of the war were in sight. 160

In warning his government of the dangers of a war with the United States the Japanese intelligence official pointed out still further that the present Japanese-American relations were heading both countries toward armed conflict. In view of that fact the Japanese official suggested that his government devise some temporary understanding with the United States in order to alleviate the economic pressure upon the Japanese people and to allow conditions in the Pacific to return to some semblance of normalcy. Reminding his government that President Roosevelt had taken an active interest in the European war when Germany invaded the Netherlands, the Japanese official pointed out that President Roosevelt would inevitably enter the war against the Nazis and would declare war on the German government rather than the Japanese. Japan could then hope to obtain a complete and satisfactory agreement with the American government. 161

48. Japanese Naval Activity Seen in the Mandates

In spite of the warnings of Japanese officials in the United States to curtail operations in the Pacific that might lead to war with America, the Japanese government continued preparations for future aggression.

On November 12, 1941 American traffic analysts disclosed that during the month of October new call signs had appeared in Mandate traffic indicating a decided increase in Japanese forces there. In fact, the Islands of Truk, Palau, Jaluit and Saipan were being included in dispatches which would not affect them under ordinary circumstances. Apparently several new units were even being added to the Sixth Base Force in the Jaluit area. 162

49. Hull-Nomura Conversation (November 12, 1941)

a. State Department’s Report 163

Since he had made an appointment on November 10, 1941 for another conversation with Mr. Hull, Ambassador Nomura, accompanied by Mr. Wakasugi, called at the apartment of the American Secretary of State on November 12, 1941. Before beginning the conversation, Secretary Hull handed Ambassador Nomura a statement which he had prepared in response

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160 IV, 88.
161 IV, 89.
162 IV, 90.
to a request from Minister Wakasugi for a further elaboration of Secretary Hull's views on the development of a true friendship between Japan and China.164

In Secretary Hull's oral statement reference was made to Ambassador Nomura's request for an amplification of the suggestion made on November 7, 1941 for the mutual exchange of pledges of cooperation between Japan and China.165 Secretary Hull reminded the Japanese representatives that he had made this suggestion after Ambassador Nomura had pointed out that if Japanese troops were removed from all areas of China, the Japanese people would have no tangible gains from their four years of heavy sacrifice. Since Europe was threatened with anarchy, Secretary Hull believed that Japan held in its power the unique opportunity for enhancing its national prestige by moral force. If the Chinese government were able to cooperate with Japan along peaceful and beneficial lines and Japan found it possible to reciprocate in a policy of mutual conciliation, the Japanese government would be making a contribution toward arresting the destructive forces that now menaced civilization.166 In this way Japan would assume leadership in a peaceful world.

What Secretary Hull envisioned in his suggestion was the practical application of basic principles directed toward the preservation of social and economic order by means of which all nations of the world would be able to collaborate peacefully, unthreatened by aggrandizement or discrimination of any kind. Such a policy would provide for liberalization of trade while, at the same time, affording access to, and development of, natural resources for the benefit of all peoples. At this critical moment in world history, the adoption of such a plan by the Japanese government would be attributed to its far-sighted statesmanship.167

After reading Ambassador Nomura this oral statement, Secretary Hull then said that in order to avoid any misunderstanding with regard to the concessions already agreed upon by the Japanese government, and in order to ascertain whether the new Japanese Ministry was willing to retain the former proposals, he had drawn up a statement on this subject. In this second oral statement handed to Ambassador Nomura concerned with the former Japanese concessions, the United States government reminded Japan that the documents handed to the President of the United States on August 28, 1941 by Ambassador Nomura asserted that "Japan is solicitous for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and the peace of the world ... ." Because of this attitude the Japanese government at that time thanked the United States for the invitation to conduct negotiations with the goal of establishing a workable understanding. In order to attain a united effort toward the peaceful settlement of the entire Pacific situation, the Japanese government stated that it was willing to make certain sacrifices. Denying any intention of threatening other countries by the stationing of its troops in Indo-China, the Japanese government stated that it "is prepared to withdraw its troops from French Indo-China as soon as the China Incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia". This same pledge of its peaceful intentions was made applicable to Thailand at the same time.168

In this document Japan made specific reference to the Soviet Union by declaring that as long as Russia remained faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty by menacing neither Japan or Manchukuo, the Japanese government would maintain friendly relations

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164Ibid.
165Oral statement handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)—November 12, 1941, S.D. II, 726–727. For Japanese version of this oral statement sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura and decoded by American cryptanalysts see IV, 97–99.
166Ibid.
167Ibid.
168Oral Statement handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)—November 12, 1941, S.D. II 727–729. For Japanese version of this oral statement sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura and decoded by American cryptanalysts see IV, 93–96.
with that country. "In a word, the Japanese government has no intention of using, without provocation, military force against any neighboring nation." Since Japan was in accordance with the practical application of the principles set forth by the United States government, it had insisted that it desired to continue the informal discussions in order to work out a progressive program by peaceful methods.

Since a new Cabinet had come into office in Japan, the United States government asked assurance that the position of the Japanese government had not changed in regard to the matters stated. When the United States had handed its last document to Japan on October 2, 1941, it had pointed out the difficulty in understanding Japan's apparent need for qualifying certain statements of policy. The United States government had in mind such phrases as:

"As long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty and does not menace Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of said treaty—"

"Without provocation—"

"Without any justifiable reason—"

In answer, Minister Wakasugi on October 13, 1941, had stated that those qualifications were the result of unfortunate phraseology and the Japanese government was willing to omit them. The United States government asked whether the new Japanese Cabinet confirmed Minister Wakasugi's statement.

In attempting to avoid any misunderstanding, Secretary Hull pointed out that the United States government had not directed any of the foregoing observations at the new proposals submitted by Ambassador Nomura on November 7 and November 10, 1941. The United States government also assured Japan that it had no desire to delay negotiations and that it would expedite consideration of the latest proposals of the Japanese government.169

After receiving these documents, Ambassador Nomura emphasized that the Japanese government wished to expedite the settlement of any problems with the United States before the impending session of the Japanese Diet because further delay would increase the difficult internal situation in Japan. He requested that some agreement be reached within a week or ten days. Assuring the Japanese Ambassador that the United States government was working as rapidly as possible to reach a decision on the Japanese proposals handed to President Roosevelt on November 10, 1941, Secretary Hull commented that some discussion with the Chinese government might be had as soon as a good basis in the exploratory conversations were reached. At the same time, however, certain of Japan's points regarding commercial policies had not been clarified sufficiently. Secretary Hull asked if the Japanese government intended to have Great Britain and other countries come to some sort of an agreement on commercial equality.

Next, Secretary Hull referred to the difficulty arising from Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact. Replying that Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact were limited, Ambassador Nomura reminded Secretary Hull that Great Britain had remained neutral in the war between Japan and Russia despite the existing Anglo-Japanese alliance. Even if the United States were to understand the attitude of the present Japanese Cabinet toward the Axis Powers, however, Secretary Hull remarked, there was always the possibility of another government's coming into power in Japan. In view of this possibility and in consideration of the growing distress of conquered European peoples, Secretary Hull declared that it was necessary to prepare for a postwar program, one in which Japan should play a constructive part by uniting with peaceful forces in opposition to Hitler in order to avert further disaster. Ambassador Nomura insisted that as time went on Japan would be less affected by Axis ties just as the Anglo-Japanese alliance had died after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. If the proposed agreements were put to a practical application, Ambassador Nomura felt that Japan would not be forced to gain access to materials and markets by aggressive means. Secretary

169Ibid.
Hull agreed that the Tripartite Pact would not be a problem; that Japan and the United States could work out their agreement along other lines.\textsuperscript{169a}

In speaking of the Japanese-Chinese situation, Secretary Hull, in reply to Ambassador Nomura's question about the United States intercession in the matter, stated that when matters got beyond an exploratory stage, the United States would wish to talk over the subject with the Chinese, British and Dutch and then re-discuss the matter with Japan. Commenting on the two documents handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull which both Ambassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi had just read, the Japanese Minister asked whether the United States would bring Japan and China together for a mutual exchange of peaceful pledges. Not wishing to commit himself, Secretary Hull said that the main problem was to dispose of basic matters relating to the provisions for a peace settlement; the questions of procedure could be easily settled. Because of some preconception that Secretary Hull's suggestion about a Japanese-Chinese peace contained more than appeared at first glance, the Japanese representatives kept going over these points during the conversation.

Taking up the Japanese concessions discussed in the second document of the United States government, Minister Wakasugi pointed out that America referred to the Japanese statement of August 28, 1941. The Japanese government wished to use its document of September 25, 1941 as a basis for any discussions. In an attempt to clarify an obvious misunderstanding on the part of the United States government, Minister Wakasugi stated that in the conversation with Under Secretary of State Welles, referred to in the United States' document, he had been alluding to phrases used in the proposals of September 25, 1941. In doing so, he had merely stated that there might have been some unfortunate phraseology in translation which could be improved after comparison with the original Japanese text. Secretary Hull thanked the Japanese Minister for calling his attention to this misunderstanding.\textsuperscript{169b}

By way of answering Ambassador Nomura's question regarding the continuation of United States aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek during Japanese-Chinese peace negotiations, Secretary Hull stated that ways would be found for safeguarding the rights of all countries concerned by some agreement. Secretary Hull did not agree with Ambassador Nomura that the negotiations for peace would drag on for an interminable period. However, Ambassador Nomura commented that if an agreement between Japan and the United States failed on the question of Japan's retention of troops in China, then the Chinese government would hold the key to future relations between Japan and the United States and this might eventually result in war. Whether the United States interceded in the Chinese Affair or not, Secretary Hull insisted, the settlement would naturally be in harmony with the proposed Pacific settlement as a whole. At the same time, however, he took the opportunity to point out to the Japanese representatives that their retention of troops in China was inconsistent with one of the basic principles, namely interference in the internal affairs of other nations. Although he did not offer anything definite on this point, Ambassador Nomura disclaimed any desire on the part of Japan to retain its troops in China permanently.

As the conversation drew to a close, Secretary Hull assured Ambassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi that the United States government was giving careful consideration to the latest Japanese proposals and it was hoped that some definite statement could be made concerning them on November 14, 1941.\textsuperscript{170}

\textit{b. Ambassador Nomura's Report} \textsuperscript{171}

After his conversation with President Roosevelt on November 10, 1941, Ambassador Nomura had made an appointment to discuss the Pacific problems with Secretary Hull. Although

\textsuperscript{169a}S.D. II, 722–726.
\textsuperscript{169b}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{170}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{171}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{172}IV, 91.
November 11, 1941 was the Armistice holiday Secretary Hull promised to study the Japanese proposal with other American representatives and discuss the results of this conversation with Ambassador Nomura on November 12, 1941.

At 3:00 p.m. on November 12, 1941, Ambassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi met with Secretary Hull and Mr. Ballantine. As a reply to the Japanese counter proposals Secretary Hull handed Ambassador Nomura two oral statements. Secretary Hull requested that Ambassador Nomura ascertain the attitude of the new Japanese Cabinet toward each of these statements. Since the second of these oral statements concerned a proposal for peace between Japan and China, the representatives of both countries discussed the China affair in detail. Although a more definite proposal would not be forthcoming from the American government for two days Secretary Hull stated that if the basic principles applied to the Pacific, such as non-discrimination in commerce, could be similarly applied to China, a complete settlement of Far Eastern affairs could be effected. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that if the Chinese question continued to play a key role in Japanese-American negotiations, the desired understanding would be delayed. Secretary Hull merely replied vaguely that if the general Pacific principles were applied to China as well as to the other countries of the Far Eastern Pacific an immediate understanding would be possible. After speaking with representatives of England and the Netherlands, Secretary Hull had come to the conclusion that those two governments might sign an agreement with Japan similar to that worked out between Japan and the United States. However, Secretary Hull stated that he had not yet spoken to the Chinese representatives about this matter. At this point in the conversation Mr. Ballantine pointed out that it had been stated in the American proposal of June 21, 1941, that the United States would not allow Japan to inflict upon other countries conditions conflicting with America’s basic principles. Anxious to get more definite details regarding Secretary Hull’s proposal for Japanese-Chinese peace Minister Wakasugi asked whether the United States intended to secure a peace guarantee from China and then transmit it to Japan, or whether the three countries would meet together in a conference. Minister Wakasugi also wished to know at what stage in the Japanese-American negotiations the United States would secure this peace pledge from China. To all these questions Secretary Hull avoided giving a definite reply. However, he intimated his intention to mediate between Japan and China in order to obtain the desired peace. Furthermore, the American Secretary of State appeared confident that once Japanese-American negotiations were in their final stages the problem regarding Japanese-Chinese peace could be settled without any difficulty.

In an attempt to make the American representative understand Japan’s position in regard to the stationing of troops in China, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that under his government’s new proposal the troops would be removed within a specified time. Although Secretary Hull replied that the stationing of Japanese troops in China constituted interference in the affairs of other nations; nevertheless, he seemed satisfied with Ambassador Nomura’s explanation on this point.

The conversation then turned to Japan’s obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Secretary Hull stated frankly that his government did not understand why Japan persisted in regarding the Tripartite Pact as a defensive measure when Hitler was carrying out a brutal offensive against the small nations of Europe. Once the European war was over, Secretary Hull said, the United States would have to take charge of the people throughout that hemisphere. If some understanding could be worked out now between Japan and the United States and a similar one between Japan, England and the Netherlands, the stability of the Pacific would

172IV, 92.
174IV, 92. See IV, 84 which reports an interview between the Chinese Ambassador and President Roosevelt.
175IV, 100.
be insured, and Japan would be given an opportunity to cooperate in the establishment of the European peace. Minister Wakasugi denied that the Tripartite Pact constituted a threat to any peace plan. In proving his point he reminded Secretary Hull that the Japanese-British alliance was in effect throughout the Russo-Japanese War and was later nullified at the Washington conference. Minister Wakasugi insisted that the situation changed with the circumstances. Furthermore, Minister Wakasugi said, Japan would not be forced to adopt aggressive policies if it could secure petroleum and other necessary raw materials from the United States and the Netherlands East Indies by normal trade measures. Since the Japanese government actually wished to apply the nondiscriminatory policy to all its commercial transactions, Minister Wakasugi believed that the United States would be willing to adopt Japan's latest proposals. In reply Secretary Hull agreed that the situation was extremely critical at this time. Nevertheless, he maintained that the problems which had accumulated over a period of ten years could not be settled over night. Minister Wakasugi reminded Secretary Hull that some agreement should be reached before the Japanese Diet convened in Tokyo on November 25, 1941.

As a result of the discussion Ambassador Nomura concluded that the United States was continuing to study the three major problems existing between its government and Japan as well as the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941. Since Ambassador Nomura was not satisfied with the American attitude toward the conversations, however, he instructed Minister Wakasugi to confer with Secretary Hull and reemphasize the need for an immediate decision.

50. Ambassador Kurusu Reports on American Pessimism

While en route to the United States by clipper, Ambassador Kurusu reported meeting Mr. Hozuituk, a member of the Cooper party, who had recently gone on a Far Eastern tour. While conversing with this man Ambassador Kurusu learned that the Cooper party felt Ambassador Kurusu's mission was a lost cause since Japanese-American negotiations would never culminate in a successful peace settlement. In reporting this attitude to Tokyo on November 13, 1941, Ambassador Kurusu asked whether the American public was influenced in any way by the pessimistic point of view of the Cooper party. Ambassador Kurusu felt that it might be of some value to learn the actual influence that this party had in the United States.

51. Japan Revises Text of Proposal B

On November 13, 1941 the Japanese government sent Ambassador Nomura instructions for changing certain phrases in Proposal B. In its revised form Section I of the addendum was to read: "As required upon having a joint agreement assuredly established between Japan and China or as soon as a just peace is made in the Pacific area, Japan has no objection to promising to evacuate her troops dispatched to French Indo-China at present."

52. Foreign Minister Togo Questions American Interpretation of Proposals

On November 13, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo sent Ambassador Nomura a message questioning America's interpretation of certain phases of the Japanese proposals. For example, Foreign Minister Togo stated that Ambassador Grew had shown him a digest of the Japanese Ambassador's conversation with Secretary Hull on November 7, 1941. In Ambassador Grew's report Secretary Hull asked Ambassador Nomura directly for a "concrete statement of Japan's
relations with the Axis powers.” Since Ambassador Nomura had made no mention of this phrase in his message to Tokyo regarding the conversation with Secretary Hull, Foreign Minister Togo asked for a more complete report on it. From the attitude of the United States toward the present negotiations it was apparent that the American government still thought of the conversations as being in their preliminary stages. On November 12, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo stated that he had mentioned this to Ambassador Grew, warning him that the seriousness of the situation forced both countries to consider these negotiations as final. Foreign Minister Togo asked Ambassador Nomura to press Secretary Hull with this point. The Japanese Foreign Minister warned Ambassador Nomura that Ambassador Grew had shown him the report of the Hull-Nomura conversations only through his own personal courtesy, therefore he warned Ambassador Nomura not to make any mention of it to American representatives in Washington.181

53. Finance Official Nishiyama to Study Japanese-American Negotiations

Possibly because of the effect of American economic and commercial results upon Japan, on November 12, 1941, Finance Official Nishiyama was ordered to study all matters relating to the Japanese-American negotiations. Mr. Okinobu Kikaya, the Japanese Finance Minister, evidently convinced that these negotiations were the focal point of the recent international situation was to confirm his instructions to Mr. Nishiyama in a later message.182

54. Japan Seeks Undelayed Chinese Peace Negotiations

In commenting upon the report of the conversation between Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi, the Japanese Foreign Office reminded its representatives in Washington that Japan was interested in Secretary Hull’s Chinese peace proposal only insofar as it could simplify the settlement of that Pacific problem. The Japanese government had no desire to carry on prolonged conversations related to it. In regard to the possible materialization of Secretary Hull’s peace plan, Tokyo reminded Minister Wakasugi in particular that it would be opposed to a conference conducted by the consular representatives of Japan, the United States and China.183

55. Japanese-American Conversations (November 13, 1941)

a. State Department’s Report184

At his own request Minister Wakasugi called to see Mr. Ballantine on November 13, 1941. Recalling President Roosevelt’s desire to see Mr. Kurusu upon his arrival, Minister Wakasugi informed the American representative that Ambassador Kurusu would arrive in Washington on Saturday afternoon, November 15, 1941.

Minister Wakasugi then turned the conversation to the United States’ misunderstanding of a statement he had made to Under Secretary of State Welles on October 13, 1941. The United States had referred to Minister Wakasugi’s remark in the oral statement handed Ambassador Nomura on November 12, 1941. Attempting to clear up completely this misunderstanding, Minister Wakasugi said that he had declared to Mr. Welles, that “there may have been some unfortunate phraseology in the English translation of our instructions, as we are not very sure of our English. If there are such phrases the wording might be adjusted.” When making this remark Minister Wakasugi said that he had been referring to the Japanese document of September 25, 1941, and not to that delivered on August 28, 1941.

181Ibid.
182IV, 106.
183IV, 107.
Impressing upon Mr. Ballantine the desperate situation current in Japan, Minister Wakasugi urged that some concrete understanding be reached between the two governments before the Japanese Parliament convened on Saturday, November 15, 1941. It was Minister Wakasugi's understanding that the United States government would give a reply to the Japanese proposals of November 7 and November 10, 1941, on the following day. In correcting Minister Wakasugi, Mr. Ballantine pointed out that Secretary Hull had said he only hoped that some statement might be forthcoming on that day. Re-emphasizing that the Japanese government wanted to avoid any further interchange of comment on the proposals submitted, Minister Wakasugi said that he hoped Secretary Hull would have a clear-cut answer to the Japanese proposals of November 7 and November 10, 1941, and that the United States would say definitely whether its proposal of June 21, 1941, was to be the final one handed to the Japanese government. Mr. Ballantine pointed out the need for a further clarification of these latest Japanese proposals, however, since Secretary Hull had already stated that he did not understand Japan's attitude on the commercial policy. Attempting to clear up this point, Minister Wakasugi declared that the Japanese government desired that the principle of non-discrimination, as applied to China, be applied by the United States and Japan to commercial dealings with the rest of the world. Mr. Ballantine felt that this point was important enough to be brought out clearly and authoritatively.

Minister Wakasugi next brought up the problem of arriving at formal negotiations. Throughout all the United States' documents it had been noted that America believed the two governments were still in the stage of exploratory discussions. Since the Japanese government had given the United States its latest proposals through Ambassador Nomura it believed that it had entered into formal negotiations. However, Mr. Ballantine insisted that until the United States government discussed the problems with China and the other governments concerned, no formal state of negotiations could be reached with the Japanese. Not wishing to argue any of these points with Mr. Ballantine, Mr. Wakasugi merely asked that they be referred to Secretary Hull.

b. Minister Wakasugi's Report

At a meeting with Mr. Ballantine on November 13, 1941, Minister Wakasugi began the conversation by pointing out that the previous day's discussions leading to no settlement had fallen short of Japanese expectations. In view of the tense situation existing within Japan itself the Japanese public was viewing the Japanese-American negotiations with impatience. Reminding Mr. Ballantine that the session of the Japanese Diet would convene in Tokyo on the following day, Minister Wakasugi warned that some satisfactory understanding must be reached without any further delay. Any discussions of general attitudes on the possible outlook must be dropped from further conversations in order to eliminate all hinderance to a satisfactory agreement. At the present time, Mr. Wakasugi stated, the Japanese government wished definite answers regarding certain points. He requested that the United States make it known that it intended to accept the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941, as clarified by the further Japanese proposals of November 7 and November 10, 1941. If these proposals were not accepted the Japanese government would like an American counter proposal clearly indicating the revisions desired. Minister Wakasugi pointed out that many factions in Japan believed that the United States, in refusing to make any changes in its proposal of June 21, 1941, was merely stalling for time. In reply to these remarks Mr. Ballantine pointed out that the United States, aware of the critical condition, had called a meeting of American representatives to discuss the Japanese proposals of November 11, 1941, in spite of the fact that it was the Armistice holiday. Not wishing to quibble over mere details, however, Mr. Ballantine

185 Ibid.
186 IV, 108.
brought up several points with regard to the Japanese proposals that the United States wished clarified. First of all, Mr. Ballantine stated, Japan, in accepting the plan of commercial non-discrimination in the Pacific, had requested that the same treatment be applied to the entire world. The United States wished to know if this sweeping proposal was to include those nations now at war. Stating that this and other terms in the Japanese proposals were designed to bring about an agreement between Japan and the United States, Minister Wakasugi pointed out that the agreement was not designed for every country in the world. Therefore, it appeared obvious that Japan only wished that its present government and that of the United States apply the basic principle of non-discriminatory treatment to its own commercial dealings with other countries.  

Minister Wakasugi then discussed the difference of opinion regarding the stage of present conversations. On the one hand, the Japanese Minister pointed out, the United States regarded the discussions as merely exploratory, while Japan considered them to be actual negotiations. In reply Mr. Ballantine referred to a statement made by Secretary Hull in which he said that once the conversations reached the stage of negotiations Great Britain and the Netherlands would be asked to participate. Disregarding Mr. Ballantine’s explanation Minister Wakasugi insisted that talks between the duly recognized ambassador of one country and the President and Secretary of State of another had always constituted a diplomatic negotiation. Therefore, Mr. Wakasugi requested that Secretary Hull be informed that Japan was treating the present proceedings as part of final negotiations. Minister Wakasugi’s report to Tokyo on November 13, 1941, contained an explanation of Ambassador Nomura’s interview with President Roosevelt. The Japanese Minister stated that the primary purpose of the interview was to submit the latest Japanese proposals; therefore, a discussion of Japan’s obligations under the Tripartite Pact did not take place. Other than a remark by Minister Wakasugi expressing the hope that the United States would not insist upon enlarging the scope of the right of self-defense, neither representative discussed the problem further. Minister Wakasugi insisted that Secretary Hull had never requested a “concrete statement” concerning Japan’s relations with the Axis powers. In fact, Minister Wakasugi had even asked Mr. Ballantine if there were any other points to be discussed and Mr. Ballantine had replied there were none. If Secretary Hull’s report showed that he had asked this question regarding the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Ballantine was certain that some mistake had been made. Naturally, however, Mr. Wakasugi pointed out, the United States was attempting to get some assurance from Japan regarding its duties under the terms of the pact.  

56. Foreign Minister Togo Requests Summaries of the Conversations  
In order to receive an immediate report of any conversations taking place between the American and Japanese representatives Foreign Minister Togo requested that Ambassador Nomura wire the Foreign Office brief summaries without any delay. More complete details could then be wired later at the convenience of the Japanese Ambassador.  

57. Ambassador Nomura Warns of America's Preparedness for War  
On November 14, 1941, Ambassador Nomura wired the Japanese Foreign Office a complete resume of America’s attitude toward a war with Japan. Although Ambassador Nomura was convinced that in the end the negotiations would be concluded successfully, he warned his government that the United States intended to stop any further Japanese moves in the Pacific whether they be northward or southward. Already using every economic weapon to curtail

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186a Ibid.  
186b Ibid.  
187IV, 109.  
188IV, 110.
Japanese aggression, Ambassador Nomura felt that the United States was now preparing for actual war. Rather than yield its fundamental political policy regarding the Pacific area the United States, Ambassador Nomura felt, would join up with the other countries interested in the Far East. The United States government had no intention of repeating the failure of the Munich conference. Since the German victories were decreasing as Russian resistance persisted, Ambassador Nomura felt that the possibility of a separate peace between Germany and England was small, and that this would have a bad effect upon Japanese-American relations. Furthermore, Ambassador Nomura pointed to the increase in American aid to China. If the Chinese problem continued to remain the stumbling block in Japanese-American negotiations, Ambassador Nomura felt that the United States might well take advantage of the situation to declare war on Japan.\(^{188a}\)

Another primary factor influencing the attitude of the United States toward Japan was the Tripartite Pact. Recently the American newspapers had pointed to the close alliance between Japan and the Axis, warning that Japan would be willing at any time to stab the United States in the back. If Japan then, continued its aggression in the south Pacific, even though that aggression be necessary for the maintenance of Japan's national life, Ambassador Nomura felt that England, the United States and Russia would attack. The countries of Central and South America, dependent upon the United States for their economic existence, would also join sides against Japan. Recognizing the fact that Japan believed America’s forces to be concentrated in the Atlantic, Ambassador Nomura stated that its activities there were confined to convoy duty and that at any moment the United States could transfer the main strength of its fleet to the Pacific.\(^{189}\)

Previously Ambassador Nomura had felt that once the United States entered an ocean war in the Atlantic it would be ready for a compromise in the Pacific. Lately, however, when Great Britain had transferred its forces to the Indian Ocean the United States had changed its attitude so that at the present time it was ready to participate in a naval war in the Pacific. Recognizing the critical situation existing within Japan, Ambassador Nomura, nevertheless, asked that the Japanese government and people be more patient toward the negotiations with the United States. He felt that it was necessary for Japan to view the entire world situation rather than its own internal conditions.\(^{190}\)

58. China Seeks Increased Aid from the United States

Mr. Iguchi learned that the Chinese Ambassador to the United States had submitted a plea for intensive aid to China in the event Japan attacked the Burma Road. According to this report the United States government rejected China's request. However, Mr. T. V. Soong, refusing to let the matter rest, at the present time was attempting to interest Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt in the plan for increased aid in China’s war against Japan.\(^{191}\)

59. Japanese Government Considers Negotiations in Final Stage

For a number of months the Japanese government had been instructing Ambassador Nomura to conduct his conversations with the representatives of the American government along the lines of final negotiations. Nevertheless, the American State Department had continued to speak of these meetings between leaders of both governments as merely preliminary discussions.

On November 15, 1941, Tokyo instructed Ambassador Nomura to continue his attempts to impress upon the United States the fact that Japan was considering these negotiations as

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\(^{188a}\) Ibid.  
\(^{189}\) IV, 111.  
\(^{190}\) IV, 112.  
\(^{191}\) IV, 113.
final. Although Foreign Minister Togo admitted that the former Japanese Cabinet had considered the conversations merely preliminary and was working toward a meeting of the Japanese Prime Minister and President Roosevelt, the present government desired to terminate satisfactorily the talks by an official agreement. Foreign Minister Togo realized that the United States officials might claim that Japan had never mentioned the changed status of the conversations; however, he felt that the United States government must nevertheless recognize the fact that the negotiations were in their final stage and that some conclusion must be reached before the Japanese Diet met on November 15, 1941. 192

60. Ambassador Nomura Speculates on Results of Possible Diplomatic Breach

In the event that these negotiations could not be terminated in the manner desired by the Japanese government, Ambassador Nomura stated on November 15, 1941, that Japanese-American relations would break down completely. To be prepared for the inevitable effects of such a breach Ambassador Nomura, in a message to his government, offered certain suggestions for the disposition of the consular offices and the evacuation of Japanese officials. Even if diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States were not entirely severed a situation similar to that now existing between Germany and the United States would arise. Under these circumstances it would be necessary to close the Japanese Consulates and recall the Japanese Ambassador. 193

Since Embassy duties would be limited only to a few pressing matters, the staff would necessarily be greatly reduced. One of two secretaries, Foreign Service Attachés Fujiyama and Inagawa and one clerk would be sent back to Japan. However, members of the intelligence staff, such as Secretary Terasaki and Clerk Yamamoto, would be transferred to South America together with certain so-called student attachés. After employees who had been engaged locally were dismissed, other Japanese officials would either be sent to South America or returned to Japan in evacuee ships. 194

Since the disposition of the various Japanese officials and nationals in the United States was of the utmost importance, Ambassador Nomura offered certain suggestions concerning their possible evacuation. As was the case when United States-German relations were severed, personnel of the Japanese and American consulates would probably be evacuated by mutual consent. While this evacuation was taking place Ambassador Nomura foresaw numerous requests from businessmen and other Japanese nationals to return home. In consideration of this Ambassador Nomura urged that a sufficient number of ships be sent to take care of the large number of requests for permission to return to Japan. If American diplomatic relations broke off completely another plan for evacuating Japanese officials would have to be evolved. Ambassador Nomura believed that Japan and the United States would be willing to guarantee the safe passage of Embassy and Consulate members. Arrangements would be made regarding the costs of the evacuation vessels, the type of markers to be used and the methods of communication to be employed. For example, the two countries might agree to send the other officials to some halfway point such as Hawaii, the Aleutian Islands or French Tahiti aboard ships of his own nation. At the assigned meeting place an exchange of consulate officials could then be effected. Some arrangements might be attempted regarding an exchange of Japanese nationals residing in the United States for Americans at present in Japan. However, in view of the difference in numbers, Ambassador Nomura did not believe that such a plan would meet with the approval of the United States. There was little doubt that Japanese residents of military age would be retained in the United States. Before the complete evacuation

192IV, 114.
193IV, 115.
194IV, 116.
of its officials Japan would have to decide on a neutral nation entrusted with protecting Japanese national property and Japanese national rights in the United States. Negotiations with the country decided upon would probably be completed in Tokyo with the diplomatic representatives of that country at the same time that plans were being made by the Japanese Ambassador or Minister with the capital of the neutral country concerned. Ambassador Nomura apparently did not place too much confidence in neutral nations, however, since he warned Tokyo that it would be extremely precarious to depend upon neutral ships in evacuating Japanese nationals should war between Japan and the United States be declared. The now neutral countries might take sides.\textsuperscript{195}

61. Tokyo Instructs Ambassador Kurusu in New Duties

Since Ambassador Kurusu was arriving in Washington on November 15, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo sent him a message expressing the gratitude of the entire Japanese government for the work which he was about to undertake. Recognizing the fact that Ambassador Kurusu had a difficult position,\textsuperscript{196} Foreign Minister Togo told the representative that the success or failure of his mission might determine the fate of the entire Japanese nation. After first arriving at some understanding with Ambassador Nomura, Foreign Minister Togo said, Ambassador Kurusu should cooperate in bringing the present negotiations to an immediate settlement. In view of the fact that a crisis was approaching largely because of the many delays caused by the laxity of the United States government, Foreign Minister Togo urged that Ambassador Kurusu allow no subsidiary problems to further complicate Japanese-American relations.

Foreign Minister Togo explained to Ambassador Kurusu that Ambassador Nomura had not yet presented proposal B to the United States. If the present condition was not alleviated within a short time, however, Foreign Minister Togo instructed Ambassador Nomura to submit this alternate proposal to American representatives.\textsuperscript{197}

62. Hull-Nomura Conversation (November 15, 1941)

\textit{a. State Department’s Report}\textsuperscript{198}

By an appointment made at his own request Ambassador Nomura with Minister Wakasugi called at Secretary Hull’s apartment on November 15, 1941. Immediately upon the Japanese Ambassador’s arrival, Secretary Hull spoke of the Japanese proposal regarding commercial policy which had been presented on November 7 and November 10, 1941.\textsuperscript{199}

Secretary Hull then handed Ambassador Nomura an oral statement regarding America’s views on this economic policy.\textsuperscript{200} This oral statement referred to the Japanese government’s proposal in which it was stated that Japan “recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in internal commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well.” The United States government assumed that Japan did not expect America to be responsible for discriminatory practices in areas outside of its jurisdiction, for such an arrangement could be fulfilled only with the consent of all the other governments of the world. In those areas in which the United States government was economically concerned, however,

\textsuperscript{195}IV, 115.
\textsuperscript{196}Apparentily this move by the Japanese government was considered a possible change of the diplomatic staff in Washington, but, when interviewed, Mr. Kurusu denied that he was going to succeed Mr. Nomura as Ambassador to the United States. (\textit{New York Times}, November 15, 1941, 5:1.)
\textsuperscript{197}IV, 117.
\textsuperscript{198}"Memorandum of a Conversation"—November 15, 1941. \textit{S.D. II}, 731–734.
\textsuperscript{199}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{200}"Oral statement handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November 15, 1941", \textit{S.D. II}, 734–736. See IV, 121–126 for text as sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura on November 15, 1941.
the principle of unconditional and non-discriminatory treatment had been the cornerstone of commercial policy. Since World War I the United States had embodied this non-discriminatory principle in every commercial treaty which it had concluded. In the twenty-two agreements made since 1934 the United States government had reduced duties on more than a thousand classifications of American tariff in order to achieve an extensive program of fair commercial agreements. Only in two cases had the United States withheld trade agreement concessions and this was in an effort to induce the countries concerned to abandon discriminatory practices. Furthermore, on every appropriate occasion the United States had sought the progressive elimination of preferences and discriminations by other countries of the world. Not only did the United States conclude non-discriminatory agreements for its own benefit but had sought similar concessions for other countries. As a part of its general policy of commercial fairness in international trade the United States had insisted upon the extension of concessions to all countries concerned in any trade agreement which the United States made. By the reduction of trade barriers the United States hoped to make its national contribution to a world trade in which all nations would benefit.

If Japan were to cooperate in favoring the policy of non-discrimination as the United States had, then it would achieve its goal in the commercial field. The United States did not see any need of Japan's incorporating the phrase "on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well" in its commercial proposal. The United States asked that this proviso be omitted.

In order to manifest a tentative commercial agreement applying the principle of non-discrimination to both Japanese and American international relations, the United States had drawn up a declaration of economic policy. Before entering into any negotiations based on this policy, however, the United States wished to make it clear that the points involved would have to be discussed with the British and other interested governments. In this joint declaration by the United States and Japan on economic practices, under the term "general policy", both governments were to agree to cooperate in reducing trade barriers and eliminating from international commercial relations all forms of discrimination. By acquiring commodities necessary for the safety and development of their economies through peaceful trade processes, both countries would create secure conditions of international trade and investment. In order to make an appropriate contribution toward the creation of such an ideal trade setup, the United States and Japan should seek the establishment of non-discriminatory economic relations in the Pacific area.

With regard to "the United States-Japanese relationship", both governments should agree to negotiate for a reciprocal trade agreement aimed at restoring commercial, financial and economic relations to a normal basis. While both governments should permit the export of commodities to the other for the purpose of security or self-defense, it was understood that any restrictions imposed would be in the spirit of friendly relations. By way of applying this "policy in the Pacific area" the governments of the United States and Japan should guarantee equal commercial treatment to the Chinese under conditions no less favorable than the treatment accorded to any third country. In order that economic, financial and monetary affairs be restored to China, the United States and Japan were to suggest that the Chinese government inaugurate a comprehensive program of economic development, using any foreign assistance that might be deemed necessary. Any relations between the United States and Japan and other countries of the Pacific area were to be governed by the same basic principles of commercial fair play and equal opportunity.
After handing both of these documents to Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull emphasized once more the advantages that Japan would gain from participating in the peaceful program envisaged by the United States government. Without first referring it to his government Ambassador Nomura did not feel authorized to make any comment. However, Minister Wakasugi asked if this proposal constituted America’s answer to Japan’s proposal regarding non-discrimination in international commercial relations, and Secretary Hull replied in the affirmative.

Minister Wakasugi then asked for America’s stand regarding Japan’s relations in the Tripartite Pact and the question of stationing Japanese troops in China.

Ambassador Nomura then pointed out that the Japanese government considered that the present conversations were not merely exploratory but were designed to arrive at formal negotiations. Requesting that Minister Wakasugi take accurate notes on what he was about to say, Secretary Hull replied that the United States government could not go beyond exploratory conversations until it had determined the attitude of Great Britain, China and the Netherlands. Furthermore, until some satisfactory conclusions resulted from the informal conversations, the United States government could not speak with those countries. Ambassador Nomura made no comment. Notwithstanding the fact that he and Ambassador Nomura had reached some settlement as a result of the American proposals of June 21, 1941, Secretary Hull continued, the answering Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941, had narrowed down the agreement. When Ambassador Nomura insisted that the question of peace in the entire Pacific area was covered in the preamble of the draft of the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941, Secretary Hull pointed out that the concessions must be contained in the body of the document rather than in the preamble.

Then Secretary Hull, referring to Foreign Minister Togo’s conversation with Ambassador Grew on November 10, 1941, during which the Japanese Foreign Minister indicated that Japan was anxious to conclude a simultaneous agreement with the British, pointed out the inconsistency between those instructions and the ones which Ambassador Nomura was being asked to carry out in Washington. In view of these inconsistencies Secretary Hull felt that the United States could not answer Japan’s proposals without first determining whether it intended to adopt with sincerity a peaceful course. After Ambassador Nomura had insisted that Japan desired peace in the Pacific and that it would interpret its obligations under any alliance independently, Secretary Hull asked whether the Japanese government would automatically abandon the Tripartite Pact if it entered into an agreement with the United States. Minister Wakasugi asked if the United States wanted Japan to denounce the Tripartite Pact. Ambassador Nomura understood, however, that the Secretary meant the Tripartite Pact to become a dead letter. Agreeing with Ambassador Nomura’s interpretation of his remark, Secretary Hull pointed out how inconsistent it would be for Japan to enter into a peace agreement with the United States while adhering to a fighting alliance with Germany. Not only would it be difficult to explain Japan’s actions to the British and Dutch people but the American public would reject such an agreement. Although Ambassador Nomura felt that the American public would accept the agreement simply because Secretary Hull recommended it, the Secretary of State said plainly that it would cause so much turmoil throughout the country that he might well be lynched.

By way of emphasizing his statements, Secretary Hull commented on the large Japanese armies in Manchuria facing Russian armies in Siberia in spite of the existing neutrality pact between Russia and Japan. What the United States desired, Secretary Hull continued, was a clear-cut, unequivocal agreement which would promote mutual trust by denouncing military expansion. In the event that the United States should be forced to go to war with Germany as a measure of self-defense, Secretary Hull felt that Japan would not continue its professed
peaceful course, nor would Secretary Hull believe that Japan's connection with the Tripartite Pact would disappear if an agreement were reached between Japan and the United States. Only after Japan had given the United States a specific guarantee that the Tripartite Pact would be considered a dead letter could Secretary Hull begin formal peace negotiations with Japan.

Ambassador Nomura insisted that the policies of the present Japanese government differed in no way from those of the previous Japanese government in spite of the fact that the Prime Minister was a military man. Secretary Hull then stated that the United States did not feel it should receive ultimatums from Japan since the United States had been pursuing a peaceful course throughout the conversations, while the Japanese government had been the one to resort to aggression.

In concluding the conference Secretary Hull said that when the problem of non-discrimination and that of Japan's place in the Tripartite Pact were settled Japanese and American representatives could sit down like brothers and find some solution to the question of stationing Japanese troops in China.202

b. Ambassador Nomura's Report

Although originally scheduled for November 14, 1941, Ambassador Kurusu's interview with Secretary Hull was postponed until 9:00 a.m. on November 15, 1941, at the request of the American State Department.203

At the scheduled time Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Wakasugi met with Secretary Hull and Mr. Ballantine for an interview lasting about an hour and a half.204 Secretary Hull opened the conversation by presenting Ambassador Nomura with two American proposals dealing with the commercial problem.205 Attempting to impress Ambassador Nomura with America's desire to see non-discrimination in trade throughout the world Secretary Hull stated that by its trade agreements with twenty-two nations tariffs had been reduced on approximately 1,200 articles. At the time of the economic conference in London Secretary Hull had urged that the policy of non-discrimination in commerce be adopted, but Germany and other countries were so strongly opposed to it that the measure was never carried into effect. While desiring to see this policy put into effect throughout the world the United States government wished to call to Japan's attention the fact that it could not guarantee the effectiveness of this policy out of the sphere of its own jurisdiction. Therefore, Secretary Hull stated, the American government wished Japan to modify its condition which stated that Japan would apply the practice of non-discrimination in commerce to the Pacific area only if it were applied to the rest of the world.

At this point in the conversation Secretary Hull handed Ambassador Nomura the second of the United States' written proposals. Mr. Wakasugi then asked Secretary Hull if this should be considered the American counter-proposal to the Japanese proposals dealing with the three major problems in the discussion. After Secretary Hull replied that the American proposals could be applied to a much wider range, Ambassador Nomura stated that Japan would give it careful consideration.205c

Following the instructions of his government Ambassador Nomura then brought up the problem connected with the interpretation of the present conferences. Ambassador Nomura stated that in view of the fact that official proposals had been handed to Japan by both President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State, the Japanese government considered these talks in the
realm of actual negotiations. Reminding Ambassador Nomura that Foreign Minister Togo himself had told Ambassador Grew that Japan desired to have Great Britain, the Netherlands, and other countries participate in the final negotiations, Secretary Hull stated that until the time when all those countries engaged in the negotiations they would be considered by the United States as merely preliminary and exploratory. Only after the Japanese and American representatives had found a basis for a suitable agreement, Secretary Hull continued, could Great Britain and the Netherlands be asked to participate in the final and actual treaty with Japan. Speaking from a practical viewpoint as well, Secretary Hull said the open and frank exchange of opinions between American and Japanese representatives would be hindered if the present talks were considered strictly official. 205b

Leaving that question for the present Secretary Hull then discussed the political stabilization of the Pacific area. In the United States' proposal of June 21, 1941, Secretary Hull stated that it was made known that America intended to enforce the application of any Pacific principles to all the areas of the Far East. However, Japan apparently intended to apply those principles only to the territories of the southwest Pacific. Not only by the nature of its statements concerning the application of these Pacific peace principles, but also by its connections with the Axis countries under the Tripartite Pact had Japan caused the United States to doubt the sincerity of its peace proposals. Therefore, Secretary Hull asked that the present Japanese government state its approval of the peaceful policy contained in the former Japanese statement of August 28, 1941. Ambassador Nomura replied that the latest Japanese proposal had set forth Japan's desire for peace, and therefore no further explanation was necessary in this respect. Furthermore, although the words "southwestern Pacific" appeared in the main text of the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941, the Japanese government in the preface to this proposal had clearly stated its desire to establish and maintain peace throughout the entire Pacific area. Secretary Hull insisted that the statement must appear in the main body of the text and not merely in the preface.

In repeating his doubts regarding Japanese sincerity Secretary Hull stated that Japan could never uphold a military alliance with Germany and a peaceful understanding with the United States at the same time. In fact, if the United States were to conclude an agreement with Japan while Japan retained its allegiance to the Axis powers the American public would "howl with laughter." Although Secretary Hull attempted to point out the incongruity of a military alliance with Germany and a peaceful alliance with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, Ambassador Nomura continued to insist that the Tripartite Alliance would not conflict with that drawn up between Japan and the United States since both agreements would have peace for their main objective.

Pointing to the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact as an example of armed peace, Secretary Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura that Japanese and Russian troops still faced one another across their national boundaries. The American Secretary of State did not desire to sign a similarly ineffective peace agreement with Japan.

After listening to Secretary Hull's statements, Minister Wakasugi asked if the United States expected Japan to withdraw from the Tripartite Alliance. Secretary Hull answered that the United States expected the Tripartite Pact to become a "dead letter" if an understanding were signed between Japan and the United States. Minister Wakasugi then asked if these latest American proposals were a reply to Japan's proposal regarding the rights of self-defense. In answering this question directly Secretary Hull stated that the United States wished definite assurance that the present Japanese government desired to follow a peaceful policy throughout the entire Pacific area and wished a reply to the United States' proposal regarding a joint statement of a Japanese-American economic policy.

205b Ibid.
In concluding the interview Ambassador Nomura stated that the Japanese government would be very disappointed with Secretary Hull’s attitude. Arrangements were made for another conference on the following day.

Summarizing the day’s conversation Ambassador Nomura stated that the United States had clarified its attitude toward the trade question; however, the two countries still differed on the interpretations given to other principles. Not only did the United States doubt Japan’s sincerity but it viewed Japan’s attitude toward the Chinese situation with suspicion.205c

63. Tokyo Instructs Ambassador Nomura in Interpretation of Japanese Proposals

Since certain phrases in the various Japanese proposals had been viewed with suspicion by American statesmen, Tokyo wished to clarify their meaning to the satisfaction of the United States government. On November 16, 1941, in instructions to Ambassador Nomura the Japanese government emphasized that any so-called modifications of its concessions were only those which any independent country might be forced to make under similar circumstances, and that they were in no way intended to limit the extent or establishment of peace in the Pacific.206

Such expressions as “without provocation” and, in relation to the Russian question, the statement “as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Russian-Japanese Neutrality Treaty”, both appearing in the Japanese proposal of August 28, 1941, were to be interpreted literally. In using the term “without justifiable reason” in the proposal of September 6, 1941, the Japanese government had wished to protect itself in view of the threatening results of the Russo-German war. When pointing out these facts to the American State Department, the Japanese Foreign Office requested Ambassador Nomura to include an assurance that the present Japanese Cabinet would uphold the concessions made in the former Cabinet’s proposals of August 28 and September 25, 1941.206a In fact, the present government was even willing to delete the word “southwestern” from Article Six of the September 25, 1941, proposals in an endeavor to prove to the United States that Japan wished to apply the principles of peace to the entire Pacific area.207

However, Tokyo insisted that Ambassador Nomura impress upon the United States the fact that Japan would not consider itself bound by any of these concessions unless the present Japanese-American negotiations ended in agreement.208

64. Hull-Nomura Conversation (November 17, 1941)

a. State Department’s Report209

In order to present Mr. Kurusu to the Secretary of State, Ambassador Nomura called on Mr. Hull on November 17, 1941. After exchanging introductions, Secretary Hull complimented Mr. Kurusu on his diplomatic manner of handling relations with the American public since coming to this country. Secretary Hull also spoke highly of Ambassador Nomura.

Turning the conversation then to the Japanese-American situation, Secretary Hull stated that the short-sighted nationalistic diplomacy which had developed in Europe and the United States after World War I was responsible for the present world difficulties. In order to bring about peace and offset the Nazi force which was now crushing 200,000,000 people in Europe, Secretary Hull wished that Japan and the United States would employ far-sighted statesmanship by adopting peaceful policies.

205c Ibid.
205IV, 131.
206a Ibid.
206b Ibid.
207IV, 132.
208IV, 131.
209Memorandum of a Conversation—November 7, 1941, S.D. II, 738-739.
Because the new Japanese Prime Minister was a military man, Mr. Kurusu felt that the American people thought General Tojo would view the situation with a warlike attitude. In fact, when General Tojo had planned his Cabinet he invited Mr. Kurusu to take an important position but Mr. Kurusu had declined because he believed that General Tojo would probably discontinue the conversations with the United States. Yet, after discussing the methods of executing Japan's national policy with General Tojo, Ambassador Kurusu had become fully assured of the new Prime Minister's desire to reach a peaceful settlement with the United States. In fact, when Mr. Kurusu had discussed his present mission to the United States with General Tojo, he had noted that the Prime Minister was optimistic in regard to settling the differences between Japan and the United States. Naturally, the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China would present the greatest difficulty. However, General Tojo believed that the difficulties in respect to non-discrimination and the European war could be easily eliminated. Since Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu were to meet President Roosevelt, the conversation drew to a close.

First of all, however, Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull two oral statements relating to:— (1) Japan's peaceful intentions, and (2) the narrowing down of the proposed understanding.210

In this first Japanese oral statement reference was made to Secretary Hull's document handed to Ambassador Nomura on November 12, 1941.211 The Japanese government wished to point out that the phrases quoted by Secretary Hull in his oral statement of November 12, 1941, had been embodied in the Japanese proposals of September 6 and September 25, 1941. The present Japanese government had no objection to committing themselves to carrying out the concessions expressed therein. In doing so, however, it was understood that the present negotiations would be successfully concluded between Japan and the United States. If such a successful conclusion were not reached, the Japanese government would not be bound by any of the commitments which it had made in these and previous proposals. Wherever phrases used by the Japanese government apparently modified its peaceful intentions, Japan pointed out that its purpose was only to express qualifications which were absolutely necessary and were in no way intended to limit the peaceful aims of the Japanese government.212

In the phrases connected with Japan's attitude toward Soviet Russia a detailed stipulation was necessary in view of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact and its relation to the war between Germany and Russia.213

In the second oral statement Ambassador Nomura stated that, since Japan had no objection to applying the principle of political stabilization to the entire Pacific, it was willing to eliminate the word "southwestern" from its proposals of September 25, 1941.214

b. *Ambassador Nomura's Report*215

Accompanied by Ambassador Kurusu Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull at half past ten on November 17, 1941. Secretary Hull began the conversation by saying that the reason for the present world situation was the lack of able statesmen following World War I. Ambassador Kurusu agreed that the United States and Japan must take over the grave responsibility of re-establishing peace. Before such a goal could be attained, Ambassador Kurusu

210Ibid.
211"Oral statement handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on November 12, 1941", S.D. II, 727–729.
212"Oral statement handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November 17, 1941", S.D. II, 739–740. See the instructions sent to Ambassador Nomura by Tokyo on November 16, 1941, IV, 131.
213See IV, 132.
214"Oral statement handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary State"—November 17, 1941, S.D. II, 740.
215II, 133.
continued, the two countries must settle their own problem by engaging in concrete negotiations. For that purpose Ambassador Kurusu had come to the United States at the insistence of Prime Minister Tojo and Foreign Minister Togo. Hoping of an immediate settlement of the three major problems now existing between Japan and the United States, Prime Minister Tojo felt that an agreement could be reached regarding commercial equality and Japan’s obligations under the Tripartite Pact. However, the Japanese representatives recognized the fact that the evacuation of troops from French Indo-China would remain the major obstacle to a peace settlement.215a

Before ending the conversation Ambassador Nomura presented Secretary Hull with Tokyo’s reply to the United States oral statement of November 12, 1941. Ambassador Nomura then notified Secretary Hull, as Tokyo had instructed him, that the Japanese government was willing to delete the word “southwestern” from Article six of the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941, thus making any peace agreement applicable to the entire Pacific area.216

65. Roosevelt-Kurusu Conversation (November 17, 1941)

a. Secretary Hull’s Report 217

After concluding the conversation between Ambassador Nomura, Mr. Kurusu and Mr. Hull, the three men proceeded to the White House where President Roosevelt welcomed Mr. Kurusu to this country.

After the usual exchange of courtesies and formalities, President Roosevelt brought up the differences of opinion existing between the two countries. He then made clear the desire of the United States to avoid war and he accepted the statement of the Japanese Ambassador that Japan was equally desirous of bringing about a fair and peaceful settlement of the Pacific question. Throughout the conversation Ambassador Nomura insisted that the situation must be adjusted immediately due to the urgency of the situation.

In answering Ambassador Kurusu’s attempts to explain the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull made it clear that Japan could not conclude a successful agreement with the United States regarding the Pacific area while retaining its allegiance to the Tripartite Pact. Not only would President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull be denounced by the American people if an agreement under those conditions were drawn up, but the countries of the world would redouble their efforts against Japanese aggression. Because Hitler had started upon an official course of invasion the United States had been forced to spend billions of dollars in self-defense. Therefore, the American public could not understand Japan’s attitude, and political difficulties in connection with Japan’s relations with Germany were difficult to overcome.217a

In emphasizing the United States’ defensive measures, President Roosevelt reminded Mr. Kurusu that some time ago he had proclaimed a zone around the Western Hemisphere which extended from 300 to 1,100 miles out into the sea. Secretary Hull then told Ambassador Nomura that the conversations had been formulated along the lines of genuine friendliness and, therefore, there was no reason for either country to attempt to bluff the other. Here President Roosevelt emphasized the United States’ position and, at the same time, exposed the sophistry of Japan’s in relation to its alliance with Germany.

Pointing out that Germany had not yet requested Japan to fight, Ambassador Kurusu said that Japan was serving a desirable purpose while maintaining peace. Secretary Hull interpreted this remark to mean that Japan was diverting the British and American navies and air forces to the Pacific. Secretary Hull then told Mr. Kurusu that the United States was on the defensive in the present Pacific situation because Japan had been the only aggressor. In fact, it was generally

215aIbid.
216IV, 134.
217a“Memorandum by the Secretary of State”—November 17, 1941, S.D. II, 740–743.
217aIbid.
believed in the United States, Secretary Hull said, that the Japanese New Order in Greater East Asia was similar to Hitler's program in Europe since it was designed to dominate politically, economically and socially, by military force, all the areas within its range. Although Mr. Kurusu attempted to defend the stationing of Japanese troops in China, President Roosevelt stated that the question should be worked out in a fair way after considering all the circumstances and relative merits involved.

When the other Pacific questions had been satisfactorily settled, President Roosevelt believed the United States would aid Japan and China so that they might begin adjustments for peace. However, Mr. Kurusu insisted it would be difficult to bring all the Japanese troops out of China at once. Then Mr. Kurusu reminded Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt that the United States had insisted that the Japanese leave Shantung during World War I. However, Secretary Hull answered Mr. Kurusu that the United States, in opposing the seizure of new territory by any country, had at the same time declined to take a dollar of compensation or a foot of territory for itself. The United States had always believed that if countries continued to fight for territory modern methods of warfare would cause the utter destruction of all countries. Since Mr. Kurusu pleaded that he had forgotten much of the technical side of commercial policy, he did not wish to discuss the recent American proposal regarding commerce.217b

President Roosevelt continued by referring to the destructive nature of armaments and also emphasized that from the long term point of view the differences between Japan and the United States should not be regarded as serious. Nothing new had been brought out by either Ambassador Nomura or Mr. Kurusu at this conversation. Both President Roosevelt and Mr. Kurusu seemed to agree that the present situation must be solved. However, President Roosevelt frequently parried the remarks of Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu, particularly in relation to the three major points of difference.

With the understanding that Secretary Hull would meet the Japanese representatives the following morning, the meeting drew to a close.218

b. Ambassador Nomura's Report219

After concluding the conversation with Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu accompanied the American Secretary of State to an interview with President Roosevelt. Ambassador Kurusu repeated what he had already said to Secretary Hull regarding the sincere interest of the present Japanese Cabinet in concluding negotiations with the United States. Since President Roosevelt was an experienced statesman, Ambassador Kurusu felt that he would appreciate the attitude of the Japanese people after four years of war with China. Speaking from personal observation, Ambassador Kurusu stated that the situation in Hongkong, Manila and other islands in that area was so strained that an uprising might occur at any moment. Therefore, from the Japanese viewpoint, a solution to the Pacific problem must be effected without further delay. Even now with the Japanese-American conversations dragging on endlessly Japan stood a smaller chance of being able to defend itself both militarily and economically from other powers. Prime Minister Tojo was optimistic regarding the settlement of all the Japanese-American problems with the exception of the evacuation of Japanese troops from French Indo-China.220

Quoting former Secretary of State Bryan, President Roosevelt replied to this last comment: "There is no last word between friends."221 Remarking that other so-called non-aggression pacts

\[217b\] Ibid.
\[218\] Ibid.
\[219\] IV, 135–138.
\[220\] IV, 135.
\[221\] IV, 136.
were now useless, President Roosevelt insisted that only by the establishment of a general understanding between the United States and Japan could the international situation be saved. Ambassador Kurusu agreed with President Roosevelt's statement. In his opinion the adjustment of the Japanese and American attitudes toward the Tripartite Pact and of the claims of both countries regarding the settlement of the China Incident would have to be effected before such an understanding could be realized. Speaking first of the Tripartite Agreement, Ambassador Kurusu insisted that his government was bound to that pact by virtue of its honor as a great power. In view of this consideration Ambassador Kurusu could not believe that the United States would urge Japan to violate the terms of this alliance. This should be particularly true, Ambassador Kurusu said, in view of the fact that the object of the Tripartite Pact was the prevention of future war and the maintenance of peace. While anxious to coordinate the two views on this problem in order to bring about a settlement, Ambassador Kurusu, nevertheless, insisted that Japan would not consider a proposal which did not have a practical application.

Turning the conversation for the moment to the China problem, President Roosevelt said that the United States was not attempting to intervene or mediate in the problems of Japan and China. If such a word existed in diplomatic parlance, he would state that the United States was merely acting as an "introducer." 221a

Ambassador Kurusu then referred to Japan's obligation under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. 222 The Japanese representative had received the impression that the United States believed Japan was merely acting as Germany's tool. In fact, it appeared to be the general opinion in America that Japan would wait until the United States was deeply involved in the Atlantic war and then make a stab in the Pacific. In order to correct this misapprehension Ambassador Kurusu stated that Japan would decide its obligations under the Tripartite Pact independently of any country. Furthermore, Ambassador Kurusu continued, any great understanding arrived at by the United States and Japan with regard to the Pacific would overshadow the Tripartite Pact.

Secretary Hull interrupted at this point to say that the United States could not wait until Germany had conquered England and attacked the United States with the British fleet from some point in South America before beginning to make some preparations for its self-defense. Secretary Hull did not understand why Japan could not grasp America's need to protect itself against aggression. In supporting Secretary Hull's statement President Roosevelt said that in his recent speech he had described German subversive activities in Central and South America, basing his remarks on authentic information from German government circles.

In reply Ambassador Kurusu assured President Roosevelt that since Japan included Central and South America in the category of the Pacific it would never be a party to disrupting the peace of those countries. Since Japan had continually made concessions towards the establishment of a just peace in the Pacific principally by promising to withdraw its troops from French Indo-China on the establishment of that peace, Ambassador Kurusu did not understand why President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull felt that the United States public would object to an agreement with Japan simply on the grounds of the existence of the Tripartite Pact.

Ambassador Kurusu felt that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from China should be enough proof that Japan intended to uphold the guarantee made to the United States. Whatever the means Ambassador Kurusu was convinced that an immediate settlement of the problems under discussion by Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull should be reached. Secretary Hull then replied that both he and Ambassador Nomura had carried on the conversations

221a Ibid.
222 IV, 137.
for so long that they had lost the ability to make any new points. Therefore, he welcomed Ambassador Kurusu's opinions.

Stating that he would be in Washington until November 24, 1941, President Roosevelt offered to discuss further any of the matters with Secretary Hull and with both Japanese Ambassadors before that time. 222a

Ambassador Kurusu and Ambassador Nomura scheduled a conference with Secretary Hull for 10:00 a.m. on November 18, 1941. 223

66. Ambassador Grew Warns United States Against Unexpected Japanese Attack 224

Referring to a previous telegram sent on November 3, 1941, wherein Ambassador Grew had warned that “action by Japan, which might render unavoidable an armed conflict with the United States, might come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness”, the American Ambassador in Tokyo emphasized the need to guard against sudden Japanese naval or military actions in the Pacific. Furthermore, Ambassador Grew warned his government not to depend too much upon a prior warning given by the Embassy staff since Japan was able to obtain effective control over both primary and secondary military information. Since only a few Americans remained in Japan and they were concentrated mostly in Tokyo, Yokohama and Kobe, Japan would be able to exploit every possible tactical advantage, mainly surprise and initiative. With American and foreign shipping absent from adjacent waters, Japan could send out its troop transports in any direction undetected. According to available indications, Japanese troop concentrations were reported in Manchuria and Formosa and new operations seemed imminent in either the southwest Pacific, Siberia, or in both areas.

Ambassador Grew warned that every precaution should be taken to guard against a Japanese surprise move. Since the Embassy’s field of naval and military observation was negligible, the United States could not depend upon the ability of the American Embassy in Tokyo to forward any warning in sufficient time. 226

67. Japanese Air Forces Move to Mandates

As Ambassador Grew had stated, Japanese military and naval activities in the Pacific gave definite indications of a surprise attack in that area. On the alert to learn at which point such a move would originate and in what direction it would travel, American traffic analysts watched Japanese tactical communications closely. 227

By November 18, 1941, the movements of Japanese air groups and air forces formerly associated with the China Sea area were predominantly towards the Mandates. The Commander of Air Squadron 24 and the Commander of the Yokohama Air Group were in the vicinity of Wotje and maintained close contact with the Commander of the Combined Air Force. Units that included the flagship of the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet (formerly the First Air Fleet) were en route to the Mandates. In fact, the frequent changes in location of the Air group commanders between Saipan, Truk, Jaluit and Wotje produced considerable confusion on all Mandate circuits.

After careful observation of these units, American traffic analysts were of the opinion that the First, Second, Third and Fifth Fleets were ready to move into the Mandates with submarine forces and combined air forces of the Combined Fleet. 227a

222a Ibid.
223IV, 138.
224"Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State"—November 17, 1941, S.D. II, 743–744.
225"Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State"—November 3, 1941, S.D. II, 704.
226Ibid.
227IV, 139.
227a Ibid.
On November 18, 1941, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called at the State Department to converse with Secretary Hull. Secretary Hull immediately turned the conversation toward a discussion of Japan’s relations with the Axis. Emphasizing the point that Japan could not make an agreement with the United States while continuing its alliance with Germany, Secretary Hull pointed out that the American people were convinced that Hitler would eventually invade the Far East. By way of illustration, Secretary Hull reminded the Japanese representatives that after concluding an anti-Comintern Pact with Japan Germany had entered into a non-aggression pact with Russia and in time had reneged even on that pact. In view of this, any agreement between Japan and the United States which did not make the peaceful purposes of both nations self-evident would only result in a redoubled effort by all nations to strengthen their armaments.

Secretary Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu that the United States was contributing to the establishment of law and order throughout the Far East by granting the Philippines their independence in 1946 and by withdrawing American Marines from China. In the application of a non-discriminatory policy throughout the world, Secretary Hull continued, the United States government was even now urging the British Empire to reduce its discriminatory practices. To the United States it seemed obvious that the only controlling influence which a country could have over an area was one gained through fair play and not achieved by the sword.

In the renunciation of forceful and aggressive measures, Secretary Hull commented, the United States had stopped using gunboats and armed forces in South America. Thus, it had achieved satisfactory relationships through the pursuit of peaceful policies. Inasmuch as the United States’ basic principles were formulated on the principle of peace, Secretary Hull said, the United States could not condone Japan’s attitude toward Axis aggression as seen through the telegrams of congratulation sent to Hitler by Japanese leaders when some atrocity occurred. In answer to these accusations Ambassador Nomura reminded Secretary Hull that in spite of their diverging courses the United States and Russia were aligned at the present time. Ambassador Nomura also stated that Japan was not in a position to be so magnanimous in extending substantial lend-lease aid to other countries as the United States had done in South America and abroad. However, because Japan was now in a serious predicament, Ambassador Nomura said that Japan was particularly anxious to conclude some agreement with the United States.

At this point in the conversation Mr. Kurusu interposed by stating that his five years’ experience as Director of the Commercial Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office had made him thoroughly familiar with Japan’s commercial policy. It was due largely to the British Empire’s preferences, Mr. Kurusu said, that Japan had been forced to join with the Axis. Mr. Kurusu reminded Secretary Hull that Japan was far more dependent upon foreign trade than the United States. In view of the fact that the present commercial situation was abnormal, Mr. Kurusu believed that the two governments should attempt some solution, possibly the use of the exchange control system which had developed in Japanese-occupied China. While in time Japan might be in a position to adopt a more liberal commercial policy, Mr. Kurusu insisted that some way must be found to ameliorate the present situation. Secretary Hull believed that the United States and Japan should come to some agreement in principle on a commercial policy. Although making no direct reply, Mr. Kurusu stated that after the United States occupied the Philippines it had

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228 "Memorandum of a Conversation"—Initialed by Joseph Ballantine—November 18, 1941, S.D. II, 744–750.
228a Ibid.
aligned itself with the European concert of nations, thereby sacrificing its former course of idealism pursued in the Far East.

Returning to the problem of the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Kurusu said that some satisfactory agreement could probably be reached even though Japan could not abrogate its agreement with Germany. However, Secretary Hull felt that a definite program of peace must be begun immediately in order to obtain the confidence of peace-minded people and, at the same time, effect a constructive program designed to offset the forces of aggression. When Mr. Kurusu asked if Secretary Hull could suggest a concrete formula for Japan's future relations with the Axis powers, Secretary Hull stated that Japan must work out this matter on its own but, he re-emphasized, the problem must be settled in order to conclude a convincing and workable relationship between Japan and the United States. Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull added, would be inconsistent with the obligations it would undertake by an agreement with the United States.

If Japan were not able to adopt a clear-cut position with regard to commercial policy, its course in China, and relations to the European War, Secretary Hull felt that the Japanese government was unable to control its politicians. Maintaining that it was important, first, to arrest a further deterioration of relations between the two countries before overcoming existing difficulties, Ambassador Nomura said that big ships cannot be turned around too quickly. They have to be eased around slowly and gradually. Refusing to change on his attitude, Secretary Hull replied that neither of the countries could promote peace so long as they were aligned in any way with an aggressive power such as Germany. Nevertheless, Mr. Kurusu insisted, if some settlement could be reached now, it would promote an atmosphere conducive to discussing fundamental problems; if not, the continuation of America's freezing regulations would cause such impatience in Japan that Japan would feel it was forced to fight while it still could. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that Japan had not entered into an alliance with Germany to be a "cat's paw" but because it felt isolated and encircled by European powers. Secretary Hull did not believe that the American public would accept this explanation of Japan's policies.

Referring briefly to the Chinese situation, Secretary Hull asked if Japan could guarantee Chinese sovereignty, territorial integrity and right to commercial equality. Ambassador Nomura replied that Japan could guarantee such protection to China. Although he had made this last point clear to Ambassador Nomura in previous conversations, Secretary Hull desired to re-emphasize its importance to Mr. Kurusu.

Secretary Hull then referred to statements made by Japanese representatives which indicated that the Japanese government considered the present conversations as negotiations rather than merely exploratory discussions. Since the British and Chinese governments had a rightful interest in the problems of the Far East, Secretary Hull told Mr. Kurusu that he would have to discuss negotiations with these two governments but that he could not do so at the present time because no real basis had been reached for formal negotiations.

Secretary Hull refused to state specifically, as Mr. Kurusu requested, just what the concerns of these governments were in the Pacific. Mr. Kurusu felt that, if the United States did have to discuss the problems with the British and Chinese, Japanese and American relations might well be at the mercy of Britain and China and in time the situation might get out of control. Secretary Hull merely commented that the declaration of programs of force by Japan's leaders only added to the present difficulty.

Referring back to the questions connected with the Chinese situation, Secretary Hull asked Ambassador Nomura how many soldiers Japan would retain in China. Ambassador

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228a Ibid.
228b Ibid.
Nomura replied that ninety per cent would be withdrawn. Although he did not reply directly to Secretary Hull’s question on how long the remaining ten per cent would be stationed in China, Ambassador Nomura stated that Japan was permitted to retain troops in the Peiping and Tientsin areas under the Boxer Protocol. Pointing to the long list of grievances suffered by Americans from the actions of Japanese forces in China, Secretary Hull stated that the stationing of any Japanese troops in China was an obstacle to peace. In view of the fact that the United States had been lenient in overlooking these grievances, Secretary Hull believed that the Japanese government should make an extra effort to abolish them.228d

If the Japanese people could rid themselves of the desire for war and invasion, Secretary Hull said, Japan could begin almost immediately to produce materials needed by peaceful countries. Reminding Secretary Hull of the strength of the United States, Ambassador Nomura replied by saying that America would first have to give some indication of aid to Japan. However, Secretary Hull reminded the Japanese Ambassador that the United States was not the one to have resorted to force. In addition, Japanese armed forces in China had been particularly destructive. Moreover, Secretary Hull continued, the American people were convinced that Germany and Japan proposed to divide the world between them.

In answering Mr. Kurusu’s accusation that the United States had held up the conclusion of a peaceful program by delaying the conversations, Secretary Hull pointed out that he had readily agreed to converse with the Japanese Ambassador at any time. It was Japan’s move into French Indo-China in July 1941 that had first interrupted these conversations and forced the United States to enforce such economic restrictions as discontinuing the shipment of petroleum products to Japan.

Secretary Hull then stated that Japan itself must decide on the method it would use to withdraw troops from China, to adopt a satisfactory commercial policy, and to determine its obligations under the Tripartite Agreement. Recognizing the suspicion with which the United States viewed Japan’s motives, Ambassador Nomura assured Secretary Hull that Japan sincerely desired to settle the China affair despite the fact that Japan felt it necessary to retain a certain number of troops in China for the time being. As soon as a just Pacific settlement could be reached, Mr. Kurusu said that Japan would withdraw its troops even from French Indo-China.228e

Secretary Hull then inquired as to what extent Japan would be able to adopt peaceful policies in the event that the United States relaxed its freezing regulations to some degree. While hoping for a realization of the high ideals on which the conversations had been founded, Ambassador Nomura stated that both the United States and Japan had maintained a relatively unyielding attitude toward the Chinese situation. After Secretary Hull had commented on the grave responsibility which Japan had to create conditions conducive to peace, Ambassador Nomura suggested that Japan withdraw its troops from southern France Indo-China, thereby re-establishing the status quo in the Pacific which had existed before July. Since this Japanese move had originally caused the United States’ freezing regulations to be put into effort, Ambassador Nomura felt that the freezing measures would be rescinded upon the withdrawal of Japanese troops. Realizing that it would be difficult to have the United States remove the embargo upon Japan unless it had definite proof that Japan had definitely renounced its purposes of conquest, Secretary Hull asked what guarantee could be given that the Japanese troops withdrawn from French Indo-China would not be used in an aggressive movement upon another area.

When Ambassador Nomura stated that the Japanese were sincerely tired of fighting, Secretary Hull replied that he would inquire concerning the British and Dutch attitude toward this suggestion offered by the Japanese Ambassador.

228d Ibid.
228e Ibid.
As the conference drew to a close, Ambassador Nomura stated that his government was studying the questions of commercial policy involved in the United States' proposal of November 15, 1941. In answer to a question by Ambassador Nomura relating to the application of this commercial policy, Secretary Hull stated that, although the program could not be put into full operation before the end of the Japanese-Chinese War, complete agreement on principles involved should be reached immediately. Ambassador Nomura then said that he would convey the results of this conversation to his government and communicate any messages to Secretary Hull through Mr. Ballantine.\textsuperscript{229}

\textit{b. Ambassador Nomura's Report}\textsuperscript{230}

At 10:30 a.m. on November 18, 1941, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called on Secretary Hull. Throughout the conversation, which lasted for approximately three hours, Secretary Hull placed the main emphasis upon Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Stating that he had foreseen the devastating effects of Hitler's activities in Europe, Secretary Hull insisted that the German war machine would eventually extend even to the Far East.

Unless the Japanese cooperated with the United States in stopping Hitler's aggression, not only would Japan fall under the power of Hitler, but diplomatic relations with the United States would be difficult to adjust. Since peace was the basic national policy of the United States, the American government could not understand Japan's attitude toward the Tripartite Pact. Until Japan severed allegiance with Germany, therefore, no effective agreement could be drawn up between Japan and the United States.

Secretary Hull stated that some American extremists insisted that the United States had become Hitler's partner because America had maintained a conciliatory attitude toward Japan. Furthermore, Secretary Hull stated, the United States did not wish to conclude a peace agreement such as the one now existing between Japan and Soviet Russia; notwithstanding the Japanese-Russian peace agreement enormous forces of the two countries faced each other across their borders.

At this point Ambassador Kurusu insisted that Japan could not abrogate the Tripartite Pact. Secretary Hull replied that, while the United States was not actually demanding that Japan break off with Germany, it still could not understand how Japan could maintain the status quo of its relationship to the Tripartite Pact while seeking a peace agreement with the United States. Nor did Secretary Hull agree with Ambassador Kurusu that the Tripartite Pact was merely a peaceful agreement designed for the purpose of Japanese self-defense.\textsuperscript{230a}

When Secretary Hull asked for definite proof that Japan did not intend to use its obligations under the Tripartite Pact to further its own aggressive desires, Ambassador Nomura replied that such proof could not be given within the limited time that remained before concluding a successful agreement. However, Ambassador Nomura suggested that if Japan show its peaceful intentions by withdrawing troops from southern French Indo-China the United States would in turn be expected to rescind its freezing measures. This suggestion did not meet with Secretary Hull's approval. Instead Secretary Hull said that Japan must first prove its peaceful intentions and then the United States, after conferring with the British government, would decide upon rescinding the present freezing measures.\textsuperscript{230b}

From this conversation with Secretary Hull Ambassador Nomura concluded that the problems connected with China were playing a small part in Japanese-American negotiations...
at the present time. Apparently Secretary Hull was mainly interested in readjusting the economic situation of the world after the conclusion of the present war. 231

In view of the fact that the United States was mainly concerned with the policy of non-discrimination in commerce, Ambassador Nomura suggested that Japan delete that phrase in the Japanese proposals which stated that Japan would apply the principle of non-discrimination to China once this same principle was applied to the entire world. Unless an agreement were reached on this commercial policy immediately, Ambassador Nomura felt it would be useless to submit proposal B to the American representatives. 231a

Speaking about this commercial question to Secretary Hull during the conversation, Ambassador Nomura urged that the United States agree to rescind its freezing measures after the Japanese evacuation of southern French Indo-China. 232 If such a settlement could be made, Ambassador Nomura continued, there would be no need for any of the countries in the Pacific to increase their military strength by sending warships to Singapore or increasing fortifications throughout the Philippines. Refusing to concede this point, Secretary Hull merely reiterated his former statement that Japan must first prove its peaceful aims. If the leaders of the Japanese government proved their peaceful intentions, then, Secretary Hull stated, the United States government would get in touch with Great Britain and the Netherlands for a conference on relevant questions. 232a

Referring to the China question, Secretary Hull again questioned the right of Japan to station its troops in that country. 233 If some agreement could be reached on this proposal, Secretary Hull promised to get in touch with representatives of the British, the Netherlands, and the Chinese governments for a discussion of the matter.

Secretary Hull then asked if the Japanese government had any reply to make to the United States proposals of November 15, 1941. Ambassador Kurusu answered that the economic positions of Japan and the United States were entirely different. While the United States had an advantageous commercial position, Japan was not so fortunate; therefore, the problems relating to commerce required more study. 233a When the economic system in Japan had been disrupted by the American freezing order, Ambassador Kurusu continued, Japanese international affairs had been thrown into a great upheaval. On the same principle, if the Japanese-controlled exchange in northern China were suddenly abolished, as the United States suggested, the economy of 100,000,000 Chinese people would be imperiled.

While admitting this fact Secretary Hull insisted that the principle of equality of treatment in commerce could nevertheless be applied to postwar economic reconstruction. Throughout his diplomatic career, Secretary Hull continued, he had fought against the preferential system of the British Empire which had resulted from the Ottawa Conference. As a result of his efforts it seemed probable that Great Britain would abolish many of its traditions. Secretary Hull was anxious to see the same discriminatory policies abolished in Japanese and American commercial dealings. 234

Summarizing the major points of this conversation Ambassador Nomura informed his government that the United States was at present primarily interested in Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact rather than the Japanese occupation of China. This change apparently had come about as a result of America's increased interest in the Atlantic war. Therefore, Ambassador Nomura felt that a compromise could be reached on matters pertaining to the Chinese questions and commercial problems, and he suggested that

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231 IV, 142.  
231a Ibid.  
232 IV, 143.  
232a Ibid.  
233 IV, 144.  
233a Ibid.  
234 IV, 145.
Japanese representatives attempt to reach a practical settlement regarding the acquisition of goods and the cancellation of the freezing issues before submitting proposal B to the United States government.235

Furthermore, in regard to the commercial policy Ambassador Nomura requested the present Japanese cabinet to submit a statement which contained no provisional notes. In this way Ambassador Nomura hoped to offset the suspicion already aroused in the minds of American officials. Already, Ambassador Nomura reminded his government, the United States had stated that it would put no faith in mere promises unless they were carried out immediately. Ambassador Nomura suggested, therefore, that Japan be ready to withdraw its troops immediately upon receiving word that the United States was rescinding its freezing order and making the necessary materials available to Japanese merchants.

Ambassador Nomura concluded his report by stating that he would confer with Secretary Hull again on November 20, 1941.236

69. Hull-Nomura Conversation (November 19, 1941)

a. State Department’s Report237

On November 19, 1941, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called at Secretary Hull’s apartment to continue the discussion that had taken place on the previous day. Although Ambassador Nomura had reported yesterday’s conversation to his government, no instructions regarding any suggestions made during the meeting had as yet been forwarded to Washington. Both Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu, however, were satisfied with the interview that Secretary Hull had given the American press regarding the contents of the previous day’s conversation.

Secretary Hull then asked Ambassador Nomura his opinion of the present situation. Ambassador Nomura replied that he believed, as he had said in yesterday’s conversation, that if the Japanese should move their troops out of southern French Indo-China the United States should rescind its freezing measure, since it was this action of the Japanese government that first provoked the economic restriction. Ambassador Nomura agreed with Secretary Hull that if such action were taken by both governments the conversations should continue. Secretary Hull recognized the fact that such a measure might give the Japanese leaders time to organize public opinion in favor of a peaceful policy. In view of the bad effect that America’s freezing regulations had on the Japanese economic system, Ambassador Nomura made it clear that Japan desired a quick settlement, although he agreed with Secretary Hull that the conversations should continue in any event, in order to arrive at a mutual agreement on all important points upon which the views of both governments had diverged.

Ambassador Nomura emphasized that Japan’s views in regard to both the Tripartite Pact and the desire to maintain peace in the Pacific had been clearly set forth in the Japanese statement of September 25, 1941. After Ambassador Nomura had stated that Japan was committed to carry out its obligations under the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull suggested that Japan let the Russian forces in the Far East and the British forces at Singapore return to Europe.237a

When Secretary Hull began to discuss the injurious effect that Hitler’s aggression had upon the whole world, the Japanese representatives discussed the German-Russian War. Impressed with the strength of the Stalin government and the stubbornness of Russian

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235 IV, 146.
236 IV, 147.
237a Ibid.
defense, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu both expressed the view that a Russian defeat would not take place in the near future. Ambassador Nomura saw little prospect either of Germany's launching a successful invasion upon the English coast.

Secretary Hull took this opportunity to point out that Germany, if unable to conquer Stalin or invade England, would probably be left with only the hostility of the millions in Europe as the result of its conquest by force. When Ambassador Nomura referred once more to Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull reminded the Japanese Ambassador that his country was equally bound by a neutrality pact with Russia. Ambassador Nomura replied briefly that Japan would be equally faithful to both alliances. However, Ambassador Nomura admitted that the Tripartite Pact had brought nothing but American resentment upon Japan. Mr. Kurusu was also pessimistic of Japan's position in the Far East, if another Brest-Litovsk occurred and Japan were faced with a combined Russo-German advance on the Pacific.

Urging the Japanese representatives to look to the future, Secretary Hull stated that Japan could stabilize the world by establishing a progressive program of peace in the Pacific. Ambassador Nomura, feeling that the United States would be very strong after World War II was over, nevertheless said the United States would only impair its strength if American forces were sent to Africa to engage in the war at the present time. When the discussion of Hitler's aggression throughout Europe continued, Secretary Hull spoke of Germany's efforts to gain control of the seas, and he emphasized that the United States would prevent that from happening by any means at its disposal. When Secretary Hull stated that the Japanese should tell Hitler to be reasonable, Mr. Kurusu interrupted with the remark that Chancellor Hitler would undoubtedly be willing to enter into peace negotiations. However, Secretary Hull replied that he had only been speaking figuratively, because the United States would demand the complete abandonment of Hitler's program of conquest.

The conference drew to a close with Secretary Hull emphasizing that the United States would stand firm on its basic principles.

b. Ambassador Nomura's Report

There is no Japanese message pertaining to this conversation available.

70. Japan Prepares for Breakdown of Diplomatic Relations

In spite of Japan's apparent optimism with regard to these informal conversations, Tokyo took every precaution to safeguard its codes and important documents in the event that diplomatic relations with America, Britain and Russia were severed. On November 19, 1941, Tokyo sent to its embassies throughout the world a simple code (consisting of a few weather terms) to be inserted, if need arose, in Japanese news broadcasts as a warning that an international emergency had struck. Embassy officials would then destroy all code papers. This was the famous "Winds" code which was to be used in the event that relations between Japan and the United States, Russia, or Great Britain were severed.

Though the code was used before the unexpected Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor it did not reveal that relations with the United States were deteriorating, since it mentioned only England. A special appendix outlines the available information concerning the "Winds" and "Stop" codes.

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238 Ibid.
239 Treaty of Peace between Germany and Russia, March 3, 1918.
240 S.D. II, 751-753.
241 IV, 148-149.
(November 20, 1941 - December 1, 1941)

PART A—HULL–NOMURA CONVERSATIONS

Japanese Efforts to Extort an Agreement on a Narrow and One-Sided Proposal

71. Hull-Nomura Conversation (November 20, 1941)

a. State Department’s Report

On November 20, 1941, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called at the State Department to offer a proposal amplifying Ambassador Nomura’s suggestion that the Japanese troops be moved from the southern part of French Indo-China in order that the United States government might rescind its freezing regulations. Under the terms of the new proposal both governments would guarantee that no advance would be made in southeastern Asia or the South Pacific except in the northern part of French Indo-China, to which Japanese troops from the southern part of that territory would be moved upon the conclusion of the present arrangement. As soon as peace was restored between Japan and China, or an equitable peace was established in the Pacific area, Japan would withdraw its troops from all of French Indo-China.

With a view to restoring their commercial relations, Japan and the United States would cooperate in acquiring necessary goods and commodities from the Netherlands East Indies, and reinstate trade conditions which had prevailed prior to the freezing of assets. Furthermore, the United States would supply Japan with a required quantity of oil. In addition, the United States would refrain from any actions prejudicial to the restoration of peace between Japan and China.

Promising to examine the proposal later, Secretary Hull said that he would like to make a few comments on the Japanese proposal in its present form. At any moment, Secretary Hull insisted, Japan could end what it chose to call encirclement and decide upon an all-out peaceful course. Furthermore, Secretary Hull felt that the Japanese government should direct its people to follow such a peaceful course. In reply, Mr. Kurusu offered the suggestion that the United States help develop Japanese public opinion by adopting the proposal which the Japanese government had just offered. This proposal, Ambassador Nomura interposed, would show Japan’s peaceful purpose by relieving the pressure on Thailand as well as French Indo-China.

Secretary Hull then asked Ambassador Nomura to consider the American people’s reaction should the United States discontinue aid to Great Britain. Then he pointed out that the purposes underlying United States aid to China paralleled those underlying aid to

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243 Ibid.

244 Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State—November 20, 1941, S.D. II, 755-756. Part of this draft proposal was sent to Ambassador Nomura from Tokyo on November 4, 1941. See IV, 29. The other items in this proposal were sent to Ambassador Nomura with instructions concerning its delivery on November 14 and November 15, 1941. Note certain changes made in the text in spite of the fact that Tokyo sent Ambassador Nomura both the Japanese and English texts of the proposals, 150-153.

Great Britain. What was needed at the present time, Secretary Hull insisted, was the manifesta-
tion by Japan of a sincere desire to pursue a peaceful course since the American
people, basing their opinion on the Nazi-like slogans of "a new order in East Asia" and
"a coprosperity sphere", believed that the partnership of Germany and Japan was aimed at
controlling the world.

After four years of fighting with China, Ambassador Nomura explained, the Japanese
government was forced to use the slogans quoted by Secretary Hull in order to urge the people
toward victory. Yet it had been clearly demonstrated from the proposals already presented
to the United States government, the Japanese Ambassador continued, that the Japanese
government was eager to reach an immediate settlement with China. Secretary Hull stated
that the United States government was anxious to help in this matter. However, when Mr.
Kurusu stated that Japan had never pledged itself to a policy of expansion, Secretary Hull
made the comment that the Chinese people might have an answer to that point.

Since the United States wished to avoid a repetition in East Asia of the "new order" which
Hitler was attempting to establish in Europe by military control, Secretary Hull pointed
out that Japan must abrogate its alliance with Germany. Waving aside Mr. Kurusu's
arguments that Japan could not eradicate its obligations under the Tripartite Pact,
Secretary Hull pointed out that Japan had not been so concerned over its obligations under
the Nine Power Treaty signed with Great Britain and the United States. Mr. Kurusu
answered vaguely that the Nine Power Treaty was twenty years old and outmoded. Not
wishing to argue this point, Secretary Hull turned back to the Chinese question and
emphasized the tremendous injury caused by Japan in the Pacific. He pointed out that the
methods adopted by the Japanese military leaders in the war with China were similar to
those used by Hitler. Although agreeing with Ambassador Nomura that the situation in the
Far East was of the utmost urgency, Secretary Hull insisted that it was still the duty of Japa-
nese statesmen to alleviate the situation in Japan.

Mr. Kurusu then asked if American aid to China would be discontinued at the beginning
of Japanese-Chinese peace negotiations. Declining to comment on this point, Secretary Hull
instead complimented Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu on the marked change in
the attitude of the Japanese people and press toward America during the past two days.
Secretary Hull was convinced that if such a change for the better could be effected in such a
short time Japanese statesmen could accomplish much more in a longer period.245a

b. Ambassador Nomura's Report246

Although November 20, 1941 was Thanksgiving Day Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador
Kurusu met with Secretary Hull to discuss the program of Japanese-American relations.
At the very beginning of the discussion Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull a copy
of Japanese Proposal B, according to instructions from Tokyo. After glancing over the items
in the proposal Secretary Hull commented on that section which requested the United
States to cease aid to the Chinese once Japanese-Chinese peace discussions had commenced.
As long as the fears emanating from the Tripartite Alliance continued in this country,
Secretary Hull stated, the United States could not cease aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek. While on one hand the United States was aiding Great Britain in order to offset
German aggression, it was aiding China to offset the same type of aggression in the Far East.
Throughout Japan and Manchukuo American businesses had been subjected to harsh
treatment by the Japanese; therefore, at this time the American people doubted Japan's
sincere desire for peace.247
Reminding Secretary Hull that President Roosevelt himself had offered to mediate in the Japanese-Chinese peace, Ambassador Kurusu insisted that such peace conferences could never take place while American aid to Chiang Kai-shek continued. Secretary Hull replied that President Roosevelt had presupposed that the Japanese would make a definite statement of their peaceful policies. In the past, influential Japanese statesmen had officially advocated the militaristic expansion of Chancellor Hitler; therefore, if the tension between Japan and the United States was to be relaxed, the Japanese government must openly state its desires to follow a course set down by the United States government. Secretary Hull believed that both he and the Japanese Ambassador had within their power the destiny of both countries, and even of the human race. In an effort to find a basis for peace negotiations, Secretary Hull promised to study the latest Japanese proposal sympathetically. 248

Since the editorial comments in Japanese newspapers had improved during the past two or three days, Secretary Hull felt that, if once guided, Japanese public opinion could become favorable toward the present Japanese-American conversations. Therefore, in his message to Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura requested that Foreign Minister Togo exercise continuous control over the Japanese press. 249

Ambassador Nomura felt that the American State Department would be ready to express some opinion on Japan's suggestion for a general agreement to alleviate the condition in the southwestern Pacific within a few days. Before the meeting drew to a close, another interview was scheduled for 8:00 p.m. on November 22, 1941. 250

72. Hull-Kurusu Conversation (November 21, 1941)

a. Secretary Hull's Report 251

Calling at Secretary Hull's apartment on November 21, 1941, Mr. Kurusu handed the American Secretary of State a draft letter which he offered by way of clarifying Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. 252

In this letter Mr. Kurusu stated that he was surprised to learn that the American people misunderstood Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Since Mr. Kurusu, as Japanese Ambassador to Germany, had signed this treaty with the Berlin government, he felt qualified to clear up any false impressions. First of all, Mr. Kurusu pointed out that the alliance with Germany did not infringe upon Japan's right to act as an independent state. Although it had assumed certain obligations, Japan was not bound by the interpretation given to those obligations by either of the other contracting parties. Anxious for peace, the Japanese government would project Japan into war only as the ultimate, inescapable necessity for the maintenance of its security and the preservation of national life against active injustice. Mr. Kurusu asked that Secretary Hull feel free to publish the contents after complete understanding had been reached by the two governments. 253

After glancing over this letter, Secretary Hull told Mr. Kurusu that he did not feel it would be of any particular help. Since Mr. Kurusu had nothing more to offer on the subject of peaceful settlement between Japan and the United States, the interview was ended. 254
b. Ambassador Kurusu’s Report

In order to arrange for the interview to take place on November 22, 1941, Secretary Hull met with Ambassador Kurusu on the previous day. Apparently Secretary Hull was in accord with Ambassador Kurusu’s suggestion that the joint peace agreement between the United States and Japan gradually overrule Japanese obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Because Viscount Isii and Eigo Fukai had fought for free commerce together with Secretary Hull at the economic conference in London, the American Secretary of State was sympathetic toward Japan’s economic leadership in the Far East.

As long as Japan gained leadership in the Pacific without resorting to aggression, Ambassador Kurusu did not feel that the United States would interfere in the activities of that area. In fact, Secretary Hull openly stated that he would like to see the re-establishment of that era subsequent to the Russo-Japanese War when Japan and the United States had influenced the affairs of the Far East and the Western Hemisphere respectively. Before achieving such a goal Japan must assure the United States that its alliance with Germany was not an obstacle to peace. Since the present situation was undoubtedly critical Ambassador Kurusu felt that Proposal B, submitted to Secretary Hull on the previous day, would have a great bearing on peace negotiations. Ambassador Kurusu expected an answer to proposal B from Secretary Hull on Monday, November 24, 1941.

73. Japanese Air and Surface Patrols Cover Shipping

On November 21, 1941 the [U.S.] Chief of Naval Operations informed fleet commanders that reliable reports indicated that Japanese air and surface craft were patrolling shipping routes from the United States to Australasia, with special emphasis apparently being placed on the Gilbert and Ellice Islands area.

In order to coordinate these operations, the Japanese East Indies fishing fleet had been divided into three units to cover Bathurst Island, Arnhem and Thursday Island in Torres Strait. Equipped with long-range radio sets with which to contact their base at Palau, units of this fleet were apparently scheduled to operate around Dutch New Guinea.

74. Hull-Nomura Conversation (November 22, 1941)

a. State Department’s Report

By appointment made at the request of Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called on Secretary Hull on November 22, 1941. Secretary Hull began the conversation by telling Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu that he had spoken with representatives of the other governments concerned in the affairs of the Pacific in order to determine if there could be a relaxation of the freezing orders enacted against Japan. As a result, it had been decided by these other governments that if Japan could give evidence of its peaceful intentions, the questions of the Pacific could be settled satisfactorily. However, the representatives of those other governments had the same misgivings which Secretary Hull himself had experienced during his conversations with Ambassador Nomura.

Secretary Hull then reminded Ambassador Nomura that the Japanese government had been talking of peace during last July even while its troops moved into Indo-China. Even though the oil being shipped to Japan during the months prior to the Indo-China invasion was not being used for normal civilian consumption, Secretary Hull, in spite of severe public criticism, had induced his government to continue oil exports to Japan.

255 IV, 159.
256 Ibid.
257 IV, 160.
Now, in November, with the American statesmen and American press backing a peaceful policy, the Japanese statesmen and press continued to adopt a warlike tone. Since Secretary Hull had pointed out several times that Japan would gain commercially from adopting a peaceful policy, he could not understand why Japanese statesmen did not cooperate with Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu in preaching peace.

Secretary Hull said that the United States government had reached no decision regarding the Japanese proposals. Nevertheless, the United States was seriously considering the release of a certain quantity of oil to Japan for civilian requirements. If only Japan could make more definite assertions regarding its peaceful intentions, Secretary Hull felt that he would be able to sway the sympathies of the Senators and other persons in this country toward Japan. After Secretary Hull had finished, Mr. Kurusu stated that the special session of the Japanese Diet had shown the Japanese people to be severely affected by four years of war, and it had also shown clearly the effects of the United States freezing measures upon the Japanese people. In reply to Secretary Hull's question regarding the attitude of the Japanese army, Mr. Kurusu assured the American Secretary of State that the Army had acceded to Ambassador Nomura's suggestion regarding the withdrawal of Japanese troops from southern French Indo-China. In spite of this encouraging sign, however, Mr. Kurusu pointed out, the situation would approach an explosive point unless immediate and ameliorating action took place.\textsuperscript{257a}

Since the world was in such a state of confusion because of the present war, Secretary Hull encouraged the Japanese statesmen to come out and say definitely that Japan wanted peace, as the United States had done so many times. Ambassador Nomura answered that there was not the slightest doubt of Japan's desire for peace, yet he admitted that it would be difficult to declare publicly that Japan was seeking conciliation. By way of example, Ambassador Nomura reminded Secretary Hull of the agitation in Japan which followed the peace settlement with Russia in 1905. In spite of Ambassador Nomura's explanations, Secretary Hull still felt that Japanese statesmen would approach the question of peace with real appreciation of the situation, in order to induce the other powers in the Pacific to reach a trade arrangement with Japan. If Japan continued such aggressive moves as it had already begun in French Indo-China, Secretary Hull continued, other nations would continue their program of armament and the peaceful endeavors of Ambassador Nomura would be in vain.

If Japan would be satisfied with the gradual relaxation of export restrictions, Secretary Hull revealed, both the United States and other countries would be willing to supply Japan with a moderate amount of necessary goods, increasing that amount in proportion to Japan's demonstration of its peaceful intentions. Not satisfied with the trade concessions which Secretary Hull promised, Mr. Kurusu insisted that immediate and complete relief was necessary. Secretary Hull's only comment was that, if the Japanese government needed all that had been asked for, probably nothing could save it. Furthermore, Secretary Hull felt that Japan expected the United States to do all the work in bringing about peace.\textsuperscript{257b}

When Mr. Kurusu asked for a further clarification of Secretary Hull's ideas on the trade situation, Secretary Hull replied that during his conversation with representatives of the other governments he had discovered that an arrangement could be effected between Japan and these countries, if Japan would only commit itself to peace. However, if Japan insisted on modifying and qualifying declarations of its peaceful statements, these other nations would not be interested.

\textsuperscript{257a} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{257b} Ibid.
Secretary Hull then asked if a recent proposal handed to him by Ambassador Nomura was intended as a temporary measure to organize public opinion in Japan in order that the conversations might continue with the purpose of concluding a more comprehensive agreement. When Mr. Kurusu replied in the affirmative, Secretary Hull stated that Japan was making the situation more difficult for the countries that were willing to release a certain amount of exports to Japan, for if Japan retained any troops in northern Indo-China, regardless of their location, they would constitute a threat to neighboring countries. For example, Secretary Hull said, almost over-night Japan would be able to move its troops from northern Indo-China to any point it desired, while the British would be unable to move even one more ship from Singapore.

Answering that Japan would bring its troops out of French Indo-China completely when the China affair had been settled, Ambassador Nomura said that at the present time Japan needed troops in northern Indo-China in order to carry on its war with China. However, it would take many days to move these Japanese troops from northern Indo-China. Secretary Hull, however, insisted that uneasiness would prevail as long as Japanese troops remained in any area of French Indo-China. Furthermore, Secretary Hull felt that Japan expected the United States to complete all the arrangements toward the settlement of the China question. Refuting this statement, Mr. Kurusu pointed out that the Japanese Foreign Minister, in a conversation with Ambassador Grew, had accused the United States of precisely the same thing.

In emphasizing the fact that it was the Japanese who first diverged from the course of law and order, Secretary Hull said that the Japanese had moved into French Indo-China in July. Secretary Hull waved aside Mr. Kurusu’s explanation that Japan had been forced into taking such action because of commercial encirclement by saying that as far back as 1934 he had warned Ambassador Saito that Japan was planning an over-lordship in East Asia, and that such militarism would eventually plunge the world into another war. At that same time Secretary Hull had attempted to discourage Hitler from adopting aggressive tactics.

In answer to Ambassador Nomura’s comment that American moral support had enabled Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to hold out this long, Secretary Hull said that a major portion of our fleet was kept in the Pacific to aid China. However, if Japan could only cooperate by doing a few small peaceful things to tide over the situation, a peaceful movement could begin within thirty or forty days. Ambassador Nomura maintained that the psychological effect of a quick settlement would be of the greatest value to Japan. Although obviously discouraged at Japan’s attitude, Secretary Hull still insisted that peace would become infectious if only the movement were begun, but if the China affair were injected into the present proposals, Secretary Hull felt that a dangerous obstacle would be set up. This obstacle, Secretary Hull believed, might even prevent the United States from mediating between Japan and China.

After a conclusive discussion on the true situation in Indo-China, Ambassador Nomura referred to Japan’s desire for a quick settlement of the Pacific problems. He asked that America state exactly what points of the Japanese proposals it could and could not accept. By way of reply, Secretary Hull urged that the Japanese government spend more time in preaching the doctrines of peace. Then he said that possibly by Monday, November 24, 1941, after a conference with the representatives of the other governments concerning the points that had been brought out in the day’s conversation, he would have something definite to say about the Japanese proposals.

Ambassador Nomura assured Secretary Hull that the Japanese government had no desire to press him for an immediate reply and agreed that Monday would be satisfactory for an answer to be forthcoming from the United States government.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Just before the conversation ended Secretary Hull referred to a general and comprehensive program involving the collaboration of other countries which he hoped to talk over with Ambassador Nomura. Ambassador Nomura said that Japan hoped for a bilateral agreement with the United States under which other interested powers could subsequently arrive at a mutual agreement with Japan. 258

b. Ambassador Nomura’s Report 259

Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull and Mr. Ballantine on November 22, 1941. Secretary Hull began the conversations by stating that he had conferred earlier in the day with the Ambassadors and Ministers of Great Britain, Australia and the Netherlands in order to obtain their opinion on the latest Japanese proposals. As a result of this conversation these representatives concluded that once Japan gave a sincere indication of its desire for peace, trade relations could be re-established between Japan and these various countries. However, these same representatives noted that Japanese politicians and newspapers seemed to be directly opposed to the peaceful course which the Japanese government claimed to desire.

Giving an example of their reasons for doubting Japan’s sincerity, these same diplomats pointed out to Secretary Hull that Japanese petroleum imports had risen just prior to the freezing order effected by the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. In fact, the petroleum intake was so great that it was obviously being stored by the navy and not consumed in civilian businesses. In view of such action the diplomats of these countries wished to lift the embargo on exports to Japan only gradually. Before any definite decision could be made in regard to resuming trade with Japan, however, these representatives wished to refer the Japanese proposals to their home governments.

In order to offset this suspicion regarding Japan’s actual motives, Secretary Hull proposed that the Japanese government make a clear-cut statement of its desire for peace. Mr. Ballantine added that such a statement would be more beneficial than the present propagandistic reports sent out by Tokyo for foreign consumption. Mr. Ballantine continued that the duty of every politician was to strive for peace. Anxious to determine the attitude of the United States toward the Japanese proposals, Ambassador Nomura requested that the British, Australian, and Dutch opinions be laid aside for the time being. Replying to this request, Secretary Hull discussed the Japanese proposals paragraph by paragraph, but actually, according to Ambassador Nomura, his comments were completely evasive. Nevertheless, Ambassador Nomura was convinced that the United States, Great Britain, Australia and the Netherlands were sincerely desirous of avoiding a crisis in the south Pacific.

Secretary Hull himself admitted that these countries wished to control the situation in the Far East so that they might be able to transfer their fighting forces to other areas. In view of this situation Secretary Hull felt that the assurances given by Japan in its proposals were an insufficient guarantee.

Attempting to refute Secretary Hull’s remarks, Ambassador Nomura insisted that the Japanese troops concentrated in the northern part of French Indo-China were directed at Yunan, the lifeline of Chungking and not at the southwest Pacific. However, Secretary Hull insisted that a quick turnabout in the situation must take place before the United States or the other countries concerned in the Pacific could answer the present Japanese proposals. Once this changed had taken place, Secretary Hull stated, trade with Japan could be resumed rapidly. 259a

258 Ibid.
259 IV, 161.
259a Ibid.
Referring next to the proposed Japanese-Chinese peace negotiations, Secretary Hull stated that United States’ aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would not cease before a complete understanding had been reached. If the United States were to stop this aid, Secretary Hull continued, then this government could not be considered a fair and neutral party, and therefore, could not mediate in the Japanese-Chinese peace. Furthermore, Secretary Hull felt that the so-called American aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was largely over-publicized. Secretary Hull concluded his discussion of the China affair by stating that it was not yet time for President Roosevelt to suggest the commencement of peace negotiations with China.

In spite of certain disagreements which had been uncovered during the present conversations, Ambassador Kurusu felt that on Monday the United States would submit some sort of counter proposal suggesting a joint plan for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific by the United States and Japan. After a preliminary agreement had been arrived at by these two countries Ambassador Kurusu was convinced that it would be submitted to Great Britain, Australia and the Netherlands for approval. If this took place it was quite possible that Japan’s objections to any change could be voted down by the four allies. Ambassador Kurusu insisted that Japan would not accept any proposals unless they met with its complete approval.

75. Japan Changes Agreement Deadline to November 29, 1941

Possibly in the hope that the United States would, as Secretary Hull had stated, submit a counter proposal on November 24, 1941, which would increase the possibility of a successful conclusion of the present negotiations, Japan agreed to change the deadline for a Japanese-American agreement from November 25 to November 29, 1941, Tokyo time. However, in notifying Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu of this change in date, the Foreign Office stressed the fact that, by that time, an agreement must not only be signed with the United States, but, by the exchange of pertinent diplomatic notes, some similar understanding must be concluded with Great Britain and the Netherlands.

Since November 29, 1941 was the final and absolute date which Tokyo had set for the settlement of its international problems, Foreign Minister Togo urged that both Ambassadors in Washington increase their efforts to bring about peace without relaxing Japan’s fundamental demands. If Japan’s aims were not accomplished by this date Foreign Minister Togo warned “that things are automatically going to happen”.

76. Chief of Naval Operations Warns of Japanese Surprise Attack on Philippines

The United States Navy was not unaware that “things are automatically going to happen”, as Foreign Minister Togo had warned on November 22, 1941. For on November 24, 1941, in a message to the Commander-in-Chiefs of the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, the Chief of Naval Operations warned that a surprise Japanese aggression in any direction could be expected. From the movements of Japan’s military and naval forces a surprise attack on the Philippines or Guam was indicated. Senior Army officers in the areas to which this OpNav message was addressed were to be informed of this fact. In the meantime these commanders were to observe the utmost secrecy in regard to their actions in order not to precipitate the expected Japanese attack.
On the same day unusual activity was noted in the Mandates on the part of the Japanese. Coast batteries, lookout stations and landing forces were identified on Truk and Saipan. From these and other indications it was assumed that similar Japanese defense preparations were being made at islands in the Jaluit and Palau vicinities, where bases were already located.266

77. Ambassador Grew Discusses Japanese Proposals with Foreign Minister Togo267

On November 21, 1941, Ambassador Grew advised Secretary Hull and Under Secretary of State Welles of the details of his conference with Foreign Minister Togo.268 During the conversation Foreign Minister Togo asked whether Ambassador Grew was familiar with the Japanese proposals presented to the American State Department on November 20, 1941,269 and with the conversation between Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu on November 22, 1941.270 Although Ambassador Grew had received a copy of the Japanese proposals, he had not yet been informed of the details of the conversation which took place on November 22, 1941. Therefore, Foreign Minister Togo gave him some of the more pertinent details.271

Foreign Minister Togo disclosed to Ambassador Grew that Secretary Hull, in a conference with representatives of other governments interested in the Pacific, had learned that Japan's offer to withdraw its troops from the southern part of French Indo-China did not meet with their approval. In explaining to Ambassador Grew that Japan could not withdraw its troops from the northern part of French Indo-China as well, since they had been sent there to hasten the conclusion of the China affair, Foreign Minister Togo insisted that Japan's offer had been an attempt to ease the tension in the Pacific.

Remarking that the United States and Great Britain had put their freezing orders into effect in the first place because Japan had moved its troops to southern Indo-China, Foreign Minister Togo could not understand why the withdrawal of its troops from that section was not satisfactory to those governments. In any event, Foreign Minister Togo continued, Japan's maximum concession was the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the northern part of French Indo-China.

Foreign Minister Togo stated that the settlement of the China affair had always been one of the principal obstacles to the restoration of friendly relations between Japan and the United States. If, however, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek were to state his desire to restore peace with Japan, as President Roosevelt had suggested he might do, Foreign Minister Togo said Japan would enter into negotiations with China provided that the United States refrained from any action prejudicial to the restoration of peace. Since Foreign Minister Togo insisted that the United States' activities must not obstruct peace between Japan and China, Ambassador Grew interrupted to inquire as to which American activities Foreign Minister Togo referred. Foreign Minister Togo replied that although he was unfamiliar with military matters he felt that any American action calculated to aid Chinese military forces should cease as soon as peace negotiations were started.

Foreign Minister Togo turned the conversation to a discussion of the Japanese proposals presented to the American State Department on November 20, 1941. Since he had formulated the document, Foreign Minister Togo felt qualified to state that the proposal was a manifestation of Japan's future cooperative spirit, based on a desire for peace. Ambassador

266 IV, 165.
267 The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State—November 24, 1941, S.D. II, 762–764.
268 Ibid.
Grew’s only reply was that he would forward Foreign Minister Togo’s remarks to the United States government.

Just before the conversation ended, Ambassador Grew suggested that, in the event the Japanese government did not expect the United States to suspend aid to China prior to the commencement of peace negotiations, the clause in the Japanese proposals referring to American non-interference in the efforts of Japan to settle the China affair would be interpreted as a statement designed to save Japanese face.

78. Ambassador Nomura Warns Against Inaccurate News Reporting

In spite of the fact that both the Japanese Embassy in Washington and the American State Department were withholding all reports concerning Japanese-American relations, Ambassador Nomura reported on November 25, 1941 that various Japanese correspondents were writing newspaper articles based purely on conjecture. Although many of these correspondents recognized that their articles were valueless, they were forced to make such reports concerning the conversations because of pressure exerted by heads of newspaper offices. Since the situation was becoming extremely critical, Ambassador Nomura urged that Foreign Minister Togo exercise more control over Japanese correspondents, and particularly over the officials in charge of the newspaper syndicates. If newspaper officials directed their special correspondents to publish only authorized information concerning the Japanese-American negotiations, this difficulty could be cleared up immediately.

79. Foreign Minister Togo Questions Newspaper Interpretation of Proposals

Tokyo as well as Washington reported problems arising out of unauthorized newspaper articles. On November 26, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo questioned an American newspaper interpretation of the Japanese proposals in which Japanese evacuation of French Indo-China was indicated as depending upon the rescinding of the American freezing act. In case Ambassador Nomura himself believed that there was some connection between the two measures, Foreign Minister Togo stated that even if such a mutual agreement on those two points could be reached it would be inadequate to meet the present situation.

The Japanese government desired an agreement based on its Proposal B, excluding the questions of non-discrimination of trade and the Tripartite Pact, and incorporating the suggestion made by the United States on November 12, 1941 concerning the establishment of peace between Japan and China through the mediation of the United States. Since the time allotted for the successful conclusion of the present negotiations was growing short Foreign Minister Togo asked Ambassador Nomura to get in touch with United States’ authorities and influential Americans in an effort to obtain an immediate answer to Japanese proposals.

In reply to Tokyo’s instructions, Ambassador Nomura stated that the question concerning the evacuation of Japanese troops from all of French Indo-China, appearing in the American newspapers, had been unauthorized and not founded upon any discussion between American and Japanese representatives in Washington. Although he had attempted to use his influence to work upon the sympathies of influential Americans, Ambassador Nomura

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271a Ibid.
272a Ibid.
273a IV, 166. The pessimism of Japanese newspapers toward these conversations was reflected in a statement made by the Tokyo Nichi Nichi denouncing the Kurusu mission as a failure. The Domei news service agreed that conditions were such that any optimism on the part of the Japanese was totally unwarranted. (New York Times, November 25, 1941, 1:5).
273b IV, 167.
273c Ibid.
continued, Secretary Hull was already turning the opinion of these American representatives to his own advantage.274

80. Tokyo Wishes Agreement to Include Petroleum Exports

In the event that a settlement should be reached on the basis of the latest Japanese proposal, Foreign Minister Togo wished for an immediate agreement regarding the acquisition of necessary materials. Even prior to the signing of an understanding the Japanese Foreign Minister desired a definite guarantee from the United States regarding the amount of petroleum to be exported to Japan. An average amount of 4,000,000 tons of petroleum per year had been exported from the United States to Japan during 1938, 1939 and 1940 before the freezing legislation went into effect. These exports amounted to approximately 333,000 tons per month. Under the suggested agreement the Japanese government would expect to receive the same amount of petroleum with a gradual increase if the negotiations continued favorably. In addition, the Japanese government wished to import 1,000,000 tons of petroleum a year from the Netherlands East Indies. In order to validate the verbal agreements reached, Foreign Minister Togo suggested that a definite statement be incorporated into the exchange of documents between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull.275

81. Japanese Ambassadors Offer to Tokyo Final Suggestion for Peace

After Tokyo had wired its embassy in Washington concerning the demands to be made once an agreement was reached with the United States, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu replied that there was very little possibility of the United States’ acceptance of Japan’s Proposal B in its entirety.276 In fact, the two Japanese ambassadors felt that negotiations would be completely ruptured if the present situation were not alleviated immediately in some way. By way of a suggestion Ambassador Nomura proposed that President Roosevelt wire the Japanese government personally to request cooperation in the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. In return, Japan would extend a cordial reply.

In declaring their friendliness to the United States, however, Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu warned the Japanese cabinet that it must not overlook the fact that England and the United States were attempting to bring the Netherlands East Indies under their military domination. In order to forestall the domination of French Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies and Thailand by the allied nations, Ambassador Nomura suggested their establishment as neutral nations in accordance with a proposal submitted by President Roosevelt in September, 1941.276a

Although the breakdown of negotiations might not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu felt that once England and the United States had militarily occupied the Netherlands East Indies, Japan would be forced to attack allied troops. In the event that such a war did take place, a problem would arise as to whether Germany would feel bound by the Tripartite Pact to come to the assistance of Japan. Both Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu doubted that such aid would be forthcoming from Berlin.

Referring next to the Sino-Japanese incident, the two Japanese representatives stated that the end of the world would come before this problem was settled. Since this was the last expression regarding the negotiations which either Ambassador intended to make they

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274 IV, 168.
275 IV, 169.
276 IV, 170.
276a Ibid.
requested that a copy of their opinions be submitted to the Japanese Naval Ministry and that some answer be made immediately by the Japanese government.\textsuperscript{277}

82. Tokyo Orders Reports on Negotiations to Be Made by Telephone

Since the situation was becoming so tense that immediate reports on the negotiations were desired by Tokyo, the Foreign Office ordered the Japanese Embassy in Washington to make future reports by telephone to Chief Kumaicho Yamamoto, Chief of the American Bureau in Tokyo. As a security precaution the Foreign Office sent Ambassador Nomura a copy of a verbal code to be used for telephone communications.\textsuperscript{278} However, Ambassador Nomura did not believe that a sufficient amount of time would be saved by this new means of communication to warrant use of the international telephone system. He pointed out that the hours for telephone conversations between Japan and the United States were restricted to the time between 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., 2:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., Tokyo time. Therefore, he held that it would be better to continue wiring urgent news.\textsuperscript{279}

83. Secretary Hull Confers with Allied Representatives (November 24, 1941)

On two different occasions, Ambassador Nomura reported, Secretary Hull had conferred with representatives of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands East Indies and China. Since Japanese-American relations affected Great Britain more than any of the other countries, Secretary Hull had discussed the Pacific problem chiefly with the British Ambassador, and was maintaining communications with the Australian, Dutch, and Chinese representatives largely through him. As the result of conducting some separate conversations with each of these representatives, instead of having them meet for joint discussion, considerable attention had been drawn to these meetings.\textsuperscript{280}

84. Conference with Japanese Representatives Postponed by Secretary Hull

Although a conference between Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu had been arranged for November 24, 1941, Secretary Hull postponed this meeting since he had not yet completed discussing the Japanese proposals with representatives of the Allied nations.\textsuperscript{281}

On the following day, therefore, the Japanese representatives again inquired whether Secretary Hull was free to meet with Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu. The State Department replied that an answer would be forthcoming on the next day. Since various bureaus of the State Department were still debating the items in the Japanese proposals, and in view of the fact that Secretary Hull was still conferring with the British Ambassador, Ambassador Nomura was convinced that the United States desired to speed up the present negotiations. He felt that a conference between American and Japanese officials would undoubtedly take place on November 26, 1941.\textsuperscript{282}

On the morning of November 26, 1941 Mr. Terasaki called on Mr. Ballantine to arrange the time for this interview. However, Mr. Ballantine stated that Secretary Hull was still studying the Japanese proposals; nevertheless, from Mr. Ballantine’s remarks Mr. Terasaki concluded that Secretary Hull would be free to confer with Ambassador Nomura later in the day.\textsuperscript{283} Consequently, a meeting was scheduled for 4:45 p.m.\textsuperscript{284}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[277] IV, 171.
\item[278] IV, 172.
\item[279] IV, 173.
\item[280] IV, 174.
\item[281] IV, 175.
\item[282] IV, 176.
\item[283] IV, 177.
\item[284] IV, 178.
\end{footnotes}
After the time of the conversation had been set Minister Wakasugi called Mr. Yamamoto by international telephone to notify the Japanese Foreign Office that a conference had been arranged with Secretary Hull. In reply to a question by Mr. Yamamoto during this telephone conversation, Minister Wakasugi stated that arrangements had not yet been made to see President Roosevelt. However, since Secretary Hull had been conferring with the Chinese representatives for the past three days, it seemed apparent that the day's interview would decide the course of future negotiations. Mr. Yamamoto then ordered Minister Wakasugi to report the results of the day's meeting by telephone. 285

85. Hull-Nomura Conversation (November 26, 1941)

a. State Department's Report 286

When Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called at the American State Department on November 26, 1941, Secretary Hull handed each of the Japanese representatives an outline of a tentative and unofficial proposed agreement between Japan and the United States. 287

In this document, under Section I "Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy", the United States and Japan, in declaring that their policies in the Pacific were peaceful, were to guarantee not only that they had no territorial design on any part of the Pacific, but that they had no intention of using military force, or in any way threatening any neighboring nation. In pursuit of this peaceful national policy, both governments were to apply the following principles to their relations with all other governments:

1. The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
4. The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

In order to provide a strong economic basis for peace, Japan and the United States agreed to eliminate political instability and prevent recurrent economic collapse by adopting the following principles:

1. The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
2. The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
3. The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
4. The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as respects the operation of international commodities agreements.
5. The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries, and as may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries. 288

Under the provisions of Section II "Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan", the United States and Japan were to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact with the British Empire, China, the Netherlands, Russia and Thailand. With the British, Chinese, Netherlands and Thai governments Japan and the United States were to conclude a separate agreement pledging the territorial integrity of French Indo-China.

285 IV, 179.
287 Ibid.
288 "Document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)—November 26, 1941", S.D. II, 768–770. For Japanese version of this document wired to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura on November 26, 1941, see IV, 180–185.
and guaranteeing that any necessary measures would be taken to offset the threat of aggression against that territory.

In the matter of trade and commerce these governments would agree not to accept preferential treatment in economic dealings with French Indo-China. In following the spirit of this pledge, Japan would withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from French Indo-China and from China. Furthermore, the United States and Japan, in order to restore the regular government at Chungking, would refuse to recognize any military, political or economic government established in China and would give up all extra-territorial rights, including those gained under the Boxer Protocol of 1901 and other international settlements and concessions.

Every effort was to be exerted to have Great Britain and other governments interested in the Pacific give up similar extra-territorial rights in China. For the conclusion of an equitable trade agreement between the United States and Japan negotiations were to be based upon reciprocal measures calling for the reduction of trade barriers by both countries. For example, the United States would place raw silk on the free list, and both governments would remove the freezing restrictions placed on the funds of the other. As another means of aiding economic relations between the two countries, the dollar-yen rate would be stabilized with funds supplied by Japan and the United States. In order to ensure the maintenance of these political and economic agreements the United States and Japan were to guarantee that they would not enter into any alliances with a third power prejudicial to these principles. Both governments were to attempt to influence other countries to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles as stated in this document.289

Secretary Hull then handed Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu an explanatory oral statement in which the Japanese government was reminded that the informal conversations carried on between representatives of both governments for the past several months were aimed at settling the Pacific problem by a complete application of the principles of peace and non-discriminatory treatment. These principles included the inviolability of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and every nation; non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; opportunity for commercial equality and the improvement of international conditions by the peaceful settlement of controversies.290

Because the Japanese government believed that a favorable atmosphere would be created if a temporary "modus vivendi" could be agreed upon while the conversations continued toward a more complete settlement of Pacific problems, Ambassador Nomura had handed Secretary Hull a set of new proposals on November 20, 1941. Anxious to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, the United States was aiming toward a broad-gauge program. After carefully considering the Japanese proposals of November 20, 1941, the United States came to the decision that these proposals conflicted with the fundamental principles upon which this broad-gauge settlement was to be formulated. Therefore, the United States offered the Japanese government its own suggestions for the simple settlement of the Pacific problems. Although making a new approach to old problems, this plan was still based upon the practical application of the fundamental principles already agreed upon during the informal conversations and it was designed to bridge the gap between the United States proposals of June 21, 1941, and the Japanese counter proposals of September 25, 1941.291

When he finished reading both documents, Mr. Kurusu asked whether this constituted the United States' official reply to Japan's proposal for a "modus vivendi". Because of the natural reaction which the American people felt towards some Japanese who were continually advocating

289 Ibid.
290 "Oral statement handed by the Secretary of State to Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)—November 26, 1941", S.D. II, 766-767. For Japanese version of this oral statement sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura on November 26, 1941, see IV, 186-189.
291 Ibid.
warlike aggression, Secretary Hull replied, the United States had been forced to treat the Japanese proposals in this manner. Nevertheless, Secretary Hull assured Ambassador Nomura, although it was not specifically stated in the counter proposal which the United States government had just presented to the Japanese representatives, that the United States might give Japan financial aid and might even settle the immigrant question if the Pacific problems were satisfactorily settled.

In replying to Secretary Hull, Mr. Kurusu referred to the proposed agreement in derogatory terms, noting that the principles contained therein were reiterations of the Stimson Doctrine. The doctrine to which Mr. Kurusu referred was enunciated by Secretary of State Stimson in a dispatch sent to Ambassador Forbes in Japan in 1932. At that time the United States had been confident that the neutral commission authorized by the Council of the League of Nations would bring about the solution of the difficulties existing between Japan and China. However, the United States wished to notify both the Japanese government and the Chinese Republic at the same time that it would not recognize the legality of any treatment or agreement between those countries which might impair the treaty rights of the United States or American citizens in Japan, including any treaties relating to the sovereignty, independence, territorial or administrative integrity of China, or to the Open Door Policy in China. Any agreement contrary to the covenants and obligations undertaken by Japan and the United States in the Pact of Paris on August 27, 1928, would not be recognized by the United States government.

Citing Japan's experience with the Hague Tribunal, when it lost a case in connection with perpetual leases, Mr. Kurusu pointed out that Japan's bitter experience with international organizations made it object to the United States' present proposals for multilateral non-aggression pacts. In fact, Mr. Kurusu blamed the Washington Conference Treaties for China's taking advantage of Japan's rights. If the United States continued to request that Japan recognize Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, then Mr. Kurusu did not see how any understanding on the Chinese question could be reached. Knowing that the proposal which Secretary Hull had just handed Ambassador Nomura was tentative and unofficial, Mr. Kurusu suggested that it not be referred to the Japanese government before American and Japanese representatives discussed its contents further. At a time when the American public had lost the proper perspective of the Japanese-American situation, Secretary Hull said, the United States had felt it necessary to draw up a document presenting a detailed picture of its position in regard to every essential point connected with the Pacific question.

Referring next to the question of exporting oil to Japan, Secretary Hull emphasized that public opinion was so strong that if he freely permitted shipments of oil to Japan he might be lynched. He then reminded Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu that the mobilization of Japanese forces in French Indo-China was directly affecting American interests as well as menacing countries to the south and west of French Indo-China.

Turning back to the pertinent questions of the China problem, Mr. Kurusu stated frankly that Japan would find it difficult to renounce Mr. Wang Ching-wei. Mr. Kurusu then attempted to show the value of the Nanking regime which had been set up in China, but Secretary Hull remained unconvinced.

When Ambassador Nomura requested that he and Mr. Kurusu be permitted to see President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull replied that President Roosevelt would be happy to see them at any time. Mr. Kurusu referred to America's lack of interest in the "modus vivendi", and said the American response could be interpreted as meaning the end of negotiations. Refusing to state definitely whether the United States had been influenced in

292 S.D. II, 764.
293 "Secretary of State to Ambassador in Japan (Forbes)—January 7, 1931", S.D. I, 76.
294 Ibid.
this matter by the opinions of the other powers with which a discussion had taken place, Secretary Hull merely stated that the United States government had explored the possibility of a “modus vivendi” and decided against it.

When the question of publicity was raised, Secretary Hull said that he would give a simple statement to the press tomorrow. Ambassador Nomura said he would not question Secretary Hull’s right to give out what he desired.295

b. Ambassador Nomura’s Report296

At 4:45 p.m. on November 26, 1941 Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu discussed the Japanese proposals for approximately two hours. At the outset of the discussion Secretary Hull stated that after numerous conferences with representatives of other nations concerned in the Pacific it has been decided that the Japanese proposals submitted to the United States government on November 20, 1941 were unsatisfactory. Therefore, in order to reconcile the divergent points of view expressed in the American proposal of June 21, 1941, and the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941, the United States was at this time submitting a tentative and unofficial plan.

After reading over that part of the American document which suggested an agreement between England, the Netherlands, China and Thailand, and also the various points regarding the stabilization of trade and politics, Ambassador Nomura replied that the United States’ proposals were decidedly unconciliatory and therefore would be entirely unacceptable to Japan. Ambassador Nomura was convinced that England, the Netherlands and China had a hand in drawing up these uncompromising terms. In support of this belief Ambassador Nomura stated that quite recently he had heard rumors that the Japanese were demanding complete control of Thailand’s national defense, and he believed that the effects of these rumors could be seen in America’s latest proposals.297

Ambassador Nomura did not feel that this latest American proposal made any attempt to reconcile the American proposal of June 21, 1941 with that submitted by the Japanese government on September 25, 1941, since the proposal differed from both preceding ones. Secretary Hull replied that the American people, unaware of the contents of the Japanese-American conversations, believed their government to be forsaking China. In view of these beliefs, influential Americans were beginning to utter non-pacific statements. In view of the present situation, Secretary Hull was unable to combat these unfavorable circumstances.298

Ambassador Nomura then pointed out various terms in this latest American document which did not meet with the approval of his government. For example, the four fundamental principles upon which the United States wished to base its relations with Japan were a reworking of the Stimson Doctrine. If Japan were to attempt to put these principles into effect, particularly the one pertaining to non-discrimination in Japanese commercial dealings with China, the economic situation in that occupied territory would be seriously impaired. However, Secretary Hull maintained that the application of that principle would not have to take place immediately.

Referring next to Section II of the American document, in which the United States proposed a non-aggression pact among Great Britain, China, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Thailand and the United States, Ambassador Nomura insisted that it revived the Nine-Power Treaty. In view of the fact that the Japanese had been at war for longer than four years with China and as yet had received no benefit from this war, the government could not

296 IV, 190.
297 IV, 191.
298 IV, 192.
accept this proposal. According to Ambassador Nomura, Japan could not agree to
denounce the Nanking regime.

In regard to troop evacuations from Japanese-occupied territories, Secretary Hull answered
that such a move need not take place until negotiations had been satisfactorily concluded. In
speaking of Japan's refusal to renounce the Nanking government of China Secretary Hull
stated that, since the Japanese puppet government was known to have little influence over
the Chinese anyway, it would make little difference if that government were completely
dissolved. Ambassador Nomura merely stated that throughout the history of China there
had been many governments. In the matter of the entire Chinese question, Ambassador
Nomura felt that the United States was unreasonable in expecting Japan to make every
possible concession and on the other hand to "apologize to Chungking".

Although promising to read over the American proposal and give it careful consideration,
Ambassador Nomura did not offer any hope for an understanding based upon the proposal
since he felt that it would be unwise to submit the proposal to the Japanese government as it
stood. Nevertheless, hoping that some agreement could be reached, Ambassador Nomura
requested an interview with President Roosevelt. Secretary Hull promised that he would
arrange for that meeting.

86. Ambassador Kurusu Telephones Mr. Yamamoto the Outcome of the Conference
On the evening of the conference Ambassador Kurusu advised Mr. Kumaicho Yamamoto
by telephone of the outcome of the discussion with Secretary Hull. Stating that the situation
was now serious and that the American representatives refused to yield a point, Ambassador
Kurusu said that he could not guarantee any satisfaction from the future meeting with
President Roosevelt unless some method could be found for concluding an understanding.
After thanking Ambassador Kurusu for the efforts he had already made, Mr. Yamamoto
explained that the situation in Tokyo was also extremely critical. Though Mr. Yamamoto
had not been too hopeful of the outcome, in concluding the telephone conversation,
Ambassador Kurusu expressed the hope that some workable solution could be found.

87. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Terminating the Present Negotiations
Because of the unsuccessful trend of the Japanese-American negotiations Ambassador
Nomura informed his government on November 26, 1941 that there was little hope that the
United States government would agree to any of the suggestions made by the Japanese
within the time limit set by the Foreign Minister. According to Ambassador Nomura the
United States was delaying negotiations on the grounds that it had to discuss Pacific
problems with representatives of various other governments.

Ambassador Nomura warned that the Japanese government would have to exercise
extreme caution in making any move in the Pacific, for already American propagandists
were reporting that the Japanese were continuing negotiations only as a means of preparing
for further aggression. If, then, the Japanese government should complete its scheduled
operations, the United States would immediately blame Tokyo for the rupture of Japanese-
American negotiations. On the other hand, if Japan were to force a rupture in the negotia-
tions, America would also use this move as counter propaganda against the Japanese

299 IV, 193.
300 IV, 194.
301 IV, 195.
301a See Section 16-A which indicates that Japan had made plans as early as November 5-7, 1941 to attack
Hawaii. This information was not available until June 4, 1945.
302 IV, 196.
302a IV, 199-200.
government. Though Ambassador Nomura recognized the fact that clarification of Japan's intentions must remain a strict military secret, he suggested that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. At the same time, a similar announcement would be made by Ambassador Nomura to the State Department in Washington.  

88. United States Occupies Dutch Guiana

In the midst of the United States' discussions with the Netherlands regarding Pacific problems, the White House suddenly made the announcement on November 24, 1941, that the United States, under an agreement with the Netherlands, would occupy Dutch Guiana to protect the aluminum deposits found in that territory. While ordinarily the Netherlands would be able to protect these deposits by means of its own armed forces, the present situation in the South Pacific made it impractical for that government to divide the strength of its troops. Brazil was to assist the United States in this protective measure.

The Japanese Ambassador notified Tokyo that while en route to the Netherlands East Indies the Dutch Foreign Minister had stopped off at Washington to speak with American officials, and as a result the United States had increased the amount of military supplies sent to the East Indies and had effected an exchange of technicians and military experts with the Dutch. In view of these events Ambassador Nomura felt that once Japanese-American negotiations were broken off the United States and Great Britain would occupy the Netherlands East Indies with their troops to protect the Netherlands' tin and rubber.  

89. American Armed Forces Prepare for War

On November 26, 1941, traffic analysis disclosed that strong forces of Japanese submarines and air groups were operating in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. As this force grew to include the 24th Air Squadron, at least one aircraft carrier and one-third of the submarines in the Japanese fleet, it was surmised that a strong Japanese task force was preparing to operate in southeastern Asia with its component parts operating from the Marshalls and Palau. Another report, however, stated that it was impossible to confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines were in the Mandates, since the best sources indicated that all known First and Second Fleet carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. However, a number of cruiser and destroyer divisions, as well as Batdiv 3 and base forces were expected to operate in the Mandates.

On November 26, 1941, the Office of Naval Operations notified the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet that once war was declared between Japan and the United States "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare, May 19, 1941", would become effective. Besides the instructions contained in this document the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet was authorized to order unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare against Axis shipping in a defined strategic area covering the waters from Shanghai to the Netherlands East Indies.

All friendly, enemy and neutral vessels were to be warned to enter this prescribed area only through lanes leading to naval control stations. Such safety zones would be carefully defined and set up after conferring with British and Dutch naval authorities. However, the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet was warned not to reveal America's intentions regarding unrestricted submarines and aerial warfare.

303 Ibid.
304 IV, 201.
305 IV, 197.
306 IV, 198.
307 IV, 202.
Particular precautions were to be taken in order to prevent any hostile ships from obtaining information which would be detrimental to American armed forces, if transmitted to Japan. On the other hand, if hostilities began without the formal declaration of war the same procedure would probably be followed although orders from the Chief of Naval Operations would first have to be issued.\footnote{Ibid.} To allow the Army Air Forces in strategic areas of the Pacific to make appropriate plans, the Army Chief of Staff requested that the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, send this information to General MacArthur.\footnote{IV, 203.}

On November 26, 1941 the United States Army offered certain infantry units for reinforcing existing naval defense battalions. Although anti-aircraft units were not available, the Army proposed to garrison troops in Hawaii at the Navy's request. The Chief of Naval Operations passed this information to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet with the respect that he be informed of the number of troops and the armament desired.\footnote{IV, 204.}

In order to leave planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing free for expeditionary flights, the Army on November 26, 1941 proposed to supply Midway and Wake each with twenty-five pursuit planes. However, the Navy would be responsible for transporting the planes and ground crews from Oahu to these islands aboard aircraft carriers. Furthermore, the Navy was obligated to supply water and subsistence to the Army Air Force crews as well as to supply them with necessary equipment. It was understood, nevertheless, that the transfer of these planes to the Navy's use was not to interfere with the planned movements of Army bombers in the Philippines. When arrangements had been made with the Commanding General, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet was to advise the Chief of Naval Operations on the decisions made.\footnote{IV, 205.}

Further orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations revealed cooperation between the Army and Navy. Army troops were to be dispatched to support Marine Units in the Pacific, and 37mm. anti-aircraft guns would also be sent, although probably not until February. Effective defense plans for all outlying bases and increases scheduled for the immediate future were to be sent to the Chief of Naval Operations.\footnote{IV, 206.}

90. Roosevelt-Nomura Conversation (November 27, 1941)

\hspace{1em} a. Secretary Hull's Report\footnote{Memorandum by the Secretary of State'—November 27, 1941, S.D. II, 770-772.}

Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurosu called on President Roosevelt on November 27, 1941. Although President Roosevelt began the conversation by referring to German international psychology, Ambassador Nomura immediately turned the discussion to Japan's disappointment over the United States' attitude toward a "modus vivendi". Although expressing the grateful appreciation of the United States government to the peaceful element in Japan and emphasizing the fact that the United States still desired the realization of this peace, President Roosevelt mentioned Japan's recent occupation of French Indo-China and the aggressive attitude of Japanese statesmen as serious obstacles to the re-establishment of Pacific stability. Even during the informal, exploratory conversations, President Roosevelt continued, the United States had noted with considerable disappointment that Japanese leaders opposed the fundamental principles of peace, thereby creating an atmosphere wholly unsuitable to the establishment of law and order.

President Roosevelt pointed out that public opinion in the United States would not allow the government to relax substantially its economic restrictions unless Japan gave a clear
manifestation of its peaceful intent. President Roosevelt stated that Japan's best interests lay along peaceful lines and not those advocated by Hitler. After four years of war, President Roosevelt continued, the Japanese people needed peace and, therefore, he could not understand why Japanese statesmen should obstruct the whole movement under discussion in Washington.\footnote{312a}

Mr. Kurusu replied that after being here for ten days and studying the problems firsthand, he had decided that the trouble lay, not with the fundamental principles, but with their application. Mr. Kurusu then referred to President Roosevelt's recent suggestion about introducing Japan and China in order that peace might be worked out between those two countries. Replying to Mr. Kurusu's question as to which of the two sides would make the first move, President Roosevelt stated that both sides would be responsible. Secretary Hull then declared that the 250,000 carpetbaggers who had followed the Japanese Army into North China must be forced to give up the property they had taken from other people.

Commenting on Japan's attempts to colonize countries under its domination, President Roosevelt said Japan would fail as Germany had because of lack of experienced people to govern those captured countries. Furthermore, President Roosevelt felt that Japan could not claim encirclement when Japan itself was encircling the Philippines.

At this point in the conversation Secretary Hull stated that the Japanese government would have to control its warlike elements before the exploratory conversations could achieve success. In Secretary Hull's opinion, everyone recognized that Japan's slogans, "co-prosperity" and "new order in the Far East", merely camouflaged a policy of military domination of the political, economic and social affairs of the countries in the Pacific. As long as Japan maintained alliances such as the anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull concluded, no real progress could be made in the peace negotiations with Japan.\footnote{313}

\textit{b. Ambassador Nomura's Report}\footnote{314}

In accordance with the arrangements made by Ambassador Nomura, both Japanese Ambassadors called on President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull on November 27, 1941.

President Roosevelt began the conversation by stating that during World War I, when Japan and the United States were allies, both governments had come to realize that Germany did not understand the thoughts of other nations. President Roosevelt realized that there were many in Japan, as there were in the United States, who were anxious to re-establish the former peaceful relations between the two governments. However, during the past several months, particularly after the Japanese occupation of southern French Indo-China, the United States had been very much disappointed in the trend of events. Although President Roosevelt admitted that the Japanese people had been living under war conditions for some time, and that the American people had been living in peace, he could not understand why the leading officials of the Japanese government could not turn Japanese public opinion toward a policy of peace. The suggestion offered by the Japanese representatives that a "modus vivendi" be arranged would not be of any value, President Roosevelt continued, unless the basic principles of international relations were agreed upon. By way of example, President Roosevelt reminded the Japanese ambassadors that before his conference with Prime Minister Churchill on the high seas Great Britain and the United States had already determined their respective basic policies and found them to coincide.\footnote{314a}

Ambassador Kurusu replied that the differences in opinion existing between Japan and the United States were not traceable to the basic principles of those governments, but rather to

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{312a} Ibid.} \footnotesize{\textsuperscript{313} Ibid.} \footnotesize{\textsuperscript{314} IV, 207.} \footnotesize{\textsuperscript{314a} Ibid.}
the application of those principles. For example, he pointed out, Japan agreed with the United States that the principle of commercial non-discrimination should be established. However, if it were immediately applied to China, Ambassador Kurusu continued, the radical and sudden change in the economic situation there would be dangerous.

Secretary Hull answered that the United States understood fully the economic situation in the Far East. As for the danger of a sudden economic change in China, Secretary Hull referred to the 250,000 Japanese residents who had followed their troops to occupied China and set up various enterprises there. If the Japanese government wished to consider the effects of a changing economic system on these merchants, then Secretary Hull admitted the problem would be difficult. However, the American Secretary of State did not believe that these merchants had any valid claims to be considered. Ambassador Kurusu merely answered that Japan was concerned only with the major economic problems.

The discussion then turned to President Roosevelt's suggestion for bringing about a peace agreement between Japan and China. President Roosevelt stated that it would be necessary for both countries to give some indication that they sincerely wished to negotiate for such a peace. Since President Roosevelt had had considerable experience in acting as a mediator between two opposing elements in many domestic crises, Ambassador Nomura was convinced that the American President would be able to handle the Japanese-Chinese situation satisfactorily. However, the Japanese Ambassador explained that he would need instructions from Tokyo.

Secretary Hull said that another reason for the failure to agree upon a "modus vivendi" was that the United States could not reconcile itself to Japan's aggressive measures. Furthermore, Secretary Hull stated, Japan was allied to Germany under the Tripartite Pact and under the Anti-Communism Pact. In addition, Japan was continuing to send vast numbers of troops to French Indo-China in order to check the military powers of other countries in that area. Yet in spite of these aggressive moves Japan asked for American petroleum exports in the name of peace. As he had pointed out in former conversations, Secretary Hull continued, neither the Japanese Prime Minister nor Foreign Minister Togo had taken any concrete action to facilitate peace negotiations. In fact, Secretary Hull stated, they continued to speak of establishing a new order by means of force.

Bringing the interview to a close President Roosevelt stated that he was leaving the following afternoon for a rest; however, he hoped to meet with both Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu when he returned the following Wednesday. Ambassador Nomura commented that President Roosevelt looked very tired. President Roosevelt sincerely hoped that while he was gone some means of settlement might be found by the Japanese and American officials.

91. Ambassador Kurusu Telephones Mr. Yamamoto

Using the voice code established by Tokyo, Ambassador Kurusu telephoned Mr. Yamamoto, Chief of the American Division of the Japanese Foreign Office, on the evening of November 27, 1941, in order to report on the interview with President Roosevelt. In reply to Mr. Yamamoto's questions regarding the negotiations Ambassador Kurusu stated that little progress had been made. Although at one time it seemed as though some agreement could be reached, at present it was obvious that a crisis was imminent. In spite of the unfavorable trend of affairs, however, Mr. Yamamoto urged Ambassador Kurusu not to break off negotiations.

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315 IV, 207.
316 Ibid.
316a Ibid.
317 IV, 172.
Ambassador Kurusu agreed to continue the conversations though Mr. Yamamoto indicated that Japan was preparing for an imminent crisis. According to Mr. Kurusu the Japanese Army was very impatient at this time. Mr. Yamamoto said that the Japanese government could not make any further concessions. After emphasizing the fact that Japanese aggression in French Indo-China was largely responsible for the lack of progress in Japanese-American negotiations, Mr. Kurusu terminated the telephone conversation.  

92. Chief of Naval Operations Issues War Warning  
Although no formal announcement had been made, it seemed apparent that peace negotiations between Japan and the United States were at an end. In anticipation of Japanese aggression in the Pacific, on November 27, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet a war warning. It announced that negotiations with Japan had ceased, and an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days. From the number and equipment of Japanese troops and naval task forces there were indications of an amphibious expedition against the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsular or possibly Borneo. Appropriate defensive preparations in conformity with WPL/46 were to be taken immediately. The War Department was sending a similar war warning to its field units, and the British were to be informed. The Continental Districts of Guam and Samoa were particularly warned against sabotage.  

Other warnings were received of the movements of Japanese warships and loaded transports to the South Pacific. A shift in the communication zones of the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Fleet implied that this fleet was scheduled for southern operations.  

On November 28, 1941, Tokyo notified Japanese embassies throughout the world that relations with the United States and Great Britain would become extremely critical within the next few days, since the counter proposal presented to Ambassador Nomura on November 27, 1941, by Secretary Hull did not meet the approval of the Japanese government, and further peace negotiations were to be broken off. DoD comment: This message was not translated until December 9, 1941.  

On the same day the Japanese Foreign Minister, while complimenting Ambassador Nomura and Kurusu for having exerted every effort towards peace, nevertheless informed the two men that no agreement could be reached in view of the humiliating counter proposal presented to them by the United States. Although the negotiations were at an end, Japan did not wish to give American representatives this impression. In future conversations Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu were to state that they were awaiting instructions from the Japanese government. At the same time, however, the two representatives in expressing their own personal opinions were to make it clear to the State Department that Japan had made many concessions for the sake of peace in the Pacific, while the United States by its unbending attitude made the realization of this peace an impossibility.  

94. Ambassador Nomura Urges Open Break in Diplomatic Relations  
Replying to Tokyo’s message on November 28, 1941, Ambassador Nomura expressed his disapproval of pretending that negotiations were still possible while in actuality Japan con-
sidered them at an end. Instead Ambassador Nomura suggested, as he had done once before, that the negotiations be irrevocably concluded either by an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a general declaration to the world at large. If such an open declaration were not made and if Japan began its scheduled operations while negotiations were being conducted, Ambassador Nomura feared that Japan would be held responsible for disrupting the peace of the Pacific. To prove his point Ambassador Nomura referred to articles appearing in American papers which stated that the United States had submitted a peace proposal to Japan and that if Japan refused to accept it, the United States could not be held responsible for any resulting war. 324

95. United States Forces Await Japanese Attack

Although the United States was convinced that Japan would make an attack somewhere in the Pacific it desired that the first overt act of aggression be taken by Japanese forces.

On November 29, 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations informed his Pacific commands that the Army had issued instructions to the Commander Western Defense Command to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as were possible without alarming the civilian population or disclosing their intent. Hostilities with Japan were possible at any moment, but American forces were to refrain from taking any offensive action though they were not to jeopardize their own defenses. Instructions had already been sent out to the Ninth Corps Area concerning subversive acts in the United States, and to forces in the Far East submarine area and to the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier regarding the defensive action to be taken once Japan commenced hostilities. 325

In order to protect American interests in the Philippines, Navy planes were to begin reconnaissance flights on November 30, 1941, and cover the area from Manila to Camranh Bay. British air forces would search for the Japanese overseas expedition, reported ready to attack the Indo-Chinese isthmus, in an arc from Tedta Bahru. At the same time British ground troops were moving into position directly opposite the Indo-Chinese isthmus, at a point somewhere near Singora.

The Chief of Naval Operations warned naval air forces not to fire upon Japanese units unless in self-defense. Careful reconnaissance was to be carried out, however, and if a Japanese expedition was sighted approaching Thailand, General MacArthur was to be notified. 326

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224 IV, 215
225 IV, 216.
226 IV, 217.
96. Tokyo Investigates President Roosevelt’s Sudden Return to Washington

When President Roosevelt returned to Washington unexpectedly from a weekend vacation in Warm Springs, Georgia, Tokyo was informed that the United States was anticipating a Japanese move in the Pacific. Japanese representatives in Mexico City advised their government on December 1, 1941, that the southward advance of the Japanese army and Prime Minister Tojo’s speech were largely responsible for awakening the American public to Japan’s real aims in the Far East. As a result, recent surveys showed that political and economic circles in Washington and New York anticipated war with Japan.

In spite of the fact that November 29, 1941, the deadline set by Foreign Minister Togo, had passed Japan did not desire to sever diplomatic relations. In order to allay American suspicions regarding Japan’s future actions, Japanese representatives were ordered to advise newspapers that negotiations between Japan and the United States would continue in spite of wide differences of opinion. In the meantime, Ambassador Nomura was to determine whether President Roosevelt had returned to Washington because of Prime Minister Tojo’s speech, or because of the critical Far Eastern situation.

97. Ambassador Nomura Reports Unfavorable Reaction to Tojo’s Speech

Answering Tokyo’s message on December 1, 1941, Ambassador Nomura reported that American governmental circles believed that Prime Minister Tojo’s speech indicated Japan’s refusal to accept the United States’ proposals of November 6, 1941. Although a United Press dispatch from Tokyo stated that Japan desired to continue negotiations for at least two more weeks, Ambassador Nomura stated that the report had an ominous tone in the light of the comments made by the Japanese Prime Minister. American newspapers were accusing Japan of stalling for time until developments in Europe provided it with an opportune moment for carrying out the already planned invasion of Thailand.

98. Hull-Nomura Conversation (December 1, 1941)

a. State Department’s Report

In compliance with Tokyo’s instructions, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called on Secretary Hull on December 1, 1941, to inquire concerning the reason for President Roosevelt’s sudden return to Washington. Secretary Hull replied that the principal factor was the recent speech of Prime Minister Tojo.

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327a II, 218.
328 IV, 219.
329 IV, 220.
331 Ibid.
A summation of Prime Minister Tojo’s speech commemorating the Japanese-Chinese-Manchuokuoan declaration was sent to Washington by Ambassador Grew on December 1, but did not arrive until December 5, 1941. Therefore, at the time of his conversation with Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu, Secretary Hull was relying on the report of the Associated Press. In the extract made by Ambassador Grew Prime Minister Tojo was quoted as stating that achieving the collaboration of Japan, China and Manchuokuo was one of the greatest tasks of the present century. However, Prime Minister Tojo said, there were still many countries which desire to obstruct the construction of a co-prosperity sphere in East Asia in order that they themselves might exploit the peoples of East Asia and thereby satisfy their own greed of possession. Because of the desire of Great Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East Asia, Prime Minister Tojo said Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek continued to expend able-bodied men in futile resistance against Japan. “For the honor and pride of mankind, we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance”, Prime Minister Tojo concluded.

After stating that the Japanese Prime Minister should have been deterred from making such a speech at a time when Japanese and American representatives were endeavoring to re-establish good relations, Secretary Hull then asked Ambassador Nomura about the general trend in the world situation, especially about the Japanese reaction to the situation in Libya and Russia. Ambassador Nomura replied that he was primarily interested in the situation existing between the United States and Japan.

Turning the conversation to Prime Minister Tojo’s speech, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu insisted that the United States had taken his views too seriously. Secretary Hull pointed out that the fact that it was broadcast made it more effective. Mr. Kurusu stated that it was quite possible that Prime Minister Tojo had been misquoted, since the Japanese news service did not always translate statements correctly into English.

Emphasizing the warlike attitude of both Japanese statesmen and the Japanese people throughout the nine months of peace conversations conducted between Ambassador Nomura and himself, Secretary Hull said that the situation had now reached a critical point. Secretary Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s blustering talks on the value of the Tripartite Alliance and of the Japanese move into French Indo-China, even while Ambassador Nomura negotiated for a peaceful agreement in Washington. Expressing surprise at the United States’ reaction to Prime Minister Tojo’s speech, Mr. Kurusu said that within a few days Secretary Hull would be given the correct translation of the Japanese Prime Minister’s statements. Within that time the Japanese government would also reply to the United States’ document of November 26, 1941. However, Mr. Kurusu stated that the Japanese government had not as yet discovered the reason for the position taken by America in the document of November 26 since the proposals submitted by Japan on November 20, 1941 had given full consideration to the points of view expressed by both sides during the conversation. The proposal of the United States failed to take cognizance of conditions in the Far East. In an effort to show Japan’s extreme desire to promote a peaceful settlement, Mr. Kurusu said that Japan would offer to withdraw its troops from southern French Indo-China still held.

Replying that the Hitler-like methods used by the Japanese in China and in other sections of the Pacific continued to obstruct peace arrangements, Secretary Hull said that the United States refused to yield to the principles of force advocated by the Japanese militarists. Notwithstanding the bellicose statements emanating from Japan, Secretary Hull said, his govern-

332 By this declaration Japan recognized its own imperial government in Manchuokuo and the Japanese-subsidized government at Nanking.

333 “The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State—December 1, 1941”, S.D. II, 148–149.

ment still hoped for stability in the Pacific. Denying that Japan's aim was conquest by force, Ambassador Nomura expressed the opinion that his country's idea of a co-prosperity sphere in the Far East paralleled Pan-Americanism in the western hemisphere.\textsuperscript{334c}

Motivated purely by a desire for self-defense similar to that motivating Britain's actions in Syria, Ambassador Nomura explained, Japan had been forced to obtain access to certain necessary materials. Secretary Hull replied that the Japanese troops in French Indo-China, regardless of their actual location, constituted a menace to the entire South Pacific and forced the United States and its allies to maintain large numbers of troops in East Asia. In this way Japan was actively aiding Hitler. Ambassador Nomura commented that actual warfare could be conducted through the agency of economic restrictions and that Japan was now suffering under that type of warfare.

Asserting that the United States would give Japan a sufficient amount of raw materials if it ended its aggressive policies, Secretary Hull said that he would be subject to severe criticism for his policy of patience if he even attempted to advocate oil shipments to Japan while Japanese military leaders continued to bluster and make blood-curdling threats. On November 22, 1941, Secretary Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura, the United States promised to consider the release of oil for Japanese civilian purposes.

Furthermore, the United States was anxious to help Japan settle the China affair, but until such negotiations were underway the United States could not cease aid to China any more than it could cease aid to Great Britain. With the concentration of Japanese troops in French Indo-China becoming more obvious and with Japanese statesmen promising to drive the white men out of East Asia, Secretary Hull said that his government could not remain inactive.

Since Mr. Kurusu believed that the two sides had been near agreement many times during the conversations of the past several months, he could not understand why the latest proposals of the United States government should emphasize the divergence of view. Expressing grave doubt that any peaceful agreement could be accomplished as long as Japanese militarists continued to preach aggression, Secretary Hull observed that there had been various contradictions between Japanese stated policies and Japanese action. Mr. Kurusu continued to insist that the Washington Conference treaties had only served to enable China to flaunt a certain advantage over Japan. Referring to his previous statement that Japanese actions were directly opposed to the purpose of the informal conversations, Secretary Hull said that to clear up the confusion resulting from Japanese contradictions the United States had embodied all its fundamental principles in the document handed to the Japanese government on November 26, 1941.\textsuperscript{334b}

Although Mr. Kurusu endeavored to convince Secretary Hull that General Tojo could control the Japanese militarists, Secretary Hull pointed out that the Japanese slogans of "controlling influence", "new order in East Asia" and "co-prosperity sphere" indicated that Japan was following Hitler's program of conquest. Both Mr. Kurusu and Ambassador Nomura disclaimed any desire on the part of Japan for war, but added that the Japanese people believed the United States was promoting the Sino-Japanese War in an endeavor to strangle Japan. Furthermore, Ambassador Nomura said, the Japanese people believed they had the alternative of surrendering to the United States or fighting.

Promising to communicate all of Secretary Hull's statements to his government with a view to offsetting the dangerous situation which Secretary Hull felt was imminent, Ambassador Nomura brought the conversation to a close.\textsuperscript{334c}

\begin{flushright}
\textit{b. Ambassador Nomura's Report}
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There is no Japanese message available relating to this conversation.

\textsuperscript{334a} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{334b} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{334c} Ibid.
99. Tokyo Prepares for Results of Diplomatic Break

Although the pretense of maintaining negotiations between Japan and the United States was being continued, Tokyo seemed to be preparing for the eventual announcement that diplomatic relations had ceased and for the inevitable results of such an announcement. On December 1, 1941, a Japanese broadcast announced that an important disclosure would be made the following morning between 7:00 and 7:30 a.m.335

Tokyo also cabled Ambassador Kurusu and Mr. Yuki eight thousand dollars each for traveling expenses, which would have to be cleared through the State Department.336

100. Japan Safeguards Its Code and Cipher Systems

On December 1, 1941 Japan informed Ambassador Nomura that its four offices in London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila had been ordered to destroy their code machines. The code machine from Batavia had already been returned to Japan.

Apparently revising former orders, however, the Japanese Embassy in the United States was to retain its machines and machine codes.337 On the following day, however, Tokyo ordered Ambassador Nomura to destroy all codes except one copy of the codes being used in conjunction with the machine. When this was completed the word "haruna" was to be wired to Tokyo. Furthermore, all codes brought by telegraphic courier, Kosaka, were to be burned. Japanese officials were to use their own discretion about disposing of other secret documents.338

As a further safeguard, all Japanese service radio calls for units afloat were changed at 0000 on December 1, 1941.339 A complete change in an important Japanese cipher system became effective a few days later on December 4, 1941.340

On December 3, 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations notified his Pacific commanders that Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London had been ordered to destroy most of their codes at once and to burn secret documents.340a

101. Japanese-American Conversation (December 2, 1941)

a. State Department's Report341

On December 2, 1941 Mr. Terasaki, First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, called on Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt in order to explain the newspaper reports of the Tojo speech which was supposed to have taken place on November 30, 1941.342 Mr. Terasaki handed Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt a statement declaring that the speech of Prime Minister Hidaki Tojo, originally drafted by the staff of the East Asia Restoration League, was to have been delivered on November 30, 1941343 in commemoration of the treaty concerning the basic relations between Japan and China.344 This manuscript, at the time of its publication in the newspapers, had been unapproved by either the Japanese Prime Minister or other government officials, and in addition, Prime Minister Tojo did not make this speech on November 30, 1941, as scheduled.

335 IV, 222.
336 IV, 221.
337 IV, 223.
338 IV, 225.
339 IV, 226.
340 IV, 227.
340a IV, 224.
342 Ibid.
343 "Statement Handed by the First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy (Terasaki) to Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine on December 2, 1941", S.D. II, 778.
344 Treaty signed with President Wang-Ching-wei at Nanking, November 30, 1940, S.D. II, 117-122.

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Furthermore, this Japanese explanatory statement pointed out that "for the honor and pride of mankind, we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance" was a mistranslation. The correct translation should read "for the honor and price of mankind, this sort of practice must be removed."345

Immediately upon noticing press reaction to Prime Minister Tojo's scheduled speech, Mr. Terasaki said, his government had wired this explanation. In an off-the-record remark, Mr. Terasaki informed Mr. Schmidt that Mr. Yamamoto, Chief of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office, had not even known what speech was referred to when Mr. Kurusu, in a telephone conversation, reported its unfavorable effects upon Japanese-American relations. Mr. Schmidt then promised to remind Mr. Ballantine to inform the Japanese representatives exactly how the State Department desired the Japanese explanation of Prime Minister Tojo's speech to be made public.346

b. Japanese Embassy Report
There is no Japanese message available indicating that Mr. Terasaki reported this conversation to Tokyo.

102. Welles-Nomura Conversation (December 2, 1941)

a. State Department's Report347
Since Secretary Hull was absent from the State Department on December 2, 1941, Mr. Welles, at the request of President Roosevelt, delivered a statement to Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu. President Roosevelt's statement, which Mr. Welles then read, referred to reports of continued Japanese troop movements to southern Indo-China and pointed out that by the terms of the treaty between Japan and the Vichy government, the Japanese forces permitted to be stationed in Indo-China were considerably less than the number already there.

Since such a large concentration of troops could not possibly be necessary for policing that region, the United States interpreted the move as contemplated aggression against the Philippine Islands, the East Indies, Burma, Malaya or Thailand. The possibility of this new aggression, in addition to the acts already undertaken against China, only served to widen the breach in Japanese-American relations. Since Japan's policy might be in conformity with the constant and steady encroachment upon the territories and rights of free and independent peoples undertaken in Europe by the German government, it was requested that the Japanese government make a clear statement of its intentions.

Though Ambassador Nomura said that he was not authorized to indicate his government's intentions at this time, Mr. Kurusu reminded Mr. Welles of Japan's offer, made on November 20, 1941, to transfer all its forces to northern Indo-China, which indicated that no threat was intended. Furthermore, both Japanese representatives insisted that the lack of adequate land communication facilities in French Indo-China would make an attack from southern Indo-China against neighboring territories almost impossible. Mr. Kurusu then asked the source of President Roosevelt's information, but Mr. Welles declined to give it.

In view of the strengthening of armaments and military dispositions by other countries, Ambassador Nomura said that it was only natural that Japan should take some defensive measures. Insisting that the Japanese people had been severely affected by the economic weapons of war applied by the United States, Ambassador Nomura called for the exercise of wise statesmanship by both sides. Mr. Welles replied that the United States' proposals for settlement would ensure Japan of peace and would guarantee satisfaction of its economic

345 S.D. II, 778.
346 S.D. II, 777-778.
needs. Believing himself to be more qualified to speak accurately of the results of the American freezing measures upon Japan than Ambassador Nomura, Mr. Kurusu said that America’s economic restrictions had put the Japanese people into an unfavorable frame of mind. However, Mr. Welles replied that the four years of warfare waged by Japan upon China which had eventually squeezed American interests out of Japanese-occupied territories had put the American people in a similar frame of mind.

Repeating his previous statements on the bad effect which the Washington Conference treaties had had upon China, Mr. Kurusu said that certain points in the American proposals of November 26, 1941 failed to take into account the actual situation in the Far East and, therefore, were difficult for the Japanese government to accept. Ambassador Nomura then promised a reply within a few days from the Japanese government concerning the American proposals. According to Mr. Kurusu, the Japanese government had hoped some settlement could be worked out on the basis of the American draft of June 21, 1941, and the Japanese draft of September 25, 1941 instead of approaching the problem from a new angle, as the United States had done in its latest proposal.

Mr. Welles then promised to refer to Secretary Hull Mr. Kurusu’s suggestion that the differences between the two governments be reconciled on the basis of those two documents.348

b. Ambassador Nomura’s Report349

Since Secretary Hull was not present in Washington on December 2, 1941, Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu conferred instead with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles. Mr. Welles began the conversation by referring to reports of new Japanese troop movements in French Indo-China and requested an explanation of this aggression. Ambassador Nomura replied that he had received no notification by his government of any further movements in that area. However, he promised to ask for information from his home government.

Ambassador Nomura pointed out that American economic pressure was having as much effect upon Japan as Japanese troops were having on other territories. While not wishing to argue the pros and cons of this question, Ambassador Nomura nevertheless made it clear that unless this economic pressure were greatly reduced the Japanese people would be forced to take measures in order to guarantee the well-being of their nation.

Ambassador Nomura reiterated that the Japanese people were suffering from the four year war with China,349a and in view of Japan’s critical internal situation, the latest American proposals, submitted on November 26, 1941, offered no basis for a satisfactory agreement. Thus, in spite of the fact that the Japanese government would carefully study the American proposals, Ambassador Nomura did not feel optimistic regarding the outcome.

The Japanese proposals submitted on September 25, 1941, according to Ambassador Nomura, represented the greatest concessions Japan could make based on the American proposals submitted on June 21, 1941. Recently the Japanese government had offered to evacuate its troops from French Indo-China upon the settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. Therefore, Ambassador Nomura could not understand the need for submitting new proposals at this time.

Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles replied that the United States government was also faced with a serious internal situation, and in view of that fact had found it necessary to clarify its position in its proposals of November 26, 1941.

From the tone of the interview with Secretary Hull on the previous day and this conversation with Under Secretary of State Welles, Ambassador Nomura was convinced that the United States desired an immediate successful conclusion of the negotiations; therefore, Ambassador

348Ibid.
349IV, 228.
349aIbid.
Nomura urged his government to give the latest American proposal every possible consideration and in its reply to leave room for a speedy peaceful settlement.350

**103. President Roosevelt Orders Reconnaissance of Forces Around Thailand**

On December 2, 1941 President Roosevelt ordered the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to form a "Defensive Information Patrol" for the purpose of reporting on Japanese movements in the West China Sea and the Gulf of Siam. This defensive patrol, consisting of three small vessels, each commanded by a U.S. naval officer, manned by Philippine crews, and carrying only a small gun and one machine gun, was to patrol between Hainan and Hue, off the Indo-China Coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques, and off Pointe de Camau.

To check on the effectiveness of reconnaissance measures currently employed by American aircraft, surface vessels and submarines, reports were to be made regarding the regular patrols performed at sea by the Army and Navy.351

**104. U.S. Navy Exchanges Information with British and Dutch**

Because of the importance of defending Allied interests in the Far East, on December 3, 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations ordered the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to exchange military information with the British and Dutch Commander-in-Chief except when such an exchange of information was considered inadvisable. It was suggested that military information could be relayed through naval observers in Singapore and Batavia by means of secure cipher systems. At an early date in the future the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet was to consider the placement of a Dutch liaison officer at Manila.352


The Japanese Military Attaché in Madrid believed the continuation of the conversations in Washington to be an indication of new hope for the settlement of Pacific problems. According to the Madrid representative Japan was making numerous concessions. For example, Ambassador Kurusu and certain Japanese newspapermen had apologized for the phrase appearing in Premier Tojo’s speech concerning the destruction of the Anglo-American hegemony. Furthermore, Japan had completely ignored President Roosevelt’s statement that America would probably be in the war by next year, and that of an American naval officer who believed that the Japanese navy could be wiped out in no time at all.

The Japanese Military Attaché in Madrid did not approve of Japan’s conciliatory attitude. Stating that Japan was pursuing a conservative and hesitant course, thereby allowing America to build up its defenses, the Japanese representative pointed to the recent Anglo-American agreement providing for the establishment of military bases on the Islands of Christmas, Fiji and Samoa, and urged the Japanese Army to take more decisive action in the future.353a

**106. American Officers in Far East Destroy Codes**

On December 4, 1941 the United States Chief of Naval Operations ordered that with the exception of cryptographic channels necessary for essential communication and certain registered publications needed for current operations and special intelligence, American naval and marine offices at Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai, Guam and Wake were to destroy their codes and secret documents to prevent their falling into enemy hands.354

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350 Ibid.
351 IV, 229.
352 IV, 230.
353 IV, 231. (This message was not translated until February 15, 1945.)
355 Ibid.
354 IV, 232–236.
In order to deliver to Secretary Hull the Japanese government's reply to President Roosevelt's inquiry regarding additional Japanese troops in French Indo-China, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called at the State Department on December 5, 1941.

In this statement the Japanese government explained that Chinese troops had been showing signs of movement along the northern frontier of west Indo-China, bordering on China, and as a strictly precautionary measure Japan had reinforced its troops in that area. Consequently, troops stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China had also to be moved. However, none of these measures taken by the Japanese government transgressed the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France.

After reading this explanation, Secretary Hull said that he understood that the Chinese were massing their troops in Yunnan against the Japanese troops massed in Indo-China. Ambassador Nomura replied that the Chinese might attack in Indo-China as a means of preventing a Japanese attack upon the Burma Road. Not having heard before that Japan was on the defensive in Indo-China, Secretary Hull said that he understood Japan's purpose was to attack China from Northern Indo-China.

Ambassador Nomura answered that the increased naval and military preparations of the A-B-C-D powers in the Southwest Pacific area had alarmed the Japanese. Furthermore, Ambassador Nomura continued, Japan recognized that one of the foremost American principles was that offense is the best defense. Secretary Hull asked if Ambassador Nomura applied this observation to the defensive measures taken by the United States against Hitler. Declining to commit himself, Ambassador Nomura merely said that because of Japan's apprehensions it had submitted its proposals of November 20, 1941. Secretary Hull felt that if Japan anticipated an attack on its forces in French Indo-China by the Chinese this constituted another reason for withdrawing its troops from that area.

Since the Japanese government had made it plain to America that it desired to settle the Chinese question, both Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu stated that the United States should be willing to discontinue aid to China as soon as peace negotiations between Japan and China were initiated. Secretary Hull inquired whether Japan would stop its aid to Hitler. To Mr. Kurusu's question as to the method by which Japan was aiding Hitler Secretary Hull answered that Japan's aggression in the Pacific was keeping the forces of the United States and other countries immobilized in the Pacific area. Ambassador Nomura murmured sotto voce, "This isn't getting us anywhere."

At this point Secretary Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura that on November 22, 1941 the United States has exhibited its unwillingness to ship oil to Japan for use by the Japanese navy for Pacific operations and he also reminded Ambassador Nomura of the United States' attitude toward continued aid to China. If Secretary Hull explained that the oil exports to Japan would aid the conclusion of a peaceful agreement, Ambassador Nomura said, the American people would accept the action without question. Secretary Hull did not agree.

Referring to his comments on the Japanese proposals of November 20, 1941, Secretary Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura that the United States could not discontinue aid to China, and that, because the presence of Japanese troops anywhere in Indo-China threatened the security of neighboring countries, the United States could not supply Japan with oil for mili-
tary and naval needs. Ambassador Nomura agreed that the United States' stand on these questions was clear. At the same time, however, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that if French Indo-China were controlled by any other power it would be a menace to Japan. 368a

Ambassador Nomura then said that if some agreement could be reached on temporary measures the exploration of fundamental solutions could be continued. But Secretary Hull pointed out that the attitude of Japanese statesmen and officials in Tokyo did not create an atmosphere conducive to peace. Attempting to point out that injurious newspaper propaganda had been prevalent in the United States as well as Japan, Mr. Kurusu cited newspaper interviews with Secretary Hull. Secretary Hull replied that Japanese officials had continuously proclaimed aggressive slogans; yet whenever he said a single word in explanation of his government's principles the Japanese complained. Mr. Kurusu said that aspersions had been cast upon himself and Ambassador Nomura by American newspapermen, but Secretary Hull answered that he had heard only good reports in regard to the ambassadors. With the usual apologies for taking up so much of Secretary Hull's time Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu left. 358b

b. Ambassador Nomura's Report

There is no Japanese message available which contained Ambassador Nomura's report of this meeting.

108. Japanese Military Attache Discounts Immediate Possibility of War with America 359

Although the United States had directed serious criticism against Japan, Major General Isoda, the Japanese military attaché in Washington believed that these reprimands were merely intended to coerce Japan into checking its southward advance. Referring to Japanese-American relations during the invasion of Siam, Major General Isoda said that at that time the American public as a whole advocated a temporary agreement between the two countries on the basis of the existing status quo in the Pacific, so that by proceeding carefully with negotiations the seemingly insurmountable obstacles to peace could be overcome. In view of this feeling, it seemed improbable to Major General Isoda that at the present time the United States government would fling the country headlong into war with Japan.

Major General Isoda pointed out that neither President Roosevelt nor Secretary Hull had commented on the authenticity of an article which, appearing on December 4, 1941 in the Washington Times Herald, spoke of a proposed increase in the Army and Navy of 10,000,000 men, with an expeditionary force of 5,000,000 men to be sent against the Axis. While Major General Isoda believed that there might be a certain degree of truth in reports of American preparations for war, the Japanese military attaché wondered whether the war propaganda was not actually a scheme of United States authorities to scare Japan. The theory that the United States actually desired peace was further circumstantiated by the conference between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull on that day. 360

Should the Japanese Army invade Siam, however, Major General Isoda continued, a war with England and the United States would undoubtedly ensue, though perhaps not immediately. He believed that the two allied nations would only close Japanese consulates and increase economic pressure against Tokyo at first, but if Japan invaded the Netherlands East Indies and attacked Singapore, American retaliatory measures would become more severe. 361
109. Japan Plans to Consider Holland a Semi-belligerent Country When at War with the United States

Once a war was declared on Britain and the United States Japan intended to treat Holland as a semi-belligerent country, exercise strict surveillance over Dutch consulates, and prohibit all communication between Holland and the allied nations. In fact, Tokyo intended to put into effect practically the same measures against Holland as would be taken against Britain and the United States.362

110. Japan to Send Formal Reply to American Proposals

On December 6, 1941 the Japanese government notified its Embassy in Washington that it would submit a reply to the United States’ proposal of November 26, 1941 on the following day. After decoding the four-part message, Ambassador Nomura was to reorganize it before presentation to the American State Department. The existence of this message was to be kept strictly secret until 1:00 p.m. on December 7, 1941, when it was to be submitted to the United States government, preferably to Secretary Hull.363

As a result of learning the time established by the Japanese for the delivery of an important message on December 7, 1941, General Marshall sent a warning dispatch on December 7, 1941 at 12:17 p.m., Washington time (06:47 a.m., Honolulu time), which did not reach Pearl Harbor until 07:33 a.m. (Honolulu time), twenty-two minutes before the attack.363a This message was not delivered to General Short until the afternoon of December 7, 1941, long after the Japanese had launched their attack.

The dispatch of General Marshall is believed to have read as follows:

“Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum; also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately.

“Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform Naval authorities of this communication.”

111. Japan Seeks Information on Roosevelt Message

Since Associated Press and United Press reports disclosed that President Roosevelt had sent the Emperor of Japan a special message, Tokyo asked Ambassador Nomura on December 6, 1941 to investigate the matter.364

112. President Roosevelt’s Message to Emperor Hirohito (December 6, 1941)365

In his message to Emperor Hirohito of Japan President Roosevelt said that since a President of the United States had extended an offer of friendship to Japan almost a century ago a long period of unbroken friendship had ensued under which both peoples had prospered substantially. Since all humanity had benefited from the peace formerly existing between Japan and the United States, and in view of the fact that the developments occurring in the Pacific area contained tragic possibilities, President Roosevelt felt it necessary to address Emperor Hirohito at this time.

Advocating peace for all nations, the United States had hoped for a successful conclusion to the present informal conversations and for a termination of the present war between Japan

362 IV, 239.
363 IV, 240-241.
363a Navy Report on Pearl Harbor, Section XVIII, places the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor at 7:55 a.m. (Honolulu time.) The State Department reports the attack as beginning at 7:50 a.m. (Honolulu time), S.D., II, 786.
364 IV, 242.
365a President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito of Japan, December 6, 1941”, S.D. II, 784-786. This message was sent to Ambassador Grew with instructions to communicate it to the Japanese Emperor at the earliest possible moment in the manner deemed most appropriate by Ambassador Grew. The press was informed that President Roosevelt had sent this message to Emperor Hirohito.
366 “A Letter from President Fillmore to the Japanese Emperor, May 10, 1851”.

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and China, in order that the diverse peoples of the Pacific could live without threat of invasion and carry on their commerce without fear of discrimination. President Roosevelt felt certain that Emperor Hirohito agreed that, in order to attain these high objectives, any form of military threat must be eliminated from the principles of both countries.

President Roosevelt then referred to Japan’s agreement with Vichy France concluded over a year ago, under which 5,000 or 6,000 Japanese troops were stationed in northern French Indo-China as a defensive measure against the Chinese forces further north. Later Vichy France permitted Japanese military forces to enter the southern part of French Indo-China. The continuation of the mobilization of Japanese military, naval and air forces in French Indo-China created a reasonable doubt on the part of neighboring nations that these troops would be used merely for defensive purposes. In fact, with the concentration of Japanese forces in the southeast and southwest corners of the peninsula, the peoples of the East Indies, Malaya and Thailand feared invasion. Certain that Emperor Hirohito could appreciate this fear and understand why the United States looked askance at the establishment of such powerful military, naval and air bases, President Roosevelt stated that such a situation could not continue and that none of the peoples of the South Pacific could sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

Assuring Japan that French Indo-China was not in danger of invasion, President Roosevelt asked that Japan ensure peace by withdrawing all its forces from that territory. For the sake of the two countries themselves and humanity in neighboring territories, to restore traditional amity and to prevent further death and destruction in the world, President Roosevelt asked that Emperor Hirohito give thought to this emergency. 367

On the following day President Roosevelt instructed Secretary Hull to send Ambassador Grew a copy of the Japanese explanation of the troop movement in French Indo-China. 367a

113. Hull-Nomura Conversation (December 7, 1941)

a. State Department’s Report 368

Ambassador Nomura had asked to see Secretary Hull at 1:00 p.m. on December 7, 1941, but he and Mr. Kurusu did not arrive at the State Department until 2:05 p.m. They were received by Secretary Hull at 2:20 p.m. Apologizing for the delay in delivering the document to Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura stated that he had been instructed by his government to deliver it at 1:00 p.m. He was not able to explain to Secretary Hull the reasons for this instruction. 369

In the memorandum which Ambassador Nomura handed to Secretary Hull the government of Japan stated that it had continued negotiations with the United States since last April with the genuine hope of adjusting and advancing Japanese-American relations and stabilizing the situation in the Pacific area. After examining the claims of the United States government and the measures which it and Great Britain had taken against Japan during the past eight months, the Japanese government had decided to declare its views. As a basis for its whole policy, the Japanese government had sought the promotion of peace in an endeavor to allow all nations to find their proper place in the world. Even during the war with China the Japanese government had striven to restore peace and prevent the extension of the war. With

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367 S.D. II, 784-786.
367a "President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State, December 6, 1941", S.D. II, 784.
369 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, took place on December 7, 1941, at 1:20 p.m. Washington time, 7:50 a.m., Honolulu time, December 8, 3:20 a.m., Tokyo time. On December 7, 1941, at 4:00 p.m., Washington time, which was December 8, 6:00 a.m., Tokyo time, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters announced that war had begun at dawn. S.D. II, 786-787. See IV, 241.
that end in mind Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September, 1940. By assisting the Chungking regime, however, both the United States and Great Britain obstructed Japan's endeavors toward the stabilization of East Asia. Furthermore, both the United States and Great Britain wilfully misinterpreted Japan's protocol with France and influenced the Netherlands government to such an extent that freezing orders against Japan frustrated its aspirations for a common cooperative economy in these regions. The very existence of the Japanese Empire had been constantly threatened by the military preparations of these countries, which had gradually perfected an encirclement of Japan. Yet, in spite of the hostile attitude exhibited by Great Britain and the United States, in August, 1941, the Japanese Prime Minister had sought a meeting with President Roosevelt and was refused on the basis that the meeting should take place only after an agreement had been reached on fundamental and essential questions. Still anxious to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Japanese government on September 25, 1941, submitted proposals which took into consideration both the United States and the Japanese points of view. Since no agreement resulted, the present Japanese Cabinet made another attempt but the United States failed to display any degree of conciliation. With a view to averting the almost imminent crisis, on November 20, 1941, the Japanese government simplified previous proposals. Furthermore, even though the Japanese government was willing to have President Roosevelt act as "an introducer" of peace between Japan and China, the American government withdrew its offer to mediate in the Sino-Japanese war and refused to agree to discontinue aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Finally, completely ignoring the claims of the Japanese government, the United States submitted proposals on November 26, 1941. From the very beginning of the present negotiations, even with regard to the China question, the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce and the withdrawal of its troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government had exhibited a most conciliatory attitude, but, on the other hand, the United States refused to yield an inch on its impractical principles. Therefore, the Japanese government desired to answer the points brought up by the United States' proposals on November 26, 1941. Although some of the principles set up by the United States government were agreeable to Japan, they all presented only a Utopian ideal, ignoring completely the actual conditions of the world which would prevent their immediate adoption. Japan felt that the idea of a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand was the old concept of collective security and incapable of solving the problems of East Asia. Since the United States' proposals stipulated that neither Japan nor the United States could conclude an agreement with any third power which would conflict with the fundamental establishment of peace throughout the Pacific area, Japan presumed that such a provision constituted an attempt to restrain the carrying out of Japanese obligations under the Tripartite Pact should the United States participate in the European War. While America claimed to be seeking the stabilization of the situation in the Pacific, actually it was scheming for the extension of the European War by aiding Great Britain and preparing itself for an attack against Germany and Italy.

In conjunction with other nations the United States government was conducting an economic warfare far more destructive and inhumane than military pressure. In fact, the United States government actually desired to strengthen its domination of China and all the other

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370 "Memorandum Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State at 2:20 p.m. on December 7, 1941", S.D. II, 787–792. See also IV, 241a.
371 For draft of proposals see S.D. II, 755–756.
372 S.D. II, 787–792.
373 Ibid.
areas of East Asia in coalition with Great Britain and other allies. For the past hundred years, East Asia had been forced to endure the imperialistic exploitation of the Anglo-American policy, while Japan now determined to overthrow that situation and enable the nations of the Pacific to enjoy their proper place in the world.

In order to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and to guarantee equality of trade and commerce in that area, the United States government proposed an agreement between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and Thailand. In the opinion of the Japanese government, not only would this proposal ignore the rights of the French government but it would extend, in effect, the Nine Power Treaty structure which was responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

In regard to America’s attitude toward the China affair, the Japanese government pointed out that America’s demands would completely destroy Japan’s position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. In view of the United States’ demands that Japan ignore the existence of the Nanking government in China and because the United States refused to cease aid to the Chungking government, it was clear that the United States desired to obstruct peace between Japan and China and throughout East Asia. Not only would the United States’ proposal of November 26, 1941, disparage the honor and prestige of the Japanese government but it ignored the sacrifices Japan had made throughout its four years of war with China. It was admitted that certain clauses of the American proposal, including those regarding commerce, a trade agreement, removal of freezing restrictions and the stabilization of yen and dollar exchange were acceptable to the Japanese government; but, on the other hand, the insistence of the American government and, it was presumed, of other interested countries to offer the proposals of November 26, 1941 prevented any agreement based on the present negotiations.

Although the Japanese government had honestly desired to adjust its relations with America, the establishment of peace and the creation of a new order in East Asia had been impeded by the lack of American cooperation. In view of this attitude, the Japanese government found it impossible to reach an agreement through any further negotiations.

After reading this document Secretary Hull replied that in all his fifty years of public service he had never seen a document crowded with such infamous falsehoods and distortions, nor had he imagined that any government was capable of uttering them.

Without making any comment Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu left.

b. Ambassador Nomura’s Report

There is no message available which contains Ambassador Nomura’s report of this meeting.

114. Tokyo Extends Appreciation to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu

Although they had failed to adjust Japanese-American relations, Tokyo recognized the fact that Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu had made every possible effort towards the re-establishment of peace in the Pacific. Therefore, on December 7, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo extended to the two ambassadors his sincere appreciation for what they had accomplished.

115. Japanese Embassy Destroys Codes

With diplomatic relations severed, the Japanese Embassy in Washington in accordance with instructions from Tokyo, proceeded with the destruction of its codes and cipher systems, cipher machine and machine codes. All secret documents were to be destroyed by fire.
116. The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941)

a. Secretary Hull's Statement\(^{376}\)

In a statement handed to the American press on December 7, 1941, Secretary Hull announced that Japan had made a treacherous and unprovoked attack upon the United States. He stated that even while Japanese representatives discussed the basis of peace with the United States, Japan's armed forces were assembling for attack upon not only the United States but also other nations with which the Japanese government was professedly at peace.

At this time Secretary Hull released the proposals handed by the United States government to the Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941, and the text of the Japanese reply handed to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on December 7, 1941. By basing its actions upon the underlying peace, law, order and justice between all nations, the United States had hoped to promote and maintain friendship between itself and other nations of the world. However, it was now apparent that Japan's professions of peace had been infamously false and fraudulent.\(^{377}\)

b. President Roosevelt's Message\(^{378}\)

Before the United States Congress on December 8, 1941, President Roosevelt declared that "Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a day which will live in infamy—the United States was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan."

Although the United States, through its conversations with the Japanese government, still hoped for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, Japanese air squadrons bombed Oahu even before Ambassador Nomura delivered the Japanese reply to the United States proposals. This reply of the Japanese government contained no hint or threat of war or armed attack, although it stated that it seemed useless to continue diplomatic relations. While stalling for time by making false statements about the establishment of peace, Japan was planning its attack upon Hawaii. This attack caused severe damage to American naval and military forces; American ships en route between San Francisco and Honolulu were reported torpedoed. In a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area on December 7, 1941, the Japanese government launched an attack against Malaya, Hongkong, Guam, the Philippine Islands and Wake Island. On the morning of December 8, 1941, Japanese forces attacked Midway Island.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, President Roosevelt directed that all measures be taken for the defense of the American nation. No matter how long it took to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people, remembering the character of the onslaught against them, would win through to absolute victory and would prevent this sort of treachery from endangering them again. "With confidence in our armed forces—with the unbounded determination of our people—we will win the inevitable triumph—so help us God."

President Roosevelt concluded his statement by asking that Congress declare war against Japan.\(^{379}\)

117. The United States Declares War (December 8, 1941)\(^{380}\)

JOINT RESOLUTION Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial Government of Japan and the Government and the people of the United States and making provisions to prosecute the same.

Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it

\(^{376}\) "Statement by the Secretary of State—December 7, 1941", S.D. II, 793.
\(^{377}\) Ibid.
\(^{378}\) "Message by President Roosevelt to Congress—December 8, 1941".
\(^{379}\) Ibid.
\(^{380}\) "Declaration by the United States of America of a State of War with Japan—December 8, 1941", S.D. II, 795.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial Government of Japan; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.\textsuperscript{381}

118. American Forces Begin Unrestricted Warfare
The Chief of Naval Operations notified his United States forces on December 7, 1941, that unrestricted air and submarine warfare was to be carried out against Japan. The Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet was to inform the United States Army and British and Dutch authorities of this action.\textsuperscript{382}

119. Japan Spreads Anti-allied Propaganda in Allied Countries
On December 8, 1941, the Vice Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo sent a message to Berlin and to neutral countries in Europe and South America concerning its reasons for the attack upon the United States territories. Because the United States refused to make any compromise in its negotiations with Japan and had instead adopted an extremely tyrannical attitude, the Japanese government was forced to send its army, navy and air units against American forces in the South Pacific. Throughout previous negotiations Great Britain and the United States had strongly opposed Japan's natural prosecution of the China war. This opposition reached such a degree of organized economic blockade and military encirclement of Japan that the Japanese Empire itself was threatened. During this time Japan repeatedly professed its determination to cooperate in the establishment of a new world order primarily through its adherence to the Tripartite Pact.\textsuperscript{383} In carrying out its propaganda against the United States Japanese representatives in neutral countries were to emphasize the above mentioned points. From time to time Japanese representatives in Berlin, La Paz, Lima, Mexico City and Stockholm were to send intelligence reports. These representatives themselves were to rely for general information upon the Domei News wires and overseas broadcasts.\textsuperscript{384}

120. Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor Surprises Turkish Foreign Minister
From information contained in a message sent to Tokyo on December 13, 1941, from Ankara, Turkey, it appeared that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had been a surprise. On December 8, 1941, Foreign Minister Saradoguru told the German Consular in that city that Japan would begin its war with America on December 10, 1941. Therefore, the announcement of the attack on December 7, 1941, was most unexpected.\textsuperscript{385}

\textsuperscript{381} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{382} IV, 246.
\textsuperscript{383} IV, 247-250.
\textsuperscript{384} IV, 251. (This message was not translated until January 13, 1945.)
\textsuperscript{385} IV, 252.
OUTLINE OF PART B

Japanese Intelligence in Diplomatic Messages

(a) Reports from the United States
(b) Reports from Mexico
(c) Reports from Central America
(d) Reports from the Panama Canal
(e) Reports from South America
(f) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands
(g) Reports from the Philippine Islands
(h) Reports from Singapore
(i) Reports from Vladivostok and Hsinking

PART B—JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE IN DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES

During the period between October 17 and December 6, 1941, Japanese officials in Tokyo continued to receive, through diplomatic channels, dispatches from the United States, Central and South America, Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands. This intelligence, in addition to that which was sent from Singapore, Vladivostok and Hsinking, gave important information to the Japanese leaders preparing for war. This was especially true of the detailed reports from Honolulu, Panama and Manila concerning American ship movements, fortifications, installations and defenses of every variety.

(a) Reports from the United States

121. Consul Sato Reports United States Navy Day Ceremony

Only five Japanese intelligence reports transmitted from agents in the United States to Japan between October 17 and December 6, 1941 are at present available. The information that the Warspite and the Maryland had entered Bremerton on October 21, 1941, was reported by Consul Sato at Seattle. Repairs were to be made on the bridge of the Warspite.\textsuperscript{386}

Consul Sato in Seattle on October 28 announced that fifteen Coast Guard vessels had sailed through the Seattle harbor in single file in commemoration of Navy Day, October 27. These vessels were listed as the Kane, the Gilmore, the Brooks, the Fox, the Bird, the Crow, the Pintail, the Eagle 57, the Batukei (Kana spelling), the Butternut, the Amber, the YP 83, the YP 87, the YP 89 and the YP 90.\textsuperscript{387}

On November 7 it was thought possible that the dispatching of a large number of United States planes to Alaska might have been an “underhanded American scheme” to force Japan to compromise by making a show of readiness to go to war. Reporting the source of information to be a certain important person or persons having connections with the United States War Department, the Japanese dispatch disclosed that six companies of bombers and twenty companies of fighters, probably about 150 planes, had been sent on November 3, 4 and 5.\textsuperscript{388}

\textsuperscript{386}IV, 253.
\textsuperscript{387}IV, 254.
\textsuperscript{388}IV, 255.
Consul Sato further reported that the Saratoga, the Warspite, the Colorado (which had formerly been identified as the Maryland by the Consul), and the Charleston were anchored in Bremerton on November 9. 389

122. Ambassador Nomura Requests Information Concerning The Warspite

A special request to Seattle from Ambassador Nomura on November 25 directed Consul Sato to investigate the progress of repair, and to report the time of the vessel’s departure and its destination. 390

123. Tokyo Outlines the Type of Information Needed

A circular from Tokyo on November 29 directed that in December full reports be made on each ship’s nationality, ship’s name, port from which it departed or at which it had arrived, port of destination and date of departure of all foreign commercial and warships in the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean and South China Sea. 391

124. Consul Identifies Warspite, Colorado and Saratoga at Bremerton

In a report of December 6, 1941, marked “Urgent Intelligence”, Consul Sato of Seattle reported that the Warspite and the Colorado were at anchor in Bremerton on December 5 and that the Saratoga had sailed on that day. 392

(b) Reports from Mexico

125. Japanese Naval Officials in Mexico Disapprove of Furnishing General Intelligence

To Foreign Minister Togo’s inquiry whether the office in Mexico had begun the work of furnishing general information, 393 Ambassador Miura replied that he had discussed this matter with his Naval Attaché and had subsequently wired the Chief of the Special Service Section of the Naval General Staff. Although at present they were awaiting a reply, he pointed out that because of the necessity of maintaining the security of the “L” organ the naval authorities disapproved of furnishing general information. He asked that the Japanese Foreign Office discuss this matter with the Navy and subsequently wire its decision. 394

Eight days later Foreign Minister Togo declared that general intelligence was to be distinguished from naval intelligence in that it was used for reference purposes by the Foreign Office. He was instructed to reorganize his office immediately for the collection of general intelligence. 395

(c) Reports from Central America

126. Intelligence Dispatches Outline United States Activities in Central America

Intelligence dispatches of military significance which originated in Central America were sent through the diplomatic office at Panama. In Costa Rica it was rumored that the American Air Forces had decided to take over bases in the Golfo Dulce off Costa Rica and the Gulf of Fonseca which faces the territory of Honduras.

It was further reported on October 28, 1941, that the United States was preparing to construct destroyer, submarine and air bases in the southeastern area of Cocos off Puntarenas.
and that the various nations of Central and South America had been admonished to watch rigorously the residents of Axis affiliation.396

(d) Reports from the Panama Canal

127. Minister Akiyama Reports Canal Military and Naval Activity

Although the Japanese intelligence reports concerning ship movements from inside the United States were few, those originating in the Panama Canal Zone were more numerous during this period of October 17 through December 7. It was found that routine ship movement reports were transmitted to the homeland regularly every two or three days.

In a dispatch of October 18, 1941, Minister Akiyama at Panama reported the movement of four American freighters, one British freighter and two American tankers toward the Pacific from October 14 to 18.

Moving toward the Atlantic through the Canal in this period had been four American freighters, two British freighters, one Dutch freighter, one American tanker and one American passenger steamer. The Japanese agent discovered that of late ships passed through the Canal at night.

In an inspection of military establishments at the Pacific end of the Canal, the Japanese official found that construction was progressing at a rapid rate and that the whole area was being covered with fortifications. Specifically mentioned were Albrook Field, where three large hangers, storehouses for airplane parts, underground tanks, and eight barracks to accommodate 200 men each were being constructed; moreover, at Corozal four 200-men barracks, fifty-five two-family officers' quarters and a 500-patient hospital were being completed.397

128. Intelligence Reports Military Construction Work and Navy Patrols

According to an intelligence dispatch, the 2nd Field Artillery Battalion, the 1st Engineers and 33rd Infantry were stationed at Fort Clayton, where barracks large enough to accommodate 250 persons were nearing completion. At Fort Kobbe barracks for twenty-six companies had been completed in addition to the recently finished hangars at Howard Field. It was noted that the construction work at the submarine base at Balboa was progressing, that 16-inch guns had been emplaced on Pearl Islands, and that warships were patrolling the waters around them. In addition, three cruisers, eight new-type destroyers, eighteen submarines, one gunboat and one submarine tender were in the Canal Zone.398

The Japanese marked the departure of an Omaha class warship toward the Pacific on October 27 as well as the anchoring of two single-funnel destroyers, one light cruiser and one 10,000 ton transport in Balboa harbor. It was further reported that one American destroyer and two submarines were anchored in the harbor at Cristobal on October 26. From October 22 to October 27 four American and four British merchant vessels had passed through the Canal to the Pacific, while six American merchant vessels, one American tanker and one Netherlands cargo ship had passed through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic.399

129. Reports Enumerate Vessels Passing Through Canal

In a routine report transmitted on November 4 Minister Akiyama declared that one American destroyer and an American warship of 2,000 or 3,000 tons had passed through the Canal toward the Atlantic on November 3. Nine American freighters and one tanker had passed through the Canal in the direction of the Pacific, and five American freighters and one Ameri-
can passenger vessel, as well as one Danish ship, had moved through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic from November 2 to November 4.\textsuperscript{400}

Since the routine ship movement report had been sent on November 4, Minister Akiyama’s transmission from Panama to Tokyo on November 5 appeared to be a special intelligence dispatch informing Tokyo that fifty army air officers of Italian origin had departed from China at the end of October. It was thought that they were being sent to China since they were of Italian blood and consequently would not be suitable for Europe.

In addition, the ship movement report on this dispatch listed an army transport of more than 6,000 tons filled with army men which had headed for the Pacific on November 2; the statement that two cruisers of the Omaha class were anchored at Balboa on November 4 was noteworthy, as well as the information that one United States freighter and one British freighter had moved toward the Pacific on November 4 and November 5.

Entering the Canal from the Pacific at this time were three United States freighters, one United States tanker and one British freighter.\textsuperscript{401}

130. Japanese Minister Corrects Identification of Vessel

On November 10, 1941, Minister Akiyama corrected a previous report to the effect that a vessel formerly identified as one of the Vanoc class had been confirmed as the Diomede, which was headed toward the Pacific. He added that two American submarines had also sailed into the Pacific on November 10.\textsuperscript{402}

Passing through Panama during November 11 and 12 toward the Pacific, according to the Japanese official, were one American and two British freighters, while moving toward the Atlantic were three American and three British freighters.\textsuperscript{403}


A British light cruiser (tentatively identified as the Liverpool), which had been under repair in San Francisco, was reported as having gone through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic on the night of November 11.

A British military transport which was loaded to capacity with military personnel had sailed through the Canal on its way from the Pacific.

Moreover, twelve Douglas two-motored bombers and six Airacobra pursuit planes had been added to the Canal air force early in November.\textsuperscript{404}

132. German Agents Correct Japanese Identification of British Cruiser

It was reported on November 13 that according to German reports the heavy cruiser (previously called a light cruiser) which had passed through the Canal on November 11 was not the Liverpool class. This ship was believed to be joining a convoy in the Atlantic.

A ship formerly reported as of the Omaha type was described as looking like a destroyer with its bow painted black and its stern white.

A commercial ship of the Union Castle type, carrying approximately 1000 of what seemed to be evacuees and a few wounded, passed through the Canal on November 13.\textsuperscript{405}

133. Intelligence Dispatches List Type, Nationality and Number of Ships Crossing Isthmus

Tokyo learned on November 18, 1941 that one British ship and one 17,000 ton Netherlands vessel had passed through the Canal in the direction of the Pacific on this day, while one 10,000
ton British vessel and one American ship had gone through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic. It was also noted that one destroyer and one submarine were undergoing repairs at Cristobal. 406

Minister Akiyama wired that four American cargo ships, one British cargo ship, one tanker and one French vessel had passed across to the Pacific and that an American cargo ship and one tanker had sailed toward the Atlantic on November 19 and November 20. 407

134. United States Sets Up Defense Fortifications in Canal Zone

Although the Japanese Minister in Panama felt that Tokyo was probably already cognizant of the Canal's defenses, he summarized the latest developments in a dispatch transmitted November 22, 1941. 408

According to informational sources, the United States had set up air bases, anti-aircraft gun bases, and airplane detector bases, which were reported as being able to discover a plane 200 miles away.

Citing examples to illustrate that the United States was exerting pressure on the Panamanian government, Minister Akiyama declared that Canal officials were checking the 2,000 Germans, 700 Italians and 400 Japanese in Panama because the United States had intimated that dangerous elements were to be found not only among the foreigners in Panama, but also in government circles. The United States was expending vast sums of money in building up the defenses of the Canal Zone; its coercion of Panama was alleged by the Japanese official to be in violation of the treaty concluded in 1936. The United States had begun to construct a road of macadam which would probably go as far as Colon and was completing the American continental highway, which would extend as far as the borders of Colombia. It appeared that the United States was assuming that an attack on the Canal would be made from both air and sea, and was preparing especially for a possible attack from the Pacific side. Having reinforced the special fleet, an area of 900 kilometers (?) with the center at Panama was being constantly patrolled. Army fortifications with 16-inch and 14-inch gun emplacements were being constructed in the territory of Panama.

The Americans were endeavoring to guard such vital points as locks, spillways and especially the control tower on Lake Gatun and the electric plant. In addition, the anti-aircraft defenses on lock #1 were being improved and it was noted that lock #3 was also equipped with anti-aircraft defenses.

Minister Akiyama said that the naval defense area which was being patrolled against possible lightning attacks extended in the north from Salina Cruz to Monepene on the Gulf of Fonseca with the southern limits extending to the air base on the Galapagos Islands. The intelligence report listed the present army strength at 47,000, naval strength at 10,000 and air force at 5,000, and it was further estimated that twice this general total made up the families of laborers, excluding Panamanians. 409

On December 1, 1941, a wire from Washington directed that Japanese officials in Panama report the passage of the United States' ships, the Mississippi, North Carolina, Washington and Wasp through the Canal. 410

(e) Reports from South America

135. Agents Speculate Concerning Planes Flown to Bathurst

That twenty-five planes had been flown from Natal to British Bathurst on the west coast of Africa was reported by Ambassador Ishii in Rio de Janeiro on November 15, 1941. These
planes, flown during the period from August 30 to November 12, had carried varying numbers of passengers. Those having a large number of passengers were thought to be carrying technicians to strengthen bases at Bathurst, while those with few passengers were thought to be en route to the Near East for the use of the British forces there.411

(f) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands

136. Foreign Minister Togo Asks for Semi-weekly Ship Movement Reports

Instructions from Foreign Minister Togo directed officials in Honolulu to report irregularly but at the rate of twice a week on “ships in harbor”, in view of the critical relations between Japan and the United States. Although this dispatch was transmitted on November 15, 1941, because of the recent change in the Japanese diplomatic code it was not translated until December 3, 1941. The dispatch requested that care be taken to maintain secrecy.412

On November 18, 1941, Consul Kita wired that a battleship of the Oklahoma class had entered port and one tanker had left port between Ford Island and the Arsenal. At anchor in the East Loch area were three heavy cruisers and a carrier, the Enterprise or some other vessel, while two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class and one of the Pensacola class were tied up at the docks at a point designated as “KS”. Four merchant vessels were at anchor in the Middle Loch area.

The entry of eight destroyers, which had entered Pearl Harbor in single file 1000 meters apart at a speed of three knots, was observed. It was added that these vessels had changed course at a thirty degree angle five times from the entrance of the harbor through the waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal to the buoys in East Loch, and that one hour had elapsed during these maneuvers.413

137. American Experts, Allegedly en Route to Burma Road, Arrive in Hawaii

Tokyo also learned at this time that 46 American transport experts and engineers, headed by Captain Richard M. Jones, had arrived in port, and were en route to China to operate trucks on the Burma road, where 3,500 new-type trucks, mostly of 21/2 ton capacity, were in use.414

138. Foreign Minister Togo Requests Report of Vessels in “N” Area

Foreign Minister Togo requested that a report be made concerning the vessels anchored in “N” Area at Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay and the adjacent areas, as well as the fleet bases near Hawaiian military reservations. These investigations were to be made in great secrecy.415

139. Consul Kita Reports Regular Naval Maneuvers

On November 24, 1941, Mr. Kita wired that the fleet normally left Pearl Harbor, conducted maneuvers and returned. It was found, however, that the Lahaina Roads area had not been used by the fleet for maneuvers or for anchoring for some time, and that only destroyers and submarines rode at anchor in this neighborhood. Furthermore, battleships seldom entered the ports of Hilo, Hanalei or Kaneohe. Normally, the Japanese official explained, battleships exercised in groups of three to five, conducting maneuvers for one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest.

Although aircraft carriers maneuvered by themselves, seaplane tenders operated with another vessel of the same class, and airplane firing and bombing practice was conducted near the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe.416
Also reported were the normal maneuver times and areas of the heavy cruisers, light cruisers, submarines, destroyers and minelayers, with a note added to the effect that minelayers had recently conducted operations outside Manila Harbor. This dispatch of November 24, 1941, Honolulu message 234, outlining the activities of a large part of the American fleet as reported by Japanese agents, was not translated until December 16, 1941.417

140. Japanese Agents Observe American Defenses
On November 28 a military report to Tokyo stated that eight B-17 planes were stationed at Midway, and that the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns was 5,000 feet (?).

Observing Sand Island maneuvers, Japanese agents reported that twelve shots were fixed, that the interval of shot flight was thirteen seconds, that the interval between shots was two minutes, and that there were no direct hits. It was rumored that 12,000 men, chiefly Marines, were expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or January. One cruiser usually remained in the waters south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor. This dispatch was read on December 8, 1941.418

141. Frequency of Ship Movement Reports Is Left To Discretion of Consul
Since intelligence reports of battleship movements were made once a week, and the vessels could have traveled far from the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands in that interval, Consul Kita was instructed by Tokyo to use his own judgment in reporting such movements. In addition, the Consul was asked to note the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time they remained at anchor. This dispatch of November 28 was translated on December 8, 1941.419

According to a dispatch transmitted on November 29 and read by United States translators on December 5, Tokyo requested that, in addition to giving reports on ship movements, Japanese officials in Honolulu report even when there were no ship movements.420

142. Foreign Minister Togo Wires Instructions Regarding Japanese Communications
In a dispatch dated November 28, 1941, which was translated December 7, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo wired instructions regarding Japanese Communications. Anticipating that ordinary communications might be severed, he said that broadcasts would inform Japanese diplomats of the situation without the use of the usual telegraphic channels. It was directed, however, that codes be retained as long as the situation in the country permitted and until the final stage was entered.421

143. Japanese Continue to Watch Navy Maneuvers
From December 1 to December 6, 1941, Japanese intelligence dispatches were transmitted regularly to Tokyo. On December 1 a significant dispatch reported that ship maneuvers were held approximately 500 nautical miles southeast of Honolulu, with the battleships leaving Tuesday and returning Friday, or leaving Friday and returning Saturday of the following week. It was noted that the fleet had never sailed westward or headed for the “Kaiui” straits northward; the sea west of the Hawaiian Islands was not suitable for ocean maneuvers. The estimate of distance was based on the fact that fuel was plentiful, long distance high speed possible, and the guns could not be heard at Honolulu.422
144. Mr. Fujii Changes American Ship Maneuver Signals

On December 3, 1941, Ichiro Fujii informed the chief of the #3 section of Military Staff headquarters that he wished to change his communication signals for American ship maneuvers. Signal one would mean that the battle ship divisions included scouts and screen units and were preparing to sortie; signal two that a number of carriers were preparing to sortie; signal three that all battleship divisions had departed Hawaii between December 1 and 3; signal four that several carriers had departed between December 1 and 3; signal five that all carriers had departed between December 1 and 3; signal six that all battleship divisions had departed between December 4 and 6; signal seven that several carriers had departed between December 4 and 6; signal eight that all carriers had departed between December 4 and 6.

A house on Lanikai Beach would be used as a signal station and would show lights during the night. One light in the window between 8 and 9 p.m. would denote signal one, one light between 9 and 10 p.m. would mean signal two, and so on; two lights between midnight and 1 a.m. would signify signal five, and so on. It was further explained that if there was a star on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it would indicate signal one, two, three or four; if there was a star and the Roman numeral III it would indicate signal five, six, seven or eight.

Also used at night would be the attic window of the Kalama House, located on the east coast of Oahu northwest of Lanikai. A similar system was to be used; for example, if the window were lighted between 1900 and 2000, it would indicate signal three, between 2000 and 2100, signal four, and so on.

In addition, signals would be transmitted through the regular broadcast station in Honolulu. For example, if a radio advertisement read, “Chinese rug for sale, apply P.O. Box 1476”, it would indicate signal three or six, whereas the advertisement, “Beauty operator wanted, apply P. O. Box 1476” would indicate signal five or eight.

In case the light or broadcast signals could not be sent from Oahu, the signals would be given by bonfire daily on Maui Island until the Japanese “EXEX” signal was received. The signal bonfire would be located at a point halfway between lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road, and would be visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island. If the fire was seen between 7 and 8 p.m., it would indicate signal three or six; between 8 and 9 p.m., signal four or seven; and between 9 and 10 p.m., signal five or eight.


On December 3 Consul Kita wired that an unidentified military transport had sailed out toward the mainland, that the Rarin had sailed into port from San Francisco, and that the Wyoming and two seaplane tenders had left port. There were no other ship movements on this day.

146. British Vessel Enters Honolulu Harbor on December 4, 1941

A report to Tokyo on December 4 contained the information that a British gunboat had entered Honolulu harbor on the afternoon of December 3, leaving early on the morning of December 4. Immediately after the vessel had entered port, a sailor had taken some mail to the British Consular Office and had received some in return.

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423 IV, 292. (This message was sent on December 3, 1941 but was not translated by American cryptanalysts until after the attack on Pearl Harbor.)

424 IV, 293.

425 V, 294. (The Wyoming had been demilitarized as a battleship in 1932, and was at that time in use as a training ship on the Atlantic Coast, Battle Report, p. 26.)

426 IV, 295.
147. U.S.S. Lexington Departs Hawaii

Noting that three battleships had been at sea for eight days, Consul Kita said that the vessels returned to port on Friday morning, December 5. On the same day the Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port. In port on the afternoon of December 5 were eight battleships, three light cruisers and sixteen destroyers, while four ships of the Honolulu class were in dock.427

148. Consul Kita Notifies Tokyo of Balloon Barrage Defenses

On December 2, 1941, Tokyo directed the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to wire day by day reports concerning observation balloons above Pearl Harbor, or any indication that they would be sent up. In view of the present situation, the presence of warships (battleships), carriers and cruisers was of utmost importance, Foreign Minister Togo declared. He asked also that he be advised whether or not the warships were provided with anti-mine (torpedo) nets. This dispatch was not translated until December 30, 1941.428

In accordance with these orders, the Consul informed Tokyo on December 6 that 400 or 500 balloons had been ordered in America and that their use was being considered in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. He reported, however, that, as far as Hawaii was concerned, no mooring equipment had been set up at Pearl Harbor nor had the troops been selected to man them. Furthermore, there were no indications that any training for the maintenance of balloons was being undertaken.

In addition, it was difficult for him to imagine that the Hawaiian defenses actually possessed any balloons. Moreover, there were limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. He imagined that in all probability there was considerable opportunity left for a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam and Ford. He added that he thought the battleships did not have torpedo nets, but he would investigate the details further.429

149. Last Intercepted Intelligence Report before Pearl Harbor Attack Lists Ships in Port

In an intercepted intelligence dispatch transmitted on December 6, 1941 from Hawaii, the last before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Consul reported that a number of battleships and one submarine tender had entered port on the evening of December 5. Nine battleships, three light cruisers, three submarine tenders and seventeen destroyers were at anchor, and four light cruisers and two destroyers were lying at the docks. The heavy cruisers and airplane carriers had left Honolulu. It appeared that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the fleet air arm.430

(g) Reports from the Philippine Islands

150. Consul Nihro Reports Movement of Philippine-Based Ships

Military, naval, installation, construction and fortification along with troop movement and disposition reports continued to flow constantly from the Philippine Islands to Tokyo. There is little doubt that the Japanese naval intelligence telegrams were explained in more detail by mail. Although Kana abbreviations, which could not be translated, were used to designate American ships, United States Intelligence estimated the possible equivalents for the Kana names.

427IV, 296. ("At sea near the end of this first week in December was the carrier, U.S.S. Lexington accompanied by three cruisers and five destroyers on a combined search which took them to the south and westward," Battle Report, p. 8.)

428IV, 291.

429IV, 297.

430IV, 298. (Berthed in Pearl Harber were eight of the nine battleships of the United States Pacific Fleet, nine cruisers, and a third of the Fleet's destroyers", Battle Report, p. 6.)

113
On October 21, 1941, a Japanese official, Mr. Kihara, reported that the ground for an air
base was being leveled in the central Mindanao district. Although an underground hanger
and underground oil tanks were being planned, the building was not progressing as quickly
as could be expected. It appeared, Mr. Kihara said, that large heavy bomber planes were
expected at this base very soon.431

The unloading of more than ten tanks from the American Leader, which touched port
at Manila on October 20, was reported by Consul Nihro. He estimated that each tank was
equipped with a gun having a barrel approximately 6 feet long.432

Although the Houston and the Marblehead were reported to have left Manila along with
eight destroyers, ten submarines and one mine layer on October 20, 1941,433 five days later
Consul Nihro declared that these two vessels were then in Manila. The Consul also informed
Tokyo that the Langley and one destroyer had sailed during the morning of October 25, but
that their destination was not known. At port in Manila on that day were the Houston, the
Marblehead, the Chester, the Black Hawk, the Isabel, the Heron, one vessel the name of
which was undeciphered, five destroyers, eleven large submarines and five small sub-
marines. Reported as under repair at Cavite was the Canopus, and two destroyers were also
in that port.434 The President Cleveland was reported to have landed perhaps 2,500 soldiers
on October 23, 1941.435

On the morning of October 27, it was reported, three destroyers, eleven submarines of the
"N" type, the Heron and two minelayers left port for unknown destinations.436 The Pecos
entered Cavite on October 26 and the Langley on October 27.

The Houston and the Marblehead sailed from Manila on the afternoon of October 28,
while the Chester departed on the morning of October 29.437

On November 1, 1941, the Houston, Marblehead, Heron, seven destroyers, eight sub-
marines and three minesweepers were reported to have entered Manila on October 31. But
the Houston left Manila on November 1; so did the President Cleveland and the President
Madison, which were loaded with American soldiers. A significant fact included in the
dispatch of November 1 was the estimation of American military and naval planes in the
Philippine Islands. In the total of 1,283 military aircraft were large bombers, scout planes,
fighters, pursuit planes and training planes. Japanese agents reported that twenty-six large
flying naval boats were based in the Philippine Islands.

Ships in port on November 1 were to be the Marblehead, the Black Hawk, the Pecos, the
Heron, the Isabel, nine destroyers, three submarines, a ship called Wohotosu (Kana
spelling), and three minelayers. At Cavite were the Langley, the Canopus and the 2 Z.438

151. Consul Nihro Obtains Information from Newspapers and Foreign Office Reports

On November 1, 1941, Consul Nihro complained that a strict guard was being maintained
and the gathering of military and naval intelligence was extremely difficult. From news-
paper and foreign office reports he learned that 120,000 of the Philippine army would be
incorporated into the Far Eastern army and additions to barracks at various camps were
being rapidly made. Indications pointed to the fact that there was to be an increase in the num-
ber of soldiers stationed in the vicinity of Lingayen during November, that the military

431 IV, 299.
432 IV, 300.
433 IV, 301.
434 IV, 302.
435 IV, 303.
436 IV, 304.
437 IV, 305.
438 IV, 306.
projects in the vicinity of Mariveles were being rushed, that three airports were being built in that vicinity; and that the docks at that location were being enlarged. In the Bataan area military surveillance was particularly strict, and it was reported that even the entry of Filipinos was restricted. It was found that a road was being constructed between Dingalan and Laur (?), and that the road between Infanta and Manila was being widened to five meters.

Consul Nihro disclosed in this same dispatch that thirty or forty fighter planes, twenty or thirty light bombers and several score of "altitude planes (?)" were stationed at Iba.439

152. Brown Soldiers Puzzle Japanese Consul

The arrival of 2,000 or 3,000 brown soldiers at the Fort Stotsenburg barracks elicited an intelligence report from the Japanese Consul on November 4, 1941. In view of the fact that the soldiers spoke Spanish he guessed that these could be "Iko's"; they were not too friendly with American soldiers.

According to rumors, the American soldiers stationed at Fort Stotsenburg were arrogant toward the Filipinos, and since there had been two or three cases of assault on Filipinos the natives were furious.

He reported further construction work at Tarallo on Migual Air Field; the wooden bridges on the highway between Tarallo and Lingayen had been replaced with concrete bridges and approximately 200 barracks had been constructed near Tarallo overlooking the Lingayen Gulf.440

153. Tokyo Directs Secretary Yuki to Investigate Philippine Defenses

On November 5 Tokyo directed that Secretary Yuki conduct an investigation for the Naval General Staff. At each "port of call" he was to enumerate the conditions at airports; the types and number of planes at each; the warships and the machinery belonging to the land forces; and the state of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.441

154. Foreign Minister Togo Asks Confirmation of Report of November 1, 1941

Referring to the report on military and naval planes made on November 1 by Consul Nihro, Foreign Minister Togo requested that the Consul send a wire immediately as to the validity of these reports.442

155. Consul Nihro Wires Further Information on Military Installation at Manila

The military installations in and around Manila were the subject of a report from Consul Nihro to Tokyo on November 6. According to his information, fifty American officials and 1,200 Filipino soldiers were stationed at Bugallon, which is located in a province north of Manila. Also at this location were eight light tanks and eight anti-aircraft guns.

At Iba in Zambales Province, which is across the bay from Manila, were ten two-motored light bombers, 190 Curtiss fighting planes and 400 American air force officers.

Stations at San Marcelino, where the construction of a new air field was under way, was a division of Philippine soldiers numbering 15,000. Furthermore, 320 Philippine soldiers were stationed at Botolan and there were 200 light tanks at Fort Stotsenburg.

Construction work was reported in Tarlac Province in the form of barracks and a new air field, as well as the building of a military road from Capas to Botolan in Zambales Province.443
Consul Nihro declared on November 8 that the province of Bataan had been reinforced by 4,000 or 5,000 soldiers, who were stationed along the coast and in the central mountain districts.

With the building of an excellent military highway between Lamao and Mariveles sentries had been posted prohibiting the passing of civilians, Philippine military personnel and others not in possession of special permits. Although the road between Bagao and Balanga had been converted into a military highway, construction of a road connecting Moron and Olongapa had been suspended and the commercial connection between these places was possibly by boat.444

156. Twenty-Three Ships Anchored at Manila on November 8, 1941

In a separate routine ship movement report Tokyo was informed that the Marblehead, the Black Hawk, the Heron, the Isabel, the tanker Trinity, the Wohotosu, eight destroyers and nine submarines were at anchor in Manila harbor on November 8, 1941.445

The Houston touched port at Cavite on November 8; two cargo boats with the names painted over entered port on November 9, landing 2,300 soldiers, and four destroyers departed on November 10 for an unknown destination.446

157. Japanese Consul Corrects Previous Estimate of Airplanes in Philippines

On November 10, 1941, Consul Nihro sent a correction to his dispatch of November 1 reporting the number of planes based in the Philippine Islands. The number of large attack planes (bombers) he raised from 29 to 32. He further disclosed that the brown soldiers, formerly believed to be “Iko’s”, were American Negroes.447

The arrival at Manila of an American cruiser, identified as one of the Chester class, was noted on November 12, 1941, and it was believed that this vessel accompanied one of the President Line ships into port.448

158. Consul Gathers Information from Japanese Residents

From a Japanese who had lived in the Province of Ilocos for about fifteen years Consul Nihro ascertained that approximately 400 Philippine soldiers and seven or eight officers were stationed in Laoag in the Province of Ilocos Norte on Luzon, and it was rumored that this force would be increased to approximately 1,700. No expansion of the present civil airport in Laoag was planned, no military planes were being stationed at that field, and no extensive activity was in progress with the exception of one reconnaissance flight nightly by one plane over the coastal area in the vicinity of the city.449

According to a report from a Japanese resident in Camarines Norte, only about sixty members of the Philippine Patrol organization were located in that area and every day five or six of these patrolmen were dispatched to Paracale and Jose Panganiban.450 That the civil airport at Paracale was not being used and that no military planes had landed at Daet since February was also reported. During the latter part of 1940 thirteen American freighters had entered the port of Panganiban and since then on the average of once a week American freighters sailed from Batangas in southwestern Luzon to Hondagua off Lamon Bay.451

444IV, 313.
445IV, 314.
446IV, 315.
447IV, 316.
448IV, 517. (This vessel was later identified as the Portland.)
449IV, 318.
450These are located on the Island of Luzon.
451IV, 319.
On November 13 Manila reported that the cruiser which had been identified as a member of the Chester class entering Manila Harbor on November 12 was now identified as the Portland, and it was added that a British destroyer of the Defender type had sailed into Manila Harbor on November 13.  

159. Japanese Report Concerning Preparations on Cebu

According to the report of a Japanese resident in Cebu, Manila informed Tokyo on November 15 that there were 300 American and 2,500 Philippine soldiers stationed on that island. The airport was being enlarged and twelve medium-sized planes, which were used by the Philippine army, had been transported to Java by air. Twelve or thirteen American army planes were stationed there, and one large bomber was in the hanger.

Moreover, the headquarters of the former patrol force was being used as the commissariat storehouse with all sorts of provisions being stored there.

Twenty American warships had anchored off the northwest coast of the Sulu Archipelago on September 22, two destroyers and one cruiser had entered Cebu Harbor in October, and one oil supply ship and a camouflaged cruiser had anchored there early in November for two or three days.

Referring to the report of November 1, as well as Consul Nihro's correction of November 10, Tokyo requested on November 15 that the Japanese in Manila discover by what route the large bombers had flown to the Philippines. It was also asked that their number be ascertained again.

160. Manila Identifies the British Ship Awatea

A ship which had entered Manila Harbor on November 13 was identified as the British transport Awatea, with 700 or 800 soldiers on board. That the vessel under escort had sailed again on the evening of November 14 to an unknown destination was also reported. The routine intelligence report of ships in harbor as of November 15 was added to this dispatch.

After reading an AP dispatch from Hong Kong Consul Nihro suggested on November 17 that the 700 or 800 soldiers embarked on the Awatea were possibly the same as those reported disembarking at Hong Kong on the morning of November 16.

The departure of the Marblehead, the Portland, possibly ten destroyers and one minelayer from Manila was the subject of a routine ship movement report on November 17.

A troop movement report from Lingayen which had been published in the Bulletin on November 17 publicized the movement of fifty-four 14-ton tanks as well as scout cars, provision cars, baggage cars and various types of military trucks together with mechanized troops from Fort Stotsenburg. They had stayed only overnight at Lingayen, returning to Fort Stotsenburg the next day.

On November 20 Tokyo requested in a special dispatch to Manila that the home office be advised immediately of the type of craft presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay. This information was to be transmitted to the Asama Maru as well as to Tokyo.

The arrival and departure of an unidentified camouflaged British cruiser on November 21 was reported in a diplomatic wire of November 22, 1941. The entry into port of an American
transport, which was rumored to be the President Harrison, for the purpose of loading soldiers and material was also noted. At Manila on November 22, according to the Japanese intelligence dispatch, were the Portland, the Marblehead, the Black Hawk, the Isabel, the Heron, the Wohotosu, the Pecos, one minelayer, nine destroyers and twenty submarines. At Cavite were the Houston and the Canopus.\(^{461}\)

161. Consul Nihro Reports Tense Feeling in Manila

On November 24, 1941, Consul Nihro declared that the feeling among the people of Manila had, in general, become tense in view of the military activity in that area. It appeared that military stores had been removed from the “port area” during the “black out” on November 21, and, in view of the movement of forty or fifty buses in the Rizal province district, investigations were being made to find if these were loaded with troops.

On the afternoon of November 22 sixty light tanks and twenty ammunition trucks, which had earlier been grouped near the headquarters of the “port area” military police, were seen leaving Quezon Bridge. It was a conjecture that troops had recently arrived in military boats, and that light tanks and ammunition trucks had been landed on November 21. Although at present the tanks and trucks were said to be en route to Meycuayan in Bulacan Province and San Fernando in Pampanga Province, their final destination was being investigated. Besides the two or three hundred American army trucks near the “port area”, which had been imported at short intervals, it was noted that troops had arrived in hill areas within the city.\(^{462}\)

162. Submarine Tender Enters Port

The information that a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland, had entered port on November 23, that five submarines had sailed to unknown destinations on November 24, and that seven destroyers had left for unknown destinations the next day was transmitted to Tokyo on November 25.\(^{463}\)

Two days later the Japanese Consul reported the departure of the Portland, the Black Hawk, two destroyers and ten submarines for unknown destinations.\(^{464}\)

163. Inaccuracy of Japanese Intelligence Reports

Since it was obvious at this time that Japan was attempting to obtain a total picture of military and naval strength in the Philippines, as well as last minute information of ship movements and troop allocations, the accuracy of their spy reports may be gauged by comparing the information with an estimate of the strength of United States air forces in the Philippines on November 27, 1941, as released by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.\(^{465}\) Japanese agents estimated that 1,283 military and twenty-six naval planes were based in the Islands\(^{466}\) (the former number was later very slightly raised).\(^{467}\) Since, according to the American estimate forty-three Navy planes and 298 Army planes were based in the Philippine Islands, our air strength in the Islands was greatly overestimated; there was seventeen more Navy planes than were reported but 985 fewer Army planes than were listed by Japanese agents.\(^{468}\)

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\(^{461}\) IV, 328.
\(^{462}\) IV, 329.
\(^{463}\) IV, 330.
\(^{464}\) IV, 331.
\(^{465}\) IV, 332. “U.S. Navy estimate of U.S. Air Strength in Philippines, November 27, 1941.”
\(^{466}\) IV, 306.
\(^{467}\) IV, 316.
\(^{468}\) IV, 352. “U.S. Navy estimate of U.S. Air Strength in Philippines, November 27, 1941.”
164. Manila Notifies Tokyo of Scouting Patrols

High-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila were the subject of an intelligence report to Tokyo on November 28, 1941. The patrols were divided into one flight of six planes and another of three planes beginning at four o'clock in the morning. Three additional planes were noted to be flying over the city independently.469

In a shipping report of November 29, 1941, Consul Nihro said that the submarine tenders Wotosu (Kana spelling) and Holland, five submarines of the 170 class, five of the 180 class, five of the 190 class, five of the 150 class, four small-sized submarines, the oilers Pecos and Trinity, two destroyers, the gunboat Isabel and one minelayer were in port at Manila. At Cavite were the Houston and the Canopus. Consul Nihro further reported that the lights at Langley Point in Cavite, at Manila, at Baguio, and on the buoys in the bay would be turned out for a time.470

165. Intelligence Report Lists Ships in Port on December 1, 1941

Manila informed Tokyo on December 1, 1941, that fourteen large submarines (possibly with the submarine tender Wotosu) and two destroyers had left port that morning. From the American Navigation, which had entered port about three days earlier, were unloaded twelve objects which appeared to be boilers.

In addition, the Manchen Maersk, a former Danish ship sailing under Panamanian registry, entered port December 1; and, although details were not ascertained, five British freighters were loading cargo at the pier. The American vessel, Spencer Kellogg, had unloaded crude oil and was scheduled to load castor oil; and the American Army's Don Esteban entered Manila harbor December 1. In port on this date were the Holland, the Wotosu (possibly), the Pecos, the Trinity, a gunboat, two small and six large submarines, while the Houston remained at Cavite. The Canopus and a cargo ship were in the vicinity (exact position not clear).471

(h) Reports from Singapore

166. Japanese Officials in Singapore Learn of Squadron Sailing

On October 22 Tokyo requested officials in Singapore to report the drills and battle maneuvers and to investigate the organization of the air force stationed in the Federated Malay States.472

The Japanese Foreign Minister informed officials in Singapore on November 18, 1941, that a squadron of ships had left port (name missing) on November 4 headed for the Malay States. The squadron had consisted of eight ships of the 15,000 ten class and ten other craft, carrying approximately 10,000 British troops, including many aviators.473

167. Tokyo Requests Information on Ships in Port

On December 5, 1941, Tokyo requested an immediate report on ships in port as well as on the movements of capital ships.474

(i) Reports from Vladivostok and Hsinking
168. American Tankers en Route to Vladivostok

Investigating the routing of American vessels to Russia, Japan learned from its embassy in Vladivostok that up to October 20 the American Consul there had received no official communication concerning the tankers being routed to Valdivostok. Although it had been decided at the Moscow conference to continue aid to Russia, it had been decided to discontinue the transportation of material to Russia via Vladivostok after the ships en route had arrived, and a new routing would be used, undoubtedly via Iran.475

169. Russian Incidents

On November 28, 1941, a message from Hsinking reported that forty-seven airplanes of an unrecognizable type, although they were definitely of American design and construction, had flown over the city of Kuibyshev during a military review in celebration of the anniversary of the revolution. It was further reported that large bodies of anti-communist forces were fighting in the vicinity of Minsk and south of Krasnoyarsk, destroying lines of communications.

"Intelligence of primary importance" was sent to the effect that twenty unsuccessful deserters who had tried to get into Manchukuo had been executed before a firing squad of the 39th Sharpshooters Division. By November 28 forty-six Russian troops had deserted. To prevent further desertions the Soviet Army had moved certain detachments away from the border and had strung charged barbed wire fences along the border. Regiments, moreover, were held responsible for detachments from which there had been deserters. On the Ude front surveillance troops of the outer Mongolian area had deliberately trespassed on Mongolian territory several times, even to the extent of ten to twenty kilometers. These troops were taking a strong, hostile attitude toward Japanese surveillance troops.476

The Foreign Office in Tokyo informed Hsinking on November 28 that Russian newspapers, quoting a Domei news report, had carried the story that a Russian division had crossed the Manchurian border. In the fighting some soldiers had been killed and others taken prisoner. However, the Russian press had reported that this was at variance with the facts, and that Russian soldiers had not crossed the border. Tokyo asked that Japanese officials in Hsinking report the true situation, since the Japanese Ambassador in Manchuria had reported the story in substantially the same form.477

475 IV, 339.
476 IV, 340.
477 IV, 341.
PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(a) Japanese-American Relations

170. Japanese Consul Considers Means of Evacuating Nationals
In keeping with plans to embark evacuees on the *Hikawa Maru*, Consul Jisaburo Sato in Seattle wired that Vancouver, Portland, and one other office would again be consulted in the event that funds were not at hand to pay expenses of nationals. He added that, in the matter of life belts, it was understood that there were plentiful supplies in stock at San Francisco.478

171. Consul Morishima Applies for Permit to Transfer American Mission Funds
Referring to a previous dispatch which concerned the transfer of donations from the combined organizations of all American mission boards to Japan, Consul Morito Morishima in New York informed Tokyo that he had applied to the government for a permit to transfer these funds. The amount to be sent to Japan proper totaled more than $37,000, and to Korea, more than $7,700, excluding the funds for St. Luke's Hospital and the Women's Christian College.479

172. Japanese Fear That Mr. Kasai's Lecture May Cause Embarrassment
From Consul Yoshio Muto in San Francisco came word on October 20, 1941, that Mr. Jiuji Kasai, a member of the Japanese Parliament, was scheduled to deliver a lecture on October 29 on the subject “Will Japan and the United States Fight?” Pointing out that such a lecture might cause embarrassment to the propaganda work in San Francisco, he advised that Japanese officials caution Mr. Kasai as much as possible during his visit in the United States. Consul Muto further suggested that Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura have Mr. Kasai cancel his lecture.480

173. Consul Originates Plan to Repay Nationals in Tokyo
Since Japanese evacuees from the United States were allowed to take not more than $210 with them, the Japanese Consul in Portland, Oregon, asked if some arrangement could be made whereby the nationals could pay funds into that office and receive payment in Tokyo in Japanese currency. The difficulty of this plan lay in the fact that the office was short of funds and could not pay the traveling expenses of any official transferring to another place. He asked, however, that this plan be considered and that immediate reply be sent to him.481

174. Secretary Terasaki Suggests Delay of Orders for Official Harada
Secretary Hidenari Terasaki questioned Mr. Yoshioka in Tokyo as to the advisability of having Official Harada sail on the *Hikawa Maru* which would leave Seattle on November 4, 1941, since his stay in the United States would be cut too short to carry out his instructions. The Secretary suggested instead that Mr. Harada leave on the *Terukawa Maru*, which would leave from Manzanillo early in December, and he asked if there were any objections to the Official's prolonging his stay.482

478 IV, 342.
479 IV, 343.
480 IV, 344.
481 IV, 345.
482 IV, 346.
175. Japanese Plan to Route Money to Vancouver Through Seattle

Meanwhile, the Foreign Minister was attempting to procure the consent of the United States to establish a route for the sending of money through Seattle to Vancouver. The money would be sent through the Yokohama Specie Bank.483

176. Sailing of Hikawa Maru Forces Secretary Matsui to Leave Japan Without Visa

Having been forced to leave Tokyo when the Hikawa Maru had sailed, Secretary Matsui, who was en route to his new post in Washington, had embarked without waiting for his visa to come through. Foreign Minister Togo directed that Ambassador Nomura have United States officials send instructions concerning Mr. Matsui to the American Consul in Vancouver. Secretary Matsui had already procured his Canadian passport and entrance visa.484

Furthermore, the Ambassador was instructed to negotiate to ensure that the confidential documents being brought on the Hikawa Maru would be passed through customs without being opened.485

Ambassador Nomura learned on October 20, 1941 that the Hikawa Maru had left Yokohama on this day with Kensuke Sato of the Foreign Office and Communications Engineer Kiichiro Ueno aboard.486

177. Japanese Consul at Vladivostok Views Pessimistically the Adjustment of Japanese-American Relations

Retransmitting the opinions of the Consul at Vladivostok which had been sent to Foreign Minister Togo, Tokyo informed officials in Hsinking that the present status of the Hull-Nomura discussions indicated the Tojo Cabinet must not alter Japan’s fundamental task of establishing its place in the Far East. After observing the progress of the Russo-Anglo-American conversations, the Vladivostok Consul felt that the adjustment of the Japanese-American relations appeared to be hopeless.487

178. Propaganda Regulations Will Apply to Neutral Countries, Japan Decrees

On October 21, 1941 Tokyo informed Berlin that Japan had decided to apply certain regulations in the case of a neutral country’s propaganda work for a belligerent nation. Although admitting that the United States Embassy had not been distributing bulletins, Japan pointed out that should this office undertake propaganda work in Britain’s stead in Japan, this work would have to be taken under control. Further, Berlin was coming to understand that British and American affiliated news correspondents were already being discriminated against to some extent, and that a large number of dispatches received by Domei and other concerns were either prohibited from publication or else withheld voluntarily.488

179. Harada to Bring Wireless Apparatus on Hikawa Maru

The Foreign Minister directed Consul Rioyji in Los Angeles to send to San Francisco the wireless apparatus he had previously requested. At that place it would be taken by Administration Official Harada and brought to Japan.489
180. Swiss Newspaper Reports Progress of Japanese-American Negotiations

One of the news dispatches referring to the Japanese-American negotiations was reported to Tokyo from Rome on October 22, 1941. According to the intelligence a Swiss newspaper had published a dispatch from Washington to the effect that when the Japanese government had expressed a desire to resume negotiations, the United States had accepted. It was further alleged that the United States had presented four sine qua non terms and that the Japanese government had accepted them in principle.490

181. Delay of Sailing Permit Will Cause Financial Loss, Japan Declares

Ambassador Nomura was instructed by the Home Foreign Office on October 22, 1941 to attempt to get a permit from the American authorities for the sailing of the Shoyo Maru, which was waiting in San Francisco harbor. To pay for additional supplies of water and food for this ship, the Japan-Eastern Mining Company had presented a letter of credit for $900 on the Yokohama Specie Bank but they had lacked an American permit to cash it. The delay in sailing would amount to $3,000 additional cost. Moreover, as for an application by the San Francisco branch of the Japanese Mitsui Bussan Company for 350 tons of fuel oil, the permit had not as yet been granted.491 On this same day, however, Ambassador Nomura replied that Mr. Atcheson had arranged to have the permit issued immediately.492

182. Ambassador Inquires Concerning Return of Japanese Students

Ambassador Nomura sent an inquiry to Tokyo in regard to the early sailing of the Japanese residents who were studying abroad. He asked if it were Tokyo’s policy to cut short the terms of those students and have them return home aboard the Asama Maru, which would touch port at Lisbon. The Ambassador also inquired as to the date on which the boat would dock there.493

183. Ambassador Nomura Sends Part of Personal Luggage to Japan

Since Semi-Official Obata would carry a considerable amount of Ambassador Nomura’s luggage when he returned to Tokyo on the Tatsuta Maru, the Ambassador requested that a member of the staff be sent to Yokohama to meet this official.494

184. Foreign Minister Togo Urges Salary Remittance Exchange for Foreign Correspondents

Another minor matter to be negotiated by Ambassador Nomura in Washington, but one which would determine future policy, was the transmission of the $1,000 monthly salary to ---Who was employed by the Universal News Feature Service. Because the American government had not as yet granted permission to remit monthly salary drafts, --- was understood to be financially embarrassed. Foreign Minister Togo pointed out that this would determine the granting of further permits to American newspapers to pay their correspondents in Japan.495

490IV, 354.
491IV, 355.
492IV, 356.
493IV, 357.
494IV, 358.
495IV, 359.
*DoD comment: Name withheld.
185. Japan Asks for Foreign Broadcast Suggestions

In a circular dispatch to Japanese officials in North and South American countries, Foreign Minister Togo reported that Japan had changed the direction, time and contents of its foreign broadcasts. Since the change had been made at the end of September, the Foreign Minister asked in his dispatch on October 24, 1941 that the Japanese officials make any suggestions concerning technique, contents and priority which they considered advisable.496

Ambassador Nomura requested on October 24, 1941 that the home Foreign Office arrange for the receipt of twenty-two boxes of records which were being sent to Japan on the Norfolk Maru. A wooden box inside one of the twenty-two boxes was to be turned over to the Navy Ministry.497

186. American Embassy in Tokyo to Get Fuel

In referring to the State Department’s request for heating fuel for the American Embassy in Japan, Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura on October 25, that the Fuel Bureau had agreed to supply oil for the Embassy heating system in Tokyo. The original dispatch explaining the fuel shortage had been sent on October 14 by Ambassador Nomura.498

187. Tokyo Requests Officials to Bring Recording Apparatus

Three days later Foreign Minister Togo inquired whether the short wave receiving apparatus he had previously requested had already been dispatched to Tokyo. Should the set be awaiting transportation, it was to be sent by the Tatsuta Maru, in care of Extraordinary Official Kobata, as part of Ambassador Nomura’s baggage.499 Consul Muto in San Francisco answered that Official Kobata, who was embarking on the Tatsuta Maru, would take the apparatus to Japan. He further reported that five recording machines and cylinders which were labeled as the personal baggage of Mr. Kanome Wakasugi had been loaded on the Itsukushima Maru, and that five # 90 recording machines and five # 66 recording machines as well as twenty typewriters and cylinders could not be shipped because of the freezing legislation. The wireless sets had already been loaded on the Itsukushima Maru as the hand baggage of Colonel Oka.500

188. Exchange of Diplomatic Expense Funds Gives Rise to Discussion

In reply to a dispatch from Foreign Minister Togo concerning the procurement of expense money by Americans in Japan,501 Ambassador Nomura answered on October 29, 1941 that according to the American government and the National City Bank, if dollars were paid to the Yokohama Specie Bank in America and if the Yokohama Specie Bank in Tokyo paid an equivalent amount to the Americans there, the exchange transaction would be complete; consequently, it would be unnecessary for American diplomatic establishments and Embassies in Tokyo to issue checks and drafts to be cashed by the National City Bank. He pointed out that inasmuch as there were no mail facilities at present between Japan and America, exchange and the buying and selling of checks were most inconvenient and that there was no other way than to remit funds by telegraph.502 The Ambassador requested permission to confer with Secretary Hull in regard to this proposal.

496IV, 360.
497IV, 361.
498IV, 362.
499IV, 363.
500IV, 364.
501IV, 365.
Foreign Minister Togo answered on the following day that the American Embassy in Tokyo had been asked to have its money sent by the American government through the Yokohama Specie Bank, but that because of the red tape involved, the Embassy preferred to continue their customary method of selling money orders and checks. At the present time, he said, the staff of the Embassy and its members wrote checks on their private accounts in banks in the United States. These private checks would be sold, according to the practice of using the reverse money order. Therefore Japan suggested that the responsibility for this practice be placed on the National City Bank of New York and affiliated banks, and that the National City Bank's cash funds in Japan be held to ensure its fixed deposits rather than to buy money orders. The only money which could be used for this purpose would be that received by the Yokohama Specie Bank through the sale of telegraphic money orders from America. It was asked that the proposal be made along these lines to the State Department and the result wired by 2:00 p.m., October 31.

From Mr. Atcheson of the State Department Finance division, Mr. Sadao Iguchi learned that details of the negotiations concerning expense money for diplomatic staffs and employees would be sent to Ambassador Joseph C. Grew. Ambassador Nomura asked that those instructions sent to Ambassador Grew be carried out, although the question of the payment of back salaries still remained pending. Since the United States had asked that the salaries for August and September as well as those for October be paid in a lump sum, Ambassador Nomura asked that the Foreign Office contact the finance ministry immediately and wire a reply.

On October 31, however, Ambassador Nomura informed his home Foreign Office that Treasury Department officials had insisted on further delay, declaring that they would have to consider the mutual release of funds for the expenses of diplomatic establishments from all angles. He pointed out that the United States refused, moreover, to ease its economic pressure on Japan, particularly in the matter of supply oil, unless Japan completely mended her ways. Certain oil tankers which were evidently in the United States and which were awaiting developments had been ordered to sail. Ambassador Nomura believed that all matters involving relations between the two countries were greatly affected by the adjustment of the relations proposal under consideration.

189. Minister Directs That Cargo Ships Return to Japan

Referring to a dispatch of October 14 regarding export permits for gasoline, Foreign Minister Togo instructed on October 30, 1941 that in case negotiations were not completed soon, arrangements should be made to have the Itsukushima Maru and the Shoyo Maru sent back to Japan. In this regard Ambassador Nomura was to get in touch with San Francisco and Japanese finance officials.

190. Broadcast Wave Length Proves Unsatisfactory

Reporting, as was requested on October 24, Ambassador Nomura declared that there was no sensitivity and that reception was impossible on the new wave length. He requested that the wave length be changed immediately to JAU 2–7.237.5 k.c.
191. Japan Learns of Alleged Source of News Leak

According to an intelligence report which was transmitted to Tokyo on November 1, 1941, a conversation with ——* and Secretary Terasaki was reported. ——* declared that when he had talked with President Roosevelt, the President had disclosed that he had hoped more strongly now than ever to meet the leaders of Japan. With the idea that this disclosure was a great “scoop”, ——* had immediately wired his New York editor, who believed this matter to be too grave in its implication and thereby delayed the publication. In addition, ——* had “sounded out” an official in the State Department. He had learned from him that Japan had proposed the Konoye-Roosevelt conference be held on board a Japanese warship. Although ——* had withheld the announcement for a few days, he had finally published it. It was the belief of ——* that the State Department was divided into two factions, the Moderationists and the Strong Policy Advocates, the first group headed by the President and including Under Secretary Sumner Welles, Maxwell M. Hamilton and Joseph W. Ballantine, the second group consisting of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Mr. Stanley Hornbeck and Cabot Coville.509

192. Ambassador Nomura Sends Representative to “America First” Meeting

Ambassador Nomura informed Tokyo that he had rushed Secretary Terasaki to New York on October 30 for the meeting of the America First Committee. There the intelligence agent has met ——* Secretary Terasaki asked ——* to tell Colonel Lindbergh, who was for “America First”, that the United States was about to fight with Germany concerning its policy of “Britain First” in the Atlantic, and with Japan under its policy of “China First” in the Pacific. He commented on the fact that a crisis was at hand between Japan and the United States and that the American people did not understand the reason for such a war, although, fundamentally, it would be due to the China problem. Secretary Terasaki had further stated on this occasion that it was a mistake to think that Japan would give in if it were driven into a tight corner by the United States. It was necessary to view realistically the situation in the Orient, since it was most inconsistent to fear a southward push by Japan and at the same time to cut off her petroleum supplies.510

193. Japanese Officials Plan to Organize and Finance New Committee

On the morning of October 31, Secretary Terasaki had discussed with ——* the same topics about which he and ——* had talked.511

Ambassador Nomura reported on November 1, 1941 that ——* would continue to devote his efforts toward the organizing of a committee to permit friendly relations between Japan and America. Although Secretary Terasaki would be the liaison agent, the committee would be promoted by Americans and would have the appearance of being financed by American money in spite of the fact that a portion of the actual expense would be born by the Japanese Embassy.

Ambassador Nomura explained at this time that an early attempt to establish the committee had been delayed by the United States freezing order and by the invasion of French Indo-China. The committee had no influential members when the first meeting was held in New York. ——* had proposed that a second meeting of the committee be held in Washington in

*DoD comment: Name withheld.
509 IV, 373.
*DoD comment: Name withheld.
*DoD comment: Name withheld.
510 IV, 374.
511 IV, 375.
*DoD comment: Name withheld.
September (sic) to discuss Japanese-American relations. Explaining the present state of strained relations between the two countries, Secretary Terasaki pointed out that as long as America continued to withhold oil from Japan, there was not much hope of progress being made. Secretary Terasaki desired to have a member of the committee meet with Secretary of State Hull to state the objections of the committee, which meeting would determine whether the committee should be continued or dissolved. It had been arranged, Ambassador Nomura said, to have ______^come to Washington to carry out this program.\(^512\)

194. Tokyo Foresees Need of Survey of United States Economic System

On November 1, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo explained that the necessity of a complete survey of present United States economics under war time conditions had been recognized by Japan for a long time. Since Japan’s 1941 budget included expenditures for the survey, it was planned to expand the financial division of the Tokyo, New York, and Washington offices and to establish an independent economic survey office in New York. Temporarily, however, in view of present conditions, it had been decided to proceed only with the expansion of present financial divisions, and the Embassy was instructed to commence their work with the commercial attache’s office, using any suitable United States surveys already made on this subject. The Ambassador would be allowed one secretary and two clerks for this work, and suitable persons were now being selected.\(^513\)

195. Ambassador Nomura Says American People Not Ready to Enter European War

For the information of the Japanese Foreign Minister, as well as Minister Yoshiaki Miura in Mexico, Ambassador Nomura sent a dispatch painting a general picture of the situation as he saw it on November 4, 1941. It was his belief that the public mind in the United States was not one iota more incensed against Germany in spite of the increase in damages to destroyers and merchantmen. Therefore, it was unlikely that the government would sever relations with Germany and invite war. Germany, knowing that a bout with the United States would not be advantageous, would, as far as possible, refrain from an outright war against America. At the present time, content with furnishing the maximum material assistance, patrolling the sea, and affording technical aid, the United States was not yet ready to become involved in Europe.\(^514\)

Inside the United States, the people were worrying about internal problems such as prices, increased taxes, inflation and other such matters affecting their immediate welfare. Government officials, on the other hand, seemed inclined to want to keep England fighting, and when the last extremities were reached, to jump in and seize the victory. That the United States was aiding Russia did not signify that it approved of Communism, but meant only that the United States could use Russia to its own ends, Ambassador Nomura declared.\(^515\)

As to the exertion of pressure on the Japanese, however, the American officials had the full backing of American people, who seemed to think that their present strength in the Atlantic was sufficient for national defense and for protection against war. In the face of Japan’s dauntless attitude, the Americans did not show the slightest fear.\(^516\) Military officials, however, did not share this optimism since they knew both that English morale was not as good as reported.

\(^{*}\text{DoD comment: Name withheld.}\)
\(^{517}\text{IV, 376.}\)
\(^{*}\text{DoD comment: Name withheld.}\)
\(^{518}\text{IV, 377.}\)
\(^{519}\text{IV, 378.}\)
\(^{520}\text{IV, 379.}\)
\(^{521}\text{IV, 380.}\)
and that, after the fall of Russia, England might possibly make peace with Germany. They realized that the Mediterranean Sea was a grave peril and that the United States was intending to under-emphasize the situation in the Pacific while exaggerating the gravity of the problem in the Atlantic. These military officials knew full well what a nuisance a war in the Pacific would be. In the advent of war, editorials had stated that the location of troops and the moment for striking would be chosen quickly, as soon as the whole situation had been taken into consideration.517

196. Japan Asks Representations in Mail Examination
That the American understanding of the arrangements with the United States government concerning the schedule of ships carrying mail differed from the Japanese understanding, was pointed out in a dispatch from the Foreign Minister to Washington on November 4, 1941. An undesirable effect had been created by the unexpected examination of the mail on the night before the sailing of the Tatsuta Maru, and it was suggested that representations clarifying the mail situation be made to the State Department. It was necessary that the loading of mail on the Taiyo Maru and the Hikawa Maru be carried out without difficulty.518

198. Ambassador Nomura Reports on Broadcast Reception
In answer to a request from Tokyo for comment on the effectiveness of a change in foreign broadcasts, Ambassador Nomura, on November 5, 1941, explained that the sensitivity of the JLG 415.105 Kcs broadcast was fairly good but that other powerful stations interfered after 8:00 p.m. The sensitivity of this same wave length to San Francisco, however, was excellent from 6:00 to 8:00 p.m., and reception was clear.520

On November 7, 1941, Tokyo transmitted a list itemizing the disposition of the October and November salaries of the various diplomatic and counselor offices in the United States. The salaries and expenses of twenty-four of the personnel of the Embassy in Washington, as well as the actual transfer, entertainment and telegraphic expenses, were itemized in yen.521

200. Japan Reprimands Officials Concerning Dispatch Classification
A dispatch reprimanding Japanese official establishments in the United States, Thailand, and Batavia because of their high priority dispatch classification was transmitted on November 8, 1941. The chief of the Telegraphic Communications in Tokyo explained that the number of messages designated "Kinqu" meaning "extremely urgent" had greatly increased, thereby implying that they were of such vital importance that they need be passed on at whatever hour received to the Foreign Minister, Vice Minister or any other principal officials. Many of these wires had been designated "Kinqu" with utter disregard as to their contents, and the Japanese Embassy in the United States was the most frequent user of this classification. Furthermore, the Chief said there was certainly no necessity to put the words "very urgent" in English before the address. He asked that special consideration be given to the choice of "Kinqu", "Daiqu" meaning "urgent" and "Sikyu" meaning "priority". 522

517 IV, 381.
518 IV, 382.
520 IV, 384.
522 IV, 385.
522 IV, 386.
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

201. Consul Muto Reports Further Investigation of Japanese Agents

Further investigation by the F.B.I. of a ———" was reported by Consul Muto on November 9, 1941. It was apparent that although primarily interested in gathering evidence to be used against ———" and ———" they considered this case an important one. It was also evident that the Department of Justice was conducting the investigation because of the numerous statements being made by the Dies Committee regarding Japanese propaganda in the United States. Evidently, too, the Department felt the need of an excuse for demanding the recall from the United States to Japan of all Japanese Consuls General and Consuls.523

202. Consul Muto Asks Confirmation of ———" Salary As Employee of Japanese Newspaper

In regard to the investigation of ———" who was officially registered as a foreign correspondent for the ———", Consul Muto said that there was little danger of his being prosecuted since during the examination he would doubtless be called upon to prove that he was hired by the ———" newspaper at $350 per month. The Consul asked that, in case of an inquiry to the newspaper's home office, this fact be confirmed.524

203. American Bank in Tokyo Receives No Instructions to Cooperate in Japanese Exchange Plan

Referring to a suggestion made by Japan regarding financial arrangements to take care of the diplomatic expenditures in the two countries, Foreign Minister Togo wired on November 10 that the National City Bank branch in Tokyo had received no instructions from its home office. He asked that officials in Washington investigate the possibility that the home office of the National City Bank did not understand the situation.525

204. Manchukuoan Officials Seize Baptist Missionaries in Harbin

Ambassador Nomura learned, on November 11, that Manchukuoan police officials had arrested three American missionaries in Harbin on October 22. Charged with infraction of the peace preservation laws, the Baptist missionaries were said to have been instrumental in organizing secret Korean organizations. Tokyo had suggested to its Ambassador in Manchukuo that the missionaries be deported. After conferring with the military and the Manchukuoan authorities, the Ambassador said that the missionaries would be deported.526

In a message to Hsingking on the next day, Tokyo declared that the American Embassy had asked that if the missionaries were to be given a fair trial, they be permitted before banishment to visit Harbin to settle their personal affairs.527 Manchukuoan officials and military authorities authorized this visit to Harbin.528

205. Foreign Minister Outlines Policy in China in Event of United States War

In a circular dispatch to Japanese-occupied states in China, Foreign Minister Togo on November 14 outlined Japanese foreign policy in China, should war be declared between Japan and the United States. The Cabinet had decided to destroy completely British and American power in China, to take over all concessions, rights and interests as well as the rights and interests of enemy powers, even should they be connected with the new Chinese government.

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523 IV, 387.
524 Ibid.
525 IV, 388.
526 IV, 389-391.
527 IV, 392.
528 IV, 393.
In carrying out these steps, the Imperial Government would avoid exhausting its veteran troops thereby providing strength to cope with a world war on a long time scale. The whole fundamental policy of the Imperial Government would be to reinforce military strength from the whole Far Eastern area should Japanese reserves and military strength for total war wane. In the realization of these steps, it was decided to utilize important Chinese in the occupied territories insofar as was possible, thereby providing for the cooperative occupation of military bases by Japan and China. At the same time, Japan would place great importance upon the acquisition of materials, especially from unoccupied areas. Consequently, the circular directed that various restrictions then in force would be relaxed, although officials were to await further instructions before carrying out decisions in this respect.529

206. Lima, Peru Chosen for Gold Deposits for Emergency Use

Viewing the prospect of an emergency, at which time diplomats, government officials and other Japanese would be forced to evacuate, the finance official in Washington requested that the Vice Minister of Finance in Tokyo arrange to have gold available in Lima, Peru. Since the exchange control was more lenient in Peru, he asked that the Yokohama Specie Bank branch in that city be given the right of attorney for the purpose of issuing the payment of gold.530

207. Tokyo Sends Instructions for Emergency Destruction of Code Machines

In a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 15, 1941, Japanese officials explained the order and method in which their code machines were to be destroyed in the event of an emergency. Explicit instructions regarding the disposal of the scrambling section, the printer and all other markers on the machines and rectifiers were included in the dispatch which was to be relayed by Washington to Mexico, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires.531

208. United States Attempts to Separate Italy from Axis, Ambassador Nomura Reports

In an intelligence report on November 16, Ambassador Nomura stated that according to Mr. L. Dainelli, secretary attached to the Italian Embassy, the United States was doing everything in its power to get Italy to leave the Axis. According to the Secretary, American Ambassador Phillips in Rome had worked hard to arrange a conference between President Roosevelt and Benito Mussolini in the Azores. The attempt ended in failure due to Italy's fear of German objection. The Japanese intelligence agent who reported the Italian Secretary's remarks, added that the United States strategy to be employed against Japan in case of a Japanese-American war was to demolish the manufacturing centers at the outset by means of air raids. It was an understanding that sixteen airplane carriers were either being remodeled or camouflaged and that thirty-two additional ones were in the process of construction. A further strategy would be to isolate Japanese forces in China by severing through submarine warfare Japanese supply routes in the China Sea.532

209. Japan Plans to Preserve Shanghai Public Peace When American Marines Evacuate

Meanwhile, in Shanghai, the Commander of the American Marines had discussed with the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces there official orders for the withdrawal of the
American Marines at that place. Consequently, it was learned on November 17, 1941 that the Japanese armies planned to divide the responsibility for the defense of the "C" area between the Municipal Council Police and the Shanghai volunteer squad. The Japanese army, however, would participate freely to preserve public peace whenever it was deemed necessary. An announcement of Japanese intentions in respect to defending this area would be made on November 20.

210. Tokyo Decides to Permit Remittances from America to Cultural Institutions

By November 18, 1941, the Imperial Government had decided to grant permits to religious organizations in Japan to receive remittances from America. They would also permit remittances from Japanese to cultural organizations in America which amount was estimated at 400,000 yen. According to the dispatch from Tokyo to Hsingking, negotiations were being conducted in America on this matter.

211. Tokyo Advises Ambassador Nomura of Plan of Evacuation

Ambassador Nomura was advised on November 18, 1941 of a plan to evacuate from the United States in case of necessity, the remaining Japanese officials and such persons as must absolutely not be held back, company officials, and all residents who were unable to board the three ships previously dispatched. No one would be warned save those residents who must return to Japan. The Foreign Minister explained that the number of those who embarked at the first sailing was much smaller than the original number of applicants due doubtless to nostalgia and reluctance to part with their property in the United States. The consuls were to be advised secretly to help those citizens who were to remain behind to work together for the common good, and to destroy immediately such secret documents as were in the possession of Japanese Companies and Chambers of Commerce. In case of Paragraph "B", (referring to a dispatch of November 15) means of cooperation between the diplomatic officials and consulates, as well as responsibility for the interests of the high offices, were being studied. Meanwhile, a plan to reduce the sizes of staffs was being formulated.

212. Japanese Officials in European Countries Warned of Critical Situation

To the pro-Axis minded Ambassador in Turkey, Foreign Minister Togo directed a dispatch concerning Japanese-American relations. He reported that the government had been in conference with Imperial General Headquarters since November 7 for the purpose of discussing the achievements of diplomatic relations on a just basis. Although there was considerable doubt that a settlement of negotiations would be reached, Japan felt that it had given its maximum efforts to bring about a settlement of negotiations. Since an optimistic viewpoint for the future was not permitted, Japan expected to find itself in an extremely critical situation should these negotiations be broken off. Japanese official establishments in Switzerland, Moscow, France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, South Africa, Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary received this information.

213. Shanghai United Settlement Council Decides Cooperative Protection Plan

Following the withdrawal of the American Marines from Shanghai, it was decided that the Military Training Bureau Police should assume patrol of the British section in that city. According to the dispatch of November 20, 1941, this plan had been suggested at the meeting of

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533 IV, 398.
534 IV, 399.
535 IV, Part A 115.
536 IV, 400.
537 IV, 401.
the United Settlement Council on November 10. Such a plan was to be communicated to the Marine Commander and would explain the cooperative protection plan in which the organized structures would be determined by the various army groups participating.538

214. Japanese Agents Report American Hospital Staffs To Be Evacuating Peking, China

From an intelligence dispatch originating in Peking, China, Tokyo learned of reports that Missionary University and Rockefeller Hospital personnel had received orders from the American government to evacuate. Consequently, Mr. Stewart and other members were hurrying to leave by way of Shanghai. Further advice on this subject would be later transmitted.539

215. Foreign Minister Directs Havana Consul in Regard to Emergency Fund

Meanwhile, the Consul in Havana had received a dispatch on November 20, 1941 from Foreign Minister Togo concerning the 3,000 dollars which he was to have on hand.540 Furthermore, instructions were sent from Tokyo on this day to Mr. Mogami, Trade Bureau representative in New York, to sell his furnishings, close his office, and evacuate with the rest of the Consulate. He was given permission to dispose of unimportant items.541

216. Foreign Office Considers Scheduling Another Evacuation Vessel

The information that an understanding had been established between Japan and the United States regarding the dispatching of a second ship was transmitted to Washington from Tokyo on November 24, 1941. In view of the ever worsening state of affairs between the two countries, the Foreign Office was considering the dispatch of a second vessel. Ambassador Nomura was instructed to impress upon the leaders of the Japanese residents in the United States that officials were considering their welfare and were looking out for their safety.542


Japanese officials in Tokyo had decided that the best way to provide funds for the South American diplomatic establishments would be to collect the unfrozen dollar accounts of Japanese residents in the United States with repayment assured later in Japan proper. As soon as Ambassador Nomura had estimated the amount which could be collected by this method, he was to send the information to Tokyo. Furthermore, he was to consider the ways or means of sending the funds so collected to the South American offices by courier mail. The personal funds of the Japanese nationals in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco were also to be utilized in this plan.543

218. Consul Morishima Asks That the Tatsuta Maru Dock at New York

Meanwhile Consul Morishima in New York suggested that the Tatsuta Maru touch port there since there were many in New York who wished to return home and for whom such an arrangement would be convenient in many ways.544

538 IV, 402.
539 IV, 403.
540 IV, 404.
541 IV, 405.
542 IV, 406.
543 IV, 407-408.
544 IV, 409.
220. Japan Wires Washington Schedule of the Tatsuta Maru

In the tentative schedule wired to Washington it was decided that the Tatsuta Maru would leave Yokohama on December 2, 1941, arrive at Los Angeles on December 14, 1941, leave Los Angeles December 16, 1941, and arrive at Balboa on December 24, 1941. Inasmuch as no plans had been made to dispatch any other vessels to the United States, Consul Morishima was advised to aid in returning as many Japanese as possible by this ship. Since it was necessary to wire the number to be evacuated, the Consul was to get in touch with the Japanese who would be returning and in as secret a manner as possible.

In accordance with instructions sent on November 18, 1941 that Japanese citizens who remained behind should be aided as much as possible, Ambassador Nomura wired on November 26, 1941 that Japanese residents all over America had already set up a mutual aid system for this purpose. In San Francisco a fund of $6,000 had been accumulated, but in Chicago and elsewhere the Japanese residents were weaker financially and had practically no funds. The Ambassador added that although the F.B.I. had compiled a complete register of members of the Japanese Association and the Industrial Council, there appeared to be no stigma attached to the list.

221. Japan Decides to Close the Japanese Cultural Association

According to a Japanese dispatch of November 26, 1941 from New York to Tokyo, a proposition whereby Japan would permit remittances of funds to an unidentified organization and the Women's College in Tokyo, if the United States would release 30,000 yen for the Japanese Cultural Association in the United States was refused. Inasmuch as rumors pointed to Secretary Hull's being very suspicious of this organization's activities, the Consul feared that the Cultural Association had very little chance of getting any expense funds. Although there was no understanding with the United States concerning the continuance of this organization, if and when the worst happened it would nevertheless be difficult to close it suddenly.

He advised, therefore, that the Cultural Association be closed immediately and that a special ship be sent to transport its employees to Japan. Should the organization close down, the Consul had already effected an understanding with Columbia University to take over the Association's curies and books. He pointed out that the organization's position as an American institution would be continued in this way.

222. Bank Employees Receive Instructions to Evacuate With the Embassy Staff

On November 25, 1941 Ambassador Nomura informed Japan that according to Commissioner Tsutomu Nishiyama the New York staff of the Bank of Japan would act in accordance with the Embassy staff regarding evacuation from the United States. He asked that the Foreign Office get in touch with all banks and companies with representatives in the United States. This dispatch was translated on December 5, 1941.


On November 25, 1941, the Ambassador forwarded to Tokyo a dispatch which named the agencies in the United States. According to the dispatch the Los Angeles News, the Calif-
ornia Daily News and the American Industrial Daily in Los Angeles had Japanese affiliations. In San Francisco the North American Times and the North American Daily received Japanese broadcasts. He also mentioned the Globe Press Service and the NBC Broadcasting Company as having foreign affiliations. He added that the United States Press Wireless, the New York Times and the New York Herald Times had maintained listening stations from time to time although at the present time this service was suspended.552

224. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Improvements in Broadcast Service

For the purpose of improving the reception of Japanese broadcasts (Ambassador Nomura had previously complained about bad radio reception), he suggested that 12,000 to 13,000 kilocycles be used in the summer and that 7,000 to 12,000 kilocycles be used as the best wave length in the winter. Besides suggesting improvement in sensitivity and time of broadcast, he said that the contents were unnecessarily verbose and not sufficiently accurate, and that the reports concerning conditions in Japan should be more terse and up to the minute. In regard to the China incident, he suggested that the news be summarized from various quarters about once a week. He further suggested that the Domei Agency take the leadership in keeping Japanese residents in the United States informed regarding the course of Japanese relations in case of an emergency.554

Two days later Tokyo wired a new broadcast schedule which would apply to the Pacific coast, to the Western hemisphere and to Europe.555

On the same day, however, Japanese officials in Washington requested that two of the radio wave lengths be changed immediately because of poor reception. It was added that the European broadcast could not be heard at all.556

225. An Emergency Code System Becomes Effective

On November 27, 1941 a circular dispatch from Tokyo outlined an emergency dispatch system using hidden-word or misleading-language telegrams. A table was to be made up with the left hand column containing the code words and the right the corresponding plain text. It was directed that a careful study of the table be made and that care be taken to make no mistake in transcribing the dispatch. To distinguish these cables from others, the English word "stop" would be added at the end as an indicator. For example, the code word "Hatakeyama" would mean "relations between Japan and ______ have been severed". Code words to indicate the names of third countries as well as times of day, month and year were included in the list. This dispatch was decoded and translated on December 2, 1941.557 (Comment."

226. Ambassador Nomura Is Asked to Request Permits for Entrance of Japanese from Hawaii

On November 28, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo asked that Ambassador Nomura negotiate in the difficulty of returning approximately ten evacuees from Hawaii to Tokyo. He pointed out the Japanese must either go to Los Angeles by American boat or that they must get special permits as through passengers on a Japanese vessel by way of the United States. The matter had been taken up with the American Consul in Tokyo, Foreign Minister Togo added.558

552 IV, 418.
553 IV, 420-421.
554 IV, 418.
555 IV, 419.
556 IV, 422.
557 IV, 423.
558 IV, 424.
*DoD comment: See special supplement, Volume V, for study of "hidden word" messages.
559 IV, 424.
An ambiguous reply, sent three days later, answered that the State Department had no objection to the evacuees changing from Los Angeles to Honolulu.\footnote{IV, 425.}

227. Japan Requests Manchukuo to Release American Missionaries

In a wire to Hsinking, Manchukuo, Foreign Minister Togo disclosed that Ambassador Nomura had again inquired regarding the probable date of the release of the missionaries. Since Japan was interested in cultivating good will in order to dispatch the Tatsuta Maru to evacuate its nationals, Japanese officials directed that the date of the release of the missionaries and the prospects for the release be wired to the Home Office immediately.\footnote{IV, 426.}

228. Secretary Terasaki Requests Addresses of Foreigners Receiving American Newspapers

On November 29, 1941 Secretary Terasaki in Washington requested from Rio de Janeiro the addresses of two foreigners in that city who were receiving American newspapers and magazines. He asked that the reply be sent immediately.\footnote{IV, 427.} The names were later transmitted from Rio De Janeiro on December 3, 1941.\footnote{IV, 428.}

229. Difficulties Arise Concerning Evacuation of Dual Nationality Holders

A minor difficulty was reported to Tokyo on December 1, 1941 by Consul Kenjo Ito in New Orleans in regard to consulate employees who were dual nationality holders and wished to return to Japan. Since, according to previous instructions, employees were to be discharged and returned via the Tatsuta Maru, he asked whether they should obtain departure visas as Japanese; whether they should attempt to give up their United States citizenship in a day or so's time; or whether they could be taken out of the country as Consul employees, thus retaining their dual citizenship.\footnote{IV, 429.}

230. Japan Issues Orders Concerning Disposition of Codes and Code Machines

In a circular dispatch of December 1, 1941 the Japanese Legation in Washington was advised to destroy codes, when the necessity arose, by means of chemicals which were on hand in the NavalAttaché's office for this purpose. The Attaché should have been advised on the procedure by the Navy Minister, the dispatch declared.\footnote{IV, 430.}

231. Courier Kosaka Ordered Back to Japan

By December 1, 1941 Tokyo had decided to have Courier Samurai Kosaka, who would arrive shortly in Washington from Brazil, return to Japan on the Tatsuta Maru, which would leave Los Angeles on December 25, 1941. If this schedule interfered with Mr. Kosaka's planned trip, establishing communications with Mexico instead.\footnote{IV, 431.}


The Washington Legation learned on December 1, 1941 that regardless of a subsequent wire containing instructions, the United States office would retain its machines and machine codes. However, the four offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila had been...
instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to destroy them; the machine in Batavia had already been returned to Japan. The dispatch was translated on December 1, 1941. 566

233. Havana Office Directed to Destroy Codes
In a circular dispatch of December 2, 1941 (which was not read by United States cryptanalysts until December 8, 1941) recipients were instructed by the Foreign Minister to destroy all telegraphic codes, including code books for communication between the three departments and the code books for the army and navy communication. One copy of the “O” and “L” were to be retained, and as soon as this operation had been completed, the one word Haruna was to be transmitted. All secret documents and the work sheets on this dispatch were to be immediately burned. Explaining that these instructions were transmitted in preparation for an emergency situation, Foreign Minister Togo asked that definite pains be taken to maintain the secrecy of this action, and that the officials remain calm. 567

234. Officials Directed to Destroy Codes
On December 2, 1941, the Japanese Embassy in Washington received an order from Tokyo to destroy all codes except one copy each of the “O” and the “L” systems. Only one code machine, however, was to be destroyed; from this United States cryptanalysts learned for the first time that the Japanese Legation in Washington possessed more than one code machine. Further proof of this was the fact that on December 3, 1941, the day after this “destruction order”, there was normal volume in machine traffic between Washington and Tokyo. Also, all of the codes brought to the Washington office by Courier Kosaka were to be destroyed by burning. This dispatch was read by United States cryptanalysts on December 3, 1941. 568

In a Tokyo circular of December 2, 1941, it was disclosed that orders had been issued to diplomatic officials in North America and Manila, Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Seas, Singora, Chienmai, and to all officials in British and Netherlands territory to return acknowledgment after burning all telegraphic codes except one copy of “O” and “L”. This dispatch was transmitted from Berne, Switzerland, to Turkey on December 2, 1941. 569

235. Officials Directed to Retain Emergency Code System Also
However, according to a circular sent out by Tokyo on the next day, the code list “Ingo Hikae”, or hidden-word code, was to be retained by all offices until the last moment. In case this had already been destroyed, copies would be resent to those offices. 570

236. Provisions Are Made for Evacuation of Diplomats
In connection with Financial Attache Nishiyama’s suggestion that gold be sent to Lima, Peru, to provide for possible evacuation of diplomats from the United States, he was directed on December 3, 1941 to handle the matter in this way. He was first, however, to instruct the Specie Bank of his plans. 571

237. Japan Requests Permission to Change Schedule of Tatsuta Maru
Tokyo directed on December 3, 1941 that Ambassador Nomura request the State Department’s permission to change the schedule of the Tatsuta Maru, since Japan would like to have the vessel stop at Manzanillo or Acapulco en route from Los Angeles to Balboa. This stop was

564 IV, 432.
568 IV, 433.
567 IV, 434-435.
569 IV, 436.
570 IV, 437.
571 IV, 438.
to be made for the purpose of picking up fifty or sixty persons in Mexico who wished to return to Japan; no general cargo would be taken aboard.\textsuperscript{572}

238. Ambassador Nomura Urges Magnanimity in Paying Employees Remaining in United States

The question of the length and amount of payments of employees, both foreign and native, who remained in the United States was discussed by Ambassador Nomura in a message to Tokyo on December 3, 1941. In case of the unexpected happening, these employees would be placed in a difficult position from the standpoint of the law, and socially as potential enemies; and the Ambassador felt that it would be far better, with a view to their friendship in the future, to treat them with the magnanimity becoming a great nation rather than to make much ado over the amount of retirement allowances that they should receive. For these reasons he suggested that such employees be paid, in addition to previously specified amounts, one month's salary for each three years of service, without distinction as to foreigners or natives; he suggested the minimum total of payment to be two and a half months of salary, (and two months of salary for those who had worked less than two years). This dispatch was translated on December 9, 1941.\textsuperscript{573}

239. State Department Approves New Schedule for Tatsuta Maru

On consulting the State Department in regard to the rearranged schedule of the Tatsuta Maru, Ambassador Nomura learned that there was no opposition to the change. However, since it would be necessary to confirm the permission in writing, the Ambassador asked that he be advised as to when the ship would arrive in Balboa and what arrangements with Mexico had been completed.\textsuperscript{574}

As Secretary Terasaki was in the middle of intelligence work, it was requested that he remain in the United States during this important time and then sail on the Tatsuta Maru. It was further added that Mr. Hiroichi Takagi was possibly negotiating with the State Department regarding the Tatsuta Maru.\textsuperscript{575}

240. Ambassador Nomura is Instructed to Explain Japanese Military Activity in French Indo-China

On December 3, 1941 Ambassador Nomura was instructed to explain as follows the rumors that Japanese military garrisons in French Indo-China were being strengthened: actually Japan had only increased its forces in parts of North French Indo-China because of the unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. As a result of this, there would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part of French Indo-China. The Japanese Foreign Office presumed that exaggerated reports of these movements were the sources of the rumors that military strength was being increased. In no way had Japan violated the limitation contained in the Japanese-French Border Agreement.\textsuperscript{576}

241. Manchukuoan Officials Decide to Release Americans

Although the American Embassy in Tokyo had made special requests concerning the trial of the American missionaries in Harbin,\textsuperscript{577} Japanese officials in that city decided by December 4, 1941 to pronounce sentence upon the Americans. On December 5, 1941 their banishment from the country would become effective. The Manchukuoan authorities, however, would like to have these persons contact the American consul before they were escorted to the border.\textsuperscript{578}
242. Japan Sends Funds for Returning of Families of Japanese Diplomatic Employees

Meanwhile Japan wired that funds had been sent for the return passage for the families of Sadao Iguchi, Matsudaira, Takashashi, Horiuchi, Hiroshi Hori, Morito Morishima, Toyoji Inoue, Shinichi Kondo, Saichi Amano, Hayasida, and Watanabe. 576

243. American Embassy Requires No Permit for Taking Out Personal Belongings

On December 4, 1941, the Foreign Minister in Japan declared that an officer of the American Embassy had brought to the Head of the American Section on October 14, 1941 a dispatch directing that no permit would be required to take out personal effects, household effects, or personal baggage. 579

244. Ambassador Kurusu Suggests United States Investigate Western Transportation Company

For Ambassador Nomura’s information, a Japanese dispatch of December 4, 1941 declared that eighty or ninety per cent of the materials carried by rail via Burma went to fatten the coffer of Mr. Soong. This was due to the fact that all shipping on the Burma route was a monopoly of the Western Transportation Company, which was in turn controlled by the Soong interest, and that only ten or twenty per cent of the electric freight trains on the route were used for the transportation of materials for the government. This information had come to Japan through a ________, an acquaintance of Ambassador Kurusu. ________ had heard these facts on November 26, 1941 from the Shanghai Branch Manager of the Canadian Pacific. If Ambassador Kurusu suggested to the United States that the Western Transportation Company be investigated, the results of the investigation might dampen United States aid to China. 581

246. Mystery Dispatch or Coded Wire Sent to Rio de Janeiro

Meanwhile, a dispatch to Rio de Janeiro in plain text sent on December 4, 1941 contained only these words: “Best regards. If you want any money to do any shopping for yourself, let me know by telegram or air mail. (Eisei)”. Apparently it was a code message or a dispatch between telegraph operators in the two Embassies; the actual meaning of the dispatch was uncertain. 584

247. Iguchi Asks Permission to Delay Destruction of One Code Machine

The Counselor of the Embassy, Iguchi, in a dispatch to the Chief of the Communication Section, wired the information that codes had been destroyed; but since United States-Japanese negotiations were yet continuing on this day (December 5, 1941), he requested permission to delay the destruction of one code machine. This dispatch was decoded December 6, 1941. 585

248. Japanese Officials in Washington Learn That American Marines Will Evacuate Shanghai

Retransmitting a dispatch which had been sent from Peking to Foreign Minister Togo on November 27, 1941, the Foreign Office informed Ambassador Nomura on December 4, 1941 that the American marines would evacuate Shanghai very soon. All would leave except a few who had been trained in air force service. It was estimated that this group would probably go to
Vladivostok as advance troops to lay the ground for the establishment of an American air base there. According to the dispatch sent to Washington the information had been derived from a disclosure by the head of a Marine group. According to the dispatch as sent from Peking, it was a corporal of the Marines who was responsible for the informational slip.

Only a few days before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Fourth Marines, evacuated from Shanghai, China, arrived in the Philippines aboard the President Harrison. The liner was later seized by the Japanese.

249. Tokyo Orders Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, and Yamamoto to Return to Japan

A dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on December 5, 1941 asked that Secretary Terasaki, Mr. Takagi, Mr. Ando, Mr. Yamamoto and others leave by plane within the next couple of days. This dispatch was read by United States cryptanalysts on December 6, 1941.

250. Consul Morishima Requests Permission for Mr. Hikida to Return Home

Consul Morishima through the Washington Embassy requested permission from Tokyo to return Mr. Deniti Hikida on the Tatsuta Maru. Mr. Hikida was an authority on the Negro problem in the United States and had been utilized by the Japanese propaganda work among the Negroes. He had also served in gathering general intelligence, in investigations and in various other capacities. Since the Consul felt that it would be to Japanese interest for Hikida to return home, he asked authorization to advance him passage for Japan. Because the time of departure was fast approaching, he requested immediate advice.

251. Ambassador Nomura Requests Additional Expense Money

Ambassador Nomura informed his home office also on December 5, 1941 that incidental expenses and secret expenses for the third quarter had amounted to more than $41,000; moreover, the telegraph fund had not been sufficient up to December. He, therefore, requested that one month’s allotment limited to the use of the Washington office be transferred by cable.

252. Ambassador Kurusu Asks That Secretary Terasaki Remain in the United States

On December 5, 1941 Special Ambassador Kurusu directed a request to Tokyo that Secretary Terasaki be allowed to remain in the United States since, as organizer of the intelligence setup, he was extremely important in view of the conditions of Japanese-United States negotiations. Making the request as a personal favor, Ambassador Kurusu said that he would have Terasaki assume his post as soon as he knew definitely that the negotiations were ended. This dispatch was translated on December 6, 1941.

253. Japan Continues Making Evacuation Plans

Mr. Furumoto, managing director of Domei News in Tokyo, instructed his representatives in New York to return quietly to Tokyo by the Tatsuta Maru, and in case such passage were not available, to arrange to go to South America.
Domei official Kato in Washington was also asked to attempt to procure passage on the *Tatsuta Maru*, the alternative, in case of failure, being an assignment to the South Seas area.\(^{595}\)

It was reported from New York that Mr. Okamuto would embark for Tokyo at Los Angeles and that Mr. Itamski, being needed in intelligence activities, would return in the same way as the Consulate staff. Decisions regarding Mr. Moriwaki and Mr. Hiramitsu would be made later. This dispatch of December 5 was translated on December 8, 1941.\(^{596}\)

Meanwhile, on December 6, 1941, Consul Muto in San Francisco asked for further information concerning Tokyo’s request for approximately sixty persons aboard the *Tatsuta Maru*, since the assignment of staterooms would be necessary.\(^{597}\)

254. Tokyo Clarifies Code Machine Reference

Tokyo advised Counselor Iguchi on December 6 that the reference to code machines in the instructions wired on December 2 had meant that one set of the code machines were to be destroyed and the other retained for the time being.\(^{598}\)

On the following day Iguchi and his staff as well as Secretary Yuki received a message of appreciation and thanks for their patriotic efforts from Bureau Chief Yamamoto.\(^{599}\)


Information was disseminated by Tokyo on December 6 and 7 in a circular dispatch concerning its policies applying to allied diplomatic and consular officials, to other subjects residing in Japan, and to publicly and privately owned allied property. Declaring that Japan would approach these matters with the magnanimity of a great nation, it would comply with international law insofar as possible, exercising care that no enemy or third power nations should have cause for retaliatory measures or unfavorable propaganda.

Diplomatic and consular officials would be exchanged for Japanese diplomatic and consular officials resident in allied countries. But until the time of exchange, the telephone would be cut off in diplomatic establishments; consular offices would be closed and sealed and short wave radio and wireless equipment seized in both consular offices and Legations; no inconvenience in daily living would be caused to allied officials. In regard to allied subjects residing in Japan, individuals who were objects of suspicion, military men, seamen, aviation personnel, persons of special technical skill, persons suspected of being foreign spies and all males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five would be placed under arrest for the present. Caution would be exercised to avoid ill-treatment of these persons, however, since Japan also had many nationals resident in allied territories.

Publicly owned property held by the Allies in Japan, with the exception of Embassy, Legation and Consular building would be confiscated, although privately owned allied property would not be seized except in the event of general requisitioning.

It was added that diplomatic and consular officials of quasi-allied countries would be denied the use of codes. Allied diplomatic and consular officials in Manchukuo would be handled in the same manner as were such officials in Japan.\(^{600}\)
256. Consul Nihro Desires Settlement of Akino's Fine

On November 25, 1941 Consul Nihro in Manila asked that Japan arrange to advance money to cover the fine of Rafael Akino, a Filipino arrested in Tokyo, or that permission be given to remit the money from Manila. This was requested since Government Official Gonzalo Akino was concerned over the fine and desired to settle the matter without publicity. 601

257. Consul Nihro Requests Competent Assistants

Foreseeing an increase in the duties of his office which entailed the procurement of military and other information, the dissemination of propaganda, and other machinations, and in order to keep in touch with the inner circles of the Philippine government, Consul Nihro felt that it would be necessary to return Mr. Kihara to Manila as soon as possible. Although, according to instructions, he had let Official Mori take office as Consul to Davao, he requested the appointment of another Japanese for the Davao post, so that Mori could be returned to Manila. Furthermore, the Consul asked that, to assist in the basic investigation plans, he be assigned an American-educated Japanese as aide. Discussing plans to return Mr. S. Kawaminami on December 8, Consul Nihro declared that even if he stayed in Manila he would not take the place of the men requested above. 602

258. Tokyo Plans Utilization of Osaka Steamship Company Funds in Manila

A plan to utilize the 83,000 pesos held in bank branches at Manila and belonging to the Osaka Steamship Company was advanced by Tokyo on November 27, 1941. In case the wishes of the company could not be realized and the necessary permit secured to remit the money to Japan, it was suggested that Consul Nihro borrow the money to retain as a secret fund in the Consulate. Japan would, if this plan were accomplished, reimburse the company in Japan. 603

The resident manager of the Osaka Steamship Company, Mr. Nagawo, reported that the remittance of this fund through purchases was not feasible at the present time. 604 Furthermore, the secret transfer of the 83,000 pesos from the Osaka Steamship branch office to the Consulate was virtually impossible since these deposits were in the name of the local Osaka Steamship Company. 605

259. Consul Nihro Destroys Useless Codes

On November 29, 1941 Consul Nihro wired that codes for which that office had no use, as well as those of which there were more than two copies had been destroyed on this day. 606 Since these codes had been destroyed, Consul Nihro informed the Foreign Office on November 30 that it was impossible to decipher a message sent from Tokyo on the previous day. 607

601 IV, 470.
602 IV, 471.
603 IV, 472.
604 IV, 473.
605 IV, 474.
606 IV, 475.
607 IV, 476.
260. Diplomatic Corps in Panama Acknowledges New Government

Minister Akiyama wired Tokyo on October 18, 1941 that the entire diplomatic corps, including himself, had made written acknowledgment on October 17, 1941 of the new Panamanian government. The United States alone had made a statement of acceptance without a moment's delay; the Italian Minister was the only one who had hesitated, and even then he had merely declared that due notice had been taken of the matter. In spite of these acknowledgments, Mr. Akiyama reported that the Embassies of the different American countries felt dissatisfied with the change in government. 608

261. Latin American Countries Deny "Veiled Intervention" by the United States

According to the Mexican and Colombian Ministers, all Central and South American countries were acting voluntarily in taking definite steps against the Axis and were not following the United States. Privately the Colombian Minister had revealed to Minister Akiyama that America's Good Neighbor Policy was ineffective, and that the only course left to the United States was a stricter policing of Central and South America. Furthermore, the Panama government had denied the "veiled intervention" by the United States, which had been intimated in a wire from Foreign Minister Togo on October 11, although Minister Akiyama added that any child could realize that the events were based on a private agreement with the United States. 609

262. Minister Akiyama Explains New Government's Foreign Policy

The new administration, Akiyama said, would cooperate fully with the United States in regard to relationships between Panamanian territory and the Canal Zone, in the registration of merchant vessels, in the matter of air bases and in the granting of additional advance bases. Consequently, the new government had appointed the Minister to Mexico City as Ambassador to Washington and had put the Minister to Germany, who was rumored to be pro-Axis, on the inactive list. 610

Furthermore, the new government had decided that vessels of Panama registry would be permitted to enter belligerent waters, according to recent newspaper reports. The Panama government had directed the German Commerce representative to be "persona non grata" because he had abused diplomatic privileges. Given to understand that requests had been made by the United States for close collaboration for the defense of the Canal Zone and the maintenance of canal service, Mr. Akiyama had been informed by the Minister of Education that Canal authorities were making preparations for such time as war between Japan and the United States would break out. These preparations, he had revealed, were on the basis of instructions from the American government and in conjunction with the change within the Japanese Cabinet. 611

Calling on Foreign Minister Octavio Fabriga, the Japanese Minister had been told that Panama had decided to defend the various countries on the American continent hand-in-hand

608 IV, 477.
609 IV, 478.
610 IV, 479.
611 IV, 480.
with the United States against Germany. Since the question of Japanese standing as a result of her alignment with the Axis had arisen, Panama had no choice, should unforetold events arise, but to assume the same attitude that the United States might take in her relationships with Japan.\(^{612}\)

In order, therefore, to render full assistance to the United States, Panama would be forced to take counter measures against Japan should Japanese-American relations reach the breaking point. The Japanese Minister replied that the new Cabinet in Japan was exerting itself to improve Japanese-United States relations, and should Japan have to take definite steps in accordance with the "merits" of the case, it was hoped that it would not be necessary for Panama to cooperate with the United States. Foreign Minister Fabriga answered that the Panama government had already decided to take such measures as were necessary to defend itself against Hitlerism.\(^{613}\)

263. Japanese Business Firms Ordered to Close on October 28, 1941

On October 28, 1941 the Japanese Minister to Panama, in a wire to Tokyo, revealed that eight days earlier he had been informed by telephone that Japanese business firms should cease operation after October 28, 1941. Although the Minister had attempted to interview the Foreign Minister privately in regard to this question, he had not been granted an interview. Consequently, Japanese Official Izawa had called on the Interior Secretary of Foreign Affairs to point out that the exercising of an embargo on Japanese businesses aggravated the present crisis. Declaring that it would be impossible to evacuate Japanese residents in so short a time because of the lack of ships, Mr. Izawa had been told merely that Panama could not grant permits for the continued operation of these firms. Applications made by Japanese business people for a ninety day postponement of the prohibition regulations had been vetoed by the Cabinet at its meeting on this day, October 28, 1941.\(^{614}\)

It was expected that a complete boycott of Japanese goods would be exercised and that extortion or plundering might ensue, in view of the total discrimination against Japanese residents. Should Japanese shops or businesses open again under the present conditions, penal regulations could be applied. For this reason the Japanese residents in Panama would like to go to Puntarenas, Costa Rica, or Buenaventura, Colombia, or even Lima, Peru, to board vessels for home.\(^{615}\)

264. Uncooperative Course of New Government is Result of Fear, Minister Alleges

In examining the new position of the Panama government it might be wise, the Japanese Minister said, to consider the publication by American-financed newspapers that Japanese nationalists were planning to evacuate Panama as soon as the opportunity presented itself. In view of the friendly cooperation with which Panama had treated Japanese problems in the past, the course now being pursued indicated a fear of arousing the wrath of the United States. The Minister concluded that it was now impossible to place confidence in the intentions of the Panama government, and at the same time it would be difficult to evacuate Japanese nationals since Central and South American countries refused to grant travel permits to Japanese residents in Panama.\(^{616}\)

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\(^{612}\)IV, 481.

\(^{613}\)IV, 482.

\(^{614}\)IV, 483.

\(^{615}\)IV, 484.

\(^{616}\)IV, 485.
Reemphasizing that the actions of Panama seemed to be instigated by the United States, the Minister in his wire of October 30, 1941 revealed that the recent control regulations for the conduct of business were being rigorously enforced. Furthermore, they were taking the attitude that even though business permits would not be granted, should war come, neither would they grant evacuation permits for any Japanese nationalists in Panama. Contributing to Panama's stand was President Roosevelt's alleged fabrication that the Nazis were plotting the establishment of five separate dependencies in Central and South America. The United States was thus instilling in the Panama government the fear that this locality might be used to further such a plot.617

265. Panama Restricts Minister Akiyama's Contacts

Insofar as the Japanese Minister's attempts to preserve his personal contacts with various Cabinet members were concerned, the Panama Foreign Office had requested some days ago that he make all contacts through the Foreign Office. He pointed out that the officials seemed not only to distrust his intentions and activities but that they were particularly suspicious of his contacts with the diplomatic corps especially with the Italian and German officials.618

When Minister Akiyama had asked the Foreign Minister if he objected to his personal contacts, an awkward silence had ensued. The logical explanation for this conduct was that, as an ex-editor of the Panama American, the Foreign Minister was trying to attract the good will of the United States. Although in the Minister's opinion Panama was a dependency of the United States, it was being allowed to assume the role of an independent nation and was being permitted, "like a child militantly waving a famous Masamune blade", to work in conjunction with the Canal military authorities.619

266. Japanese Minister Says the United States is Urging Panama to Take the Lead

Panama was being permitted, in the name of democracy, to take the fore, being one step ahead of the United States in her hostilities to the Axis powers. Possibly it might even go so far as to sever diplomatic relations, although lacking the strength to effect this act. Panama had armed her merchant vessels and had recalled her diplomatic officials to Germany without considering their replacement. Furthermore, on October 29, 1941 the Foreign Minister had said that a group within the Cabinet had argued that diplomatic relations with Axis powers, including Japan, should be severed; but the majority in the Cabinet had vetoed the suggestion. Panama, as well as all Central and South American countries, at the insistence of the President of the United States, had ordered the dissolution of all Nazi groups. The Foreign Minister had added that Japan was not included in the order possibly because its form of government was not feared, although they considered Japanese government as one form of Nazism.620

The United States in preserving her position in various countries in Central and South America seemed to be experimenting by urging Panama into the lead; consequently, Panama's mission was to test the strength of Germany and Italy in Central and South America as well as to measure the extent of Japanese inroads in Central and South America. When, on October 30, 1941, Foreign Minister Fabriga told the Italian Minister that diplomatic relations between the several countries were made difficult by Germany and Italy's sinking of Panamanian vessels, the Italian Minister had replied that until this time Italy had tried so far as possible not to touch Panamanian vessels.621

617 IV, 486.
618 IV, 487.
619 IV, 487.
620 IV, 488.
621 IV, 489.
267. Japan Sends Official Complaint to Panama

Japanese reactions to this Panamanian aggressiveness were revealed in a wire to Panama on November 1, 1941 from Foreign Minister Togo. Mr. Yamamoto, Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, had sent an official complaint to the Panama Consul, and at the same time Minister Masatoshi Akiyama was instructed to make a strong official complaint to the Panama government in that country. Japan, the Foreign Minister said, would take a firm stand on this matter in view of the effect on other South American countries. Japan would demand that (1) Panama make payment for the loss incurred by forcing Japanese to close their businesses, (2) that Panama would allow a time limit in which the Japanese might clear up their stock, (3) that arrangements for Japanese capital investments should be made, and (4) that Panama should arrange for the entry of these Japanese into other South American countries. It was thought best to advise against Japanese returning to Japan, since it was most important not to break relations with Panama and South American countries at this time. Furthermore, to return home would be to play into the United States' hands. 622

268. Minister Akiyama Suggests Retaliatory Measures

By November 5, 1941 Minister Akiyama was able to wire that Panama officials were seriously considering Japan's protest, but that they were still trying to chase all Japanese out of their country. Since there was a rumor that the government had received funds from the United States, Panama would no doubt be willing to cooperate with the United States in defending the safety of the Panama Canal. Consequently, it was necessary to make the Japanese protest as strong and as effective as possible. If it were impossible to take over part of Panama for the purpose of protecting the Japanese in that country, then it might become necessary to take over all ships in East Asia flying the Panama flag. If this were done, it would be necessary to maintain the utmost secrecy so that no warning would be served. If this emergency act were carried out, the Panama Consul in the United States would appeal to Washington, so that the Japanese Embassy there should be prepared not to receive this complaint through the United States, but to refer it instead to the Panama government. He asked that his protest be supported in Japan to the full extent when the Foreign Minister made demands of his own upon Minister Herari. 623

Minister Akiyama had further decided to demand that Panama authorities protect Japanese residents, assure them of a living, and help them to re-establish themselves in business. Japanese individuals were being instructed simultaneously to stay in Panama for the purpose of making complaints. Although Japan could not tell what attitude would be taken towards its complaint, Minister Akiyama felt that in any event the carrying out of his emergency suggestion would be the best retaliation. 624

269. Japan Requests Immediate Reopening of Businesses

Since it was clear that Japanese residents were facing increasing hardships in making their living, Minister Akiyama requested the Foreign Minister to open immediately the Japanese shops for business. Meanwhile, he had warned the residents against the indiscretion of illegal business or hiring lawyers, since the authorities might be given a pretext for their deportation. For his own information Mr. Akiyama was interested to know the date on which Minister Fabriga had wired his Minister in Japan. 625

622 IV, 490.
623 IV, 491.
624 Ibid.
625 IV, 492.
270. Radio Broadcast or Domei Service is Suggested to Publicize Panama’s Action

Because the Panama newspapers were either owned or controlled by the family of the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, it could be expected that Japanese announcements as well as their re-publication would be interfered with. Since criticism would be based on the United States’ dogmatic conception of “democracy”, Japan should enlighten the people either by radio broadcast or by Domei service. Specifically to be stressed was the fact that the application of the control law was arbitrary; it had been applied three days before it was to have gone into effect, and thus it attempted to drive the Japanese out by the right of prepossession. On November 5, 1941, when someone had appealed to the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, he had forbidden the opening of Japanese shops even temporarily, and he had cruelly forbidden their engaging in other work. Discrimination in applying the law had been shown to the Chinese and to white foreigners. Not only was the law understood to be applicable only to the Japanese, but the present Foreign Minister, Fabriga, one of the Cabinet’s “stooges”, had approved the closing of Japanese shops; rivals were attempting to take over the Japanese businesses and the landlords were beginning to demand, since the Japanese were unemployed, that they hand back the shops or auction off the equipment.

271. Tokyo Foreign Office Protests to Panama Minister; Requests Formal Statement from Panama

On November 6, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo wired that Bureau Chief Yamamoto had, on November 1, 1941, protested to the Panamanian Minister Agustin Ferrari in Tokyo with the request that the protest be forwarded to Panama. It was declared that Japan considered this question a serious one, calling for a formal statement from the Panamanian government. Minister Ferrari, replying that he had received no information from his country since the recent change in government, had promised to transmit the request. Foreign Minister Togo declared that he would like to have the details of the question published in Panama as well as in Japan and would wire instructions as to when this was to be done.

272. Panama Cabinet Says Japanese Note is Phrased in Insulting Terms

In the New York Times, under a Panama dateline of November 8, 1941, was a report that the Panama Cabinet had refused to consider the protest by the Japanese Legation against the closing of all Japanese businesses because the note was phrased in insulting terms and constituted intervention in the internal affairs of the nation.

The article explained that the law nationalizing commerce prohibited members of a race not admitted as immigrants to engage in business, thus causing the closing of all Japanese shops.

273. Minister Akiyama Says Japanese Will Have Trouble Disposing of Large Stocks

Since Panama had been a distributing center for Japanese goods, it would be difficult for the Japanese to dispose of large stocks because in addition to the ending of retail sales and re-exportation of goods required a license which could be granted only when the entire proceeds of the transaction were deposited in a blocked account. Repatriation of the Japanese would be difficult since Japanese ships no longer called at the Isthmus. Warning Panama of the responsibility incurred, the note described the restrictive order as “inhuman cruelty.”

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626 IV, 493.
627 IV, 494.
628 IV, 495.
629 Oral History Interview with Captain II, p. 496. (The New York Times, November 8, 1941, “PANAMA REJECTS TOKYO’S PROTEST, Japanese Expulsion from Canal Area to be Continued.”)
630 Ibid.
274. *Newspaper Article Originating in Japan Charges Panama with Inhuman Acts*

The *New York Times* report from Tokyo publicized the announcement by the Japanese Foreign Office that strong protest had been lodged with the government of Panama against discriminatory and "inhuman" acts which it charged were designed to expel Japanese residents from the Panama Canal area by depriving them of their livelihood. The protests, the article stated, were especially significant since the Japanese government undertook to speak in the name of all Asiatic people and called upon the government of Panama to "revert to a free, independent policy and settle this unpleasant question without being influenced in any way by any foreign power".

275. *Japanese Minister Reports Dismissal of Spanish Minister*

On November 10, 1941, Minister Akiyama reported to Tokyo that the Spanish Minister was of this date "persona non grata" and that, because of circumstances, it was thought that he could not do otherwise than resign. The reason given for his dismissal was his statement in a public club that "Panama is being trodden on by the iron boot of Uncle Sam. Panama can no longer hold her head high among the family of nations as a sovereign state." It was thought that the United States was back of this action.

The Spanish Minister had informed the Japanese Minister confidentially that he was merely a sacrifice to the new Panama policy of attachment to the United States and that, although he may have been a little disorderly, the question was not big enough to constitute an issue. When he had requested the dean of the diplomatic service to ask the President of Panama not to make an issue of his actions to the Spanish Foreign Office, his request had been shelved. The Spanish Minister has asked that, if possible, this truth be relayed to Spain through him, the Japanese Minister.

276. *Mexican Minister Incensed at Treatment of Japanese, Returns Home, Akiyama Declares*

Minister Akiyama further reported that the Mexican Minister was returning home since he was extremely enraged at the new regime. In a confidential talk with Japanese official Izawa, he alleged that the continued United States "tutorship" of Panama had made impossible his remaining in office any longer. Of his own volition he had decided that the recent unfair and racial discrimination exercised against the Japanese had made it imperative that he return home.

He questioned whether the Panama government would recognize the diplomatic passport approved by the former Panama President, Arias, or whether through the meddling of the United States, an incident similar to that involving the Spanish Minister might occur. It seemed to him that decisions had been reached to revoke diplomatic rights in Panama.

277. *Mr. Izawa Negotiates for Reemployment of Japanese in Panama*

In order to make the United States realize the desperate situation of the Japanese in Panama, Mr. Izawa had asked Mr. Kata, head of the Panama Canal, Defense Division, to consider using Japanese in the construction work of the canal. Mr. Kata had answered that this question would be discussed with those in command of the work. From this reply it seemed possible, Minister Akiyama reported, that some kind of work might be procured until Japan could send a ship for them and thus evacuate all Japanese from Panama; at the same time the damage demand for the Japanese government would be lessened.
278. Minister Akiyama Suggests Further Retaliatory Measures

Meanwhile, the Japanese Minister had given thought to retaliation for the discrimination against Japanese nationals. He suggested, on November 15, 1941, that Japan could (1) Refuse to give permits to Panama ships for sailing out of Japanese ports and to seize or detain Panama ships in Japanese waters, (2) Freeze Panama capital in Japan making it impossible for business to be carried on and (3) Carry out items (1) and (2) in Manchuria and occupied China. Although it would be advantageous to Japan to seize Panama ships, it would be wise, first, to watch the future development of United States-Japanese relations.\(^{637}\)

279. Foreign Minister Togo Plans to Aid Nationals

The Foreign Minister in Japan wired Japanese Official Koshi in Panama that the government would consider the expenditure of funds to help the Japanese. In view of the time when relations might become even more strained, thought should be given to a way of moving all Japanese to some other country. It was also requested that the policy of disposing of stock belonging to Japanese companies in Panama be wired to Tokyo.\(^{638}\)

280. Japanese Military Men Are En Route to Homeland

On November 18, 1941, Minister Akiyama informed Tokyo that Lieutenant Colonel Nakano and Commander Michinori Yoshii, with their party, had left Cristobal safely on November 18, 1941, flying directly to Lima, Peru. Arriving there at 5:30 p.m., they would embark immediately for Japan.\(^{639}\)

281. Minister Suggests that Young Japanese Nationals be Attached to Central and Latin American Legations

That ten young single men who had been forced to close their businesses because of the Panama incident be appointed to serve in some capacity in Japanese foreign diplomatic establishments was suggested by Minister Akiyama in a circular dispatch of November 19, 1941. If appointments were possible, these men were willing to work without salary and furnish their own traveling expenses.\(^{640}\)

282. Minister Akiyama Stresses Danger of Communication Stoppage

According to a dispatch transmitted from Tokyo on November 19, 1941, Minister Akiyama reported on November 20, 1941, that should war develop and Panama follow hand-in-hand with the United States, there was danger that communications might be stopped. As far as he was concerned, he believed there was no recourse but for Japan to align itself with Argentina, Chile and Peru.\(^{641}\)

283. Japanese Nationals Urged to Evacuate to Latin American Countries

Because, according to previous dispatches, officials in Tokyo advised that Japanese in Panama be scattered throughout Central and South America rather than be sent home, Minister Akiyama in Panama wired on November 22, 1941 that the evacuation vessel which would touch port at Balboa was being kept a secret from the Japanese nationals. This was done to influence them to resettle in countries near Panama. However, in case the evacuation vessel took off some of the Japanese, he asked that Tokyo officials persuade the United States to order Canal officials to cooperate in the evacuation.\(^{642}\)

\(^{637}\) IV, 502.
\(^{638}\) IV, 503.
\(^{639}\) IV, 504.
\(^{640}\) IV, 505.
\(^{641}\) IV, 506.
\(^{642}\) IV, 507.
284. Arrangements Made for Tatsuta Maru to Dock at Balboa

Having learned through the State Department in Washington that the Tatsuta Maru must pay its expenses in cash when it docked at Balboa, Ambassador Nomura requested Tokyo to have the ship supplied with funds through the Consulate in Panama.643

On November 25, 1941, Minister Akiyama reported that not only would permission be granted for the Tatsuta Maru to dock at Balboa but that Panama officials were quite anxious for the ship to come. It was quite clear that Panama officials did not desire even one Japanese to remain near the Panama Canal Zone, although some did undoubtedly choose to remain in Panama in spite of the threat of internment. The Minister inquired about the authority for selling tickets on the Tatsuta Maru, requesting instructions as to whether they should be sold through the NYK or through the consulate.644

On November 26, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo felt it necessary to explain that the Tatsuta Maru was not being sent for the purpose of a general evacuation. The fact that it was docking at Balboa meant only that Japan was giving its citizens who could not stay in Panama or settle in other countries a chance to settle in Japan. If Japanese nationals could move to other Latin countries, they were to be guided accordingly, and it was directed that those that were returning home make preparations and those who were going to third countries get their passports.645

The consulates in Havana, the United States, Canada, Vancouver and Panama learned on November 26, 1941, the schedule of the Tatsuta Maru. Leaving Balboa on December 26, 1941, it was scheduled to arrive in Yokohama January 15, 1942, although the possibility existed that it would stop in Los Angeles also on the way home.646

285. Panamanian Minister Reports Arrival of Peruvian Minister in Washington

The Minister in Panama reported to Washington on November 29, 1941, that Minister Sakamoto, the Japanese Minister to Peru, would arrive in Washington on the night of November 29, 1941.647

286. Japan Proposes Reparation for Treatment of Japan Nationals in Panama

Referring to the formal documents demanding reparation for the treatment of Japanese nationals in Panama, Japanese Minister Akiyama reported that the Foreign Minister in Panama had considered the documents neither unreasonable nor without legal grounds, although he answered that the exclusion of Japanese was by popular demand. Acting as authorized spokesman for Panama, the Foreign Minister had told Minister Yamagata and Charge d’Affaires Izawa that there was nothing to do but administer the law; therefore in the ten times Izawa had talked with him the Foreign Minister had opposed Japanese claims and would not give a satisfactory answer.648

When Minister Akiyama attempted to get reparations on the basis of a previous understanding with former Foreign Minister Arias, as had been formally suggested by Japan, Foreign Minister Arias had nonetheless testified that Japan had been properly notified of the law many times through her Minister and last November, through the Charge d’Affaires. Since the protest by the Japanese Ministry appeared to be without success, practically all of the Japanese except Amano had sold out their business at a fair price and had returned to Japan.649
287. Minister Akiyama Communicates with Buenos Aires and Tokyo Regarding Codes

On December 3, 1941, Minister Akiyama directed officials in Buenos Aires to remit a previous dispatch in one code and from then on to use other codes.650 This dispatch gave the names and addresses of two foreigners in Rio de Janeiro who were receiving American newspapers and magazines.651

Apparently having already received instructions concerning the destruction of codes and secret papers, Minister Akiyama reported on December 5, 1941, that code books had been destroyed by burning in accordance with instructions.652

288. Minister Akiyama Experiences Financial Annoyances

On December 6, 1941, Mr. Akiyama requested that expense funds through March 1944, be immediately remitted with a monthly special increase of $400 as well as the fourth period sum of $18,185 for the propagation of information.653

On December 8, 1941, because of the urgency of the situation, Minister Akiyama made a full report of the income, expenditures, withdrawals, temporary loans, and reserve and estimated future expenses of the Panama office.654
PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(c) Japanese-Hawaiian Relations

289. Consul in Honolulu Requests Funds Before Arrival of Tatsuta Maru
In need of funds before the entry of the Tatsuta and Taiyo Marus into Honolulu port, the Japanese Consul in Honolulu asked that funds be wired before October 23, 1941, when the Tatsuta Maru would dock.655

290. Japanese Official Requested to Bring Money Back to Japan
Aboard the Tatsuta Maru was Japanese Official Maeda, for whom Tokyo had obtained permission from the American State Department to land in Honolulu and San Francisco.656 Upon his arrival in Honolulu Clerk Maeda was to be told in absolute secrecy to “bring back that money just as it is”.657

291. Foreign Office Asks that be Kept Under Strict Surveillance
The Japanese Foreign Office advised Honolulu that another passenger aboard the Tatsuta Maru, , was to be kept under strict surveillance while in Honolulu. Since actions and words had created various incidents while he was in Japan, if he said or did anything untowardly, the home office was to be advised immediately.658

292. Tokyo Suggests National be Assigned to Second Evacuation Vessel
Since there would be room for fifty first class and eighty second class passengers aboard the Taiyo Maru, Tokyo suggested that passengers be assigned to the Taiyo Maru rather than to the Tatsuta Maru.659 Consequently, a list of available accommodations on the Taiyo Maru,660 which sailed from Yokohama on October 22, 1941,661 was dispatched to Honolulu.

293. Special Codes to be Retained as Long as Situation Permits
Foreign Minister Togo, explaining that the special code broadcasts were designed to inform diplomats in the country concerned should ordinary telegraphic channels be severed, directed on November 28, 1941, that the codes be retained as long as the situation in that locality permitted, and until the final stage was entered.662

294. Japan Ponders Recall of Staff
On December 4, 1941, the Japanese Consul and his family in Honolulu were instructed to wait at that place pending further instructions. Foreign Minister Togo assured the diplomatic staffs in this circular dispatch that a great deal of thought was being given to the return of the Consul’s staff and families.663

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655 IV, 519.
656 IV, 520.
657 IV, 521.
658 *DoD comment: Name withheld.
659 IV, 522.
660 IV, 523.
661 IV, 524.
662 IV, 525.
663 IV, 526.
664 IV, 527.
295. Consul Nihro Advises Early Evacuation of Useful Nationals

Expressing his opinions in the event of war between Japan and the United States, Consul Nihro in a dispatch of October 20, 1941, predicted that Japanese residents in the Philippines would be placed under strict surveillance by the American and Philippines authorities. For this reason, he felt that it would be particularly expedient to repatriate at an early date the Japanese nationals who were acquainted with the situation in the various areas.664

296. United States Making Preparations for War in Earnest, Consul Says

Furthermore, the political shake-up in Japan was quite a shock to the people in the Philippine Islands; and it had been pointed out in an article in the Bulletin that although the new Cabinet did not intend to take any great risks as yet, it was made up of the military capable of carrying out any decision it might make. In an editorial in this paper, which could be considered as reflecting the views of one section of the people, it had been stated that nothing could be expected of the Japanese-American negotiations.

Among the several points Consul Nihro called especially to the attention of Tokyo officials were his beliefs that the United States Military authorities were making preparation in real earnest; that they were watching and directing more carefully than ever the government of the Philippine Islands, as well as the Filipino leaders; that they were instilling in the minds of the people the idea that because of the power of the United States, the ultimate victory would surely be on the side of the democracies; and that they were endeavoring to strengthen the morale of the Philippine people, thereby increasing the sense of reliance which the Philippine people feel toward the United States.665

297. Payment of Fine for Manila Youth in Japan Creates Problem of Exchange

Referring to the case of Rafael Akino, who had been arrested in Japan and charged with black market activities, Consul Katsumi Nihro in Manila wired Tokyo on October 24, 1941, that Gonzalo Akino had presented a check for 1500 pesos for his fines. Because of the difficulty of transferring this fund to Japan, due to the freezing of credits, the Consul suggested that Mr. Morokuma or one of young Akino's friends advance the money for his fine and return to Manila. This action was advised since Gonzalo Akino was a powerful government official who desired to avoid unfavorable publicity before the next general election. In order to get the money out of Manila, it would be necessary to go to the High Commissioner's office, an act which would expose the present difficulties. Therefore, it would probably be wise for Morokuma or some friend to pay the fine and win the Manila official's gratitude. Both Rafael Akino's real father and Gonzalo Akino (Aquino), who regarded the accused as his own son, would consider ways of paying the fine and expenses as soon as the boy was returned to Manila.666

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664 IV, 528.
665 IV, 529.
666 IV, 470, 530.
298. Consul Protests Opening of Diplomatic Mail Pouch

Considerable difficulty was developing in the matter of transporting diplomatic mail, for it was explained by Consul Nihro on October 21, 1941, that authorities demanded the examination of the diplomatic mail pouch which was to be taken by Courier Yashiro Tsuchiya to Japan. When the Consul had applied to the High Commissioner to intercede with the company to have the mail pouch passed without inspection on the basis of international law and procedure, he had been informed that the consent of Washington must be procured before the company could be asked to waive the application of their rules.

Although, actually, there was no objection to a cursory inspection (such as a previous one when sealed letters were not opened), yet the setting of a precedent in permitting the inspection of a diplomatic mail containing official documents would be unfortunate, the Consul declared. For this reason, although Courier Tsuchiya was scheduled to leave Manila on October 26, 1941, it would be better to delay the Courier’s departure until the matter became clearer.

Foreign Minister Togo answered on October 22, 1941, ordering that the inspection of the pouch be definitely refused and that Courier Tsuchiya’s departure be postponed. Reviewing the details of the Aeroplane Company’s refusal to allow Courier Tsuchiya to board the China Clipper to Hong Kong, Mr. Nihro wired Tokyo on October 24, 1941, that he had drawn up for the office of the High Commissioner an official memorandum, which that office had required, before taking the matter up with the officials in Washington.

299. Japan to Investigate the Seizure of Mail

On October 28, 1941, the Japanese Consul at Manila asked that the seizure of mail sent on foreign ships by way of Hong Kong be investigated. To avoid the difficulties which might arise should this practice continue, Consul Nihro requested that it be brought to the attention of the proper authorities.

On October 30, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo, in consideration of this request, asked for information concerning place of origin of all matter censored in Hong Kong. He said that it was necessary that Japan make all communications absolutely secure.

300. The Asama Maru Tentatively Scheduled to Arrive November 10, 1941

On October 31, 1941, the Japanese Foreign Minister wired that the Asama Maru was scheduled to arrive in Manila on November 10, and would leave the next day for Singapore. While at Manila, it could pick up at least seven hundred, and possibly eight hundred passengers by crowding the vessel. Foreign Minister Togo disclosed that the Asama Maru would possibly make one trip to Britain, after which it would probably be impossible to dispatch Japanese ships.

Since the refugees who were to sail on the Asama Maru were in rather straitened circumstances, Consul Nihro suggested that the fares be lowered to approximate those of the Hakone Maru.

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667 IV, 531.
668 IV, 532.
669 IV, 533.
670 IV, 534.
671 IV, 535.
672 IV, 536.
673 IV, 537.
301. Japan Changes Arrival Date of the Asama Maru to November 19, 1941

Replying to Consul Nihro's suggestion that the Asama Maru stop at Singapore before Manila (so that Manila evacuees might not travel home by way of Singapore), the Japanese Home Office answered that the ship would arrive at Manila on November 19, rather than on the 10th. The ship would not stop at Davao.

Furthermore, on November 2, 1941, the Japanese Consul requested permission to return the families of officials to Japan on the Asama Maru. In spite of the fact that it would be a stabilizing influence on the Japanese residents in the Philippines if officials' families remained, Consul Nihro believed that it was not wise to delay too long, should an unforeseen incident occur.

On November 3, the Consul, apparently still concerned over the space available on the evacuation vessel, inquired whether any of the seven or eight hundred accommodations would be taken up by passengers from Singapore.

A dispatch from Tokyo on November 4, however, ignored the Consul's question reiterating only that the Asama Maru would leave Singapore on November 6 and arrive at Manila on November 19 or 20. The Consul was instructed to negotiate with the High Commissioner's office to arrange for the arrival and departure of the vessel and to procure fuel and supplies.

302. Consul Nihro Reiterates Advice that Fares be Reduced

Having received no answer to his request that fares on the maru be lowered, Consul Nihro reemphasized the fact that the evacuees had but scant means to meet the heavy financial burden placed on them by the high rates. He again asked that the Asama Maru's fares for all classes, especially second and third, be reduced to the rate of the Hakone Maru. In spite of the fact that on November 1 the Foreign Minister had wired specifically that the vessel would not call at Davao, Consul Nihro asked on November 4 that he be advised as to the possibility of the ship's stopping at that port.

303. Consul Arranges Permit to Enter Manila as Vessel Sails from Homeland

In accordance with Tokyo's instructions to arrange with the High Commissioner's office for the vessel's entrance and departure, as well as for fuel and supplies, the Japanese Consul replied on November 5, 1941, that he had investigated this matter. Mr. Willoughby, of the Commissioner's office, had said that he did not believe there would be any problem in this matter; nevertheless, the Japanese Consul had asked for confirmation of this statement in writing.

On November 6, Singapore and Manila were advised that the Asama Maru had sailed on November 3, from Yokohama. Mr. Masayashi Kakitsubo, an official of the European-American office, had sailed as a representative of the Foreign office.

304. Passenger and Freight Fees to Buy Supplies for the Asama Maru

Tokyo directed on November 13, 1941, that the four hundred fifty tons of diesel oil and one thousand tons of water, fruit and vegetables be loaded onto the Asama Maru, to be paid for from the monies collected as fares and freight charges.
305. Asama Maru to Evacuate Japanese Officials and Businessmen

By order of the Secretary to the Minister of the Navy, Lieutenant Commander Hatakeyama of the Medical Corps was directed to return to Japan on the Asama Maru.684

Since, as previously mentioned, this was to be the last evacuation vessel to Manila, members of the trade promotion organization were to be induced to return to Japan on the Asama Maru, or Fuji Maru, which had been assigned to the Dutch East Indies for evacuation purposes.685 Consul Kihara, however, because of urgent business in Tokyo, was ordered to return to Japan immediately by plane rather than to await the scheduled accommodation by steamer.686

According to a dispatch, transmitted from a Mr. Shirai in Manila to the Department of Commerce and Industry, the Consul General had suggested that the branch office be closed temporarily and the personnel be returned to Japan since there was no business at the time.687

306. Japanese Legation Staff Obtains a Loan

A dispatch, retransmitted to Tokyo and Washington, reported that the high Commissioner in Manila had granted permits for a loan and for the receipt of the outstanding balance of the Legation's allowance. However, no instructions relative to the needed cancellation of the freezing order had yet been received. Moreover, a message from the Washington Embassy had asserted that twenty-five thousand pesos for operating expenses in Manila and additional sums for the higher staff members had been approved. The Manila Legation requested a confirmation of these appropriations.688
307. Vice Consul Kobayashi Transports Secret Documents to San Francisco

Minister Yoshiaki Miura was instructed to send a member of his staff to San Francisco to meet Vice Consul Ichizo Kobayashi on the *Hikawa Maru*, since secret documents for the Mexican Embassy and for all South American offices would be carried by that official.689

308. Minister Miura Sends to Tokyo a Resume of Comments on Mexico’s Position in the Event of a Japanese-American War

In a message to Tokyo on October 23, 1941, Minister Miura declared that in the event of the United States becoming involved in the war, it was generally believed that Mexico would either follow its example or assume a status similar to being in the war. At an informal dinner party which the Mexican Minister had given on October 21, former Vice Minister of Communications and Finance M. C. Rolland had discussed the attitude that Mexico might take should hostilities develop between the United States and Japan. He believed that the United States would immediately occupy Mexican bases and strengthen anti-Axis activities in Mexico. Since the government which was formed to support the United States, naturally was following a course of cooperation, should the United States ask Mexico to declare war, the government would likely comply at once. Although the populace in general was friendly toward Japan, Mexican politics and foreign affairs were now manipulated entirely by a small number of politicians and military men who were not worthy to be called military men. Since the people were absolutely powerless, it would be a mistake to expect anything of them. Mr. Rolland declared that the only chance of a change in Mexico’s present policy would occur if Germany gained the supremacy in Europe, and Japan in Asia, while the United States, on the other hand, would face a national crisis because of economic breakdown and for other reasons.690

309. Navy Department Retracts Alleged Statement by Secretary Knox of “Immediate Action Within 24 Hours”

On October 25, 1941 Minister Miura in Mexico learned confidentially from an executive of the *Excelsior* newspaper of the statement made on October 24 by Secretary of the Navy Knox referring to the near approach of the crisis between Japan and America. Secretary Knox, in the statement which reached the newspaper office at noon, had asserted that there would be “imminent action” in the Far East “within twenty-four hours”. At a request from the Navy Department, word had gone through two hours later to the effect that the phrase “within twenty-four hours” should be deleted.691

310. Minister Miura Plans to Return to Japan

An unidentified Japanese official in Mexico (probably Minister Miura) was advised by Tokyo on October 27 that he would be permitted to announce his intention to return to Japan only after he had made definite arrangements for his passage home. He was informed that there was no space on the *Terukawa Maru*, although it might be possible to find space on

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689 IV, 552.
690 IV, 553.
691 IV, 554.
the Hikawa Maru sailing from Seattle on November 4. Another possibility was the President Line vessel which sailed from San Francisco to Shanghai. The official was requested to choose a method of transportation and to advise the Home Office.692

On November 3, Minister Miura wired that the chances of getting reservations at San Francisco were very slim. It would be necessary, the Minister said, to announce his intention of returning home by November 14 or 15, at the very latest, since four or five days would be required to travel by rail to San Francisco. After leaving Mexico, the Minister said, he couldn’t very well “come sauntering back again because he couldn’t get ship accommodations in San Francisco”. In addition, he pointed out that if by chance he were successful in finding accommodations at San Francisco, there was the danger that he would become stranded in the Philippine Islands or in Hawaii should certain developments occur in Japanese-American relations. In any event, he, as Minister of the Imperial Government, would be placed in an undignified position which might result in criticism of the government should any of the anticipated events materialize. For these reasons, he suggested that he apply openly and directly to the United States Government to reserve accommodations or he could, as an alternative, remain in Mexico. In spite of the fact that his position there would be exceedingly difficult, he would nevertheless endeavor to carry out the instructions of the Foreign Minister to the best of his ability.693

311. System of Importing Rayon Undergoes a Change

A fact, which would be announced in a few days in the official Mexican Gazette, was reported to Tokyo on November 6, 1941, namely, the cancellation by the Economics Department of the import certificates of the Rayon Distributing Company. The subsidy system was to be dispensed with on November 10, Minister Miura said. In the future, the importation of rayon would take place in a manner totally different since no subsidy would be given to a controlled distributing company and the importation of rayon could be carried on by anyone who was willing to pay a tariff of one peso per kilogram. The change in the system had been brought about by the fact that the distributing company, through its system of importation and distribution, had never achieved the expected results; consequently, Mexico was very hard up for rayon. In cognizance of this fact, Japan should watch carefully to see that no rayon was being transshipped from China to Mexico. Since the Minister had himself been given a report that Itoochuu had shipped some two thousand cases to Chile, he felt that the rayon shipments might be going by way of Chile and Argentina to Mexico.694

312. Panama Incident Has No Noticeable Effect in Mexico

On November 9, 1941 Minister Miura wired that the announcement of the Panama Incident in Mexico had had no noticeable effects in that country. The Universal had, on November 8, published a telegram stating that Japan had protested against the new trade laws which curtailed Japanese businesses in Panama. The report gave Panama’s reply, namely, that this protest constituted interference in the internal affairs of Panama. As yet, there had been no confirmation of the report from other sources.695
313. Mexican Newspapermen Return from Japan Via Vancouver and Cuba

Two Mexican newspapermen, Mr. Jose Llerco and Mr. Araisa, who had been sent to Japan at the expense of the Japanese Government were, according to a dispatch from Tokyo on November 13, returning to their country on the **Hikawa Maru**. Since the American authorities had refused to credit the transit visas on the ground that Mr. Llerco was anti-American, they had been forced to disembark at Vancouver and return to Mexico by way of Cuba. As both of the men were exceedingly competent reporters, the Foreign Minister felt that they would be of great help in Japanese machinations in Mexico. During their visit in Japan, they had met all of the prominent men and had a very clear picture of Japan’s position.

Mr. Llerco was, the Foreign Minister explained, under contract to the Yomiuri newspaper as its Mexican correspondent. 696

314. Courier Inoma Dispatched to San Francisco

In deference to Tokyo’s request that a courier be sent to San Francisco to pick up secret papers which were being brought by Courier Oshino, Minister Yoshioki Miura reported on November 17 that Courier Inoma had been dispatched for this mission. Courier Inoma was scheduled to proceed to Los Angeles for explanation pertaining to these papers. It was further asked that Courier Kosaka, who would pass through Mexico City on November 19, stop in that city on his way to Washington. 697

315. Mexican Reporter Returning from Japan Expresses His Gratitude for Hospitality Extended

On his return to Mexico, Mr. Araisa, one of the Mexican reporters sent to Japan, had visited a member of the Japanese Legation in his private apartment. At that time he had expressed his deep gratitude to the Japanese, particularly to the Investigation Bureau, for the welcome and kindness he had received during his visit to Japan. He explained, however, that he and Llerco, having visited Japan on the invitation of the Japanese and having taken quite a sum of money with which to make the trip, were now accused of being spies. For this reason he hesitated to call at the Embassy or the Chancellery since they were not allowed too much freedom of movement.

Furthermore, Llerco, who, with his brother, published the newspaper **Hoy**, had been fired while he was in Japan, and the people in Mexico were more angry with him than they were with Mr. Araisa.

For the present, these two men were unable to write articles favorable to Japan. This was unfortunate since hostile writers would be producing a great deal of anti-Japanese propaganda. He promised, however, that when the time was ripe, they, too, would put pens to work for Japan’s benefit. 698

316. Mexico Enforces Stricter Passport Policies

That passport restriction were becoming more strictly enforced was reported to Tokyo on November 18 by Japan’s Minister in Mexico. Although those who had suffered persecution by the abolition of passports were political refugees as in the case drawn up by Ambassador Bureseda, Mexican Ambassador to Panama, which had no bearing on the present question, it still boiled down to whether or not the Mexican Government wished to exercise clemency where Japan was concerned. Mexico, he said, did not now recognize the passports of laborers, and the only way to get into Mexico was by way of a farmer’s or investor’s passport. In some cases, the Mexican Government requested that only 750 pesos be put up to return home in

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696 IV, 559.
697 IV, 560.
698 IV, 561.
case of emergency but, in other cases, as much as from 60,000 to 110,000 pesos might be necessary. Even important reporters had been denied entry into the country as in the case of special correspondents Asano and Nakano. Although negotiations concerning them had been going on over a period of months, there did not seem to be much chance of their being admitted.699

A searching examination was being conducted with a view to expelling all foreigners who had passports with flaws, and the number of Japanese who might fall victim to this was approximately one hundred.

The former policy of extending the passports of Japanese citizens whose time was up had been discontinued, and they were allowed to wait only until the next ship could come to evacuate them.

Naturally, Minister Miura said, this situation existed as a result of Mexican-American relations; and, as in the case of Panama, it was not a policy for humane considerations but simply a question of their relations with the United States.

The predicament of the Japanese was pitiful beyond words and the Imperial Government itself was on the spot in this respect. Assuring the Foreign Minister that he himself was not attempting to escape any labor or embarrassment, he pointed out that diplomats in Mexico must be careful not to say anything to get the countries they represented into trouble. As soon as the Foreign Minister had evolved an answer to this question, he asked that he be instructed immediately.700

317. Minister Miura Gives His Opinion Regarding Oil Agreement Between United States and Mexico

Following the announcement on November 19 of the United States-Mexico agreement concerning the oil question, Minister Miura transmitted his opinions of the matter on November 20. As a reason for the rapid accomplishment of the agreement, he suggested that the United States could not afford to have a shadow fall upon her many relations with Mexico, which played the part of flagman for the various countries in Central and South America. The United States found it impossible to acquiesce to any policy which would delay the completion of continental defense in Mexico.

Furthermore, Mexico had reached a condition of great uneasiness because of insufficient raw materials and capital, as had already been reported. Added to this was the dissatisfaction of the people in regard to the existing economic agreement as well as the threat of adverse trade conditions never before seen in Mexico. Since the government found its position untenable, the United States cleverly took advantage of all this to conclude the oil agreement.701

318. Agreement Signifies Desire for Mutual Understanding Between United States and Mexico

Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla had explained to newspaper reporters that the agreement removed the obstacles to close cooperation, which were possible sources of friction if postponed. In establishing the agreement, proof had been given of the desire on the part of both countries for mutual understanding and honest friendship. The Japanese Minister added that important writers in Mexico had declared the agreement signified Mexico's gradual yielding to the United States, to the point where it was no longer possible to move either hand or foot.702

699 IV, 562.
700 IV, 563.
701 IV, 564.
702 IV, 565.
319. Minister Miura Requests Traveling Expenses and Reservations on the Tatsuta Maru

Minister Miura on November 26, 1941, asked that a room on the *Tatsuta Maru* be reserved for him and that traveling expenses be sent as soon as possible. He inquired about the schedule of the Maru, whether the vessel would sail from Los Angeles to Balboa and directly to Japan or would stop at Manzanillo on the way back, as it would be necessary for him to announce the date of his departure. 703

320. Japanese Nationals Request Aid in Obtaining Reservations on Tatsuta Maru

On this day he also informed Tokyo that it was virtually impossible to secure visas for Japanese nationals in Mexico to enter the United States. The only method of travel to Panama would be by plane, for all other ways of transportation were difficult to arrange. Since many of the nationals in Mexico had realized that their only opportunity to return home would be via the *Tatsuta Maru*, they had requested Minister Miura’s assistance in obtaining transportation on this vessel. 704

321. Minister Miura Asks that the Tatsuta Maru Load Freight at Manzanillo

He further requested that the *Tatsuta Maru* be directed to stop at Manzanillo to take on 2,000 tons of miscellaneous freight for transportation to Japan. 705

322. Japanese Officials Use Mexico-Tokyo Diplomatic Channel for Intelligence Routing

Since, according to previous arrangements, Mexico City was to be used as an intelligence center by the Japanese to glean useful information from the United States, a Japanese intelligence officer reported on an address made by a United States Marine Corps recruiting officer in Dallas, Texas, on November 26, 1941. It was learned from the address that the United States standing army was 3,000,000, but that 3,000,000 additional reserves were planned and that the production of armaments had been increased accordingly. The United States Marine Corps personnel was now about 62,000 but 100,000 would be needed within one year. 706 *Note:* This message was translated in 1945.

Furthermore, the Mexican office reported a German language broadcast from London on the night of November 30 stating that England was again dispatching warships to the Far East. Another item sent to Tokyo was taken from an Associated Press dispatch from Manila on December 1 to the effect that American pilots using American planes had recently organized an air unit to protect the Burma Road. 707

323. Tokyo Sends Instructions by Courier Kosaka Regarding Japanese and Manchurian Daily Broadcasts

In regard to a previous wire requesting certain instructions which were to have been delivered by courier, Tokyo answered on November 29, 1941, that the instructions were being sent by Courier Kosaka. Having been instructed to impart the knowledge from the Embassy of the United States to Mexico, Courier Kosaka would discuss the reception of Japanese and Manchurian (sic) daily broadcasts: these would pertain to conditions in

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703 IV, 566.
704 IV, 567.
705 IV, 568.
706 IV, 569.
707 IV, 570.
708 IV, 571.
708a IV, 571. DoD Comment: Textual rendition of the message is suspect—appears in retrospect to be the establishment of a warning system.
Japan and Manchuria; the material would be distributed only in the Mexican Legation and the military and naval attaches' offices; broadcasts received would be put into Japanese text and immediately forwarded to Colombia, Venezuela, El Salvador and Panama. 708

324. Tokyo Wires Formal Authorization for Minister Miura's Return

Formal authorization for Minister Miura's return to Japan was wired from Tokyo on December 1, 1941. 709

325. Minister Miura Reports Impossible Reception of General Broadcast

On this day Minister Miura reported to Washington that conditions intermittently made it impossible to receive the general broadcasts. He asked that, should a broadcast be intercepted in the code of the caption telegram (named in the heading of this message), it be relayed to him immediately. 710

326. Foreign Minister Togo Instructs Minister Miura to Arrange for Employment of Japanese from Panama

Foreign Minister Togo, in a dispatch of December 1, 1941, instructed that Minister Miura arrange for the employment of Japanese from Panama immediately. These instructions were in accordance with the policy of the Japanese government which decreed that as many Japanese as possible should be resettled in Latin and Central American countries rather than be returned to Japan. 711

327. Tokyo Orders Mexico to Limit Expenses and to Use "S" Code

Furthermore, the Foreign Minister explained that expenditures in the Mexican Legation would be confined to the limits of the moneys already granted to that office. It was added that circumstances made it necessary to consider the use of the Navy "S" code, which had been explained in a previous circular. 712

328. Minister Miura Discusses with Panama the Employment of a New Staff Member

In accordance with instructions from the Home Office, Minister Miura declared that one person would be added to the staff in Mexico. Although the dispatch from Panama had mentioned candidates who would be willing to pay their own fare and to work without salary, the Minister discouraged this, suggesting that Panama provide travel expenses as well as a suitable wage after the appointee’s arrival in Mexico. 713

329. Tokyo Makes Plans for the Tatsuta Maru to Enter and Leave Port at Manzanillo

On December 4, 1941 Tokyo directed that arrangements be made with the Mexican government to allow the Tatsuta Maru to enter and leave port at Manzanillo. Tokyo ordered that no general freight be loaded. It also asked that negotiations with Mexico be undertaken so that Mr. Minoru Takada, the Foreign Office Liaison official on board the ship, and his aide, Takade Toshiyuki, might obtain entrance permits. 714
330. The Mexican Government Reopens Its Legation in China
On December 4, 1941 Tokyo, as well as the Washington office, was informed that the Mexican government was reopening its legation in China, which had been closed for the last seven years. Clearly indicating the position of the Mexican government in relation to the present American-Japanese question was the fact that the radical Miguel Angel Menendez had been named as Minister to Chungking.715

331. Minister Miura Asks for Confirmation of Schedule of Tatsuta Maru
Since the route of the Tatsuta Maru seemed illogical to Minister Miura, he wired for confirmation of the schedule. He declared that in his opinion there was some mistake about the Tatsuta Maru leaving Los Angeles and docking at the Mexican port.716

However, on this same day he relayed Tokyo message # 243 to the Consul in Los Angeles which stated that the vessel would dock at Manzanillo on its way from Los Angeles to Balboa. Since it was scheduled to arrive on December 19, 1941, and leave two days later, he had estimated its arrival in Balboa to be on December 26, 1941. This information was to be relayed to Washington and Panama.717

That the Mexican government had no objections to the entrance permits for Foreign Office liaison official Takada and his aide Toshiyuki, who were on board the Tatsuta Maru, was wired to Tokyo on December 5, 1941.718

332. Tokyo Informs Minister Miura it Approves Taking American and Mexican Money to Japan
In answer to a request from Minister Miura, Tokyo declared that there were no restrictions on bringing American (?) or Mexican money to Japan and that, in fact, the Foreign Office approved of the plan.719

333. Japanese Minister in Mexico Informs Tokyo of Destruction of Ciphers and Code Machines
On December 7, 1941 the Japanese Minister in Mexico informed Tokyo that all telegraphic ciphers, code machines and safes with the exception of one set each of two separate codes had been destroyed, although on December 2, 1941 Tokyo had instructed that Washington need not follow instructions to get in touch with Mexico.720

Minister Miura declared that he had received the code word Sensan from San Francisco, possibly indicating that this office had similarly destroyed its codes and code machine. He added that he would do likewise with his telegraphic ciphers addressed to various South American offices which were in his care.721
PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(f) Japanese-South American Relations

334. Columbia Refuses United States Overflight Requests

Bogota reported to Tokyo on October 24, 1941, that the government of Colombia had refused the United States the right to fly over its territory, although Venezuela and Brazil had agreed to allow the U.S. to overfly their countries.722

335. Japanese Naval Authorities Ship Transmitter Despite Protests of South American Foreign Offices

When the Japanese Embassy in Argentina warned that it could not safely accept the radio transmitter parts being shipped aboard the Toa Maru,723 Tokyo advised its Rio de Janeiro office that the equipment would be sent to the diplomatic office in Brazil and was to be taken ashore if there was a possibility of successful transportation. If Brazilian authorities suspected the nature of the cases, they were to be returned to Tokyo.724

Word came to Rio on October 27, that the Toa Maru had left Buenos Aires, Argentina, on October 25, 1941, with the radio aboard.725 Minister Shui Tomii also advised Tokyo that along with the transmitter he was shipping diplomatic papers which were entrusted to the ship’s Captain.726

336. Mitsubishi Unable to Ship Supplies Aboard Toa Maru

Although Minister Tomii had hoped to include a cargo of Mitsubishi supplies aboard the Toa Maru, since this material had already failed to reach Japan on the Yamazato Maru, there seemed to be no possibility of obtaining a shipping release. Even though Vice-Minister Yoshio Nakamura had already interviewed the Interministerial Commission in Argentina, the Chief of the Trade Bureau and the Vice Minister of Agriculture to gain a permit, he was told that the export of tungsten should have been prohibited earlier. Mitsubishi representatives, as well as Naval Attache, Katsumi Yukishita, consulted the Chief of the Naval Staff. In view of the fact that the United States had already agreed to purchase two thousand tons of tungsten a year from Argentina, it was believed that such a guarantee would constitute a monopoly in the tungsten trade and that the whole matter would develop into a political rather than a business transaction. With this in mind, Minister Tomii felt that there was practically no hope of shipping the goods aboard the Toa Maru on October 25, 1941.727

337. German Representatives Reserve Cabins Aboard Toa Maru

Apparently some German representatives were also aboard the Toa Maru leaving Rio de Janeiro for Buenos Aires. Although the Toa was crowded, Tokyo advised Berlin on October 27 that two cabins aboard the ship had been reserved.728

722 IV, 584.
723 III, 671.
724 IV, 585.
725 IV, 586.
726 IV, 587.
727 IV, 588.
338. Japanese Navy Promises to Stow Radio Transmitter

When the *Toa Maru* reached Rio, Naval Attache Atsuo Shigehiro reported to Ambassador Ishii on November 6, 1941, that he was bringing ashore the radio transmitter. However, since Ambassador Itaro Ishii personally, objected to being put on the spot by naval officials he again warned that hereafter the Imperial Navy and Foreign Departments would need to cooperate more closely for if the Foreign Service was not informed of future undercover activities, the Ambassador declared he would be forced to have nothing to do with such matters. Then the Naval Attache had replied that in view of such opposition, he would merely store the transmitter in his office without even unwrapping it.

339. Brazil Begins Close Inspection of Japanese Exports and Imports

Ambassador Ishii in the same message, then explained that he had disposed satisfactorily of the 200 additional items which had been sent. He also revealed to Tokyo that the Treasury Department in Brazil was secretly checking all exports to Japan, even resorting to punching holes in trunks and bagging when the situation arose. One method of checking contents being used by Brazilian custom inspectors was that of “accidentally” dropping and bursting baggage of Japanese. Since in one particular instance a package had been similarly opened when German Ambassador Henrich D. Stahmer was going aboard a Japanese Maru, Mr. Ishii’s staff was forced to cover up both for Japan and the Brazilian government but Ambassador Ishii felt that if such a situation occurred again, Japan would be embarrassed and relations with Brazil irretrievably damaged. He again warned that Japanese naval officials should be more cautious in their activities and refrain from sending such hazardous orders to their representatives abroad.

340. Terukawa Maru to Stop at Callao

The problem of whether the *Terukawa Maru* would put in at Callao was still undecided on October 20 when Foreign Minister Togo wired the Japanese office in Buenos Aires to make accommodations for Ambassador Tanakawa aboard the ship. At this time Foreign Minister Togo advised Minister Unggo Yanai in Bogota that the *Terukawa Maru*’s schedule was still undetermined but instructions had been sent to the Kawasaki steamship agent in Santiago, arrangements were to be completed immediately for loading the Ambassador’s baggage.

On November 5 Minister Yanai in Bogota, having learned that the *Terukawa Maru* would not stop at Callao, wired the Japanese Naval Attache in Mexico that certain matters which were to have been shipped aboard the naval vessel could not now leave Brazil. However, the Minister explained that he had cabled to Tokyo requesting that the ship’s schedule be altered in order to take aboard the cargo.

In spite of all the haggling over the Terukawa’s schedule, it was revealed on November 13, 1941, that the ship would dock at Callao since a party of four, headed by Commander Michinori Yosii, formerly scheduled to arrive in Trinidad from England, now would sail aboard the *Terukawa Maru* departing Callao November 19.

By December 1, 1941, it developed that the *Terukawa Maru* was to be utilized in returning the Colombian Ambassador carrying with him special material labeled “canned goods” to Japan. The Ambassador was to deliver the shipment to the son of Yanai, Minister to Bogota, who would in turn deliver the special cargo to the Navy Department.

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729 IV, 590.
730 IV, 590A.
731 IV, 591.
732 IV, 592.
733 IV, 593, 594.
734 IV, 595.
735 IV, 596.
On November 7, 1941, both the Japanese Ministries in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires advised Berne, Switzerland; Ankaran, Washington, Mexico, England, France, Germany and Italy that they had begun to use the code machine.\textsuperscript{736}

### 342. Minister Yanai Advises Instigation of New Radio Code

By November 21, 1941, South American countries had undertaken specific plans for the impending emergency when Mr. Yanai in Bogota advised on this day that it would be practically impossible to carry on wire communications via United States and British telegraph companies. Japanese broadcasting stations would be the only direct means of communication between Tokyo and South America and it would be advisable to set up a code call sign for each Japanese embassy and legation.\textsuperscript{737}

### 343. Tokyo Urges That Maltreated Japanese in Panama Be Taken to South America

It soon became obvious that the situation involving Japanese nationals in Panama would also come to a head. On November 4, 1941, Ambassador Ishii retransmitted Tokyo’s analysis of the general revised policy of the Panamanian government towards the yellow race. In the words of Japanese Foreign Minister Togo the Japanese nationals had remained mild and unruffled in the face of government discrimination against their businesses and that through pleas and persuasive methods they had induced the former president of Panama to promise friendly treatment. Nevertheless on October 8, this resume declared, because of a coup d’etat which resulted in the installation of an unfriendly president, Panama’s relations with Japan immediately turned for the worse, and on October 30 all Japanese business was to be stopped forcing almost 300 persons into unemployment and bankruptcy. It was Japan’s desire that these nationals be allowed to infiltrate elsewhere in South America.\textsuperscript{738}

Apparently Japan blamed the United States for anti-Japanese pressure on Panama and was determined on a relentless opposition in which they would appeal to the great South American powers and their sympathy for humane treatment of individuals. However Japan’s propaganda organization would endeavor to place the United States in the position of being a ruthless power in the eyes of Latin America. In addition, it was to be pointed out that should the Axis power be victorious in the war and an East Asia co-prosperity sphere be established, Panama’s present unfriendly attitude would be remembered for a long time.\textsuperscript{739}

On November 15, a circular message from Tokyo to Mexico was transmitted to Brazil by Ambassador Ishii for information regarding the attitude of the Panamanian government with regard to Japanese nationals there. According to the circular, Japan had made representations to Panama protesting and seeking:—

1. Compensation for damage to Japanese property;
2. A suitable period for the disposition of stocks held by Japanese nationals;
3. Preservation of Japanese property in the future;
4. Abandonment of pressure upon Japanese to evacuate.

The circular advised that Japanese nationals were only permitted to engage in laundry work, domestic endeavors and chauffeuring in Panama and that some three hundred of them faced financial ruin. In an effort to obtain the transfer of these nationals all Japanese offices in important South American cities were advised to make representations to their accredited countries.\textsuperscript{740}

\textsuperscript{736} IV, 596, 598.  
\textsuperscript{737} IV, 599.  
\textsuperscript{738} IV, 600.  
\textsuperscript{739} IV, 601.  
\textsuperscript{740} IV, 602.
344. Minister Tomii Advises Adjustment of Japanese American Relations to Give Japan More Time

Minister Tomii in Buenos Aires added to the general picture then on November 22, 1941, he explained that in recent months South American sympathy toward the United States was increasing in direct proportion to increased trade. Minister Tomii was of the opinion that it would be wise to adjust Japanese-American relations immediately in order to give Japan additional time to restrict this increasing North American influence.

In all his conversations with the Acting President of Argentina, Minister Tomii explained that Argentina had expressed complete confidence in Japan. He stated that only a successful adjustment of Japanese-American relations could aid in the preparation of a Japanese-Argentine commercial agreement. In the event of a breach in Japanese-American relations, the agreement would be terminated.

345. Minister Koseki in Paraguay Burns Codes

On November 22, Japanese Representative Koseki in Asuncion, Paraguay, advised the Foreign Office in Tokyo that he had burned all codes in accordance with instructions from the Ambassador to Brazil.

346. New Code Words Issued November 29, 1941

Not long after Minister Yanai’s request that a new code be installed, a circular from Tokyo on November 29 revealed a complete list of additional code words with their equivalent meanings.

347. Tokyo Lists Accomplishments of Pearl Harbor Day

On December 10, 1941, a Tokyo circular was intercepted in transmission from Rio to Buenos Aires, outlining the December 7 accomplishments of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy against American and British forces in the Pacific. According to the report, the Imperial Navy had carried out a withering air attack on the American fleet at Hawaii, sinking two and seriously damaging four battleships, seriously damaging about four large cruisers, shooting down many enemy planes and possibly sinking an aircraft carrier.

On December 8 the combined Japanese Army and Navy Air Corps reportedly attacked the Philippine Air Force, shooting down forty planes at Iba, fifty to sixty planes at Clark Field, with a loss of only two planes to Japan. Davao, Wake and Guam were heavily damaged and at Guam the warship Penguin, was sunk. Midway was subjected to heavy fire on the afternoon of the 8th with loss of an airplane hanger and fuel reserves. Before dawn on December 8, the Imperial Navy Air Corps had bombed Tengaa and Seretaa bases near Singapore and the Imperial Army and Navy, under a unified command, had easily occupied Thailand that afternoon.

In Southern China, their air corps had attacked an enemy air base north of Hong Kong where twelve of fourteen planes were burned and the British gunboat Jeitoreru was sunk while the American gunboat Wake surrendered. At Peking and Tientsin, the American Marine Corps was disarmed and the Shanghai international concession was completely occupied, as was the British concession at Shamen.

(a) Argentina

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741 IV, 603.
742 IV, 604.
743 IV, 605.
744 IV, 606.
348. Japan Attempts to Improve Trade with Argentina

Even though Argentina maintained a friendly attitude toward Japan during the pre-Pearl Harbor months, trade between the two countries became more circumscribed. Export and import trade with Japan during September amounted to 7,162,614 pesos and 3,391,523 pesos respectively. Domestic Commerce officials Kosaku Tanaka and Masuo Katō worked until October 24, 1941, when Foreign Minister Togo issued instructions that Minister Tomii should secure their transportation back to Japan.

Investigations revealed on November 5, 1941, that it was still possible for Japan to purchase wool, hides, quebracho, and linseed but no tungsten. They also concluded that since the purchasing power of Japanese merchants was 2,000,000 yen, it would be wise to increase their reserve purchasing power by exportation of higher priced raw silk to Argentina.

349. Japan Undecided as to Sympathies of Argentina

According to the Japanese, Argentina did not intend to enter the war between the United States and Japan but would remain on the sidelines. According to the Japanese-Panamanian Minister, Mr. Akiyama, on November 12, 1941, this fact was evidenced by the proposed withdrawal of the Argentine Minister to Panama in the event of war between Japan and America.

With regard to Japanese endeavors to relocate its nationals from Panama to various South American countries, Minister Tomii wired Tokyo on November 14, 1941, that the atmosphere in Argentina had been relatively calm as far as the Japanese question was concerned. However, the fact that the government of Argentina had been so quiet, sticking to a neutral policy, Minister Tomii believed forebode no good for his countrymen and with this in view revealed that he had made representations to the government in an effort to prevent unfortunate action.

That America had decided to declare war against Japan appeared plain in the reports received from the United States, it was declared in a message from Buenos Aires to Tokyo on November 28, 1941 (translated 1-14-45). This fact was substantiated by the progress of Japanese-American negotiations and the movements of Japanese troops from Central China. Furthermore, British male citizens in Argentina were being rapidly drafted by England.

Minister Tomii continued to work towards better relations between Argentina and Japan reporting on November 28, 1941, that he had talked with Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranya in Buenos Aires. Confusion concerning Argentina's attitude toward these negotiations resulted after La Pazon and British and American newspapers published apparently unconfirmed reports on the Tomii-Aranya conversation. Mr. Tomii informed his Home Office that the Argentina government had not refused to cooperate but appeared less enthusiastic.

Mr. Tomii continued that Secretary Nakamura had visited the Commerce Bureau vice-chief in order to verify the source of the newspaper report and all the leaks regarding the conversations. Presumably, the Foreign Office was unaware of recent developments but immediately reassured Mr. Tomii that a thorough investigation would be made. At this point the Japanese minister generalized that in settling a commerce problem, publicity was not the desirable thing and asked that the forthcoming negotiations be kept strictly secret.
When Minister Tomii began his conversations with the Foreign Minister of Argentina on December 5, 1941, he brought up the subject of Japanese-American relations and asked bluntly what position Argentina would take should the United States and Japan go to war. In reply the Foreign Minister referred to the Havana Protocol, a declaration calling for the joint defense of American Continents whereby Japan would naturally be treated as an aggressor nation. Although the United States was expected to request aid from Argentina, the Foreign Minister assured Mr. Tomii that no harm would come to Japan. He referred to this policy as “qualified neutrality” which left the Japanese Minister in considerable doubt as to the real intentions of the South American nation. With the expectation of a second interview Mr. Tomii departed.753

In a later dispatch on December 8, 1941, Minister Tomii then revealed the essence of his talk with the Foreign Minister. During the interview he stated he had stressed Japanese-Argentine amity through the years and the fact that Japan regarded Argentina as the leader of all South American countries and then advised the Foreign Minister of Japan’s wishes. In reply the Foreign Minister agreed with the Japanese points of view but stated that it would be necessary for him to consult with the President of Argentina. According to the Foreign Minister, London, Ottawa, Canberra, and Chungking had all made the same proposition, although he had not yet heard from Washington and Rio de Janeiro.754

According to the circular from Tokyo which was intercepted in transmission from Buenos Aires to Rio de Janeiro, Japan feared that upon the outbreak of war with America and England it might become impossible to communicate directly with Mexico, Central America, Panama and Cuba. In this event it would be desirable that Japan be on the alert for any information regarding declarations of war and detention of Japanese in these questionable countries.755

(b) Brazil

350. Japan Improves Communications Facilities to Brazil

Since the direction, time and contents of Japan’s foreign broadcasts had been changed before October 1, 1941,756 Brazil’s receiving station was reporting increased efficiency on November 11, 1941, while Ambassador Ishii conveyed his pleasure over the improvement in reception. At the same time, he suggested that it might be wise to inaugurate a more detailed broadcast of Japanese news in an effort to impress South American listeners with the fairness of Japan’s position in current international affairs.757

351. Courier Kosaka Leaves Rio de Janeiro for Washington

The day following Courier Kosaka’s arrival in Rio de Janeiro, October 29, 1941, Ambassador Ishii confirmed with Tokyo that the Courier would return to Japan via the United States. He also announced that a member of the Rio office would accompany Courier Kosaka to New York.758

On November 12, Ambassador Ishii wired to Tokyo on behalf of Courier Kosaka that the latter would arrive in Washington by the 5th of December and would continue to San Francisco where he would arrive by the middle of the month. The Ambassador at this time suggested that Mao, in Mexico, make connections with Courier Kosaka in Washington.759

753IV, 614.
754IV, 615.
755IV, 616.
756IV, 617.
757IV, 618.
758IV, 619.
759IV, 620.
Then the Ambassador advised Japan's Mexican office on November 18 that Courier Kosaka would stop over in Mexico after arriving at San Francisco. \(^{761}\)

The Japanese Embassy in Washington was instructed on November 12, 1941, to have Army Surgeon Major Hayakawa, whose status was to be secret, sent immediately to Brazil. Although Major Hayakawa was to act as a non-career specialist connected with the Embassy in Brazil and serving only in that country, he was to be under the orders of the attache resident in Argentina. \(^{762}\)

352. Japan Recognizes Strong United States Sympathies in Brazil

There was little doubt that United States influence was strong in Brazil or that Japan was aware of the resultant antagonism toward itself. Ambassador Ishii had learned from various consuls by October 30 that England and the United States had been purchasing Brazilian newspapers for propaganda purposes with a view toward alienating the Brazilian people from Japan. In order to combat such activities Ambassador Ishii advised that he was working with Brazilian government authorities in Rio and in view of the imminent danger of a crisis, his employees had been diligent in collecting pertinent information. \(^{763}\)

Then in November the government of Brazil conferred upon United States Chief of Staff George Marshall the honorary title of Supreme Commander of the Brazilian Army, Ambassador Ishii lost no time in wiring Tokyo on November 25, 1941. This gesture, he explained, was an expression of appreciation for General Marshall's assistance to Great Britain in securing the re-loading of German anti-aircraft guns consigned to Brazil at the request of Chief of Staff Pedro Goez. \(^{764}\)

353. Japan Transfers Bank Funds

The impending crisis caused a flurry of transactions for a transfer of Yokohama Specie Bank funds to the Imperial government's ministry in Caracas, Bogota and Panama. An unidentified representative of the Specie Bank was to arrive in Caracas on November 30, 1941, and would be in Bogota by December 4, from which he would travel to Panama on December 10. Traveling on a diplomatic passport, the representative would be given the title of extraordinary official attached to the Rio office. \(^{765}\)

354. Ambassador Ishii Asks for Additional Funds

As British and American pressure upon Brazil became more confining, Japanese representatives operated in secrecy. In view of the fact that such machinations would require increased resources Ambassador Ishii asked on November 28, 1941, that Japan appropriate temporarily a secret fund. Throughout the message, Ambassador Ishii attempted to emphasize the need for secrecy in combating the present critical turn of events. \(^{766}\)

355. Ambassador Ishii Has Difficulty in Radio Reception

Although, generally, transmissions to South American countries had cleared considerably by the last of November, Ambassador Ishii radioed on November 30 that Brazilian and Argentine receivers were finding difficulty in copying Japan's 10:30 p.m. broadcast. Thereafter he initialed negotiations to test reception of 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. broadcasts. \(^{767}\)
356. Japan Prepared for Crisis As Brazilian Army Supports America

Despite Foreign Minister Aranya's protestations of neutrality when interviewed by Ambassador Ishii on December 1, 1941, it was apparent that Brazil would be unable to accede wholeheartedly to a neutrality policy in view of the fact that military authorities were pressing for a United States-Brazil alliance. The Ambassador described Brazil as "neutral in favor of the United States". 768

On December 2, 1941, Ambassador Ishii retransmitted the circular from Tokyo to Japan's Santiago office revealing additional code words and their meanings for activities in preparation for the coming crisis. 769

The question of sufficient funds for Japan's machinations in opposition to United States pressure arose again when on December 2, 1941, Ambassador Ishii advised Tokyo that the estimated 512 contos previously requested would be insufficient to complete reconstruction of the Naval Attache's office. In view of the fact that the number of personnel had been increased by three and additional security equipment was needed, the Ambassador requested that naval authorities arrange for disbursement of an additional nineteen contos. 770

On the following day, Ambassador Ishii adovsed Tokyo that in view of current activities he had arranged for a loan of 5000 contos from the Specie Bank, making a total of 6000 contos on hand at diplomatic headquarters in Brazil. In addition, the Ambassador had arranged for a further loan of 10,000 contos as a safety measure in the event that conditions would take an adverse turn. 771

357. Ambassador Ishii Requests Release of Secretary Kusano

Three days later, on December 6, 1941, Ambassador Ishii advised that he had released telegraphic official Kusano who, for various physical reasons, was inefficient in his position. It would be desired, the Ambassador said, that Mr. Kusano's return to Japan be authorized sometime before December 7 and that a more healthy successor, well-versed in telegraphy and machinery, be appointed. 772

358. Japan Sees United States Military Occupation of South American

Japan grasped quickly at the occupation of Netherlands Guiana by the United States armed forces as the first military occupation of the South American continent in its analysis of the international situation retransmitted from Rio de Janeiro to Panama on December 7, 1941. The analysis emphasized the implications of this action stating that the United States was just beginning to reveal its true military objectives.

The release compared the United States' occupation of Netherlands Guiana with Japan's occupation of French Indo-China, stating that the United States would act as it pleased in Latin America and under the banner of hemispheric solidarity would constantly threaten all of Latin America. Foreign Minister Togo called upon all Japanese representatives in South America to seize every opportunity available to point out the obvious intentions of the United States affecting South American governments and people. 773

On December 8, 1941, Ambassador Ishii advised Tokyo that he had acted in accordance with these instructions and by arranging a confidential conversation with the Under Secretary of State of Brazil. At the interview he had explained the situation from Japan's viewpoint and questioned the Brazilian regarding his government's attitude toward the
United States-Japanese war. The Under Secretary had replied that Brazil stressed the importance of hemispheric solidarity but did not say definitely that Brazil would sever relations with Japan. 

From local officials Ambassador Ishii gathered that hemispheric solidarity as interpreted by Brazil meant political and economic cooperation but had no particular military implications. In addition, he learned that the Brazilian government was protecting Japanese workers against fifth column agents and also that the United States was demanding that Brazil freeze all Japanese property there, with which he believed Brazil would comply. Ambassador Ishii learned that articles pertaining to any interpretation of Japanese-American war were being shunned as were all articles which might provoke the Japanese, although publicity needed to be written sympathetically toward the United States. Ambassador Ishii said that although he had explained to the press why Japan was forced to fight America, the control office forebade the newspapers to print it.

359. Japan Issues Instructions for Burning Codes

On December 8, Tokyo ordered that all codes with the exception of one each of certain codes be destroyed. Only in the event of a crisis would the remaining codes be destroyed. Foreign Minister Togo demanded that the files of his message to Ambassador Ishii and other secret and confidential papers should be burned in accordance with developments in Rio. Certain code words were to be used if and when Ambassador Ishii burned the various systems.

360. Minister Yamagata Suspects United States Machinations in Chile

When Minister Yamagata in Santiago secretly learned that the United States had formally requested air bases in return for economic favors on October 16, 1941, he immediately associated this move with the economic crisis within Chile and observed on October 20, 1941, that the coincidence of the two events disclosed to a degree the United States' attitude toward Japan.

Minister Yamagata then originated a dispatch on November 5 urging Tokyo to take advantage of the Chilean economic crisis to support a plan for increased Japanese-Chilean trade and to back negotiations for a new trade treaty. The Minister also voiced a protest against the cancellation of the Kaku Maru's departure for Chile and against Japan's failure to arrange for the sailing of another ship in its place. The next day while answering a query from Japan's Rome office, Minister Kiyoshi Yamagata advised that no foreign ships were sailing at that time from Chile to the Far East.

361. Japan Limits Tour of Chilean Press

For undetermined reasons Japan had decided to return six visiting Chilean newspapermen to their native land without allowing them to visit Shanghai or Nanking. Having employed the Chilean press members for educating the people of South America to respect and cherish Japanese nationalism, Foreign Minister Togo on December 2 issued instructions for the six men returning home via the Tatsuta Maru to be cared for in Panama. A total of $2,160 was to be on hand when the Tatsuta docked and specific instructions were issued that the press members were not to disembark at Panama aboard an American vessel.
It soon became obvious, when on November 18, 1941, the United States communication intelligence facility intercepted a retransmission of Tokyo's message, that Japan had discovered excessive political maneuvers among the South American nations. Since the Colombian Foreign Minister as well as the Peruvian Vice Minister had been conferring in Chile and as the Chilean President had been ousted only recently, it was obvious that machinations were afoot. However, these moves did not necessarily mean that Latin America was consolidating for war against Japan, the Foreign Minister pointed out as he revealed that discussions were being carried on among South American nations for independent action in the event of a Japanese-American conflict.783

However, another dispatch intercepted on November 21, 1941, originated by Ambassador Ishii in Rio de Janeiro and transmitted to Tokyo revealed that Foreign Minister Oswald Aranya of the Brazilian Foreign Office was scheduled to visit Chile in the office of negotiator between Chile and the United States for allied occupation of one of Chile's military bases. Ambassador Ishii had been advised of this by the German Ambassador who was a close associate of the President of Brazil, Getuilo Vargas.784

By November 25, 1941, Minister Tomii in Buenos Aires had discovered that the principal object of the Brazilian Foreign Minister's visit to Argentina and Chile was to exchange opinions regarding the defense of the Americas and the creation of military bases. The outcome of the informal conversations had been, according to an intelligence report, (1) to preserve neutrality, (2) to defend the southern portion of South America by Colombia, Peru, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, excluding Uruguay, Paraguay, Ecuador and Bolivia because of their strong United States inclinations) and (3) to prevent establishing military bases in Uruguay (to be guaranteed by Brazil and Argentina).785

A circular message from Tokyo advised all South American offices on November 28, 1941, that Japanese-American negotiations would take a critical turn within the next few days since the United States had overlooked all that Japan stood for. This was for the information of the Japanese diplomatic offices only.786

According to a December 6 dispatch from Minister Yamagata to Tokyo, Germany had pressed the Chilean government for information concerning its control of the Magellan Straits. The Secretary of State had revealed to the German Ambassador that Chile planned joint action with Argentina and that Chile had decided not to permit these straits to be used as a military base.787

On December 2, 1941, Minister Yamagata had supplemented his interpretation of the ABC conferences. He explained that while Argentina and Chile were resolved to preserve neutrality, Brazil had already maintained an understanding to support America as a non-belligerent. However, the Foreign Minister had assured Mr. Yamagata that he would do all in his power to maintain Chilean neutrality.788

When on November 22, 1941, Minister Yamagata visited the Foreign Minister of Chile, he explained the problems of Japanese nationals in Panama. The Foreign Minister had been surprised by these activities and listened "with an air of incredulity and horror" as Mr. Yamagata disclosed the inhumane treatment being meted out to his compatriots and
promised that he would discuss the matter immediately with the Vice President and offered
the suggestion that perhaps Chile could influence Panama to change its attitude. Whereupon
Minister Yamagata assured the Foreign Minister that this would be impossible and
suggested that Chile allow as many as 300 Japanese to enter its boundaries. In reply
the Foreign Minister had inquired as to the possibility of evacuating Japanese nationals in
Panama to which Minister Yamagata explained that Japanese for many years had been
residing in Panama and did not cherish the idea of leaving Latin America.

The Foreign Minister then advised the Japanese Minister that Chile, although it had no
particular racial prejudice, had been discontinuing, in recent months, the issuing of
immigrant passports. Should they change this policy the United States and other countries
might interpret it as definite discrimination in favor of Japan whereas Chile was in no
position to show such partiality. However, the Foreign Minister promised to consult with his
Vice President but Mr. Yamagata held little hope that large numbers of Japanese would be
permitted to enter Chile.

The day after this interview Minister Yamagata advised Tokyo that he had visited the
Apostolic Delegate, currently confined because of sickness, where he again repeated the
story of Panamanian discrimination against Japanese nationals and asked if the Catholic
representative could not intercede. However, the delegate had replied that Panama was
not under his jurisdiction and suggested that Minister Yamagata appeal directly to the Pope.
Mr. Yamagata then suggested that perhaps the delegate could intercede on behalf of Japan
in Chile and was advised that at a good opportunity the delegate would consult with the
Foreign Minister.

Although Minister Yamagata had been conferring with high officials he was unable to
secure entrance visas for the staff of Amano and company which was to enter Chile and on
November 25 was reprimanded by Foreign Minister Togo who instructed that the matter
should be concluded immediately by obtaining separate visas for these employees.

The next day, November 26, Tokyo issued instructions to evacuate as many Japanese
nationals as possible on the Tatsuta Maru which would leave Japan for South America by
the end of November.

Following Tokyo's reprimand with regard to Chile visas, Minister Yamagata called on the
Foreign Minister on December 1, 1941, to explain the problem of entrance visas for Japa-
nese in general, entrance visas for diplomatic employees and primarily visas for Amano
staff members. Since Chile's Vice-President had been quite busy, the Foreign Minister
had seen no opportunity to discuss the matter with him but hastened to inform Mr. Yamagata
that he himself was trying to obtain an entrance permit for members of the Amano company
staff.

However, the Foreign Minister cautioned Mr. Yamagata that present day conditions did
not favor the entrance of Japanese into Chile since British and American agents had already
sought to accuse him of being pro-Axis. He explained that although every precaution was
being taken to avoid being caught, American surveillance had become increasingly strict
necessitating the constant alertness of foreign office officials. The Foreign Minister asked that
this be kept strictly secret and that Minister Yamagata deal directly with him in view of the
fact that he, always sympathetic toward Japan, was attempting to remove obstacles to
Japanese-Chilean trade.

789 IV, 651.
790 IV, 652.
791 IV, 653.
792 IV, 654.
793 IV, 655.
Mr. Yamagata asserted his faith in the Chilean Foreign Minister who apparently was convinced that the Amano staff members were not Japanese spies but was only afraid that American and British authorities might look askance at such behavior. Then Minister Yamagata related a story of previous American machinations against the German Minister in Chile and suggested that similar unpleasant action might be instigated against the Japanese.794

(d) Peru

364. Minister Sakamoto Asks Permission to Confer with Ambassador Kurusu

Apparently the general opinion of the people and the government in Peru was one of pessimism regarding the outcome of Japanese-American relations. According to Minister Tatsuki Sakamoto in Lima on November 12, 1941, Peru held no expectations of success for Ambassador Saiburo Kurusu in Washington. In a message to Tokyo, Minister Sakamoto asked that he be given expenses and time for a three weeks trip to the United States in order to talk with Ambassador Kurusu regarding the international situation and its effect on Peruvian policies for the future.795

Since relations with South America had become so foreboding Foreign Minister Togo, on November 15, granted the Minister’s request stipulating a period of ten days for the trip.796

On December 8, acting Minister Masaki Yodokawa in Lima revealed that Mr. Sakamoto had been in Washington since November 26.797

3C5. Acting Minister Yodokawa Analyzes Peruvian Attitude

As the situation developed in Peru, Acting Minister Yodokawa analyzed the current happenings for the foreign office. Accordingly he reported that at midnight on December 7 an extraordinary session of the Peruvian Cabinet was held to determine their final policy toward the Japanese situation. However, Mr. Yodokawa believed that Peru would await a decision from other major South American powers before taking any definite steps. However, he reported that strict police surveillance was to be expected and that Japanese newspapers had already been banned.

Realizing that another Cabinet meeting was in the offing, Mr. Yodokawa advised that he had spoken privately with the Peruvian Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs asking him, in the interest of Japanese nationals, to permit supervised publication of certain papers. The Under-Secretary had conceded that Peru differed from other South American countries in that it supported a greater number of Japanese but on the other hand it was in a highly strategic position from the standpoint of the United States.

Mr. Yodokawa then confided that the general public appeared resigned to war and he personally feared that Peru might enter the conflict within the near future.798

The next day the Minister submitted a resume to Tokyo concerning the hostile attitude being taken by Peruvian newspapers which were going so far as to advocate severing relations with Japan. According to his special spy reports, the Peruvian government had advised the press confidentially to report all news sympathetically toward the United States.

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794 IV, 656, 657.
795 IV, 658.
796 IV, 659.
797 IV, 660.
798 IV, 661.
By this time Japanese were forbidden to travel in certain sections and it was expected that funds would be frozen and the purchase of Japanese goods stopped. All telegrams to Panama would now of necessity be written in English and an attack on the Japanese sponsored APRA Party Wing was in the offing. 799

The Minister revealed on December 8, 1941, that the Peruvian Government had broadcast its decision to take no steps in opposition to hemispheric solidarity and that Japanese funds would be retained in local banks. However, Mr. Yodokawa believed that Peru was merely following the lead of Brazil and Argentina and did not expect any particular difficulties to arise which might jeopardize the lives and property of the Japanese. Apparently the Japanese had merely been denied the right of assembly and movement throughout the country and it was not logical that any sudden and drastic action would be taken against them. 800

By December 8, 1941, Mr. Yodokawa had arranged for the local German and Italian Ministers to handle all telegraphic business should the government of Peru adopt an active anti-Japanese policy. 801

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799 IV, 662.
800 IV, 663.
801 IV, 664.
PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(g) Japanese-British Relations

366. Custom Question Forces Ambassador Tsurumi to Remain in Singapore

Despite the fact that Ambassador Tsurumi had given considerable assistance to the army attachés in Singapore, he desired to return to Japan. However, on October 20, 1941, he was informed by Vice Minister Amau in Tokyo that due to the arising of the customs issue, it was necessary that he remain in Singapore and maintain his duties as Consul-General. Amau had previously explained this situation to Ambassador Craigie and voiced his regret at the turn of events. 802

367. Ambassador Tsurumi Receives Permit for the Loading of Raw Cotton

A reciprocal agreement between Japan and Great Britain provided for the shipping of glycerine to England if British authorities granted the Japanese permission to export cotton. 803

In a previous dispatch dated October 6, Shanghai had been directed to ascertain whether or not the British Consul-General had succeeded in obtaining export permits for glycerine. Tokyo also asked that steps be taken to delay the exportation of the shipment until the loading of the raw cotton and machinery had been completed. 804 On October 22, Ambassador Tsurumi reported to the Japanese Foreign Office that eight days previous he had received a written notice from the British chief of administration stating that the latter would permit the loading of the raw cotton which had been landed from the Star of Egypt but that no reference had been made to the specified quantity nor to the loading of the machinery. 805 However, on October 28, 1941 Tokyo learned that both types of raw glycerine, No. 50 and No. 70 respectively, had already been shipped from Shanghai. 806 An investigation was ordered and on the following day a dispatch was sent to Japan informing the authorities there that on October 9, 1941 the glycerine had been sent on the Dutch ship Tjimanok to Batavia. 807

368. Spanish Ambassador Reports Improvement of Conditions in Britain

Mr. Yakachiro Suma, Japanese Ambassador to Spain, reported to Tokyo on October 24, 1941, his recent conversation with the Spanish Ambassador to London, the Duke of Alba, 808 who had returned to Madrid for a short visit. The Duke was favorably impressed with the general situation in England and stated that the standard of living there was much better than in Spain. The British officials had anticipated a lengthy war in the Atlantic and were making every preparation for the defense of the British Isles. Great Britain earnestly desired the actual participation of the United States and had sent Sir Alfred Duff-Cooper to America for the purpose of arousing war fever. The consensus of opinion, however, was that the United States was unlikely to enter the present war since the public opinion, particularly that of the Isolationists, was strongly against it. 809

802 IV, 665.
803 III, 762.
804 III, 775.
805 IV, 666.
806 IV, 667.
807 IV, 668.
808 IV, 669.
809 Ibid.
369. Details of Unloading Scrap Iron Remain Unsettled

Mr. Eiji Kawasaki, the Japanese representative in Vancouver, in a dispatch sent to Ottawa on October 28, 1941, reported that after making inquiries of the Imperial Shipping Company in Vancouver and the King Brothers in Victoria, the date of unloading and other details concerning the scrap iron remained entirely unsettled.810

370. The Asama Maru Prepares to Evacuate Japanese Nationals from British-Controlled Ports

On October 31, 1941 Singapore learned that an N.Y.K. ship would soon arrive from Tokyo for evacuation purposes. In order to arrange the sailing schedule of the vessel, Tokyo requested that it be notified at once as to the number of Japanese nationals to be evacuated and the requisite procedure for leaving the country.811 On the same day, a second dispatch gave the itinerary of the Asama Maru. With Mr. Sugiyama, of the Ministry of Communications, on board in charge of the vessel, it was scheduled to leave Japan on November 7, 1941, and put in to port at Manila three days later, there taking aboard 700 passengers. Leaving Manila on November 11, 1941, it would arrive in Singapore on the 15th of that month and embark an additional 500 persons. Arrangements were to be made with the authorities concerning the provisions for the return trip on November 16, 1941. At a later date the Asama Maru was scheduled for a trip to Britain but the negotiations were not yet completed, and meanwhile it would make another round trip to Singapore.812 Because of her sailing to Manila en route to Singapore, as a precautionary measure, the vessel embarked as one pressed into the service of the Imperial Government; however, regardless of the capacity of the ship, the matter of her handling in the port of Singapore was to be arranged on the basis of the Japanese-British agreement.813 All evacuees boarding the Asama Maru were to carry their money in the form of exchange drafts, and Mr. Tsurumi was instructed by the Japanese foreign Minister to collect the fares of those embarking and to hold the money as a special account from which the expenses incurred while in port at Singapore were to be paid. Expenses incurred en route were to be paid after the arrival of the ship in Japan. The British authorities in Japan had been contacted in regard to this matter and authorities in Singapore were to be advised immediately.814

On November 5, 1941, a change in the itinerary of the vessel was made to the effect that the Asama Maru would leave Tokyo on November 6 thus advancing the entire schedule by one day. The supply of food, water, and fuel sufficient for the round trip had been placed aboard, and the British Ambassador in Tokyo had been contacted in regard to the arrangements concerning the payment of harbor taxes. This matter was to be dealt with in the same manner in the case of the Fuso Maru.815

371. The Kito Maru Abandons Trip to Dairen

Meanwhile, as the Asama Maru prepared to sail to Singapore, a dispatch from Shanghai informed Tokyo that the Kito Maru would sail on to Yokohama after its arrival in Tokyo. A trip to Dairen had been scheduled but due to the public excitement over the Tomisurafu matter, the decision had been made to sail directly to Japan.816
372. Japanese Officials in Singapore Continue Negotiations in Regard to the Frozen Accounts

In Japan the withdrawal of British diplomatic funds or bank deposits of the members of the staff had been forbidden. Although they were not permitted to draw upon their accounts secretly, legal permits could be issued in case drafts were made against British or American banks. At that time steps were being taken with competent authorities to prohibit even the granting of these special permits. In view of the fact that the question of drawing drafts against Japanese and British diplomatic bank accounts was deadlocked, Singapore was instructed to continue negotiations for permission to defray necessary expenditures from frozen accounts. Mr. Togo asked that he be notified as to the result of the negotiations.818

373. Japanese and Canadian Officials Disagree Concerning the Purchasing Rate of Y100

Apparently Tokyo had requested a change in the purchasing rate for Y100 in exchange between America and Canada for on November 6, Mr. Yoshizawa, the Minister in Ottawa, notified Tokyo that after a member of his staff had conferred with the Canadian officials in regard to the request, he had learned that in American dollars the latest New York buying rate for Y100 was $23.44. The selling rate was $23.57, making the average rate $23.50%. Adding to this the fixed average rate for exchanging money orders between America and Canada at a premium of 10½%, a rate of $25.97 was given. The Japanese staff member replied that in this case the exchange between American and Canada should be at the New York market rate rather than the Canadian fixed rate. The Canadian officials insisted firmly, however, that there was no precedent for taking the New York price. The Japanese staff member replied that if the above calculations were insisted upon, it would be impossible to settle the matter. Since it would be necessary to make some reply to Canada, Mr. Yoshizawa requested a wire from Tokyo at once stating the basis for their submitting the figure of $26½%.820

374. Mr. Wataru Assumes Post as Commercial Attaché in Shanghai

On November 6, 1941, Tokyo requested an application, addressed to the Foreign Minister from Mr. Wataru, in regard to his appointment as Commercial Attaché in Shanghai. The application together with the decision of the head of the industrial section was to be sent at once by air mail. The following day Shanghai wired a reply to Tokyo concerning its request for information in regard to Mr. Wataru’s period of employment and salary. Unless in order to comply with regulations within the country, no definite period of employment would be specified; however, after three years of service a promotion would be in line. In regard to the remaining points, the basic salary was quoted as $1800.00, national currency; exchange allowance $1316.57; and living allowance $2605.00; making a total of $5721.57.822

375. Japan is Concerned Over the Attitude of Great Britain

On November 11, 1941, a discussion of Britain’s present position in the war was sent from London to Washington and later relayed to Tokyo. The British attitude toward Japan was, of necessity, conditioned by the vicissitudes of the German-Soviet war, which, had
reached an extremely critical phase. Due to Russia's continued resistance and the German losses which had been far greater than anticipated, the Atlantic war and the bombing of England had been considerably slowed down and Britain's imports and accumulation of commodities had increased along with the expansion of its production. The British at last had confidence in their preparations to resist a German invasion and were manifesting a willingness to carry on the war for seven years if that were necessary to attain ultimate victory. Operations in the Mediterranean and in the Near East had been more favorable than anticipated and in addition the financial situation had also been relieved since results of the contributions for the Army Drive had exceeded all expectations. Cooperation between England and America was becoming more closely knit, and in view of this and the improved conditions in Britain, a break in the negotiations that were in progress between Japan and America would merely serve to spur the British government on in its attitude toward Japan. It was the earnest desire of Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Japanese Ambassador in London, that at this time the Imperial Government should formulate a far reaching national policy in order not to be circumscribed by future developments and that it would face the Japanese-American negotiations with an epoch making plan and a resolute determination.

After the Ambassador had given the above resume of the British attitude toward Japan, Mr. Churchill made a special broadcast and took the occasion to utter a final warning to Japan. The Japanese ambassador was convinced that he was not bluffing and that he had no intention of seeking a rapprochement made with Japan at the expense of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.824

376. Spanish Charge d’Affaires in Cairo Comments on the Situation in Egypt

Senor Gabriel Alloman Villa-Ionga, the Spanish Charge d’Affaires in Cairo en route to his home passed through Ankara on November 10 and commented on the situation in Egypt. He had observed that due to the successes of Germany in the war, the anti-British attitude was increasing but the positive policy of the British had thus far managed to suppress it to some extent. Since the establishment of Tojo's cabinet in Japan, the increase of Australian troops had been deferred and it was rumored that some of the troops would return to their homeland. At the same time, as a warning, British troops had been recently stationed in Syria near the Turkish border and between 170,000 and 180,000 troops were established in the Libyan border region.825

377. Japanese Naval Reconnaissance Bomber Flies Over Hong Kong

Canton notified Tokyo that on the previous day, November 12, 1941, the British Consul-General had called to say that on November 5, 1941, a Japanese Naval reconnaissance bomber made a flight over the southern part of Hong Kong Harbor and then headed north. As a result of the protest lodged concerning a similar occurrence on September 28, 1941, Japan had promised to issue strict instructions in order to prevent a repetition of the incident. This recurrence was most unexpected, hence another protest had been submitted and it was requested that Canton contact the military authorities immediately.826 On November 11, 1941 the British Embassy in Tokyo had also lodged a strong protest giving a resume of the November 5 incident. Canton received this information on November 13, 1941 and was requested to wire Tokyo immediately upon the completion of the negotiations.827

824 Ibid.
825 IV, 682.
826 IV, 683.
827 IV, 684.
378. Ambassador Craigie and the Foreign Minister Culminate the Honma Incident
On November 13, 1941, when British Ambassador Craigie called on the Foreign Minister regarding some other matter, the question of Honma, Vice Consul of Rangoon, arose and the Minister criticized the British for their action in this matter. The Minister explained that of its own initiative, the Japanese Government had already issued a recall to Honma whereupon Craigie declared that the deportation by the British Government would automatically be dropped. At this point the subject was closed. During the interview the matter of returning the evidence which had been gathered for the case was not discussed but since England had discontinued its deportation order, Tokyo demanded that the evidence material immediately be returned to the office from which it was taken.828

379. Japanese Foreign Minister is Concerned Over Family Remittance Permits
Freezing order permits had been issued for family remittances from certain British subjects residing in Japan proper as well as those British who were working for Japan's benefit. However, as a matter of principle no other permits had been granted because it was reported that Great Britain had refused family remittances to Japan. On November 14, 1941 the Japanese Foreign Minister informed London that he would be willing to cooperate in allowing such remittances if Japanese nationals residing in England and the colonies were accorded similar privileges.829

380. Canadian Army Troops are Sent to the Orient
It had been rumored that Canadian Army troops would soon be sent to the Orient and as a confirmation of these reports, on the morning of November 16, 1941, a transport of the Canadian Pacific Line guarded by a British warship came into port at Hong Kong. It carried on board about 1,000 Canadian soldiers, all volunteers and of mixed nationality, who were entered in the Kuryushinsho (Kana spelling) barracks. The strength and details of this division were being held in secret but according to reports another 2,000 troops were expected. Tokyo received this news on November 17, 1941, and it was relayed to Japanese officials in Canton, Shanghai, Nanking, and Ottawa.830 On the same day Mr. Yano at Hong Kong informed Tokyo that additional information had been gathered in regard to the Canadian soldiers. A news correspondent who had visited on board the ship inadvertently revealed that Brigadier J. K. Lawson, the Canadian Commander, was in command of the 2,000 green troops whose training would begin soon after their embarkation.831 Four days later Shanghai threw further light on the number of Canadian troops stationed in Hong Kong, for according to a JF dispatch the warship Canada had transported one regiment of 3,000 soldiers and three more regiments were en route to Hong Kong.832

381. Makino of the Johol Rubber Plantation is Instructed to Return to Japan
Meanwhile on November 18, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo had instructed Mr. Makino of the Johol Rubber Planation in Singapore to make arrangements for returning to the homeland. After expediting affairs relative to the management of the planation, all employees who could possibly be spared together with the overseer were to return to Japan by way of Thailand or any other available route. The matter of the remaining Japanese, non-residents, rested entirely with Mr. Makino.833

828 IV, 685.
829 IV, 686.
830 IV, 687.
831 IV, 688.
832 IV, 689.
833 IV, 690.
Diplomatic Relations Between Iraq and Japan are Severed

Rashid Ali Al-Gailani, leader of the quelled anti-English revolts in Iraq, had been receiving assistance from the Japanese and because of this alliance, the Iraq government severed diplomatic relations with the Japanese Imperial Government as of November 16, 1941. Two days later Tokyo advised Ankara of this new development and at the request of the Turkish Minister in Iraq, the Ankara officials were ordered to contact the Turkish Government in regard to caring for the legation property in Bagdad since Japanese interests were not represented there. 834

Britain Removes from Office the Chief of Staff and His Assistant

In a short time the Chief of the Imperial Staff, Sir John G. Dill would have reached the age of retirement. Therefore, according to an announcement made on November 15, 1941, he was transferred from his post to the position of Governor of Bombay and was succeeded by General Sir Alan-Brooke, Commander of the home forces. His assistant, Lt. General Pownall was also transferred to another key position and his successor was Major General A. E. Nye. Lt. General Pownall had been reared and educated in Japan and both he and General Dill were recognized authorities on that country. The General Staff, so Shigemitsu believes, was the only organ of the British government which could correctly evaluate and understand matters pertaining to Japan, and he thought, quite possible that with Japanese-British relations at such a critical point, the removal of these men from their posts was part of a program to purge all those persons who might have leanings toward Japan. 835

The Boris Arrives in Seattle

Mr. Seijiro Yoshizawa, Japanese Minister in Ottawa learned on November 18, 1941, that the Boris had arrived in Seattle but because the Captain possessed no bill of lading he was forbidden to unload his cargo. The Japanese had been asked to remove the obstacle at once and Mr. Yoshizawa requested that the Tokyo officials wire instructions to the Ottawa office immediately after contacting the Mitsui Shipping Company and taking the necessary steps to clarify the matter. 836

Mr. Yoshizawa Seeks Funds for the Ottawa Legation

Officials at the Japanese legation in Ottawa had found it impossible to arrange any payments out of the frozen funds since August, 1941. After negotiating with the New York office, provisions were made to secure $3500.00 in American money. Receiving Tokyo's approval of the measure, Mr. Yoshizawa had sent a member of his staff to New York and as a result received $10,000 in American currency; however, $3,000 of this amount was required by the Consular Office in Vancouver. Arrangements had been made for Clerk Kihara who was soon to leave New York for Seattle to deliver the money to the Ottawa officials. On November 20, the money on hand in the office amounted to $10,500 and, in the event of war another $20,000 would be available from New York. Provided that Tokyo sanctioned the receipt of this money, Mr. Yoshizawa believed that the difficulty could be surmounted without receiving funds from any other source. 837

In the event that the evacuation of Ottawa should become necessary, the Japanese legation, the office and the interests there would be assumed preferably by Brazil but

834 IV, 691.
835 IV, 692.
836 IV, 693.
837 IV, 694.
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

should that prove impossible, Argentina would be suitable. Officials in Tokyo, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires were to be contacted. In addition there was the question of Italian interests which the Japanese had taken over. If at all possible the Minister in Ottawa requested that further instructions be wired directly to him.838

386. Mr. Kawakasi Negotiates for Funds for the Nisso Company in Vancouver

Because of the freezing order placed on Japanese funds by the British,839 the Nisso Company branch in Ottawa was unable to ship lumber to Japan since about $65,000 in Canadian money remained unpaid. Negotiations for the payment of these funds were to be carried out in Tokyo, and Mr. Kawakasi suggested that the Tokyo officials obtain the details of the case from Mr. Aida who had just returned to Japan from Vancouver. After the matter of supplying this money was discussed with the head office of the Nisso Company, instructions were to be sent to the branch office in Vancouver.840

387. Foreign Minister Togo is Concerned Over the Remaining Japanese Residents in Singapore

Originally the Asama Maru was scheduled to sail from Japan to Manila and then to Singapore arriving there on November 15, 1941, to evacuate a group of Japanese nationals from that city;841 however, the Japanese Consul had requested that the vessel stop at Singapore before traveling to Manila since many of the passengers could not afford the longer way to the homeland. On the revised sailing schedule the Asama Maru was to leave Singapore on November 6, 1941. An evacuation trip to Britain was also being planned but since negotiations were still incomplete the Asama Maru was scheduled for another round trip to Singapore.842 On November 20, 1941, the Foreign Minister in Tokyo requested information concerning the remaining Japanese residents in Singapore after the last evacuation had taken place. The number of men, women and children were to be listed separately including their ages and their places of residence and further details were to be given in regard to how many of those remaining were engaged in farming, mining, exporting and importing, retail and miscellaneous enterprises as well as their financial condition. Should it prove impossible for those Japanese to carry on business activities as a result of the freezing legislation, Mr. Togo was to be advised as to the approximate length of time that they would be able to carry on their affairs plus the prospects for the possible removal of some of these persons into Thai or French Indo-China.844 Four days later, the situation having become increasingly more difficult, Foreign Minister Togo sent a dispatch to Singapore sympathizing with the unhappy lot in which the remaining Japanese residents found themselves. Despite the difficulty in bringing about further evacuation, he promised to do whatever possible in order to send another vessel to Singapore; however, in the event that the situation should become worse, he assured the Japanese merchants that their government would continue to make the best possible arrangements in order to protect the interests of those remaining nationals.845

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838 IV, 695.
839 III, 734.
840 IV, 696.
841 IV, 672.
842 IV, 538.
843 IV, 672.
844 IV, 697.
845 IV, 698.
388. Tokyo is Concerned Over British Code Material

Meanwhile the Japanese were becoming concerned over certain British code material. On November 21, 1941, a message had been sent from Peking to Tsingtao, a port in northeast China, with the information that clues had been obtained there regarding telegraphic codes being used by the British Embassy. Apparently they were being employed for communications between Shanghai, Chungking and London and though there was a possibility that they had previously been decoded by the North Army there was a chance that they might prove to be of some value. The three codes in question were the diplomatic codes, plain language abbreviations and numbers code, and information regarding them was to be wired to Peking immediately. In addition the following day Tokyo wired Peking to investigate the British codes coming in at the time. A great deal of the material could not be read and though it was necessary that the investigation be a cautious one it was equally important that it be done completely and thoroughly.

389. The Premier of Burma Attempts to Attain an Independent Status for His Country

On November 18, 1941 U Maung Saw, Premier of Burma who, for the past few weeks had been in London for the purpose of obtaining an independent status for his country, called at the office of Hirasawa, Japanese representative in New York. Having failed to accomplish his mission, the Premier was very disgruntled over Britain’s refusal of Burma’s request. As he departed London on November 14, 1941, he had not hesitated to express his dissatisfaction to a reporter of the New York Times in the presence of the British Premier. It was his wish to interview President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and “appeal” to the British Government through the “press.” After leaving New York, the Premier planned to travel to Bangkok via Canada, New Zealand and Manila arriving there around December 7, 1941, where he would remain a few days before returning to Burma. Since he realized that he would be under the strict surveillance of the British after his return, he desired to take advantage of the opportunity to confer with some influential Japanese during his visit in Bangkok. At his suggestion that he meet Consul Saito, Mr. Hirasawa gave him his calling card by way of introduction. In view of the present world conditions, the Premier apparently desired to oppose British might by means of Japan’s strength.

390. Hong Kong Economic Condition is Becoming Critical

On November 24, 1941 Shanghai forwarded to Tokyo a report received two days previous from Hong Kong concerning the present economic conditions in that city. On November 20, 1941 there were no more than approximately 10,000 bales of cotton thread and 4,000 bales of cotton cloth in the warehouses. Taking No. 20 Soma cotton thread in Hong Kong dollars as a standard the sudden rise in price was $345.00, $410.00 and $480.00 at the end of September, October and November 13 respectively. The factories had accepted orders for their output up to February 1942; however, the export of cotton to Japan and Shanghai was prohibited and it would have been impossible to procure the aforementioned cotton from the warehouses at as reasonable a price as had been expected. Consequently the factories would be seriously embarrassed.

Control regulations were enforced and it was decreed that the amount of cotton goods on hand must be recorded each month; that any sale and shipment of cotton must have the permission of the authorities and that a maximum selling price be affixed.

446 IV, 699.
447 IV, 700.
448 IV, 701, 701A.
The prospects for the future were not too encouraging for when control was enforced and since there were no sellers at the unreasonably low fixed price there were many illegal transactions at high figures. In addition there was not more than a two months supply of cotton in the warehouses and eventually difficulties would arise in regard to sending khaki clothing to England. A suggested plan of operations was therefore submitted whereby it seemed expeditious to enforce a strict and thorough embargo obstructing transportation of Hong Kong products to England and the South Seas. When Hong Kong finally yielded, a plan of barter transactions in rice, flour, sugar and like commodities would be suggested.849

391. Tokyo is Concerned with Code and Cipher Systems

Tokyo notified Japanese officials in Washington on November 26, 1941, that they would receive and use temporarily a new keying system which had been devised by the telegraphic official in London for the cipher machine for messages between London and Tokyo. Washington was instructed to transmit to Tokyo the one word ASADA in clear text which would signify the receipt and understanding of the information.850

Later on December 1, 1941, Japanese officials in London received orders from Tokyo to discontinue the use of their code machine and dispose of it immediately. Extreme caution was to be observed in carrying out the instructions for its disposition and particular attention was to be directed to dismantling and destroying the important parts of the machine. At the same time the rules for use of the machine between the head office and the Ambassador resident in England were also to be burned. Upon receipt of the telegram the one word “Setteju” was to be wired to Tokyo in plain language and after the disposing instructions had been carried out the word “Hasso” would serve to notify the Japanese Foreign Office of the completion of the task.851

On the following day, in a message from Mr. Takanobu Mitani, Japanese Minister to Switzerland, it was learned that the Japanese diplomatic officials in North America, Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Seas and in British and Netherlands territory, had also been ordered to burn all of their telegraphic codes with the exception of one copy of O and L.852

Meanwhile, on that same day, Japanese officials in Singapore received from Tokyo a table which was composed of important code words and their corresponding meaning.853

392. Japan Prepares for Hostilities

On December 2, 1941, Japanese officials in Canton notified Tokyo that precautionary measures had been taken should hostilities begin. The Army had completed preparations to move upon Thai and in the event that the British resisted to the end, it was prepared to occupy the country militarily.854

Two days later official orders for physical examinations had not yet been issued in Shanghai; however, this was going to be carried out as of the first and handled as though the order were confidentially sent on that date.855

On December 5, 1941, Japanese officials in Peking announced that concurrent with opening war on Britain and America, Holland would be considered a semi-belligerent and strict surveillance would be exercised over her consulates in China. All communications between them

849 IV, 702.
850 IV, 703.
851 IV, 704.
852 IV, 705.
853 IV, 706.
854 IV, 707.
855 IV, 708.
and the enemy countries as well as other use of code messages and wireless would be prohibited. In the event that Japan and Holland became involved in a war, the same steps be taken toward the latter country as were taken in the case of Britain and America.\textsuperscript{856} Preparations had been made on the basis that the treatment accorded the property and staff of Britain, America and Holland in North China, would be comparable to that accorded them in occupied territory. Peking suggested that a policy be adopted whereby a suitable person of a third power such as Belgium, Spain or Brazil be recognized as custodian of the interests of Britain, America and Holland in North China.\textsuperscript{857}

In addition, steps which would coincide with measures concerning the departure of the Japanese Consular Staffs and resident nationals were to be taken for the evacuation of the Staffs and nationals of the hostile nations. All public property belonging to enemy nations was to be seized and placed in the custody of Japan.\textsuperscript{858}

Meanwhile the Japanese Minister in Ottawa, in interpreting recent instructions from Tokyo, surmised that should the situation become critical, his staff would be cut to the last possible man. Since they were already working on a “skeleton staff,” he felt that further reduction would be impossible. However, he conceded that in such an eventuality they could probably manage with only the use of their diplomatic staff. He feared that Mr. Suzuki, apparently referring to Lt. Gen. Teiichi Suzuki of the Japanese cabinet, would prove to be an obstacle to the accepted plan and Tokyo was asked to take this into consideration.\textsuperscript{859}

On December 7, 1941, in a circular telegram, Tokyo revealed that relations between Tokyo and England were not in accordance with expectations.\textsuperscript{860}

The following day the local military commander paid a visit to the Japanese official in Tientsin with the information that though France maintained her neutrality, she would cooperate with Japan insofar as possible. This had come from the French Consul who had called on the military commander in regard to the recent incursion of troops into the British concessions.\textsuperscript{861}

On December 9, 1941, in a message from Hsinking relayed to Tokyo, it was learned that immediately following the opening of hostilities, in accordance with prearranged plans, the telephone wires of the United States, British and semi-enemy consulates in Harbin, Mukden, and Dairen were cut and their radios and automobiles were destroyed.\textsuperscript{862}

\textsuperscript{854} IV, 709.  
\textsuperscript{857} IV, 710.  
\textsuperscript{858} IV, 711.  
\textsuperscript{859} IV, 712.  
\textsuperscript{860} IV, 713.  
\textsuperscript{861} IV, 714.  
\textsuperscript{862} IV, 715.
PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(h) Japanese-German Relations

393. Ambassador Oshima Asks to Resign

Immediately after the appointment of Shigenori Togo to the position of Foreign Minister in Tokyo on October 19, 1941, Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima again undertook to secure a resignation from his position in Berlin. Stating that the appointment of the new Foreign Minister had been a source of much gratification to him since Mr. Togo always had been an excellent friend, Ambassador Oshima pointed out that although he formerly had been in a position to offer assistance to the new cabinet, in view of the policy which would now most assuredly be undertaken, he felt unable to continue representing the Japanese government in absolute harmony with its new policies.

The Ambassador pointed to the fact that on previous occasions, during the office of Foreign Minister Matsuoka, he had requested permission to resign and now in view of conflicting opinions, he could only hinder the new Foreign Minister.863 On October 30, 1941 Tokyo wired its refusal stating that Ambassador Oshima now occupied a very important position and no temporary appointee could satisfactorily hold it down. Foreign Minister Togo suggested that for the time being Ambassador Oshima subject his personal desires to the common good of the Empire.864

394. Japan Sees an Increase of British and American Aid to Russia

Probably one important reason for Tokyo's refusal to grant the Ambassador's plea was the increasingly urgent situation created by growing British aid and American lend-lease to Russia. On October 20, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo in Tokyo readdressed a London dispatch to Berlin which stated that although the German army had been advancing at a surprising speed on Moscow, these gains were counter-balanced by British impatience and the British Parliament's sudden decision to step up its aid to the Red Army. Although there was some debate resulting from minor opposition to such a move, Ambassador Namoru Shigemitsu in London believed that Prime Minister Churchill would not choose to listen to the arguments of amateur strategists and would more firmly entrench his policy of giving military aid to Russia.865

In order to explain Great Britain's attitude, it was believed that since the Soviet had proved itself capable of stronger resistance than had been anticipated, Great Britain realized the strategy of keeping Germany occupied on its eastern front. This view, according to the Japanese Ambassador in London, was not only upheld by the government and the influential classes but also by the majority of the people themselves.

Under the existing situation in which both the invasion of England by Germany and the invasion of the continent by England would be impossible, it was feared by the Ambassador Shigemitsu that the war would develop into one of Germany against Great Britain and might last for an indefinite period of time.866

On October 22, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo transmitted to Ambassador Oshima a telegram from Capetown in South Africa, which revealed three routes being taken by United States lend-lease material in its supply line to Russia. The first route moved by railroad and truck

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863 IV, 716.
864 IV, 717.
865 IV, 718.
866 IV, 719.
starting at Basra on the Persian Gulf and moving North to the Caucasus via Iraq and Iran. The second route proceeded through Iran from Bandar Abu Shahr on the Persian Gulf to Teheran and thence to the Caspian Sea where it shipped across to the Russian shore or from Teheran to Tabriz where it was railroaded to the Caucasus. However, the water span proved to be limited since only two large boats could depart from wharves of the first port. Although engineers were attempting hurriedly to deepen the water sufficiently, it was believed that the railroad facilities, despite their present condition of repair, was proving the most successful of the two lines from Teheran. American lend-lease shipments also depended upon a third route from the Indian border to Mirjawa on the Iran-India border from which a railroad line extended to Mashed on the Iran-Soviet border. \(^{867}\)

The Japanese Ambassador at Hsingking, General Yoshijiro Umezu, expressed his views on the increasing aid Russia was receiving from England and the United States, stating that actually the help had been so meager that Stalin himself was dissatisfied. He concluded that insomuch as Russia was fighting Germany single-handedly and was being destroyed for the benefit of England and America, he believed that it would be to Russia's advantage to make peace. Suggesting that Japan propose a peace conference to be held in Nanking after the fall of Moscow, he declared that if Japan acted as mediator, it would be performing a great service.

Ambassador Umezu itemized the conditions which he thought should be a part of this proposal:
1. The holding of a large-scale conference during the summer of 1942;
2. Russia was to relax ties with Great Britain and the United States and was not to interfere in Japan-China affairs; and,
3. If possible, Russia was to supply Japan with oil. \(^{868}\)

395. Exchange Broadcasts Become Acceptable to Japan and Germany

On October 23, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo became impatient of the results which were to be obtained with regard to the Japanese-German negotiations for the exchange of broadcast facilities and publicity releases. These negotiations which had been underway since August of 1941 and (see Japanese-German Relations, Chapter 3, Volume II, Section 33—Berlin and Tokyo Begin Negotiations for Improved Communications) concerned the exchange of memoranda which would offer to both governments the final analysis of all news coverage which was to be transmitted by private broadcasting companies. By this time there remained only a minor difference of opinion, and it was left for the two countries to compromise on that point. \(^{869}\) Therefore, on October 25, Ambassador Oshima replied that the German Foreign Office had practically agreed but that its formal reply would be given the following week. \(^{870}\)

396. Progress of the Russo-German War (October 1941)

Tokyo by October 24, 1941 had received detailed information on the Russian-German situation from its representatives in Helsinki and Bucharest.

a. Report from Finland

The Helsinki Minister, Tadashi Sakaya, reported on the Finnish role being played in the conflict, saying that Finland had set out to regain that territory which had been seized by Russia and that its objectives in its recent attack on the Soviet were, first, to regain lost territory and, secondly, to make secure its own defenses. In the Karelian area, the Finnish army had already passed the old border line by October 24 and had invaded Russia while at the present time, it was cooperating with Germany in surrounding Leningrad. The Finnish forces had
also cut the Murmansk railway and were assisting in the invasion of the Kola peninsula. Southern Hanko, which remained in Russian hands, would probably be the subject of a compromise since further pursuit of this territory would only result in further sacrifices.

Although Finland had hoped to abandon her assistance to Germany after the fall of Leningrad and Kronstadt, it was now necessary to assist Germany in the struggle for the Kola Peninsula. However, not desiring to inherit Germany's further difficulties, it was thought by the Japanese Minister in Helsinki, that Finland would soon quietly retire from the struggle. According to Minister Sakaya, as far as Finland was concerned, all that now remained was the accomplishment of a few compromises to be followed by reconstruction work.  

b. Report from Roumania

From Bucharest, Roumania, came additional information on the war situation which stated that in the attack on Odessa, the Roumanian army's losses had been smaller than previously reported by the Russian propaganda office. In view of the fact that the Roumanian army lacked large guns and possessed only a few flame throwers in comparison to the mechanized forces of the Soviet, it was only natural that they should try to avoid a direct encounter. In the battle around the north coast of the Black Sea the Roumanian and Hungarian armies fought diligently for several reasons. By cooperating with the Germans they were not only assisting in the oppression and annihilation of Bolshevism, but also attempting to gain for themselves favor in the eyes of the German war lords who would be in a position to arbitrate in their behalf on such questions as the Transylvania border line.  

In Bessarabia it was noted that the Russians were carrying out their scorched earth policy to a great extent, but the amount of damage in the Ukraine appeared to be unexpectedly small. Probably the Russians did not have either enough explosives or sufficient time to fire the regions.

The political situation within Roumania was also reported on by the Japanese Minister who acknowledged that there were still those within the country who, having been in power under the old order, were sincerely desirous of an English-American victory. However, the majority were confident of German success over Russia and firmly believed that by the following summer, the whole question would be settled since Germany would employ her air force and submarines in an attack on England. Many were of the opinion that a direct war between the United States and the Axis was in the offering, in which case the United States would be chased from the European continent. According to the Minister, all Americans in Hungary, Bulgaria and Roumania had already been confidentially advised by their diplomatic offices to evacuate. Newspapers had become unreserved in their comments against American and English citizens. These same anti-American groups considered that all lend-lease and British aid was of little importance in the settling of the all-over conflict; and they were showing contempt for the American and British coquetry in favoring Bolshevism. Since Roumania was a particularly religious country, it was not favorably impressed by the United States' outward policy of protecting "religion, humanitarianism and justice," and at the same time carrying on friendly relations with communistic Russia. Roumania, which considered itself maltreated by the Soviet Union, was gradually growing more confident and fond of Germany, a feeling which the Japanese Minister believed to be quite spontaneous. 

397. Tokyo Relays a Summary of Diplomatic Relations as Advanced by Germany

In a circular letter addressed to Hsinking, Peking, Nanking and Shanghai Foreign Minister Togo relayed in its entirety a message sent to him by Ambassador Oshima on October 16, 1941.

871 IV, 726-727.
872 IV, 728.
873 IV, 729
According to Ambassador Oshima a specially appointed delegate from Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop informed him that after the fall of Moscow, the German forces would continue the campaign in the Caucasus throughout the winter. The sweeping plans of the German army included an invasion of the Near East, including Syria, Iraq and Iran. Although the eastern Mediterranean would be cleared of all British influence, the battle of Africa would have to be postponed temporarily because of Great Britain’s present strength in that area.

Improved conditions between Germany and Turkey were reported by Ambassador Oshima. The German objective in Turkey was to induce Ankaran participation in the Three-Power Pact, and a recently concluded commercial pact between the two countries was paving the way. Insomuch as Turkey had long hated Italy, it would be a tremendous diplomatic victory for Germany should she succeed in these negotiations.

Germany needed the help of France and Spain if it were to combat English influence in the western Mediterranean; and Ambassador Oshima pointed out German progress in regard to this. Germany had made her Consul-General in Vichy a Minister and France was expected to send a diplomatic representative to Berlin thereby establishing better relations between those two countries. The general outlines of a peace treaty between Germany and France had already been worked out although a few points would require additional negotiation. Once the German-French relations were firmly established, Spain would undoubtedly prove no barrier.

The German representative had informed Ambassador Oshima that a compromise peace between England and Germany was out of the question despite the present peace rumors. However, it was possible that peace terms would be offered Great Britain after the termination of the Russo-German war.874

398. Asama Maru Departure is Delayed Because of Unsuitable Routing

The Asama Maru, which had been scheduled to depart from Tokyo at the beginning of October,875 was, on October 21, still in port and preparing to sail about the first of November. There had been some dispute about the route which the Japanese merchant vessel would take in that Germany had specified an area which the ship’s captain believed would take it into the combat zone. Therefore, Tokyo asked that Ambassador Oshima check with the German authorities to see why they felt that the previously scheduled route for the Asama Maru, which also had been taken safely by the Suwa Maru and the Fushimi Maru, would be unsatisfactory to Germany and why they had prepared an obviously dangerous course.876

In reply on October 25, 1941 Ambassador Oshima advanced his opinion that the German course had referred chiefly to waters adjacent to England, but as far as changing the route was concerned, it was still a matter for negotiations and the Ambassador believed that Germany was approachable on the matter. He asked that a definite request be decided upon in Tokyo so that he might present it to German officials.877

Minister Kiyoshi Tsutsui in Bucharest suggested to the Senior Adjutant of the War Office in Tokyo that some of the Poles who had been working on anti-Russian espionage in Roumania be sent to Japan aboard the Asama Maru. These men, he certified, had Manchukuo passports; and the Kwantung representatives were in favor of this action.878

Aboard the *Asama Maru* had been stowed German-Russian war pictures as well as fifty or sixty reels of cultural film sent by the German Foreign Office. Both the film association and the German Foreign Office was desirous of having these films transported as official baggage since it was believed that the British government would refuse to permit their transportation. On October 27 Tokyo replied that there would be no objections to classifying the films as diplomatic baggage.

By October 31, the *Asama Maru* still had not left port and newspaper reporters in Rome were beginning to feel that Japan was showing an indecisive attitude in delaying its departure. Even by December 4 when it would have been timely to have shipped a cargo of decorations to Germany and Italy the *Asama Maru* remained at anchor. There seemed to be no prospect of her departure.

**399. Axis Powers Reacclaim the Anti-Comintern Pact**

Apparently the continuous discoveries of communistic plots throughout Europe and Asia at this time were alarming the Axis powers, which in culminating the Tripartite Pact had specifically stipulated a program of active aggression against the International. On October 25, 1941 Ambassador Eugene Ott had called upon Tokyo’s East Asia Bureau Chief suggesting that the Axis powers promulgate a five-year extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact, stating that he had received orders to make this proposal from his home government.

Ironically, on October 24 Tokyo had been forced to report that its judiciary officials had just arrested a German newspaperman, Wolfgang Sorge, connected with the Frankfurter Zeitung. He was accused of communistic activities in Japan. Sorge had personally been gathering intelligence for Ambassador Ott, who had expressed complete amazement and had demanded that he be allowed to talk privately with the accused correspondent. Foreign Minister Togo had then made an exception in view of the particularly friendly relations existing between Japan and Germany and had allowed the Ambassador to talk with Sorge in the presence of police officials. In relating this incident to Ambassador Oshima in Berlin, Foreign Minister Togo asked that the matter be considered in strictest secrecy.

Regarding the proposal of October 25, Foreign Minister Togo addressed another dispatch to Ambassador Oshima on October 31, 1941, relating that he had told Ambassador Ott that the Japanese Imperial Government was in favor of convening a conference to extend the Anti-Comintern Pact. He officially instructed Ambassador Oshima to initiate negotiations with Germany concerning the text of such a proposal. On November 4 Foreign Minister Togo advised Ambassador Oshima that Japan felt from a legal point of view that the secret appendix which had been attached to the previous Anti-Comintern Pact was no longer necessary and that Japan would attempt to secure an agreement of its Privy Councillors to abolish it. In addition, the Japanese Foreign Minister offered a suggestion that a distinction should be drawn between the original signatories and subsequent participants and also that the basic text of the protocol should be in three languages, Japanese, German, and English.

In an attempt to secure as many participants as possible in the new protocol, Foreign Minister Togo directed a dispatch to Nanking on November 11 in which he stated that the Nanking
Foreign Minister, Tateki Horiuchi, had applied to Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop for admission to the group of signatories. Foreign Minister Togo outlined the form of the telegram which had been sent to von Ribbentrop. The negotiations which the Tokyo Foreign Office was holding with the Nanking government in this regard were to be handled by Minister Shi-niokura Hidaka. On November 11, 1941, an actual translation of the protocol was transmitted to Berlin from Tokyo which states in part:

The Imperial Japanese Government, the German Government and the Italian Government together with the Hungarian Government, Imperial Manchurian Government and the Spanish Government, recognizing that the protocol signed by the above governments is a most effective means of combating the activities of the Communist “International” and believing that the Common interests of the above governments are best served by close cooperation between them do hereby agree to extend the effective period of the said protocol. For this purpose the following stipulations are agreed upon.

Also on November 11, Foreign Minister Togo wired the exact message which he expected Ambassador Oshima to give the German government with respect to Japanese cooperation. In this document, the Japanese government had declared itself to be in complete accord with the German government in respect to extending the validity of the first Anti-Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936. Japan had taken the position that Article 5 of the Tripartite Pact, which stated:

Japan, Germany, and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting parties and the Soviet Russia, superseded this second supplement which the Imperial government desired be nullified.

With respect to the supplementary signatories, German Ambassador Ott had called upon Foreign Minister Togo in Tokyo to request the concurrence of the Japanese government in the inclusion of Roumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia in an expanded Anti-Comintern Pact. The Foreign Minister approved and advised that he would instruct the Roumanian, Bulgarian, and Finnish Ministers in Tokyo to contact the German and Italian Ministers regarding their inclusion in the pact. Only in the cases of Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia did Japan feel that the concurrence of the three Tripartite powers would be sufficient to include them in the pact.

Naturally there were many minor details which threatened to delay the final signing. On November 12, 1941, Ambassador Oshima, having already transmitted the text of the protocol, requested that any objections to portions of it be wired immediately. Ambassador Oshima advised that he had already changed the expressions, “The Hungarian Government” and also the expression the “Italian Government” to read “All European Governments” and had changed “The Japanese Government” to read “The Great Imperial Japanese Government.”

By November 13, seven governments had expressed their desire to sign the new protocol on November 25, 1941. Tokyo, in a dispatch to Hsingking, revealed that the Japanese and German text had already been completed but that the official Italian text had not yet been received. At that time Tokyo advised that certain minor alterations were being made in the text. Foreign Minister Togo requested that Minister Yoshijiro Umezui in Hsingking establish contact with the Manchurian Minister in Germany, Lu Yi-wen, and instruct him to handle the final signature.
After the Minister in Hsingking had received the official text from Tokyo, he immediately instructed the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin to advise the Manchurian Minister there as to the proper steps to be taken in signing the protocol.895

In order to satisfy the Manchurian government, Tokyo asked that Ambassador Oshima advise the German officials that Manchuria would like to have "The 8th year of Kotoku" inserted in the text. In this regard, Japan felt, too, that Spain would also desire to have the date of its new era inserted. He asked that a revision be made immediately. However, it appeared that the German government was anxious to have negotiations completed and advised Tokyo accordingly. In reply, Foreign Minister Togo acknowledged that it might be possible to encourage the Manchurian government to withdraw its insistence upon a revision of the text.897

On November 15, Foreign Minister Togo attempted to explain to the Manchurian government that he had proposed to the German Foreign Minister that the phrase "The 8th year of Kotoku" be inserted in the protocol, the Spanish government had then requested that a Spanish text of the treaty be prepared. As Manchuria could plainly see, due to shortness of time, it would be impossible to satisfy both Spain and Manchuria although the Germans were fully appreciative of their viewpoints. Foreign Minister Togo then explained to the Manchurian government that if the Japanese and Manchurian governments pressed the matter of saving face for all countries which expected to participate, the settlement of the problem would be delayed. During such a long pause Germany's proposal to Spain might fall through and severe repercussions would follow.898

On November 13 Ambassador Oshima advised his home office that Germany desired to keep the negotiations involving the participation of the various countries in the pact secret until November 25, when it was believed that a surprise announcement would be of great propaganda value. On the other hand, it was believed that if the matter should leak out from either the Japanese or Chinese side before then, it would be most awkward.899

By November 14 Ambassador Oshima revealed that Roumania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Croatia, according to German sources, were at last displaying a desire to join with the past signees. Finland's reply was to be expected within three days and Denmark would await Finland's decision.900

In reply, Foreign Minister Togo stated that he had not favored the entrance of any other nations in the negotiations but Germany's insistence had forced him to agree. The Japanese government of China would join with the others immediately.901 Also on this day, Foreign Minister Togo notified Ambassador Oshima that he should submit the Foreign Minister's telegram empowering him to sign for the Japanese Empire.902

From Berlin on November 16, 1941, Ambassador Oshima related that the Assistant Under-secretary of Foreign Affairs had told Japanese Consul Shun-ichi Kase, in Berlin, that the Spanish government had been pressed for a reply. By the night of the seventeenth, Germany expected an answer and was to notify Consul Kase immediately.903

By November 17, when the Nanking government still had not made its final arrangements, Foreign Minister Togo wired instructions that Ambassador Oshima should present to Nanking

895 IV, 753.
896 Also referred to as "The 9th year of KO".
897 IV, 754–756.
898 IV, 757.
899 IV, 758.
900 IV, 759.
901 IV, 760.
902 IV, 761.
903 IV, 762.
a joint statement from Japan, Germany, and Italy urging it to formally enter the negotiations. Whereupon the statement "We wish to have the Nanking Government make formal application for inclusion in the pact. Please arrange for the application to reach Berlin during the 25th", was issued to Nanking. Also on November 17, the Italian text was sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Oshima so that a comparison could be made with the German and Japanese texts.

Hsingking wired Tokyo on November 21 that the exercise to be carried out on November 25 in honor of the signing of the protocol extending the Anti-Comintern Pact had been fixed. They would include a special broadcast of greetings from the Minister of State and the German and Italian Ministers on the evening of the 25th and the morning edition of the 26th would carry the conversations between the Japanese Ambassador, the Minister of State and the Head Office.

For some inexplicable reason the German government attempted on November 21 to postpone the date of signing the protocol to November 28, but when Ambassador Ott met with cold opposition from an anxious Japanese government whose Council had already stipulated in the original text that there could be no method of revising the text, and when Ambassador Oshima in Berlin conveyed to the German Capitol these sentiments, the German government under the guidance of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, retracted its suggestion and ordered that the signing would take place as it had been planned on November 25.

Foreign Minister Togo notified officials in Nanking and Hsingking on November 21 that the consent of Manchukuo, Hungary and Spain had been secured in regard to the new protocol and that the necessary procedures within those countries was being pushed to enable the signing to be carried out in Berlin on November 25. He mentioned that Germany and Italy probably would produce a large-scale propaganda effort tying in the Russo-German war on that day but that Japan did not plan to publicize the extension of the pact more than to make a simple statement of fact.

On November 22 the Axis nations had induced several nations to join with them in reaffirming the anti-Comintern pact on November 25, 1941. Included in this group were China's peoples government, Roumania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia, and Finland with the possible addition of still doubtful Denmark.

The ceremony attending the signing was to be held at 10:30 or 6 p.m. and would consist of speeches by Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and representatives of all the participating powers. Those signing for their respective countries were to be Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop for Germany, Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano for Italy, Minister Ro-Gi-bun (Lu-yi-wen) for Manchukuo and Foreign Minister De Ladislaus Bardossy for Hungary, in addition to Ambassador Oshima for Japan. According to Ambassador Oshima the visit of the Spanish Foreign Minister had not been scheduled as yet.

In a dispatch on November 24 Ambassador Oshima confirmed the hour of 12:30 as the signing time, adding that the Hungarian, Manchurian, and Spanish representatives as well as himself would make speeches during the ceremony. He also confirmed the adherence of Den-
mark and the attendance of the Spanish Foreign Minister.\textsuperscript{914} The following day Denmark's decision to participate in the signing was relayed to Hsingking by Foreign Minister Togo.\textsuperscript{915}

Although it had been the ambition of both German and Japanese leaders to keep the proclamation a secret until such a time as its announcement would provoke the greatest propaganda throughout the world, it was inevitable that some leak would occur and Ambassador Oshima assured his home government that the error which occurred on November 22 was unavoidable although it was unfortunate that Germany through interviews with the Foreign Office Press Bureau had disclosed vital information which might be used by the enemy in counter propaganda.\textsuperscript{916}

As soon as the ceremony had been completed Ambassador Oshima transmitted a memorandum to Tokyo and Hsingking relating the exact order of signing: Japan, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain, by Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister Ciano, Foreign Minister Bardussy Dlolaszio, Foreign Minister Lu i-wen and Foreign Minister Ramon Serrano Suner.\textsuperscript{917} Ambassador Oshima then proceeded to assure the Manchurian government that the method of signing had been as it had requested, and that all copies of the text were identical.\textsuperscript{918}

On December 4, Ambassador Oshima confirmed the fact that Croatia had also acquiesced in the reacCLAIMED protocol opposing the Comintern.\textsuperscript{919}

Ambassador Oshima informed the Home Office in Tokyo that on the morning of November 25 the exchange of official documents abolishing the secret auxiliary agreement of the first Anti-Comintern Pact had been completed. However, he noted the German request that the existence of that secret agreement should be kept secret, even though it had been cancelled. Ambassador Oshima said that notes had been exchanged to that effect.\textsuperscript{920}

\textbf{400. Halting of American Shipping at Manila Impedes Japanese-German Trade}

In spite of the fact that Japan had been attempting to dispatch additional merchant vessels to the United States and had been engaging in the proper negotiations, by November 4, 1941, arrangements still had not been completed. Apparently the American shipping service between North America and Shanghai had been cancelled at Manila making it impossible for returning Japanese to reach home from the European continent.\textsuperscript{921} This move was viewed with much anxiety by Ambassador Oshima under pressure from businessmen in Berlin who were anxious that at least one ship a month should touch port in Germany from Japan regardless of whether a regular schedule could be maintained. Personally, the Ambassador was much concerned since only by this means could he be assured of a method of return to Japan.\textsuperscript{922}

\textbf{401. Progress of the Russo-German War (November, 1941)}

By the end of the first week in November, it was evident that Ambassador Saiburo Kurusu in Hong Kong would be undertaking a grave mission in order to solve what was called an "unprecedented crisis" and which would necessitate his complete understanding of the Russo-German situation.\textsuperscript{923} Therefore, in order to assist the Ambassador, Minister Toshijiro Umetsu
in Hsingking wired his analysis of the outlook for the Russo-German war to Hong Kong. In this resume he pointed out the similarity of the Soviet and Chinese problems.

a. Their territory is so vast that the government can flee anywhere.

b. The population is so numerous that the military forces have unlimited reserves.

c. The living standard is low, and the people are inured to suffering and privation.

d. They have the most skillful of leaders.

e. They have natural fortifications (for example, the Urals and the three provinces to the north).

f. The Russians are politically indoctrinated.924

It was Minister Umetsu's opinion that if the Germans did not halt their march after the fall of Moscow, the Russians could continue to resist and though Germany should occupy the whole territory west of the Urals, by the following spring, the Soviet Union would still control forty per cent of the whole resources, population and industry in the east. He believed that the foundations of the Stalin regime were so firmly entrenched that even if its striking power were lowered, one would be extremely foolhardy to depend upon its downfall within a very short time. Because of the evident possibility of Russia's holding out indefinitely, Germany would be handicapped and would be restrained from attacking England for some time and no early close of hostilities in Europe could be expected.925

On the same day, the Foreign Office in Tokyo advised Minister Umetsu of a resume which it had received from Budapest, Hungary. In the confidence of the Hungarian Foreign Office, Ambassador Mauturo Inoue had secured the information that, after the fall of Moscow, the Soviet government would be totally deported to the Urals, the productive power of which was at that time still unknown.

Intelligence reports divulged that Germany's next ambition would be a conquest of the Caucasus, Iran, and Iraq. In pursuit of this aim, it would attempt to cut off the petroleum supply of the British forces and then take over Syria and Egypt. Should the Nazis be successful herein, Turkey would have no alternative than to bow to the German will.926

With regard to the Ukraine, it was estimated that not more than twenty per cent of the industries had been destroyed and reconstruction work was already successfully underway.927 The booty captured from Ukrainian armies offered a few minor disadvantages. It had been discovered that Soviet gasoline, untreated, would not propel Hungarian motor cars while Soviet machines likewise could not operate on the Hungarian type of gasoline. Nevertheless, despite such difficulties, the Hungarian army had managed to equip one mechanized brigade with Soviet arms and armament. Supplies from Galicia could be brought to Hungary although shipping problems prevented immediate use of resources in the Ukraine where the Germans appeared to be cultivating plants which would produce rubber substitutes.

Guerilla warfare in Serbia, on the other hand, was proving fierce. Rails between Nishi in southeastern Yugoslavia and Belgrade had been split in sixteen places. The Ukrainian Danube fleet was seen near Belgarde protecting navigation on the river.

With regard to the situation in the Balkans, the Ambassador at Budapest reported that this year's crops were about normal, but because of the war the agricultural situation in the Ukraine would not improve for another year or two.

The Ambassador also voiced an opinion regarding the possibility of the United States' entrance into the war, stating that should the allies secure bases in Scotland, the Azores and Northern Ireland, which it undoubtedly would, Germany would counteract by invading Portugal and attacking Gibraltar.928
In response to Japan's request of October 29, 1941, Ambassador Oshima informed the home government of Germany's success in governing occupied Russia. The Ambassador on November 10, transmitted the summary of the situation as he had been advised by a dependable German source. Accordingly, it was reported that Dr. Alfred Rosenberg, who had been designated by the German High Command to govern occupied Russia, was already in Riga administering the affairs of the three Baltic countries as well as portions of White Russia. Acting director Mr. Erich Koch, had taken office at Kiev on October 31, and these two men were carrying out the administration.

In these areas quite a few members of the intelligentsia remained but apparently were cooperating with the Reich in its administrative policy. These people appeared to be indigenous and were being used to best advantage by Koch and Rosenberg. Although the two German officials were pulling the strings, it had become the best policy to allow to the natives the actual positions of justices of the peace, judges and minor military officials in direct contact with the people. With the exception of the political gendarmes, the police were almost entirely made up of Russians. It was believed that the technical skill and knowledge of agriculture of the Germans were invaluable to them here.

In other sections, however, the so-called intelligentsia had been disposed of and the people themselves appeared to be too helpless to act upon their own initiative and seemed to have lost all ambition. German leaders merely directed them in the "best possible manner". This type promised to be of no trouble whatsoever in the future. Germany had quickly diverted Soviet railways to its own use, and according to a speech by Chancellor Hitler, 5,000 of the 25,000 kilometres of captured railway had already been changed to the German gauge. Although a conspicuous part of German supplies and troops were being transported to the front lines by rail, trucks were also being used extensively. A supply road from Germany to the battlefields had already been completed. After the warfare along the Black Sea and the Baltic was successfully completed, Germany was expected to add ships to the present methods of transportation.

In Germany's attempts to uproot the Kolhoz system and to replace it with Nazi agricultural techniques it had become necessary to fight for the recognition of private ownership. Once this was accomplished, German leaders presumed that their methods would produce better results. In order to meet the shortage of labor on German farms and in its factories, Russian prisoners and foreign labor amounting to 2,500,000 and 3,000,000 respectively were being imported. Nineteen different countries were supplying foreign labor for the Hermann Goering factories while Russian prisoners were being used in the Rhine area. Although this did not fully compensate for the shortage of labor, it was estimated that approximately seventy or eighty per cent of the peacetime strength had been met. According to Ambassador Oshima, there was not the slightest sign of impoverishment though it was true that there was some scarcity of labor and materials. Industries in occupied Russia were being reorganized and the situation there was well under control.

On November 11, 1941, the Foreign Office in Tokyo attempted to summarize the Russo-German situation for its officials in Washington, stressing the point that although the German march on Moscow made the possibility of its fall imminent, it would be a great mistake to conclude that the Stalin government would collapse immediately since so much assistance could be secured both from Russian territory east of the Volga and from America and Great Britain. The summary touched upon communistic uprisings and sabotage in German occupied countries and remarked that German police powers were dealing successfully with these factions.

929 IV, 786.
930 IV, 786.
931 IV, 787.
932 IV, 788.
933 IV, 789.
Evidently the Japanese Foreign Office believed that although United States public opinion still prohibited nominal participation in the war by a) designating neutrality zones and issuing "shooting orders" for these areas, b) occupying Greenland and Iceland, c) attempting to nullify the neutrality act, and, d) arming its merchant vessels while at the same time e) attempting to secure military bases in Central and South America and abolish Axis influence in the Western Hemisphere, it was actually engaging in anti-Axis activities.933

On November 11, 1941, in what he called a summary of his six-months duty as an administrative official inspecting conditions in Germany, Kohel Muto addressed an Ode-to-Nazism to the Home Minister extolling the virtues of the New Order and the uncontended influence with which the Fuehrer led his German people. Any sign of discontent, he felt, was only a natural anxiety over the speedy conclusion of the war and in no way could be interpreted as a hint of conflict midst his unified people. Admitting that the food situation was falling short of normal times, he said it appeared far from a critical stage. According to Mr. Muto, a German downfall through lack of food would be impossible for several years to come. Shortage of labor, he explained, was being met by Russian war prisoners and foreign labor. Again he pointed to the high morale of those behind the fighting lines and the absence of any disturbances in either the large or small factories.934

402. Fresh Rumors of a Combined Europe Meeting Under Hitler Arise

It was not long until rumors began to circulate again about a conference of all the European nations which Chancellor Hitler supposedly had planned in order to give England and America a demonstration of his leadership throughout the continent. Ambassador Oshima divulged on November 11, 1941, that he had learned from a reliable source of Germany's plans to hold such a meeting in Vienna late in 1941 or early in the following year and to ask all neutral nations to participate in the conference. Vichy, Spain, and Finland had already signified their acquiescence, while Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey appeared reluctant to participate.

Since England and America somehow had heard of these rumors, Ambassador Oshima was not at all certain that the congress would be held. He believed that at present Germany would not make any startling diplomatic moves since the Russo-German war remained undecided. But upon the fall of Moscow, he confided that some diplomatic maneuver could be expected, particularly in regard to German-French relations.935

403. Progress of the Russo-German War (November 13-14, 1941)

a. Report from Finland

On November 13, 1941, the Foreign Office in Tokyo relayed a summary of the Finnish situation as it had been reported by the Japanese Embassy in Helsinki. There, as in other sections of Europe, sharp reductions in exports and imports, scarcity of labor and an unexpectedly early winter had produced a critical food and clothing situation. Prices of all commodities had risen sharply to one hundred forty-four per cent of the 1939 standard. These official quotations could not compare to the actual market prices which, because of bootleg transactions, had risen many times and promised to reach higher levels as the war continued.

Although anti-Soviet sentiment among the people in the front lines was very strong, the unusually frugal living conditions and long expected British and American pressure might cause a breakdown in operations against the Russians.936
b. Report from Berlin

With regard to the actual progress of the German army in Russia, the Foreign Office transmitted a Berlin summary to Manchuria and its various headquarters in China on November 13. A primary obstacle to the German advance was, of course, the extremely cold weather. Although the German spearhead had already reached Rostov, because of the inability of successive detachments to advance at an equal rate, the city had not yet been taken. Along the line to Kerch the advance had been stalemated by mud. In preparation for the final offensive, powerful German detachments had been massed in the greatest concentration of the war along the line extending from Kalinin to Tula. Although the Soviet government had already transferred sixteen fresh regiments from the Far East in addition to fifteen other regiments and had added a citizens’ army of 200,000, the Germans, were already superior in both number and quality and were expected to begin a rapid advance when weather conditions improved.

According to this German source, Stalin had asked that Great Britain land troops on French soil but it was believed that the Empire would merely promise to pound Germany from the air. These raids were doing little if any damage and were being used merely to furnish figures for propaganda purposes with regard to RAF activity.937

A later report, from a German of high reliability, revealed that on November 14 favorable weather had returned on the Russian front and major campaigns were resumed. The strategy called for an encirclement of Moscow rather than a frontal attack. This encirclement, if the current weather conditions prevailed for a week, should be completed in ten days. In accordance with a political press claim that Germany intended to split off the main cities of Moscow and Leningrad and follow with their destruction, such tactics would be pursued until final victory. Although it was expected that the Russians would hold out for a certain length of time, it did not alter the fact that the Russian campaign would be completed. This was also pointed out by the announcement that Hitler had appointed Dr. Alfred Rosenberg to the post of Minister for the eastern occupied area in preparation to setting up the political government.

In the southern section German forces were advancing southwest of Rostov toward a portion of the Caucasus lying north of the Caucasian mountain range. Since this was an extremely hazardous undertaking for severe winter weather, it was expected that the war would be carried on into the spring.938

The same German source which reported on November 14 advised a member of Ambassador Oshima’s staff on November 21 that fresh infantry and artillery forces had crossed the border in the Tula area and after capturing the town, were forcing their way northeast.

Regarding the fact that the Germans had been anticipating a British counter attack in North Africa it was not believed, even though the British outnumbered them four to one, that their armies were as efficient as Nazi trained soldiers. Their only concern appeared to be that should the fighting become prolonged, the supply problem might become critical.939

Latest reports from the fighting front as relayed by Ambassador Oshima placed German forces twenty-five kilometers north of Moscow and from the south as far as Ryazan on November 27. Although Russian troops were opposing vigorously, German spokesmen were confident of an ultimate victory at Moscow.

Likewise in the north African war, the report continued, German forces had overcome the impending crisis and, combined with Italian troops there, were well on their way to success under the leadership of Field Marshal Rommel.940

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937 IV, 794.
938 IV, 795.
939 IV, 796.
940 IV, 797.
c. Report from Alexandrovsk
An Alexandrovsk intelligence report rebroadcast by Tokyo on November 13, revealed additional information concerning the Black Sea area. It appeared that armed soldiers, horses, and vehicles were being transported from Alexandrovsk to the opposite coast of the Black Sea while the populace was giving up clothing. Under the newly imposed bread rationing system workmen were allowed 600 grams and other civilians merely 300 grams.941

d. Report from Bulgaria
According to a message from Sofia, on November 14 the Germans in Serbia were being opposed by both the Nationalists Party, numbering around 10,000 occupying the mountains south of Belgrade, and the Communist Party numbering 20,000 scattered throughout the towns and cities in the interior and active on the Roumanian border. In order to combat these two factions two divisions of Marshal Sigmund Liszt's army, a detachment of Austrians, 30,000 armed Roumanians under General Milan Neditch, as well as complements of young men's associations and National Guards backed by German war lords, were operating. However, since the German army had encountered little experience in the art of partisan warfare, it appeared to be making slight progress against such opposition.

According to this dispatch, the craze for assassinating German soldiers still continued and members of the royal family and high officials of Serbia were in danger and were taking every precaution to avoid encountering these anti-German factions. In an attempt to retaliate, Germany, on October 17, ordered the execution of 2,000 teachers, students, and others and again on November 3, 30,000 people were arrested at one time, including the education minister.

From private sources, the originator of the message from Sofia had learned that if the progress of its power politics continued, Germany would declare war on Serbia and enlist the backing of Bulgaria, Roumania, and Croatia. When this suggestion was made to the Bulgarian King, he politely refused to cooperate under such circumstances. The Serbian people, finding German oppression unbearable, were even considering the possibility of being annexed to Bulgaria.

With regard to the situation the Macedonia, Albania and Greece, there existed the same critical shortage of food and unless some relief measures were taken at once, national distress by winter would reach incomparable limits.942

404. Japanese Specialists Study German Industries
In order to gain first-hand information with regard to the operation of industries within Germany, Japanese specialists under the direction of Ambassador Oshima, had organized to study and investigate the steel industry. All Japanese technicians were prepared to assist in the promulgation of a plan to operate in close liaison with German Officials and industrialists. A central office, known as the Berlin Branch of the Japanese Steel Production Control Association, was to be set up to work in close connection with the home office. Such an organization would require a staff of clerical and technical employees at an estimated cost of 15,000 yen, but in the opinion of Ambassador Oshima this promised to be an exceptionally profitable undertaking.943

In addition to a thorough Japanese study of the German steel industry, plans were continued for the Japanese to investigate many other manufacturing techniques and, in some cases, to buy either the equipment from Germany or the patent rights for the manufacture of that equip-
ment. Three clerks, Yoshida, Hanaoka, and Kinoshita, were reported learning the method of
manufacturing high grade lubricating oils at the RUAHEMI Company's plant on October
27. Photographs of the 75 mm. powder chamber and cartridge case were received and addi-
tional plans were requested on October 28, 1941.

Various articles for aerial warfare were believed obtainable from Germany according to a
wire sent by a Japanese committee in Berlin on October 29. These included sighting apparatus
for firing and bombing use, automatic bombsight, precision photometer, a 20 centimeter high
angle continuous air camera, the KERUBIN flying oxygen respiratory apparatus, electrically
heated flying clothes, the Askania automatic pilot device, wave length recording apparatus
and testing devices. The Japanese Air Service Headquarters replied on November 25, listing
those articles which they wished to purchase outright from Germany. In addition they ex-
pressed a desire to buy the manufacturing rights to the Rheinmetall 13 mm. machine gun
and to several other pieces of equipment.

On November 10 the Japanese delegation in Berlin wired the War Office in Tokyo informa-
tion concerning the ME-210 and the plane which it was to replace, the ME-110. Because of the
ME-210's speed and maneuverability the Japanese planned to develop a similar plane in co-
operation with the Germans; this, however, would depend upon the plan's practicability after
additional tests. To fulfill Japanese requirements a new type motor was suggested, possibly
the DB 605 or the DB 611. The performance of the plane under these circumstances was esti-
mated at 640 km. speed and a cruising range similar to a regular ME-210. The construc-
tion of the plane would vary in accordance with the different purposes to be fulfilled; e.g., interce-
p tor, STUKA, or long-range reconnaissance plane. The construction time was estimated from
16 to 11 hours when in mass production.

The Chief of the Technical Headquarters section in Germany wired its home office in Tokyo
and the Ordnance Administration Headquarters there the results of a visit to the Mozeru
factory. He had authorized this visit to enable the Japanese to learn methods of constructing
rifle stocks from laminated materials. It was discovered that laminated stock materials con-
sisted of beech boards about 1 millimeter thick put together with a glue material and that its
weight in the finished rifle was 100 to 150 grams more than that of walnut; however, its advant-
ages over walnut included being able to be dried by hot air in eight hours and a comparatively
small degree of warping.

Another committee wire from Berlin advised the Vice Minister of War on November 29 that
the Japanese and Manchukuo cargo, which was to be loaded on blockade-runner number 1,
would be gradually increased to a gross tonnage of about 2700 tons. A small amount of this
would be Swiss cargo. It was estimated that by December 15 all of the freight would have been
assembled in Germany ready for transportation by special trains.

The Illies Company would operate the transportation of the agricultural and industrial
cargo for Germany and would assume responsibility for damage to the cargo. Only that cargo

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944 'IV, 801.
945 'IV, 802.
946 'IV, 803–804.
947 'IV, 805.
948 'IV, 806.
949 'IV, 807.
950 'IV, 808.
950a Kana Spelling.
951 'IV, 809.
952 'IV, 810.
952a Kana Spelling.
which was acceptable to the German Economic Ministry was to be shipped. The Illies Company had planned to advance the fees for storehouse expense and transportation by land and sea and would be reimbursed for this by the SHOWA Company. Only the SHOWA Commercial Company and the Manchukuoan authorities were to have disposal authority. Insurance rates, commission charges, and transportation expenses were discussed as well as the time for payment. \(^{953}\)

The War Office of the Senior Adjutant in Tokyo requested that authorities in Berlin immediately send the two Universal Parallel Testing Machines previously ordered. This dispatch was dated December 7, 1941. \(^{954}\)

405. President Inonu Offers Turkey as a Mediator Between Germany and Russia

On November 1, 1941, Ismet Inonu, the President of Turkey, made a gesture toward the promotion of peace between Germany and Russia in his address to the parliament of his country. Rumors of a conference which had been planned for December 10 at Vienna followed this speech. Some newspapers, however, considered these stories German propaganda. According to Ambassador Papen, who had conferred with the Japanese representative in Ankara, Germany had absolutely no intentions of making any peace proposals and such rumors were a result of British propaganda. However, it was believed that the Turkish president was desirous of extending his good offices.

On the other hand, rumors pointed to the fall of Moscow when Turkey would act as a mediator and in following such a course, find a way to change its foreign policy. \(^{955}\)

406. Axis Powers Bicker Over Vital Rubber Shipments

The problem of Siamese rubber shipments to Shanghai again arose while the Italian Naval Attache in Shanghai also negotiated for a portion of the supply. But Japan, whose reserve supply of this material had been notably short, had ordered the Mitsui branch in Shanghai to refuse the Italian request. \(^{956}\)

The Esso, carrying a load of rubber consigned to the German firm of Karlwitz and to the Japanese Continental Trading Company, was scheduled to arrive in Shanghai about the twentieth of November. Two days before that time officials in Shanghai notified the home office that the tonnage was presumably divided up with 320 tons, valued at 2,000,000 yen, for the German firm; approximately 203 tons, valued at 1,300,000 yen for the Japanese company; and a balance of 70 or 80 tons, valued at 500,000 yen. Japanese officials, unsuccessful in their attempts to have the Germans release their consignment to Japan, requested that the matter be taken up with the German Commercial Attache in Tokyo, Dr. Helmut Wohlthat.

The question of Italy arose again, but Japan remained insistent that the third Axis party should not share the vitally needed raw material.

Similarly, the Japanese government was faced with demands of Japanese business firms in Shanghai that the rubber be unloaded at the wharf immediately. In opposition Japan felt that until local authorities had established undisputed control there would be a danger that foreign firms might acquire the supply. \(^{957}\)

407. Ambassador Oshima Says Axis Political Aim of the War is the Dismemberment of Russia

According to a dispatch transmitted from Berlin on November 21 the political aim of the war against Russia was not as had been previously stated by the Ambassador, the destruction of

\(^{953}\) IV, 811.  
\(^{954}\) IV, 812.  
\(^{955}\) IV, 813.  
\(^{956}\) IV, 814.  
\(^{957}\) IV, 815.
Bolshevism, but rather the crushing of Russia as a nation and although Germany was forced to resort to unprecedented cruelties if the Soviet intended to oppose, such tactics were unavoidable.

Ambassador Oshima also briefly touched on the statistics regarding British forces in the Near East and Egypt and revealed that Germany was convinced that Great Britain was bluffing and that it had not nearly these resources in men and supplies on hand as it pretended.

With regard to German-French relations, Germany was, according to the Ambassador "taking care" of its allied nations.

Apparently Hitler had been considerate of Italy's wishes with respect to Mediterranean warfare. However, since several German ships had been sunk in recent weeks an order had been recently issued that twelve German submarines were to be sent into the Mediterranean, one of which had accounted for the sinking of the *Ark Royal*. 958

Ambassador Oshima also expressed his opinion on the future possibilities of the Russo-German war when he disclosed on November 21 that the possibility of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union seemed remote, although he believed that Germany preferred a short war so that she might transfer her fighting forces to possibly, the British front.

Regarding Japanese relations, the Ambassador believed that whatever policy Japan adopted with regard to the United States and Great Britain would influence her greatness and for this reason he felt that Japan should avoid violence at the present time although it was necessary to blast the British-United States-Russian joint action. In order to accomplish this it would be necessary to bring about peace between Germany and the Soviet Union, and Ambassador Oshima expressed his belief that Japan's position would be enhanced considerably should she offer herself as a mediator for peace at the opportune time. 959

408. Japanese Officials in Ankara, Helsinki, and Vienna Report German Activities to the Home Office

In contradiction to a London radio broadcast which quoted Ambassador Franz von Papen as having said that Germany planned to offer Great Britain peace terms at the conclusion of the Russo-German war, the Japanese office in Ankara informed Foreign Minister Togo that the German Ambassador to Turkey had discussed only "miscellaneous matters" with the correspondent. It was therefore presumed that the correspondent in question had based his observations on the scarcity of German bombings on England and on the speech made on the first of November by the Turkish President, Ismet Inonu. When questioned by the Japanese, Ambassador von Papen had denied the whole thing, pointing to Germany's military and economic strength and its confidence in ultimate victory without compromise. 960

From Helsinki Minister Tadoshi Sakaya wired Tokyo a review of the Russo-German war for the latter part of November. The number of Russian soldiers deserting to the Finnish Army increased with the complete encirclement of Leningrad; some of these prisoners were interrogated and from them it was concluded that Leningrad no longer received foodstuffs and had only a scant supply left. Because of deaths from starvation and from freezing as well as a shortage of ammunition, it was surmised that Leningrad could easily be taken by a rush movement. This, however, would leave the problem of feeding the three or four million people of Leningrad to Germany and Finland, neither of which wanted to assume the responsibility. 961

According to a dispatch sent from Vienna to Foreign Minister Togo, German strategy included an attack on Stalingrad and Astrakhan from Rostov, cutting off the Caucasus and at the
same time German forces would attack Batum on the Black Sea. Regardless of the winter, Germany was determined to seize the Caucasus. The Japanese had received this information from the former mayor of Vienna, Minister Neubacher, who had recently been ordered to take charge of all German oil interests from the Baltic nations to the Caucasus. Minister Neubacher also asserted that Germany planned to use every resource in reconstructing all oil fields even though they had been fired.962

409. Germany Proposes Final Draft of the German-Manchukuoan Economic Relations Pact

As a result of a talk between Mr. Otaki and Dr. Helmut Wohlthat during which the Japanese representative presented many of the Manchukuoan opinions, a final draft for the new German-Manchukuoan pact was proposed by Germany. The title was to be "A provisional agreement for extending German-Manchukuoan Economic Relations" and it would be effective until the last day of March, 1942.

According to the wire sent by Foreign Minister Togo to authorities in Hsingking on November 28, 1941, the pact arranged for the delivery of previously contracted soy beans and soy bean oil and for the issuance of exchange and export permits. The agreement concerned itself principally with the rates and manner of payment of goods, specifying that this contract would be acted on by authorized conferences of local tradesmen.

Foreign Minister Togo urged that the Manchukuoan government promptly wire him of its adoption of the pact insomuch as the matter had been discussed with Japanese military authorities and Vice Minister Miura and all were in agreement with Germany about it.963

410. Ambassador Oshima Interviews Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop

On November 28 Ambassador Oshima was received by Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop who came to the conference late explaining that he had just been attending a meeting of German bigwigs including Hermann Goering, at the Fuehrer's official residence. At this conference the campaigns for 1942 were discussed, in addition to Japan's future policies. When the Foreign Minister finally arrived his first question concerned Japanese-American negotiations to which Ambassador Oshima replied that he had no official word. The Foreign Minister then began immediately to discuss Japan's New Order in East Asia and advised that there never would be another time so appropriate as the present for Japan to take a forward step, and he warned that if Japan hesitated, when Germany succeeded in establishing her New Order in Europe, all the military might of Great Britain and the United States would be concentrated against Japan. He then proceeded to explain that the Fuehrer had stated that very day: "There are fundamental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan and the United States." Hitler had also revealed that Germany had received advice that there was practically no hope of successful Japanese-United States negotiations. The Foreign Minister continued that if Japan did reach a decision to fight Great Britain and the United States with Germany, Japan would benefit. Then, the Foreign Minister stated that he considered President Roosevelt to be a fanatic and that it was impossible to tell just what the United States' president would do next. However, he believed that, just as in the past, the United States would try to avoid war. In view of the tone of Hitler's recent speech and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's remarks, Germany's attitude toward the United States appeared considerably stiffened and there were no indications that Germany would refuse to fight the United States if necessary.

When Ambassador Oshima inquired as to the state of the Russo-German war, the Foreign Minister responded that Germany was now determined to crush the Soviet Union to an even greater extent than had been planned. The Fuehrer was now determined to wipe out Russia,
and since practically all the main military objectives had been taken, the war on the eastern front would soon be finished and German troops would be returning. The Foreign Minister continued that Germany would advance and cross the Ural Mountains in the spring, chasing Stalin into Siberia. When Ambassador Oshima asked when this was to be expected, he was informed that the campaign would be launched in May of 1942 and that by summer Germany expected Axis air connections from the Ural Mountains to Manchukuo would be possible.

Ambassador Oshima then questioned the Foreign Minister about Germany's British policy at the present time. He learned that Germany would first dispose of Britain’s influence in the Near East, Africa, Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea before launching landing operations against the home island itself. All preparations had been made by Germany for this campaign. German intelligence reports indicated political splits within the English government. They stated that Churchill’s influence was waning and that Chief of the Labor Party, Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, had been advocating revolutionary measures. Stating that, of course, he did not believe all of this, the Foreign Minister said that he was convinced that conditions in England were anything but satisfactory, a situation which might mean that England might collapse before it was necessary to launch landing operations. In any event the Foreign Minister continued, Germany would not make peace with England and he repeated the oft-quoted statement:

“We are determined to remove all British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this war, England will have no influence whatsoever, in international affairs. The Island Empire of Britain may remain, but all of her other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided three ways by Germany, the United States, and Japan. In Africa, Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share of the African colonies. Germany desires above all else, to control European Russia.”

When Ambassador Oshima suggested that Germany might be faced with subduing all of England's possessions, the Foreign Minister pointed to the fact that although it was hoped the war would last but a short time, there was a possibility that it might continue for another year. He then stated that should Japan go to war against the United States, Germany would join with its Axis partner immediately. He reassured the Japanese Ambassador that there was no possibility of Germany forming a separate peace with the United States.

411. Axis Powers Arrange for Simultaneous Declarations of War on the United States

Since the Tripartite Pact had become a major obstacle to success in Japanese-American relations in the United States was demanding its repudiation, Japan found itself in a hopeless position. Powerless to abandon its stand as a Tripartite ally, Japan, under pressure from Germany as well as the United States, trailed after its Axis partner making protestations of reassurance that the three power alliance remained foremost in Japanese foreign policy. When Ambassador Oshima informed Foreign Minister Togo that he was scheduled for an interview with Chancellor Hitler on November 27 at 2:00 p.m., he was instructed to inform the Fuehrer that regardless of the difficulties in American-Japanese relations the Tripartite Alliance would not be abrogated.

On November 30 as Japanese-American relations became more strained, Foreign Minister Togo informed Ambassador Oshima that the Empire was faced with a grave situation and told the Berlin representative that he should immediately convey secretly to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop that there was an extreme danger of an outbreak of war between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan and that this clash might come “quicker than anyone dreams”. The Foreign Minister continued that Ambassador Oshima was to remind Germany that the Empire’s
position with Russia had already been clarified on previous occasions; but the Ambassador
might say that although Japan planned a southward movement, she would not relax her pres-
sure against the Soviet. In the event that Russia joined with England and the United States,
Japan would be ready to strike against her, but for the present it was necessary to concern
herself with the southern advance. Such a message, the Foreign Minister stressed, should be
kept absolutely secret.968

In reply to this message from the home office, Ambassador Oshima itemized the notes which
he held that had been exchanged between Japan and Germany at the signing of the Tripartite
Pact. These, the Ambassador wired, he would take with him on his next visit to Foreign Min-
ister von Ribbentrop; however, since he did not have the one from Ambassador Ott to Foreign
Minister Togo regarding what should be done in the event of an Anglo-Japanese and an Ameri-
can-Japanese war, Ambassador Oshima requested that it be sent to him immediately.969

In a second message on November 30 Foreign Minister Togo stressed Japan’s alliance to the
Tripartite Pact, stating that in all its American negotiations it had remained adamant in
regard to the principles of the Tripartite Pact. Since this pact was indicative of Japan’s policy
in China and French Indo-China, to which policy the American cabinet was in complete op-
position, it seemed that the two nations were in complete opposition. Japan believed that the
main motive of the United States was to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan,
Germany and Italy in Europe and in the Far East, in other words, the prevention of the com-
bination of the Tripartite Alliance. The Foreign Minister believed that the United States con-
sidered it impossible to maintain friendly relations as long as the Empire of Japan was allied
to Germany and Italy. This fact had been brought out in the most recent Hull-Nomura meet-
ing. According to the Foreign Minister it had become clear that a continuation of negotiations
would be detrimental to Japan.970

Apparently the United States’ proposal at the meeting on November 26, had insulted the
Japanese government when it said:

"... no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any
bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifi-
cally the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the
Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany or Italy."

The Foreign Minister believed that this consideration alone would invalidate Japanese-Ameri-
can negotiations and he was much perturbed that the United States had consulted with Eng-
land, Australia, the Netherlands, and China before extending this plan. Therefore, according
to Foreign Minister Togo, the United States, in collusion with these nations, regarded Japan,
along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.971

On December 5 Ambassador Oshima replied that he had relayed to the Germans the Foreign
Minister’s outline of the current events in Japanese-United States negotiations. The Ambas-
sador believed that the United States would attempt to divorce Japan from Germany by pub-
lishing the record of the negotiations in a propaganda program. In order to combat this action
the Ambassador believed that Germany and Italy should be informed immediately by the
Japanese government the contents of the Konoye message.972

After meeting Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop at 7:00 p.m. on December 1, 1941 the Ambas-
sador explained that the Germans, according to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, understood

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968 IV, 826.
969 IV, 827.
970 IV, 828.
971 IV, 829.
972 IV, 830.
Japan’s desire for haste and would bring Chancellor Hitler’s authority to bear as soon as it was possible to contact him. Mr. Gauss, who had been attending this conference, then expressed his opinion that Germany and Japan should jointly declare war on the United States to which Ambassador Oshima agreed. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop cautions that this message should not be transmitted to Tokyo by Ambassador Oshima who, in turn, asked that his home government exert care in the use of this material.  

In an effort to impress Japan, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop continued at this interview to say that despite American and British propaganda regarding the defeat at Rostov, Germany’s retreat had been merely a strategic move to prevent undue bloodshed in the face of a Russian defense. According to the Foreign Minister, General Paul von Kleist in charge of maneuvers there had retired voluntarily. The Foreign Minister also volunteered the information that General Rommel’s army had completely annihilated one division of New Zealand troops at the Tobruk garrison. He also reported that the encirclement of Moscow was progressing favorably.

Two days after his interview with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop on December 1, 1941, Ambassador Oshima was again called to the German official headquarters to be informed that Dictator Hitler was at a distant place and it was impossible to contact him immediately because of communications, security and weather conditions. Accordingly, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop would be forced to meet with Chancellor Hitler at military headquarters upon the latter’s arrival there on the 4th or 5th. Although such a delay was regretted by the Foreign Minister, it would be impossible for Germany to proceed until the Fuehrer had given his approval and in this regard he was convinced that the desired response would be forthcoming.

Ambassador Oshima again stressed the importance of immediate action. In his wire to Tokyo on December 3 he assured Foreign Minister Togo that there would be no objections.

At 3:00 p.m. on December 5, 1941, Ambassador Oshima called on Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop to receive Germany’s approval and declaration of the alliance.

Minister von Ribbentrop, through his representative, attempted to impress Ambassador Oshima with the importance of secrecy in the matter and explained that even Ambassador Ott in Tokyo had not been notified, nor had the Italian ambassador in Tokyo.

By December 6, 1941, Tokyo wired that it had not received the second clause to the German-Japanese text and Foreign Minister Togo feared that it would not arrive in time for signature on that date. He urged Ambassador Oshima to postpone in some manner Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop’s departure, or to secure a proxy for the initialing.

In reply Ambassador Oshima advised that at 7:00 p.m. he had sent representative Shun-ichi Kase and Tomohiko Ushiba to conduct negotiations for initialing of the agreement with Gauss. It resulted that only the German language would be used in the text and that the signing would be in order: Ambassador Oshima, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and the Italian Ambassador. Ambassador Oshima then transmitted the concluding portion of the agreement in the German language:

“We will use the letter X to represent ———. In witness whereof have the undersigned by their governments only authorized this agreement signed and with their seals provided. Done in triple originals in German, Italian and Japanese language in Berlin on the —— December, 1941, in the 20th year of the Fascists (era?), corresponding to the —— day of the 12th month, the 16th year of Showa (era?).”

973 IV, 831.
974 IV, 832.
975 IV, 833.
976 IV, 834.
977 IV, 835.
978 IV, 836.
979 IV, 837.
Two "extremely urgent" dispatches then reached Berlin from Tokyo asking that the second clause to the agreement be sent immediately.980

Apparently by December 7, 1941, some additional idea had been presented by Germany with regard to the agreement, to which Tokyo authorities concurred. Since this had been accepted there would be no objection to the official signing but Foreign Minister Togo divulged that since developments were proceeding so rapidly, the crash might occur before the official signing had been completed. Thus, circumstances might be altered by the time the signing could be accomplished and Ambassador Oshima also was to explain that Japan expected Italy and Germany to declare war against Great Britain and America before the agreement was officially signed.981

According to Ambassador Oshima, as soon as he had received the radio report of the Japanese attack at 11:00 p.m. on the 7th, he contacted Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and attempted to secure Germany's immediately participation, which, although it required Chancellor Hitler's final decision, was undoubtedly forthcoming.982

The next day at 1:00 p.m. Ambassador Oshima again in an interview with the Foreign Minister expressed Japan's wish that Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war at once, but Minister von Ribbentrop merely replied that Hitler was at the time discussing matters pertaining to publicizing such a declaration in order to make an impression on the German people. In this interview Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop revealed that Chancellor Hitler had issued orders of attack to the entire German navy on the morning of December 8.983 On the same day Germany, Italy and Japan reached an agreement regarding the war against the United States:

"Article 1. Germany, Italy and Japan will conduct the war forced on them by the United States of America and England with all means at their disposal to a victorious conclusion (working in common)."

"Article 2. Germany, Italy and Japan pledge themselves not to conclude an armistice or peace with either the United States of America or with England without complete, mutual understanding."

"Article 3. Germany, Italy and Japan will collaborate most closely after the victorious conclusion of the war for the purpose of bringing about a just New Order."

"Article 4. This agreement comes into force (becomes effective) when signed. In witness thereto the under-signed, duly authorized by their governments, have signed this agreement and affixed their seals."

As Ambassador Oshima pointed out in a separate message, explaining the agreement to Tokyo, Article 3 of the text would be of great advantage to Japan since on the strength of it Germany and Italy would assist in the establishment of a Far Eastern Sphere of Co-prosperity under Japanese domination. The Foreign Minister then expressed his desire that the agreement be approved in Japan immediately so that the official signing could be arranged for December 10. During the conference in which this agreement was drawn up, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop paused in order to congratulate the Japanese government upon its successful attack at Pearl Harbor and to praise its navy.985

Later, on December 8 Ambassador Oshima transmitted the final revised text, stating that the German and Italian governments in all sincerity had signed the agreement.986

Foreign Minister Togo notified Ambassador Oshima on December 9 that Ambassador Ott had called on him twice that day with a proposal in regard to the new agreement. Stating that undoubtedly the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin was already aware of this proposal, the
Foreign Minister instructed him in what way the Home Office desired the text to be altered if the Germans insisted upon preserving the first part of Article III of the Tripartite Pact. 987

In order that the German government should keep well informed upon the progress of the Japanese-American war, Ambassador Oshima had induced German authorities to confer daily with the press in Tokyo at 11:00 a.m. Berlin time, at which time a Japanese official would present the latest news of the day. Ambassador Oshima was also endeavoring to extend the present time limit in the Tokyo-Berlin telephone communications and asked that the proper authorities in Japan investigate the possibilities of this. 988

412. Tripartite Powers Strengthen Their Positions in the Near East

On December 6, 1941 Tokyo had been informed that although the United States had been cultivating Turkey's friendship and was continuing to supply Ankara with lend-lease material, it was obvious that Turkey would be forced to collaborate with the Axis by spring; and, accordingly, Germany and Italy were not especially worried over British and American activities. 989

Arab agitators, sponsored by Germany, were discussed by Ambassador Oshima in a message dated November 20, 1941. The Ambassador announced the arrival in Berlin of Haj Amen el Husseini, exiled Mufti from Jerusalem, and pointed out that although the Italians were very concerned over Arabic underground activities, they had decided to let the Germans handle the affair. The latter were making plans to conduct this activity with Husseini as the principal figure; hence his transfer from Rome to Berlin. 990

413. Japan Attempts to Pacify Germany in Regard to Japanese-Russian Relations

An intelligence report from Sofia in November had informed Foreign Minister Togo of the possibility of a non-aggression agreement between the United States and Russia. Based on the supposition that after German forces occupied Moscow, Japan would abrogate the Tokyo-Moscow neutrality agreement by taking Vladivostok, it promised American aid for Siberia. The report stated that despite American reluctance to make such an agreement, it felt that it might be necessary to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. 991

Ambassador Umezu at Hsingking later advised Foreign Minister Togo that, irrespective of the possibility of the United States' constructing air fields in Siberia, Japan must preserve its neutrality toward Russia unless it wished to sacrifice the present route for German-Japanese supplies. 992

Foreign Minister Togo, on December 6, continued to emphasize the importance of Ambassador Oshima's reassurance to Germany with regard to Japan's position with Russia so that the German government would not insist upon an exchange of diplomatic notes on this question. Ambassador Oshima was to explain that Japan would not allow American materials to pass through the Japanese sphere of influence to Russia.

In the last analysis, should the German government insist upon a guarantee in this matter, Tokyo realized that it would have no alternative but to issue a statement prohibiting American shipments to Russia via Japanese waters. However, Ambassador Oshima was to make it clear that Japan could not carry this out thoroughly since in order to prevent Soviet Russia from attacking Japan, Japan could not capture Soviet shipments. The Foreign Minister made it clear to Ambassador Oshima that if Germany would not agree to this last clause, they would necessarily have to postpone the conclusion of such a treaty. 993

987 IV, 846.
988 IV, 847.
989 IV, 848.
990 IV, 849.
991 IV, 850.
992 IV, 851.
993 IV, 852.
414. Japan is Concerned with Mongolian Uprisings
On October 20, 1941, a retransmitted dispatch advised Tokyo that Taiyuan government authorities wishing to expand and enlighten the Northwest and Outer Mongolian information network, had decided to hold a round-table discussion with the chief officials.994

Apparently the many Mongolian border incidents, which Japan believed to be sponsored by organized Mongolian Communists, were precipitating alarm in the Japanese Capital, in view of the fact that Russian armies, on the pretext of quelling and controlling future uprisings in Inner Mongolia very close to Japanese-controlled Manchuko, planned to occupy the areas under dispute. According to Japan’s interpretation, this would be but a stepping-stone to Russian machinations with the Mohammedan armies in Inner Mongolia and in the Wungsia area.995

Later, on November 28, Mr. Yoshitomi at Hsinking requested that December 30 be scheduled for a conference in order that an understanding might be reached with Manchukoan officials in regard to expenses and plans for “enlightenment.”996

415. Manchukoan Border Incidents Cause Increasing Concern in Tokyo
Meanwhile, on October 29, the Japanese Minister in Hsinking had reported that a Japanese border patrol had been attacked on October 23 by Russian troops “clearly within the Manchukoan border”. Japanese troops returned the fire, and their Lieutenant in charge was killed. According to the Hsinking Minister, Soviet propagandists had been publicizing the incident in an attempt to impress Great Britain and the United States, while Japan, on the other hand, intended to minimize the whole incident and merely lodge a formal complaint in Moscow.997

Soon after this event, another incident involving a Japanese scout plane caused further concern in Tokyo and Hsinking, for Manchuko had taken upon itself negotiations with Russian authorities and thereby had confused the issue.998

416. Japan is Concerned with Communist Activities in Manchuko and China
Yoshihide Kiyono, arrested as a member of the Communist Party in Hsinking, submitted a written confession to the Japanese officials. From the document, Tokyo learned, on November 4, 1941, that the representative of the Japanese Communist party, Kenzo Yamamoto, was established at the Communist office in Khabarovsk, a Soviet city near the northeast border of Manchuko; and from this office, through the Communist office in Shanghai, the Comintern carried out its Communist program in Japan. The “Committee for Reconstructing the Japanese Communist Party”, instigated by Mr. Yamamoto, organized the Communist Party in Manchuko and planned a union with the Chinese communists. From the information gathered from the confession, the military police were able to arrest a number of persons in Hsinking. From these suspects it was learned that the Communists were to be united through the Western Division of the Kyowa Kai, including even the Leftist elements in Northern and Central China.999

994 IV, 853.
995 IV, 864.
996 IV, 855.
997 IV, 856.
998 IV, 857.
999 IV, 858.
417. Japan and Russia Equally Unprepared for War Against Each Other, Minister at Hsinking Declares

Despite the sporadic border conflicts, neither Japan nor Russia was eager to pursue any issue involving war. From Japan's point of view, which the Minister at Hsinking conveyed to Ambassador Kurusu on November 6, 1941, the Kwantung Army had insufficient men—800,000 as against 1,000,000 Soviet troops—to wage a successful attack on Russia's eastern border. In addition, the vast Far Eastern area suffered a temperature of about forty degrees below zero for one-third of the year. Railroads were scarce, communication lines poor, and there could be no doubt but that such a war, if undertaken, would last a long time. The Minister was certain that Japan, in view of the present activities with regard to the China Incident, was not strong enough to attempt an all-out blitz against the Soviet.

It was obvious to the Japanese Minister that Russia would not endeavor to antagonize Japan in view of its western frontier activities, and also, according to a dispatch received by the Vice-Chief, General Staff in Tokyo on November 6, the Red Army was transporting troops from Leningrad to Moscow by air, which seemed to prove that Russia lacked crack reserve units.

418. Russia Thought to be Moving Border Troops to Western Frontier

According to a Tokyo circular intercepted in transmission November 11, 1941, Japan was convinced that Russia was assuming a "stall policy" since no conclusion had been reached on the Japanese request that the shipping of United States plane gas to Vladivostok be reconsidered and since Russia had chosen to ignore the fact that their floating mines had been found in the Japan Sea. It was also learned that Russia was transferring its Mongolian border troops to the Western frontier, as various reports indicated that East Asia and Mongolian Russian troops were fighting in Moscow. This premise coincided with the recently inaugurated Russian policy of relaxing vigil along the Mongolian-Manchukuoan border since the Soviet Union did not believe that Japan intended to attack them in the east.

419. Japan Questions Manchukuo's Motives in Cancelling Visas

Apparently without Japan's knowledge, Manchukuo had suspended issuing all entrance and exit visas to Third Power nationals and was cancelling those already in existence effective November 9, 1941. On November 17 in reply to Japan's questioning this move, the Japanese Minister in Hsingking revealed that the Kanto Army in Manchukuo had had a very special reason for cancelling all visas but that this restriction would be removed by November 30, 1941. On November 19 Tokyo originated a request that the new Manchukuoan order be suspended in the special case of three Norwegians who desired to return home aboard an American ship leaving Shanghai in the near future. By December 5 Hsingking reported that visas had been issued to the three men to travel by way of Shanhaikwan, on condition that they reported their itinerary beforehand.

1000 IV, 859.
1001 IV, 860.
1002 IV, 861.
1003 IV, 862.
1004 IV, 863.
1005 IV, 864.
1006 IV, 865.
420. Government Authorities Agree on Manchukuo’s Policy in the Event of War

On November 28, 1941, the Minister in Hsinking advised Tokyo that certain measures had been adopted regarding the treatment of British and American nationals in Manchukuo in the event of war with England and the United States.

This policy declared that all nationals would be interned in Harbin, Mukden and Chokinshu until arrangements could be made for their transportation home and that control of any property left by them would be administered by the Manchukuoan government. Of those persons to be interned in Manchukuo there were 339 British Nationals and eighty-one American citizens of which consular officials and Catholic Missionaries were to be given preferential treatment. Those who were to be evacuated through Russia would be released through Manchuli and those leaving Shanghai would be released in Dairen.1007

On December 4, the Japanese government in conference decided upon a policy which Manchukuo would follow upon the outbreak of war:

Policy

“When Japan enters a war, Manchukuo for the time being shall not enter it because of Manchukuo’s relation to Japan and her policy. Manchukuo shall treat Great Britain, the United States and Netherlands Indies as enemy countries, and shall take measures to that end.”

Specifically, Manchukuo would not recognize diplomatic representatives of the belligerent opponents and the use of code telegrams and short-wave radio sets would be prohibited to them. Manchukuo was to disregard any request addressed to a Third Power for protection of their consulate buildings and the interests of the resident Nationals.

Regarding Soviet Russia, Manchukuo was to observe the Neutrality Pact and follow Japan’s example in taking every precaution not to provoke Soviet Russia.1008

A later dispatch on December 4, 1941, changed the wording of the Policy somewhat and specified that “England, the United States, and the Netherlands” was to be substituted wherever “England and the United States” occurred in the text.1009

421. Japan Ponders Disposition of Its Manchukuoan Army

Reiterating his arguments for continued peace with Russia, again on December 4, Minister Yoshijiro Umezu in Hsinking stated three problems concerning the Russo-border question which faced the Kwantung Army Command: (a) persons with Moscow connections were urging a direct attack on the Soviet Union to preclude the latter’s giving bases to the United States; (b) others advocated passivity and the transference of half of the Kwantung troops southward since Russia had shown no signs of belligerence; (c) some, feeling that Russia might consent to fight if the United States urged that it wage war against Japan, felt that it was best to keep the present border forces intact.1010

422. Japan Asks Renewal of Five-Year Rights to Northern Sakhalin Coal and Oil

Further negotiations with Russia were in progress in regard to mining rights in Manchukuo. In 1936 Japan had made a five-year agreement with Russia concerning the petroleum and coal rights in the area of Northern Sakhalin; however, because of the lack of facilities for embarkation and shipment, little mining work had been undertaken by the Japanese during the period until 1941. On December 4, 1941, the Imperial Government, through Vice Minister Nishi, requested of the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo that the agreement be extended for an additional five years.1011

On December 7, the government issued a circular message requesting that instructions previously issued for the disposition of enemy people now be put into effect.1012

1007 IV, 866.
1008 IV, 867.
1009 IV, 868.
1010 IV, 869.
1011 IV, 870.
1012 IV, 871.
PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(j) Japanese-Italian Relations

423. Italy Urges Japan to Restrain United States from Participation in the War

In direct opposition to the German policy of promoting aggressive action on the part of Japan against America, various Italian organizations and publications were urging that Japan's best course lay in the prevention of hostilities between the Axis partners and America. According to President Aloisi of the Society of Friends of Japan, who spoke with Japanese Ambassador, Zenbei Horikiri, on October 18, 1941, the Nipponese would be doing an outstanding service for Italy if they could restrain the United States from participation in the war.

On the other hand, he urged that it would soon be timely for Japan to strike at Russia in order to fulfill its Imperial dream of a co-prosperity sphere in East Asia. President Aloisi predicted that as soon as Moscow collapsed, Germany, as well as Italy, would expect Japan's assistance in crushing the Soviet Union. 1013

424. Italy Disapproves Japan's Dissemination of British Propaganda

Nevertheless, some Italian circles were accusing Japan of disseminating camouflaged British propaganda within its borders. Director General Prunas of the Transoceania Bureau, Italian Foreign Office, when he conferred with Secretary Yoshiro Ando on October 20, 1941, complained that Japan had been prohibiting the distribution of propaganda printed by belligerent countries and that it had been freely disseminating British material transmitted via the United States. The Director General asked Mr. Yoshiro Ando to insist that Japan take immediate action, to which Mr. Ando countered that his government already had given special consideration to a program of favoring Axis propaganda. 1014


When Ambassador Horikiri talked with Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano on October 22, 1941, he must have learned something of Italy's uninformed position regarding the Japanese-American negotiations. After hearing the Foreign Minister's wishes that the new October 18 Cabinet might increase Japanese-Italian solidarity, Ambassador Horikiri was advised that the Count, having no recent knowledge of the Japanese-American negotiations, was not in a position to judge their merit one way or the other. The Italian Foreign Minister promised that after visiting Chancellor Hitler the following day, he would be able to discuss the situation more intelligently. 1015

During the second week in November, rumors were afloat that Premier Mussolini had departed for an interview with Hitler because of anxiety over recent Mediterranean developments. 1016

426. Ambassador Horikiri Urges Japan to Publish More Italian Propaganda

Even though, as Director General Prunas had objected on October 20, 1017 Japan was restricting Axis propaganda, it appeared that Italy, on the other hand, was giving the green light to Japanese publicity there. Ambassador Horikiri in a dispatch on November 12, 1941, desired...
the Home Office to send as much information on Japan and East Asia as was convenient. He conveyed a point made by the Italian Minister of Propaganda, Alessandro Pavolini, on November 3, that although Italians were prohibited from discussing the political situation within Japan, they were not being allowed to lose interest in Japanese-Italian relations.1018

427. Japan Desires Italian Reciprocity in Air Transportation to South America

In an attempt to persuade Italy to transport Japanese diplomatic material to South America free of charge, Tokyo had said in a previous message that currently Japan was handling all Italian mail and parcels to South America free of charge and under Japanese seals; and had asked for reciprocal treatment for Japanese mail from Italy to Rio de Janeiro. Rome acknowledged the message on November 1.1019

On November 17, Ambassador Horikiri again complained; he had been unable to forward his travel record and large amounts of other correspondence. Now he wished to send these to Rio de Janeiro by Italian air mail. He asked whether or not Tokyo had made arrangements for its transportation from Rio de Janeiro to Japan.1020

428. Japanese Officials Discuss Trade Relations with Italy

Japanese-Italian trade relations were seldom mentioned in dispatches sent through diplomatic channels, but on October 24 Foreign Minister Togo notified Ambassador Horikiri of details in regard to the settlement of claims between Italian subjects and the East Asia Development Company.1021 During the following month the completion of a Japanese order for the 210 millimetre howitzer occasioned a dispatch from Ambassador Horikiri to the Vice Minister of War in Tokyo, in which he stated that his office was negotiating a revision in the contracts because of a transfer of the manufacturing companies.1022 Italian naval circles in Shanghai requested permission to ship tin scrap to Italy via Japan on the Kobe Maru, and according to a dispatch dated December 5, 1941, the Japanese planned to grant this request.1023

429. Ando Rebukes Gayda for Attempting to Utilize Japan in Axis Machinations

Since Virginio Gayda, Editor of "Gionnale d'Italia" had taken the position through his publication that Japan should be the "sole arbiter of her destiny", he had refrained from publishing any persuasive articles referring to Japan's attitude; but Mr. Ando had surmised from a private conversation with him that Gayda personally favored Japan's adoption of a positive military program against the Anglo-Saxon countries.

It had been generally accepted by both Gayda and Ando while conferring that:

"This present war, Japanese efforts to the contrary notwithstanding, is becoming a revolutionary war against the old order of British and American Imperialism. The war is gradually spreading, and it is inevitable that it eventually will engulf the whole world. Hence, we may as well reconcile ourselves to the fact of the war's being prolonged for several years."

1014 IV, 876.
1015 IV, 877.
1016 IV, 878.
1017 IV, 879.
1018 IV, 880.
1019 IV, 881.
Confiding that he had been considering the proposed Axis-sponsored Federation of States to be set up after the war, Editor Gayda explained that he believed Germany would take the leadership in the South and Balkan Peninsula and with Italy's cooperation would be able to solve all European problems.

At this point Mr. Ando had taken the opportunity to discourage some Italians in their belief that Japan could solve all of her problems merely by advancing southward, explaining that Japan was not a country to move rashly, and it would be wise if the other Axis partners realized that the Imperial Japanese government could not be utilized unconditionally for their own private benefits.1024

430. Ambassador Horikiri Explains Italian Censorship of Japanese Mail

In a routine message to Tokyo on November 24, Ambassador Horikiri informed Foreign Minister Togo of the system of Italian censorship which was applicable to Japanese mail, explaining that ordinary Japanese mail was not receiving any preferential treatment but that the official mail of his office was never touched. Picture postcards had been forbidden to go out from the country and foreign newspapers and magazines had been forbidden importation. Outgoing mail was more strictly censored than incoming.1025

431. The Japanese Ambassador Reveals Revolutionary Plot in India

Although the first part of a message transmitted to Tokyo on November 22, 1941 is not available, the second section reveals enough information so that the general outline of a revolutionary plot for India can be recognized. In order to initiate the plot, which was being undertaken in expectation of a rupture in British relations, Ambassador Horikiri explained that secret radio propaganda, pamphlets distributed by air, and distribution of propaganda by the Hindus themselves would be the most effective means of promulgation. Russia had been of aid from a standpoint of propaganda technique, and Germany had assisted financially.

The Ambassador then revealed that large numbers of Axis agents were following instructions in India as well as in North and South America. The Axis was also finding adherents from among Hindu prisoners of war, who would be returned to India as Axis employees.1026

One of the outstanding agents, Mr. Shiedai, a leader in the Hindustan Gaderu party, was being utilized by the Axis in machinations toward India. This agent, who conferred with Ambassador Horikiri in Rome on December 1, was scheduled to administer radio propaganda activities. In his first broadcasts he said in substance that Asia stood in the "shadow of Japan's leadership", that since freedom for India was the basis of Japan's final victory, Japan would restore her lost freedom. He also told the Indian people that Japan was not motivated by political ambitions toward India, but wished to work with her people in a close economic and cultural relationship.

Shiedai was in charge of the European Area and the names and addresses of agents in Shanghai and French Indo-China could be secured from his men in San Francisco and Buenos Aires.1028

Also involved in espionage activities was a Pu Ran-Lingh, a member of the Gadar Party at Gadar Ashram, in San Francisco. In the message from Ambassador Horikiri to San Francisco were instructions to organize "our comrades in Lithuania, Georgia, Manila, Singapore, Siam, Indo-China, etc.".1029

1024 IV, 852.
1025 IV, 888.
1026 IV, 884.
1027 Kana spelling.
1028 IV, 886–886, 888.
1029 IV, 887.
432. The Catholic Church at Rome Seeks to Forestall Breach in Japanese-American Relations

Among the various organizations within Italy seeking to forestall a breach in Japanese-American relations was the Roman Catholic Church. Ambassador Horikiri had been advised that Pope Pius XII had secretly conferred with the American envoy, Mr. Harold Tittman, on November 20, at which time the Pontiff had asked that President Roosevelt be urged to consider carefully the new Japanese proposal toward a successful culmination of Japanese-American negotiations.\(^{1030}\)

Ambassador Horikiri was also garnering information from another Papal representative, Msgr. Cicognani in Washington, who commented upon the negotiations, saying that the situation had become quite delicate since Japan so definitely stood in the way of United States-supported British and Russian victories. In addition, many Americans apparently felt that the Japanese had demanded concessions in direct opposition to American ideals and that, by doing so, had encroached upon American interests and honor. Cicognani also said that there were reports and difficulties in the negotiations of late had “constrained the Interventionist faction headed by the President and strengthened the position of the Isolationists.”\(^{1031}\)

The Catholic Church was torn by diverse sympathies. Pro-Fascist factions claimed that by the church’s support of the Tripartite Alliance, it would extensively advance Catholicism throughout the Near and Far East. On the other hand, some leaders, among them the United States representative to the Vatican, Harold Tittman, claimed that Japanese and Spanish adherence to the Axis made the current Japanese-American negotiations virtually impossible. Pope Pius XII, however, had failed to clarify his position in this matter by the end of November.\(^{1032}\)

433. The Catholic Church is Unmoved by Arabic Situation

In pursuit of Catholic support for the Tripartite Alliance, German officials had notified the Vatican by November 26, 1941, that it would be wise for Pope Pius to be represented at conferences between Italian, German, Japanese, Turkish and Palestine officials, who were concerned with the setup of Arabia and the Middle East in postwar European organization. Germany and Italy intended to assist the Arabs in overthrowing English domination and in forestalling American strategy there.\(^{1033}\)

The Japanese had received reports previous to this time with regard to the Arabic situation as it affected the Christian world. According to an intelligence report from Rome on November 6, 1941 Mr. Harold Tittman, American representative to the Vatican, had held a secret interview with the Pope on November 4. At that time, the representative had argued that Christianity would be endangered should the Arab race, now being encouraged by Germany and Italy, through the Grand Mufti attain a superior position. Mr. Tittman declared that the democracies should advocate a status quo for the Arab world and that the other peoples of the world should live together in harmony and justice. Asking whether His Holiness would countenance such a scheme as this on the part of Germany and Italy, Mr. Tittman had concluded that he hoped His Holiness would lodge a protest. The Pope had answered that until the Arab race actually became a menace to Christianity, he was uninterested in the matter.\(^{1034}\)

According to a dispatch from Rome on December 6, the Italian government had already made representations to the Turkish government for the establishment of unnamed organizations. No additional information was supplied at this time regarding the nature of these agencies.\(^{1035}\)

\(^{1030}\) IV, 889.
\(^{1031}\) IV, 890.
\(^{1032}\) IV, 891.
\(^{1033}\) IV, 892.
\(^{1034}\) IV, 893.
\(^{1035}\) IV, 894.
434. Ambassador Horikiri Complains of Weaknesses in Japanese Radio Transmissions to Rome

Ambassador Horikiri complained of weaknesses in the Japanese radio transmissions to Rome, and on November 8 he asked that the JUP wave length be changed immediately. The station JUO (P) was changed on the twentieth. Meanwhile sensitivity of JAP had become progressively weaker, and again Ambassador Horikiri wired Tokyo saying, in view of the present state of international affairs, he felt that Rome was not being adequately informed and that one wave length was not sufficient. He then urged that concurrent broadcasts in three wave lengths be initiated.

By November 27, according to a Berlin-to-Tokyo transmission, JUO had been improved, but the sensitivity of JAP remained poor; and the suggestion was made that the two broadcasts simultaneously. However, in Rome on the twenty-seventh, sensitivity was reportedly excellent and the complete routine message was received. However, this success had followed two days of impossible reception.

On November 29, 1941 Ambassador Horikiri reported to Tokyo that of the Japanese language radio broadcasts to Europe in recent days, JLT was not heard at all while JVW could be heard fairly well with some exceptions. In addition, he complained that the Japanese announcer on these broadcasts, speaking rapidly in low tones and swallowing the ends of his words, was interfering with good reception. Again Ambassador Horikiri cautioned that the Rome Office might be missing some important news releases.

To correct the situation he suggested that a new announcer be selected whose enunciation was of a high quality, and also that news be broadcast in such order that the most important news would be given before fading out should occur and urged that the high priority releases be repeated at the end of each broadcast. In addition, he suggested patriotic music be played as an introduction to the broadcast.

On December 5, 1941, the Ambassador reported again that the general intelligence broadcast had been unintelligible for December 2, 3 and 5. He then inquired as to the outcome of his suggestion of November 20 that Japan initiate simultaneous broadcasts.

435. Ambassador Horikiri Obtains Information Concerning Italian Relations with Croatia, France, and Russia

According to a conversation reported by a member of Ambassador Horikiri’s staff in Rome, Italy had very little confidence in the Croatian government despite the apparent friendliness between the two. The economic situation in Croatia was reportedly critical with food supplies scarce and facilities meager for the transportation of the only plentiful product, timber. The invading Italian troops had been beset with continual assassinations.

The Japanese Ambassador informed Foreign Minister Togo that despite the difficulties of supply, the Italians were optimistic of the final outcome of their armies in Libya. As for their relations with the French, they expected the use of the Tunis army transportation facilities to increase as a result of Weygand’s elimination.

Japan’s custody of Italian property in Russia was recognized by the Soviet Union in a memorandum sent to Lt. Gen. Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, Japanese Ambassador in Moscow. Tokyo forwarded this information to Ambassador Horikiri on December 3, 1941.

1036 IV, 895.
1037 IV, 896.
1038 IV, 897.
1039 IV, 898.
1040 IV, 899.
1041 IV, 900.
1042 IV, 901.
1043 IV, 902.
1044 IV, 903.
436. Ambassador Horikiri and Secretary Ando Confer with Mussolini and Count Ciano

On December 3, 1941, Ambassador Horikiri divulged that he, accompanied by Secretary Ando, was scheduled to confer with Mussolini and Count Ciano at 10:30 a.m. of that day. 1045

Ambassador Horikiri opened the discussion by reviewing Japanese-American developments. Stating that he had been carefully watching the outcome of the negotiations, Premier Mussolini was not surprised, "in view of the utter bullheadedness of the United States and the meddlesome nature of President Roosevelt", that the negotiations had deadlocked. He believed that one of the aims of the United States was to make the Far East its own economic sphere of influence but contended that if it sought to separate Japan and the Axis, it would stumble on Japanese loyalty.

Italy endorsed Japan's dream of new order in East Asia, the Premier confided, and proceeded to discuss the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, at which time he explained that Italy would give every military aid in checking the British navy in the Mediterranean. In order to accomplish this, Mussolini revealed that a German-Italian air force bloc had been discussed.

When asked outright what Italy would do upon Japan's declaration of war, Mussolini replied that Italy "was obligated to participate under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this point." 1046

437. Ambassador Horikiri Learns of Italian Position in Regard to the War with the United States

After receiving a wire from Foreign Minister Togo on December 2 which stated that a certain part of the treaty under discussion was to be kept secret from Italy, 1048 Ambassador Horikiri reported to Tokyo that a confidential report from Berlin had disclosed that either separate declarations between Germany-Japan and Italy-Japan or a joint declaration were desirable. 1049 Apparently the Italian government was little concerned as to its own part in these negotiations. It was taken for granted that Italy would fall in line with German-Japanese decisions. 1050

Shortly before December 8, 1941, the Japanese Vice Consul Uyama consulted the Italian Consul General in Shanghai in regard to Japanese invasion plans and Italian military cooperation in controlling the situation. The Italian representative promised his country's aid but specified that the Italian need for gasoline would have to be supplied. 1051

1045 IV, 904.
1046 IV, 905.
1047 IV, 906.
1048 IV, 907.
1049 IV, 908.
1050 IV, 909.
1051 IV, 910.
PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(k) Japanese-French Relations

438. Mr. Arnald Refuses to Make Military Expense Payment in Piastres

Attempting to procure the Japanese occupation expenses in piastres from France, Japanese officials in Vichy conferred on October 17, 1941 with Mr. Arnald of the French Foreign Office. In a previous dispatch transmitted from Tokyo on October 16, 1941, Foreign Minister Toijiro Toyoda had warned that French authorities might use the lifting of the Shanghai export embargo as an excuse for delaying negotiations for the defrayment of military expenses. In the discussion of October 17 Mr. Arnald protested that the French used the Chinese money or piastres to pay their officials in China and were considering buying materials in Shanghai with it. For this reason the French official was adamant in his refusal to pay the military expenses for September and October in piastres. Mr. Arnald said, however, that he had instructions to confer with French Ambassador Arsene Henri on the lifting of the export embargo in Shanghai. 1052

439. Japan Instructs Ambassador to Procure Export Permit by October 24, 1941

Because of difficulty in securing permits to export 3,000 tons of goods from Saigon, the Japanese government decided for the time being to load a vessel in the port with other products. It was asked in this dispatch of October 20, 1941, however, that permission be secured to export the 3,000 tons of freight by October 24, 1941. 1053

440. Japan Protests Movement of Troops into Unfortified Zone

In a dispatch from Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to Saigon on October 20, 1941, Japan argued that Thailand's reinforcement of an area established as an unfortified zone between French Indo-China and Thailand, violated the Joint Defense agreement, as well as the Mekong agreement between Thailand and French Indo-China. Should French Indo-Chinese authorities approve, since no special prohibitions were stipulated, the Japanese Minister in Saigon was instructed to deal with the matter as he thought best. 1054

441. Tokyo Plans to Land Planes in Indo-Chinese Waters

Whether the Japanese government should obtain permission from the Vichy authorities or whether they should confer with the Colonial government in regard to the landing of Japanese planes in Saigon waters was discussed in a dispatch transmitted on October 20, 1941 to Vichy. Foreign Minister Togo advised that plans to land the planes were already formulated, and for this reason an answer was requested immediately. 1055

442. Foreign Minister Togo Applies Pressure in Shanghai by Limiting Exportations

In a dispatch of October 24, 1941 from Foreign Minister Togo to Vichy and Hanoi, the origin of the Shanghai permit system was explained, and instructions given for further procedure in treating this subject. The permit system was described as a retaliatory measure designed to combat higher prices set by French Indo-Chinese authorities on coal, zinc, and rice.

1052 IV, 911, 912.
1053 IV, 913.
1054 IV, 914.
1055 IV, 915.
Unless the Colonial official amended their attitude in this matter, Japan could not satisfy them on the Shanghai permit system, and would, furthermore, be forced to prohibit any exports leaving Japan for French Indo-China. Politically, this uncooperative attitude on the part of French Colonial authorities would make some political measures inevitable. In offering terms for negotiations, Foreign Minister Togo declared that if the French would allow the importation of Japanese goods, Japan would cooperate in making payments for rubber. In this way, the exportation of Japanese goods would be effected without obstructions, and the Shanghai permit system would be managed in a way favorable to French Indo-China. 443. Japan Threatens Action Unless French Agree to Payment of Military Expenses

Warning that the present French Indo-China resistance was becoming very annoying to the Japanese, the Foreign Minister said that if authorities went one step further, an irremediable situation would ensue. At the time when an agreement on the payment of military expenses almost had been reached, French officials had advanced the question of the Shanghai permit system, and consequently refused to pay the piastres necessary. Since the Japanese concerned were becoming angry, Foreign Minister Togo asked that the two matters be settled in separate negotiations. 444. Tokyo Decrees Further Export Restrictions to Combat Freezing of Assets

It was further pointed out at this time that twenty-nine important items destined for shipment to French Indo-China, Burma, Hong Kong, Kwantchow-Wan, Macao and unoccupied sections of South China had been placed on an embargo list as early as April 7, 1941 for the purpose of stopping the flow of materials to Chiang. As a retaliatory measure after the freezing of assets by the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, Japan had restricted business dealings with foreigners and had instituted an export license system having to do with fourteen items of important materials. Because this measure was aimed principally at the United States, Britain and Netherlands, Japan had advanced the policy of issuing as many licenses as possible for articles flowing from Japan and China to French Indo-China. Dealers proceeding on the assumption that the license system would sooner or later be applied to them began to corner the market on cotton threads and cotton goods. In view of the sudden increase in the outflow of these articles there was danger that large quantities of materials were reaching Chiang by way of unoccupied areas in China. Added to this danger was the tendency on the part of French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies to purchase from Chiang the materials for which they had been depending upon Japan. Therefore, Japan had decided to extend the embargo to apply to all shipments scheduled for the unoccupied areas in China, and had further added cotton goods and cotton cloth to the list of articles coming under the license system. Moreover, of late Japan had been following the policy of minimizing the number of licenses issued to French Indo-China. 445. Consul Hayashi Investigates Pro-Japanese Party Members

In answer to an inquiry concerning a political party in Hanoi, Consul (?) Hayashi on October 25, 1941 sent an explanatory wire to Tokyo. The political party, DAIETUTO, formed in July of 1940, had about one hundred and fifty active members, chief of whom were newspapermen. During September and October more than seventy party members had been arrested by French Indo-Chinese authorities and this resulted in the loss of the guiding

1054 IV, 916.
1057 IV, 917.
1058 IV, 918.
1059 IV, 919.
party elements. Since the party's objective was to join with the Japan-Manchukuo-China bloc, its members were relying on Japanese military forces to aid in attaining this goal. Up to this time, the Japanese army, navy and Sumida organizations had had no connection with this party. The rumors, however, that the leader of the party was under the protection of the Japanese military were being investigated.  

446. Special Committee Receives Codes

A request for one or two simple codes and a code address book for the use of the Natural Resources Investigating Commission was wired to Tokyo from Hanoi on October 25, 1941. Having relied on the Consulate General for the sending and receiving of messages, the commission found this arrangement inconvenient since the consulate was some distance away. 

On October 27, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo answered that one copy each of five Japanese codes were being brought by Ambassador Kenkichi Yoshizawa's party, which was leaving Kobe on October 31, 1941. The Survey Commission, upon receiving the codes, was asked to dispatch the one word STUZA, and the Consul in Hanoi was requested to obtain a receipt for the codes. It goes without saying, Foreign Minister Togo added, that all wires concerning matters of a secret nature should continue to be sent through the Consulate. 

447. Tokyo Instructs Kato To Request Only Plane Landing Space

Instructions that Ambassador Sotomatsu Kato in Vichy limit his requests to the demand for landing places for hydroplanes near Saigon were sent on October 27, 1941. The matter of another subject was not to be discussed until it was officially presented during the negotiations which were scheduled to begin in January of 1942. Apart from the demand for hydroplane landing space, the Ambassador was to maintain silence and watch developments. 

448. Hanoi Consul to Negotiate for Plane Landings Independently

The Japanese Consul in Hanoi, however, was instructed to negotiate independently in regard to air connections on the Saigon-Bangkok airline. Although Japan was negotiating with the French government in Vichy in this respect, it was necessary to meet emergency requirements before the settlement of formal negotiations. 

449. Government Officials are Listed as Dangerous to France-Japanese Cooperation

On October 28, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo learned that a Mr. Wagner had made a detailed report to French government circles regarding future propaganda and elements which were endangering France-Japanese cooperation. When Colonial Minister Platon was summoned, he concurred, and pointed out that there were DeGaullist inclinations within the Governor Generalcy. To completely extirpate injurious elements, Minister Platon would soon send several persons to French Indo-China to investigate. Names on the lists of injurious elements so far were George Gautier and De LaSalle of the Governor Generalcy; the Chief of Education and Propaganda Department, Albert Charton; Governmental Office Representative, Montevani; and newspaperman, Samuel De Sacy.
450. Frenchman Intercedes in Behalf of Japan

It was added, in a separate dispatch to Hanoi and Vichy, that a Frenchman by the name of Mr. Wagner, who was a contributor to *L'Illustration* and who was a close friend and companion of Mr. Andre Roban and Marshall Petain, desired that the trouble over French Indo-China be settled as soon as possible. For this reason Japan was sending him to France to discuss the matter with influential Vichy officials. Traveling by way of Brazil, Mr. Wagner was scheduled to stop in Hanoi by the middle of November, where he was to be met and assisted in whatever way possible. Furthermore, the Foreign Minister asked that he be informed of Wagner's actions whenever the occasion warranted.¹⁰⁶⁶

451. Togo Plans to Send Emissary Group Despite Visa Procurement Difficulty

Regardless of the fact that the French Ambassador to Tokyo, Mr. Arsene Henri, refused on orders from Vichy to cooperate in issuing visas for the Japanese investigating commission traveling to French Indo-China, Foreign Minister Togo was resolved to send the whole troop according to schedule. However, since he preferred that French officials issue the desired instructions regarding the Special Emissary and his troupe, he asked that they be requested once again.¹⁰⁶⁷

The Vice-Minister had been informed on October 28, 1941, when he conferred with Ambassador Henri, that if the number of personnel accompanying the Special Emissary were too great, this fact might result in provoking ill-feelings among the French Indo-China people. Since the agreement had already been effected regarding the dispatching of the Special Emissary, The Vice-Minister replied that the question of the accompanying personnel was a matter for the Japanese to decide and that it was difficult to understand why there should be any complaint on the subject. The Vice-Minister reiterated that the commission was designed to bring about cooperation between Japan and French Indo-China, in industrial and economic matters, and would not include one single military man. In answering, the French Ambassador repeated only that his instructions were to limit the number of visas to approximately twenty. In case visas were not issued in time for the sailing of Special Emissary and his troupe, it was intended that the entire party should leave the evening of October 30, 1941 without visas, although the Japanese Ambassador was directed to apply pressure to secure them.¹⁰⁶⁸

452. Japan Reiterates Threat to Secure Military Expenses

Retransmitting to Vichy on October 28, 1941, a dispatch from Mr. Uchiyama, Foreign Minister Togo relayed further information concerning negotiations for the payment of September and October occupation expenses. Since the September installment of the military expenses had not been forthcoming and the French government continued to make excuses, Minister Uchiyama had warned the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Hanoi on October 22, 1941, that the Japanese army would be forced to act. The Secretary of General Affairs, however, faced with such threats of military action, had promised to answer, following instructions from Vichy.¹⁰⁶⁹

On this same day, October 28, 1941, the Japanese Minister in Vichy wired the Japanese Foreign Minister that Mr. Arnald had directed the November and December running expenses to be settled in a lump sum. Vichy also ordered the French Indo-China officials to undertake an investigation in cooperation with the French military officials. Japan,

¹⁰⁶⁶ IV, 926.
¹⁰⁶⁷ IV, 927.
¹⁰⁶⁸ IV, 928.
¹⁰⁶⁹ IV, 929.
therefore, must take the proper measures to explain the evident necessity of funds, thus expediting the payment of the expense money. Since such pressure would have to be applied through the military officials in French Indo-China, who would be working with the French investigating committee, the Japanese Minister asked that these instructions be communicated to Japanese officials in French Indo-China.1070

In an incomplete message of October 28, the Japanese Minister in Vichy informed Tokyo that France agreed to accept payment in gold, in case payment in American dollars was impossible, and that, moreover, she had decided to reserve 25,000 tons of the French Indo-China crop for herself, dividing between Germany and Japan the total remainder of the payment, which was to be made either in dollars or gold.1071

453. French Authorities Agree to Issue Visas for Entire Yoshizawa Group

In a later dispatch from Vichy on October 28, 1941, Tokyo was assured that visas would be issued to all the members of Ambassador Kenkiji Yoshizawa's investigating committee. The Ambassador, to ascertain that such instructions were clear, asked French officials to wire again to Ambassador Henri in Tokyo so that he would issue visas to all the members.1072

454. France Accedes to Japan's Military Expense Payment Demand

Referring to wild remarks pertaining to Ambassador Yoshizawa's visit, which were contained in an Indo-Chinese publication, Foreign Minister Togo declared that as long as such an uncooperative atmosphere existed at the scene, all efforts to adjust matters in an amicable manner would amount to nothing. It was feared that should Japan and France fail to make a satisfactory adjustment, the troops stationed in French Indo-China might finally become exasperated, and an unfortunate situation might ensue. Ambassador Sotomatsu Kato in France was to bring this situation to the attention of Vice-Premier Jean Francois Darlan, suggesting that instructions urging cooperation be sent to the French Indo-China authorities.1073

455. French Indo-China Remits Occupation Expenses

On October 30, 1941, Vichy released the information to its Tokyo office that French authorities had agreed to pay the monthly occupation expenses to Japan for November and December. Exchange of diplomatic notes had been made on October 28 regarding the payment in a lump sum.1074

On the following day Tokyo reported that the Indo-China bank had placed 6,000,000 piastres at the disposal of the Yokohama Specie Bank. This amount included the September balance of 1,500,000 piastres and the October allotment of 4,500,000 piastres. The Specie Bank was continuing negotiations for the balance of 9,500,000 piastres.1075

In regard to the 66,000,000 piastres which Japan had demanded on France in payment of supplementary military expenses, the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau in Hanoi had been advised that Japan had agreed to discuss the disposition of the funds. Included in the conference would be one person from the French finance ministry, three military officers, and two technical experts.1076
456. Japanese Officials Arrive at Hanoi

On November 4, 1941, Minister Uchiyama wired Tokyo that he and Secretary Ito arrived at Hanoi on November 3, whereas Vice-Consul Iida had arrived at Hanoi on November 1, 1941.1077

Tokyo learned on the same day that Mr. Haraguchi had left Saigon for Japan and for this reason could not continue his uncompleted discussions with Mr. Kanji Okura.1078

457. Japan Demands Payment in Full from French Indo-China

Continuing his practice of relaying to Vichy the dispatches which were directed to him from his Minister in Hanoi, Foreign Minister Togo on November 4, 1941 wired Ambassador Sotomatsu Kato concerning the financial developments. Although the Secretary General of Affairs in Hanoi had ordered the bank of Indo-China to pay 15,000,000 piastres to Japan, Minister Uchiyama had asked about the remaining 500,000 piastres. Replying that, "You fellows certainly like to quibble over small amounts", the Secretary had promised to wire for further instructions. The Secretary again pointed out, however, that France had agreed to pay an additional 1,500 piastres if a group of experts met to discuss the disposition of provisional expenses. He supposed, however, that since the quick payment had been effected, this term had been eliminated.1079

458. Tokyo Forwards New Code Machines for the Hanoi and Saigon Offices

Hanoi was notified on November 5, 1941, that new code machines were being sent to Hanoi and Saigon by Courier Ken Harada, who was returning to his post on the Kokuryu Maru. Printer #64 and transposer #43 were being transported for the Hanoi Office, while printer #80 and transposer #50 were to be sent on to Saigon. Contained in four wooden boxes and five suitcases, the machines were to be handled as the luggage of Ambassador Yoshizawa. Upon receipt of the code machinery the one word ASADA in plain language was to be wired to Tokyo.1080

459. French Indo-China Makes Payment in Philippine Dollars

Having been informed of the transaction by the Japanese Minister in Saigon, Foreign Minister Togo wired Vichy on November 5, 1941 to report the payment of 9,500,000 Philippine dollars. The payment had been made to cover military expenses for November and December as well as the unpaid balance of 500,000 Philippine dollars.1081

460. Investigation Discredits Aid of Pro-Japanese Frenchman

Meanwhile Mr. Uchiyama, who was investigating the record of Mr. Wagner, wired on November 6, 1941 that the Frenchman was undoubtedly mixed up in the collapse of France. It was further learned that he was of Jewish extraction and that, in spite of the fact that he was a contributor to L'Illustration, his local press did not enjoy the confidence of the government and of the people. Furthermore, Mr. Wagner had been asked to leave French Indo-Chinese suddenly and on his way to France had stopped off in Japan. In view of these circumstances, the Japanese Minister suggested that no credence be placed in any intelligence given by him.1082

1077 IV, 937-938.
1078 IV, 939.
1079 IV, 940.
1080 IV, 941.
1081 IV, 942.
1082 IV, 943.
461. Foreign Minister Togo Outlines Duties of Ambassador Yoshizawa

In answer to a dispatch from Hanoi suggesting the appointment of a liaison officer for a province in Indo-China, the Japanese Foreign Minister replied on November 7, 1941 that Ambassador Yoshizawa would be accompanied to that province by army and navy men who would assume the liaison work between the Resources Corps and Japan. Consequently, there was no need for the appointment of a separate liaison officer.1085

A dispatch transmitted on the same day to Vichy said that Envoy Kenkichi Yoshizawa, also Ambassador Plenipotentiary, had been invested with full powers to conduct negotiations in French Indo-China. Therefore, Ambassador Kato was to arrange to match this by granting to the Governor General of French Indo-China full powers to negotiate with the Special Japanese Envoy.1084

Moreover, Ambassador Yoshizawa was informed, by separate wire, of the extent of his responsibilities. He was directed to supervise the secretariat cooperating with the ranking military and naval officials in carrying out the Japanese policy toward French Indo-China. He would execute matters relating to the government in general, especially those deriving from the functioning of the Matsuoka-Henri Agreement. In regard to the joint defense of Indo-China he would supervise matters relating to places selected for joint defense, troop quartering and supplying, as well as movement on maneuvers, and the use of air and naval forces. The investigation of the economic resources in execution of the Economic Agreement would also be his responsibility, as well as the supervision of investigating parties, the development of enterprises, and the protection of the economic conditions of the Japanese. He was to be responsible for intelligence, propaganda, and cultural enlightenment, for the supervision of education and health of Japanese nationals in Indo-China, for the carrying out of the Japanese policy regarding Chinese in Indo-China and Thailand, and for the stopping of aid to Chiang Kai-shek.1085

462. Ambassador Kato Asks for Schedules of Yoshizawa Party Members

According to Ambassador Sotomatsu Kato in Vichy, the party of Ambassador Yoshizawa included more than one hundred persons. He had learned also that one group of the party, which had now arrived in French Indo-China, did not plan to return, and he asked that he be informed at once of those who did plan to return.1086

In answering this query from Vichy, Foreign Minister Togo revealed that the Economic Investigating Committee accompanying Ambassador Yoshizawa included more than two hundred and forty-three individuals representing the Agricultural and Forestry Ministry and the Commercial and Industrial Ministry. Thirteen parties totaling sixty-five persons would leave French Indo-China about the middle of January, while twelve parties made up of eighty-two persons were scheduled to leave early in February. The sailing date of the remaining seventeen parties, including more than eighty-six persons, was not definite. He asked, however, that should any of the parties find it necessary to sail at an earlier time than was scheduled, their transportation via a mail boat be arranged.1087

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1083 IV, 944.
1084 IV, 945.
1085 IV, 946.
1086 IV, 947.
1087 IV, 948.
463. Tokyo Officials Demand Release of Shipment

Learning from Saigon that the Governor General had refused permission to load 2,900 tons (rubber) on the grounds that the French home government must approve the shipment, Minister Togo asked his Vichy representative to see that instructions were sent immediately to the Governor General to load the 2,900 tons at once. The wire, transmitted November 9, 1941, intimated that there was some underhanded design back of the note from the Governor General and suggested that such a delay could have serious effects on the future negotiations for the 10,000 tons. 1088

464. Consul Ogawa to Sail on Chicago Maru

Consul General Ogawa in Hanoi learned on November 10, 1941 that the Chicago Maru, which was scheduled to transport his party, would arrive at Canton on November 16, whence it would proceed to Haiphong or Saigon. Since the vessel's course after leaving Canton was not settled, Consul Ogawa was asked to get in touch with Canton for more definite information. 1089

465. French Government Approves Rubber Shipment

Foreign Minister Togo, relaying the information from Saigon, informed Ambassador Kato that the Kanju Maru had sailed with the specially marked 3,000 tons of rubber on November 3, 1941. Although French Indo-Chinese officials had held out on the permit for the remainder of the second contract consisting of 2,100 tons, Japan had nevertheless obtained the permit and consequently would ship the rubber on the Seikai and the Melbourne Maru. Although the price had become exorbitant, arrangements were being made to purchase the 2,900 tons which was the remainder of the 15,000 tons under contract. Foreign Minister Togo complained that the price of Indo-Chinese rubber had been greatly increased by the German market. Between September and November Germany had been paying 3,000 piastres a ton for rubber, but for what reason the Foreign Minister said, “Heaven only knows.” He pointed out that it was up to Japan to negotiate with Berlin in order to set a price “to keep Germany and Vichy from robbing us.” 1090

466. Expansion of Japanese Army in French Indo-China Creates Difficulties

Despite the fact that since Japan and French Indo-China had signed defense agreements and the equipping and organizing of French Indo-China was being carried out, the French Indo-Chinese Government had been showing anti-Japanese policies, such as a reluctance in issuing import and export permits. Fearing that the Japanese might start agitation between the Chinese and the Annamese, a “stall policy” had been adopted regarding Japanese and French Indo-Chinese questions. 1091

That a crisis had arisen in the military occupation of French Indo-China was also wired to Vichy on November 12, 1941. Endeavoring to expand military facilities, Japan wished to move into North Indo-China, an action which would violate the Nishihara-Marutan Agreement. Since they considered the restrictions stipulated in the agreement as still valid, the French Indo-Chinese authorities had refused to permit the Japanese army’s expansion. Japan now revealed that it had anticipated such a case as this, and had foresightedly inserted a clause in the treaty to the affect that the restrictions stipulated in the Nishihara-
Marutan Agreement were cancelled. The French authorities in Vichy were, therefore, to issue definite instructions at once that the French Indo-Chinese authorities withdraw their claim.  

It might be said, however, the Japan’s control of French Indo-China was progressing favorably. Mr. Yoshizawa and his company had left for their new post in Hanoi during the latter part of October and from there, they planned to penetrate all fields.  

Having already wired Vichy asking that the Governor General in French Indo-China be given extensive powers to negotiate with Ambassador Yoshizawa in the protectorate, Foreign Minister Togo now asked Ambassador Yoshizawa in French Indo-China to insist upon the granting of these powers.

467. France Agrees to Provide Additional Supplies to Japan

Following a series of negotiations with French authorities Japanese Official Harada had obtained definite promises from Mr. Arnald. France agreed to provide by the end of 1941, 10,000 tons of additional goods and would issue instructions to French officials to supply Japan with 12,000 tons of the remaining 15,000 tons to be shipped within the year providing that the payment was made in gold. Although the French approved of payment in gold, they were reluctant to accept payment in yen, arguing that if this kind of payment were accepted, they would have to permit the Germans to pay in marks. Ambassador Kato in Vichy wired that he would continue to negotiate along these lines.

468. Tokyo Releases New Broadcast Schedule for Far East

Meanwhile, a new schedule for Japanese broadcasts direct to Singapore, French Indo-China, the South Seas, Thailand, the Dutch East Indies and Malay was relayed to Singapore. Between 7:00 p.m. and 9:30 p.m. Japan would broadcast to the South Seas in Mandarin, Cantonese, Fukienese, and Japanese. Between 10:00 p.m. and 11:40 p.m. a broadcast to French, Indo-China and Thailand would be made in French, Thai, Cantonese and Burmese languages. Between 9:55 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. the Dutch East Indies and Malay would hear broadcasts from Japan in Dutch, English, Malay and Fukienese.

469. Vice-Minister Roshier Considers Movement of Japanese Troops

In answer to the Foreign Minister’s telegram regarding the problem of stationing Japanese troops in North Indo-China, Ambassador Kato wired on November 14, 1941 that Mr. Harada had transmitted the contents of his instructions to Vice-Minister Roshier. Mr. Roshier had replied that he would at once look into the matter.

470. Secret Messages Withheld from Staff Members are to be Headed by “Gaisin”

Minister Uchiyama in Hanoi advised on November 15, 1941 that messages of a special nature which were best not seen by staff members should be sent addressed to the Consul General and headed by the word “Gaisin”. This practice was used in messages addressed to the Japanese Embassy in China, he pointed out.

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1095 IV, 953.
1093 IV, 861.
1094 IV, 954.
1094 IV, 955.
1094 IV, 956.
1097 IV, 957.
1098 IV, 958.
471. Japan Vests Negotiating Authority in Ambassador Yoshizawa in French Indo-China

Reiterating that all matters of an economical nature in French Indo-China were to be the responsibility of Special Ambassador Yoshizawa, Foreign Minister Togo requested that Minister Uchiyama also ask the French government to cable authority for negotiations to the French Indo-China governor. If, however, France wished to carry on negotiations regarding rubber in Vichy, such an arrangement would be permissible; but a full outline was to be forwarded to the home office so that negotiations there would coincide with those carried on in French Indo-China. 1099

472. Japan Agrees to Transport Rubber for Germany as Far as Japan

In spite of the shortage of Japanese ships, Japan had agreed to transport French Indo-China rubber bound for Germany as far as Japan. In compliance with an arrangement made with the German Commercial Attaché, approximately 10,885 kilotons of rubber would be transported in this manner. The Kanju Maru had carried 3,000 kilotons to Japan during October and the Hibari Maru had already loaded 2,000 kilotons to be transported to Japan during November. The Sidney Maru would carry 3,000 kilotons late in November, and 2,885 kilotons of rubber would be transported on an undesignated vessel early in September. Ambassador Oshima in Berlin was asked to explain to German authorities the great lengths to which Japan had gone, in view of her shortage of ships, to dispatch these vessels. 1100

473. German Official Says Germany and Japan Must Agree on Division of Indo-Chinese Rubber

On November 17, 1941 Ambassador Kato inquired whether the allotment of French rubber had been taken up with the Germans yet. A German member of the Armistice Commission had informed the Japanese Counselor of the Embassy in France, Mr. Harada, that Germany and Japan would have to reach an agreement on the amount of French Indo-Chinese rubber to go to Europe and the amount to go to Japan out of the 1942 production. For the information of Japanese officials, Ambassador Kato declared that the estimated production of French Indo-Chinese rubber for 1941 was 75,000 tons, and for 1942 would be 80,000 tons. 1101

474. Planning Committee Draws Up Bill to Export Materials

In referring to the question of granting a permit for exportation of goods from Shanghai, Foreign Minister Togo informed officials in that city that the planning committee had drawn up a bill, which, under Japanese direction, contained practically the same contents as the former one. It specified that goods to be sent to French Indo-China and Thailand would be divided into definite categories and authorized additional permits pertaining to cotton textiles and cotton products, as well as unconditional permits pertaining to all goods. Declaring that Japan would like to allow permits, on the basis of past experience, for conditional-permit goods even if there was nothing to import in exchange, Foreign Minister Togo asked that the amount and value of goods to be exported from Shanghai be wired to him for his information. 1102

On November 19, 1941 in a dispatch to Vichy the Tokyo Foreign Office wired instructions regarding negotiations for French Indo-Chinese rubber. It was necessary that Japan have an understanding with France regarding the minimum amount that the Imperial Government could procure. In case the 1942 production exceed 70,000 tons Japan decided that a “suitable formula” would be worked out for the disposition of rubber between Japan, France and Germany. 1103

1099 IV, 959.
1100 IV, 960.
1101 IV, 961.
1102 IV, 962.
1103 IV, 963.

234
475. Japan Obtains Visas for Members of Yoshizawa Party

Further instructions for the procurement of passport visas for Ambassador Yoshizawa and his party, as well as for the Border Delineation Committee, were sent to Vichy on November 20, 1941. It was necessary that representations be made to the French government so that instructions might be sent to Ambassador Henri in Tokyo for the issuance of these passport visas. 1104

476. Japanese Suspect Decoux of Collaboration with Americans and English

On November 21, 1941 Tokyo learned that Governor General Jean Decoux in Hanoi had made a trip to the west bank of the Mekong River, where a French Indo-Chinese rubber plant was located. This trip, according to army reports, had been made under the guise of calling on the wife of a Governor General in that area. Since it was rumored that Governor General Decoux was in collaboration with the British and Americans there, such information was of the utmost importance to the Japanese Imperial government. 1105

477. Resignation of General Weygand is Considered to be German Victory

The resignation of General Weygand was discussed in a report from Vichy to Tokyo on November 22, 1941. Although the General’s position had become very delicate and he was falling more and more into disfavor, he was, however, trusted implicitly by the colonial forces and the hearts of the French people were with him uniformly.

Even though Marshal Petain had let General Weygand go with reluctance, this act of the French government showed its decision to sacrifice American supplies in North Africa. That Jean Francois Darlan and Minister of the Interior Pierre Pucheu, both advocates of stronger relations with Germany, had won a great victory was evident, and it was believed that France-German cooperation would be much stronger in the future. 1106

478. Japanese Insist on French Indo-China as Site for Negotiations

Attempting to have France empower French Indo-China officials to negotiate directly with Japan, Japan was informed that France would not, by any means, leave these negotiations up to its representatives in French Indo-China. Since the Colonial Minister was on a trip to Africa, it would be impossible to settle the matter immediately. Therefore, Mr. Arnald had suggested to Japanese Official Harada that either Tokyo or Vichy be chosen for the negotiations. If it were decided that the rubber question had any connection with the Armistice Commission, it would be better to hold the negotiations in Vichy. Mr. Harada had explained that such negotiations were different from those held in the spring and were designed primarily to elaborate in a different way on the terms of the treaty. Since the situation in Japan was now very tense, Mr. Harada suggested that Arnald reconsider the place of negotiations and issue the required instructions to French Indo-China. Arnald promised to reconsider the matter and reply in two or three days. 1107

In a subsequent dispatch, however, Tokyo learned that Mr. Arnald had instructed the Governor of French Indo-China to leave the discussion to the Japanese and French officials in Vichy with the alternative of leaving the matter up to the military headquarters of both armies. 1108
479. Tokyo Arranges Contract for Additional Rubber

On November 24 Tokyo informed its officials in Vichy that French Indo-China authorities had had no instructions from France since last month and that no arrangement had been made with the Yokohama Specie Bank for payment. It was suggested in this dispatch that since only 5,000 of the 10,000 tons previously agreed upon were available, that Japanese merchants contract for the 5,000 tons immediately. It was also advised that Japan assume the export tax of the supplementary amount supplied, although it had been agreed when Mr. Fujio Minoda, the Japanese representative in Saigon, had talked with the French Indo-Chinese economic representative Mr. Martin, that Japan would assume only half of the amount of the export tax. Because it was possible to load only 2,900 tons during November and all available vessels were filled, it was necessary to assign the Akamine Maru to load rubber.1109

480. Specialists are En Route to Bangkok Office

On November 24 Minister Yoshizawa in Hanoi informed the Japanese Minister in Bangkok that two specialists were en route to his office via Saigon. These two men, Toshiro Sakai and Irakame Okuda, would be assigned to his office.1110

481. Minister Iwafuro Uchiyama Complains of Lack of Information Concerning Japanese-United States Negotiations

Since the representatives of Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and China were aware of the matters being discussed in Japanese-United States negotiations, the Japanese Minister at Hanoi, Iwafuro Uchiyama, declared in his dispatch to Tokyo on November 25 that the Hanoi Foreign Office had been left out of the picture since it was uninformed of its role in case war broke out. The Foreign Office organ had been advised by the military that a reply would be forthcoming from the United States on November 25 and that, if such a report were true, the Japanese Cabinet would no doubt make a decision between peace and war within the next day or two. Should the Japanese-American negotiations bring to a successful termination, it would be possible to launch the plans which had been laid down in advance. However, should the negotiations not end successfully, Japanese forces in French Indo-China would be able to move within the day since practically all preparations for the campaign had been completed. In the event of war, the Minister was concerned as to whether the status quo should be maintained insofar as French Indo-China’s governmental setup was concerned. He asked that he be advised by cable or special messenger service since it was imperative that prior arrangements be made as far in advance as possible.1111

482. Japanese Officials Told to Disregard French Attitude

Foreign Minister Togo directed on November 26 that Japan disregard the attitude of French authorities and act on the basis of Japanese demands in regard to the problem of the local army in French Indo-China. This stand was taken since it was expected that the French would not easily concede to Japanese demands. It was further directed that when similar problems occurred in the future, a reply in accordance with this policy should be made to French Indo-Chinese authorities.1112

Foreign Minister Togo directed on November 26 that officials in Saigon investigate the dynamiting of the American Consulate there and wire a reply.1113

1109 IV, 969.
1110 IV, 970.
1111 IV, 971.
1112 IV, 972.
1113 IV, 973.
483. Japan Encounters Difficulty in Securing Roundabout Visas

Experiencing difficulty in securing roundabout travel visas for two secretaries, Mr. Kimio Murai and Mr. Kiku Murakami of the Yoshizawa party, Foreign Minister Togo asked that negotiations be conducted with French authorities so that instructions could be sent to Ambassador Henri in Japan. It was pointed out that the two secretaries had visas for direct travel only and that this fact hindered activities of the Imperial Envoy and necessitated a wait of about a month in their travel.\(^{1114}\)

484. French Accede to Japanese Demands Concerning Rubber Negotiations

That the French had acceded to Japanese demands and had consented to conduct negotiations in Hanoi regarding the rubber question and the purchase of rice was forwarded by Ambassador Katō in Vichy on November 28, 1941.\(^{1115}\)

Although Tokyo made no objections to negotiating in Vichy regarding rubber, it was pointed out that the method of making payments for rice was contained in Article 22 of the Joint-Defense Agreement. It was emphasized that details regarding amounts and price would be worked out on the spot in Hanoi. Tokyo asked that Vichy officials be urged to accept this arrangement.\(^{1116}\)

485. Mr. Ogawa Suggested as Liaison Officer

To act as liaison official between the Japanese diplomatic staff and the army in French Indo-China, Foreign Minister Togo suggested that Mr. Ogawa be attached to the military forces. As long as war did not break out, there was no change in the duties of the Embassy Office with regard to enlightenment and propaganda, but during war time, this work was the prerogative of the military forces in French Indo-China.\(^{1117}\)

486. Japan Promises Not to Increase Her Troops in Indo-China

According to a United Press report from Vichy, the Saigon radio station had broadcasted that Japan promised no further increase of troops in French Indo-China, and that she would not use French Indo-China as a base for attacking the Burma road. It was reported that Ambassador Yoshizawa would make the promise to Governor General Decoux. The United Press report had been sent to Tokyo from Vichy.\(^{1118}\)

487. Mr. Yokoyamu in Hanoi Negotiates for Supplies

On December 3, 1941, Mr. Katsukiyo Yokoyamu, Japanese Representative in Hanoi, informed the Home Office that after conferring with Captain Kakiuchi of the Navy, he had received only a vague order from the Navy Department to ship 24,000 liters of gasoline to the Hainan Island. Since the method of transportation or means of storage of the gasoline had not been stated and since the Fleet had asserted that, because of the danger at hand, it would be impossible for them to carry the gasoline, Mr. Yokoyamu requested that the Navy Department send more complete orders on this at once.

In addition, it was suggested that in the event of the approaching emergency the Shigen Chosa, a natural resources research group in Hanoi, complete the most urgent of the metal problems with which they were engaged and close their affairs at once.\(^{1119}\)
On the following day Tokyo dispatched to Hanoi the information that the Navy Department had sent instructions to the Chief of the Munitions Section on Hainan Island and desired that Mr. Yokoyamu get in contact with the representative of the Munitions Section at Saigon in order to obtain supplies. 1120

488. Japan Prepares to Invade French Concession in Shanghai

That Japan was also preparing its affairs in the event that complications arose between Japan and Soviet Russia was apparent from the information contained in a dispatch from Shanghai to Tokyo on December 4, 1941. Bearing in mind the relations existing between Japan and France, Japanese officials were to inform the French Ambassador in advance that Japan would take necessary military measures in the French Concession Shanghai.

If the French authorities would agree to refrain from applying their laws of protection in the Concession, Japan would be able to exercise the suppression of enemy activities and the disposition of enemy property in the Concession without enforcing Japanese military orders and regulations. Should French authorities, however, not agree to this, Japan would pour in its military police without any regard to the attitude which the local French authorities might take. In discussing the action, the Japanese official was to bear in mind that an occupation of this kind should be accomplished after the central authorities had agreed to it. 1121

489. Tokyo Orders French to Cooperate in Efforts Against Sabotage

On December 5, 1941 Tokyo ordered that French authorities in Indo-China cooperate with the Japanese in stopping the sabotage efforts of the Chungking sympathizers in that country. 1122

Furthermore, two days later, Tokyo asked that steps be taken by French Indo-Chinese authorities to deport the insolent Chinese Consul and to exterminate Chungking influence. 1123

490. Japan Decrees Removal of British and American Consuls

On December 7, 1941 Tokyo directed that the Japanese Minister in Hanoi confer with the French Indo-Chinese authorities about the British and American consuls, that contact then be made on the next day with Japanese military leaders for action, and that this action be so taken as to make the French Indo-Chinese authorities appear responsible. 1124

491. Joint-Defense of French Indo-China Proclaimed

Ambassador Kato in Vichy learned on December 8 that Major General Akito Nakamura had issued the joint defense agreement a few minutes past midnight on December 7. At dawn on December 8, Allied agencies and establishments in French Indo-China were taken over and important persons were interned. Ambassador Kato was instructed to assure the French officials that diplomatic officials were being given particular consideration. The Commander of the combined forces in French Indo-China had undertaken the invasion of Thailand at 3:20 a.m. on December 8. 1125

According to a dispatch from Hanoi which was relayed by Tokyo to Vichy on December 8, 1941, the Military Attache, Col. Seiichi Ito and the Naval Attache, Mr. Horiuchi, planned to negotiate with Governor General Decoux concerning a secret military agreement for the joint

1120 IV, 980.
1121 IV, 981.
1122 IV, 982.
1123 IV, 983.
1124 IV, 984.
1125 IV, 985.
defense of Indo-China. As representatives of the Imperial Army High Command and the Imperial Navy Command and upon orders from the Imperial Headquarters, the representatives would present the text of the cooperative scheme on the morning of December 8.

The proposal asked for general, specific and detailed cooperation with Japan by all French Indo-Chinese agencies and demanded that French Indo-China lend its strength of arms, if necessary, against Japan's enemies, among whom now stood England and the United States. On presenting the proposal Military Attache Ito would demand an immediate answer.

When the Minister at Hanoi expressed his incredulity that Governor General Decoux could, himself, answer the demands, Military Attache Ito answered that should the French Indo-Chinese authorities delay by attempting to wire Vichy, the Japanese army would carry out the terms of the proposals. Should it be necessary, the Attache informed the Minister, Japan would occupy French Indo-China militarily.\textsuperscript{1126}

492. Japan Denies Change in Troop Disposition in French Indo-China

Japan informed Hanoi that a reported last minute change in the destination of the military forces in Indo-China was false. The Chiefs of both the Military and the Naval Affairs Bureaus insisted that they knew nothing of the rumored change in plan, and action was to be taken in accordance with the decisions previously reached in the joint conference.\textsuperscript{1127}

493. Darlan Declares that France Will Take a Neutral Stand

Apparently having been informed of Japan's intentions in French Indo-China and Thailand, Defense Minister Darlan declared that after taking note of each item he would call the attention of the Colonial Minister, C. Platon, to the details.\textsuperscript{1128}

According to a later dispatch, however, Mr. Darlan promised to confirm the Japanese proposal in writing and declared that the French Government would take the neutral position of maintaining friendly relations between France and Japan.\textsuperscript{1129}

\textsuperscript{1126} IV, 986.
\textsuperscript{1127} IV, 987.
\textsuperscript{1128} IV, 988.
\textsuperscript{1129} IV, 989.
JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

494. Tokyo is Informed of a British-American-Chinese Financial Conference

According to an intelligence dispatch from Shanghai on October 20, 1941 the financial status of the Chungking government had reached such a point that only a foreign loan of $200,000,000 in armaments and supplies would save it from bankruptcy. Mr. T. V. Soong, after talking with American financial authorities, had obtained a promise of $100,000,000 worth of material, $50,000,000 of which was to be supplied by the end of the year. However, according to Tokyo sources, Chungking’s critical situation made it necessary for Mr. Soong to ask for the full amount in November.\footnote{IV, 990.}

Japanese agents in Hong Kong reported a four-day British-American-Chinese financial conference (October 12–15) which resulted in Great Britain and the United States urging that dollar currencies be withdrawn and requesting that accurate data regarding Chungking monies in circulation be supplied. According to these intelligence sources as relayed on October 25, 1941, the Chinese delegates at the conference had reciprocated by making several proposals;

(a) Establishment of International Trade Bureau;
(b) Revision of the United States-China Silver Agreement to strengthen the currency exchange market;
(c) Acceptance by Hong Kong of the Chungking currency and the prevention of its inflation by Hong Kong officials;
(d) The accomplishment of an all Latin-American asset-freezing program against Japan;
(e) The release of Chinese properties frozen by the United States and Great Britain to the Chungking government for investigation and fair distribution;
(f) The establishment of an orderly trade relationship between Chungking and the United States and the floating of a new loan of $100,000,000.\footnote{IV, 991.}

495. Rumors Reach Tokyo of Secret Chungking-Communist Agreement

From a Hong Kong message dated October 22, 1941 Tokyo on October 31 revealed that Russia had continued its supply of military goods to Chiang Kai-shek but had warned that this service would have to be discontinued temporarily.\footnote{IV, 992.}

This intelligence was supplemented on November 7 by a Shanghai dispatch which divulged that rumors, apparently originated at the United States Consulate in Shanghai, told of a secret Nationalist-Communist agreement of October 21. Since the full contents of this agreement were not to be known by various divisions of the Nationalist Army, disputes had continued after the date of the supposed conciliation. However, after realizing the folly of continued activity against the Communists, the Chungking government had issued orders to cease operations.\footnote{IV, 993.}

Another dispatch from Shanghai on November 28, confirmed that Chiang Kai-shek was making peace with the Central Communist Party. This intelligence also supposed that there were 400 American planes and over 300 volunteer pilots on the Tenmen Route.\footnote{IV, 994.}
496. Japanese Authorities Increasingly Suspicious of Chungking-American Activities

According to another intelligence report from Shanghai on November 10, 1941, a Japanese agent had declared that Chungking was negotiating for peace with Japan in order to camouflage its program for increasing its military strength, in addition to slowing Japanese progress.1135

Japanese authorities in Tokyo were all the more suspicious on November 13, when a report from Shanghai confided that someone (probably Owen Lattimore, representative of the United States at Chungking) had revealed that his government would not plan to change its policy toward the Far East and that it had only agreed to enter into negotiations with Japanese Ambassador Saiburo Kurusu for a brief stalling period. In addition, the report continued, rumors that special preparations for Ambassador Kurusu's trip to America had been made by the United States, were false and had been started only as part of Japan's propaganda.1136

497. Hong Kong is Informed of Measures to be Taken in China in the Event of a Japanese-American War

Meanwhile, on November 14 in a message to the Japanese Consul-General in Hong Kong, Foreign Minister Togo declared that although the Imperial Government was making a final effort in Japanese-American negotiations, the outlook was not optimistic. In the event that the negotiations failed, the Cabinet Council had decided upon special measures to be taken in regard to China. These included the expulsion of British and American military and naval forces in China, the acquisition of enemy concessions and important interests, and the seizure of enemy interests which were connected with the National Government.1137

In effecting these measures and to ensure the potentiality to face a lengthy world-war, care must be taken to avoid exhaustion of national strength and to lighten the burden on manpower and on material resources. In order to gain popular sentiment on the basis of Japanese-Chinese cooperation, Foreign Minister Togo urged that encouragement be given the activities of the Chinese Leaders in occupied territories; and while making peace a reality in those areas under Japanese power, great stress was to be laid on the acquisition of commodities, especially from unoccupied territories. Because of this, emphasis was placed upon a reasonable adjustment of existing limitations, and it was with this in view, the Foreign Minister said, that the above points were decided.1138

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1135 "IV, 995.
1136 "IV, 996.
1137 "IV, 997.
1138 Ibid.
PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(m) Japanese-Nanking Relations

498. Nanking Appoints Minister Li Fang Commercial Attaché to Berlin

Although it had originally been planned for Mr. Li Sheng-wu, Nanking's newly-appointed Ambassador to Germany, to sail for Lisbon aboard the Asama Maru, his position as Chief of the Education Department made his immediate departure impossible. Two first secretaries, Mr. Tang and Mr. Feng, were then appointed to Ambassador Li Sheng-wu's staff, and they were to fulfill his duties in Berlin until his arrival. Nanking officials later decided that the secretaries were not sufficiently experienced for this mission and named Mr. Li Fang, Minister to Rumania, to fill the post of Commercial Attaché in Berlin, leaving only a Charge in Rumania.

Ambassador Kumataro Honda in Nanking telegraphed these details to Ambassador Oshima in Berlin on October 18, 1941, pointing out that Minister Li Fang was pro-Axis and had long been associated with President Wang Ching-wei. It was doubted that Rumania would object to Minister Li's transfer to Berlin insomuch as the Rumanian government did not have a full-time minister in Rumania.

499. German Diplomats Depart for Nanking

Ambassador Henrich D. Stahmer and Minister Erich Boltze, both of whom had been appointed as German representatives to Nanking on October 2, 1941, left Berlin on October 18 according to Ambassador Oshima. They expected to stop over in Tokyo for about two weeks before taking up their new duties in Nanking, and Ambassador Oshima urged that the Japanese in Nanking help them with their affairs, particularly in regard to living quarters.

After Germany had officially recognized the puppet government in Nanking, arrangements had been made for the two governments to exchange diplomats. Japan approved the appointment of Ambassador Li Sheng-wu to the Berlin post. Berlin then transferred Consul-General Fischer in Shanghai to Nanking as the German Charge d'Affaires, and at the same time that Ambassador Stahmer and Minister Boltze were named, Berlin designated Mr. Johannes Borchers as a member of their staff.

500. Nanking Refuses to Comment on Tojo Cabinet

The change of the home government in Japan on October 18, 1941 caused some alarm in parts of China, according to reports from Nanking and Canton. On October 20, 1941 Ambassador Kumataro Honda in Nanking reported a conversation of the Minister of Publicity of the National Government of China, Lin Pai-sheng. Mr. Lin supposedly said that the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet had shocked his government but that the appointment of General Tojo who had long worked for a settlement of the China incident was reassuring. Insomuch as the People's Government felt that any comment about the change in Cabinets might reflect disadvantageously on them, Mr. Lin remarked that they planned to make no official statement.
High officials of the Chiang Kai-shek government in the Canton area had expressed uneasiness at the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet until they heard of General Tojo's appointment. They seemed to feel that the new Cabinet would break the deadlock in the Japanese-American negotiations either by reducing Japanese military operations in China or by bringing about a war between Japan and the United States, which would give the Chungking government the opportunity to wage a counter offensive.  

501. Occupied China Attempts to Stabilize Its Currency

In their attempts to stabilize monetary value in the new National Government of China, the Japanese had difficulty in coordinating the currency throughout occupied China. Foreign Minister Togo on October 20 informed Peking officials that he planned to handle the matter of partial revision within the law of temporary control of currency and that he wanted to do it in such a way as to meet with the complete approval of the Chinese authorities; consequently, he desired the opinions of the Chinese forwarded to him as soon as possible.  

The fall of the legal tender's value necessitated conferences in Nanking. On October 31 Ambassador Honda reported that many of the Nanking officials felt that the legal tender should be kept at a certain rate. Although no definite arrangements had been made to put this stabilization plan into effect, another meeting was scheduled for November 4, 1941.  

502. Japan Distributes Newspapers to the Chinese

The Japanese continued their efforts to propagandize the Chinese both in and out of occupied China. One of the methods which they used extensively was the distribution of Japanese-edited newspapers. On October 22 Ambassador Honda in Nanking telegraphed Tokyo that they had begun mailing to many cities three days' issues packed together in large unsealed envelopes. The papers thus disseminated were the Central Telegraphic News, the Central News, the Republic Daily News, the Old Nanking Newspaper, and the Transit Daily News. He added that copies of these papers destined for Singapore, Siam, Saigon, and Hanoi were sent in care of Japanese military authorities and that those addressed to Manila were the only ones which were handled through the facilities of the Nanking diplomatic staff.  

503. Ambassador Honda Plans Trip to Tokyo

Ambassador Honda in Nanking advised Foreign Minister Togo on October 22 that he planned to return to Japan about the middle of November and that he was bringing with him three men attached to his staff. After expressing his desire to speak personally with the new head of the Foreign Office, Ambassador Honda pointed out that one of the secretaries who was accompanying him would be able to reveal the details of the political intrigues which were under way in Nanking.  

504. The Vatican Reportedly Favors the Nanking Government

Papal recognition of the National Government of China was sought by the Japanese, but on October 28 the Japanese Embassy in Rome revealed an intelligence report from the Vatican which stated that the government at Chungking would not recognize an apostolic envoy whose seat was at Nanking. Apostolic Delegate Zanini at Peking was credited with informing the Vatican that the Catholic Bishop of Chungking had definitely said Chiang Kai-shek would
permit no association with the People's Government; and therefore, it would be impossible to have one delegate serve both governments.

According to this intelligence report, Pope Pius XII felt that Chungking's attitude was merely a trick to force him to acknowledge it as the real government of China. But since he expected unoccupied China to surrender to the Japanese insomuch as it could not receive support from Russia, the Pope planned at present to leave Delegate Zanini with President Wang and to have the Bishop of Chungking take care of the Catholic interests in his area. Rome requested that the Foreign Office in Tokyo check the accuracy of this report.\footnote{1153}

A week later Ambassador Horikiri in Rome again telegraphed Tokyo, pointing out that the Vatican attributed special importance to the sources of its secret information; hence it was imperative that the Japanese know the accuracy of the October 28th report.\footnote{1154}

On November 10 Foreign Minister Togo relayed this request to Peking, asking that the reliability of the secret agent in that city be checked.\footnote{1155} Four days later the Foreign Minister reported some verification to Rome. Professor Hosoi of an unnamed Catholic university had supposedly discovered that Catholic dignitaries headed by Apostolic Delegate Zanini had decided in secret meetings that the Nanking government should be recognized as the seat of their ecclesiastical administration and had forwarded that recommendation to the Pope.\footnote{1156}

### 505. Administration Difficulties Arise in Shanghai

Arrangements to place Japanese in administrative posts in the internal government of Shanghai were under way by October 24. Foreign Minister Togo concurred in the appointments of Commercial Attache Watari to the Municipal Council and Major Goto to the position of Chief of the Secret Service Department. However, he specified that a Japanese appointed to the latter post should be accorded equal rank with the Chief of the Detective Department.\footnote{1157}

Three weeks later Shanghai telegraphed the People's Government in Nanking that Major Goto's salary and car had been arranged and that he had been listed as an unofficial employee of the Japanese Foreign Office.\footnote{1158}

Shanghai officials on October 28 complained that their city lacked money for its ordinary activities because of the reduction of trade following the freezing of British and American assets. To offset the rising governmental expenses, it was suggested that the taxes and customs be adjusted by the following means: 1) a revision of tax rates, imposing a better ratio between necessities and superfluities; 2) a return to the gold standard; and 3) taxation of items previously exempted including military goods.\footnote{1159}

### 506. Japan Concludes Agreement with the Shansi Army

The surrender and incorporation of the Shansi army into the Nanking puppet forces had not been completed by late October. Mr. Sakuji Hayashi in Peking revealed that General Yen Hsi-shan, the head of the Shansi army, complained that Japan had not supplied the September and October quota of arms and funds and that it was impossible to complete the transfer without Japanese cooperation. It was arranged for Mr. Iwamatsu, the Chief of the First Army, to meet with General Yen near Kogi in an effort to solve the problems, and General Yen was assured that Japan was assembling the funds promised to his organization.\footnote{1160} On October 30
Peking announced that as a result of these negotiations a final agreement with the Shansi army had been satisfactorily concluded.\footnote{1161}

### 507. President Wang Desires Collaboration with Chungking

Earlier in October Tokyo had agreed to contact President Wang Ching-wei on all the details involving occupied China that were discussed in the conversations between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura.\footnote{1162} But on October 28 President Wang again expressed to Minister Hidaka his anxiety over these negotiations. He felt that a fusion of the Nanking and Chungking governments should be effected immediately and that the prolonging of the Washington conversations might prevent Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from seeking such a conciliation.\footnote{1163}

Shanghai officials on November 1 notified Tokyo that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei had reached an understanding over the appointment of the chairman of the North China Affairs Board immediately after Mr. Yen Hsi-shan, the head of the Shansi army, had severed relations with the Chungking government. It was reported that Chiang wished to use Chang Hsueh-liang as Mr. Yen's successor. Although the Shanghai dispatch stated that this report was probably propaganda supported by Commander Bei Tsung-chi of the 9th Route Army, it advised that a thorough investigation be made immediately.\footnote{1164}

### 508. Japan Initiates New System for the China Affairs Board

The Japanese Cabinet Council in August had decided on the establishment of Japanese administrative organs in China, and on November 1 Foreign Minister Togo telegraphed the final plans to Shanghai and Nanking. As of that date the control of affairs by the China Affairs Board was to be superseded by a new administrative system which included the following changes: 1) local offices of the China Affairs Board would take over the functions of the former Trade Offices; 2) the Welfare Ministry would incorporate the former employees of the China Affairs Board into its personnel; 3) employees having important duties in relation to Japanese trade could communicate directly with the Welfare Ministry; 4) low-salaried local employees could be used as temporary consular clerks; and 5) overseas officials would report local sanitary conditions to the Welfare Ministry.\footnote{1165}

On November 6 Nanking informed Foreign Minister Togo that the East Asia Development Company wished to continue their close contact with the Japanese Foreign Office.\footnote{1166}

### 509. Japan Proposes Methods of Controlling Chinese Nationals Abroad

As had been the case in Germany, Chinese nationals in Portugal evinced a pro-Chungking attitude. On November 4 Ambassador Horokiri in Rome advised Nanking to establish a legation in Lisbon as soon as possible, pointing out that the Chungking representative there would create difficulties.\footnote{1167}

Japanese officials throughout eastern Asia sent their recommendations to Nanking in regard to representatives of the People's Government. The Embassy in Bangkok suggested that someone who was related to the Chinese by blood and who had a wide range of acquaintances among the Chinese population should be sent to do propaganda work. Saigon proposed that the Nanking delegate should organize Chinese there into pro-Wang groups.
The reports from Rangoon, Batavia, Singapore and Manila were discouragingly alike, stating that any pro-Nanking work would be impeded by the stiff opposition of the Chungking government and by the British, American, and Dutch influences. They suggested that radio broadcasts and newspapers be used to disseminate propaganda.\textsuperscript{1168}

Tokyo on November 21 decided that Japanese agents who were to work among Chinese residents abroad should be immediately transferred to Macao, French Indo-China, Thailand, and other Japanese occupied territories.\textsuperscript{1169}

510. Japanese Apprehend Blue Shirt Terrorists

Military police in Shanghai were reported to have arrested Major General Chin Kyo-ju,\textsuperscript{1170} the Chief of the Shanghai branch of the Blue Shirts and the head of the Chungking terrorists, according to a Nanking dispatch dated November 6, 1941. As a result of this arrest, the Japanese obtained information concerning the background and affiliations of those engaged in terrorism in Shanghai, and they expected to use this information to prevent future activities of the Blue Shirts.\textsuperscript{1171}

On November 21 Shanghai officials declared that the Blue Shirts' activities in Shanghai and Nanking had been completely stopped, but that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was still attempting to promote underground movements in those areas.\textsuperscript{1172} Apparently political prisoners captured in northern China were to be sent to Nagasaki; for the following day Tokyo requested information concerning the method, channels, means of transportation and time required for shipping the prisoners.\textsuperscript{1173}

511. Ambassador Oshima Urges Mr. Li Sheng-wu to Report to Berlin Immediately

On November 10, 1941 Ambassador Oshima requested that the People's Government in Nanking arrange in some way to have Ambassador Li Sheng-wu take office in Berlin immediately. Referring to earlier messages of his which pointed out that the adverse propaganda of Chinese residents in Germany made it advisable to have a Japanese-supported representative from Nanking, Ambassador Oshima stated that the uncertain date of the Asama Maru's sailing made it seem advisable to have Ambassador Li use a different route, perhaps via South America on an Italian plane.\textsuperscript{1174} Although Mr. Oshima had received Nanking's dispatch of October 18 which told of Minister Li Fang's appointment as commercial attache in Berlin,\textsuperscript{1175} apparently he felt that the situation required the Ambassador's presence.

512. Japan, Manchuria, and China Plan Exchange Broadcasts

Foreign Minister Togo announced that the first anniversary of Japanese-Manchurian-Chinese collaboration would be celebrated by a special exchange of broadcasts between the three countries at 7:20 p.m. on November 30. Each country was to be allowed ten minutes.\textsuperscript{1176}

513. Japan Plans to Confiscate Third Country Concessions in China

Possible Japanese occupation of the International Concession in Shanghai raised the question of what demands were to be enforced on citizens of third countries; such as the seizing of

\textsuperscript{1168}IV, 1020.
\textsuperscript{1169}IV, 1021.
\textsuperscript{1170}Kana spelling.
\textsuperscript{1171}IV, 1022.
\textsuperscript{1172}IV, 1023.
\textsuperscript{1173}IV, 1024.
\textsuperscript{1174}IV, 1025.
\textsuperscript{1175}IV, 998.
\textsuperscript{1176}IV, 1026.
businesses held by third country nationals and the control of wireless, mail, newspapers, and other details not under the authority of the municipal council; and the treatment of the consular groups. Japanese officials in Shanghai requested clarification of the Home Office’s policy in regard to this on December 2, pointing out that the Nanking army headquarters disapproved of such action despite the fact that it might shortly be imperative. 1177

Foreign Minister Togo two days later replied that in the event of a sudden international crisis it would be to Japan’s advantage to occupy the joint concessions; however, he emphasized that Japan had hitherto respected the International Concession and that in enforcing a military occupation of it, there should be as little destruction as possible. Mr. Togo mentioned that he personally favored leaving the French concessions alone. 1178

514. Japan Extends Its Control Over the Chinese

Mr. Fujishima in Shanghai outlined the Japanese policy in regard to an unidentified Chinese organization, the Kumonkai, 1179 in a dispatch to Consul General Nagai dated December 1, 1941. The plan under study included the Japanese domination of the branches of the Kumonkai in China proper and eventually of those in Thailand and Malaya, and the means for the accomplishment of this domination included control of the leaders of the societies, mutual credit and banking associations, propaganda, and trade associations. 1180

Foreign Minister Togo informed Peking officials the following day that enemy juridical persons, particularly financial representatives, were to be prevented from fleeing with their documents, coins, valuable specie, gold and silver trinkets, et cetera. Buildings which belonged to such persons and which were then deemed necessary for military use were to be occupied although the Japanese could not seize personal property and should not make a general seizure of buildings which were not needed immediately. 1181

515. Japanese Leaders Outline Their War Policy in China

Five Japanese leaders, Commander Kitazawa of the army of North China, Vice Chief of Staff Arisue, Mr. Nishimura of the Fourth Section of Staff Headquarters, Chief of Staff Kazyama, and Liaison Officer Shiozawa of the Chinese Development Board, conferred in Peking on December 1 and 2, 1941. They telegraphed their conclusions to the Foreign Office in Tokyo on the day following the conference.

Insomuch as the impending war would decide the fate of the Japanese Empire, they stressed that attention should be given to the larger aspects rather than to insignificant local matters. The latter should be administered carefully and in accordance with international laws; for "the fact that this war is one which is unavoidable for the existence of Japan and the maintenance of peace in East Asia" should be emphasized to all nations in an effort to strengthen Japan’s position at the war’s conclusion.

Referring to the Russo-Japanese war in which President Theodore Roosevelt acted as peace mediator, they stated that the only possible intermediary for this war would be the Pope. Therefore, it would be necessary to handle enemy churches with this point in mind.

The management of China should be left to the Chinese insofar as that was possible, a policy which would enable Japan to turn its attention to the other phases of the war. The problem of obtaining materials for a long war would necessitate a thorough study of closed trade.

1177 IV, 1027.
1176 IV, 1028.
1177 Kana spelling.
1180 IV, 1029.
1181 IV, 1030.
Vice Chief of Staff Yadoru Arisue pointed out that in permitting China a freer hand in its internal affairs, Japan might be thought weakened. It was essential, according to Vice Chief Arisue, that the Chinese not be allowed to make such a mistake.\footnote{\textit{I}, 1031.}

516. Japan Fights Espionage in Northern China

From Tsingtao on the northern coast of China came a report on December 6, 1941, saying that many of the Jews in that sector were anti-Japanese. Included in this group were approximately forty German Jews. Naval officials had requested that they be allowed to take military measures against this faction, but before that could be done, an understanding with the German consuls would have to be obtained.\footnote{\textit{I}, 1032.}

The same day Hsingking asked for information in regard to the handling of enemy nationals. On November 19 "an outline of emergency measures against espionage" had been submitted which stipulated, as measures against nationals of enemy countries, that males between the ages of nineteen and forty-five were to be taken as well as those persons having special attainments or exceptional talents, and that measures could be taken against diplomatic offices and their staffs and the property of enemy nations, including ships. Insomuch as there was a wide divergence between this outline and the one recently approved by the Foreign Office's Investigation Department, Hsingking officials were undecided as to which plan to follow.\footnote{\textit{I}, 1033.}

517. Nanking Outlines Method of Handling Enemy Nationals and Property

On December 7 Nanking announced its policies for the disposition of matters pertaining to the enemy, including diplomatic missions, enemy civilians in general, civilian enemy property, and natural foreign countries.

In regard to the diplomatic missions, all work of the consulates of enemy nations was to be terminated and the following steps were to be taken: 1) the use of all radio apparatus would be prohibited; 2) the receiving and dispatching of all coded messages would be prohibited; 3) permits for the dispatching and receiving of all plain text telegraph messages would be required; 4) both military and diplomatic personnel would be sent to guard the enemy consulates; 5) the use of telephones would be prohibited; 6) the displaying of colors would be prohibited; 7) consuls and their staffs would reside within the consulate buildings and would be required to obtain permission to contact outside persons; 8) Chinese clerks and interpreters would be required to obtain permits to enter or to leave the consulates; 9) identification cards would be issued to all Chinese servants employed in consulates; 10) consuls and their staffs would be required to comply with all official instructions regarding their evacuation; and 11) offices and residences would be sealed after consulate personnel had been evacuated.

Civilian enemy persons would be required to swear that they would engage in no actions harmful to Japan, but they would be permitted to keep residence and to travel outside the city limits of Nanking if they held travel permits from Japanese military authorities. Mail would be censored; telegrams in plain language would be sent only by special permission. All meetings and speeches by such persons would be cancelled, and religious representatives in this category would not be allowed to discuss current events.

As for civilian enemy property, the government would confiscate all property which was of military value; however, schools, churches, and hospitals were not to be touched and their normal activities might continue.

The third power which was to be responsible for enemy diplomatic interests would be notified of its duty orally, and nationals of foreign, non-belligerent nations were to be treated as always unless they were proved to be of bad character.\footnote{\textit{I}, 1034.}
518. Japan Directs Nanking Not to Participate in the War
   In a circular letter issued on December 7, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo stated that the National Government of China was not to declare war at that time.\textsuperscript{1186}

519. Tripartite Powers Secure Shortwave Broadcasting Unit in Shanghai
   On December 8 Foreign Minister Togo directed Shanghai officials to take immediate steps to commandeer a powerful broadcasting station belonging to the Chinese or any other enemy power. This would be done in cooperation with the German and Italian authorities and would be utilized as a propaganda medium both internally and externally. The Foreign Minister suggested that a national of a neutral country, possibly a Frenchman, be used as the agent for this.\textsuperscript{1187}

\textsuperscript{1186} IV, 1035.
\textsuperscript{1187} IV, 1036.
520. Consul General Ishizawa Arranges to Leave Batavia

As diplomatic relations between the Netherlands East Indies and Japan became increas-ingly strained, Consul General Yutaki Ishizawa in Batavia requested that his Home Office permit him to return to Japan immediately. On October 23, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo notified the Consul that his return would have to be postponed until Consul General Shunsuke Asada at Bangkok arrived to take his place. Insomuch as the Foreign Minister desired a personal report on conditions at Bangkok, Consul Asada's arrival in Batavia would be delayed.1188

Two days later Mr. Ishizawa explained his predicament to the Foreign Minister, stating that on October 8 he had informed Jacob E. Hoogstraten, Vice Minister of Economic Affairs, that the Netherlands East Indies' reply to the Japanese had been so unsatisfactory that there was no point in continuing negotiations; therefore, he planned to return to Japan. These statements had been made, the Consul remarked, in an effort to bluff the Dutch into reconsidering the matter; however, when they showed no indications of doing that, the Consul had announced that he would sail for Japan on the Takatiho Maru. After notifying the local newspapers of his decision, he had started paying his farewell calls, and now to be forced to postpone his departure after matters had proceeded so far would be "exceedingly embarrassing". Consul Ishizawa then requested that Tanun Kotani, who had had much experience in dealing with the Dutch authorities be appointed Acting Consul General until Consul Asada arrived.1189

There followed an interchange of dispatches between Foreign Minister Togo and Consul General Ishizawa; the former insisting that it was necessary for the Consul to remain in Bata-via,1190 the latter asking for permission to leave.1191 In one instance he informed the Foreign Minister that he was paying his farewell call to the Governor-General at a luncheon on October 30; and that since the sailing of ships for Japan was irregular and the British no longer issued visas for airplane passage via Singapore, his remaining after the sailing of the Takahito Maru on November 8,1192 might necessitate a considerable delay which Dutch officials would undoubtedly consider strange.1193

521. Dutch Officials Become Suspicious of Japanese in the Indies

Trade relations between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies were deadlocked and a diplomatic break became more and more evident. Although Consul Ishizawa had informed Dutch officials early in October that further negotiations were futile and that he planned to return to Japan immediately,1194 the staff of the Japanese Consulate in Batavia continued to be conspicuously large, thus arousing the suspicions of the Dutch.

According to the Consul's dispatch of October 27, the Chief of the East Asia Bureau, A.H.J. Rofinck, had demanded reasons for the recent increase in the Japanese diplomatic staff and warned that if the Japanese were camouflaging military activities through their diplomatic offices, the Dutch government would not remain silent. Although the Consul attempted to refute Mr. Rofinck's claims by pointing out that the recent trade conferences had necessitated the personnel, he concluded that the Dutch official was unimpressed and admitted that it was hard to predict the future plans of the Netherlands East Indies government.1196

1188 IV, 1037.
1189 IV, 1038.
1190 IV, 1039.
1191 IV, 1040.
1192 IV, 1041.
1193 IV, 1042.
1194 IV, 1043.
By October, 1941, trade relations between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies had reached the point where major businesses and manufacturing houses were considering closing and returning home. In a secret departmental message to Tokyo on October 18 Consul General Ishizawa in Batavia urged that the Borneo Petroleum, the South Seas Development Company, the South Seas Forestry Company, the Borneo Trading Companies, and the Pearl Button Company be subsidized in order that their rights and interests be preserved. He suggested that the Finance Minister should request the Yokohama Specie Bank to release funds for this.\textsuperscript{1196}

Two days later the Borneo Trading Company asked that telegraphic connections with its head office in Kobe be established by the diplomatic staff. The word "oxbiz" was assigned to the new channel.\textsuperscript{1197}

In a reply addressed to the Borneo Trading Company on October 24, Foreign Minister Togo advised that he would apply to the Finance Ministry for 45,000 gilders in the form of a temporary loan through December. The Foreign Minister also advised that the assignment of a ship to Shanghai was under consideration.\textsuperscript{1198}

Consul Ishizawa announced on October 22 that he was unable to hold negotiations with the Dutch authorities because of the holidays of October 22 and 23; therefore, he asked that the sailing of the \textit{Nissho Maru} be postponed since, under the present circumstances, only miscellaneous goods could be loaded and it was impossible to unload any cargo.\textsuperscript{1199}

Foreign Minister Togo replied two days later that it would be impossible to postpone the \textit{Nissho Maru}'s sailing; consequently further shipments of miscellaneous goods aboard this vessel had been cancelled. It had been decided that soy sauce, fermented soy bean mash and agar-agar would be sent.\textsuperscript{1200}

In addition to trade difficulties, Japan was finding it necessary to finance the opposition of Chinese activities throughout the Indies. On October 23 Foreign Minister Togo informed the Batavia office that he was forwarding 15,000 yen to cover the October-December program.\textsuperscript{1201}

Negotiations had not yet been concluded when Consul Ishizawa sent his admonition to Japanese officials in Tokyo on October 23. He accused them of completely disregarding his warning by shipping cotton textile and other goods to the Indies, thereby accumulating a credit of 80,000,000 yen which the Dutch had immediately frozen. On the other hand, the Netherlands had invested only a negligible amount in Japan, and Japan was now in a very disadvantageous position.\textsuperscript{1202}

Mr. Ishizawa threatened to discontinue his efforts if Tokyo authorities refused to take steps to protect Japanese business and property in the Netherlands East Indies.

Continuing his complaint, the Consul explained that the Dutch had agreed at his request to supply Japan with needed material, but that through Japan's red tape and inattentiveness, the \textit{Tjisalak} had had difficulty entering port and had been forced to sail empty. Under these circumstances he pointed out that it was only natural that the Dutch should refuse to fulfill Japanese wishes.

\textsuperscript{1196} IV, 1044.  
\textsuperscript{1197} IV, 1045.  
\textsuperscript{1198} IV, 1046.  
\textsuperscript{1199} IV, 1047.  
\textsuperscript{1200} IV, 1048.  
\textsuperscript{1201} IV, 1049.  
\textsuperscript{1202} IV, 1050.
In addition he accused the home government of failure to keep him advised of pertinent activities. Emphasizing his efforts to protect Japan’s business enterprises in the East Indies, he disclosed his plan to visit Vice Minister Hoogstraten who had favored an adjustment of relations. Now, however, Mr. Hoogstraten had apparently given up; for he was departing for Australia on October 31 leaving only the Director of Economic Affairs, Hubertus J. Van Mook, and the newly-appointed Chief of the Trade Bureau, Suhinmeru, both of whom were unsympathetic to Japan. Nevertheless, the Consul promised to attempt an interview before Mr. Hoogstraten’s departure if, before that date, the Home Office would send its basic policies in regard to the Indies.

Since the time of Vice Minister Hoogstraten’s departure was drawing near, Consul Ishizawa again asked for information from Japan in a wire dated October 28. He also mentioned that the number of Japanese nationals desiring to evacuate would overflow the Takatiho Maru and the Nissho Maru which had been assigned for that purpose.

In reply to Consul Ishizawa’s remonstrances of October 23, Foreign Minister Togo advised on October 29 that the Dutch did not realize the desperate situation of their branch banks and firms in Japan. If Dutch bank balances in Japan were adequate, it was decided that loans might be made to Dutch firms upon guarantee. Stating that very little cargo had been booked for the Nissho Maru, he declared that normal shipping conditions could not be expected until world affairs were settled. The Foreign Minister asked that Consul Ishizawa contact Mr. Hoogstraten in an attempt to effect a trade policy.

523. Japanese Agents Secure Military Information Concerning the Indies

In reply to a Tokyo War Department request for information concerning troops and planes, Major Kuriya in Batavia submitted a report to the assistant Chief of Staff on October 25 revealing 1) the formation and combat methods of Netherlands East Indies pursuit planes; 2) the organization of the air forces and the types of planes employed; 3) the location of the various forces, and the types and number of planes recently received from the United States and England. He estimated that the total number of planes which both the navy and army possessed was between 700 and 1000.

On October 29 Consul General Ishizawa reported to the Vice Minister and the Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo on the general background and qualifications of the newly-appointed commander in chief of the Netherlands East Indies Army, Lt. General H. terPoorten, stating that the new chief was an authority on aviation and was probably the one most responsible for mechanizing the Netherlands East Indies Army. Lt. General terPoorten was considered an excellent strategist and had won the respect of his subordinates although a few felt that he leaned toward Naziism. The Consul also submitted a brief resume of the career of the new Chief of the General Staff, Colonel R. Bakkers.

Another message on the 29th to the same addressees divulged additional military information concerning the induction of 1500 natives into the army. The East India Political Federation has issued the statement that the people of the East Indies realized their duty to serve in the armed services and would build up the strength of their land through their legislative and political parties. According to Consul Ishizawa this organization would not carry much weight.

1203 Kana Spelling.
1204 IV, 1050.
1205 IV, 1051.
1206 IV, 1052.
1207 IV, 1053.
1208 IV, 1054.
1209 IV, 1055.
It was believed that while Vice Minister Hoogstraten, now the acting chief of economics, and Mr. Duff-Cooper of England were both in Australia, they would confer on obtaining supplies from there.\footnote{IV, 1056.}

A brief of newspaper reports was sent by Consul Ishizawa on October 31 to Tokyo. They revealed that coastal defense maneuvers had been held on October 27 and 28 at unnamed landing points on the south coast of Java and on Bali and Madura. Extensive maneuvers west of Batavia in the Mawok and Tangeran regions and small ferry lands on various rivers were also reported.\footnote{IV, 1057.}

524. Dutch Governor-General Evinces No Alarm over Impending Crisis

During the course of his farewell calls in Batavia Consul General Ishizawa attended a dinner arranged by the Governor-General, Dr. A.W.L. Tjarda Van Starkenborgh-Stachouwer, on October 30. On the following day the Consul made a lengthy report to the Foreign Office in Tokyo concerning the conversation which he held with the Governor-General.

Attempting to discover the exact attitude of the Dutch toward Japan, Mr. Ishizawa had expressed his willingness to convey the Governor-General's messages to Foreign Minister Togo. The Dutch official reportedly informed the Consul that the policies of the Netherlands East Indies government were exactly what the Japanese had been told in their daily contacts with Dutch authorities and that he had nothing to add to them; however, he expressed a willingness to improve relations between the two countries should an opportunity present itself. Consul Ishizawa inferred from the calm attitude of Dr. Van Starkenborgh-Stachouwer that the Indies had already prepared for resistance against Japanese force and therefore did not need to effect an understanding with Japan.\footnote{IV, 1058.}

525. Tokyo Plans the Evacuation of Japanese Nationals

In an effort to organize the mass evacuation of Japanese nationals scattered across the Netherlands East Indies, Foreign Minister Togo on October 27 outlined plans for shipping them aboard the Takatiho Maru and the Nissho Maru. He wired Consul General Ishizawa that the 1700 or 1800 evacuees originally scheduled for the Hawaii Maru should be accommodated in the Takatiho Maru.

Listing the proposed routes of the two ships, the Foreign Minister said that ports of call for the Nissho Maru would include Batavia, Makkasar, Menado, and Sandakan; for the Takatiho Maru, Surabaya and Keelung. Passengers were expected to provide their own blankets and were limited to one ton of baggage on the Takatiho Maru and two tons on the Nissho Maru.\footnote{IV, 1059.}

Two days earlier the Consul had notified Tokyo that approximately 1700 nationals planned to leave on those ships. He had stated that although the remaining Japanese merchants wished to stay in the hope that the economic and commercial relations of the two countries would be somewhat stabilized, they were preparing to evacuate at a later date should it become necessary. The Japanese fishermen and farmers in Java remained unworried about the situation, and the Consul assured the Foreign Office that their evacuation could be postponed until the two nations had actually broken off relations.\footnote{IV, 1038.}

In reply to the Foreign Minister's evacuation plan, Consul General Ishizawa proposed that the Nissho Maru's route include Sumaran even though it might necessitate canceling its docking at Batavia. He explained that it would be an unnecessary expense and inconvenience for the evacuees from central Java to travel to Soerabaja.\footnote{IV, 1060.}
The numbers of those who finally sailed aboard these ships was smaller than had been anticipated, and the Foreign Minister expressed annoyance at this. He pointed out that this made it necessary to dispatch another ship to accommodate those who had been left behind and it was arranged, therefore, for the *Fuji Maru* to dock at Batavia on November 20 and to leave Soerabaja about the 28th of that month. Foreign Minister Togo emphasized the importance of having everything in readiness this time and of informing Soerabaja, Medan, and Menado promptly. 1216

526. Mr. Ishizawa Requests Subsidy for Japanese Newspaper in Batavia
Consul General Ishizawa on November 2, 1941 suggested that the Foreign Office arrange to cover the growing deficit of the Japanese language newspaper in Batavia. Although the issues had been decreased and the expenses had been curtailed in order to counteract the financial loss of subscriptions and advertisements caused by the evacuation of nationals, it would need assistance to meet current expenses. The fact that the Chinese language papers were continuing as always increased the importance of maintaining the Japanese newspaper. Consul Ishizawa estimated that 2,500 guilders would cover the deficit until the end of the fiscal year. 1217

527. Communication Difficulties Arise in Batavia
The decrease in telephone communications between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies caused Foreign Minister Togo to suggest that such calls be stopped temporarily and resumed later if necessary. He intimated to Consul Ishizawa on November 6 that Japan might curtail all international telephone conversations and requested the Consul's opinion with regard to the Indies. 1218
Two days later the Consul approved the cancellation of telephone service and reiterated that there was little chance of securing permission from Dutch authorities to use the Japanese language. 1219

Another communication difficulty confronted Consul Ishizawa in his exchange of telegraphic messages with the Japanese Consul at Dilli, Tokitaro Kuroki. He requested that the Foreign Office send Consul Kuroki code books, the abbreviated transmission code and telegraphic addresses to facilitate the telegraphic work between the two offices. 1220

528. Lt. Kuriya is Ordered to Return to Japan
In a telegram dated November 6 Japanese Staff Headquarters in Tokyo ordered Lieutenant Kuriya to return to Japan by airplane after contacting the military attache at Bangkok and the "tomi" group in Saigon.

Until the arrival of Lt. Toyoaki Yamauchi who was to continue Kuriya's work, Satoru Shimpo, a Domei newsman in Batavia, and Yoshio Matsugaki, the Consul in Soerabaya, were directed to take charge of his research. This provision made it unnecessary for Kuriya to delay his departure for any reason. 1222

Two days after receiving his orders, Kuriya replied that he was sailing on the *Takatiho Maru* on November 10 to avoid being interrupted by the British should he go via Bangkok. He expected to arrive on November 24 or 25 but requested further instructions when he would reach Keelung on approximately November 20. 1223

1216 IV, 1061.
1217 IV, 1062.
1218 IV, 1063.
1219 IV, 1064.
1220 IV, 1065.
1222 IV, 1067.
1223 IV, 1068.
529. Dutch Authorities in Netherlands East Indies Prepare for War

On November 10 Consul Shinichi Hyasaki in Medan, having learned of Dutch preparations to destroy oil fields and refineries on Sumatra in the event of war, wired two messages to the Foreign Office in Tokyo relating the details of the Indies government’s arrangement.

The destruction forces, divided into two groups both of which were to receive double pay, were ready to destroy all oil fields in Susu and Brandan when advised to do so by telephone. The refineries at Susu, Brandan, and Rantoo were fully mined, and two others were being prepared. At Susu the wire net was reported as being very near the machinery while at Brandan a short wire connected the machinery to the post office near the workers’ barracks.

The Netherlands East Indies authorities were understood to have distributed sealed secret orders which were to be opened the moment war was declared. The people had been ordered to stop work and to stay away from crowds when the danger became imminent and swords were being supplied for emergency use by those working in the fields. Automobile roads were being constructed on both Sumatra and Borneo to avoid congestion on the national highways and other preparations included the placing of cannon and the laying of mines at strategic points.

530. Supittai Denounces Japanese Foreign Policy

Vice Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, H. J. Spit, accused the Japanese government of pursuing a policy of racial supremacy similar to Germany’s stating that it had become a threat to his country. According to a report of the conversation held between the Vice-Governor-General and Consul General Ishizawa which was sent by the latter to Tokyo on November 12, Mr. Spit had proclaimed that the “Dutch East Indies do not want to fight, but they are not afraid to do so”.

Consul Ishizawa had reviewed the developments between the two countries, concluding that the Netherlanders had changed to an anti-Japanese political policy which made a reconciliation difficult. He attested that Japan had always based its aims upon justice and that he had endeavored to convince the Netherlands East Indian authorities that the Japanese advancement in southern French Indo-China offered no threat to the Dutch. After accusing Great Britain, the United States, and Holland of selfishness in their use of the world’s resources he emphasized that the New Order in East Asia would prevent this.

Adamant in his stand, the Dutch official answered the Consul by saying, “Holland has not been selfish. She has supplied the whole world with her resources. We understand the Japanese idea so we refuse to accept it.”

531. Japan Orders Remaining Nationals to Return Immediately

As soon as he learned of the scheduled arrival of the Fiji Maru in Batavia, Consul General Ishizawa pointed out to his Home Office that all Japanese merchants should be evacuated since there was no possibility of business resuming. Local travel had become increasingly difficult, and many nationals from outlying districts were gathering in Batavia to await the Fuji Maru’s arrival. Disclosing that he had been keeping in touch with army and navy authorities who agreed with him that a steamer should be made available about the end of December, the Consul inquired what should be done in the event that the international situation became impossible before the complete evacuation was accomplished.
The same day, November 13, 1941, the Foreign Office telegraphed Batavia that the following nationals should return to Japan: those engaged in farming and the employees of firms as well as all those familiar with conditions in the Netherlands East Indies and with the languages. Only the officers most essential to Japanese firms should remain. The evacuees were instructed that their departure should be made to seem a spontaneous withdrawal.\footnote{\textit{IIV}, 1073.}

The Consul replied that now that he knew the Foreign Office's policy in regard to evacuation, he would attempt to comply with it; but indicated that it might not be possible to have as many of the nationals as were expected aboard these ships.\footnote{\textit{IIV}, 1074.}

On November 16 Foreign Minister Togo amplified his directions of the 13th. The staffs of all firms were urged to maintain business as much as possible. In the Medan district it had been decided that three or four men of the Tozan Agricultural Products Company, two members of the Showa Rubber Company, and one or two of the Sumatra Colonization could return to Japan at the discretion of the appointed peoples. The South Seas Rubber Company's employees were informed that they did not have sufficient personnel to permit anyone to leave, while the evacuation of those connected with the Tropical Industries depended upon the completion of a contract for management of the Mitsui New Tropical Rubber Plantation.\footnote{\textit{IIV}, 1075.}

The South Countries Company in the Batavia district was to be permitted to send anyone whom Mr. Ogura approved. In this district the Nomura Supply Company was given instructions for the continuance of business.

Toshisuke Kondo of the Dutch East Indies Development Company in Banjermasin was told to return to Japan on the first boat available after he had made suitable arrangements for the management of the business. Mr. Kodama was to be allowed his own choice in staying or leaving.\footnote{\textit{IIV}, 1076.}

To ensure that all possible nationals would sail aboard the \textit{Fuji Maru}, the Foreign Minister expressed concern over any leakage about certain negotiations which were underway. He informed the Consul that none of the nationals were to know anything about the negotiations for fear they would become hopeful and decide not to leave the country.\footnote{\textit{IIV}, 1077.}

\textbf{532. Japanese Trade and Shipping Problems (November 1941)}

Mr. Imagawa, the representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank in Batavia, on November 5, 1941, consulted the President of the Specie Bank in Tokyo about the 5000 yen which had been due the Dutch Consul General in Kobe since October 16. Mr. Imagawa also reported on a proposal to approve the telegraphing of 100,000 yen to cover the expenses of the Dutch merchants who were permitting the export of 4000 tons of maize loaded on the \textit{Takatiho Maru}, and the \textit{Nissho Maru}.\footnote{\textit{IIV}, 1078.}

On November 11 the Foreign Office informed Consul Ishizawa that Japan would not consider the insincere proposals made by the Netherlands East Indies in regard to trade between the two countries. The Consul was directed to conduct negotiations for the bartering of each shipload of goods as an independent transaction.\footnote{\textit{IIV}, 1079.}

The 60,000 yen supposedly sent to the Indies for the export of the maize loaded on the \textit{Takatiho Maru} and the \textit{Nissho Maru} had not been received by November 21 when Consul Ishizawa informed Tokyo of the situation. Emphasizing its importance, he asked that the Finance Ministry be immediately advised of this.\footnote{\textit{IIV}, 1080.}
Two dispatches from Tokyo on November 21 notified Dilli on Timor and Menado on Celebes that Japan was sending 10,000 yen to the former and 5,000 yen to the latter. These sums were for the “secret fund” and were to be retained by the receivers in cash, pending instructions as to its usage.\(^{1237}\)

The next day Consul Ishizawa demanded that Tokyo explain why it sent a plain text message to Mr. Imagawa, informing him that permission had been refused for the payment of the 5,000 yen by the Specie Bank in Kobe to the Dutch Consul-General there.\(^{1238}\) This sum had been promised to the Dutch official in October.\(^{1239}\)

Authorities in Tokyo learned from Consul Tokitaro Kuroki in Dilli that it was impossible to withdraw the funds deposited in the bank there. On November 26 he stated that there was approximately 140,000 to 150,000 pataka worth of redeemable notes in the possession of the bank, and that they were virtually inaccessible.\(^{1240}\) Two days later Consul Kuroki again wired Tokyo and after giving an estimate of the exportable manganese at Dilli, he disclosed that the Dutch desired wire netting (screening) for sifting ore in payment for the manganese. Although the Dutch were prepared to supply a considerable amount of the ore, there was no way of transporting the material unless Japan dispatched a special ship.\(^{1241}\)

533. Netherlanders’ Attitude Remains Anti-Japanese

Consul General Ishizawa, continuing to ferret out the opinions of the Netherlanders whom he visited during his farewell calls, found that they were staunchly anti-Japanese. In a second\(^{1242}\) conversation with the Chief of the East Asia Bureau, A.H.J. Rofinck, on November 17 the Dutch official manifested a desire for Consul Ishizawa to remain in Batavia, remarking that the tense international situation demanded a Japanese diplomat who understood the attitude of the Netherlands thoroughly, and that he did not think that Consul Asada, who was to replace Consul Ishizawa was a good choice. Consul Ishizawa in his report to Foreign Minister Togo on the following day stated that his reply to the Chief had been that he was leaving Batavia because of the insincerity evinced by the Dutch government and that he had no control over the appointment of his successor. He questioned the reasons behind Mr. Rofinck’s request but admitted that the relations between their two countries were grave. Pointing out that it was the economic blockade which the Dutch in cooperation with England and the United States were effecting against Japan that had caused this serious rift, it made no difference who held the office of Japanese consul general since there was little that that official could now do, unless the Netherlands East Indies changed its policy.

In conclusion Consul Ishizawa revealed that this time the Dutch official had not insisted that the Indies government was neutral and that the Dutch had no intention of compromising but rather were preparing for war.\(^{1243}\)

534. Japanese Businesses Close in Preparation for Evacuation

The arrival of the Fuji Maru and the evacuation plans of the Japanese from Batavia were explained to a group of importers, bankers, and retail and wholesale shopkeepers in a meeting called by Consul General Ishizawa in the middle of November. The majority of the group decided to leave two or three persons in charge of finishing up their businesses and to return the remaining personnel to Japan. However, many of the wholesalers and shopkeepers did not think their affairs could be closed by the sailing date of the Fuji Maru.

\(^{1237}\) IV, 1081–1082.
\(^{1238}\) IV, 1083.
\(^{1239}\) IV, 1078.
\(^{1240}\) IV, 1084.
\(^{1241}\) IV, 1085.
\(^{1242}\) IV, 1043.
\(^{1243}\) IV, 1086.
Several stores needed cash in order to close their affairs, since even though they would sell their stock, the cash for this sale would not be immediately available. The manager of the Specie Bank in Batavia suggested that the bank float a loan for these stores, taking the stock as collateral. Before the branch bank could do this, however, permission had to be obtained from the Department of Finance and Consul Ishizawa wired Tokyo to arrange for this permit.\textsuperscript{1244}

On November 18 Foreign Minister Togo notified the Borneo Rubber Company that its personnel should be evacuated as soon as business conditions would permit. Those who would have to remain were to return to Japan by mail steamer or mail plane as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{1245}

Foreign Minister Togo had informed Toshisuke Kondo of the Dutch East Indies Development Company in Bandjermasin that he was to return to Japan as soon as he had made arrangements to transfer the management of the company.\textsuperscript{1246} In a message on November 20 he further stipulated that Mr. Kondo was to be sent back to Japan aboard the \textit{Fuji Maru}.\textsuperscript{1247}

535. Consul General Ishizawa Complains of Minor Problems

Consul General Ishizawa mildly rebuked the Foreign Office on November 21 for sending code messages directly to one of his translators, Mr. Aratame. Although praising the translator's work, he pointed out that the consul general, according to the existing contract, should have cognizance of all messages and that in the future they should be sent to him.\textsuperscript{1248}

The next day the Consul had occasion to complain again to the Foreign Office. The broadcast wave lengths had been changed on November 10 and he was unable to receive the 10:30 JAP broadcasts because of weak signals. He suggested that in the future JUO (9430) be used.\textsuperscript{1249}

536. Netherlands East Indies Government Suppresses Japanese Agents

Japanese fishing boats off the coast of the Netherlands East Indies had long aroused the suspicions of that government; and, according to a dispatch from Consul General Ishizawa on November 19, their surveillance over Japanese vessels had become "oppressive". Captains of various Japanese boats in the vicinity of Gaspar and Biliton had reported that Dutch, and possibly some English, flying boats had stopped the vessels once or twice each day and subjected them to intimidating inspections.

Consul Ishizawa brought the matter to the attention of the Foreign Office, including in his report the information that although there were no warships near Baspar or Biliton, there were always several vessels about fifty miles north of Batavia. These were presumed to be night patrol boats. Dutch authorities were further pressing their investigations by questioning Japanese about their various activities. Among those investigated was the head of the Oshiro Company who had made a loan to the harbor master in Batavia.\textsuperscript{1250}

At this time a Dutch countermeasure was divulged in a dispatch from Shanghai. A Dutch newspaper concern was reported as negotiating for the purchase of a newspaper, \textit{The Voice of the People}.\textsuperscript{1251}

On November 22 Consul General Ishizawa requested that the Foreign Office remit 30,000 guilders for the expenses of Koo Choo Sui\textsuperscript{1252} who was employed by the Consul to stamp out...
anti-Japanese feeling. Although the Netherlanders had begun to watch Koo closely, the Consul attested that the man's familiarity with the Chinese and natives would be of aid to the Japanese in case of an emergency. Koo was planning to distribute pro-Japanese pamphlets at the suggestion of the Consul.\textsuperscript{1253}

Another Japanese agent, Mr. Takada, was so closely watched by the Dutch that his efforts were practically useless according to the Consul on December 1. It was thought that he had already departed for Japan aboard the \textit{Fuji Maru}.\textsuperscript{1254}

537. Germany Requests That Its Nationals Be Evacuated by the Fuji Maru

In compliance with a request from the German authorities in Tokyo, Foreign Minister Togo on November 22 suggested that Consul General Ishizawa arrange for the evacuation of German women and children resident in the Netherlands East Indies. According to the Foreign Minister they numbered about 119. The German embassy in Tokyo had assumed the responsibility for steamship fares aboard the \textit{Fuji Maru}, and the Foreign Minister proposed that they be accommodated on this ship, if possible. In doing this he remarked that such measures should be taken after consulting the German and Swiss consuls in Batavia.\textsuperscript{1255}

538. Japan Prepares to Invade the East Indies

In preparation for the complete evacuation from the Netherlands East Indies Consul General Ishizawa on November 17 asked for instructions concerning the disposal of the furniture, office supplies, and automobile used by the naval office in Batavia.\textsuperscript{1256}

Foreign Minister Togo directed Consul Yashio Matsugaki in Soerabaya to obtain automobile road maps used by Motor Club members and to send them to Japan on the \textit{Fuji Maru}. The General Staff in Tokyo, anticipating invasion needs, had requested them stating that copies would suffice.\textsuperscript{1257}

The United States Navy received on November 21 information from the Dutch Legation which reported a Japanese expeditionary force near Palau. The Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies had divulged its presence, saying that the force was large enough to constitute a threat to the Dutch East Indies or Portuguese Timor and should it move beyond a stipulated point he would regard it as an act of aggression.\textsuperscript{1258}

Reports on military strength continued to be sent to the home government by branch diplomatic offices. On November 26 Consul Shinichi Hayasaka in Medan announced that approximately 150 Australian troops were stationed at Medan and that it was believed that 220 Australian troops were on the Island of Shunbiram.\textsuperscript{1259}

539. Consul Ishizawa Orders Consulate Classified Material Burned

In compliance with a directive from Foreign Minister Togo the Japanese consulate in Batavia was preparing itself for hasty evacuation. Consul Ishizawa itemized the things which had been done by December 2: 1) expense funds were being converted into cash as rapidly as possible; 2) the files of secret diplomatic correspondence had been burned and other secret documents were to be burned immediately; 3) telegraphic documents were to be disposed of; and 4) other matters awaited the final approval of the Foreign Office.\textsuperscript{1260}

\textsuperscript{1253}IV, 1094.
\textsuperscript{1254}IV, 1095.
\textsuperscript{1255}IV, 1096.
\textsuperscript{1256}IV, 1097.
\textsuperscript{1257}IV, 1098.
\textsuperscript{1258}IV, 1099.
\textsuperscript{1259}IV, 1100. (Kana Spelling)
\textsuperscript{1260}IV, 1101.
The Consul further notified Tokyo of the burning of all copies of incoming and outgoing dispatches through December 1, 1941; these included the telegraphic communications. It had been decided to burn all wires received or dispatched by the Batavian office at the end of each day; furthermore, a complete list of everything destroyed at that office would be sent to the Foreign Office by either a Japanese vessel or the next courier. 1261

The same day Consul Ishizawa reported to his Home Office that all charts had been burned with the exception of the ones which he specified. Remaining were maps of New Guinea, Peru, New Zealand, Turkey, Germany, the Netherlands, China, Honduras, and Columbia. 1262

540. Japanese Foreign Office Declares the Netherlands a Quasi-Enemy Nation

Japan declared the Netherlands a quasi-enemy power in a circular letter dated December 4, 1941, which the Foreign Office sent to Nanking, Shanghai, Peking, and Hsinking officials. Explaining that the Dutch had enforced prohibitions regarding the use of codes and were exercising rigid control over Japanese officials, Foreign Minister Togo announced that the Netherlands government was obviously working with enemy powers.

Whether or not the Netherlands officially declared war on Japan, the Foreign Office revealed that Japan planned to issue a declaration to the effect that a state of war existed between the two countries and would treat the Netherlands as an enemy nation in accordance with International Law. 1263

1261 IV, 1102.
1262 IV, 1103.
1263 IV, 1104.
PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(o) Japanese-Thaiese Relations

541. Japanese Plan Invasion of Southern Thailand

In spite of the fact that it would be necessary to invade Southern Thailand, the Japanese were attempting to complete the strategic preparations for the invasion of the Bangkok plain without antagonizing the Siamese governing class which was determined to preserve the neutrality of their country. In the ultimate establishment of Japan's goal, the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, it was necessary to consider Siam's position as a member nation and to pay careful attention to her wishes, especially since Siam's enmity would create difficulties for Japanese-Burma operations for which Japan needed transit through Siamese territory and for their use of the southern Siamese railroad lines for its army operating in Malaya. For these reasons Japanese officials in Bangkok urged that southern Siam be sacrificed, if unavoidable, but that the neutrality of the greater part of Thailand be preserved.1264 This dispatch, transmitted to Tokyo on October 18, 1941, was not readable by United States Communication Intelligence officers until April 30, 1945.1265

542. Intelligence Agent Reports Thai-ese Troop Movement to Border

According to the intelligence reports gathered by Consul Harada in Chiengmai, the Thai-ese were constructing roads from that province to the border. Not only were the Thai-ese building an air field twenty kilometers from the frontier, but it was further reported that soldiers were being dispatched to the frontier area with regular camps at several points between Maun and Faun.1266

On October 20, 1941 Tokyo took the initiative in suggesting that the authorities report the names of Thai-ese nationals in England who wished to sail for home. Such an inquiry was possibly made in view of returning the Thai-ese nationals via Japanese ships.1267

543. Ambassador Tsubokami Requests Funds, Supplies to Open Drug Concern

Referring in a dispatch on October 20, 1941, to previously discussed plans to establish drug concerns in Thailand, Ambassador Tsubokami requested that 5,000 baht as well as drugs and needles be sent to him. He notified his home government at this time that all preparations were completed for the opening of the firm.1268 On the next day Foreign Minister Togo wired 8,000 yen to be used in the scheme of operating spy centers in Thailand which would be disguised as Chinese drug stores.1269

544. Japanese Officials Plan to Use of Indian Troops in Malaya

From two Japanese diplomatic dispatches of October 20, 1941, from Bangkok to Tokyo, it was learned that the Japanese were planning to use Indian troops in their Malayan operations. A special report concerning their use was being forwarded by plane to Tokyo, where it was suggested, that since the report was in the Punjab language and in un-revised form, that it be

1264 IV, 1105.
1265 Ibid.
1266 IV, 1106.
1267 IV, 1107.
1268 IV, 1108.
1269 IV, 1109.
revised by officials who were familiar with this language. The Bangkok originator suggested that the number of Indians be increased since, unfortunately, the Thaiese authorities had interned some of them, and that the Indians be allowed to infiltrate into all parts of Malay to begin activities among the Indian troops there, or to maintain liaison between the disturbance units and the Japanese Army.\textsuperscript{1270}

545. Foreign Minister Togo Proposes Set-Up of Short Wave Radio in Bangkok

At the suggestion of Vice-consul Hachiya, Foreign Minister Togo proposed on October 21 that a short wave radio set be installed at Bangkok. If this plan were feasible the receiving set would be used to pick up Japanese broadcasts for rebroadcasting. Foreign Minister Togo inquired if such a set could be procured in Bangkok.\textsuperscript{1271}

The answer, was apparently made in the negative since the Foreign Minister decided on October 22 to send a forty or fifty kilocycle apparatus with a remodelled pole screen to the Thaiese capital.\textsuperscript{1272}

In addition the Chief of the Wireless Section in Tokyo was transmitting a list of prices of parts used in the transmitter for the information of Chief Kojima.\textsuperscript{1273}

546. Ambassador Tsubokami Asks Permission to Remain at Post Because of Difficult Situation

On October 22, 1941, Ambassador Tsubokami wired that he would like to postpone his return to Japan, which was planned for the end of October, because of prevailing conditions in Thailand. He asked that his successor be chosen carefully since greater secrecy would be necessary in dealing with Thaiese authorities at this particular time.\textsuperscript{1274} In explaining the difficult situation then existing in the country to which he was accredited, the Japanese Ambassador said that the pro-English faction was creating the impression that Thailand eventually would become "a storm center". Uncertainty and doubt arose in the minds of the Thaiese by the treatment of the Japanese-American conversations and developments in the German-Russian war. In a talk with Prime Minister Pibul, Ambassador Tsubokami had discussed the basic policies of the new Japanese Cabinet. He assured him that there would be no change whatsoever in Japan's observance of Thaiese territorial integrity, sovereignty and policy of neutrality.

When the Japanese Ambassador had mentioned, however, that rumors of England's guarantee of Thaiese neutrality would have an unfavorable influence on the good relations between Japan and Thailand, Prime Minister Pibul had declared that such rumors were definitely without basis.\textsuperscript{1275} Thailand, the Prime Minister said, was assuring the continuance of its neutrality by the Amity Pact with Japan and the non-aggression agreement with Great Britain. Pointing out that the people of his country would not forget the preferential position taken by Japan recently in the Thaiese-Indo-China dispute, Prime Minister Pibul assured Mr. Tsubokami that the people of Asia greatly appreciated the difficult fight Japan was making as a leader in East Asia. Thailand greatly desired that Japan would secure a foothold not only in the Pacific but in the whole world.\textsuperscript{1276}

547. Tokyo Adds Army Man to Bangkok Legation Staff

Under the alias of "Taro Ishii", an army man, Major Kubo, would be attached to the Bangkok Embassy as Secretary, Foreign Minister Togo informed Ambassador Tsubokami on

\textsuperscript{1270} IV, 1110-1111.
\textsuperscript{1271} IV, 1112.
\textsuperscript{1272} IV, 1113.
\textsuperscript{1273} IV, 1114.
\textsuperscript{1274} IV, 1115.
\textsuperscript{1275} III, 1116, 1117.
\textsuperscript{1276} III, 1117.

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October 24, 1941. Due to conditions in Thailand, it was thought best to have this military man undertake his duties under an assumed name. Major Kubo was scheduled to leave the homeland by plane on November 2, 1941.\textsuperscript{1277}

As a result of a cable from the army in French Indo-China and from Counsel Yamaguti, Engineer Otowa of the Communication Department in Bangkok was being sent to French Indo-China for two weeks.\textsuperscript{1278}

548. Japanese Plan Establishment of Air Wireless Section

In order to aid in their air operations, the Japanese officials in Bangkok were making plans for the establishment of a special air wireless section, the first of which was to be stationed at Saigon. Much of their information had been gained from the reading of the British Navy air wireless at the army and navy attaché offices at Bangkok, where they had learned the British wireless communications system as well as the disposition and movements of their air units.\textsuperscript{1279}

549. British Cabinet Member Submits Proposals to Thailand

Ambassador Tsubokami on October 25, 1941, also reported that Sir Alfred Cooper, referred to as Duff-Cooper, Minister of Information in the British Cabinet, had stopped at Bangkok en route to Manila at which time he talked with Prime Minister Pibul. During the discussion the British Cabinet Member had proposed (1) The abandonment of a pro-Japanese policy, (2) That Thailand be made a free market and, (3) The acceptance of British guarantees for Thailand safety. When Japanese officials had investigated this matter, Nai Wanitto had insisted that rumors of such proposals were entirely false and other investigations seemed to substantiate his denials, Ambassador Tsubokami declared.\textsuperscript{1280}

According to impressions gained from recent public opinion in Bangkok, Japanese officials in that city felt that the Japanese had been placed in a disadvantageous position as a result of their regrettable and undue cowardice in the face of allied maneuvers. Not only was Japan weakened in regard to its leadership of the Siamese and other people of East Asia, but the allied powers were being encouraged to an even greater pitch of arrogance.\textsuperscript{1281}

550. Major Aoyama Reports on Code, Espionage Work

From an intercepted dispatch of October 29, 1941, originated by Major Aoyama, it was learned that although the Naval Attache’s office was studying the British Air Force communications system, especially the air bases and their call signs, the flying units and airplane call signs, the army intelligence office and the Naval Attache’s office were not working on the solving of the British Air Code. Devoting their combined efforts to the collection of intelligence on the Burmese Army, these offices had no personnel to spare for the code work. Major Aoyama felt that Japan should set up immediately a new air wireless espionage agency at Saigon.\textsuperscript{1282}

551. Tokyo Forwards Instructions for Operation of Beacon Radio Set

Meanwhile, the Chief of the Radio Section, in a dispatch to Engineer Hasimoto, said that he would send a book of explanations for the operation of the beacon radio set by the next mail plane. He would also cable wires for receiving transmissions as soon as such wires could be obtained.\textsuperscript{1283}
552. Japan Continues Plans to Establish Navy Controlled Steamship Company

In continuing his secret plans to establish a Japanese-Thaiese steamship company, which would be controlled by the Japanese navy, Foreign Minister Togo declared that Nai Wanitto should have no apparent connections with the company. Instead, his trusted subordinates should be the only Thaiese stockholders. Furthermore, the head of the Yamashita Steamship Company with whom Japan was dealing should be guided along these lines.1284

553. Japanese Ambassador Requests Ten Large Radios for Use in Thailand

By October 30, 1941, Ambassador Tsubokami informed Tokyo that broadcast reception was now possible, but that instruments equipped with metal tubes and loud speakers were still needed. He disclosed that not many people save the Japanese there were interested in receiving broadcasts from Japan, and suggested that private Thaiese citizens be furnished sets for placement in mixed residence quarters. He explained that the broadcasts would be much more effective if loud speakers were used. He requested that the Home Office arrange to purchase ten large radios for use in Thailand.1285

554. Japanese Ambassador Asks for Restriction on Number of Japanese Merchants Entering Thailand

Although Secretary Nishiyama, who would soon return to Japan, would explain the matter more thoroughly to Foreign Minister Togo, Ambassador Tsubokami suggested the limiting or restricting of Japanese merchants who were setting up shops in Thailand. Although the Ambassador could see no reason for having any more shops open, he noted that the number had almost doubled since the beginning of the year. It would be far better to assist those merchants who were already there rather than to continue the policy of sending new ones.1286

555. Rumor Discloses that Britain Asks Exclusion of German Fifth Columnists

In an intelligence report which the Japanese Ambassador sent to Tokyo, Foreign Minister Togo learned that the British government had requested that Thailand refuse permission to Mr. Otto Wendler and Mr. Hoover to enter the country since they were German Fifth Columnists. This information, the dispatch revealed, had been picked up as a rumor.1287

556. Japanese Government Has Difficulty in Securing Export Permit

By October 31, 1941, the Mitsubishi Company at Bangkok had secured for the Japanese government 4,400 tons of iron manufactured goods valued at 1,300,000 bahts. However, difficulty was being experienced in securing an export permit for this supply, and consequently Foreign Minister Togo was asked to use his influence to see that the permit was secured.1288

The information that the Thailand Economic Minister had placed restrictions on the future exportation of rice was the subject of inquiry from Tokyo on October 31, 1941. The Foreign Minister had learned of this limitation through a Domei dispatch from Bangkok on October 30, 1941. If such a report were confirmed, Ambassador Tsubokami was asked to inquire into the reason.1289

1284 IV, 1125.
1285 IV, 1126.
1286 IV, 1127.
1287 IV, 1128.
1288 IV, 1129.
1289 IV, 1130.
557. Japan to Sell Gold to Thailand
Details of a proposal concerning the gold liquidation, which had been decided between Mr. Fukuda of the Specie Bank and representatives of the Thailand Banking Consortium, were sent to Tokyo on November 5, 1941. According to the plan, gold bars would be sold to the Thailand Consortium in liquidate the balance which was outstanding on the November 2, 1941, Thaiese account. The price of gold was to be fixed at thirty-five dollars per fine ounce. Furthermore, it was to be earmarked as the property of the Consortium and kept in safe custody on the Consortium's behalf or on the basis of any subsequent Thai transfer on the Bank of Japan with no charge payable for such custody. It was further agreed in the proposed plan that the Thailand Ambassador in Tokyo should appoint any official of Thai nationality to inspect the gold at any time the Ambassador saw fit. At such time as the Consortium should request transfer of the gold to Bangkok, the Yokohama Specie Bank would undertake the delivery, the cost of transportation, and insurance to be borne by the Japanese Bank.1290

558. Tokyo Attempts to Purchase Thaiese Rice
Attempting to purchase 700,000 tons of Thaiese rice, Ambassador Tsubokami disclosed on November 5, 1941, that it would be impossible to secure outward consent to such a purchase. However, it might be possible for Thailand to give secret consent, with Japan cooperating by making successive small purchases and shipments as rapidly as possible, therefore finally securing the 700,000 tons. Although Nai Wanitto believed that this was the only possible and feasible plan and that it could be accomplished, the Ambassador asked that Consul-General Asada, who was shortly to return to Japan, be consulted. Mr. Tsubokami requested permission to proceed with the purchase of an additional 50,000 tons for the loading month during which 150,000 tons had already been contracted.1291

559. Foreign Minister Plans to Send Money for Purchase of Radio Sets
In answer to Ambassador Tsubokami's request for 2,000 bahts to purchase ten large radio sets, Foreign Minister Togo replied on November 5, 1941, that the money was being remitted. He directed that he be informed as soon as the instruments were procured, since he wished to arrange for an increase in this equipment.1292

560. Thaiese Official Considers Re-exportation of Armaments to British Possessions
In spite of the fact that the Thaiese Economic Minister had been prohibiting re-exporting of material from Thailand, he was considering the granting of permission for the re-exportation on the Sumatra Maru of the freight which included armaments for British possessions. Although the case had been presented to the Premier and his approval was expected, the Thaiese Economic Minister had disclosed to Ambassador Tsubokami that he expected to press him again for a quick decision.1293

561. Two Japanese Officials Receive Ill-Treatment
From Consul-General Isono, by Courier, Ambassador Tsubokami released the information on November 6, 1941, of two cases of Japanese ill-treatment in Rangoon. On November 5, 1941, a special detachment of officers composed of Chinese policemen under British direction had invaded the home of Vice-Consul Homma, seizing his diary and some

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1290 IV, 1131.
1291 IV, 1132.
1292 IV, 1133.
1293 IV, 1134.
Japanese publications. On the same night a number of policemen had broken into the home of Mr. Udaman, Chief Clerk of the Japanese consulate, and had arrested him.1294

Consul Isono also revealed that he suspected that Rangoon officials were tying up code messages from and to his office. Consequently, he was checking as to whether one of his messages had been received.1295

562. Tokyo Informed Concerning British Forces in Malaya

Ambassador Tsubokami, by November 4, 1941, had arrived at a plan of action to convince the governing classes in Thailand of Japan's superiority by propagandizing various points. These would include the facts that the English military force in Burma and Malaya was definitely inferior to the Japanese force; that should both Japan and England send military forces to Siam, the Japanese force would be greatly superior; that allied forces would be isolated from their homelands at the outbreak of the war and their fate would be destruction; that Japan's relations with Russia were progressing favorably; and that the Imperial Army was superior.1296 This dispatch was not translated until March 16, 1945. It was learned, however, by a Japanese intelligence agent in Bangkok that the British Army was rushing plans for the defense of Lashio. It had been reported in Bangkok that the British had been piling up aeroplane gas at each air field around Lashio.1297 Furthermore, in a conference with the attaches of the German and Italian Legations, the Japanese Attache had inquired as to the effectiveness of the British forces in Malaya and Burma. Considering the greatly reinforced strength of the British troops and in view of the superiority of their flying instruments, the attaches believed that should an attack be made on Malaya or Burma, it would be impossible to avoid a pitched battle. In addition, British shipping in these waters was reported to be no small item.1298

563. Foreign Minister Togo Dispatches Official to Shanghai to Speed Plans for Bangkok Drug Dispensary

On November 6, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo informed Shanghai that he was dispatching Mr. Yoshizumi Kuriya of the Tokyo Ooki Drug Store to Shanghai as a special agent. While in that city he was to work out certain details in connection with Japanese plans to open a Chinese Drug dispensary in Bangkok. The Foreign Minister requested that Vice-Consul Iwai participate in the discussion concerning this matter. The plan included the purchasing of such Chinese drugs as he saw fit, after which the supply would be sent immediately as pure Chinese exports to Bangkok. The name of the Bangkok dispensary and its location were listed as John's Dispensary, 128 Wokhumgin Hwasomphone, Bangkok, Thailand.1299

564. Japan Enlarges Bangkok Staff

During the first part of November, 1941, the Legation staff in Bangkok was being enlarged. One official was to be dispatched from Manchuria for the purpose of taking up duties as a formal representative in Thailand.1300

In a message from Bangkok on November 7, 1941, Ambassador Tsubokami asked for the services of Clerk Fujishima, who at that time was serving in the Philippine Islands. In addi-

1294 IV, 1135.
1295 IV, 1136.
1296 IV, 1137.
1297 IV, 1138.
1298 IV, 1139.
1299 IV, 1140.
1300 IV, 1141.

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tion, either Clerk Shinokawa or Clerk Kayahara were to be added to the Embassy at Bangkok. On November 7, 1941, Tokyo inquired whether it would be possible to add Mr. Yokota, Ministry of Communications Secretary, and Engineer Hasimoto as Secretaries to the Embassy; in this way the Foreign Minister said it would be possible to coordinate the various functions under the Foreign Office as had been effected in French Indo-China.

565. Ambassador to Ask Nationals to Secure Rubber, Tin

The Japanese Ambassador in Bangkok was instructed to get in touch with Japanese nationals of that city to direct that the necessary 3,000 kilotons of rubber and 800 kilotons of tin be purchased. Since it was very important that Japan obtain from Thailand and French Indo-China all of the rubber and tin possible, the transactions for these goods would be facilitated by arranging easy payment through the Yokohama Specie Bank or by direct remittances.

566. Japanese Ambassador Establishes Name, Stockholders for Shipping Concern

In connection with the establishment of a Japanese shipping concern in Thailand, the Japanese Ambassador had, by November 10, 1941, been somewhat delayed by the suggestion that Wanitto's subordinates rather than Wanitto himself should be stockholders for Thailand. This suggestion had, according to instructions from Tokyo, been made to Mr. Yamashita who was head of Thai shipping concern. It was further disclosed that the name of the Japanese company had been registered as the Tai Sho Un Company, Ltd. (The Thai Industrial and Commercial Company.)

567. Japanese Officials are Disappointed in Advancement of Proposal to Establish a Commission

A strange situation had arisen according to a wire sent by the Japanese Ambassador to Bangkok, resulting from the proposed establishment of a commission in accordance with Article II of the Tokyo-Bangkok Treaty of Amity. Hearing from Mr. Wanitto that Mr. Derreck wished to discuss such an establishment with him, the Ambassador had sent Minister Futami in his place to the Foreign Office since he had been ill on that day. At the time of the visit Mr. Derreck had not referred to the origin of the committee but had "wandered in his talk". As a result, Minister Futami had broken off the conversation and returned. Upon investigation of these strange proceedings, the Ambassador had learned that Prime Minister Pibul had originated the plan and, accordingly, the Japanese Ambassador had immediately approved it through the military and naval attaches. As to the reason why Mr. Derreck had not referred to this matter during the conversation of November 7, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador said that Derreck feared such a proposal from Thailand might arouse England and consequently considered the time not yet right.

568. Bangkok Papers Print Reports of the Japanese Army Campaign in Burma

In a detailed intelligence report sent from Bangkok to Tokyo on November 10, 1941, rumors concerning the opening of a Japanese army campaign in Burma were reported. Sensational reports were being printed on this subject in Thai, English, and Chinese language newspapers. Furthermore, reports dealing with the failure of the Japanese-American negotiations, the increased tenseness on the part of the United States, the possibility of the European
War spreading into the Pacific, and Japanese activities in French Indo-China were creating considerable uneasiness among the officials as well as the people of Thailand and Chungking. After investigating the causes for this condition created in Thailand, the report cited as causes the stagnation of the Japanese-American negotiations, the anxiety over the wholesale purchase by Japan of Thai ese materials, the American and British policies towards Thailand, and the uncertainty of the Japanese policy toward the Southern Pacific area.

It was pointed out that the feelings of the Thai ese people had changed from friendliness to aloofness and from aloofness to opposition. Since the people had come to believe that a Japanese invasion of Thailand was almost certain, there were those who proclaimed loudly that a Japanese war was inevitable and that the Thai ese should fight to the end against the Japanese invaders. Furthermore, the Autonomy Society had been distributing handbills exposing Japanese plans for invading Thailand, attempting to get the people interested in a plebiscite. This secret society had been sending its members from door to door asking, "Who should Thailand depend on in case it becomes no longer possible to maintain her neutrality?". Quoting as a source of information a Thai ese newspaperman, it was further reported that a secret order had been issued prohibiting the printing of articles and editorials concerning (1) Speculations about the situation in the South Seas, (2) Sounding out the intentions of the new Japanese Cabinet and (3) Commenting on Japanese, British, American and Russian views on Thailand.

Further evidence that the country was gradually getting on a war basis was noted in the issue of secret instructions by government organizations to the effect that Thai ese employees of Japan observed and reported the actions of persons who visited Japanese residents, as well as in the secret order issued by the Chief of Police to reward those who exposed foreign espionage organizations. In addition a bill was being drafted to recruit 100,000 Thai ese volunteers. 1306

569. Disguised Army Experts to Be Sent to Thailand

The information that communications equipment, as well as four army communication experts, would be sent to Thailand as non-career clerks under the Foreign Office, was transmitted to Thailand in an army dispatch of November 11, 1941. The men were scheduled to leave by air on November 13, 1941, and consequently arrangements were being made for their visas. Assigned to Bangkok would be Mr. Kameo Okudara, Communications Clerk Third Grade, and Mr. Hideo Yuki, an army employee, while to Singora was dispatched Mr. Toshio Sukai, Communications Clerk First Grade, and to Chiengmai, Mr. Jitiro Taniguchi, Communications Clerk Second Grade. 1307 When the machinery arrived, 1308 it was to be received as official baggage from the head office to the Embassy and was to be treated as if it had no connection with the Communications Clerks. 1309

570. Intelligence Agents Report Discussion Between Mr. Duff-Cooper and Premier Pibul

In a secret intelligence report sent to Tokyo on November 12, 1941 the discussion between Mr. Duff-Cooper, the British Ambassador to Thailand and Premier Pibul, which took place on October 3, 1941, was reported. At the time of Premier Pibul's secret visit to the airport to see the two Britishers, Mr. Duff-Cooper had advised that Japan was likely to invade Thailand and that Thailand should (1) have nothing to do with Japan, (2) close avenues through which American and other raw materials were sent to Japan, and (3) drive the Japanese out of

1306 IV, 1147.
1307 IV, 1148.
1308 IV, 1149.
1309 IV, 1148.
Thailand. Pibul had replied that he would consider these things and that if his Country were invaded by Japan it would resist vigorously cooperating meanwhile with the British forces. Great Britain, however, should not under any circumstances militarily occupy any Thaiese territory before a Japanese invasion. He assured Mr. Duff-Cooper that he would not in any case be taken in by Japan and advised England not to worry.1310

On this same day the additional intelligence was transmitted that Prime Minister Churchill had boasted in a speech of November 10, 1941, that England was ready to fight Japan. Since there was the possibility that this statement had given Thailand the impression that England was very strong, Ambassador Tsubokami suggested that the Imperial Government answer Mr. Churchill very strongly in order to avoid the danger of Thailand’s turning against Japan. In retaliation Ambassador Tsubokami suggested two alternatives, first, that he tell Thaiese officials that Mr. Churchill’s declaration was merely a pump-priming trick to get an American fleet concentrated at Singapore, since such a statement was obviously to be taken as a confession of England’s impotence in defending her own interest in the Orient; secondly, that he tell Thaiese authorities that cool-headed politicians of third countries were not surprised at such statements as this which merely amounted to nothing.1311

571. Tokyo Sends 3,300 Yen to Purchase Radios

On November 12, 1941, Bangkok officials were advised that 3,300 yen was being remitted for the purchase of ten large radio transmitters to disseminate Japanese propaganda in Thailand.1312

572. Japan Approves Plan to Purchase Rice Unobtrusively in Small Amounts

In answering Tsubokami’s suggestion of November 5, 1941, that Japan contract secretly for 700,000 tons of rice, procuring this amount unobtrusively in small purchases, Foreign Minister Togo advised that this plan had been approved by the department of Agriculture and Forestry. However, in reply to his application for permission to purchase 50,000 tons immediately, the Foreign Minister said that this matter would be dealt with after Japanese Official Shiba had arrived in Bangkok.1313

An impediment in Japanese plans to purchase rubber was seen by Ambassador Tsubokami in his dispatch of November 14, 1941. Reporting that the market was poorly supplied with rubber, the Japanese Ambassador pointed out that foreign companies had been purchasing such vast amounts that Japanese companies had found it hard to keep pace. Because it would be difficult to get even one hundred tons per month, it might become necessary to purchase rubber regardless of price. The Ambassador asked that the guild be fully informed of this situation.1314

573. Japan Will Have Controlling Interest in New Shipping Concern

A brighter picture was seen, however, owing to Japanese plans to establish a shipping concern. Although the stockholders and the directors would not use Japanese personal names, fifty-five percent of the stock would by fixed policy be held by Japanese. The board of directors of seven men would include two Thaiese. For the time being, however, it would be necessary to use ships of neutral registry on a charter basis since Japanese ships could be purchased only after the company became completely established and conditions suitable.1315 In spite of this encouraging report, Foreign Minister Togo declared that as a result of

1310IV, 1150.
1311IV, 1151.
1312IV, 1152.
1313IV, 1153.
1314IV, 1154.
1315IV, 1155.
Thailand’s refusal to permit participation of foreign nationals in jointly-managed enterprises, no action would be taken on this step at the present time.  

574. Japan Fears that Chinese and British Interests Are Buying Rubber

Declaring that it was necessary for Japan to purchase 1600 tons of rubber from Thailand by the middle of December, Foreign Minister Togo, in a wire to Shanghai on November 17, 1941, relayed the information that Chinese and British interests were buying up the rubber so that Japan was experiencing difficulty in procuring the scheduled amount. Consequently, the purchase of the 1400 tons of rubber aboard the Esso which had sailed from Bangkok November 10, 1941, was to be investigated since Japan was also interested in procuring this rubber.  

575. Japan Asks Investigation of Report that Prime Minister Pibul Desires to Resign

On November 17, 1941, the Japanese Foreign Minister requested an investigation concerning the truth of a special message that Prime Minister Pibul desired to resign. The information had been sent to the Yomiuri agency following the announcement by the Thai government on November 16, 1941.  

576. Gold Negotiations Do Not Permit Optimistic Outlook, Ambassador Says

Ambassador Tsubokami admitted on November 18, 1941, in a wire to Tokyo that the negotiations concerning the sale of gold to Thailand did not at that date permit any optimism, and that a policy of procrastination was foreseen by the Thaiese Bank Syndicate’s application for future credit. Furthermore, the attitude of the Thaiese government regarding the question of raising the desired amount of baht remained uncertain. Although, it was understood that the Financial Ministry already had a plan of its own for negotiating the sale of gold, many days would be required for the confirmation. Considering the attitude of the Thaiese government it might become necessary, Ambassador Tsubokami declared, to resort to political means in order to reach a solution of the question and he asked instructions concerning the policy to be followed in such a case.  

577. Tokyo Advises Caution Regarding Operational Plans

Extreme caution in the use of terms which might reveal Japanese operational plans was urged by Tokyo at this time in view of the critical situation. Bangkok officials were asked to take care to ensure perfect secrecy regarding the proposed plans. This Japanese dispatch, however, was not translated until March 16, 1945.  

578. Japanese Return Imperial Portrait to Homeland

On November 20, 1941, arrangements were being made to return the Imperial portrait to Japan for safekeeping. Since Secretary Taniguchi would transport the portrait by airplane, it was asked that someone meet him at the Japanese airport upon his arrival.  

579. Intelligence Report Informs Tokyo of Planned Chinese-Thaiese Cooperation

In a spy report of secondary importance to Tokyo, Foreign Minister Togo learned on November 20, 1941, that Chinese residents had, through a Chinese nationalist leader, proposed to
join hands with Thailand in case war broke out between that country and Japan. It was requested that Thaiese natives be given full instructions and drill. On November 10, 1941, the Cabinet had discussed this letter and on November 11, 1941, the British Minister in Bangkok had interviewed Prime Minister Pibul on this subject. This interview was formally reported to Tokyo at the time of its taking place. 1323

580. Prime Minister Pibul Assures Ambassador that Thailand Desires to Cooperate Despite Difficulties

In a conference with Prime Minister Songram Luang Pibul on the afternoon of November 20, 1941, Ambassador Tsubokami discussed the critical international situation, informing the Prime Minister of his talk with Foreign Minister Togo. During the conversation Prime Minister Pibul declared that Thailand wished to supply, to the extent of its ability, needed commodities to Japan and that, in regard to this question, the Anglo-American position was very unreasonable. Although no proposal for an accord had been received from the British, it was possible that Great Britain would freeze Thailand’s funds amounting to 160,000,000 baths in England, and forbid the exporting of oil and hemp bags.

It was Mr. Pibul’s belief that the British authorities in the Far East wished to bring the Thaiese region into the conflict in order to retain the “status quo”. It was, however, the Prime Minister’s earnest desire that Japan should remain powerful until the end, and that after the war the Imperial government should occupy a position of power in the world. 1324

The Japanese Ambassador had explained that America was unreasonably opposing Japanese demands and that there appeared to be no way to effect a solution. Not only would the aftermath of the international holocaust engulf Thailand, but it might endanger the establishment of the New Order in East Asia and the emancipation of the Asiatic peoples. 1325

581. Japan Learns of Alleged British Proposal to Supply Thailand with Arms

Ambassador Tsubokami also reported that a British Minister had called on Prime Minister Pibul on November 18, 1941, according to a spy report. During this visit the British Minister had observed that on October 27, 1941, Great Britain had proposed a secret treaty with Thailand, promising to supply Thailand with arms; and that on November 17, 1941, he had received instructions from London that his country was now ready to furnish those arms.

582. British Minister Points to Thailand’s Danger

According to the spy report the British Minister had observed that Great Britain was sorry for the mistakes she had made concerning Thailand in the past and had volunteered the information that there were a great many Japanese Fifth Columnists in Thailand at this time. Moreover, it was possible for Japan to now carry out her well-laid plans for an invasion of the Southern Pacific. Before this should happen, Thailand should join with England, the United States, the Netherlands Indies and China in a defense camp. In this way Japan could be weakened by a war of nerves. To this proposal, Prime Minister Pibul had replied that Thailand had never yet been invaded by the Japanese army, and at the present time was sticking to strict neutrality. To the British Minister’s interpolation that the Japanese could possibly attack Burma and pass through Thailand, Pibul had answered that the British forces could undertake the same action. If the Japanese forces did not pass through Thailand they would have to give an account to the Axis “for having danced to England’s fiddle”. 1326

1323 IV, 1163, 1150.
1324 IV, 1164.
1325 IV, 1165.
1326 IV, 1166.
583. Japan to Receive Less Rubber Due to Production Decrease
To prepare Japan to expect less rubber than was previously requested from Thailand, Ambassador Tsubokami notified the Home Office on November 22, 1941, that the actual shipment of rubber from the plantations would be fifty per cent less than ordinary years. From the beginning of 1941 until October, of the total 38,000 tons of rubber exported, 21,400 had gone to Japan, 7,300 had been sent to Shanghai, 1,200 to Manchukuo, 7,600 to the Malay States. He pointed out that the amount of rubber shipped to Japan in the future would not be equal to its requirements.1327

584. Supplies for Japanese Owned Drug Dispensary are Sent from Shanghai
On November 22, 1941, Shanghai wired the information that the drugs for the Chinese drug dispensary in Bangkok were being dispatched from Shanghai on the Toa Kaiun during the latter part of November. Details of the transfer were to be communicated by Mr. Awaya who was returning from Tokyo on the Kobe Maru on November 21.1328

585. Ambassador Tsubokami Requests Assistance for Five Newspapermen
Ambassador Tsubokami in a dispatch on November 22, 1941, requested that the five men sent by the Nichi Nichi newspaper be assisted to procure visas while they were in French-Indo China. These men were listed as Koichi Yanashita, Hiroshi Nakano, Hideo Ishibashi, Takashichi Saruwatari, and Ryosuke Taniguchi.1329

586. Thailand Consortium Makes Written Proposal Regarding Liquidation of Japanese Gold
Ambassador Tsubokami reported on November 21, 1941, that, although no concrete proposal had been advanced by the Consortium regarding the purchase of gold, they had made a written proposal to the Yokohama Specie Bank on November 19. According to the understanding of August 2, 1941, the Thaiise requested a shipment of gold equivalent to 10,000,000 bahts, 500,000 bahts of which was to be sent by air. Although Mr. Fukuda had delayed by saying that the matter would have to be referred to the Head Office, Ambassador Tsubokami advised that Japan ship the amount requested, and suggested that negotiations regarding the purchase of gold be begun.1330

According to the price of gold previously set in the agreement between Thailand bank authorities and the Yokohama Specie Bank, the price of gold upon its delivery to Bangkok would amount to 10 baht, (80 satan). However, now at the time of delivery in Bangkok the price appeared to be 11 baht. Since Japan assumed the cost of the delivery of the gold to Thailand, Foreign Minister Togo directed that Ambassador Tsubokami settle the price at 10 baht, 80 satan.1331

Foreign Minister Togo wired on November 24, 1941, that Japan would send 10,000,000 bahts by boat since it was not convenient to transport this amount by air. He asked that Ambassador Tsubokami arrange for a suitable boat.1332

587. Foreign Minister Togo Sends Secret Fund to Bangkok Foreign Office
On November 24, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo wired that he was sending 60,000 baht to the Bangkok Foreign Office to be kept in cash in a special secret fund. This fund was to be spent later as would be directed.1333
588. Bangkok Office Returns Code Machines to Japan

Since Thailand was close enough that the code machines could be transferred to Japan in comparative safety, rather than destroying them, Ambassador Tsubokami reported on November 24, 1941, that two obsolete code machines would be en route to Japan in care of the Captain of the Batavia Maru which would leave port on December 1, 1941. He asked that arrangements be made so that it would not be inspected when passing through customs.1334

589. Ambassador Tsubokami Believes that Thailand Should be Led to Cooperate Voluntarily

Ambassador Tsubokami on November 25, 1941, pointed out that should the Empire take decisive action in a southward advance, it would be necessary to bring Thailand into the Japanese camp, considering the necessity of a belligerent's rights to make clear the relations between sovereign and subjects. He also stated that Thailand should be led voluntarily to take an attitude of cooperation. In the event of an attack upon Burma and Malaya there would be a necessity of temporary infringement upon the territorial sovereignty of Thailand. After Japan's objectives had been attained, however, restoration would be made and the independence of Thailand would be respected. Should Thailand cooperate in a positive way with Japan, Thailand would be given full assurance that its swamp lands could be reclaimed in the areas concerned. Should Thailand's assets in England be frozen resulting in the fluctuation of the value of the country's money, Japan would make available sufficient funds to create a "bloc" money system, and should also prepare to provide petroleum and other essential commodities. The Ambassador re- emphasized his points by saying that Thailand's sovereignty must not be impaired beyond the limits of necessity; that its standing as a nation should be maintained to the very last with military discipline to reassure the Thaiese populace; and that strict control should be exercised over any attempts at profiteering.1335

590. New Pro-Japanese Party Advocates Collaboration with Japan

Inner circles of the Thailand government were taking a serious view regarding Thailand's foreign diplomatic policy toward the international situation. It was declared that the new pro-Japanese party felt that one means of maintaining its government's independence was closer collaboration between Thailand and Japan. Concrete plans had been reportedly laid on November 23, 1941, when a secret meeting was held between Pibul, Tumaron, Min, Purrijitto and Pananow Nai Wanitto.1336

591. Prime Minister Pibul, Defense Minister Puromu Differ Concerning Thailand's Policy

A retransmission to Berlin on November 25, 1941, of a dispatch from Bangkok to Tokyo explained the feeling existing between Prime Minister Pibul and National Defense Minister Puromu over questions of policy and Nai Wanitto. While Mr. Pibul believed that the Thaiese policy should be one of strict neutrality, Mr. Puromu, on the other hand, believed that Thailand would be safer by definitely tying in with one side, thereby eliminating the possibility of being attacked by either side. When Prime Minister Pibul had questioned which side he would join, Minister Puromu had replied that they must wait and see which side won out in the Russo-German war.1337
592. Ambassador Requests Funds for Machinations

Referring to a previous dispatch in which 6,900 yen had been requested for a machinations fund, Ambassador Tsubokami on November 25, 1941, again asked that this amount be transmitted to him immediately.1338

593. Ambassador Recommends that Crew of Fishing Vessel Escape to the Saigon District

On November 25, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador in Bangkok referred to a plan in which a fishing vessel belonging to Nagafuku of Singapore figured largely. It appeared that it was impossible for the vessel and the crew to make a getaway as first planned and that arrangements would have to be made for half of the crew to escape to the Saigon district. After considering this action and discussing it with Secretary Tahir, if the Foreign Minister thought this plan proper, he was asked to issue orders to this effect.1339

594. Japan Agrees to 25,000,000 Baht Exchange of Gold

Recommending on November 25, 1941, that the negotiations then underway be adjourned, Foreign Minister Togo declared that the Finance Ministry had agreed to the gold purchase totalling 25,000,000 bahts. Furthermore, judging from the volume of goods Japan had received from Thailand on indent purchase, he informed Ambassador Tsubokami that it would be necessary to have the equivalent bahts available in Japan for many months yet.1340

Referring to Tokyo's question effecting the exchange of gold at 10 bahts, 80 satan, Ambassador Tsubokami in a dispatch on November 26, 1941 wired Tokyo concerning the difficulties involved in the exchange. Because of the present problems he suggested that Japan should resort to a political solution and that actual settlement of the question should be effected by February, 1942, when the credit agreement between the two countries should expire.1341

595. Japan Discovers Discrimination in Thai Censorship

In his attempt to discover the basis on which Thailand conducted its censorship, the Ambassador to Thailand also explained that letters passed between Japan and Thailand frequently appeared to be censored, but letters passing through the country seemed to be untouched. Since documents between the Foreign Minister and the Japanese Embassy in Thailand did not go through the post office, these were not censored.1342

596. Ambassador Advises That Railway be Completed Quickly

The suggestion that the Siamese railway be completed by Japan as quickly as possible was sent to Japan on November 26, 1941, by the Ambassador in Bangkok. Moreover, he requested that Japanese companies and responsible authorities in Siam get in touch with his office before handling foreign trade.1343

597. Foreign Minister Togo Asks that Additional Rubber be Secured

In a dispatch designed, primarily, to list the schedules of the Japanese Marus carrying rubber from Thailand to Japan, Foreign Minister Togo commented on Ambassador Tsubokami's wire concerning the general total of imports amounting to 38,000 tons. In his opinion it was still possible to procure 10,000 tons of rubber and he requested that the Ambassador spur Japanese merchants to complete the arrangements for the rubber.1344

1338 IV, 1178.
1339 IV, 1179.
1340 IV, 1180.
1341 IV, 1181.
1342 IV, 1182.
1343 IV, 1183.
1344 IV, 1184.
598. Japan Plans to Investigate Raw Opium Market

The Foreign Minister requested that an investigation regarding the supply and demand of raw opium in Thailand be conducted. He asked that the amount consumed, the amount produced, the imports and the price at which the Purchasing Bureau obtained raw opium and the price at which it retailed be listed. 1345

599. Consul General Asada Carries Important Papers to Thailand

Foreign Minister Togo declared on November 27, 1941, that Consul General Asada, returning to Japan, was carrying papers regarding the secret negotiations with Prime Minister Pibul. The Foreign Minister directed that the Ambassador should consult Consul General Shunsuke Asada in any matter pertaining to Thailand. 1346

600. High Ranking Official Says Thailand Friendly to Japanese Army

The pertinent remarks of a high ranking Thai official which were learned through the associate editor of the Bangkok Times, Mr. Ado, via a Japanese secret agent, were reported to Tokyo on November 27, 1941. According to the high ranking official the Thailand government sympathized with the aims of the Japanese army and declared that the recent strict observances of neutrality were merely gestures toward Great Britain and America. The official stated, moreover, that should the Japanese army invade Thailand that country was not prepared to repel the invasion and that if it were tactfully carried out the people would probably settle down peacefully in three or four months feeling safe. 1347

In spite of this report, however, Japanese officials in the Thai capital reported on November 28, 1941, that Thailand had begun to draft men, although the conscription was not heavy. As an example, it was found that of the 232 persons working for nine Japanese companies, seven had been drafted. 1348

601. Agreement Stipulates Continuance of Gold Exchange to March, 1942

The Japanese Ambassador wired Tokyo that a conference had been held between Mr. Yoichi Fukuda of the Yokohama Specie Bank and Minister Kohei Futami, Uychiyama, the Finance Ministry Advisers, and Prince Aitsu concerning the transfer of 25,000,000 bahts. Declaring that Japan wished to continue the exchange of gold until the end of March, 1942, Mr. Fukuda had obtained a promise that the Finance Minister would take up this case at a Cabinet meeting on December 3, 1941. It was hoped that the Finance Minister would eventually request the transfer of American dollars only, with Thai funds being held in reserve. 1349

602. Ambassador Requests Additional Secret Fund

On November 28, 1941, Ambassador Tsubokami requested 100,000 yen for the purpose of carrying on intelligence and enlightenment propaganda in the eventuality that remittances from Japan might cease. Since it had been decided to enlarge upon and carry out a propaganda policy which had been previously decided, the Ambassador stated that he would send the written plan to Tokyo at a later time. 1350
603. Ambassador Tsubokami Explains Objectives of Prime Minister Pibul's Speech

In regard to Prime Minister Pibul's broadcast to his people on November 27, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador declared that the speech had been made to lay the groundwork for a diplomatic about face and to warn those who were influenced by British propaganda. During a talk with Minister Futami, Mr. Pibul had been particular to refer to this point.1351

During the discussion Pibul revealed that British propaganda had been fluctuating and that not a few Thais had been in the employment of Great Britain. He had told Minister Futami that in his talk to be given later in the day he would declare that it was Thailand's policy to stick to neutrality and would advise them not to be taken in by propaganda from foreign sources. Minister Futami replied that should Japanese forces in French Indo-China be forced to embark on a local course of action, he would like the Prime Minister to realize that such action would not in itself be aimed at Thailand. He promised that any military action would be in behalf of Pibul's country and he asked for his cooperation. The Prime Minister then revealed that because of the insecurity of his own position, he had not dared to inform the Thais of his hopes that Japan would occupy French Indo-China, considering Thailand's policy of neutrality. Should the country be threatened by some Japanese action supported by the Prime Minister, Mr. Pibul would be cut off, "isolated, a lone man".1352

604. Ambassador Tsubokami Suggests that Thailand be Persuaded to Cooperate

Discussing the present situation in Thailand and laying the groundwork whereby Thailand could be justifiably invaded by the Japanese army, Ambassador Tsubokami sent a dispatch to Tokyo on November 29, 1941. From the standpoint of face-saving and also for material reasons, it would be better if Thailand should abandon her neutrality policy by formally requesting cooperative action "from the nation concerned" rather than by being compelled to consent to considerations by pressure brought to bear.

This had been suggested to Mr. Luang Sindhu, Minister of Education, and Mr. Wanitto in a conference with Naval Attache Yoshika at which time Mr. Luang Sindhu had volunteered to handle the matter and to put forth every effort for its realization. Through these two Thais the Japanese had learned that discussions in the Cabinet concerned the real intentions of Japan or the real meaning of the East Asia co-prosperity plan, the influence of the Japanese southward expansion policy, the extent of commodity supplying, and the duration of time of stationing troops. Led by Nai Wanitto the pro-Japanese group in the Cabinet in advocating the establishing of a union between Japan and Thailand had been having better success with the result that their position had become more favorable. Although the matter was as yet unconcluded, the opposition since about November 25, 1941, had kept silent.1353

605. Thais Still Vote for Neutrality

In spite of the discussion of joint military action by the pro-Japanese faction, Thailand still desired to maintain strict neutrality and Ambassador Tsubokami explained that the Nation which made the first move would be regarded as Thai's enemy. Considering this, the Japanese Ambassador suggested that Britain be forced to aggression, with Japan assuming the position of Thai's helper. To effect this, Japan should land her troops near the British territory of Kotaparu, forcing Britain to invade Thailand from Patanbessa. This would result in Thailand's declaring war on Great Britain.1354

However, should Japan use the method of presenting an ultimatum to Thailand, it might be difficult to limit the conflict, officials in Bangkok wired on December 3, 1941. Details

1351 IV, 1191.
1352 IV, 1192.
1353 IV, 1193.
1354 IV, 1194.
concerning this subject were to be reported to the Vice-Chief of the General staff through Staff Officer Yahara.1355

606. Officials Originate Plan To Force Mr. Pibul to Declare His Position
Reportedly concerned over Prime Minister Pibul's "weak character" were Mr. Luang Sindhu and Mr. Wanitto who suggested a plan whereby Mr. Pibul would be forced to declare his position. One method would be for Japan to remove forcibly some undesirable Japanese from Thailand, subsequently publicizing this as the forerunner of a general evacuation of Japanese nationals. Such action would speed favorable developments, the Ambassador said.1356

607. Ambassador Sends List of Codes to be Destroyed
On November 30, 1941, Ambassador Tsubokami transmitted a list of the codes which the Bangkok office planned to destroy, requesting that any objections be sent by return wire.1357

608. Japanese Ambassador Suggests Counter Propaganda Tactics
To counter British propaganda, the Japanese Ambassador suggested that Japan have published in English and Thaiese newspapers editorials stressing that the colored races in Australia and North America were suppressed, that Japan's objective was not Thailand, and that small nations had been victimized by British propaganda and schemes in the war between Germany and Britain.1358

609. Foreign Minister Togo Remits Funds for Propaganda Purposes
The ¥100,000 earlier requested by Bangkok for propaganda purposes had been sent, Foreign Minister Togo advised Ambassador Tsubokami on December 1, 1941.1359

610. Japanese Officials Set Up Secret Wireless Communication Facilities
In the event that communications between Bangkok and Tokyo were cut off, secret wireless communication facilities had been set up between Bangkok and the Domei Press Office in Saigon.1360 Moreover, to meet any emergency situation, Japanese officials in Bangkok were concerned with arranging the Thaiese currency problem, and requested, on December 3, 1941, that a suitable person be appointed to the Embassy staff for this purpose, and sent as soon as possible.1361

In view of the urgency of concealing Japanese plans, it was deemed inadvisable by the Vice-Chief of the Japanese General Staff to withdraw Japanese fishing boats from Singapore. For the time being, then, it was decided that this action should not be taken.1362

611. Nai Wanitto Believes Thailand Will Cooperate with Japan in Two or Three Days
During a three-hour Cabinet speech, Prime Minister Pibul had declared that "The time had come when Thailand must cast its fate with that of Japan," Ambassador Tsubokami reported

1355 IV, 1195.
1356 IV, 1194.
1357 IV, 1196.
1358 IV, 1197.
1359 IV, 1198.
1360 IV, 1199.
1361 IV, 1200.
1362 IV, 1201.
on December 4, 1941. This had been approved by a standing vote by Mr. Luang Sindhu, Mr. Boriban, Vice-Commander Rwankurien, Minister of Defense Ruansweri and the Chief of the General Staff Ruanbititto Songhram. Mr. Wanitto believed that Thailand would switch over to Japan within the next two or three days.\textsuperscript{1363}

In spite of this belief, however, it was also reported on December 4 that the Siamese government had sent two men to talk with the Commanding Officer of the British Far Eastern Army at Singapore. These men were to observe the condition of the British forces and to deal with the matter of purchasing material.\textsuperscript{1364}

612. Thailand Sends Official Reply to Financial Proposal

On December 4, 1941, the terms of the memorandum regarding the financial negotiations between Thailand and Japan were wired to Tokyo to be regarded as the official reply of Thailand. It had been handed to Minister Futami on December 4, 1941, and stipulated that the Yokohama Specie Bank would transfer 25,000,000 baht in gold to the Treasury Department.\textsuperscript{1365}

613. Propaganda to be Disseminated in Thailand is Sent to Japan

In accordance with his previously advocated policy of disseminating propaganda, Ambassador Tsubokami forwarded communications to Japan which, if broadcast in English and Thaiese, could be heard by the Thaiese populace. The propaganda had been originally written by the Japanese special correspondent in Bangkok.\textsuperscript{1366}

614. British and American Residents Evacuate Bangkok

Meanwhile, on December 5, 1941, the Ambassador informed Tokyo that British and American residents were beginning to evacuate Bangkok but that the number going to British Malaya was not large. He reported that many were going to the vicinity of Hoanin and South Thailand. Moreover, he informed Tokyo that a conference of delegates reporting the evacuation had been held at the British Legation on December 3, 1941\textsuperscript{1367}

It had been learned that approximately thirty Americans living in Chiangmai, Lampang, Prae and other cities in that vicinity had met at a hospital in Chiangmai on November 30 to discuss the matter of their evacuation. The result of their discussion was not included in the dispatch transmitted from Bangkok to Tokyo on December 2, 1941.\textsuperscript{1368}

615. Ambassador Informs Tokyo of Schedule of Batavia Maru

On December 6, 1941, the Ambassador transmitted the schedule of the \textit{Batavia Maru} as well as cargo which it would carry to Osaka. Scheduled to sail on December 5, 1941, it would touch port at Saigon and Keelung.\textsuperscript{1369}

616. Japan to Issue Proclamation on December 8, 1941

Tokyo informed Ambassador Tsubokami that December 8, 1941 would be the declaration or proclamation day as had been decided by the liaison conference of December 6, 1941. A receipt was to be sent immediately from Bangkok as soon as this dispatch had been received.\textsuperscript{1370}

\textsuperscript{1363} IV, 1202.
\textsuperscript{1364} IV, 1203.
\textsuperscript{1365} IV, 1204.
\textsuperscript{1366} IV, 1205.
\textsuperscript{1367} IV, 1206.
\textsuperscript{1368} IV, 1207.
\textsuperscript{1369} IV, 1208.
\textsuperscript{1370} IV, 1209.
617. Invasion of Thailand to be Announced by Separate Wire

In a message which was badly garbled in transmission from Tokyo to Bangkok on December 7, 1941, it was learned that Japan would announce its invasion of Thailand by separate wire as soon as the Imperial government's decision became clear. Ambassador Tsubokami was instructed to arrange to defeat Britain's plots by choosing the most appropriate statement in the announcement as the Embassy's statement. He was urged to exercise every precaution to insure that the Imperial forces' objectives would not be exposed in making these announcements.1371

618. Foreign Office Provides Ambassador with Varying Explanations in Case Occupation is Peaceful or by Force

According to separate message "A", which was to be applicable should the occupation be accomplished peacefully, it was pointed out that the relations between Thailand and Japan had reached the highest point of their friendship and that the two countries together would strive toward the stabilization of the Far East and towards the creation of a co-prosperity sphere. The Ambassador could use any of the following phrases; Japan and Thailand had reached an agreement on the joint defense of Thailand or had reached an agreement of a certain kind of alliance; or Thailand had agreed to join the Tripartite Pact; or Thailand agreed to permit the passage of Japanese troops through Thailand.1372

In the event of a forceful occupation, it was to be explained that for some time past the British had been massing large numbers of troops on the Malayan and Burmese borders under the pretense of defense. Since these British troops had attacked Thailand, the Imperial government had begun to occupy Thailand as an emergency defense measure. It was to be pointed out that Japan had absolutely no intention of conducting an invasion or of interfering with Thailand's independence and that full cooperation was expected from the officials and people of Thailand.1373

619. Thailand Gives Right of Passage Through Territory to Japanese Army

An agreement signed by the Japanese Ambassador and the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs was sent to Tokyo on December 8, 1941. As representatives of their respective governments they agreed that Thailand should give to Japan the right of passage through Thai territory, extending all necessary facilities for the said passage of Japanese forces and to take every measure to avoid conflict between the Japanese and Thai forces. The particulars for the execution of the agreement should be determined between the military authorities of the two countries. Japan by this agreement guaranteed that the independence, sovereignty and honor of Thailand would be respected.1374

620. Tokyo Announces Armies' Advance and Occupation of Bataan Island

In a war situation report on December 9, 1941, the Vice-Chief of the General Staff announced that as of December 8 Japanese units had landed in Thailand, Malaya, and Kota Bahru (on the east coast of Malaya) and were making progress in setting up their bases in preparation for further advancement.

One transport had been lost, as well as eleven unidentified units and several fighter planes. Japanese units had succeeded in damaging forty-four and shooting down fifteen allied planes. He announced that Thailand had been invaded at 1230 (I zone time) on December 8 and that the units which had landed south of Bangkok were advancing toward the city.

Japanese units had also occupied Bataan Island north of the Philippines, and the army had been bombing northern Luzon, while the navy had been bombing the central and southern part of the Island.1375

1371 IV, 1210.
1372 IV, 1211.
1373 IV, 1212.
1374 IV, 1213.
1375 IV, 1214.