This paper and the attached chronology summarize defense reform and changes in the Navy’s roles and authorities from 1798 through early 2012. The chronology places defense and Navy organizational and institutional reform in the context of major historical challenges to the service and the nation. By necessity, it includes an examination of the Chief of Naval Operation’s (CNO) advisory role and the relationship between the Navy and the Department of Defense after 1947.

The chronology, which is not meant to be definitive, captures nearly 200 defense and Navy reform-related events since 1798. When possible, the authors have provided on-line references to encourage further investigation into detailed aspects of defense and Navy reform.

The chronology suggests that after the significant reform effort that culminated with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433) (hereafter referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act), a large number of other legislative remedies were necessary to address the unintended consequences of the original legislation. Often, the problems that exhaustive reform efforts attempted to redress persisted despite the best efforts of Congress, the Navy, and other defense officials.

The chronology also proposes that most calls for reform have been related to one or more of four themes: the degree of civilian control of the military with the advent of new warfighting capabilities; business management, acquisition, efficiency, effectiveness, and cost savings;
improving unity of effort (a.k.a., joint operations); or significant shifts in national policy and strategy as a result of changing international circumstances.

Defense reform must also be seen as part of contemporary reform efforts that followed what Professor of Public Service Paul C. Light has characterized as “broad patterns in the tides of reform.” Light has argued that these tides “reflect deep shifts in the market for administrative reform that are rooted in changing public attitudes, rising congressional involvement in administrative reform, and declining presidential engagement in either generating legislative initiatives or resisting Congress.”

The first tide was the pursuit of scientific management, which dominated administrative reform from the 1930s to the 1960s, and for the Navy played out even earlier, at the turn of the 20th century; the second was the “war on waste” in the 1970s; the third focused on “openness,” which had a prominent role during the administration of President Richard M. Nixon (January 1969–August 1974); and the fourth was the “liberation of management” movement of the 1980s and 1990s.

Recent reform efforts have reflected a combination of many of these “tides,” especially as the pace of reform has increased. Both the Navy’s early efforts at reform and, later, defense reform in general can be seen as part of these broader themes in government reform, especially when the governmental apparatus comes under political pressure to perform multiple tasks in a


complex environment. For this reason the chronology includes entries that highlight these themes, from the scientific management principles of Frederick Winslow Taylor to the more modern efforts by David Packard and beyond.

Uniformed service professionals have often been the last to embrace some of the more controversial reforms, possibly in part to defend against what they may view as interference by misinformed civilian authority. Uniformed Navy leaders have been especially creative in their efforts to side-step some of the more extensive reform efforts by either resisting change or, more subtly, compelling concessions. This intractability may well be the result of the axiom that the Navy, among all the services, maintains a unique responsibility for the maritime commons. “The Navy . . . was always wary of placing naval forces under the command of Army or Air Force generals,” wrote Peter Swartz of the Center for Naval Analysis. “The Navy believed that the optimum use of these forces was only possible when their commanders were themselves naval officers, trained and experienced in the exercise of sea power. They saw the assignment of naval ships and aircraft to CINCs [commanders-in-chief, now combatant commanders] from other services as a recipe for misuse.”

Despite such parochialism, Navy leaders have not approached policy and strategy formulation in a vacuum. The Navy operates in a dynamic environment that includes a variety of other organizations, institutions, and individuals that have critical roles to play in policy and defense reform. Though the discourse is typically professional, the CNO has often found himself in disagreements or, at the most extreme, at public loggerheads with a variety of other organizations and institutions that have included the material design bureaus (abolished in 1966),

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the fleet, the Marine Corps, combatant commanders, other service chiefs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman, members of the Joint Staff, the Secretary of the Navy, his own staff, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Much of the friction has been the result of efforts to enhance civilian oversight of the services, often at the expense of the service chiefs. Internal Navy staff organizational changes have often reflected the CNO’s efforts to avoid or manage centralization (at either the Navy secretariat or Department of Defense levels) and maintain uniformed Navy oversight of and influence over complex and politically charged issues.

Since 1915 many of these disagreements have concerned the CNO’s role and authority in operations, developing and executing budgets, establishing priorities (e.g., current operations vs. future capabilities), recruiting and training personnel (e.g., having the right number of civilians and Sailors with the right skills), and the Navy’s role as a component of national policy and security strategy.

The supposition both within Congress and in some sections of the public and defense community has been that inadequate civilian supervision and control have been the root cause of the myriad problems encountered with the defense establishment. Congress, of course, is a civilian authority, but since 1947 it has almost systematically abrogated much of its oversight responsibility to the Department of Defense. The debate has now become more about what civilians—those in OSD or the service secretariats—will assert control over the uniformed military, especially in the area of weapons development and acquisition.

The centralization of civilian authority within both the Navy secretariat and the OSD has been one of the most politically sensitive and divisive issues that the CNO has had to address. Few active duty military officers are willing to publically state that there has been too much
civilian control of the military. Yet, the individuals involved with the complexities of defense organizational and institutional reform, both political and administrative, have sparred over what constitutes adequate and appropriate authority for effective administration. “Authority commensurate with responsibility is universally recognized as a basic requirement of sound administration,” wrote retired Rear Admiral Julius A. Furer, but agreement among the disparate groups involved has been difficult to achieve. As a result, defense reform has been, for the most part, incremental. Some officers have found such centralization efforts, especially when they perceive that the uniformed naval professionals are sacrificing responsibility to civilian or joint authority, anathema to a well-run and effective Navy.

The first major Navy administrative reform meant to create a more effective, modern management system came in August 1842 when Congress created a system of bureaus responsible for the material needs of the Navy. However, it was after the 1898 Spanish-American War that circumstances demanded the Navy address the need for a modern fleet capable of worldwide deployment with an eye toward blockading and conducting fleet actions against a peer competitor. Such modernization required an end to officer promotion by seniority, the amalgamation of line and engineering officers, centralized planning, systematic training, improvements in engineering and gunnery, an investment in research and development, and the ability to mobilize in the event of war.

By statute, the individual responsible for these efforts was the Secretary of the Navy. However, one man with a small cadre of assistants found these responsibilities impossible to

5 Julius A. Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington, DC: Naval History Division, 1959), 7–8. The text can also be found at http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/Admin-Hist/USN-Admin/index.html.
effectively or efficiently address. The increased demands required the secretary to have help, and this came initially from a series of *ad hoc* boards and committees, a system of aids, the material bureaus, and eventually the General Board of the Navy.

Yet, with the exception of the General Board, these efforts proved to have been inadequate to the task. On the eve of World War I, Congress created the position of Chief of Naval Operations. The role of the CNO and his staff (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, or OPNAV) in setting policy for the Navy and developing effective strategies for national defense has changed as the power and authority of the CNO varied over time.

At the time of the creation of the CNO and OPNAV, the Secretary of the Navy was the controversial Josephus Daniels (March 1913–March 1921), who believed among other things that ships afloat should serve as schoolhouses. Such social engineering received little public support from the uniformed professionals, even though some likely recognized that a modern Navy, with new, expansive missions, demanded skilled, efficient, and educated Sailors.

Navy reformers and strategists at the time, such as Captain Alfred T. Mahan and Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, along with several Navy secretaries and President Theodore Roosevelt (September 1901–March 1909), rejected the Navy’s limited, pre–Spanish-American War strategy of commerce raiding. In doing so, they also questioned what had been the traditional view that the secretary managed strategy and the fleet while the technical details of sailing and ship design were left to the uniformed professionals.

Instead, Mahan, Luce, and contemporary Navy reformers preferred that the service carry the more robust strategic responsibility of “command of the seas,” which required a capital ship building program that included a battleship fleet to search out and defeat the enemy’s fleet in a dramatic and climactic sea engagement. This vigorous approach to naval strategy demanded new ships and new ideas in naval administration that necessitated (or so the reformers argued) the formation of a general staff to minister to the new Navy’s strategic, operational, and material needs. This staff, according to the uniformed reformers, would necessarily require an increase in the influence and control of the uniformed Navy vis-à-vis the civilian secretariat regarding all aspects of Navy administration.

In the winter of 1915, Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, at the time the aid for operations (a pre-CNO position created by then-Secretary of the Navy George von Lengerke Meyer in 1909) and others approached Congressman Richard P. Hobson (D-AL), a member of the House Naval Affairs Committee and a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, to add language the officers had drafted to the annual appropriation bill calling for the establishment of a uniformed service chief. The recommended language stated:

There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations, who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy not below the grade of Rear Admiral, appointed for a term of four years by the President, by and with the advice of the Senate, who, under the Secretary of the Navy, shall be responsible for the readiness of the Navy for war and be charged with its general direction.

Daniels astutely used a delay during the bill’s consideration to influence the language to ensure that the CNO, by statute, would be “under the direction [emphasis added] of the Secretary,” and denied the CNO authority over the “general direction” of the fleet, which ensured civilian control of the department and avoided a plan that Daniels believed would have led to the “Prussianiz[ation] of the American Navy.”\(^\text{10}\) The law also allowed for captains to be selected for CNO, as opposed to rear admirals or higher in the committee’s draft, so Daniels could circumvent the Navy’s current uniformed leaders, whom he distrusted.\(^\text{11}\) Daniels soon selected Captain William S. Benson as the Navy’s first chief of naval operations.\(^\text{12}\)

In the inter-war period, the Navy’s challenge was how best to use scarce dollars to build a framework for a large Navy that could take the war across the Pacific to Japan, especially given the limitations on naval material development as a result of the Washington and London treaties, both of which dictated specific limitations to warships in terms of total tonnages as well as armaments for certain classes of ships. The Navy’s War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, developed the intellectual foundation for a modern Navy. Throughout this period, the authority of the CNO often fluctuated in part because of the office holder’s personality.

CNO Admiral William V. Pratt (September 1930–June 1933), a man who believed “administration is the thief that steals time,”\(^\text{13}\) recognized the importance of personality and how it influenced the development of the Navy. With this in mind, he maintained that the Navy’s


\(^{11}\) Ibid.

\(^{12}\) For a biography of Benson, see Mary Klachko, with David F. Trask, *Admiral William Shepherd Benson: First Chief of Naval Operations* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987).

uniformed leaders consisted of two types of officers: those who fretted and “meddled constantly with detail, delegated as little as possible, found fault incessantly with those below them, and were able always to pin the cause of failure on some errant subordinate” and “those who picked the best leaders they could to serve them and gave these men the freedom to accomplish what they could.” He also believed that naval officers “fastened everything upon the opinion of the Chief,” which he found to have been “a sort of pass-the-buck system. Its roots lie in fear: fear that someone over you will find fault. Therefore, many men in top positions have spent so much time over trivial details that they have no spare moments for more important matters.” For Pratt, the key to effective leadership and management of the Navy was in finding the right men with the right leadership qualities to serve as the service’s senior uniformed leaders.

The Navy staff and the responsibilities of the CNO grew with time. The CNO’s authority increased significantly, however, when Admiral Ernest J. King strove to gain authority over the organization of the Navy, not necessarily at the expense of the secretariat, but because he needed

that authority to be both an effective and a responsible wartime commander; a difficult balance at best.\textsuperscript{17}

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Congress had considered a variety of legislative initiatives that would have consolidated the Navy and War departments into a single “Defense Department.” When, during World War II, Congress began to explore options for a post-war defense structure, with service consolidation again on the table, it was soon evident that the Navy was not on board. Initially, a number of senior military leaders, including General George C. Marshall Jr., supported the concept of a single, post-war “department of war.” Senator Harry S. Truman (D-MO) also supported service unification along similar lines. When Congress held hearings on the matter, virtually every war department official who testified supported the single department concept, which was a reversal of the positions of their counterparts two decades earlier. Even a Joint Chiefs of Staff special committee directed to study the issue arrived at similar conclusions. Despite the committee’s recommendation, retired Admiral James O. Richardson, the committee’s chairman, opposed the conclusions as premature. Instead, he concluded that the roles and missions of the Army and Navy were so “divergent” that a single department would inhibit the “development of each.”\textsuperscript{18} Similar arguments had been made by those opposed to like reforms throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In June 1945, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal (May 1944–September 1947) commissioned Ferdinand A. Eberstadt, an influential attorney and policy advisor who had been instrumental in the development of the National Security Council, to independently examine post-war defense organization. He

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\textsuperscript{17} See Barlow, From Hot War to Cold, ch. 1, 9–34; Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, 932; Thomas Hone, Unpublished Manuscript, History of the Navy Staff, ch. 5.
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concluded, contrary to popular opinion, that defense unification would “not improve national security.”

In the post-war period, defense reorganization was meant to reflect Washington’s new peacetime responsibilities. At the time, two interrelated issues drove Navy organization. The first was the struggle over development of the necessary platforms and delivery of nuclear weapons. The second was the emergence of the Cold War, which challenged the traditional notions of service roles and missions. Several years passed before the nation’s leaders comfortably accepted the idea of large standing military forces, Washington’s leadership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the role that strategic nuclear deterrence would play in the nation’s national security strategy. Inevitably there would be an effort to keep defense spending in line with domestic needs and a struggle over what is now called “joint operations” accompanied by the logical need to maintain forward deployed forces to bolster allies and deter direct Soviet aggression. As a result, there was a flurry of legislation, conferences, public debates, and political struggles within Congress because of the size and complexity of defense budgets. Those early debates and congressionally-driven reforms resulted in the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 80-253) and the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 (PL 85-599) that respectively created and then gave greater authority and discretion to the Secretary of Defense. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was the culmination of these efforts.

After nearly 25 years of congressional debate on the establishment of a defense department, the ten-page National Security Act of 1947 (PL 80-253) established the Joint Staff

\[19\] Ibid., 16–19.
and the Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{20} One of the act’s defining purposes was to enhance civilian control of the military and not just improve military organization.\textsuperscript{21} Apparently, it proved to have been politically unresponsive to the issue of civilian control, as a number of other post-1947 defense reports (such as the Rockefeller report for President Dwight D. Eisenhower\textsuperscript{22} and the Symington Report to Senator and President-elect John F. Kennedy\textsuperscript{23}) and defense secretaries (such as Robert S. McNamara\textsuperscript{24}) continued to address the issue in a manner that further increased civilian authority over defense planning and programming through administrative instead of legislative means. Civilian control of the military is, of course, in the eyes of the beholder, and the meaning and context has changed with each generation (and sometimes even within the same generation) of uniformed and civilian military leaders.

The eight-page Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 (PL 85-599) amended the National Security Act of 1947 and granted the defense secretary wide latitude in organizing and managing the military establishment.\textsuperscript{25} The act also intended to provide the services with “unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense.”\textsuperscript{26} This act


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.; Barlow, \textit{From Hot War to Cold}, 57–73, 228, 234–240. During the war both the Army and Navy had opposed congressional interest in any new organizational arrangements, but after the war the Army’s position changed, which left the Navy and Marine Corps as the services primarily opposed to service integration.


\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
served as the rationale and authoritative guide that Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (January 1961–February 1968) used to usher in what were some of the most wide-ranging administrative defense reforms of the 20th century; and all without congressional approval.27

The time from McNamara’s years in the Pentagon to the Goldwater-Nichols Act was a period of consolidation of the Cold War defense establishment. For the most part the focus of reform fluctuated between military “efficiencies” and “effectiveness,” terms that had been used by defense reformers who favored service consolidation since the early 1920s. The reason, in part, was due to the large number of organizations that became directly involved in the reform process. As could be expected, McNamara’s consolidation of authority within the Office of the Secretary of Defense were neither unique nor without controversy. Sometimes a shared dedication to a common goal could overcome such tension, but at other times a public political crisis ensued, as it did in 1949 (well before McNamara’s time in the Pentagon) with the “revolt of the admirals,” which flourished, in part, over the Navy’s role in nuclear weapon delivery.29

Like Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson’s decisions that led to the “revolt,” McNamara’s changes to how the Pentagon would conduct the nation’s business also earned scorn from the Navy’s uniformed leaders. In October 1965, for example, both Rear Admiral William A.

27 McNamara believed that what the Defense Department really lacked were the necessary management tools found in the private sector that would “make sound decisions on the really crucial issues of national security” possible. Instead of organizational reform that would have required congressional approval, such as the elimination of the current service structure, he would provide the department with a “new planning system [that] allowed us to achieve a true unification of effort within the Department without having to undergo a drastic upheaval of the entire organizational structure.” See Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (NY: Harper & Row, 1968), 88, 95.

28 See, for example, the hearings on the Defense Procurement Process held on 13 and 20 September 1984 and on 30 January 1985. Defense Process, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Defense Acquisition Policy of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, September 13 (Part 1) and 20th 1984 (Part 2) and January 30, 1985 (Part 3).

Brockett, the chief of the Bureau of Ships, and his deputy, Rear Admiral Charles A. Curtze, retired over their opposition to increased OSD authority.  

McNamara’s reforms lingered. In July 1969, the commander of Naval Ship Systems Command, Rear Admiral Edward J. Fahy, retired for comparable reasons. CNO Admiral Arleigh M. Burke (August 1955–August 1961) believed that such centralization stifled initiative and would leave an “ignorant” civilian bureaucracy in “command” of the military. Despite these concerns, the defense establishment retained McNamara’s administrative and institutional foundation.

On 15 July 1985, President Ronald W. Reagan used an executive order to charter the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. The commission, popularly known as the Packard Commission after its chairman, David Packard, reviewed defense acquisition in response to a number of high-profile scandals that occurred during the early stages of Reagan’s military build-up. The commission’s recommendations found a ready audience with the authors of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The 87-page act was meant, according to the preamble, to “strengthen civilian authority in the Department of Defense,” enhance the authority of the unified


and specified combatant commands, improve the formulation of strategy and contingency planning, provide more “efficient use of defense resources,” improve joint officer management, and “otherwise . . . enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.”

The act gave the Secretary of the Navy sole responsibility for auditing and comptroller activities, information management, and legislative and public affairs within the department. The act also created the Defense Acquisition Executive Service, which effectively stripped the service chiefs from the acquisition chain of responsibilities. The result was the construction of what one critic has described as an “impenetrable wall between a military-controlled requirements process and a civilian-driven acquisition process to the detriment of both.”

Then, in what seemed to be an event that occurred with little warning, the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the defense establishment found itself managed through organizations and routines ill-suited to the post–Cold War world. Washington’s enormous defense budgets had always attracted interest of numerous and disparate stakeholders, which in turn created a large number of external constituencies interested in a variety of reforms.

37 Blickstein, Where Do We Go From Here?, 24.
from weapons acquisition to oversight, and changes in who can serve (and where they serve) in the military.

With time, a number of new, unintended complications arose with the legislation, and much of the post–Goldwater-Nichols Act reform effort has aimed to incrementally address the concerns and needs of the external constituencies.\(^{38}\) For some defense critics and policy makers the recommendations of the Packard Commission and the Goldwater-Nichols Act that followed have become insufficient for today’s new challenges.\(^{39}\)

The most recent flurry of reform efforts started when it became apparent that the post–Cold War defense establishment was unresponsive to the administrative, planning, and equipping needs to fight the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. In March 2015, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) launched a two-year review of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to see if the three-decade old law remained relevant.\(^{40}\) Further guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense in support of this effort was meant to “reexamine the structure of the military staffs and the service secretariats to ensure optimal performance.” These efforts “must also be mindful of preserving civilian control over the military and the ability of the service chiefs to deliver military advice to the service secretaries.”\(^{41}\)


Alongside changes to defense administration, the post–World War II period has seen changes in the command of operational military forces. Since its inception in 1946, the military’s joint command arrangements, known as the Unified Command Plan (UCP), have concentrated authority in the hands of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (especially the Chairman), at the expense of service autonomy. The Navy has tended to push back against this concentration, with limited success.

At the outset of the UCP, the commands covered specific regions where potential conflict reflected post–WWII realities and the disposition of U.S. forces (i.e., Europe, the Far East, the Atlantic). The initial plan also left entire areas of the world (Africa, the Middle East, most of Asia) outside of the UCP scheme. Since then, the plan has gradually grown to span the entire globe, through a combination of expanding existing commands and creating new geographic commands including Central Command (CENTCOM) and Africa Command (AFRICOM). The creation of functional commands linking service components with similar missions has advanced service cooperation. Yet, much of the post-1991 consolidation of the UCP has been as much about cost savings and a lack of a unified threat calling for a joint force in a given region.

Changes to the UCP have also occurred because of changes in the strategic threat environment. The Eisenhower administration added the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) to the UCP in 1954 to provide for an integrated defense against Soviet bombers as part of the “New Look” defense policy. In 1975 the Ford administration replaced CONAD with an Air Force specified command, Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM), in part because of budget concerns but also in line with the change in the Soviet strategic threat from bombers to missiles. Then, in 1985, the Reagan administration, with strong congressional support, established the Space Command (SPACECOM) to oversee the Strategic Defense Initiative.
program. With time, SPACECOM eventually absorbed ADCOM’s mission. Although Northern Command (NORTHCOM) created after the 9/11 attacks is geographic rather than functional, it was organized to serve as the military wing of U.S. homeland defense planning and contingency operations.\footnote{Swartz, et al., \textit{Lines in the Sea}, 263–271}

Finally, Congress created the Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Prompted by the failure of Operation Eagle Claw in 1980, as well as coordination issues in the 1983 invasion of Grenada, Congress sought to ensure effective command and control of service-specific special operations forces (SOF). In the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1987, Congress directed DOD to create a unified combatant command to oversee SOF. To ensure adequate oversight, Congress gave the SOCOM commander more authority than other combatant commanders, including oversight of “special operations-peculiar equipment” in the budget process and the career paths of special operations personnel in each service.\footnote{Ibid., 273–282}

Since the mid-1970s, changes to the UCP have been effectively manpower neutral with regard to headquarters staff. Secretaries of Defense and the JCS have been careful to ensure that the creation of new commands is balanced by the elimination of old commands. In most cases, the missions of an eliminated command are integral to the command that succeeded it, though there are two notable exceptions. The first is SOCOM, established in 1987, which took Readiness Command’s headquarters billets without absorbing its mission. The second is Joint Forces Command, which was eliminated in 2011 as a cost cutting measure; its missions were parceled out to other unified commands and the Joint Staff, but no command was created to take its place in the UCP.
Most of the changes in the UCP occurred in the face of intense opposition from the uniformed Navy. Emerging from World War II, the Navy attempted to preserve its Atlantic and Pacific fleet organizations, which were reflected in the first UCP in 1946. That plan created three primarily Navy commands—Atlantic, Pacific, and Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean—and a key Navy goal in the Cold War period was to maintain the autonomy of these three commands, while minimizing non-Navy control over Navy assets in other commands.\(^4\) Simply put, the Navy has consistently believed that naval warfare is different from land warfare, requiring education, training, and experiences only possessed by naval officers. Since ships can move from region to region, the Navy has also argued that keeping ocean areas in Navy-dominated commands eased issues of coordination and planning.\(^4\)

To that end, the Navy has tepidly supported geographic commands, which represent looser, more decentralized, patterns of authority.\(^4\) Of special interest to the service has been creating or maintaining commands that covered either oceanic or land areas, but not both. This way, the Navy could ensure the appointment of admirals for oceanic commands, while land-based commands under an Army or Air Force general would have few naval assets to “misuse.”\(^4\) In fact, the extension of the Army-dominated European Command into the Mediterranean may be one of the reasons the Navy deemphasized the region in the 1950s and

\(^4\) Ibid, 77–78.
\(^4\) Ibid., 110–12.
\(^4\) Ibid., 110–12. For example, before 1958, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) had direct control over Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command, and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, not only as the Joint Chiefs of Staff executive agent/executive agent of the Secretary of the Navy, but also because those three commanders were the CNO’s purely naval subordinates as fleet Commanders in Chief (\textit{Lines in the Sea}, 85–7).
\(^4\) Ibid., 110–12.
By the late 1960s, this had expanded to an attempt to draw a distinction between the NATO areas in Europe, necessarily dominated by heavy land and air forces, and the rest of the globe, where periodic crises demanded the rapid response available from the Navy and Marine Corps.

On the other hand, the Navy has tended to oppose the creation of functional commands, viewed as representing increased centralization of authority within OSD and the Joint Staff. While the Navy acquiesced in the 1954 creation of CONAD, which did not involve significant Navy assets, the service fought the creation of SOCOM, SPACECOM, and TRANSCOM in the 1980s, arguing that Navy special forces, satellites, and transport provided critical support for naval forces, especially in Pacific Command (PACOM) and Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), and that removing them from Navy control threatened the effectiveness of Navy combat formations. In the early 1990s, however, CNO Admiral Frank B. Kelso acquiesced in the assignment of Navy ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to the new Strategic Command (STRATCOM) after receiving assurance that Navy officers would constitute 35%—355 of approximately 1,000 officers —of the new command’s staff.

The Navy’s efforts to pursue its agenda with regard to the UCP have been mostly unsuccessful. Today, most of the geographic commands span large areas of land and ocean, while the functional commands have control over Navy ballistic missile submarines, space assets, special forces, and transport. However, it has remained unclear whether “these losses

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48 Ibid., 171–3.
49 Ibid., 114.
50 Ibid., 110–12.
51 Ibid., 93.
52 Ibid., 307–12.
53 Ibid., 115.
[have] had any appreciable effect on the Navy’s institutional health.” The one unqualified success of Navy policy with regard to the UCP has been the gradual expansion of PACOM to cover the entire Pacific Basin and parts of the Indian Ocean while always remaining under the control of an admiral.

Measuring success in such a complex reform environment, especially after 1986, has been problematic. Reform has typically been administrative, legislative, or a combination of both. The most effective reforms have changed the service’s and the Pentagon’s institutional culture. To that end it can be fairly argued that Secretary of Defense McNamara’s exhaustive administrative reforms to planning and programming have been the most effective as they fundamentally changed the services’ institutional culture with a firm emphasis on civilian control of defense programs. They have also been among the most controversial. To varying degrees many of the other reforms have also found success, while simultaneously creating unforeseen complications that have required incremental, increasingly complex adjustments to the contemporary state of play.

Since 1915 the ability of the CNO and OPNAV to recognize, adjust to, and accommodate rapidly changing political and strategic circumstances has been critical for institutional, organizational, and individual success. One advantage of internal changes in the Navy staff structure has been that they come with comparatively little political cost. In the inter-war years, for example, the CNOs nurtured OPNAV’s war planning abilities. Recently, CNO Admiral Gary Roughead (September 2007–September 2011) established the Deputy CNO for Information

54 Ibid., 330.
Dominance (N2/N6) and created an independent Director for Naval Integration (N00X). CNO Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert (September 2011–September 2015) established the Deputy CNO for Warfare Systems (N9), eliminated the Director for Naval Integration (N00X), and assigned the Director, Assessments Division as Director, Capability Assessment Group with these additional responsibilities. Admiral Greenert also established the 21st Century Sailor Office (N17) and the Unmanned Warfare Systems Directorate (N99). However, these Navy staff changes are fleeting at best. Staff organizational changes have typically reflected the immediate needs of the CNO for flexibility and not the enduring organizational and institutional reforms defense reformers have demanded.
Selected Reference Chronology: Defense and Navy Reform Since 1798

1798

30 April: Congress creates the Navy Department. In 1789, Navy matters are the responsibility of the newly-established War Department. However, with time, the burdens and responsibilities of managing both an Army and Navy become too onerous for one office. Secretary of War James McHenry (January 1796–May 1800) proves to be a disappointment, especially in managing naval matters. McHenry, acutely aware of the burdens of office, recognizes that his position may not be able to handle both an Army involved in confronting Native Americans in the West and quelling civil disturbances and a Navy capable of protecting U.S. commercial shipping interests abroad.

Barbary corsairs operating in the Mediterranean continue to seize U.S. merchant ships and hold their crews for ransom. Increasing tensions over France’s seizure of U.S. merchant ships in the Caribbean and the subsequent “XYZ Affair,” when three French representatives demand a bribe to restore relations with the United States, only highlight further the nation’s need for a strong Navy. Some in Congress doubt McHenry is up to the task of preparing an adequate military response to such varied provocations.

Congress thus creates the Navy Department. President John Adams appoints Benjamin Stoddert (May 1798–March 1801) as the Navy’s first secretary. On 18 June 1798 the new Navy Department begins work with a small staff out of offices at 139 Walnut Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.\(^{56}\)

1815

7 February: The Office of Navy Commissioners, responsible for civil functions of the Navy, is created. The Secretary of the Navy maintains responsibility for military issues, such as personnel appointments, discipline, and fleet deployment.57

1842

31 August: Congress creates the Navy’s bureau system. The Office of Navy Commissioners proves ineffective in managing increasingly sophisticated technology, which calls for greater expertise in technical areas. The commissioners fail to provide for the latest ship improvements, such as steam propulsion.58

The Navy’s initial five bureaus are: Yards and Docks; Construction, Equipment and Repairs; Provisions and Clothing; Ordnance and Hydrography; and Medicine and Surgery. The bureaus had responsibility for the business side of the Navy, while the Secretary of the Navy handled fleet operations and personnel issues.59 The President nominates bureau directors with congressional approval.60

This organization does not remain static, and often changes with the demands of both Congress and the Navy.61 The secretary can redistribute the workload among the existing bureaus,62 but not eliminate them or reorganize them based on the needs of the executive branch alone. The bureaus also have independent budgets and, over time, develop distinct relations with the congressional naval committees.

Congress thus maintains “considerable control of the Navy” through the confirmation process of the bureau chiefs. This, in turn, creates an “alliance of mutual interest with Congress,” along with a certain degree of “independence from the Secretary” of the Navy.63

58 For general information on the bureaus, see Organization and Administration, Historical Leadership, Bureaus, Naval History and Heritage Command, http://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/organization-and-administration/historical-leadership/bureaus.html.
62 Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, 198.
1862

5 July: Congress, with support from Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles (March 1861–March 1869), reorganizes and authorizes eight bureaus to more effectively address the Navy’s material needs during the Civil War. Three of the original bureaus—Medicine and Surgery, Provisions and Clothing, and Yards and Docks—are retained, but the remaining two are reorganized into four for Equipment and Recruiting, Navigation, Ordnance, and Construction and Repair, and a new bureau is added to deal with advanced technology, Steam Engineering. The increase in the number of bureaus represents a further subdivision of the “technical cognizance in the earlier bureaus.”

1869

3 February: Outgoing Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles (March 1861–March 1869) writes that Benjamin M. Boyer (D-PA), “who is on the Military Committee, tells me that General [John M.] Schofield, Secretary of War [June 1868–March 1869], was before the committee today and advised the consolidation of the War and Navy Departments under one head.” Welles denounces the recommendation as a threat to free government. Schofield’s proposal reflects what may be a reconsideration of the 30 April 1798 decision to separate naval activities from the war department. Nothing further comes from the recommendation until early 1924.

1882

23 March: Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt (March 1881–April 1882) further reorganizes the bureaus establishing the Office of Naval Intelligence inside the Bureau of Navigation. In 1884 the Bureau of Navigation gains the responsibility for ship movements.

1889

25 June: The Bureau of Navigation increases its authority when Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy (March 1889–March 1893) issues General Order No. 372. This outlines the bureau’s responsibilities, including:

- Orders to the fleet and officers
- Education of officers and enlisted Sailors (including the Naval Academy)
- Enlistment and discharge of all enlisted Sailors
- “[E]stablish the complement of the crews of all vessels in commission.”

64 See Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, 116–117; General Order, Rules for Correspondence; OP-09B22, “Evolution of the Organization of the Department of the Navy,” 8–9.
• Maintain records of service for all “squadrons, ships, officers, and men, and prepare the annual Naval Register for publication.”68

1889

July: Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy (March 1889–March 1893) convenes an ad hoc policy board to coordinate policy, strategy, and ship construction. The board concludes that the United States needs a large battle fleet. The size of the plan shocks Congress, which agrees instead to a more modest plan for three 8,500-ton battleships for 1890 and stretches costs for additional ships over several years. Tracy recognizes the importance of political compromise and instead of insisting on 20 Indiana-class battleships, he agrees that 12 is a more reasonable number given the ships’ projected capabilities.69

1898

May: During the Spanish-American War, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long (March 1897–April 1902) establishes the War Board. It is to transform war plans developed at the Naval War College into actual operations.70 Under the auspices of the Bureau of Navigation, the board compensates for Long’s lack of naval experience and serves, as best as practical, as a de facto Navy general staff.71 The board’s mandate proves to be as short-lived as the war (April–August 1898),72 which does not last long enough to properly exercise any new ideas in naval administration and the bureaus continue to jockey for influence and resources.

1899

Frederick Winslow Taylor’s scientific management theories emerge as important considerations

69 Friedman, U.S. Battleships, 1, 5, 23–25.
72 Mahan, “The Work of the Naval War Board of 1898,” 628.
} His theories initially capture the industrial management efficiencies necessary to improve worker productivity at Bethlehem Steel Company. Navy officers are not immune to these influences (Taylor, a mechanical engineer works, for a time, at the William Cramp & Sons Shipbuilding Company in Philadelphia) and find themselves caught in the maelstrom during the transition from old to new ideas and notions of what it means to be a professional naval officer.\footnote{See S. B. Luce, “The Board of Navy Commissioners: Commissioners for Executing the Office of Constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of the United States,” U.S. Naval Institute \textit{Proceedings}, vol. 27, no. 4 (December 1911): 1120; Dr. Dennis Conrad, “Were they So Unprepared? Josephus Daniels and the United States Navy’s Entry into World War I,” 1–2, Unpublished paper presented at the United States Naval Academy McMillen Naval History Symposium, 2009 (in author’s research files); Tom Hone, “A W.W. I Naval Officer’s Story,” \textit{War on the Rocks}, September 6, 2013, http://warontherocks.com/2013/09/a-wwi-naval-officers-story/; Stewart, “The Management Myth.”
}

Taylor’s ideas first find purchase with Lieutenant Commander Holden A. Evans at Mare Island Navy Yard, near San Francisco, California. Taylor also works closely with Rear Admiral Caspar F. Goodrich when the latter serves as commander of the Brooklyn Navy Yard. Goodrich, in turn, helps Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce found the Naval War College and serves as the third and fifth president of the college.

} and certainly is one of a handful of Navy reformers who are in a position to translate theories into practice. As a reformer, Luce is likely aware of Taylor’s ideas. He uses the term “scientific management” in some of his writings and refers to the specialized term in quotation marks.

} the title of which evinces Taylor’s systematic ideas of modern industrial management.

} Apparently, Secretary of the Navy George von Lengerke Meyer (March 1909–
March 1913) finds Taylor’s ideas of little use, so in turn Taylor encourages the use of the term “scientific management.”

3 March: Congress amalgamates the Navy’s line and engineering officers. From the start of the steam era in the Navy, engineering officers are classified as a separate branch of the officer corps. Despite their importance, they, like doctors and paymasters, are not line officers and could not rise to command a ship. To address the obvious equality issues that arose as a result of the dual professional tracks, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long (March 1897–April 1902) convenes a board to study the “causes of friction between the Line and the Engineer Corps” over such issues as authority, rank, and social status. In March 1899 Congress amalgamates the two, but differences remain.

1900

13 March: Secretary of the Navy John D. Long (March 1897–April 1902) establishes the General Board of the United States Navy with General Order No. 544. The board is a compromise between a fully developed Navy staff and the bureau system. Some contemporary public comments refer to the General Board as a General Staff.

The board serves as a quasi-Navy staff under the directorship of Admiral of the Navy George Dewey until his death in 1917. The Secretary of the Navy determines the board’s agenda and it

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80 See Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, 236–37; Petersen, “Fighting for a Better Navy,” 155–56. For his part, Mahan explained how he viewed the relationship between strategy and technology in a critique of the officer educational system. For Mahan, the current state of Navy officer education, with its emphasis on technology and engineering, was misguided. He had argued as early as 1879 that the “manufacture of ordnance, the intricate questions connected with explosives, have a very close connection with the military part of [the officer’s] business. Yet to say that an exhaustive and exact knowledge of the various processes by which the finished gun and the proved power are furnished to his hand and the rapid though gradual advance made in each, is necessary, is to occupy ground that is not tenable.” Though Mahan recognized that understanding some of the technical aspects of warships and weapons design remained essential, he also believed that it was more important for naval officers, especially senior ranking officers, to comprehend the methods of employing the fleet, and the technical aspects of how an individual ship operated was of secondary importance. See Jon T. Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 17–18, 22–23.
82 Alfred Emanuel Smith, “The Naval War Board,” The Outlook, vol. 24, no. 12, March 24, 1900: 650, https://books.google.com/books?id=2pyPw_hYuAC&pg=PA650&lpg=PA650&dq=Long+creates+the+Navy+War+Board&source=bl&ots=BEVq4DRTz&sig=gVv1nqftJ5cXyz_CsbHoiDygQZ0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi7kM6GsMXkAhXJ1h4KHVB-BdUQ6AEiHDAA#v=onepage&q=Long%20creates%20the%20Navy%20War%20Board&f=false.
83 After the Battle of Manila Bay, Congress allowed the promotion of George Dewey to the permanent rank of admiral, the first officer to hold the rank since the Civil War. In 1903 Congress created for Dewey a special rank, Admiral of the Navy, which he held until his death in 1917.
advises him on strategy, types of ships, fleet size, and manning for the purpose of budget submissions to Congress. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) becomes an ex officio part of the board when his position is established in 1915, but this ends in 1932 when the revised *Navy Regulations* removes him from the board.\(^\text{84}\) The board remains in being until 1951 when the CNO assumes its remaining duties and responsibilities that survive the staff changes of World War II.\(^\text{85}\)

1908

12 November: President Theodore Roosevelt signs Executive Order 969, “Defining the Duties of the United States Marine Corps.” In particular, the Marines are to garrison “navy yards and naval stations, both within and beyond the continental limits of the United States,” and “furnish the first line of the mobile defense of naval bases and naval stations” overseas.\(^\text{86}\)

1909

March: Secretary of the Navy George von Lengerke Meyer (March 1909–March 1913) creates an aid system and divides Navy administration into four components: operations, personnel, material, and inspections.\(^\text{87}\) He places each material bureau, based on “those materials or works in which it is to be regarded as the expert,” under what he calls “aids,” who were four senior Navy line officers that report directly to him and have cognizance over their assigned component.\(^\text{88}\) Meyer is careful to ensure that the aids have no executive or supervisory authority. This encourages them to be free from the bureaus’ daily activities and allows them to shape recommendations without undue bureau influence or interference. Their advice contains both “strategical and tactical matters.”\(^\text{89}\)

1915

3 March: The Navy Act establishes a Chief of Naval Operations.\(^\text{90}\) The legislation states:

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\(^\text{90}\) Before 1843, the fiscal year was the calendar year. In 1843 the fiscal year changed to 1 July–30 June. This remained in effect until the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 changed the fiscal year, beginning in 1976, to 1 October–30 September.
There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations, who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the line of the Navy not below the grade of Captain for a period of four years, who shall, under the direction of the Secretary, be charged with the operations of the fleet, and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war.\textsuperscript{91}

Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske leads a group of Navy reformers that had pushed for a full Navy staff for years.\textsuperscript{92}

**11 May:** Captain William S. Benson becomes the first Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Benson had been in command of the Philadelphia Navy Yard when selected to be CNO. With the exception of George Dewey, the Admiral of the Navy, the highest permanent grade for flag officers was rear admiral. These officers serve in three- and four-star billets (such as fleet commanders) and would then revert to rear admiral upon completion of their tour. Many reformers believe Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske will be the first CNO, but Fiske knew he had no chance after he circumvented Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels (March 1913–March 1921) and went directly to Congress to get his version of the CNO language into the Naval Appropriation Act of 1916.\textsuperscript{93}

**July:** Thomas A. Edison organizes the Naval Consulting Board as a private body at the request of Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels (March 1913–March 1921). The board receives legislative recognition in the Naval Appropriation Act of 1916. It functions as a civilian advisory board on inventions and never formally dissolves, holding annual meetings until 1943.\textsuperscript{94}

**21 July:** President Thomas Woodrow Wilson issues an ultimatum to Germany regarding the sinking of RMS *Lusitania*, warning that Washington considers any future sinkings as “deliberately unfriendly” acts, The President also instructs Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels (March 1913–March 1921) to draw up a “wise and adequate naval program” for submission to Congress. Wilson’s letter receives strong support from the General Board.\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{91} Thomas Hone and Curtis Utz, draft manuscript for OPNAV Centennial.
1 December: The Navy submits the Naval Appropriation Act of 1916 to Congress, which contains the service’s first ever five-year shipbuilding program. The General Board has advocated multiyear building programs since 1903.  

1916

29 August: Congress passes and President Thomas Woodrow Wilson signs the Naval Appropriation Act of 1916. The act ushers in, according to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels (March 1913–March 1921), “the largest expansion in times of peace and greatest efficiency since the Navy Department was organized under the act of April 30, 1798.” The act authorizes a three-year shipbuilding program that encourages the President to undertake prior to 1 July 1919 the construction of ten first-class battleships, six battle cruisers, ten scout cruisers, 50 “torpedo-boat destroyers,” 68 submarines, three fuel ships, one repair ship, one transport, one hospital ship, two destroyer tenders, one fleet submarine tender, two ammunition ships, and two gunboats.

29 August: Congress creates the Council of National Defense for the “coordination of industries and resources for the national security and welfare” and for the “creation of relations which will render possible in time of need the immediate concentration and utilization of the resources of the Nation.” Council members include Secretary of War Newton D. Baker (March 1916–March 1921), Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels (March 1913–March 1921), Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane (March 1913–March 1921), Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston (March 1913–February 1920), Secretary of Commerce William C. Redfield (March 1913–October 1919), and Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson (March 1913–March 1921).

1918

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100 Ibid., 141.
8 August: Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels (March 1913–March 1921) authorizes the enrollment of women in the Marine Corps Reserves for clerical duty.101

1919

28 February: Representative Ernest Lundeen (R-MN) introduces a bill to create a separate department of air service. Although the bill dies in committee, the issue of a separate service air arm continues.102

11 August: Navy officers serving on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations establish a new planning division. Manned by 20 officers, some of whom had served previously on the London planning staff of Rear Admiral William S. Sims during World War I, the new division is responsible for training, logistics, and weapons development, in addition to war plans and policy.103

1921

10 June: The Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (PL 67-13) centralizes budgeting in the executive branch.104 Prior to this, government agencies send budget requests independently to congressional committees. The act requires the President to coordinate the requests for all agencies and send a comprehensive budget to Congress. It also creates the Bureau of the Budget, now the Office of Management and Budget.105 In response, the Secretary of the Navy appoints Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Robert E. Coontz (November 1919–July 1923) as the Budget Officer of the Navy.106 He is the only CNO to serve as budget officer; the position moves to the Navy secretariat in 1923.107

12 July: Congress creates the Bureau of Aeronautics. Previously, naval aviation is under the control of a director of aviation in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Rear Admiral David Taylor, chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, who believes that the office of the CNO is not up to the task, lobbies Congress to establish a Navy bureau of aviation as a distinct entity. Other reformers, such as Rear Admirals Bradley A. Fiske and William S. Sims, concur with Taylor’s ideas. Secretary of the Navy Edward Denby (March 1921–March 1924), CNO Admiral Robert E. Coontz (November 1919–July 1923), and former Secretary of

107 Hone and Utz, draft manuscript for OPNAV Centennial.
the Navy Josephus Daniels (March 1913–March 1921) support the idea, as do the bureau chiefs and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.\(^\text{108}\) The new bureau has charge of all matter pertaining to naval aviation as prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy.\(^\text{109}\)

1922

1 January: The *Navy Directory* of this date is the first to include the War Plans Division (WPD) within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In late 1921, the Chief of Naval Operations establishes the WPD after other sections of the old Planning Division shift to elements of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations staff or to the bureaus. The division’s main mission is to prepare various war plans color coded for different nations: orange (Japan), red (Great Britain), black (Germany), silver (Italy), etc. Orange is seen as the most likely adversary and is the focus of most of the division’s work for the next two decades. The WPD, with an initial staff of nine officers, works with the Naval War College (war games at Newport) and the fleet (Fleet Problems) throughout the period to develop, test, and improve the plans.\(^\text{110}\)

21 January: Walter F. Brown recommends from his position as President Warren G. Harding’s (March 1921–August 1923) special representative on the Joint Congressional Committee on Reorganization of the Administrative Branch of the Government that, “the War and Navy Departments be divested of all activities not directly related to national defense and then consolidated into a single department to be known as the Department of Defense, which, in addition to the Army and Navy Divisions shall include a Division of National Resources.” The proposal is not new. On 28 August 1921, Brown explains, in an article in the *New York Times*, that such a reorganization would provide “great economies . . . through the saving of overhead expenses and the joint purchase of supplies, the use of interchangeable guns and munitions, and the joint training of soldiers and sailors.” Congress creates the Joint Committee in 1920 for the purpose of investigating and formulating legislation on executive branch reorganization. Eventually the White House appoints Brown as the executive branch’s representative on the committee, which is allowed with a special amendment. Brown drafts a proposal that the president’s cabinet debates and modifies.\(^\text{111}\) Brown becomes Postmaster General under President

\(^{108}\) See William M. McBride, *Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865–1945* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010); Letter from Josephus Daniels to Senator Keyes, February 1, 1921, Calendar No 714, Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department, 2 February 1921, [https://books.google.com/books?id=v6M3AQAAIAJ&pg=PR107&lpg=PR107&dq=Congress+Navy+Bureau+of+Aeronautics&source=bl&ots=YgU7oAQwWT&sig=QPYvUXVERLuTXnx9WcZ8GNewl_4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjb9a-


\(^{110}\) Hone and Utz, draft manuscript for OPNAV Centennial; Edward S. Miller, *War Plan ORANGE*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 77–121.

\(^{111}\) U.S. Government, testimony of Secretary of War John W. Weeks, Reorganization of Executive Departments, Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Reorganization of the Administrative Branch of the Government,
Herbert C. Hoover (March 1929–March 1933) and remains an influential member of the Republican Party.

6 February: The Washington Naval Conference produces three multilateral treaties meant to reduce naval armament and ships of the major naval powers and diffuse tensions in East Asia. The Four Power and Five Power Treaties had the most impact on naval power.

The Four Power Treaty supersedes the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, reliving the United States’ fear of a two-ocean war in case of hostilities with Japan. The United States, France, Great Britain, and Japan also agree to consult with each other in the event of a crisis in East Asia.

The Five Power Treaty is the major agreement of the conference as it limits naval armament by the use of tonnage restrictions and ratios. The total tonnage for capital ships (battleships and battlecruisers) and aircraft carriers for each nation, as well as maximum tonnage for individual capital ships and aircraft carriers, is limited. Tonnage allocations for each signatory nation are ratio based 5 (U.S. and Britain):3 (Japan):1.75 (France and Italy). All other warships must be no larger than 10,000 tons and with guns no larger than 8 inches. The treaty reflects, for the most part, the limitations that the United States proposes at the start of the conference. The one major difference is in the area of “auxiliary craft,” which includes destroyers that the treaty does not cover. The treaty, with its limits on improvements to Pacific bases contained in Article XIX, leads the Navy “to design a measurably different fleet than it might otherwise have done” in the absence of naval limitations. It codifies “parity between the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy” and establishes, according to one modern scholar, the “U.S. Navy’s superiority in capital ships over the Imperial Japanese Navy.”

The conference restrictions help stimulate interwar U.S. Navy reform.

15 April: Representatives Clifton N. McArthur (R-OR) and William S. Vare (R-PA) sponsor the amendments to the Naval Appropriations Act of 1923 that authorizes 86,000 enlisted men for the Navy for fiscal year 1923. At the beginning of fiscal 1922 the Navy reduces the number of enlisted personnel from 115,000 to 106,000. Given the political support for fiscal retrenchment, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Robert E. Coontz (November 1919–July 1923) anticipates further reductions, but wants to maintain a force of 96,000 sailors. Republican leaders of the House Appropriation Committee recommended a reduction to 67,000 enlisted men, despite

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113 Ibid.
President Warren G. Harding’s (March 1921–August 1923) support for a force of 86,000. CNO Coontz and his staff obtain a copy of the committee recommendation and respond that such reduced manning would all but nullify the 5:5:3 provisions of the Washington Treaty. Coontz considered the passage of the McArthur-Vare Amendment one of his greatest achievements as CNO.\textsuperscript{115}

31 May: The General Board agrees that the Five Power Treaty gives “formal international recognition to the principle of an American Navy second to none, which has thus become the national policy.”\textsuperscript{116}

15 November: Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Robert E. Coontz (November 1919–July 1923) cancels winter maneuvers. The CNO’s Annex to The Annual Reports to the Navy Department for 1922 includes one simple sentence: “The winter maneuvers contemplated for the year were abandoned on account of the lack of fuel.”\textsuperscript{117} The Navy lacks funding to carry out necessary training. In the same annex Coontz states: “An arbitrary sum was appropriated to be expended for fuel. This sum proved absolutely inadequate . . . .” In previous years, the fuel estimate is made with the “understanding that deficiencies could be incurred” and paid from later years or supplements.

Congress agrees that the arbitrary amount was inappropriate and indicates “that this practice would no longer continue.” Coontz emphasizes that “operations relied entirely on fuel,” either coal or oil on which the need and cost may vary, not “an amount to be paid for fuel.” Fleet operations and training, as well as manning, is also part of the ongoing financial challenges facing the Navy.\textsuperscript{118}

1924

7–31 January: The congressional Joint Committee on the Reorganization of the Administrative Branch of the Executive Department holds hearings on the consolidation of the Navy and War Departments. The committee rejects the recommendation by Walter F. Brown—the personal representative of President Warren G. Harding (March 1921–August 1923)—that the Navy and War Departments merge into a single department. Despite what appears to be presidential support, both Secretary of War John W. Weeks (March 1921–October 1925) and Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby (March 1921–March 1924) strongly oppose consolidation.

Weeks maintains that the currently existing joint organizations, which include the Joint Army and Navy Board, the Joint Army and Navy Planning Committee, the Joint Aeronautical Board, the Army and Navy Munitions Board, and the local joint planning committees are “adequate and

\textsuperscript{115} Hone and Utz, draft manuscript for OPNAV Centennial; Coontz, From The Mississippi to the Sea, 416–19; Coontz, Annual Reports of the Navy Department for 1922, 39.

\textsuperscript{116} Davis, 57.

\textsuperscript{117} Coontz, Annual Reports of the Navy Department for 1922, 39.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.; Hone and Utz, draft manuscript for OPNAV Centennial.
efficient machinery . . . to prevent duplication of effort and to insure unity of planning and the effective and efficient conduct of joint operations.”

Weeks maintains that “to attempt to apply methods applicable to civil business to the military and naval forces would result in reduced efficiency and lower esprit de corps.” He adds that only men without the necessary “military or naval experience” support consolidation.

Secretary Denby agrees with Weeks’ opposition and believes the two departments are “vital and well-administered.” He adds that he knows of “no officers in the Navy Department” who support consolidation.

The committee eventually rejects Brown’s recommendations for consolidation. However, its rejection does not stop consideration of a single defense department. With only the exceptions of 1928, 1934, 1937, and 1938, each year saw at least one bill or resolution before Congress calling for unification.119

24 March: The House of Representatives establishes the Lampert Committee, under the chairmanship of Representative Florian Lampert (R-WI), to assess the status of the Army Air Service.120

1925

26 February: Representative John B. P. C. Hill (R-MD) offers a congressional resolution, according to historian Dr. Robert Albion, “authorizing the investigation of the advisability of creating a Department of Defense, with Under Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air.”121

30 November: The Morrow Board, a collection of well-known military and political figures, releases its report on the status of U.S. aviation. President John Calvin Coolidge (August 1921–March 1929) established the board, named after its chairman, Dwight W. Morrow, after the 3 September 1925 loss of the Navy dirigible Shenandoah. Morrow, a respected diplomat, politician, and businessman, and the board investigate the status of U.S. aviation, including the


121 Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, 1798–1947, 372.
growing interest from the military departments. The board in its conclusion rejects any idea of a unified defense department.\textsuperscript{122}

**14 December:** The Lampert Committee, named for its chairman, Representative Florian Lampert (R-WI), which the House of Representative established on 24 March 1924 to assess the status of the Army Air Service, proposes the consolidation of the Navy and War Departments into a single defense department. This conflicts with the recently released recommendations of the Morrow Board.\textsuperscript{123}

1926

**11 December:** The General Board of the Navy expresses concerns over the loss of naval parity with Great Britain, including the loss of skilled workers and the disconnection between “phased [ship] construction” and fiscal authorizations.\textsuperscript{124}

1930

**22 April:** The United States signs the London Naval Treaty. Unlike the previous Washington Naval Treaty, this addresses destroyer numbers. It defines destroyers as “surface vessels of war the standard displacement of which does not exceed 1,850 tons (1,880 metric tons), and with a gun not above 5.1-inch (130mm) caliber.” The treaty’s Article 8 exempts destroyers from the U.S.’s 150,000 ton limitation, but only so long as they did not mount guns above 6.1 inches, have more than four guns above 3-inches, could not launch torpedoes, or were “designed for a speed greater than twenty knots.”\textsuperscript{125}

Article 16 establishes tonnage totals for destroyers, “not to be exceeded on the 21st December, 1936 . . .” For the United States, this total is 150,000 tons with the demand that “vessels which cause the total tonnage in any category to exceed the figures . . . shall be disposed of gradually during the period ending on the 31st December 1936.” The treaty also limits the size of destroyers. No “more than sixteen per cent of the allowed total tonnage shall be employed in vessels of over 1,500 tons (1,534 metric tons) standard displacement.” However, “destroyers completed or under construction on the 1st April, 1930, in excess of this percentage may be


\textsuperscript{124} Davis, 58.

retained, but no other destroyers exceeding 1,500 tons (1,542 metric tons) standard displacement shall be constructed or acquired until a reduction to such sixteen percent has been effected.”

1933

16 June: Congress passes and President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. This creates economic stimulus through government and industry cooperation. It suspends antitrust laws, calls for industrial self-regulation, and allows companies to write industry-wide “codes of fair competition” for the protection of consumers, competitors, and employers that effectively fix prices and wages. It also establishes production quotas, and imposes restrictions on entry of other companies into the alliances. Employees receive the right to organize and bargain collectively and could not be required, as a condition of employment, to join or refrain from joining a labor organization.

For the most part, the shipbuilding industry supports the act. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company begin building the aircraft carriers *Yorktown* (CV-5) and *Enterprise* (CV-6). Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation begin construction of two heavy cruisers, *Quincy* (CA-39) and *Vincennes* (CA-44). Other builders, such as Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, Electric Boat Company, New York Shipbuilding Corporation, and Bath Iron Works receive portions of new ship construction programs.

7 December: Secretary of the Navy Claude A. Swanson (March 1933–July 1939) signs General Order 241, establishing the Fleet Marine Force.

1934

27 March: President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the Naval Parity Act (PL 135), popularly known as the Vinson-Trammell Naval Parity Act because of its congressional sponsors, Representatives Carl Vinson (D-GA) and Park M. Trammell (D-FL).

The U.S. Navy is not building ships to the numbers and tonnage allowed in either the Washington or London Treaties, and the act authorizes the acquisition of 102 warships within the confines of both. It requires that:

The first and each succeeding alternate vessel of each category, except the fifteen-thousand-ton aircraft carrier, upon which work is undertaken, and the main engines, armor, and armament for such vessels . . . shall be constructed or manufactured in the Government navy yards, naval stations, naval gun factories, naval ordnance plants, or arsenals of the United States, except such material or parts as were not customarily manufactured in such Government plants prior to February 13, 1929.

The act places fixed limits on profits for contracts over $10,000 for both aircraft and ships. The scope is far-reaching, especially with the low-dollar minimum reporting requirement. It also covers, in the words of the General Accounting Office in 1980, “practically all tiers of subcontractors and material suppliers that contribute to a completed aircraft or vessel.” By 1980, the act is still in effect although circumstances that surround its adoption in 1934 are no longer present. There is bipartisan agreement that the act is no longer “workable.”

1938

17 May: The Naval Expansion Act of 1938 (PL 528), otherwise known as the second Vinson Act, authorizes the President, within the limitations of the Washington and London Treaties, an increase—estimates are approximately 20 percent—in the tonnages of authorized vessels, including capital ships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The act allows for a 46 percent increase in aviation construction over the current building program. It also authorizes and directs the Secretary of the Navy “to appoint a board consisting of not less than five officers to investigate and report upon the need, for purposes of national defense, for the establishment of additional submarine, destroyer, mine, and naval air bases on the coasts of the United States, its territories and possessions.” It further directs that the Secretary of the Navy “cause the report of the board authorized by this section to be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives during the first session of the Seventy-sixth Congress.”

1939

4 August: President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorizes appointment of the War Resources Board to study the Army and Navy Munitions Board Industrial Mobilization Plan. The plan is to transition the U.S. economy to a war footing after a declaration of war. The board’s existence ends when it submits its report on 24 November 1939.

1940

\[\text{\textsuperscript{131} Statement of Walton H. Sheley, Acting Director, Procurement and Systems Acquisition Division, before the Subcommittee on Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services on Suspension of the Vinson-Trammell Act, June 25, 1980.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{132} Naval Expansion Act of 1938, Public Law 528, 17 May 1938,}\]
\[\text{http://www.alternatewars.com/Congress/PL_528_Vinson_Act_1938.htm.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{133} Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, 976, 977.}\]
25 May: President Franklin D. Roosevelt establishes the Office Emergency Management in the executive office of the President. It assists in the coordination of information and maintains liaison between the President and any newly created emergency agencies. The office coordinates existing and planned Army and Navy procurement contracts.134

14 June: The Naval Expansion Act (PL 629), popularly known as the Eleven Percent Act, increases ship tonnages and provides for direction of the construction of specific types of ships. The act allows the President, at his discretion, to establish a Naval Consulting Board. That board consists of “seven members to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among eminent civilians in the fields of industry, science, and research, to serve during the pleasure of the President. This Board is . . . authorized to make recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy in any matter concerning the Naval Establishment and the national defense.”135

15 June: President Franklin D. Roosevelt establishes the National Defense Research Committee to advise him on the War and Navy Departments’ investments in new technology.136

17 June: The Army and Navy Munitions Board create a subcommittee to help develop munitions priorities.137

20 June: Upon the recommendation of Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison (July 1938–June 1940), Congress establishes the Office of Undersecretary of the Navy for the “duration of the emergency.”138 Secretary Edison also combines the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering into the Bureau of Ships. This bureau contracts for all naval vessels and their “machinery and technical equipment.”139

25 June: Congress authorizes the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to stockpile strategic materials.140

28 June: Congress authorizes the Navy to use negotiated contracts for warship and aircraft acquisition.141 This is an important step in government efforts to accelerate warship acquisition by ending the pre-war practice of soliciting sealed bids. Congress also overturns the rule (established in the Naval Parity Act, PL 135) that limits a vendor’s profits on Navy contracts over $10,000 to 10 percent.142

134 See Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, 514–515, 826; Hone and Utz, draft manuscript for OPNAV Centennial.
136 Hone and Utz, draft manuscript for OPNAV Centennial.
137 Ibid.
138 Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, 978.
139 Ibid., 840, 978.
140 Hone and Utz, draft manuscript for OPNAV Centennial.
141 Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, 979.
142 Hone and Utz, draft manuscript for OPNAV Centennial.
1941

1 March: Under the leadership of Senator Harry S. Truman (D-MO), the Senate creates the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program. It examines and investigates a wide range of issues, from encouraging subcontracts for small businesses to reclaiming excess profits from major ship and aircraft manufacturers.143

12 March: President Franklin D. Roosevelt issues Executive Order (EO) 9096, Reorganizing the Navy Department and the Naval Service. The order combines the positions of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Commander in Chief United States Fleet (COMINCH). The CNO has authority for training, planning, intelligence collection, and preparing warships for operations; COMINCH has authority for managing the active fleet and executing war plans.144 The CNO serves as principal naval adviser to the President on the conduct of the war, and the principal naval adviser and executive to the Secretary of the Navy.145 He has authority to organize the fleet, execute war plans, direct planning, and establish requirements for Navy construction and procurement. The Under Secretary of the Navy serves as chief procurement officer managing relations between the Navy and civilian industry.146 Admiral Ernst J. King’s role as the combined CNO/COMINCH represents the zenith of the CNO’s authority and influence.

1942

2 Nov: Wartime Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall Jr. goes on record in favor of the establishment of a single post-war “department of war.”147

1943

28 March: Representative James W. Wadsworth Jr. (R-NY), through a House resolution, establishes a Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy. Representative Clifton A. Woodrum (D-VA) chairs the committee. Hearings begin on 24 April 1943 and end on 19 May 1944. Every War Department official who appears supports the single department concept as does former Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels (March 1913–March 1921), who also testifies. Representative Carl Vinson (D-GA), a strong Navy supporter, opposes consolidation.148 Of note, Wadsworth’s son-in-law is William S. Symington Jr., the first Secretary of the Air Force.

1944

143 Ibid.
146 Ibid., 7–8.
9 May: The wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff directs the formation of a special committee to study post-war national defense issues and make recommendations on future organizations. Leading the committee is retired Admiral James O. Richardson, the former Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. The committee conducts interviews with Navy officers and, at the time, nearly one-half reportedly favor a single defense department. It recommends a single department, a military “Commander of the Armed Forces,” a chiefs-of-staff organization, and one undersecretary with responsibilities for department business. The committee also recommends five assistant secretaries. Richardson opposes the recommendations and believes that it is too early to draw any conclusions from the war. He also believes that the roles and missions of the Army and Navy are so “divergent, so great in magnitude, and so distinct in mission” that a single department would inhibit the “development of each.”

26 August: Senator Harry S. Truman (D-MO) wrote “Our Armed Forces Must Be Unified” supporting unification and published in Collier’s magazine.

1945

19 June: Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal (May 1944–September 1947) commissions Ferdinand A. Eberstadt, an influential attorney and policy advisor who had been instrumental in the development of the National Security Council, to conduct an independent examination on the organization of a post-war defense establishment. His report concludes that under “present conditions” unification of the Army and Navy Departments would not improve national security. Instead, it recommends an organization to coordinate the Air, Navy, and War departments, each with a cabinet-rank secretary.

25 September: President Harry S. Truman signs Executive Order (EO) 9635, Organization of the Navy Department and the Naval Establishment. The order cancels EO 9096 and revises the Chief of Naval Operation’s (CNO) authorities to solidify civilian control “under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy.” The order reassesses and realigns civilian control of the military with a shift in emphasis from the CNO to the Navy secretariat; the CNO remains the primary naval adviser to the President. It also clarifies CNO’s authority over Navy bureaus as neither separate from nor superior to the authority of the Secretary of the Navy. The CNO also establishes operational requirements; secretariat manages procurement and deals directly with civilian suppliers.

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149 Ibid., 14–16.
150 Ibid., 17.
151 Ibid., 16–19.
154 Ibid., 9–10.
155 Ibid., 9.
1946

14 December: The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s first Unified Command Plan establishes seven commands as an “interim measure for the immediate post war period.” These commands, which grew organically from the post–World War II disposition of forces, are: Far East Command, Pacific Command, Alaskan Command, Northeast Command, Atlantic Fleet, Caribbean Command, and European Command. While some contain more than one service, others, such as the Atlantic Fleet, are service specific. The plan places each unified command under the supervision of a service chief (i.e., the Chief of Naval Operations supervises Pacific Command); an officer of that chief’s service is appointed to run each command. Units not assigned to unified command remain under independent service control.

1947

26 July: The National Security Act of 1947 (PL 80-253) creates the position of Secretary of Defense to coordinate the National Military Establishment, which includes the three services—the Army, Navy, and newly created Air Force. The Department of the Navy becomes an executive department of a service component under the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense serves as principal adviser to the President for matters relating to national security. The authority conferred upon the secretary to execute this function is, however, couched in vague and ambiguous terms. According to the law, the secretary is to formulate “general policies and programs for the National Military Establishment” and to exercise “general direction, authority and control.” It also formalizes the Unified Combatant Command system and gives the Joint Chiefs of Staff the responsibility to establish unified commands in “strategic areas” subject to the approval of the President and Secretary of Defense.

James V. Forrestal, moving from the Department of the Navy, becomes the first Secretary of Defense (September 1947–March 1949).

November: After successful lobbying from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (NELM) is created as a specified command with the CNO as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the time, the Navy viewed NELM as the

159 Feickert, “The Unified Command Plan.”
161 Feickert, “The Unified Command Plan.”
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
“centerpiece of potential counter offensives against the Soviets, in peacetime, crises, and war,” and the eventual home of the Navy’s first nuclear-capable carrier squadrons.\textsuperscript{165}

1948

\textbf{March–August:} Meetings between service chiefs and operational deputies at Key West, Florida (March) and Newport, Rhode Island (August) seek to establish roles and missions for the armed forces. The Navy maintains land-based naval aviation assets and is granted a secondary role in the employment and development of nuclear weapons. The Marine Corps receives the primary role of developing amphibious warfare doctrine and equipment. The Army is effectively barred from developing fixed-wing combat aircraft.\textsuperscript{166}

\textbf{12 June:} The Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948 (PL 625) establishes the Women’s Army Corps within the active Army and authorizes the enlistment and appointment of women in the active Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, as well as in all four services’ Reserve components.\textsuperscript{167}

\textbf{26 July:} President Harry S. Truman signs Executive Order No. 9981, “Establishing the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services,” desegregating the armed services.\textsuperscript{168}

1949

\textbf{10 August:} The National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (PL 81-216) seek greater fiscal efficiency and cooperation among the services.\textsuperscript{169} The act changes membership of the National Security Council and designates the Joint Chiefs of Staff as “the principal military advisers to the President.”\textsuperscript{170} Additionally, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) receives unqualified authority, direction, and control of defense policy. Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force lose their status as executive departments and become fully subordinate to SECDEF.\textsuperscript{171}

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\textsuperscript{166} Barlow, \textit{From Hot War to Cold}, 184–190; Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal, “Functions of the Armed Forces and The Joint Chiefs of Staff,” 21 April 1948, \url{http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/utils/getfile/collection/p4013coll11/id/729/filename/730.pdf}.
\textsuperscript{167} Public Law 625: The Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, 80th Congress, 12 June 1948, \url{https://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/Pages/Speeches/PublicLaw625.aspx}.
\textsuperscript{169} Act of August 10, 1949 (National Security Act Amendments of 1949), Public Law 81-216, reorganizing fiscal management in the National Military Establishment to promote economy and efficiency, The National Archives, Record Group 11, \url{https://research.archives.gov/id/299860}.
Military Establishment receives the title of executive department and is renamed the Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{172}

As a result of these changes, the staff elements of the Secretary of Defense substantially increase, and the size of the Joint Chiefs of Staff doubles.\textsuperscript{173} Some Navy leaders view the strengthening of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff as an effort “to destroy the Navy and its tradition of decentralized command.” Arguments center on the fact that, in effect, the act crafts a “civilian” general staff that has little or no knowledge of how the Navy functions.\textsuperscript{174}

1950

14 April: The State Department’s policy planning staff and the Joint Chief of Staff’s strategic planning staff conduct a three-month effort and develop National Security Council Document 68. The study concludes that the Soviet Union poses a long-term threat to U.S. vital interests (ideas and values) and world peace. It recommends the United States conduct “a rapid buildup of political, economic, and military strength” to deter Soviet expansionism and war. President Harry S. Truman does not take immediate action on the recommendations.\textsuperscript{175}

1951

10 March: An Act to Authorize the Construction of Modern Naval Vessels (PL 3) is the last of the so-called Vinson Acts. It authorizes the President to “undertake the construction of, or to acquire and convert, not to exceed five hundred thousand tons of modern naval vessels” in four categories: combatants, auxiliaries, service craft, and experimental types.\textsuperscript{176}

The act also authorizes the President to “convert . . . from among those vessels on the Navy list determined to be best fitted for conversion, to modern naval vessels” for warships and mine warfare vessels. The act requires Congress approve the transfer or disposition of any vessels and rescinds the tonnage authorizations remaining from four previous acts (PL 204, PL 665, PL 72, and PL 61).

1952

28 June: With Public Law 416, an act to strengthen the “United States Marine Corps, and to establish the relationship of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Congress amends the National Security Act of 1947 to “fix the personnel strength of the United

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[172] Ibid., 23–24.
\item[173] Ibid.; Swartz, et al., Lines in the Sea, 80.
\item[175] Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 507.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
States Marine Corps, and to establish the relationship of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

7 July: After the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) post of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), President Harry S. Truman reforms U.S. military organization in Europe. Army, Air Force, and Navy components there are placed inside an expanded European Command and the commander assumes SACEUR responsibilities. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) remains a specified command and becomes the naval component of European Command. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command assumes the role as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, making him theoretically coequal with SACEUR in the NATO command structure.

1953

29 June: Under direction from President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson (January 1953–October 1957) changes the executive agents for unified and specified commands under Reorganization Plan No. 6. The plan was part of recommendations from the President’s Advisory Committee on Government Organization (established by Executive Order 10432 on 24 January 1953), and is otherwise known as the Report of the Rockefeller Committee, after its chairman, Nelson Rockefeller. The other members of the committee are David Sarnoff, president of the Radio Corporation of America, General Omar Bradley, Vannevar Bush, a nuclear scientist, Dr. Arthur Fleming of the Office of Defense Mobilization, former secretary of defense Robert Lovett, and Dr. Milton Eisenhower, the president’s brother. The report proposes to strengthen civilian control of the military and serves as the plan’s basis. The plan recommends that the President take “decisive administrative action” (and statutory changes as necessary) to give the Secretary of Defense complete control over “all agencies of the department.” Additionally, the report recommends that the defense secretary select the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but also allows for the chairman’s participation in political-military decision making. The plan permits Wilson to re-organize the Pentagon more like a corporation.

Upon receipt of the report, Wilson immediately forwards it to President Eisenhower with full support. Eisenhower, in turn, forwards it to Congress as an executive reorganization measure in order to limit congressional interference. As such, the document does not require congressional approval, and Congress only has 60 days to give it a straight up-or-down vote before it comes into effect.

180 Barlow, From Hot War to Cold, 344-8; E. Bruce Geelhoed, Charles E. Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon, 1953 to 1957 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979), 62-5.
into effect. After debate, the House votes in favor. The Senate, however, fears that the plan may give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs too much authority and takes no action.\(^{181}\)

**30 October:** President Dwight D. Eisenhower approves “A Report to the National Security Council” (otherwise known as National Security Council Document 162/2) from James S. Lay, the council’s executive secretary as the nation’s Basic National Defense Security Policy. The document defines the President’s Cold War strategy and outlines the basic problem of balancing the needs of the U.S. economy and meeting the threat to U.S. security from the Soviet Union.\(^{182}\) Instead of conventional forces, the Eisenhower administration, with what is called a “New Look” strategy of “massive retaliation” elects to build an atomic arsenal meant to deter conflict with the Soviet Union.\(^{183}\)

The President lays out this strategy to the public and Congress on 7 January 1954 during his State of the Union address. He notes that “our military power continues to grow” and rhetorically assures the nation and the world that “this power is for our own defense and to deter aggression. We shall not be aggressors, but we and our allies have and will maintain a massive capability to strike back.”\(^{184}\)

**1954**

**16 March:** Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson (January 1953–October 1957) issues a revised version of the Key West Agreement as Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the Armed Forces and Joint Chiefs of Staff.” The directive adds the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, clarifies the chain of command, and provides for the resourcing of unified commands.\(^{185}\)

**1 September:** The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) establish the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), which is the first command referred as “joint” rather than “unified” or “specified.” It is created in response to the possibility of a Soviet air attack on the continental United States and the need to coordinate air defense forces across service lines. From September 1957,


CONAD is also the U.S. component of the new U.S.-Canadian North American Air Defense Command. This command was created by redesignating Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Air Defense Command and augmenting it with representatives from other services. The Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, receives more authority over forces outside of his service than other unified command commanders “down to the assignment of targets for individual aircraft batteries.”

1956

21 June: Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson (January 1953–October 1957) eliminates Far East (FECOM) and Northeast Commands. His decision comes after 1955 guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine the Unified Command Plan every year. Both decisions, especially the disestablishment of FECOM, were supported by the Navy, which saw the Pacific Basin and littoral as a single theater that required unified command under a naval officer.

26 November: Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson (January 1953–October 1957) issues a memorandum, “Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense,” which addresses inter-service controversies such as aircraft use, airlift adequacy, air defense, Air Force tactical air support for the Army, and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

1957


1 August: OPNAV (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations) Instruction 0501012 establishes the Navy Planning System and a five-year long-range objectives (LRO) budget plan for the President through the Secretary of Defense. The LRO informs the service’s Joint Service Objectives Plan submission and serves as an integral planning and programming document.

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191 Ibid., 11.
Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh M. Burke (August 1955–August 1961) describes it as a document that “temper[s] requirements with fiscal realism.”

1958

January: Pacific Command and Pacific Fleet are separated and Commander in Chief, Pacific Command no longer serves as the commander of the unified command and the Navy’s Pacific Fleet.

6 August: The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 (PL 85-599) removes military service departments as executive agents. The military commander-in-chiefs report directly to the Secretary of Defense with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) serving as his staff. Orders issued to the commands by the JCS are collective, issued under the authority of the secretary. The act also strengthens the authority of the secretary in the areas of strategic planning, military operations, and administration of the Department of Defense. It is the last major reorganization of the armed services until the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

The act depends on greater use of the unified commands as operational instruments and an increase in strategic and tactical planning by enhancing the authority of the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the three military departments. It stipulates that the services are no longer separately administered, but only separately organized. Authority for direction and control of the military departments is vested in the Secretary of Defense. The act also requires that he, rather than the JCS, assumes responsibility for assignment and removal of forces to and from the unified and specified commands. The JCS and its component service chiefs are removed from operational chains of command.

The act ensures that the future role of the military departments would be limited to providing logistic support to the unified and specified commands. It also contains language that allows the Secretary of Defense to establish new agencies and positions, including the reassignment of responsibilities within an Office of the Secretary of Defense. The act encounters stiff
opposition from key elements in Congress who see the increases in the authority of the secretary as a reduction in their own authority and that of the three services.\footnote{Booz-Allen & Hamilton, \textit{Review of Navy R&D Management}, 53–54}

This act is especially damaging to the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)—Admiral Arleigh M. Burke (August 1955–August 1961) is sometimes known as the last CNO for this reason. Under the executive agent system, Burke, in practice, exercised secretary of the Navy authority over Commander in Chief, Pacific, Commander in Chief, Atlantic, and Commander in Chief, Northeast Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and these three were also the CNO’s subordinates as Fleet Commander in Chiefs. The CNO, therefore, exercised administrative and operational oversight over the three Navy-controlled commands.\footnote{Swartz, et al. \textit{Lines in the Sea}, 85–87.}

1960

\textbf{15 September–5 December:} Senator W. Stuart Symington (D-MO) heads the Committee on Defense Establishment, which provides newly elected President John F. Kennedy with the Symington Report, a wide-ranging critique of Department of Defense operations. The report argues that preparation for old-style “open warfare,” as fought in World War II, is no longer an appropriate model for either strategy or weapon development and acquisition. Instead, the nation has entered an “era of cold war and protracted conflict, with always the possibility of nuclear attack.” The report focuses on weapons acquisition and concerns that the United States could soon fall behind the Soviet Union in weapons development. The committee recognized the need “for early selection among alternative weapon systems and for shorter lead times between conception and use.” This is necessary to avoid “building weapons which have become” obsolete “as a result of delay.”\footnote{Report to Senator Kennedy, 5 December 1960, 4.}

The committee also suggested scrapping the Unified Command Plan and replacing it with four unified commands—Strategic, Tactical, Continental Defense, and Civil Defense—and that the new Strategic Command should be led by an admiral.\footnote{Swartz, et al., \textit{Lines in the Sea}, 93.}

1961

\textbf{21 January:} The Senate confirms Robert S. McNamara as the eighth Secretary of Defense (January 1961–February 1968). McNamara begins rapid centralization of the direction of much of the Defense Department. He depends on the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 for authority, and establishes defense-wide agencies for supply, intelligence, and contract auditing. He also increases reliance on management systems and procedures to focus centralized control and introduces the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System along with contract

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{Booz-Allen & Hamilton, \textit{Review of Navy R&D Management}, 53–54}
  \item \footnote{Swartz, et al. \textit{Lines in the Sea}, 85–87.}
  \item \footnote{Report to Senator Kennedy, 5 December 1960, 4.}
  \item \footnote{Swartz, et al., \textit{Lines in the Sea}, 93.}
\end{itemize}
formulation and definition for acquisition of weapons systems.  

1962

1 January: Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (January 1961–February 1968) creates the United States Strike Command (STRICOM). This has authority over the combat ready Strategic Army Corps and Tactical Air Command units in the continental United States, and is tasked with developing joint doctrine, providing reinforcement for other commands, and executing contingency operations if the Joint Chiefs of Staff so order. Initially it has no regional responsibilities. But on 30 November 1963, STRICOM gains responsibility for planning and operations in the Middle East, sub-Saharan African, and Southern Asia over the Navy’s objections to removing Middle East planning from Commander in Chief, Northeast Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

1963

1 December: Caribbean Command (CARIBCOM) is renamed Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which reflects a change in emphasis for the command. From 1957, CARIBCOM lost all responsibility for the oceanic areas of the command, which were transferred to Atlantic Command and Pacific Command. Instead, CARIBCOM “became responsible for representing U.S. interests and administering the Mutual Defense Assistance Program in all of Central and South American (except Mexico).”

1966

7 March: Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze (November 1963–June 1967) begins reorganization of the Navy Department. His purpose is to reflect Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara’s (January 1961–February 1968) changes and “enable the Navy to more effectively carry out its functions of preparing naval forces for assignment to unified and specified


205 Cole, et al., The History of the Unified Command Plan, 32–33.

206 Ibid., 33–34.

207 Ibid., 34–35.

208 Swartz, et al., Lines in the Sea, 184–87.
Commanders and developing and providing the manpower and material resources to support naval forces.” The principal elements of the reorganization plan are:

- Restructuring the bilinear system into a unilinear organization by placing the material, medical, and personnel functions under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations
- Reconstituting the Naval Material Support Establishment as the Naval Material Command

Nitze also restructures the four material bureaus into functional commands, effectively eliminating them in their present form. The new commands are: Naval Ship Systems Command, Naval Air Systems Command, Naval Ordnance Systems Command, Naval Electrical Systems Command, and Naval Supply Systems Command.209

1969

30 May: Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird (January 1968–January 1973) establishes the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council as an advisory body to the Secretary of Defense on matters concerning major weapon systems acquisition.210 The council is part of Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard’s efforts to bring “management by objectives” into Department of Defense programming.211 The council serves as a “high-level source of advice to Packard and Laird on how major weapons programs were progressing as they reach[ed] critical decision points.” 212

1970

April: Incoming Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. (July 1970–June 1974) establishes a special project office to begin work on an internal Navy plan of action, known as Project 60, for modernization once he assumes office on 1 July.213 Zumwalt, along with Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee (January 1969–May 1972) present their conclusions to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird (January 1968–January 1973) and Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard on 10 September.

212 Ibid., 48.
Zumwalt shares the briefing with all Navy flag and Marine Corps general officers on 16 September and he stands down the Project 60 office (OP-00H) on 25 September.  

The project includes decisions on 52 subject areas ranging from several concept formulations for new ships to deployments and officer pay. The recommendations include the “context of potential budget reductions” and “indicate the effect of such reductions,” which “would curtail our capabilities critically, regardless of our actions.”

1971

13 July: Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, Defense Acquisition, establishes management practices, program phases, contract types, and integrated logistics support for acquisition of major defense systems.

31 December: Readiness Command replaces Strike Command, though responsibilities remain unchanged. Contingency responsibilities in the Middle East and South Asia are given to European Command and Pacific Command, respectively.

1973


1974

30 August: The Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (PL 93–400) establishes the “Office of Federal Procurement Policy in the Office of Management and Budget to provide overall direction of procurement policies, regulations, procedures, and forms for executive agencies in

215 Ibid.
219 Ibid., 42.
acCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS.” IT ALSO PROMOTES “ECONOMY, EFFICIENCY, AND EFFECTIVENESS IN THE PROCUREMENT OF PROPERTY AND SERVICES BY AND FOR THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.” THE ADMINISTRATOR PROVIDES OVERALL DIRECTION OF THE PROGRAM, INCLUDING POLICIES, REGULATIONS, PROCEDURES, AND FORMS.220

1975

1 July: Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger (July 1973–November 1975) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reorganize the Unified Command Plan to cut costs and eliminate headquarters billets. Continental Air Defense Command is disestablished in favor of standing up the Air Force’s Aerospace Defense Command as a single-service specified command, removing a layer of headquarters bureaucracy. Alaskan Command is also eliminated. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which the JCS recommends eliminating, is downgraded to a three-star billet after President Gerald Ford expressed concerns over the diplomatic effects of disestablishment. The headquarters for the Navy and Air Force components of SOUTHCOM are also disestablished. Readiness Command now provides Joint Task Force headquarters and forces for contingency, disaster relief, and evacuations in regions not otherwise assigned to a command such as sub-Saharan Africa.221

22 October: Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger (July 1973–November 1975) asks the Joint Chiefs of Staff to streamline unified and specified command manning, and mandates headquarters cuts of 20 percent at Pacific Command, 8 percent at Atlantic Command, and 210 billets at European Command.222

1977

1 February: The Joint Chiefs of Staff create the Military Airlift Command as a specified command of the Air Force, which has charge of air transport.223

1979

April: Secretary of Defense Harold Brown (January 1977–January 1981) establishes the Defense Resources Board (DRB) as the focal point for the Department of Defense’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).224 The board initially participates only in the

224 See J. Y. Draper, “Role of the Defense Resources Board in the Planning Phase of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System,” Study Project Report, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 1985,
programming and budgeting phases of the system and does not enter the planning phase until 1981.\textsuperscript{225} One concern is that the DRB will dampen service influence in the final stages of the PPBS process.\textsuperscript{226}

**December:** Secretary of Defense Harold Brown (January 1977–January 1981) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) direct the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force within Readiness Command with responsibility for planning “rapid deployment force operations in the Middle East and Africa” and other areas as directed by the JCS.\textsuperscript{227} The Iranian hostage crisis (1979–1981) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) “underscore the need to strengthen U.S. presence in the region.”\textsuperscript{228} The task force is not a fixed set of units, but a reservoir of forces suitable and available for non-NATO contingencies.\textsuperscript{229} The JCS establish a permanent headquarters on 1 March 1980.

**1981**

**April:** In response to continued problems with fraud and abuse in the Department of Defense (DOD), Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger (January 1981–November 1987) creates the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Review and Oversight. Responsibilities include the development of policy and maintain oversight and provide guidance to DOD components on matters regarding criminal investigation programs. The office also monitors and evaluates adherence of DOD components to internal audit and review principles, policies, and procedures. The office is also responsible for the development of policies, performance evaluation, and monitoring follow-up actions. The office also exercises direction, authority, and control over the Defense Audit Service and advises the Secretary of Defense on incidents of fraud, waste, or abuse.\textsuperscript{230}

**1982**

**8 September:** The Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1983 (PL 97-252) establishes the Department of Defense inspector general office.\textsuperscript{231} This builds on the October Inspector General

\begin{footnotes}
\item[225] Draper, “Role of the Defense Resources Board.”
\item[228] Feickert, “The Unified Command Plan,” 33.
\item[230] Trask and Glennon, Documents on Organization and Mission, 5.
\end{footnotes}
Act of 1978 which establishes inspectors general in 12 federal departments, but excludes the Department of Defense. 232

1983

1 January: The Joint Chiefs of Staff create Central Command out of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. The new command bolsters planning and presence in the Middle East. 233

24 September: The Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984 (PL 98-94) establishes the Office of Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. 234 Prior to 1983, each service monitors systems being developed under service control. 235

The act also increases the authorized number of assistant secretaries of defense from 7 to 11. This is in response to 1978 cuts made by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown (January 1977–January 1981). Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger (January 1981–November 1987) believes the cuts reduce “the flexibility of the Department in adapting the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Service secretaries to changes in Defense priorities, policies, and programs.” One of the new positions covers reserve affairs. Congress also directs that another of the new assistant secretaries have oversight of command, control, and intelligence. Two other positions “not designated by law went to new assistant secretaries for research and technology and for development and support.” 236

28 October: The Joint Chiefs of Staff give European Command responsibility for sub-Saharan Africa engagement and contingency planning. 237

1984

12 January: The President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, known as the Grace Commission, established in February 1982 by President Ronald Reagan, releases its summary report. 238 It states that the Pentagon could save $92 billion over three years by reducing major weapon purchases, reforming military retirement, closing commissaries, consolidating or shuttering military bases, and reforming the military health care system. The final report maintains that if the government implements the survey’s recommendations throughout the federal government there will be a three-year savings of $424 billion and $1.9 trillion annually by the year 2000. 239

232 Trask and Glennon, Documents on Organization and Mission, 2.
235 Trask and Glennon, Documents on Organization and Mission, 10–12.
236 Ibid., 12–13.
239 Trask and Glennon, Documents on Organization and Mission, 14.
4 February: In congressional testimony, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger (January 1981–November 1987) questions whether the support of Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) for defense department two-year budget submissions is appropriate. Weinberger indicates that the second-year dollars will be subject “to at least two major sets of potential alterations.” If the Defense Department was the only department submitting two-year budgets, states Weinberger, department submissions “would have to be fitted into the overall Governmental picture in the second year which would not be on a 2-year budget.” The second was that the “press of world activities and world events” could also demand a change. In later testimony he praises multiyear procurements first approved in 1982. He believed that some of the 32-multiyear contracts would save “four and a half billion dollars that we would have to be spent [sic] if we did not have the multiyear authorization.”

6–7 May: The Naval War College hosts the Newport Conference on Joint Chiefs of Staff reform. Those presenting agree—and likely mirror the Navy’s opposition to what becomes the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986—that a slower, more deliberate approach will yield better results. The purpose of the conference is to “contribute to an informed discussion of the issues raised by the current reform proposals by presenting a wide range of views on military reform and by examining how other nations organized their military command structures.” Presenters include Robert J. Murray, Admiral James L. Holloway III, General Bruce Palmer Jr., Dr. David K. Hall, and Dr. Jeffrey G. Barlow. Presenters of historical case studies include Dr. John Gooch (Great Britain), Dr. Steven T. Ross (France), Dr. Williamson Murray (Germany), and Dr. Arie Ofri (Israel). The conference attendees summarize the following:

The Joint system is not perfect. For those of us who have worked within it, and who have suffered its frustrations, it often seems very imperfect indeed. Yet in the longer sweep of history, it has not done too badly. It has, in many ways, performed as well as a democracy and a committee system allow. Nevertheless, it might help to cut off one hump and turn the camel into a dromedary. To accomplish this, only modest surgery, rather than major reform is needed. (Robert J. Murray)

There are solutions to the criticisms leveled at the present system which are less drastic than the suggested legislation, and would not require a fundamental alternation of basic concepts. If changes are made to the [Joint Chiefs of Staff]

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241 Ibid., 25.

system, those alternatives should be for the purpose of correcting valid shortcomings of the system that, in fact, represent a threat to its ability to provide the best possible military advice to the Commander in Chief, and to implement the policies and the operational commands of the national command authority to the operating forces in the field in a timely and effective manner. The current reform proposals would satisfy neither of these criteria. (Admiral Holloway)

[T]here are numerous problem areas within the [Department of Defense (DOD)] that are very probably far more serious than the [Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)] problem . . . I might point out just a few: A bloated bureaucracy in the Pentagon, especially with regards to the [Office of the Secretary of Defense] staff and the staff secretariats of the service secretaries. The proliferation of interminable layers of review within the DOD stifles initiative, consumes an enormous amount of time and energy, and constitutes a major source of discontent and low morale among the staff “troops” in Washington. . . . I have tried to give some historical background and context to the question of JCS reform and have concluded that only evolutionary change is possible in time of peace. . . . I have also indicated that the inevitable trend seems to be toward more centralized authority within the DOD and that the JCS should recognize this by taking the initiative and possibly preempting less desirable proposals. (General Palmer)

External scrutiny of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] by public and private entities helped improve the procedures employed within the existing structure. . . . But to believe that the improved performance of the current JCS system can be “institutionalized” and reduced to statutory print is a mirage. (Dr. Hall)

Much of the concern so recently expressed for radical reform of the [Joint Chiefs of Staff] system is driven by a search for perfectibility in senior military decision making that is simply not obtainable through defense reorganization. . . . For change to be effective it must be gradual and tied to a thorough understanding of the purposes it is designed to serve. (Dr. Barlow)

24 May: With Secretary of the Navy Instruction 42000.29A the secretary appoints himself the de facto “acquisition executive,” recognizing the office’s authority for acquisition matters concerning the Navy. The instruction also designates the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Shipbuilding and Logistics (ASN [S&L]) as the senior procurement executive responsible for the performance of systems and for managing the career acquisition workforce. The assistant secretary is also designated the focal point for procurement and the logistical systems needed to support the systems procured by the Navy. The instruction also directs the Chief of Naval Operations to support the ASN (S&L) in carrying out his duties.243

243 Nemfakos et al., The Perfect Storm, 19.
15 July: President Ronald Reagan establishes the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, known as the Packard Commission, with Executive Order 12526. 244

23 September: The Pentagon creates Space Command (SPACECOM). This reflects the Reagan administration’s interest in space operations and ballistic missile defense. Aerospace Defense Command is disestablished, and SPACECOM absorbs its mission and headquarters billets, while taking its place as the American element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command. 245

October: The Center for Strategic and International Studies publishes Toward a More Effective Defense. 246 The study emphasizes the need to strengthen joint military institutions and improve the quality of military advice. It recommends, among other things, making the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense; giving a broad role to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; instituting a biannual defense budget; and streamlining the Planning, Programming, and Budget System. 247

16 October: The Senate Armed Services Committee publishes Defense Organization: The Need for Change. 248 The report criticizes “current organization and decision making procedures of the Department of Defense and of the Congress.” It also argues that the Secretary of Defense has insufficient “power and influence” to overcome service “institutional forces that undermine his authority and offer him little help in carrying out his vast responsibilities.” The committee proposes 91 specific recommendations that attract attention and encourage discussion, but only a few become part of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. 249

8 November: The Department of Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1986 (PL 99-145) requires the Secretary of Defense to “establish for each fiscal year a goal for the percentage of defense procurements to be made during that year (expressed in total dollar value of contracts entered into) that are to be competitive procurements.” 250 Despite Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s (January 1981–November 1987) earlier concerns, the act also requires a two-year budget submission from the services every other year (Section 1405) beginning with FY 1988/1989 budget. In response, the services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense modify the planning, programming, and budgeting process during calendar year 1986 to focus on fiscal

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247 Trask and Glennon, Documents on Organization and Mission, 15.
248 Staff Report of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, The Need for Change.
249 Trask and Glennon, Documents on Organization and Mission, 15–25.
years 1988 and 1989 rather than only fiscal year 1988.\textsuperscript{251} The two-year budget can apply to the budget presented to Congress, the budget resolution adopted by Congress, or to the frequency and period covered by appropriations acts.\textsuperscript{252}

**1986**

**30 June:** The Packard Commission, established 15 July 1985, releases its final report.\textsuperscript{253} It includes recommendations for national security planning and budgeting—planning should begin with national security objectives and priorities, budget provides a five-year estimate to reflect competing demands based on National Security Council (NSC) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) recommendations; military organization—designate Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as principal uniformed military adviser to the President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense; acquisition, organization and procedures—create a new position, by statute for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition); and government-industry accountability.\textsuperscript{254}

President Ronald Reagan had already endorsed the commission’s preliminary recommendations with National Security Decision Directive 219 of 1 April 1986.\textsuperscript{255}

**1 October:** In a wide-ranging reform effort, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433)\textsuperscript{256} attempts to resolve what Congress determines to be an inadequate connection between military strategy and requirements, a failure to field common equipment, poor management and service resistance to joint programs, and a lack of effective service coordination of acquisition.\textsuperscript{257}

The act implements many of the recommendations from the Packard Commission, which changes the relationship between the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and national leadership and includes a shift in the advisory role from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{258}

The legislation also provides a legislative basis for the combatant commands, attempts to improve service interoperability by integrating planning and procurement, and increases the power of the chairman at the expense of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Service chiefs retain

\textsuperscript{255} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{257} Staff Report of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, The Need for Change, 6.
\textsuperscript{258} Thomas Hone and Curtis Utz, draft manuscript, History of OPNAV, ch. “The Continuing Response to Goldwater-Nichols and the End of the Cold War,” 1.
responsibility for training and equipping their forces, but the chairman replaces the corporate JCS as the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and gains increased power in the budgeting process.\textsuperscript{259}

Additionally, it establishes the position of Vice Chairman of the JCS, removes operational authority from CNO and other service chiefs, combatant commanders report directly to Secretary of Defense, reduces the number of Navy deputy CNOs from six to five, and changes many relationships within the Departments of Defense and the Navy.

**14 November:** The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (PL 99-661)\textsuperscript{260} attempts to redress problems in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 by reducing the excessive number of briefings that program managers had to deliver for program approval\textsuperscript{261} and streamlining reporting from program managers to program executive officers to the senior acquisition executive, but service chiefs remain out of the chain.\textsuperscript{262}

The statute includes Title IX of Division A, the Defense Acquisition Improvement Act of 1986, (PL 99-500, corrected law 99-501). This amends federal procurement provisions outlining the duties and precedence of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. It also significantly changes defense acquisition policies and procedures. Among them, it

- establishes the position of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition;
- directs the secretary of a military department to establish a baseline description for a major defense acquisition program under the jurisdiction of such secretary;
- directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a certain program aimed at increasing the efficiency of the management structure of defense acquisition programs by reducing program manager reporting requirements, and describes programs participating in such efforts as defense enterprise programs;
- directs the secretary to designate programs for participation in the defense enterprise program and provides milestone authorizations for such programs;
- directs the secretary to ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, defense procurement supply requirements are fulfilled through the use of nondevelopmental (i.e., commercially available) items;
- directs the secretary to take specified actions limiting the use of funds for undefinitized contractual actions (contracts in which all necessary terms are not final). Requires oversight of such action by the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General;
- directs the secretary to require the use of a competitive prototype program strategy in the development of a major weapons system;

\textsuperscript{261} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{262} Ibid.
• directs the secretary to require certain types of weapons testing (survivability, lethality, operational) to be completed for major weapons systems and munitions programs before proceeding beyond low-rate initial production of such systems or programs;
• directs the secretary to take appropriate action to ensure that DOD increases the use of multiyear contracting authority in FY 1988; and
• provides certain limitations on the use of federally funded research and development centers.

It also mandates the creation of a unified Special Operations Command and also revises defense procurement procedures other than competitive procedures and requirements relating to defense contractors.263

1987

13 April: When the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff establish the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) they disestablish Readiness Command (REDCOM) to free funding and headquarters billets for SOCOM. The Army transfers elements of REDCOM to Forces Command (FORSCOM), now a specified command. SOCOM uniquely controls special forces, which includes “promotion, assignment, retention, and professional development,” as well as expansive programming and budgeting authority.264

1 July: The Department of Defense creates Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).265 This emerges as a result of recommendations from the Packard Commission that wanted the defense department to create a “unity of [transportation] effort” in wartime. The Air Force’s Military Airlift Command (MAC) [Air Mobility Command from 1992] loses its status as a specified command and becomes a TRANSCOM component. The new command gains responsibility for the Navy’s Military Sealift Command and the Army’s Military Traffic Management Command (Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command from 2004).266

4 August: Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.96 designates the Secretary of the Navy as the service’s acquisition executive. He therefore holds not only program decision authority but also responsibility for the acquisition process. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Shipbuilding and Logistics (ASN [S&L]) reports directly to SECNAV for acquisition matters and is charged with supplying, equipping, servicing, and maintaining the Navy’s equipment; and has responsibility for acquisition, production, and support for the Navy and Marine Corps, as well as providing staff support that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Chief, Material Command (CMC) each consider necessary to perform their duties and responsibilities. The instruction

divests the CNO of acquisition responsibilities, but charges him with supplying, servicing, maintaining, outfitting, and logistics functions.²⁶⁷

5 August: SECNAVINST 5430.95 designates the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Engineering and Systems (ASN [RE&S]) responsible for all Department of the Navy acquisition except ship construction and conversion, and for matters regarding research and development. In support of this role, the Chief of Naval Research reports to ASN (RE&S). The instruction also codifies the elimination of Naval Material Command.²⁶⁸


22 December: The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1988 (PL 100-202) prohibits all government departments and agencies from purchasing electricity in a manner inconsistent with state law governing the provision of electric utility service, including state utility commission rulings and electric utility franchises or service territories pursuant to state statute, state regulations, or state approved territorial agreements. The act provides for two exceptions:

- Nothing precludes the head of a federal agency from entering into a contract pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 8287.
- Nothing precludes the secretary of a military department from entering into a contract pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2394 or from purchasing electricity from any provider when the utility or utilities having applicable state approved franchise or other service authorizations are found by the secretary to be unwilling or unable to meet unusual standards for service reliability that are necessary for purposes of national defense.²⁷¹

1988

29 September: The National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (PL 100-456) requires the Secretary of Defense to “revise the Department of Defense regulations that provide for the use of fixed-price type contracts in a development program” only if the level of program risk permits realistic pricing or the use of a fixed-price contract permits an equitable and sensible allocation of program risk between the United States and the contractor.

²⁶⁷ Nemfakos et al., The Perfect Storm, 25.
²⁶⁸ Ibid.
It also requires the President to submit to Congress “a comprehensive report on contractual offset arrangements required of United States firms for the supply of weapon systems or defense-related items to foreign countries or foreign firms.” Offset arrangements occur when U.S. firms enter into contracts with foreign countries or foreign firms that require a specified percentage of work of the contract be performed by one or more foreign firms, require the purchase of a specified amount or quantity of unrelated goods or services from foreign sources, or require a specified investment in domestic businesses of such foreign countries.

The act also establishes a test program for contract awards to small and disadvantaged businesses for printing, binding, and related services for the Department of Defense.\(^{272}\)

It places requirements, restrictions, or limitations on Department of the Navy procurement programs for the Trident II missile, DDG-51 destroyer, 5-inch semi-active laser guided projectile, AH-1W ground support equipment, and AN/SQR-17A acoustic processors.

It directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a detailed report on the current and projected Navy requirements for aircraft no later than 1 December 1988.

Additionally, it modifies joint duty provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and directs the Secretary of Defense to prescribe guidelines that a fixed-price contract should be awarded in the case of a development program only when the level of program risk permits realistic pricing and the use of a fixed-price contract permits an equitable allocation or program risk between the United States and the contractor.\(^{273}\)

1 October: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1989 (PL 100-463) modifies the previous fiscal year’s budget only to the extent necessary for significant high priority changes.\(^{274}\) However, despite a two-year budget submission, Congress continues to appropriate money on a yearly basis. The act also designates the Department of Defense as the lead agency for detection and monitoring for the “War on Drugs,” and authorizes $300 million in spending for this purpose.\(^{275}\)

1989

24 January: Assistant Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV signs a memorandum giving Commander-in-Chief U.S. Special Operations Command budgetary authority over Major Force Program (MFP-11). Soon after, the Office of the Secretary of Defense gives Special Operations Command (US SOCOM) control of selected MFP-11 programs effective 1 October 1990 and


total MFP-11 responsibility in October 1991. For the first time, a Commander-in-Chief has authority for a budget and program objective memorandum.

MFP-11 is known as the “Special Operations Forces (SOF) checkbook.” For the Navy, this means that U.S. Navy Sea, Air, and Land Teams (SEALs) transfer to USSOCOM and all SEAL funding is its responsibility. Thus, the SEALs no longer compete with platforms in the Navy budget.\(^\text{276}\)

**12 June:** The Defense Management Report is a response to a February 1989 presidential directive to the Secretary of Defense. The report establishes a way to fully implement the Packard Commission’s recommendations and attempts to improve the performance of the defense acquisition system.\(^\text{277}\)

It concludes that sound management principles can be met with current division of responsibilities between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified and specified commands, military departments, and defense agencies.\(^\text{278}\) Under these arrangements the Deputy Secretary of Defense conducts day-to-day operational management and provides a more rigorous Planning, Programming, and Budget System (PPBS). The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) exercises authority intended by Packard Commission and authority will extend to directing secretaries of military departments upon executing acquisition responsibilities. The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) provides advice and support on foreign relations and arms control matters and serves as primary adviser of the PPBS planning phase while the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff continues in advisory role.

**28 September:** The day before his retirement, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff William J. Crowe Jr. (October 1985–September 1989) releases a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney (March 1989–January 1993) on the roles and functions of the armed forces. This report is the first reform effort since the Key West Agreement. Admiral Crowe believes that both Defense Reorganization Acts of 1958 and 1986 “have rendered the term ‘Service Roles and Missions’ an inaccurate description of the division of Defense responsibilities.” He recommends that the secretary should amend Department of Defense Directive 51000.1 to require the Chairman to report on Roles and Functions of the armed forces and to provide “more precision and clarity in the allocation of Service functions.” He also recommends that each service have its own close air support. On 3 October, new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin L. Powell (October 1989–September 1993) forwards Admiral Crowe’s report to the service chiefs.\(^\text{279}\)

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\(^{278}\) Ibid., 8.

2 November: New Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell (October 1989–September 1993) sends a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney (March 1989–January 1993) essentially repudiating Admiral Crowe’s 28 September memorandum. Although he includes Admiral Crowe’s report as an attachment, he maintains that the “report is not a consensus document” and is, instead only “the first iteration in a process that will remove ‘Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces’ from the status of icon and will place it in a context as a working document of the Department of Defense.” On the controversial issue that each service provides its own close air support, General Powell notes that JCS Pub 0-2 already allows

[A]ny Service [to] provide close air support as a matter of theology. It does not necessarily follow that each Service must have close air support assigned to it as a primary function to be performed. . . . Without disagreeing with Admiral Crowe’s statement . . . I do not recommend that you change DODD 5100.1 to assign close air support as a function to be performed by the Army. It would sow considerable confusion and would be detrimental to the progress that has been made between the Army and the Air Force in recent years to resolve this issue.280

21 November: The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1990 (PL 101-165) directs the Secretary of Defense and each purchasing and contracting agency of the department, for current and future fiscal years, to assist U.S. small and minority-owned businesses to participate equitably in the furnishing of commodities and services. This is accomplished by increasing the resources and number of personnel jointly assigned to promoting both small and minority business involvement in purchases; making information available to such businesses, as far in advance as possible, regarding proposed purchases; assisting small and minority business concerns to become equitable participants as subcontractors on contracts; and otherwise advocating and providing small and minority business opportunities to participate in the procurement process.281

1990

20 January: Based on recommendations from a defense management review board, President George H. W. Bush nominates Gerald A. Cann to the new position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. This consolidates responsibilities previously assigned to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for shipbuilding, logistics, and research engineering.282

281 Laws Relating to Federal Procurement, 491.
29 January: The end of the Cold War results in significant naval reductions in both the United States and the Soviet Union and the submission of first post–Cold War Department of Defense budget. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney (March 1989–January 1993) announces the Fiscal Year 1991 defense budget, which calls for a fleet of 546 battle-force ships by the end of the fiscal year, including 14 deployable carriers.

Cheney also announces the expected retirement of battleships Iowa (BB-61) and New Jersey (BB-62), and a reduction of the Navy’s personnel strength from 591,000 to 585,000. Additionally, the budget cancels the Sea Lance antisubmarine missile (UUM-125), in part because of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In February the Soviet Union announces plans to scrap 26 diesel-electric submarines, including, 4 cruisers, 4 destroyers, and 45 surface ships. These reductions are in addition to the 12 submarines and 28 surface ships the Soviet Union scrapped in 1989.  

5 November: As part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 1991, the FY 1991 Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (PL 101-510) [DAWIA] establishes an Acquisition Corps and professionalizes the workforce through education, training, and work experience with implementation uniformity throughout the Department of Defense.  DAWIA establishes contracting officer qualification requirements, Acquisition Corps membership selection and eligibility requirements, program and deputy program manager assignment and other qualification requirements for major and significant other acquisition programs, and requirements for acquisition personnel assigned to critical acquisition positions—those senior acquisition positions with greater responsibility.  However, differences in policies and practices between civilian and military personnel remain.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 1991 law also directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to appoint an Acquisition Law Advisory Panel. The panel is to review acquisition laws applicable to the Department of Defense to streamline the process, making recommendations for the repeal or amendment of laws as it deems necessary, and preparing a proposed code of relevant acquisition laws.

The panel reviews more than 600 laws and produces a 1,800-page report with 300

recommendations to amend, repeal, delete, or consolidate statutes, and in some cases, create new laws. Its recommendations influence other procurement reform studies.  

Critics believe that the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and DAWIA acts build a wall between the military communities of line and acquisition officers, with the result that few line officers understand the acquisition processes and the acquisition work force officers are stigmatized as “civilians in uniform” who do not understand the operational needs of their service.

5 November: The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1991 (PL 101-511) restores funding to the balances of any unobligated amount of a Department of Defense appropriation withdrawn under the provisions of Section 1552(a)(2) of Title 31, U.S.C., the obligated balance of which had not been transferred pursuant to the provisions of Section 1552(a)(1) of Title 31, U.S.C.

1991

5 August: SECNAVINST 5400.15 codifies the Secretary of Defense’s direction to designate an individual Assistant Secretary of the Navy as the acquisition executive. The instruction provides the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition a full-time role in the development and procurement of systems and in guaranteeing that operational requirements were transformed into executable processes. This change marks another major shift in the Navy’s acquisition processes.

5 December: The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (PL 102-190) authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to transfer specified FY 1991 research and development funds for the procurement of Navy aircraft. It authorizes the secretary to use FY 1991 AV-8B Harrier aircraft procurement funds for other authorized aircraft procurement programs, projects, and activities, with certain fund use limitations. The act also directs the Secretary of Defense to report to the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees concerning procurement objectives for air cushion landing craft and authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to transfer specified funds from FY 1991 unobligated balances for the FY 1992 procurement of Trident missiles.


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289 Blickstein, Where Do We Go From Here?, 28.
291 Nemfakos et al., The Perfect Storm, 26–27.
Roth (R-DE) and Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), repealing the exclusion of women in the Navy and Air Force from assignment to aircraft engaged in combat missions.²⁹³

1992

27 February: Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank B. Kelso II (June 1990–April 1994) and Commandant of the Marine Corps General Carl E. Mundy Jr. (July 1991–June 1995) testify on the Annual 1992 Department of the Navy Posture Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee. The statement emphasizes the dramatic changes that have occurred since the end of the Cold War and the consequential shift in U.S. military strategy from an emphasis on global superpower confrontation to future conflicts, which are likely to be regional, sudden, and disparate. The Navy and Marine Corps have already begun to adapt to changing geopolitical realities, emphasizing the exceptional quality and force readiness of the expeditionary naval forces.²⁹⁴

June: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin L. Powell (October 1989–September 1993), with input from Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) Paul Wolfowitz, begins a significant “Base Force” review to evaluate the roles, missions, and force structure after the Cold War.²⁹⁵ The results suggest “acceptable” post–Cold War drawdown targets, rather than letting Congress develop its own cuts. Navy leadership is generally hostile to General Powell’s initiatives as they were largely frozen out of planning. The review also suggests a target Navy of 450 battle-force ships, including 12 carrier battle groups and reorients defense planning around Desert Storm–sized “Major Regional Conflicts.” The objective is that the United States should be able to win two simultaneous major regional conflicts.²⁹⁶ Powell eventually suggests replacing the Unified Command Plan with an Atlantic Command (ACOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and creating smaller, deployable contingency commands to provide for command and control.²⁹⁷

1 June: Strategic Command (STRATCOM) replaces Strategic Air Command (SAC). With the end of the Cold War, strategic forces shrink and come under joint command for the first time. The new command gains oversight over submarine nuclear ballistic missiles, previously kept solely under Navy control. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank B. Kelso (June 1990–April 1994) expressed concerns that the new organization, which took over SAC’s headquarters and billets, would be unable to effectively oversee Navy strategic assets, but relents after the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) mandates that 35 percent of headquarters staff at STRATCOM (355

officers) would be Navy personnel. The JCS considered folding Space Command into STRATCOM to eliminate 100–300 staff billets, but ultimately took no action.298

**July:** Marine Forces Pacific and Marine Forces Atlantic are stood up under Commander-in-Chief Atlantic and Commander-in-Chief Pacific as Marine component commanders directly under the Commander-in-Chiefs. Previously, Marine forces in each unified command had been considered part of the naval component. This change develops from ad hoc command arrangements developed by Commander-in-Chief, Central Command General Norman Schwarzkopf for the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in the run-up to Operation Desert Storm in 1990–1991.299

**Summer:** Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank Kelso (June 1990–April 1994) reorganizes Navy staff structure “to strengthen the Navy’s position inside the Pentagon” and to reflect his Total Quality Leadership management practices. He replaces old “OP” codes with “N” codes, and named to match Joint Staff elements (e.g., OP-06 is renamed N3/N5 because it fills an analogous function to the J3 and J5 elements), allowing the Navy to liaise more easily with the Joint Staff. Admiral Kelso also places platform sponsors under an expanded Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments section (N8), which centralizes planning and programming in one staff element. With the reforms, N8 replaces N3/N5 (Operations, Plans, and Strategy) as the most powerful Office of the Chief of Naval Operations element. Admiral Kelso also switches resource decisions from naval warfare areas (i.e., Anti-Submarine Warfare, Strike Warfare), to joint warfare areas (i.e., Strategic Deterrence, Joint Littoral Warfare), forcing sponsors to consider the wider utility of their programs. In 1992–1993, the new N8 organization proactively recommends cost savings, rather than letting Office of the Secretary of Defense or Congress impose blanket cuts.300

**6 October:** The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1993 (PL 102-396) prohibits a wide number of actions regarding the expenditure of defense funds. Prohibited are

- the use of appropriations for unauthorized publicity or propaganda;
- the use of appropriations for the procurement of any food, clothing, specified cloth (cotton, silk, and wool) or synthetic fabrics, or specified metals not grown, produced, or processed within the United States;
- Department of Defense (DOD) funds from being used by the secretary of a military department to purchase coal or coke from foreign nations for use at U.S. defense facilities in Europe when U.S. coal or coke is available;
- the use of appropriated funds for conversion to contractor performance of an activity or function of DOD performed by more than ten civilian DOD employees until a cost analysis is completed and certified;

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299 Swartz, et al., Lines in the Sea, 106.
• funds from being used by a military department to modify an aircraft, weapon, ship, or other item of equipment if such item is to be retired or otherwise disposed of within five years after completion of the modification;
• the use of funds for fixed-price contracts exceeding $10,000,000 for the development of a major defense system or subsystem, unless the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and the secretary take action;
• the use of appropriated funds for the procurement of welded shipboard anchor and mooring chains manufactured outside the United States;
• funds available to DOD or the Navy from being used to implement certain automated data processing or information technology facility consolidation plans, or to make reductions or transfers of personnel in connection with such plans until a congressional notification requirement has been met by the secretary;
• Navy funds from being used to carry out an electromagnetic pulse program in the Chesapeake Bay area in connection with the Electromagnetic Pulse Radiation Environment Simulator for Ships program, until the Secretary of the Navy makes certifications to Congress concerning the program’s importance;
• the use of funds to reduce or disestablish the operation of Navy Reserve P-3 squadrons below the levels funded in the act. Directs the Secretary of the Navy to obligate funds appropriated for FY 1991 through FY 1993 for the modernization of aircraft he intends to keep in the fleet for more than 5 years;
• more than 15 percent of the funds available to DOD for sealift from being used to acquire ships constructed in foreign shipyards;
• funds from being used to support the Tailhook Association; and
• thirty-five percent of funds earmarked for certain military aircraft from being obligated or expended until the secretary submits a report on their military and fiscal validity.

On a more positive note, the act authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to use specified funds to charter ships for use as auxiliary minesweepers, directs the secretary to increase the ceiling price of certain contracts and to make specified payments to the contractors within ten days after the enactment of this act, and allows funds from the Commander in Chief Initiative Fund to be provided to the Director of the Joint Staff regarding areas not within the responsibility of a commander of a combatant command.301

23 October: The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (PL 102-484) prohibits and controls the purchase or merging of a foreign government entity with any company engaged in interstate commerce in the United States that is performing a Department of Defense or Department of Energy contract under a national security program.302

Additionally, it limits the ability of the Secretary of Defense to re-obligate any sum merged in a Department of Defense “M” account until the secretary has identified an equal sum under

Section 1406 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 that can be canceled. An M or a Surplus Account occurs as a result of unobligated funds after the availability of those funds (generally 1, 2, or 3 years) expires. Unused obligations can be used to fund increases in valid obligations if an agency discovers that it has underestimated the amount of the obligation or receives an unexpected charge associated with a given fiscal year and appropriation.  

1993

12 February: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin L. Powell (October 1989–September 1993) recommends several changes to defense doctrine in a report to Defense Secretary Leslie Aspin Jr. (January 1993–February 1994). In his report, General Powell emphasizes the importance of retaining a high state of readiness, and the need for forward deployments that support U.S. foreign policy objectives. Other recommendations include consolidating Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard initial fixed-wing training and transition of such training to a common primary training aircraft. He also recommends that the military consider merging the individual services’ major aircraft maintenance depots into a joint depot maintenance command.

27 March: When the White House releases the Fiscal Year 1994 budget, Secretary of Defense Leslie Aspin Jr. (January 1993–February 1994) describes the proposal as “the first truly post–Cold War budget . . . it cuts Cold War forces and begins to buy the new capabilities we need to meet the new dangers we face.” The budget includes a number of new initiatives:

- $398 million for an account to cover the costs of peacekeeping, humanitarian, and disaster relief operations
- Special emphasis on strategic mobility and military power projection by funding a sixth amphibious assault ship (LHD) and developing the V-22 Osprey
- Intensified efforts to slow the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means, including $400 million to continue and expand efforts to cooperatively reduce the WMD threat in the former Soviet Union

To support and further the spread of democracy, the budget also renews efforts to forge security partnerships with Russia and former Soviet states with an additional $50 million to institutionalize and expand military-to-military contacts.

305 271700Z Mar 93, CNO CHINFO Series, Post 1990 Command File, 1993, box 943, Navy Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC 20374; This issue of NAVNEWS includes a full breakdown of the FY94 budget as it pertains to defence and particularly Navy spending and force structure and the outline of post–Cold War restructuring and force reductions.
28 April: Secretary of Defense Leslie Aspin Jr. (January 1993–February 1994) lifts the Department of Defense policy ban on the assignment of women as combat aircrew. 306

29 April: In a message to Navy leadership, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank B. Kelso II (June 1990–April 1994) outlines the Navy’s steps in implementing the major changes directed by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin Jr. (January 1993–February 1994) regarding the future roles of women in the military, including permitting them to compete for assignments in aircraft engaged in combat missions. In step with changes across the armed services, the Navy plans to open as many additional ships as practicable within current law and draft legislation to repeal the law that excludes assignment of female Sailors to ships engaging in combat missions. The admiral also directs that recruiting for aviation officers and the selection of aircraft/mission specialization be on a gender-neutral basis. 307

3 August: The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (PL 103-62) assesses the requirements for federal agency personnel regarding knowledge and skill in information resources management and the adequacy of those requirements for facilitating the achievement of performance goals. 308 The act’s preamble states congressional concern regarding waste and inefficiencies in the federal government. It emphasizes the need for greater attention to program performance and results in the hopes of improving strategic planning and performance measurements throughout the federal government.

It also assesses the extent to which the positions and personnel at the executive and management levels of the agency meet those requirements. The act develops strategies and specific plans for hiring, training, and professional development to rectify deficiencies in meeting those requirements. Additionally, the act mandates reporting to the head of the agency on the progress made in improving capability. 309

2 September: Secretary of Defense Leslie Aspen Jr. (January 1993–February 1994) releases the preliminary results of the Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era (otherwise known as The Review) a “comprehensive review of the nation’s defense strategy, force structure,


modernization, infrastructure, and foundations.” The review downgrades requirement for winning two simultaneous major regional conflicts to winning two regional conflicts “that occur nearly simultaneously.” The review also proposes further cuts to Navy force structure: 11 carrier battle groups and 346 battle-force ships. Critics find fault for the review’s emphasis on short-term threats over long-term modernization. The review also recognizes a need for acquisition reform given that “certain oversight and regulatory practices that were adopted during the Cold War are no longer affordable or necessary today. The existing DoD acquisition system is based on outdated management philosophies and organizational structures.”

13 September: The Clinton administration begins the National Performance Review, an interagency task force to reform and streamline the way the federal government works. The review includes a six-month study of the federal government meant to “move from red tape to results to create a government that works better and costs less” that is “a new customer service contract with the American people.” It frames the issue as a problem of industrial-era bureaucracies in an information age and the need to create an “effective, entrepreneurial government by cutting red tape, putting customers first; empowering employees to get results; and cutting back to basics: producing better government for less.”

By 2001, the task force claims the following major accomplishments:

- Reduction in the size of the federal civilian workforce by 426,200
- Savings of $136 billion
- Reduction in headquarters staff and a cut of 78,000 managers government wide
- Removal of 640,000 pages of internal agency rules
- Closure of 2,000 obsolete field offices
- Procurement reform that expands the use of credit cards for small item purchases

1 October: The Department of Defense reorganizes Atlantic Command (ACOM) and gives it the responsibility to supervise most forces in the continental United States (CONUS). ACOM is the “joint force integrator” for CONUS-based forces not part of any other unified command, including Army Forces Command, Air Combat Command, the Atlantic Fleet, and Marines in the

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Atlantic. This change was made at the urging of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin L. Powell (October 1989–September 1993, who “took the initiative in creating a CONUS-based command. . . . Because it was CONUS-based and its Cold War mission had been greatly reduced, Powell selected U.S. Atlantic Command,”) to avoid the creation of an entirely new organization with new headquarters obligations. In October 1999, the Joint Chiefs of Staff renames ACOM the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). 314


1994

18 January: In a press briefing, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank. B. Kelso II (June 1990–April 1994) emphasizes that while the naval forces of the future, as he explains in Force 2001: A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy–Marine Corps Team, will have smaller numbers of ships, aircraft, and personnel, their capability will be significant because of technology and prudent cost-cutting measures. He states that “One of the basic philosophies of our plan is to take charge of our own fate. To get there, we need to reduce the excess infrastructure we have and make ourselves efficient at what we do to create the capital necessary to maintain a quality Navy. We’re not only thinking about the Navy today, but the Navy after the next Navy,”316

9 February: Secretary of Defense William J. Perry (February 1994–January 1997) releases “Acquisition Reform: A Mandate for Change.” Acquisition reform is consistent with other national goals, such as: saving taxpayer money, reinventing government, strengthening the military, and improving the economy. To accomplish this, the Department of Defense (DOD) must

- rapidly acquire commercial and other state-of-the-art products and technology from reliable suppliers;
- assist conversion of U.S. defense-unique companies to dual-use production;
- aid in the transfer of military technology to the commercial sector;

• preserve defense-unique core capabilities;
• integrate, broaden, and maintain a national industrial base sustained primarily by commercial demand capable of meeting DOD’s needs;
• adopt business processes characteristic of world-class customers and suppliers; and
• stop applying government-unique terms and conditions on contractors.  

5 October: The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 1995 (PL 103-337) designates four programs for participation in the defense acquisition pilot program as called for in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. These programs are the Joint Direct Attack Munition, Joint Primary Aircraft Training System, commercial derivative aircraft, and commercial derivative engine.

13 October: The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA, PL 103-355) overhauls “the cumbersome and complex federal procurement system.” Among the many aspects of this law, it eliminates most paperwork and record keeping requirements for acquisitions below $100,000 and allows direct “micropurchases” of items below $2,500 without competitive quotations or compliance with the Buy American Act and certain small business requirements. The law stipulates that “within 1 year of FASA’s enactment, or by October 13, 1995, major elements of subtitles A and B require federal agencies to establish cost, schedule, and performance goals for acquisition programs and annually report on the progress in meeting these goals, create personnel performance incentives linked to the achievement of these goals and submits recommendations for legislative changes necessary to facilitate and enhance the management of acquisition programs and the acquisition workforce based on performance.” The law also requires the Department of Defense to report annually on whether the time required for incorporating new technology into major weapon systems has decreased by 50 percent and to review its acquisition program cycle regulations.

Additionally, it authorizes the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy to conduct a testing program of alternative and innovative procurement procedures. Each test will be carried out in no more than two specific procuring activities in an agency designed by the administrator. The agency shall select the procuring activities participation in the test with the administrator’s approval.

The law requires the administrator of the “Office of Federal Procurement Policy of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the heads of civilian agencies, to develop results-

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oriented acquisition process guidelines for property and services.”

13 October: The Government Management Reform Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-356) expands the requirement for a fully audited financial statement under the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 to 24 agencies and components of federal entities designated by the Office of Management and Budget. The law also requires the Department of the Treasury to produce a consolidated financial statement for the federal government, which the General Accounting Office is to audit annually.

1995

26 May: SECNAVINST 5400.15A stipulates that systems commanders exercise the authority of acquisition executive to directly supervise acquisition programs and report to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for execution of programs that are not development or acquisition projects. Accordingly, the divide between the CNO and the procurement process remains intact. Program executive officers are authorized to act for and exercise the authority of the acquisition executive with respect to their assigned programs, and to maintain oversight of the cost and schedule performance.

30 June: The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 1994 (PL 103-160) requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish a Commission on Roles and Missions, conduct a study, and submit a report. The purpose of the report is to review the “appropriateness . . . of the current allocations of roles, missions, and functions among the Armed Forces,” evaluate and report on alternative allocations, and recommend changes in the current definition and distribution of those roles, missions, and functions.

The commission attempts to allocate roles and missions among the services in the context of the Key West Agreement of 1948, which is “no longer appropriate” as it leads to institutional quarrels and “unsatisfactory compromises.”

Importantly, the commission promotes full implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433) and identifies six attributes

323 Army Knowledge Management.
324 Nemfakos et al., The Perfect Storm, 28.
326 Trask and Glennon, Documents on Organization and Mission, 207–213.
327 John P. White, Chairman, transmission letter, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces.
328 Ibid.
for “a successful DOD in the future.”  

- Responsiveness to requirements that change over time
- Reliability in delivering predictable, consistent performance
- Cooperation and trust
- Innovation in new weapons, organization, and operational concepts
- Competition directed toward constructive solutions to complex problems
- Efficiency in the use of resources

It also recommends:

- Improve the ability of Secretary of Defense to provide unified strategic and programmatic direction to DOD.
- Expand the role of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander-in-Chiefs in ensuring better joint doctrine, training, weapons planning, and support.
- Focus the military departments on providing the right mix of capabilities for unified military operations.
- Improve capabilities to deal with new challenges in the post–Cold War world.
- Reduce the cost of the support infrastructure through an increase in outsourcing and better management.

1996

10 February: The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 1996 (PL 104-106) allows the Secretary of Defense to conduct a pilot program for the purpose of “determining the potential for increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the acquisition process in facilities by using commercial practices on a facility-wide basis.” The act contains two embedded “reform acts”—Division D—Federal Acquisition Reform and Division E—Information Technology Management Reform—referred to collectively as the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.  

The Federal Acquisition Reform Act provides guidance to ensure a fair and open competitive process for contractor support. It gives contracting officers more discretion when making competitive range determinations and permits the use of simplified acquisition procedures in the purchase of commercial items up to $5 million.

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329 Summary, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces.
330 Ibid.
The Information Technology Management Reform Act establishes chief information officers (CIO) for federal agencies. They are responsible for providing advice and assistance to agency heads on information technology (IT) acquisition and information resource management (IRM). The CIO is also responsible for developing, maintaining, and facilitating the implementation of a sound and integrated IT architecture, a framework for evolving or maintaining existing IT and acquiring new IT. The act requires agency heads to identify in the agency’s IRM plan (required by the Paperwork Reduction Act), major IT acquisition programs that significantly deviate from their respective cost, performance, or schedule goals. It also establishes the CIOs’ government role, forms the interagency CIO Council, and includes a pilot program for IT Share-in-Savings. Share-in-Savings is a contracting method that “encourages industry to develop creative technology solutions to meet agency needs and, at the same time, helps Administration efforts to advance the President’s Management Agenda to make the federal government a modern, citizen-centric, electronic enterprise.”

**July:** Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John M. Shalikashvili (October 1993–September 1997) issues Joint Vision 2010. The document provides a “conceptual template for how America’s Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.” It introduces four new operational concepts: precision engagement, dominant maneuver, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.

**23 September:** The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 (PL 104-201) allows the Secretary of Defense to waive certain sections of Title 10, United States Code, for any “defense acquisition program designated by the Secretary of Defense for participation in the defense acquisition pilot program authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 1991 (PL 101-510).” The act also allows the Secretary of Defense to waive Operational Test and Evaluation requirements and selected acquisition reporting requirements for pilot programs.

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333 GAO, Acquisition Reform.
335 Acquisition Community Connection, DAU.
336 “GSA Promotes ‘Share-in-Savings’ IT Contracting, November 6, 2003, GSA#10052, [http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/101345](http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/101345).
19 October: The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 (PL 104-320) re-enacts the 1990 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (PL 101-552 and PL 102-354). This creates a process “in which a third party neutral assists the disputants in reaching an amicable resolution through the use of various techniques.” It also codifies the authority of federal agencies to use alternative dispute resolution techniques and gives them the flexibility in determining whether and how to use them. Each agency, however, must adopt an alternative dispute resolution policy and the agency head must designate a senior official as the “dispute resolution specialist.” They must also provide training for the specialist and other employees involved in implementing the act.

1997

May: The Joint Chief’s of Staff publication, “Concept for Future Joint Operations,” builds on Joint Vision 2010, issued in July 1996 to provide a “conceptual framework for America’s armed forces to think about the future.” Information superiority and full spectrum dominance underlies technological innovation that makes Vision 2010 a reality. The concept stresses dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics.


Some critics maintain that the review is unsuccessful. First, because Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili (October 1993–September 1997) gets out “in front of civilian

policymakers in Office of the Secretary of Defense while constraining the range of potential options” and that Defense Secretary Cohen is the newest member and only Republican in President William Clinton’s cabinet and has little leverage to mitigate against General Shalikashvili’s influence. Additionally, budgets are “frozen at levels that . . . not only seem incapable of resolving the emerging gaps but also hindered the development of more creative strategies for resolving the Department of Defense’s dilemma.”

**November:** The Defense Reform Initiative Report identifies four pillars, or major areas, of reform: reengineering—adopt best practices; consolidation—reorganize; compete—apply market mechanisms; and eliminate—reduce excess support structures.

Defense Reform Initiative Directives (DRIDs) cover issues that require reports to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on the implementation status of most of the initiatives the report identifies.

New ideas emerge for changing the way defense does business. Sometimes they take the form of DRIDs and others are informal reviews. The emphasis on reform is for the defense establishment to

- adopt best business practices (i.e., electronic business operations and contract administration and finance, and travel and logistics re-engineering);
- encourage organizational change (i.e., personnel reductions in Office of the Secretary of Defense, defense agencies, Department of Defense field activities, Joint Staff, headquarters elements, and combatant commands); and
- streamline through competition (evaluate entire military and civilian workforce to identify functions that are commercial in nature and could be opened up for public-private competition under the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 process, an executive branch policy for managing public-private competitions).

The report also recommends that, whenever possible, the federal government should conduct competitions between public agencies and the private sector to determine who should perform the work. There is also strong interest in eliminating unneeded infrastructure.

**18 November:** The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 (PL 105-85) requires 60 percent of all eligible purchases made by the Department of Defense for an amount less than the micro-purchase threshold contained in the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (PL 93-400) [30 August 1974]. It also clarifies eligible purchases and reporting requirements.

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December: The National Defense Panel Report addresses the need for transformation of military and national security structures. This is to build on the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 reforms and restructure the entire national security system to improve coherence and flexibility in response to threats at home and abroad. The report incorporates economic, political, diplomatic, and military elements in an integrated system of mutual reinforcement and support.

The objective includes the Unified Command Plan, proposing significant changes to the functional commands to incorporate new mission capabilities and some restructuring of the geographic command, operational concepts and equipment (including transforming the industrial base), key Department of Defense (DOD) business practices (including transforming the department’s infrastructure).

The report highlights the need to focus DOD resources on future challenges—even if that means accepting more risk in the near term (e.g., structure and forces are sized to meet today’s security requirements, however, it inhibits the ability to adapt and respond to challenges in the longer term).

The report encourages experimentation in investigating new joint operational concepts, application of advanced technologies in new ways, exploration of different organizational structures, and stimulation of innovative thinking to develop synergies inherent in the services and other national assets. It would also like to see planning and long-term thinking in a manner that enables DOD to alter its response as threats and challenges develop and the potential of new technologies are better understood.350

1998


1 May: A presidential memorandum establishes the Interagency Administrative Dispute Resolution Working Group. Its purpose is to assist federal agencies in developing and implementing alternative dispute resolution programs, coordinating multi-agency initiatives, promoting best practices and programs, and disseminating policy and guidance.352

1999

**Spring:** The Expansion of Defense Reform Initiative includes defense reform initiatives focused on pillars around the Department of Defense’s business processes. These include efforts to encourage the adoption of best business practices, improve the quality of life, improve financial management, increase competition, and save tax dollars through eliminating unneeded infrastructure and the transformation of acquisition and logistics.

### 2000

**1 October:** When Admiral Vernon Clark (July 2000–July 2005) takes over as Chief of Naval Operations, he reorganizes Navy staff. N84 (antisubmarine warfare), N85 (expeditionary warfare), N86 (surface warfare), N87 (submarine warfare), and N88 (air warfare) divisions move from N8 to the new N7 (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs). N7 focuses on requirements and composition of the future Navy and creates N70 (warfare integration). N8 (resources, requirements, and assessments) refocuses on developing current program and budget, and on preparing for the Quadrennial Defense Review. N4 (logistics) refocuses as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics. (N3/N5 had been responsible for fleet readiness.) N4 defines all warfare area (air, surface, and subsurface) readiness requirements aside from manpower and training.

### 2001

**30 September:** The objective of the second Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is to “shift the basis of defense planning from a ‘threat based’ model . . . to a ‘capabilities based’ model.” It focuses on how an adversary might fight rather than specifically who the adversary might be or where war might occur. The U.S. military must maintain an advantage in key areas while denying asymmetric advantages to adversaries and adapting existing military capabilities to new circumstances. The QDR recognizes key military-technical trends and the rapid advancement of military technologies. It also recognizes problems associated with the proliferation of chemical-biological-nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles coupled with new arenas of military competition and the increasing potential for miscalculation and surprise.

**1 October:** Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vernon Clark (July 2000–July 2005) designates Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet as the concurrent Commander, Fleet Forces Command (COMFLTFORCOM), who is responsible for “coordinating, establishing, and implementing integrated requirements and policies for manning, equipping and training Atlantic and Pacific Fleet units during the inter-deployment training cycle.” This decision makes COMFLTFORCOM the primary point of contact for all fleet and fleet-type commander issues.

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355 Swartz and Markowitz, “Organizing OPNAV.”

pertaining to policy and requirements related to manning, equipment, and training.\textsuperscript{357} This new organization effectively combines what are separate commands—the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.

2002

1 October: After the 9/11 attacks, the new Unified Command Plan (UCP) reorganizes continental defense. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) becomes the unified command in charge of “homeland defense, civil support and security cooperation.” Strategic Command absorbs most of Space Command’s (SPACECOM) functions, although NORTHCOM becomes the American component of the North American Aerospace Defense Command. SPACECOM was disestablished in part because the current UCP capped the number of unified commands at ten; most of its headquarters billets were used to standup NORTHCOM.\textsuperscript{358}

2005

23 December: SECNAVINST 5400.15B designates the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) as the principal adviser to the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) in the allocation of resources to meet programming and budget processes. In essence, the instruction confers on the CNO the responsibility to advise the SECNAV on what programmatic priorities to assign to the requirements, the development of which is his key responsibility. The CNO still stands outside the procurement process.\textsuperscript{359}

2007

13 September: SECNAVINST 5400.15C charges the Chief of Naval Operations, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), to analyze alternatives before the development phase of a weapon system.\textsuperscript{360}

1 October: The Pentagon stands up Africa Command (AFRICOM) eight months after President George W. Bush announced its creation in February. Its mission is to “help Africans achieve their own security and play a supportive role” as they “build democratic institutions and establish good governance” on the continent.\textsuperscript{361} It oversees U.S. forces and operations in sub-Saharan Africa. AFRICOM is initially a sub-unified command of European Command but becomes a standalone unified command 1 October 2008.\textsuperscript{362}


\textsuperscript{358} Feickert, “The Unified Command Plan,” 20, 42.

\textsuperscript{359} Nemfakos et al., The Perfect Storm, 28.

\textsuperscript{360} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{362} Feickert, “The Unified Command Plan,” 28–32.
2008


2009

22 May: The Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA, PL 111-23) requires the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to seek combatant commander input to identify requirements. In connection with a separate requirement for cost, schedule, and performance trade-offs throughout the acquisition lifecycle of major defense acquisition programs, WSARA provides for continuous engagement between senior military leaders and the civilian acquisition community.

17 August: Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus (May 2009–Present) assigns department-wide responsibilities for the administration of the Department of the Navy in Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.7Q, Assignment of Responsibilities and Authorities in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. The instruction designates four civilian executive assistants, six staff assistants, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Navy’s operating forces as offices of the Secretary of the Navy.

2010

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366 Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here?, 3n6.
23 March: The House Armed Services Committee recommends that the Department of Defense and Congress “review and clarify the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986’s separation between acquisition and the military service chiefs to allow detailed coordination and interaction between the requirements and acquisition processes and to encourage enhanced military service chief participation in contract quality assurance.”


2011


31 August: Joint Forces Command is disestablished with its responsibilities divided among Transportation Command, Strategic Command, and the Joint Staff. According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (December 2006–July 2011), the decision is part of his initiative to streamline Department of Defense and reduce administration costs. He noted the command’s costs (~$1 billion) and headquarters manpower (2,800 military and civilian, 3,300 contractors) as the primary reasons for its disestablishment.

21 December: Published on this date, the Navy’s Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act Operating Guide establishes officer position certification levels through captain/colonel.

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Joint assignments for acquisition officers become more difficult because of mandated course work. Critics claim the act exacerbates the “civilianization” of the workforce. Rigid requirement of joint duty service means officers no longer have time to rotate between operational duty assignments and material management assignments if they want to achieve flag or general officer rank in an operational role.\(^{374}\)

2012

12 March: Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert (September 2011–September 2015) realigns Navy staff with NAVADMIN 083/10. He establishes N9, the Warfare Systems office, which integrates manpower, training, sustainment, modernization, and procurement of the systems. With new Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for N9, Vice Admiral William R. Burke, the Navy intends that these changes will “improve decision making processes associated with planning, programming, budgeting, and execution, and enhance focus on warfighting capability and total ownership cost.”\(^{375}\)

The realignment redirects N8’s responsibilities toward integration of capabilities and resources, and it also gains the evaluation and technology requirements office (N091) which becomes N81. N4 (logistics) transfers afloat readiness resources to N2/N6 and N9, but retains Logistics Programs, Energy and Environmental Readiness, Ashore Readiness, the Combat Logistics Force, and fleet readiness reporting and assessment.\(^{376}\)

\(^{374}\) Blickstein, Where Do We Go From Here?, 28.
\(^{376}\) Ibid.