



GRAMPAW PETTIBONE

Glider Pilots

A lieutenant and a lieutenant junior grade reported to maintenance control to be briefed on a post-maintenance check flight in an S-2G *Tracker*. Following the brief and a review of the maintenance records, the crew went aboard the aircraft and conducted an uneventful preflight.

The run-up power check was good on both engines and the nacelles were clean and dry. Clearance for takeoff was received with no undue delay in tower release. The brakes were released and the throttles were smoothly advanced to takeoff power. All gauges indicated go! At approximately 95 knots, just prior to liftoff, an acceptable torque pressure split was noted between the port and starboard engines with the port engine lower.

At 100 feet in the air, the port engine torque pressure backed off more, and the aircraft swerved to port. Having passed the abort gear and without sufficient runway remaining to land, flight was continued.

The gear was raised and power was reduced to 50 inches manifold pressure (map) on both engines. The port engine continued to back off and



swerves were felt to that side. Having stabilized the aircraft in a climbing altitude, the pilot commenced a turn to downwind and explained his intentions to the copilot via UHF so that both he and departure control would know why the aircraft was deviating from departure instructions.

Meanwhile, still in a climbing left-hand turn at about 300 feet, the port engine oil temperature began to rise.


Passing 600 feet, the port chip light illuminated and the port engine began to run rough. The S-2 was now heading downwind and attempting to gain altitude. The pilots agreed that the port engine should be secured. The tower was notified and the checklist executed. The feathering cycle was completed normally and the aircraft was trimmed at 800 feet and 120 knots, with full increase rpm and 50 inches map on the starboard engine.

The in-flight secure checklist had been commenced. At this time, both pilots noted *two chip lights*; the one on the port side they expected to see but the starboard one presented the next interesting three minutes of flight !!!! Almost simultaneously, the starboard oil pressure dropped from 65 psi and the starboard engine began losing power. There was no way to make the 180-degree position.

The pilot cut throttle on the starboard engine with hopes of maintaining electrical and hydraulic power and not aiding and abetting a sudden engine seizure. At this particular time, simultaneously with throttle closing, the pilot banked the aircraft over 30 degrees to the left, nose down. He notified the tower that they were landing midfield (in reverse direction on the runway from which they had taken off) and would give a gear check.

The gear was lowered and indicated down and locked by 200 feet, and then the flaps were extended two-thirds. The gliding S-2 was now about 20 degrees off runway heading and around 100 feet with the nose coming up to reduce airspeed. Line-up on final was a shade to the right of centerline, but was corrected prior to touchdown which was a little fast at 112 knots.

On touchdown, the pilot cross-checked the instruments and noted the starboard oil pressure was zero and that both chip lights remained illuminated. Brakes were not required as the aircraft slowed very quickly and turned off the duty runway.



The flight time was broken down as follows:

Total flight time, two engines — three minutes.

Total flight time, one engine — two minutes.

Glider time — one minute.



Grampaw Pettibone says:

Fantastic! Great! Stupendous! Cool! Tremendous! These two lads remind me of a duck: calm and cool on the surface but paddling like fury underneath. I redesignated both lads Naval Glider Pilots in addition to Naval Aviators. What else can be said but a big Well Done for Lt. R. J. (Moe) Moriarty and Ltjg. Carl Dodd.

Editor's Note: It's a rare day when Gramps is pleased enough to raise the shield of anonymity and mention flight crews by name. Lieutenants Moriarty and Dodd have joined a very exclusive list.

Dump Something

Following a routine carrier-based briefing, the pilot and RIO preflighted and manned their F-4J *Phantom*. Turnup and post-start checks were normal. The F-4 was then taxied to the catapult where normal positioning and hookup were accomplished. Engine instruments during run-up to military power while taking tension were normal and verbally passed to the RIO.

Upon signal from the catapult officer, the pilot selected afterburner. Instruments were again checked and all were indicating a normal condition. After receiving "ready to go" from

the RIO, the pilot saluted and the cat officer, after making his checks, which included a thumbs up from the power plants troubleshooter, gave the launch signal.

Just prior to hold-back release, both crew members described hearing and feeling a "thump" from the after section. The RIO states that he felt a thump under his feet. The pilot glanced at the cat officer hoping to see a suspend signal, but when he didn't, he maintained full power and remained positioned for launch. Witnesses state that a large orange flame billowed from the aft section of the starboard engine as the launching stroke commenced. The orange flame was noted to partially extinguish approximately two-thirds down the cat track.

The pilot knew something was wrong, but he was satisfied that the cat shot was a good one. He decided to get his gear up and flaps to one half and fly straight and level, foregoing any clearing turn. The pilot later stated that on the catapult stroke the throttles transmitted a funny sensation in his hand.

Following launch from the carrier, the pilot felt an abnormal acceleration. The RIO asked the pilot if he was in max afterburner and the pilot stated he was. The pilot continued to monitor his instruments and nosed down slightly to decrease the angle of attack

and gain airspeed. During a period of noticeable settling, the ship transmitted "you're settling." The RIO states he informed the pilot to jettison everything. The pilot, who was concentrating on flying the aircraft, did not hear the RIO.

During this time frame, numerous "eject" calls from many sources were made to the F-4. As the aircraft continued to settle, the pilot told the RIO to get ready and, as the descent continued, he transmitted "eject."

The RIO initiated ejection via the alternate seat pan handle. The pilot, seeing the water approaching, initiated his ejection using the seat pan handle. Both ejections operated as advertised. Both crew members were picked up by helo and returned to the carrier.

The accident board concluded that a malfunction of the right engine coupled with the pilot's failure to jettison external stores were the causes of this accident.



Grampaw Pettibone says:

Great balls of fire! What in the world was the lad thinkin' of? This driver was concentratin' on his instruments so hard that he "gagged" his brain! What's that? Did I hear someone say aviators must possess "division of attention" capability?

Apparently the RIO tried to be of some service by telling the pilot to jettison external stores, but—he didn't hear; concentratin' too hard.

Smart money says when you have one engine (out of two) malfunctioning and you can't maintain altitude—dump something and see if it helps. Whatever you dump will be cheaper than the flying machine—and your life.

