

# GRAMPAW PETTIBONE


## An Ounce Was Needed

Upon noticing his engine to be throwing an excessive amount of oil, the pilot landed at an outlying field to wipe the oil from the windshield. Evidently no thought was given to investigating source of the oil. After cleaning the windshield, the pilot immediately took off. At about 300 feet altitude, the engine "conked," resulting in a crash landing in stumpy terrain. Examination of the engine revealed that it had frozen due to lack of oil.

Having noticed an excessive loss of oil, it seems that this pilot should have determined the remaining oil supply and the cause of his oil loss before taking off again. Had he taken these common-sense precautions, the accident, would have been prevented.

## Rendezvous Advice

During division rendezvous at 4500 feet, an F4U pilot took a short cut to get into position. In doing so, he pulled up into the propeller of a plane which



was already in position. The propeller cut off his tail section.

The pilot never got out of his plane.

The following comments are quoted from a ComFAir Alameda Safety Bulletin on this accident:

"Because pilots are constantly urged to make rendezvous promptly, this does not mean that they can take short cuts in the proper rendezvous procedure. In joining up, excess speed *must* be lost prior to reaching proper position and the plane brought in carefully to avoid



overshooting. If it is apparent that you have not lost excess speed, do not cock a wing up to pull into formation, hoping thus to lose speed. Keep out and make another approach.

"It seems possible that this pilot did not realize the condition of his plane and was trying to make a recovery all the way down. After a mid-air collision, make a quick check of the plane. If it is out of control, with surfaces gone—then *get out!*"

## "Famil" Flying

An ISIC made the following comment in his endorsement to a recent accident report:

"There is altogether too much aimless and pointless, time and pilot-killing flying going on in all squadrons, under the dubious guise of 'famil' flying. If the pilot in this report had been properly checked out and briefed exactly as to what he was supposed to do, when and how he was supposed to fly, this accident probably would not have occurred. Commanding Officers are reminded that the numerous young pilots now reporting to squadrons cannot be expected to know all about 'squadron policy'. They must be con-

scientiously and thoroughly instructed and briefed in every phase of the long training program necessary to turn out a fully qualified pilot. Commanding Officers are directed to take positive action to insure that Squadron Flight and Flight Training Officers personally, and adequately brief all pilots before they proceed on any training flight regardless of how routine the flight may seem to be."



**Grampaw Pettibone Says:**  
Read Ye! And heed this man;  
ne has spoken wisely.

The engine of an SB2C suddenly roared into life. Tie down lines parted and the plane jumped its chocks, heading directly toward a row of parked planes. The picture shows the results. Cause: The inexperienced plane captain who was in the cockpit and who had started the engine for warm-up was



unfamiliar with correct starting procedure and was not on the ball! After the plane jumped the chocks it ran amuck for approximately 30 yards before crashing into an SNJ. Brakes were not applied, throttle was not cut nor was the ignition switch touched until after the crash.

► **Comment:** BuAer Manual, Art. 11-101 states:

Under no circumstances shall engines be started without a competent person at the controls. Wheels will be chocked.

## OKINAWA TYPHOON VERSUS NAVAL AIRCRAFT —————>

WHEN the October 9 typhoon hit Okinawa with six hours of extreme winds heavier than 100 knots, it caught the Navy seaplane base without facilities adequate to withstand a storm of that intensity. Wind velocities as high as 135 knots in gusts were the probable main cause of the damage to aircraft

which could not be evacuated from the base. Flyable aircraft were evacuated as news of the rapidly-growing typhoon was received. Damage suffered by buildings of the base seems to indicate that damage to aircraft was not excessive. Ordinary methods of securing planes against wind were of little use.





## Grim Maintenance:

Fire in the air during the first leg of his ferry flight recently caused an FM-2 pilot some little concern and a few burns but he managed a safe landing at an airfield. A fire fighting crew right on the job quickly brought the blaze under control and an investigation was made as to the cause of the fire. What the investigators found just "shoudden happen to a dog."

The rubber gas hose had two cuts in it that allowed fuel to escape. In an apparent attempt to stop the leak, some "mech" instead of replacing the hose had taped over the two cuts!



### Grampaw Pettibone Says:

If the "mech" in this case who committed "arson", but fortunately failed to commit homicide, had been conscientious and familiar with his job, this near serious accident would not have occurred. However, full blame rests on the inspecting personnel who cleared the plane for ferrying; obviously, the requirements of ACL 84-85 had not been met.

## Safety Ideas

Costly taxiing accidents at a field were reduced 85% by the following corrective action initiated by the C.O.:

1. An inadequate parking area which necessitated taxiing in extremely limited spaces was corrected through construction of a new parking ramp.
2. To insure that established safety policies are observed, a Ramp Officer was appointed. His duties require a constant patrol of the ramp and field area, alert for any discrepancies that possibly could lead to an accident. To aid in this patrol, a ramp control tower has been constructed on top of the operator's hangar from which the operator commands an unobstructed view of the field and parking areas. The tower is connected by a two-way inter-phone with operations and the field towers and is in communication with the Alert jeeps by two-way radio. From his position in the tower, the operator directs the Alert jeeps to stand fire guard and in the parking of aircraft thus assuring most expedient use of their services.
3. Congestion on the ramp and runways further has been decreased by construction of a perimeter road between parking areas, making it no longer necessary for refueling units and crew transport trucks to cross runways and parking areas. The system speeds up service and decreases danger of aircraft collisions with these trucks.

From ATC's "Flying Safety Journal".



### Grampaw Pettibone Says:

My hat's off to that C.O. Accident prevention takes just such smart thinking as he displayed. Before aviation becomes as safe as it can be, aviators are going to have to take full advantage of their experience. They must foresee potentially dangerous conditions. Then the important thing is to take action that will

eliminate or at least reduce these hazards.

I hope that pilots eventually will take their profession seriously enough to make it as safe as possible. Right now there are so many needless accidents resulting in loss of life and equipment, that it makes me wonder if the present-day pilot really isn't a fatalist. Now, the thing I've got against a fatalist is that he's very likely to be careless. This is understandable because he figures that no matter what he does, his time will come at a certain moment and there just isn't anything he can do about it. Well, to my way of thinking this is pure bunk, particularly in aviation where a flier's life, and those of his passengers, depend on his skill, knowledge and judgment. I'll bet you that among the "old" aviators, you won't find a single fatalist—anyway, not a single living one!

## GRAMPAW'S SAFETY QUIZ



ALL AVIATORS should know the answers to these questions. In the air, the penalty for not knowing may prove fatal. If you miss an answer on the ground, penalize yourself by looking up the reference.

1. If, while flying CFR, you encounter weather below that required for CFR, what should you do?
2. If you are lost and faced with a forced instrument let-down over terrain you do not definitely know, what should you do?
3. Jet planes approaching for a landing have the right-of-way over all other aircraft taking off and over all other aircraft landing except those in emergency and those engaged in hospital evacuation. True or False?
4. Beginning at what altitude should oxygen be used: (a) day? (b) night?
5. When oxygen is being used on altitude flights, the air valve on diluter demand regulators shall be turned to what position?  
(Answers to Quiz on page 40)



### Grampaw Pettibone Says:

I hear about people only when they get into trouble and have accidents. All I can do then is to holler about the mistakes they make, and that sure enough puts me in the kick-in-the-pants department. It isn't that I'm a morbid old duck always seeking out experiences with unhappy endings, as Dilbert thinks. Fact is, I'm trying to air his mistakes so everybody can profit by them. Certainly no one would be more pleased than I to tell about happy experiences. But I don't hear about such experiences. Only accidents are reported. Guess people are glad to forget near accidents. But that's where we're wrong. These near accidents should get as much publicity as do accidents. Perhaps then

we could get that old barn door shut in time to keep some guys from killing themselves later on.

All of us can learn something from the circumstances that contribute to near accidents. And that is where everyone can help everyone else. All you have to do is let me know of these experiences and I'll publish them right here in this column, keeping your communication confidential just the way Dorothy Dix has always done in her "advice to the lovelorn." We want to know of cases where accidents were prevented or made less serious by the smart or lucky action of pilots, crews or others.

To cite an example, let me tell you of an experience of a young friend of mine. . . . In those days when very little was known about stalls in accelerated flight, this young friend was flying a comparatively new seaplane in the fleet. One day, after flying by his ship down-wind at about 150 feet, he pulled up into a power-off, wingover to reverse course for landing.

At this moment, his eye spied a private yacht at anchor in the bay and on this yacht a lovely young thing, sunning herself. Naturally, all thought of flying immediately left his mind until an automatic effort to recover from the wingover brought no results. The controls were sloppy; a quick glance at the airspeed indicator showed over 100 knots. (The normal stalling speed for this plane was approximately 55 knots.) From then on a good emergency reaction to a stall, an immediate response from the engine and an extra five feet of altitude were all that saved his neck.

Back at the ship he got hell for "showing off" but was secretly admired for being a "hot" flyer. Smugly basking in this questionable glory, he never let on that it was anything except damned good flying. But a few months later he had occasion to wish that he had been big enough to tell what really happened: two of his friends were killed in the same type plane and in nearly identical circumstances (sans yacht and beauty) to those that surrounded his own near accident. Thereafter, immediate flight tests were conducted to determine the cause of these crashes and it was concluded that the planes were stalling at speeds considerably above normal stalling speed.

This phenomenon was then called an "incipient spin"; now, of course, we refer to it as a high "g" stall or a stall in accelerated flight. But to get back to my young friend's responsibility and the moral of this story: had he been able to swallow his pride and tell his C.O. what really happened to him, those aforementioned flight tests might have been made in time to save some lives.

Now, I'm not trying to offer an excuse for pilots to withhold confessions from their C.O.'s, but, having a slight understanding of human nature, I am trying to create an outlet whereby valuable experiences will get proper publicity. Again, let me assure you that I promise to keep all identifying matter confidential. Send to:

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