


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**Monthly
Historical
Summary**



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
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FOREWORD

Enemy activity in the Delta increased sharply in September as the VC/NVA launched full scale attacks in the U Minh Forest. Aggressive operations by the 21st ARVN Division, coupled with blocking operations by TRAN HUNG DAO VI waterborne units and air strikes by Black Ponies and Seawolves, dealt the enemy a telling blow. The Black Ponies had a field day, mowing down 238 of the enemy. September's action in the U Minh was a significant victory for GVN forces.

Elsewhere in the Delta, several TRAN HUNG DAO operations were altered. On 20 September, TRAN HUNG DAOs VIII and XIX were combined into a new operation, TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI, under the command of CTF 217. Also on 30 September, TRAN HUNG DAO V was slightly altered to effect better coordination between 25th ARVN Div. and naval units on the Upper Saigon River, and was renamed TRAN HUNG DAO XXVII, under the command of a VNN Captain as CTF 216.

On 20 September, sapper guerrillas scored an important coup in destroying part of the Phnom Penh tank farms, destroying about one third of the stored POL stocks and 40 percent of the POL storage capacity. This attack underscored the importance

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of the Tan Chau-Phnom Penh convoys which supply the vital POL to the Cambodian capital.

The ACTOV programs proceeded smoothly during September with one LSB and eight ISBs turned over, totaling 28 out of 32 support bases placed in VNN hands. In addition, 62 ships and craft were turned over, the largest single craft turnover since the December 1970 combat craft turnover.

U.S. Naval strength failed to decline significantly, the total figure on 30 September being 9,950 officers and men, a reduction of only 21 men from last month's total.

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CURRENT OPERATIONS

| <u>VNN Designations</u> | <u>Former USN Designations</u> |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| TRAN HUNG DAO IV (TG 214.2) | SOLID ANCHOR |
| TRAN HUNG DAO VI (TG 212.5) | SEARCH TURN |
| TRAN HUNG DAO XV (TF 213) | MARKET TIME (Inner Barrier) |
| TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII (TF 218) | NONE |
| TRAN HUNG DAO XX (TG 219.1) | NONE |
| TRAN HUNG DAO XXI (TF 210) | NONE |
| TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV (TG 214.1) | NONE |
| TRAN HUNG DAO XXV (TG 212.2) | NONE |
| TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI (TF 217) | NONE |
| TRAN HUNG DAO XXVII (TF 216) | NONE |
| RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE (TF 228) | NONE |
| CHI LANG I | SEA TIGER |

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NAVAL MOBILE OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS (RIVERINE) AND
CTF 116 SUMMARY

Effective 1 September, the Mobile Operations Staff, VNN, changed its name to Naval Mobile Operations Headquarters/Riverine. In another important change on 1 September, the staffs of SA, Deputy Commander, TRAN HUNG DAO, Commander Delta Naval Forces (CTF 116), and Senior Advisor Naval Mobile Operations Headquarters (Riverine) were combined into one staff under the command of Captain R. S. Moore, USN.

In a message released on 6 September, SA DEPCOMTHD again emphasized the dangers of the flooding expected in September as well as the military possibilities which it could afford the enemy. Among these were decreased effectiveness of base defense and larger numbers of rivercraft moving on the waterways giving the enemy a greater chance of unhindered resupply and communication.

SA DEPCOMTHD also issued an injunction to the advisory staffs of TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV and XXV concerning the use of skimmers for administrative purposes. He stated in part, "I recognize the convenience that the use of skimmers represents and your inclination to use them. However, there have been six Navy men killed by enemy attacks on skimmers this year, one of them

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in an area considered well pacified. Administrative matters simply do not justify such a risk."¹

The Accelerated Overhaul Program continued with varying degrees of success. There were still some instances when boats arrived at repair facilities with only two men aboard and there were other times when the crews would arrive with their boat and then disappear. The American advisors, both with the boat units involved and at the repair facilities, wrestled with these and other problems and each month their efforts were rewarded with improvement as the VNN personnel began to grasp the management concept of the repair effort.

The TRAN HUNG DAO Operations underwent yet another metamorphosis in September as TRAN HUNG DAOs V, VIII, and XIX were disestablished, to be replaced by TRAN HUNG DAOs XXVI and XXVII.

On 30 September, TRAN HUNG DAO V was replaced by TRAN HUNG DAO XXVII in an effort to further coordination with the ARVN troops in the area. Captain Quynh, VNN, was installed as Commander, TRAN HUNG DAO XXVII in another move to strengthen cooperation.

1. SA DEPCOMTHD msg 080809Z SEP 71

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At 0001H on 20 September, TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI was born, encompassing virtually all of Kien Hoa and Dinh Tuong Provinces, with the stated purpose of joining with the 7th ARVN Division to more effectively interdict coastal and riverine transshipment on the coast of Kien Hoa Province and on the waterways of both provinces. CTF 217 in Dong Tam was designated commander, TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI, and CTG 217.1, located in Dong Tam, and CTG 217.2 in Ben Tre were his assistants. SA to this new operation is CDR W. Wardell.

Overshadowing all of these changes was the Communist offensive in the northern U Minh Forest, which was bloodily blunted by combined ARVN, VNN, and USN combat assets. The allies struck back at the VC/NVA using artillery, U.S. and Vietnamese air assets and VNN Naval units as blocking forces, inflicting upwards of 600 killed and completely crushing the ill fated offensive. At the end of the month, the U Minh was quiet with only sporadic action occurring.

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TRAN HUNG DAO IV

Enemy contact within the TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO was moderately heavy during September, reflecting the pressure put on the VC/NVA by the ARVN in the U Minh Forest campaign. U.S. Navy Seawolves flew 16 missions and eight incidents of naval interest occurred. Four of the incidents involved ambushes of VNN craft in support of the 41st ARVN Rangers. The remaining four incidents involved LDNN (VNN Seal) missions. Three of those missions were woodcutter security operations, and one was a reconnaissance/intelligence patrol. All four LDNN incidents were initiated by VC ambushes. Friendly casualties suffered in all the incidents were: one ARVN Ranger killed; and 12 personnel wounded, including ARVN Rangers, LDNNs, VNN sailors, one Vietnamese civilian, and one USN Seal advisor. The USN Seal suffered minor wounds on the left hand while handling a VC booby trap. He was treated at the ISB Nam Can Dispensary, and returned to duty. The predominant VC weapons used for the ambushes were: launch bombs, B-40 rockets, and automatic small arms (AK-47s).

The Seawolves suffered one equipment casualty on 25 September, when a JP-4 fuel transfer pump was stolen from a locked stowage fuel farm at ISB Nam Can. The fuel pump was used to transfer

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JP-4 to a 10,000 gallon ready service fuel bladder. At the time of the theft, the ready service bladder was approximately half full. A search of the base, barracks, boats, and junks failed to uncover the missing pump. A replacement pump was ordered to keep the TG 116.1 helicopters flying; and it was air shipped to ISB Nam Can on the same day.

In the area of harbor defense, a stride forward was accomplished at ISB Nam Can. The O-in-C of HQ 9611 (VNN) and the repair advisor established a training program for a 15 man VNN PADD team from the crew of HQ 9611. The ISB Nam Can PADD operator and VNN Seals assisted in training the novice PADD operators. An electronics trained VNN officer took charge of HQ 9611 training, and custody of the PADD unit was turned over to the repair advisor of the HQ 9611 on 15 September.

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TRAN HUNG DAO V

Enemy activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO V AO was heavy, but contact with VNN assets was light. The 25th ARVN Division was in frequent contact and U.S. Navy Seawolves flew 23 missions in the AO. The VNN tallied three waterborne incidents in September. The first incident occurred on 20 September. Two PBRs on patrol sighted a small sampan and wooden barge that were concealed on the bank. A search discovered no contraband, and both the sampan and barge were destroyed. On 23 September at 1845H, two PBRs sighted seven VC on the bank and one VC in the water. The VC in the water was captured, but the other seven escaped. The final incident occurred on the Lower Saigon River (vic XT 672 288) at 0830H on 24 September. Five RAC and one LCM were ambushed with ten B-40 rockets and automatic weapons fire. The boats returned fire, and the Seawolves were scrambled. Contact lasted about 20 minutes. The results of the engagement were, two VNN killed, one officer and one enlisted, ten VNN wounded (six seriously); slight damage to one Monitor and three ASPBs from B-40s.

Some problems were encountered with RPD 52 boats in the Accelerated Overhaul Program. A misunderstanding in arrival schedule had two boats arrive a day later than LSB Nha Be expected

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them. RPD 52 also did not provide the supervisory personnel required, because of operational commitments. The SA DEPCOMTHD then originated a message to SA RPD 52 and LSB Nha Be reiterating the importance of the Accelerated Overhaul Program, and directing all parties to cooperate fully. Differences and discrepancies were resolved, and the overhaul of both craft proceeded normally.

Throughout the month, intelligence reports continued to indicate VC and NVA infiltration into the AO (NILO Lam Son SPOTREP 110600Z SEP 71). It was believed that "COSVN had ordered an increase in military forces and activity around the Capital Military District to keep ARVN forces busy; then, if a political crisis develops, additional attacks will be launched without further orders from COSVN" (3rd RAIO msg 280949Z SEP 71). Numerous probe attacks against ARVN forces were reported (NILO 25th ARVN Division Cu Chi msg 281600Z SEP 71), giving credence to the intelligence estimates.

On 30 September, TRAN HUNG DAO V was disestablished and replaced by TRAN HUNG DAO XXVII. The purpose of the reorganization was to provide better liaison and cooperation between 25th ARVN Division and the VNN on the Upper Saigon River. Concurrently the

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25th ARVN Tactical Area of Responsibility was redefined to include the Upper Saigon River to XT 49 47. Third Riverine Zone Commander assumed command of TRAN HUNG DAO XXVII; the SA Third Riverine Zone was assigned the additional duty as SA, TRAN HUNG DAO XXVII. Bases and AOs remained the same as in TRAN HUNG DAO V.

TRAN HUNG DAO VI

The naval war in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO was exceptionally light during September. Only one enemy initiated firefight was reported. On 12 September, a WBGP on the Kinh Ba The received small arms fire from five VC on the opposite bank. The PBRs returned fire. The VC broke contact after four minutes, with no casualties on either side. The SA, CTG 212.5 reported that, "Units of 212.5 are beginning to break away from stereotype operations" (SA THD VI msg 021230Z SEP 21).

The major ARVN operation in the U Minh Forest pressured VC and NVA forces. TG 212.5 provided a 20 boat blocking force on the Cai Lon River from 21-23 September in an attempt to cut off the hard pressed enemy as they tried to break out of the U Minh by moving northward. U.S. Navy Seawolves flew an impressive 38 missions in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO. Again, most missions were against targets of opportunity, flushed out by the U Minh operations.

Two vehicle accidents occurred involving U.S. Navy personnel. The first incident involved three naval advisors from Ha Tien, who struck a Vietnamese child, even though they followed all conceivable safety precautions. The girl's injuries were minor and she was well cared for by U.S. units. The second vehicle accident was minor. On 27 September, a jeep hit a parked truck in Rach Gia. There were no injuries.

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TRAN HUNG DAO VIII

Naval action with the enemy in the TRAN HUNG DAO VIII AO was very light again in September. Only one contact with the enemy was made during the month. At 0525H on 6 September, six RID 42 units broke their WBGPs on the Lower Kinh Xang to respond to a call for assistance by an outpost, which was under attack by an unknown size unit of VC. While transiting north, the boats were ambushed from the west bank of the canal (vic XS 367 523) with B-40s and small arms fire. In the initial salvo, three boats were hit, two requiring substantial repairs to engine and 20mm gun turret. The other three boats continued to return fire. After five minutes the VC broke contact. Navy Seawolf and Army Nighthawk gunships arrived overhead and placed strikes on the VC position. Casualties in the engagement were five VNN wounded, two seriously; VC losses were unknown. The Nighthawk helicopters medevaced the wounded to My Tho, and the boats returned to Dong Tam for repairs. At 0630H RF troops were inserted in the area, but their sweeps produced no results.

VNN efforts for the month were directed in support of ARVN and RF troops. Navy units conducted insert and extract missions, and escorted ammo barges from Dong Tam to the Phuoc Long

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Artillery Base. Also, the usual WBGp and ambush missions were conducted.

Meanwhile, U. S. Navy Seawolves had a typically busy month. They flew 28 missions in support of both VNN and ARVN assets in the AO; results of the mission were undetermined.

On 19 September, CNO VNN disestablished operations TRAN HUNG DAO VIII and XIX. TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI was initiated on 20 September, incorporating most of the areas formerly covered by both TRAN HUNG DAO VIII and XIX. The reasons for this reorganization are covered in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI section of this summary.

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TRAN HUNG DAO XXVIII

Three Mekong convoys successfully transported POL to Phnom Penh during the month, continuing the trend begun in July of reducing the number of convoys and correspondingly increasing the number of ships per convoy.

The first convoy of the month, TP-31, departed the Tan Chau staging area on 2 September at 2000H, with one VNN LSSL, two ASPBs, two PCFs, ten PBRs, an MNK Commandment, six MNK LCM-6s, and 11 MNK PBRs escorting a convoy composed of a cargo ship, four POL tankers, and three tugs with four barges. The convoy transported a total of 1,770 tons of cargo, and 1,066,500 gallons of POL. At 0327H the next morning, the first of two ambushes occurred, as ten B-40 rockets came whistling from the east bank, accompanied by .51 caliber machine gun and small arms fire. The convoy units responded with suppressing fire. A U.S. Army C&C helo and U.S. Navy Seawolves fired on the enemy position with unknown results. There were no friendly casualties or damage. A VNAF AC-47 gunship was unable to fire due to the close proximity of a FANK position. At 0620H, the second attack occurred in the vicinity of WT 210 660, 18 miles east of Phnom Penh, consisting of six B-40 rockets fired with no effect. The convoy escorts returned fire,

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but, once again, air strikes were prohibited due to the proximity of FANK units. The FANK units later swept the area. Convoy TP-31 arrived at Phnom Penh at 1100H without further incident.

The last two convoys were collectively attacked four times within a 11 kilometer stretch of the river. Three attacks occurred within four kilometers of each other, each of these attacks occurring within a 25 minute period near dawn. All four were near the reported 12 August location of an unidentified 100 man enemy unit targeted against convoy escort craft at WT 281 609. The return convoy left the Cambodian capital city at 1140H the next day, with six merchant ships, four POL tankers, and four tugs towing five barges. They were escorted by one VNN LSSL, 12 VNN PBRs, 11 VNN ASPBs, 11 VNN PCFs and nine MNK PBRs and one MNK ASPB, and arrived at Tan Chau at 1700H without incident. TP-31 was organized around eight main body elements divided into a VN unit of five elements and a Cambodian unit of three elements. The convoy operations commander was CDR May, VNN, on an LSSL, with VN and MNK deputy commanders. Under CDR May were: an advance force of one VN ASPB and two MNK PBRs; two ambush teams on one PCF and two VN PBRs each; a reaction force of one VN ASPB, one MNK commandment, and six MNK LCM-6s; a VN escort unit of six PBRs (one each for the first four vessels and two for the fifth); an MNK escort unit of five PBRs (two for the first two vessels and one for the third); and finally a reserve unit of

four PBRs.

The first attempted sapper attack along the Mekong for some time occurred on 10 September in the early morning hours. Sentries at an ARVN logistics compound at Neak Luong spotted four sappers at 0100H and took them under fire, killing one, while the others escaped. Fire was returned by the sappers, who carried pistols, slightly wounding one ARVN. The VNN craft in the area went on increased alert and took anti-sapper pre-assigned positions. At 0400H, a sentry on an ASPB saw a swimmer and offered him a line to come aboard and surrender, which he declined. The sentry proceeded to barrage the recalcitrant sapper with M-16 fire and grenades at a ten meter range. At 0420H a sentry on a second ASPB saw another swimmer who also refused capture and was taken under fire with an M-16 and grenades. The final results were two sappers killed and two probably killed, while one ARVN soldier was wounded.

Mekong convoy TP-32 was organized around two escort units, one VN and one MNK, escorting three ships, six tankers and seven tugs towing barges. General cargo and 1,864,440 gallons of POL were transported. The convoy departed the Tan Chau staging area at 2000H on 12 September. At 0943H the next morning, the convoy was ambushed as one B-40 rocket and small arms fire broke

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the morning silence. The ambush unit was on the east bank at WT 255 290. The escorts made firing runs near the bank. One tanker received light damage at bridge level, slightly wounding one MNK liaison officer and one crewman. Again air cover did not respond due to the proximity of friendlies. The convoy reached Phnom Penh at 1530H on 13 September, with no further encounters. PT-32 departed at 1200H the next day, and arrived at 1737H after an untroubled passage. Three merchant ships, four tankers, and six tugs carrying 600 tons of rice were escorted. To provide continuous airborne cover for TP/PT-32, a total of 71 sorties were flown. SA CTF 218 noted continuing cooperation between the VNN convoy commander and the MNK deputy in working out minor command and control problems during the passage.

The continuing comfortable POL level in the capital city was interrupted when, on 20 September, sappers attacked the Phnom Penh tank farms. Destroying one third of the POL stocks and 40 percent of the storage capacity, the sappers set the city back on emergency rationing for a time. At 0015H, the Shell and Esso Russei-Keo Tank Farms on the north side of the city were attacked. The damage was serious but not critical, with reserves of each product sufficing for 5-15 days. The total storage capacity before

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the attack was 11,700 cubic meters in the Esso compound, of that only 3,102 cubic meters capacity remained serviceable after the attack, a reduction of 62 percent. Roughly one half of the 4,998 cubic meters of POL was destroyed. In the Shell compound, the storage capacity was only 20 percent reduced, and only about one fourth of the 8,459 cubic meters of POL was destroyed. The sapper attack was the most serious in the Phnom Penh area since the attack on Pochentong Airfield the previous January; it occurred on the final eve of a three day Khmer religious holiday when Khmer defenses were in a low state of alert. It demonstrated amply that the VC/NVA continued to be capable of surgically precise efforts in Phnom Penh requiring a minimal force, but producing substantial and spectacular losses. Gas stations resumed selling fuel after two days of suspensions. POL supplies, replenished on 25 September with the arrival of a Mekong convoy, remained adequate. The clandestine Red news service daily harped on their success. Attempts to interdict convoy TP-33 and then to mine tankers while in port both failed. TP-33, with about 7,400 cubic meters of POL, arrived five days after the POL farm attack. The companies were hard pressed to find storage facilities for the arriving POL, and were forced to improvise, utilizing all sorts of facilities, and finally requiring one tanker of the five arriving with the convoy to stay in Phnom Penh.

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On 24 September at 0400H, an ARVN unit engaged a small enemy unit in the vicinity of WT 262 295, with two enemy KIA and no friendly casualties. Later, at 1830H, a FANK company observed eight sampans and four of the enemy armed with AK-47s in the vicinity of WT 255 290, and engaged them with unknown results. The same day, at 2150H, Neak Luong came under mortar attack, 20 rounds of 82mm mortar impacting near the POL point in the vicinity of WT 312 443, destroying 22,000 gallons of truck fuel and 67,000 gallons of helo fuel. There were negative VN casualties. Responding to this loss, convoy TN-33 departed Tan Chau at 1200H on 26 September with nine LCM-8s to resupply Neak Luong.

Commencing with convoy TP-33, CTF 218 began a new policy of informing the Waterways Center five days in advance of convoy sailing date from Tan Chau. Two days later Waterways Center organized and allowed the Vung Tau-Tan Chau convoy to depart. This advanced planning prevented the prolonged and costly waiting at the Tan Chau staging area. The convoy departed Tan Chau on 24 September at 2200H, having been delayed three days so that essential repairs and stock adjustments due to the damage from the POL farm attack could be completed. The convoy was composed of six merchant ships, six tankers, three tugs, and nine LCM-8s with military cargo for Neak

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Luong. The convoy transported 1,796,016 gallons of POL, and 7,179 tons of general cargo. The lead three elements were under the cognizance of the MNK deputy commander. At 0540H the next morning, the convoy came under a barrage of an unknown number of B-40s, with attendant .51 caliber machine gun fire, in the vicinity of WT 283 600. The MNK escort craft, and USN Seawolves returned immediate suppressive fire, and the convoy continued without delay. The attack was characteristic of the attacks against all convoys during the high water period. The distinguishing feature of these attacks was a few B-40 or B-41 rockets fired from extreme ranges near friendly positions (to prevent air strikes). At 0610H, the convoy again came under attack from the vicinity of WT 248 630, as ten rockets fell short into the water. PT-33 departed Phnom Penh the next day at 1200H with the upriver escort, three merchant ships, four tankers, and five tugs. Six hours later the convoy arrived after an untroubled passage.

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TRAN HUNG DAO XIX

As in the previous two months, enemy action in the TRAN HUNG DAO XIX AO was exceptionally low during September. No waterborne contact was made with the enemy, and only one Seawolf mission was flown in the AO. TRAN HUNG DAO XIX PBRs and junks, on loan from CG-34 and 35, continued to support ARVN and RF troops on insert missions, and conducted routine patrols. Other units of TRAN HUNG DAO XIX assets continued to support the 10th ARVN Artillery Regiment units by shuttling men, artillery, ammunition, and supplies between the Ben Tre Ferry Landing (XS 548 298) and Phuoc Long Fire Support Base (XS 531 222).

On 11 September, the six junks from CG-34 and 35 were permanently detached and returned to their respective commands. COMTHD recommended that Third CZ HQ designate patrol areas along the coast for the returned junks.

On 19 September, TRAN HUNG DAO VIII and XIX were disestablished. Most of their AOs were incorporated by TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI, which was initiated on 20 September. The geographic limits of the AO and the mission are covered in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI section of this summary.

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TRAN HUNG DAO XX

Contact with the enemy in the TRAN HUNG DAO XX AO was light again during the month of September. Only nine Navy Seawolf missions were flown in the AO, and two naval incidents occurred. At 1655H on 30 September, two junks of CG-42 were ambushed by an estimated 20 VC on the Giang Thang River. A 30 minute firefight ensued. Three VNN were WIA and one junk lightly damaged. Enemy casualties were unknown.

The second incident reinforced suspicions and confirmed intelligence reports of VC transshipment of supplies (NILO Ha Tien PERINTREP 18-71). On 14 September at 1630H, a CG-44 junk sighted a sampan crossing the Giang Thang River (vic VS 483 538). The junk hailed the sampan and boarded for a routine inspection. A second sampan, ahead of the one that was stopped, took flight. Upon close inspection of the stopped sampan, the inspectors found concealed contraband: one AK-47, one M-16, one first aid kit, civilian clothes, and one set of VC identification papers. The two detainees, one female and one male, were taken into custody as prisoners. The SA CTG 219.1 said he "considers the VC prisoners CIA as... not extremely significant as [the capture was] only a law of averages event. It is known [that the] enemy crosses

[the] river into Cambodia as easily in daylight as at night. Whether [the capture was by] pure chance or [by] faulty enemy security/intelligence is unknown, but the event was bound to happen eventually."¹

NILO Ha Tien and his VNN counterpart learned from interrogations of the prisoners that they were members of an 11 man unit functioning as a commo-liaison and rear service group for local guerrillas and local forces. The PWs gave an account of their recent activities.

PW joined his unit while it was at Moso. His unit was billeted in one cave and was tasked with resupplying all VC/NVA units in Moso.. .. This unit was there prior to 1971. The PW's unit collected food from surrounding villages of Binh Tre, An Binh, and Hoa Dien in Kien Luong [District]. In addition, they made monthly trips to Cambodia to receive supplies for the NVA at Ang Koul VS 335 560.. .. Supply route was over-land, crossing Giang Thang River between VS 488 543... and VS 477 543... (PW commented this route was still active, though not extensive since withdrawal of VC/NVA from Moso).

In September 1970, PW said that ARVN operations had cut off most supply routes to Moso and many VC were killed. May 1971, all units received orders to withdraw from Moso with the NVA unit moving to the U Minh Forest.

The Ha Tien LF moved from Moso and divided into various small detachments... and later on in July 1971, moved into an area... of Kien Luong at VS 67 45.... Since they set up their base camp there has been no ARVN operations in the area.

The base camp is located in a lightly forested area. For the rainy season they build elevated floors above the water and use nylon or camouflage for the roof. In the dry season they would move their base camp to higher and drier ground. The PW indicated

1. SA CTG 219.1 msg 161630Z SEP 71

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that they feel safe in this area and therefore the unit does not employ night security....

The PW stated there were two infiltration routes for the trans-shipment of ammo and weapons.

(1) From Vinh Te Canal to Tam Ngan Canal (Kinh So Mot) to Rach Gia....

(2) From Cambodia to Vinh Te Canal to Moso. This was supported by PW's unit, but has been deactivated since the VC withdrawal from Moso....

The PW had no knowledge of coastal infiltration....¹

At the present time, intelligence estimates indicate extensive VC infiltration throughout the AO. The PW's statements concerning the disruption of VC commo-liaison routes in the Moso area in 1970 show that well coordinated land, air, and waterborne operations are required to effectively interdict the enemy.

1. NILO Ha Tien msg 211040Z SEP 71

DECLASSIFIEDTRAN HUNG DAO XXI

Contact with the enemy in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXI AO was very heavy during September, reflecting the major campaign that ARVN forces conducted in the U Minh forest. U.S. Navy Seawolves flew 19 missions in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXI AO, and there were nine enemy initiated incidents during the month. These incidents included: six ambushes of VNN craft, two attacks on bases, and one mining. Friendly casualties suffered were as follows: 19 VNN wounded and three USN wounded. VNN craft received the following battle damage: one ATC sunk; minor damage to one CCB; and slight damage to one ATC, one ASPB, one CCB, and two PBRs. Enemy casualties were undetermined in all incidents. All the ambushes on VNN craft followed classic VC tactics. Concealed, prepared positions on the banks of selected waterways were used to launch attacks with small arms, B-40 or B-41 rockets, and in one instance, a 57mm recoilless rifle. The attacks on bases were stand-off ABFs, utilizing small caliber rockets, 82mm mortars, and sniper fire. It was an active month for TRAN HUNG DAO XXI forces.

Three USN personnel were wounded during the base attacks. The OP Base at Kien An was attacked twice on 15/16 September. The first attack was by B-40 or B-41 rockets and small arms fire at 2345H. Engineman Second Class J.K. Thompson, USN, received

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multiple fragmentation wounds and a compound fracture of the right leg when a B-40 rocket impacted near his position in the vicinity of the mobile repair facilities. Petty Officer Thompson was medevaced to the Third Surgical Hospital in Binh Thuy. His prognosis was good. At 0415H, Kien An was attacked again, but with small arms and 82mm mortars. Petty Officer R. J. Cooney, USN, received a minor small arms shrapnel wound in the neck while defending his position with a .50 caliber machinegun. He was treated by a corpsman and returned to duty. The third U.S. Navy sailor was wounded on 21 September, at 0700H. The man, an NMCB-5 Detail Mustang gate guard was shot in the shoulder by a sniper. He was medevaced to the Third Surgical Hospital at Binh Thuy. The incident is more fully covered in the Seabee section of this summary.

The USN forces were kept busy on six major salvage operations on the TRAN HUNG DAO XXI waterways. The most extensive of these was the salvage of the HQ 1226. The HQ 1226 had two holes in her hull, one a six footer on the port side. A three boat salvage force reported to the scene on 5 September. By 11 September, the HQ 1226 was moved to Kien An, where it rested up side down, parallel to the beach, in 20 feet of water, with a bubble trapped in the bow. On 30 September, the HQ 1226 was raised and patched.

The U. S. Navy's PMS Assistance Team THREE was active at both Ca Mau and Kien An. To date, two ten day courses have been conducted. TGs 210.1 and 210.2 have had a total of 21 VNN junior officers trained as instructors. The CTF 210 Repair Advisor and PMS Assistance Team THREE established a seven day indoctrination course at the Kien An OP Base. Eight boats have been qualified at Ca Mau, ten at Kien An, and 22 more boats are in various stages of training. TF 210 is expected to be fully indoctrinated in PMS by 15 November of this year.

TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV

Naval contact with the enemy in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV area was moderate during September. U.S. Navy Seawolves flew 38 missions, mostly in support of ARVN units. Five waterborne firefights occurred during the month; all were enemy initiated ambushes using B-40 rockets, 57mm recoilless rifles, and small arms fire. The VNN suffered eight wounded and boat damage as follows: three ATCs, two with significant damage and one with minor damage; and one PBR with 10 percent damage. Enemy casualties were unknown in each incident. Over all, the VNN effort for the month was divided between interdiction and combined operations. The interdiction effort consisted of routine patrols, WBGPs, and ambushes (utilizing both boats and troops). The combined operations included troop insertions for sweeps, blocking forces on the waterways, and escort services for ARVN tugs and barges. The combined operations were conducted primarily in support of the 41st and 64th ARVN Ranger Battalions, and 303 RF Battalion.

Throughout the month, intelligence reports stressed the increase in VC/NVA infiltration in Hau Nghia and Long An from the Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia. The infiltration was suspected of being aimed at interfering with the forthcoming Presidential election on 3 October.

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On 18 September, the NILO post at Go Dau Ha was closed. And on 29 September, LT R. W. Hyde, USN, relieved LT T. M. B. Salmon, USNR, as NILO Moc Hoa.

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TRAN HUNG DAO XXV

Enemy activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXV AO was light during September. Two waterborne firefights were recorded, resulting in one PBR sunk, two VNN wounded, one VC killed, and one AK-47 captured. Four Seawolf missions were flown in the AO in support of TRAN HUNG DAO XXV forces, with results undetermined.

Throughout the month, intelligence reports continued to reflect VC/NVA infiltration. Predictions were made that their purpose was to disrupt the up-coming Presidential election on 3 October, and to be in position to take advantage of any political confusion that may arise from the elections.

On 6 September, COMTHD XXV announced his plan to conduct monthly materiel, PMS, and base defense inspections. He also directed all his COs to conduct bi-monthly inspections.

On 6 September, an Army CH-47 food helicopter landed to replenish ATSB Phuoc Xuyen. Rotor wash blew over a 300 foot section of the eastern north-south catwalk connecting towers one and three. This was significant because much of the ATSB was under water with seasonal floods. The catwalks connect the vital areas of the base. Reinstallation of the catwalk began immediately. A NAVFORV Public Works Team arrived on 12 September to assist in

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installing helo pad and security lighting, and to secure the catwalk.

A refueling problem also developed at ATSB Phuoc Xuyen. Helicopter gunships refueled with JP-5, which was stored in barges at the ATSB. The base's source of JP-5 was the YRBM-21, which was turned over to the VNN on 28 September. The VNN had no requirement for YRBMs to carry JP-5. Fuel supply convoys had to be organized. LCM-6s with fuel bladders brought JP-5 from Ben Luc every three weeks. This was one more example of the VNN solving operational/logistic problems as the USN phases out of its support role.

On 29 September, LT H.O. Buzhardt, Jr., USN, relieved LT J.P. Sellinger, USNR, as NILO Tay Ninh. Tay Ninh has been an active post, sitting astride infiltration routes from Cambodia.

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TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI

Kien Hoa and Dinh Tuong Provinces were known to be VC strongholds for many years. In an effort to better interdict commo- liaison routes, the VNN reorganized their assets in both provinces. TRAN HUNG DAO VIII and XIX were combined into TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI on 20 September, in order to more effectively: coordinate patrols and ambushes; support the 7th ARVN Infantry Division and local forces in amphibious operations; and coordinate operations with the 10th Regiment and 11th ARVN Artillery Division. The TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI AO was defined as the waterways of the Ham Luong, Mo Cay, Ben Tre, and Ba Lai Rivers, and the Ma Cau, Xung (My Tho), Dong Tam, Ba Beo, and Tong Doc Loc Canals. The coordinates defining the exact AO were listed separately in NAVLE DRAC (Naval Liaison Delta Regional Assistance Command) secret msg 210111Z SEP 71. Elements assigned to the TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI operation were designated TF 217, under the command of Commander, Fourth Riverine Area; and included RAGs 21 and 33 (TG 217.1 at Dong Tam), RAGs 23 and 31 (TG 217.2 at Ben Tre), RIDs 42 and 45, RPD 58, HQ 801, HQ 543, and one section of junk forces detached from the Third Coastal Zone. CTF 217 established operational command at Dong Tam.

During the ten days in September that TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI

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was operational, U.S. Navy Seawolves flew ten missions in the AO, and one naval incident was reported. The naval incident occurred on 29 September. Three LCM-6s inserted an RF platoon (vic XS 397 460) at 1800H on 28 September. The three boats of RAGs 21 and 33 then set a WBGp (vic XS 399 458). At about 2030H, the boats left their WBGp without notifying the VNN NOC and beached at XS 383 490. A watch was set, but at 0200H on 29 September, a command detonated mine exploded between two of the boats. Both boats sank immediately. Two VNN sailors were killed, while three were missing and presumed dead.

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RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE

The Long Tau Shipping Channel, the Raison D'etre of Rung Sat Special Zone operations, enjoyed its 11th month of freedom from enemy attacks on shipping. The most recent incident involving attacks on shipping on the Long Tau occurred 1 November, 1970. Since then, 3,233 ships have transitted the channel safely.

There were eight Chuong Duong airmobile/watermobile sweep operations coordinated by the RSSZ Operations Center during September, as well as numerous PRU/RF/PF inserts. Only two of the operations made significant contact with the enemy, and the total RSSZ tally for September ran: 11 VC killed with three probably killed and three captured; six sampans and 40 bunkers damaged or destroyed; and one RF killed and five wounded.

USN Seawolf helos of Detachment Two operating from LSB Nha Be flew support missions for the Chuong Duong operations and made 21 intelligence-related air strikes during the month. Typically, results were not obtained on 19 of the strikes, although Seawolves were credited with three enemy killed and 35 bunkers and three sampans destroyed on missions where damage could be assessed.

The one notable incident of the month occurred on 17 September

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when two USA LHFTs and one USN LHFT, responding to intelligence, placed air strikes on a base camp in the vicinity of YS 033 792, eight kilometers east of Nha Be. Three of the enemy were killed by the air strikes, and a bunker and three sampans were destroyed. Directly following the air strikes, an RF company was inserted by Slicks, and soon made contact with an enemy force of unknown size at the base camp, killing one and capturing one VC. The SA RSSZ, in an 181540Z SEP 71 message, extolled the helicopter fire teams efforts: "Combined professionalism of Seawolves, Mad Dogs, Greyhounds, and Razorbacks made the operation on 17 September a complete success. The results, as reflected in...RSSZ Spotrep Nr 368...demonstrated a can do spirit and cooperation that is highly commendable. In rapid succession, the gunships placed accurate fire on enemy positions and the Slicks inserted and extracted in confined LZs during a driving rain. An enthusiastic well done to all hands."

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The following was the disposition of the RAID units at the end of September:

| <u>RAID</u> | <u>OPCON</u> | <u>Location</u> | <u>THD</u> |
|-------------|--------------|-----------------|------------|
| 70 | CTG 210.1 | Kien An | XXI |
| 71 | CTG 210.1 | Kien An | XXI |
| 72 | CTG 210.2 | Kien An | XXI |
| 73 | CTG 210.2 | Kien An | XXI |
| 74 | CTG 210.2 | Ca Mau | XXI |
| 75 | CTG 210.2 | Ca Mau | XXI |

Each RAID is composed of approximately seven ATCs, four ASPBs, one MON, and one CCB. The RAIDs are reviewed in their respective operations. On 12 September 11 RAC of RAID 73 changed operational control from TG 210.1 to TG 210.2 for operations in the southern U Minh OP areas replacing 11 RAC of RAID 74 which began a 30 day stand down for repair.

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CTF 212

The following was the disposition of RPD units at the end of

September:

| <u>RPD</u> | <u>OPCON</u> | <u>Location</u> |
|------------|--------------|--------------------|
| 51 | CMD | Nha Be |
| 52 | 216.1 | Phu Cuong |
| 53 | 214.1 | Ben Luc/Tra Cu |
| 54 | 214.1 | Go Dau Ha/Ben Keo |
| 55 | 218.2 | Tan Chau/Chau Doc |
| 56 | 212.2 | Moc Hoa |
| 57 | 228 | Nha Be |
| 58 | 217.1 | My Tho |
| 59 | 218.2 | Tan Chau |
| 60 | 221.1 | Hoi An/Thuan An |
| 61 | 212.5 | Rach Soi |
| 62 | 212.5 | Rach Soi |
| 63 | 212.2 | Phuoc Xuyen |
| 64 | 212.2 | Tuyen Nhon/Moc Hoa |
| 65 | Training | Binh Thuy |

Each RPD is composed of approximately 20 PBRs and is reviewed in the operation in which it operates.

CTF 214

The following was the disposition of RID units at the end of September:

| <u>RID</u> | <u>OPCON</u> | <u>Location</u> | <u>THD</u> |
|------------|--------------|----------------------|------------|
| 40 | 214.1 | Go Dau Ha/ Tra Cu | XXIV |
| 41 | 218.2 | Tan Chau | XVIII |
| 42 | 217.1 | Dong Tam | XXVI |
| 43 | 216.1 | Phu Cuong | XXVII |
| 44 | 214.1 | Ben Luc/ Tan An | XXIV |
| 45 | 214.2 | Nam Can | IV |
| 46 | 217.2 | Dong Tam | XXVI |
| 47 | 214.2 | Nam Can | IV |
| 48 | 218.2 | Tan Chau | XVIII |

Each RID is generally composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, six ASPBs, one CCB, one Zippo, one REF, and one RECH.

The RIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.

RIVER ASSAULT GROUPS

The following was the disposition of RAG units at the end of

September:

| <u>RAG</u> | <u>OPCON</u> | <u>Location</u> |
|------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------|
| 22 | CTF 227 | Saigon |
| 24 | CTG 216.1 | Phu Cuong |
| 26 | CTF 210 | Ca Mau |
| 27 | CTF 228 | Nha Be |
| 28 | Commander, Third Riverine Area | Long Binh |
| 30 | CTG 216.1 | Phu Cuong |
| 21/33 | CTG 217.1 | Dong Tam |
| 32 | Commander, First Coastal Zone | Hue |
| 23/31 | CTG 217.2 | Vinh Long |
| 25/29 | CTG 210.3 | Ca Mau |
| 81 | Convoy Escort Fourth Riverine Area | Cat Lai |

Each RAG is composed of approximately one MON, one CCB, three LCVPs and four LCM-6s. The RAGs are reviewed in their respective operations.

SPECIAL WARFARE

The following was the disposition of the Seal Detachments operating in a combat capacity throughout the country at the end of September:

| <u>Detachment</u> | <u>OPCON</u> | <u>Location</u> | <u>Officer-in-Charge</u> |
|--|--------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| Team One Det Golf November Platoon | 116.6.2 | Dong Tam | LT Fletcher |
| Team One Det Golf Oscar Platoon | 116.10.2 | Ben Luc | LTJG Walsh |
| Team One Det Golf Mike Platoon | 116.10.2 | Ben Luc | LT McCary |

Seal units are reviewed in their respective operational areas.

Quebec Platoon stood down on 8 September, and Mike Platoon replaced Quebec Platoon at Ben Luc on 10 September. Oscar Platoon shifted from Nam Can to Ben Luc at the end of September.

CTG 116.7

The following was the disposition of HAL-3 Detachments at the end of September:

| <u>Det.</u> | <u>Task Org.</u> | <u>Location</u> | <u>O-in-C</u> |
|-------------|------------------|--------------------------------|---------------|
| 1 | 116.1.1 | Nam Can | LT Mears |
| 2 | 116.9.1 | Nha Be | LCDR O'Neil |
| 3 | 116.13.1 | Ca Mau | LCDR Morrison |
| 4 | 116.10.1 | Ben Luc | LT Fulbright |
| 5 | 116.15.1 | Chau Doc | LCDR Hull |
| 6 | 116.14.1 | Phu Loi | LCDR Stoner |
| 7 | 116.6.1 | Dong Tam | LCDR Venter |
| 8 | 116.5.1 | Rach Soi | LCDR Henry |
| 9 | 116.17.1 | VERNON COUNTY (LST-1161) | LCDR Pellerin |

In September the Seawolves flew 930 missions; 97 were in contact with the enemy, and 38 enemy were killed. Sixty seven structures, 61 bunkers and 81 sampans were damaged or destroyed.

Vietnamese pilots and gunners continued to work effectively with the various Seawolf detachments, and most of the pilots of the first group qualified as attack helicopter commanders (AHAC), a significant step in helicopter pilot qualification. Two of the pilots

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will stay on after 1 October, the date that the first group was to return to the Vietnamese Air Force, and will be given the opportunity to qualify as Fire Team Leaders (FTL), the most responsible tactical position given to helicopter pilots.

On 20 September at 1138H, a tragic accident involving a UH-1M aircraft, attached to Detachment 4 at Ben Luc, occurred at XS 470 918. The aircraft on routine patrol experienced a rotor blade casualty and disintegrated, killing all four crew members. A Seal Team was inserted to protect the crash site and the weapons and classified material, all of which were recovered. Casualties were LCDR L. L. Cover, USN, and LTJG A. W. Barden Jr., USN, co pilot and pilot respectively, and AMSI H. E. Cowen and ADJ2 C. H. Goldbin, door gunners.

In another incident, a UH-1B of Detachment 9 caught fire at the helo pad at LSB Nha Be during refueling. The incident occurred at 1630H on 22 September, and, due to quick action by the crew, damage was superficial and no injuries were incurred.

Detachment 9 was relocated to YRBM 21 on 24 September and was placed under the operational control of CTG 116.15 to be used by CTF 218 for a period of 72 hours; after release from CTF 218, Detachment 9 returned to VERNON COUNTY (LST-1161).

On 25 September, LT A.K. Mears relieved LCDR A.E. Pellerin as Officer in Charge, Detachment 1, at Nam Can. In addition, LT T.W. Fulbright assumed the duties as Officer in Charge of Detachment 4 at Ben Luc. This was due to the aircraft accident on 22 September killing the former Officer in Charge of Detachment 4, LCDR L.L. Cover, USN.

On 28 September, as a result of the aircraft accident on 22 September, all helicopters assigned to the squadron were grounded for a one time maintenance check on rotor blades. At the end of the month, most aircraft were still grounded due to the meticulous care being used in the inspection of the rotor blades.

On 30 September, LCDR A.E. Pellerin, USN, relieved CDR C.R. Hall, USN, as Officer in Charge of Detachment 9.

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OV-10A aircraft inflicted heavy losses on the VC/NVA troops in the Delta during the month of September. The VC/NVA launched large attacks in the northern U Minh Forest Area and were soundly defeated with a great assist from the "Ponies". They flew 99 missions in contact with the enemy, killing 309 troops and damaging or destroying one sampan, 168 structures, and 65 bunkers; although the majority of these statistics resulted from the U Minh campaign, elements of CTG 116.8 patrolled throughout the Delta to give assistance wherever it was needed.

In addition to combat air patrols and quick response missions, TG 116.8 flew Visual Air Reconnaissance Search (VARs) missions in support of CTF 115. These missions were ordered to increase aerial surveillance of coastal transshipment areas and to help coastal units enforce the curfew.

The most intense and successful engagement of the month took place on 17 September in the vicinity of VQ 878 712, located in the northwest corner of the U Minh Forest. The "Ponies" made repeated strikes using rockets, machine gun, and cannon fire, from 1545H until 2345H for troops in contact. Clearances were granted by the 33rd RCAT (Regimental Combat Assistance Team) and the

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aircraft were controlled on target by a U.S. Army advisory team. Results of the multiple strikes were 68 enemy troops killed, and 24 AK-47 rifles captured. TG 116.8 lost no aircraft or personnel and friendly ground casualties were light.

The OV-10A jockeys once more had a field day on 20 September when the 33rd RCAT again called for assistance, this time to silence enemy mortar positions (vic VQ 882 370), close to the positions that had been thoroughly routed on 17 September. The "Ponies" struck from 0930H until 1330H, killing 20 VC and making it possible for ground troops to advance and capture five AK-47 rifles, 14 B-40 rounds, and assorted ammunition. The airmen suffered no casualties and all aircraft returned safely.

Black Pony strikes were credited with a major part in the allied effort to break up the September offensive in the northern U Minh Forest.

One other extremely successful series of strikes took place on 21 September at WR 095 448, during the period from 1640H to 1820H. An Army helo had been shot down and "Ponies" were called in to protect the area. They placed four rocket and machine gun strikes in the area killing 42 enemy troops. Friendly casualties were not known.

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COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCES

U.S. Navy MARKET TIME and VNN TRAN HUNG DAO XV units maintained an effective barrier against sea-borne infiltration in September. MARKET TIME units inspected 1,938 craft during day and night patrols, boarded 67, and detained no persons. The MARKET TIME units were composed of, on the average, two MSO, two PGs, one DE, one DD, one LST, and one WHEC throughout the month. VNN TRAN HUNG DAO XV units inspected 16,910 craft, and detained 177 persons during day and night patrols.

FIRST COASTAL ZONE

Enemy activity continued to be moderate throughout the First Coastal Zone during September. Operations continued at a moderate pace in the Chi Lang I AO with six reported incidents, four involving LDNN inserts, one of which resulted in one VC killed by air on the 28th. Also, CG 14 personnel conducted a combined operation with National Police Field Forces on Cu Lao Cham Island on 23 September, resulting in one deserter wounded and ten people detained.

Activity in the Chi Lang II AO was low, with no significant incidents reported.

Activity in the Chi Lang III AO was moderate, with 14 mining incidents reported. Four of the incidents were harmless mine detonations, two involved minings of LCMs, while the eight others involved mine turn-ins and recoveries, attesting to the continuing success of the VNN psyops/VIP effort. Three of the mines recovered were floating booby traps, possibly directed at civilians, probably indicative of an attempt by the VC/NVA to hurt the psyops effort.

Swimmer/sappers were also active in DaNang Harbor as they possibly attempted to mine the SS RAINBOW, anchored at anchorage

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10, late in the evening of 12 September. Coast Guard personnel on a tug observed a sampan lying under the port bow, and fired warning shots to alert the U.S. Army sentry. Two figures then dropped off the anchor chain into the water, and the sampan tried to evade around the starboard side of the ship. The tug pursued and halted the sampan, capturing five men, including one still in the water. EOD personnel checked the ship for mines with negative results. Early the following morning, another sampan was observed under the stern of SS RAINBOW by the U.S. Army sentry. Four persons were spotted in the water and one in the sampan. One swimmer attempted to climb a line hanging over the stern. The sentry fired into the swimmers and sampan, possibly wounding several of the swimmers. The sampan disappeared into the blackness, escaping. EOD personnel again checked the ship but found nothing.

In miscellaneous incidents throughout the First Coastal Zone, on 2 September, VNN HQ 13, under the OPCON of U.S. CTG 115.6, detected and apprehended the SS EASTERN TRADE and two junks engaged in smuggling off DaNang. In another incident during the night of 23-24 September, the U.S. ammunition ship, USS KILAUEA (AE-26) was repeatedly challenged by VNN HQ-1 (ex USS CAMP, DER-251) with no reply. The HQ-1 then fired three 3 inch 50 caliber

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illumination rounds in order to visually identify the contact. At that time, the KILAUEA turned on her navigation lights and responded to the challenge. Apparently, the HQ-1 used a weak amber light to initiate the challenge which could not be seen on the KILAUEA.

On 19 September, LT John D. Fritsvold, USNR, relieved LT David J. Mallon, USN, as NILO Chu Lai.

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SECOND COASTAL ZONE

Harbor security at Qui Nhon continued to be the main topic of interest in the Second Coastal Zone in September. Many recommendations made in the harbor security study conducted last month by COMNAVFORV were being implemented: waterline lighting was being improved, pier security manning level was brought up to 100 percent, and ship/pier separation was being increased by widening fenders and camels for better visibility of the water line. In addition, ISDS (Improved Swimmer Defense System) arrived at Qui Nhon on 25 September and was assigned the designator TE 115.9.3.1, under the OPCON of SA HDU Qui Nhon, CTU 115.9.3. The ISDS was composed of two sonars, one active and one doppler, and a special high resolution radar capable of detecting surfaced swimmers within 400 yards under good conditions. The system was mounted on an LCM-6 platform, and incorporated an 81mm mortar firing specially fused water entry rounds. The mortar could be vectored for attack by either the radar or sonar.¹ The system became operational at Qui Nhon on 27 September.

In spite of these increased security measures, Qui Nhon managed to have several swimmer/sapper incidents. At 2317H, 23 September, two empty barges were sunk while tied up to an ammu-
1. COMNAVFORV msg 261152Z SEP 71

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dition wharf. EOD personnel recovered an unexploded eight to ten pound charge from between two other barges at the wharf. The pier sentries had not noticed anything unusual prior to the explosion. Furthermore, on 26 September, personnel enroute to the SS PATRICIA noticed a line attached to the SS LUCKY TWO, moored at commercial buoys. EOD personnel dove and rendered harmless a mine composed of eight 25-30 pound blocks of CHICOM TNT. At the time of the EOD search, a small sampan with one VN male aboard was detained in the vicinity of LUCKY TWO.

Sappers were also active at Cam Ranh Bay. On 13 September, USAF personnel engaged an enemy sapper team one kilometer northwest of NAF, resulting in one wounded sapper captured. A NAF skimmer craft saturated the suspected water escape route with concussion grenades, causing a secondary explosion. No friendly casualties occurred.

USS CURRENT (ARS-22) completed salvage operations on SS GREEN BAY on 11 September. The GREEN BAY departed Qui Nhon on 23 September, enroute to Hong Kong, under tow by the Dutch tug, ELBE.

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THIRD COASTAL ZONE

Operations proceeded smoothly in the Third Coastal Zone during September. Enemy activity was light to moderate. The coastal cloud unit, TU 213.3.1, inspected 5,731 craft during day and night patrols, in and between the Binh Dai, Thanh Phu, and Long Toan VC Secret Zones. The task unit support ship, USS WINDHAM COUNTY (LST-1170), was relieved by the USS VERNON COUNTY (LST-1161) on 7 September. U. S. Navy Seawolves of HAL-3 Detachment 9, staging from the LST, flew 17 missions in support of the task unit, destroying 23 sampans, five structures, two bunkers, one junk, and one water reservoir; and damaging seven bunkers, five sampans, and two structures.

U. S. Navy Black Ponies of VAL-4, based at Binh Thuy, also aided the air operations with four strikes on 20, 22, 28, and 29 September, killing 19 VC, and destroying 17 structures and five bunkers. All of the strikes took place in the general vicinity of coordinates XR 638 560, and were directed at enemy bunker complexes and personnel concentrations.

The enemy did not seem to fear allied air operations in the secret zones as he frequently fired on the Seawolves and Black Ponies with seeming disregard for the consequences. In a particularly

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audacious encounter on 4 September, Seawolves were escorting a Thanh Phu District RF/PF convoy, 33 miles southeast of Dong Tam. The helos placed random automatic weapons fire in the mangroves along the route of the convoy. Suddenly, at 1030H, the lead sampan of the convoy took fire from the south bank (XR 710 012), but proceeded through the area undamaged. The second sampan received heavy fire, lost steering control, and went into the bank. Upon withdrawing, one B-40 round, fired at point blank range caught the sampan amidships, immediately sinking it. The Seawolves put in door gun strikes on the enemy position. However, the enemy refused to be routed, and continued his attacks, the battle raging for about one hour, the Seawolves receiving moderate to heavy ground fire during this time. The Seawolves continued to cover for the convoy until the friendlies were out of the area. Miraculously, there were no friendly casualties.

Coastal groups were very active throughout the month. On 8 September, CG 34 and 35 junks were released from operations with TRAN HUNG DAO XIX units and were free to actively support the cloud task unit in the transshipment interdiction effort. However, enemy activity was not confined solely to the secret zones as CG 33 found out at 2300H on 30 September. Four rocket rounds landed

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in the CG 33/ Rach Dua area, one round scoring a direct hit on two junks alongside the pier, sinking both junks. No personnel casualties resulted.

In a miscellaneous incident in the Third Coastal Zone, the Polish merchant vessel LELEWELL, bound for Singapore, required a medevac to Vung Tau for a serious cardiac patient. This was the second Polish merchant vessel in two months to require a medevac to Vung Tau.

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FOURTH / FIFTH COASTAL ZONES

Cloud operations continued to improve in the Fourth/Fifth Coastal Zones during September. A comprehensive assessment of transshipment/infiltration points throughout the zones was made by U.S. task group advisors. Areas of primary interest mentioned were the Gan Hao River (WQ 46 95), Ong Doc River (VR 79 99), Dong Cung River (VQ 79 93), and the Rach Tien Dua (VR 83 53), all in the Ca Mau Peninsula; and the "Hump Area" of the U Minh (VR 89 87). Also mentioned was a new area further north, near Ha Tien, the Bai Ot Peninsula (VS 490 370), supposedly a new staging area for coastal transshipment. It was believed that recent 16th ARVN Regiment operations in the Moso Mountains and Three Sisters Area (VS 89 19), a long time transshipment staging area, caused the shift to the new location.

In the light of this new intelligence, several of the cloud units were repositioned. TU 213.4.1, formerly patrolling in Rach Gia Bay, moved south to cover the U Minh "Hump Area". Also, TU 213.4.2, spread its activity throughout MARKET TIME areas 9H, 9M, 9K, and 9K1 primarily to interdict arms movement from Cambodia to the Bai Ot Peninsula.

On 30 September, LT James W. Heubach, USN, relieved LT John D. Rausch, USN, as NILO An Thoi.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY

September 1st saw the close of the U.S. Veterans' Project, first begun in July. This project was coordinated by the Department of Defense with the Navy serving as the executive agency. Ten veterans worked on the project, the construction of 20 dependent shelters. These shelters were 20 percent completed upon the veterans' arrival in-country, and were over 80 percent completed when they returned to the United States. Once settled in three of the housing units they were constructing, they made the project site their home. They had austere living conditions, but wanted to live and work with the Vietnamese. They were all able to establish good rapport with the Vietnamese.

In a message on 6 September, COMUSMACV granted COMNAVFORV's request to increase the cost limit of an average dependent housing unit from \$600 to \$700.


The Sister Ship Program gained momentum during September with the visit of COMDESRON 17 to the squadron's sister ships, RPD 56 at Moc Hoa, and RPD 58 at My Tho. The purpose of the visit was to identify ways in which the sister unit program could assist in the professional growth and development of the VNN counterpart unit and further two-way communication. As a follow up to the

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initial contact, COMDESRON 17 desired to host a visit by VNN sister
unit officers aboard his flagship, USS HENRY B. WILSON.

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New dependent housing units on Binh Ba Island, in the mouth of Cam Ranh Bay, provide more comfortable living for the families of sailors assigned to Coastal Group 26 there.



On a river near the Phu Cuong OP Base, a Vietnamese sailor hauls in fish caught as part of the Operation Helping Hand fishing project his base has underway to provide more protein to the diets of Navymen and their families.

ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY

The ACTOV program took giant strides towards completion during the month of September. LSB Dong Tam and eight ISBs were turned over during the month, making 28 out of 32 support bases placed in VNN hands to date. A total of 62 ships and craft were turned over during the month, a figure rivaling the December 1970 mass turnover of combat PBRs. Included were the USS FORSTER (DER-334), a Coast Guard lightship, the USS SATYR (ARL-23), two YRBMs, 12 LCMs, and assorted utility and small craft.

Intermediate Support Base Qui Nhon was the first of eight ISBs to be turned over to the VNN Logistics Support Command during the month, passing into VNN hands on 1 September. Vinh Long followed suit on 7 September; Thuan An on 10 September; Long Phu on the 14th; Cat Lai on the 16th; Cho Moi and Long Xuyen on 23 September; and finally Nam Can on the 27th. Logistics Support Base Dong Tam was turned over on 30 September, the ninth and final base to be turned over during the month, and the 28th base turned over in the ACTOV program. Two radar sites, at Vung Tau and DaNang, had also been turned over previously.

LSBs Cam Ranh Bay and Binh Thuy experienced changes of command on 20 and 22 September respectively. The bases will

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continue as U.S. bases, but with a VNN commanding officer, until the turnover of the base when all control and assets are formally and physically transferred. From the time of change of command, the VNN complement increases and the U.S. component decreases, the remaining U.S. personnel assuming an advisory status.

The VNN Blue Water Navy received the Radar Picket Destroyer Escort USS FORSTER (DER-334) and the U.S. Coast Guard Lightship WLV-523 on 25 September at the USN Ship Repair Facility in Guam. The FORSTER, renamed TRAN KHAN DU (HQ-4), was one of the first U.S. naval units to participate in the MARKET TIME coastal surveillance operations in 1965. The FORSTER overhaul was completed on 20 September, 42 days ahead of the original schedule. Sea trials were held on 13 and 16 September, and "with guns blazing and a 20 knot full power trial, FORSTER proved herself ready as a worthy addition to the VNN... The good guys contributing to the early completions and success of the overhaul were the FORSTER crew and the SRF Assistant Repair Superintendent LT Clemen."¹ A special task force selected to manage the overhaul accomplished 64,282 dollars of the work previously assigned the ships force. About one third of the HQ-4 (ex FORSTER) crew had trained aboard the HQ-1 (ex CAMP) before reporting aboard, with additional

1. DER Project Officer, LCDR Whitely msg NAVSHIPREPFAC
GUAM 170640Z SEP 71

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extensive training following the turnover. The Lightship Ba Dong, also turned over, will assume the job of ACTOVRAD Gap Filler, taking station off the coast in a position where the coastal radars cannot give adequate coverage.

On 30 September, the USN turned over the Landing Craft Repair Ship USS SATYR (ARL-23) in a ceremony at Long Xuyen support base. The SATYR, valued at an estimated 5.5 million dollars, had been providing repair services and logistic support for VNN riverine assault and coastal patrol craft operating in the Mekong Delta. With the turnover, nearly 120 American sailors left the SATYR, with ten U.S. Navymen remaining as advisors. ARLs are capable of providing full repair services to the underwater body, hull, screws, and shafting, as well as to diesel engines, auxiliary machinery, electrical, electronic and ordnance systems of the various riverine and coastal patrol craft.

Two non-self propelled barges were turned over during the month. On 15 September, the YRBM-16 was turned over at LSB Nha Be, and on 28 September, the YRBM-21 was turned over at Tan Chau. The YRBM-16 had been serving since 1967 in a repair, messing, and berthing capacity for riverine combat craft in the Mekong Delta. The barge returned to Vietnam in August from Guam where it

underwent a complete refitting at a cost of 1.3 million dollars.

With the severe shortage of craft and repair facilities for PBRs, these mobile repair barges were most welcome additions to the VNN.

More than two years of concentrated effort came to a close on 25 September, when the last five boats of the MR I portion of the ACTOV Craft Program were turned over to the VNN at LSB DaNang, the Republic's northernmost seaport. Four LCM-6 pusher boats and a 50-foot utility boat were transferred. Since the first transfer in August 1969, over 100 boats were turned over at DaNang. CWO Sorensen, DaNang's ACTOV Division Officer, stated "All the boats that we've turned over are in as good a shape as they were when they were new. The boats are stripped down to bare metal and repainted, inside and out. All equipment is removed and overhauled, and all electrical circuits are checked and tested. They're good-looking craft when we're through with them, and they run well". In the spring of 1970, there were approximately 275 U.S. Navymen in the ACTOV Division at DaNang, doing all turnover work on the boats, and they dwindled to 22 men by the end of September. The projected completion date for the boat turnovers was June of 1972. However, with the accelerated program in effect, nine months were shaved off that time.¹


1. NSF DaNang NEWS RELEASE No. 199-71, September 25, 1971

Also on 25 September, four LCM-6s, an LCM-8 (minidock), and a 100-foot UTB were transferred to the VNN at LSB Nha Be; while two LCM-6s were turned over at LSB Dong Tam; and an LCM-6 was transferred on board the USS SATYR.

Four Army PBRs were turned over at ISB Cat Lai on 29 September. They assumed waterborne escort of ammo tows to Bien Hoa.

On 11 September, at NTC Saigon, 208 personnel comprising P O class 2S/71 were graduated. On 30 September, 71 OCS graduates of Tran Hung Dao Class XII received their commissions from RADM Chon at the NTC in Saigon. This ceremony marked the completion of the OCS program, which provided a total of 744 new officers to the VNN in its two year span.


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ISB Thuan An; an operational intermediate support base, manned by well-trained, competent Vietnamese officers and navymen, courtesy of the U.S. Navy.


The base provides fuel, maintenance, administrative, financial, and logistic support for river and patrol bases in the northern portion of MR I. Because of its central location, Thuan An provides a vital link in the supply chain to these bases. It is located about 15 miles northwest of Hue on an island. The base was constructed in 1970 by USN Seabees from MCB 10, and commissioned on November 11, 1970.

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U. S. Navymen haul down American flags on the last boats to be turned over to the Vietnamese Navy at the U. S. Naval Support Facility, DaNang, Republic of Vietnam. Four LCM pusher boats and a 50-foot utility craft were turned over, marking the end of the ACTOV CRAFT program at DaNang.

DECLASSIFIED ACTOVLOG



* Base already turned over

NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON

Several milestones of the VNN supply improvement program were completed at the end of September, throughout the LSB/ISB support complexes, including standardization of procedures, stock purification, and rewarehousing. The Accelerated Overhaul Program was noted to be slipping in its deadlines, and the program was adjusted such that the goals of the program could yet be achieved. Also during the month, the Drug Rehabilitation Program shifted from Nha Be to Naval Hospital, Miramar, California, leaving the detoxification effort in-country at LSB Nha Be.

The Accelerated Overhaul Program for PBR and RAC craft began in July with the approval of the commander of the VN Joint General Staff and General Abrams of MACV to stand-down riverine craft operations to insure that the craft would be in a high state of readiness for the upcoming dry season campaign. By the middle of September, it became obvious that the original program deadlines would not be achieved. Factors contributing to the slippage included: failure to schedule craft into overhaul in accordance with the established schedule, inadequate boat crew participation in overhaul responsibilities, improper supervision of repair work, less than optimum utilization of limited lift capability, failure to properly plan and prepare for overhaul work packages, and, absenteeism

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among both repair and craft personnel. Accordingly, the schedule was revised to reduce the number of PBRs in overhaul at any one time from 28 to 18 and the number of RAC craft from 54 to 42. The revised schedule was adjusted to reflect actual progress and demonstrated capabilities of the repair facilities.

The causes for slippage in the overhaul deadlines were often expressive of the problems of Vietnamization on the whole, and are worth expanding upon. It was felt that VNN repair support supply personnel on the repair craft HQ-800 on the Vam Co River were reluctant to submit work stoppage messages, feeling that they might appear to be implicating their seniors at VNNLSC.¹ LSB Dong Tam experienced a delay when PBRs from TRAN HUNG DAO XIX failed to show up (as scheduled) for nine days, with the hull repair facilities standing empty for six days.² Dong Tam further suffered from large scale absenteeism from the repair facility. The difficulty appeared to be discouraged and unmotivated sailors, inadequately supervised and controlled.³ The VNN commander of the Dong Tam facility illustrated his sense of frustration, in suggesting that concertina wire be strung around the repair shops to prevent the men

1. LOGSUPBASE Nha Be msg 200424Z SEP 71
2. SA LSB Dong Tam msg 231039Z SEP 71
3. SA LSB Dong Tam msg 111522Z SEP 71

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from slipping away. A more reasonable solution appeared when CNO VNN was petitioned to allow the facility to establish two eight-hour shifts with extra pay in lieu of the disheartening 12-hour day.¹ A critical shortage of tools/repair parts to support the overhaul and PMS programs on the PBRs was noted. With no survey action having been taken at the time of loss by the RPD commanders, replacements could not justifiably be forthcoming. This impasse did not solve the problem for the PMS program, and it was suggested by SA CTF 212 that the survey/replacement technical procedures would have to be dispensed with and the requisite tools given out anew.²

The implementation of the standard field procedures at the LSB/ISBs was completed 26 September. For the first time, all 18 bases and their supported activities were operating under a single, standard set of procedures, written in both Vietnamese and English. The LSB/ISB stock purification and rewarehousing program was completed 30 September. The following supply departments were turned over in September: LSBs Nha Be, Cam Ranh Bay (106 days ahead of schedule), and DaNang; ISBs Ca Mau (commissioned), Nam Can, and Cho Moi.

1. SA LSB Dong Tam msg 161102Z SEP 71

2. SA CTF 212 msg 241005Z SEP 71

On 27 September, requisition channels for Brown Water support were shifted back to the VNNSC. Since 17 July, VNNSC had referred all LSB/ISB requisitions to NSA, Saigon, to reduce the workload during mechanization and rewarehousing.

On 30 September, the project to pull VNNSC excess and to rewarehouse and inventory remaining Blue Water material in the Warehouse 5 complex was completed. This complex, consisting of three large buildings, contains more than 22,000 line items with an ultimate capacity of about 70,000 line items, and will hold all active line items at the VNNSC. The excesses located in the remainder of the VNNSC warehouses will be processed by the VNN at a later date.

The milestones initially established to improve supply support in the VN Navy were completed 30 September, several months ahead of schedule. The progress in the last three months was excellent. Phase I of the VNN Supply Support Improvement Program was completed. The following items were the major accomplishments of Phase I:

- a. The VNNSC was mechanized.
- b. The VNNSC is operating under simple, written procedures.
- c. All active materiel at the VNNSC was rewarehoused, inventoried, and taken up on the records.

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- d. Excess materiel at the VNNSC was segregated.
- e. All LSBs and ISBs were purged of excess material, rewarehoused, inventoried and now operate on standard written procedures.
- f. A responsive transportation system was established and all backlogs were eliminated.
- g. Range and depth of stocks to support all VNN ships and craft were reviewed and revised by SPCC, Mechanicsburg, and all deficiencies placed on order with delivery scheduled in-country by 30 October, 1971.
- h. A responsive CASREPT and Work Stoppage procedure was established with weekly status being provided to all activities.
- i. A Materiel Control and Screening Procedure (MATCONOFF) was established to utilize in-country assets for all urgently required materiel not available at the VNNSC or NSA Saigon.
- j. The VNN operating forces were finally receiving reasonably responsive supply support.

By the beginning of September the rehabilitation phase of the drug program in-country was shifted to Naval Hospital, Miramar, California, as the last of the personnel in rehabilitation left the APL-30 at LSB Nha Be. Nha Be remained the central detoxification site in-country, as all personnel admitted into the program were

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forwarded to Nha Be for a 10-14 day stay for evaluation and administrative processing. In September there were 58 persons admitted to the center at Nha Be.

The NAVFORV Drug Education Team continued its briefings for all incoming personnel in Saigon, and made trips to all activities in the field on a quarterly basis. The team discussed the drug program on these trips, and distributed tapes and pamphlets which in many cases were well received. The team also set up a 24-hour drug hot line in-country.

The proportion of the drug problem for the Armed Forces in Vietnam was found to be less than first anticipated. As of 22 September, 97,296 personnel being reassigned out of RVN had been screened: 3,580 or 3.7 percent were positive on confirmatory tests. The Navy fared better in the breakdown of the statistic as follows: ¹

| <u>Service</u> | <u>Service No.</u> | <u>Screened</u> | <u>Pos/Confirmed</u> | <u>Percent</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|-----------------|----------------------|----------------|
| USA | | 72,730 | 3,484 | 4.8 |
| USN | | 7,327 | 25 | 0.3 |
| USAF | | 17,239 | 71 | 0.4 |

During the month, RADM Salzer, COMNAVFORV, traveled


1. COMUSMACV msg 011404Z OCT 71

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
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to several support bases throughout the country to discuss matters with the U.S.N. advisors along with their counterparts. At each base he also took the opportunity to address all hands. The bases the admiral visited were LSBs Dong Tam, Binh Thuy, Cat Lo, Cam Ranh Bay, and DaNang. At DaNang and Cat Lo the admiral also took the opportunity to visit the local CSCs to discuss the coordinated use of air assets as well as the employment of the CSC. On 16 September, RADM W.C. Dowd, DEPCOMNAVFORV for Supply, toured LSB Cam Ranh Bay, the same day RADM Salzer was there, and termed the supply department the best in the country. On 10 September at LSB Cat Lo, the day COMNAVFORV was visiting, CAPT R.G. Mills, CO NAVSHIPREPFAC Subic, visited to discuss the ACTOVLOG program in preparation for assuming duties as CINCPACFLT Maintenance Officer. On 18 and 19 September, RADM A.W. Price, Jr., DEPCOMNAVFORV for Operations, traveled to the VNNTC at Nha Trang for the Naval Academy graduation, then on to DaNang for a tour of ACTOVRAD Site No. 2 and the nearby CSC. He toured OP Bases Hue and Cua Viet also during his tour. On 28 September, he toured Tan Chau OP Base, and proceeded on to the YRBM-21 for her turnover ceremony.

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LT Du Xinh, the repair officer at Binh Thuy, discusses the progress of the Accelerated Overhaul Program with LT Joe T. Rucker, his American advisor.



Seaman Khuu Vinh Hung grinds valves with his American advisor,
PO2 David L. Jones.

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NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES

The Navy construction experts of NMCB-5 and CBMU-302 continued to achieve solid results at far flung bases throughout the Republic of Vietnam. In addition to the major units various small detachments from NMCBs 4, 5, 10, 40, 62 and 133 worked at USAID projects from Soc Trang, deep in the Delta, to Xuan Loc, about 35 miles northeast of Saigon. These detachments worked on roads, schools, a maternity clinic, and various other projects to better the standard of living of the citizens of South Vietnam.

The constructionmen of NMCB-5, Detail Maverick at Mui Dinh ACTOVRAD Site (35 men including advisors), completed their work on 26 September and moved off the site. They are preparing to stand down and return to CONUS in late October, however, construction at the site was not without its dangers. Mui Dinh was probed by an ABF of two rounds of unknown ordnance on 11 September at 2100H. No casualties were incurred as the rounds impacted 300 meters south of the base. The Seabees responded with fire in the general direction of the enemy and managed to suppress all hostile fire.

Detail Mustang (99 men including advisors) continued its work on the ISB at Ca Mau. This detail was plagued with transportation problems due to virtually impassable roads and its isolated location.

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Due to the road conditions in September, food shipment had to be flown to the base by CH-46 helicopters of Air Cofat, the Navy's own "White Hat Airlines". A sentry, EA2 D.P. Rehm, was wounded in the left shoulder as he stood his watch at the main gate of the ISB. The sniper was thought to have been a great distance away as the bullet penetrated his shoulder and lodged there. He was medevaced to the Army hospital at Binh Thuy and was expected to return to duty in 10 to 20 days. Detail Mustang was expected to complete their work at Ca Mau on 10 October and prepare for movement back to CONUS during the last part of October.

Detail Bonco, stationed at the ACTOVRAD site at Nui Ta Kou (84 men including advisors), saw their completion date slip two weeks due to excessive rainfall and extremely uncooperative Viet Cong insurgents. The elusive guerrillas again this month planted mines on Route 341 slowing construction by disabling dump trucks and trying to impair the morale of the Seabees. Three Seabees were wounded and a five ton dump truck had its front end totally destroyed when the vehicle hit a mine on 30 September at 0930H. The incident occurred at ZS 135 970, and following the now familiar pattern, the sweep team, using a mine dog, found the second mine at 1030H at ZS 135 972, about 200 meters up the road from the first mine, and blew it in place. The three wounded men, EOCN

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J. E. Eichorn, EOCN G. R. Hattrup, and BU3 R. A. Weber were treated at the 24th Evacuation Hospital and released to light duty with NMCB-5, Detail Stallion, at the base camp in Bien Hoa.

NMCB Detail Colt, consisting of nine men, completed the An Khanh Footbridge near Saigon on 17 September and turned it over to Vietnamese use on the 20th. This footbridge, built for the convenience of VNN dependent children, saves them a trip of 3.5 miles which was the distance they traveled to school last year.

CBMU-302 supported NAVCAT (Naval Civic Action Teams) elements at various locations throughout RVN as the dependent shelter program for the Vietnamese Navy continued. There were no combat incidents recorded by CBMU-302 but one Vietnamese Navy petty officer was killed on 3 September in DaNang when a ten ton cement truck went out of control and struck him. Solatium payments were paid to the widow and civil reaction was held to a minimum. In Saigon, an accident occurred at a block plant operated by NAVCAT 18, in which two female employees were seriously injured due to the negligence of a third civilian.

Seabee Team 0417 working in support of USAID, at Long Khanh Province near Xuan Loc, northeast of Saigon, was attacked with two

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
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B-40 rockets at 2345H on 25 September. One round hit a revetment and sickbay while the other impacted outside of the camp. EO3 Ritchie Grethey received minor shrapnel wounds and one three quarter ton truck received minor damage.


The following is a listing of the Seabee detachments working in Vietnam in support of USAID projects as of 15 September:

| <u>Unit</u> | <u>Location</u> | <u>Team Leader</u> |
|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 0417 | Xuan Loc | ENS Murray |
| 0518 | Soc Trang | WO2 Lucey |
| 1019 | My Tho | LTJG Hong |
| 1020 | Go Cong | LTJG Howe |
| 4006 | Tan An | LTJG Roussos |
| 6206 | Ham Tan | LTJG Burrus |
| 13308 | Ben Tre | LTJG Healy |

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Smiling youngsters cross the An Khanh Footbridge, near the VNN Shipyard, Saigon.



This footbridge was constructed by Seabees of NMCB-5, Detail Colt, and turned over to the Vietnamese on 20 September.

APPENDIX I

1. (C) NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP ORGANIZATION

| | |
|---|--|
| CHNAVADVGRU U.S. MACV | RADM R.S. SALZER, USN |
| CHIEF OF STAFF | CAPT R.A. PADDOCK, USN |
| SENAVADV | CAPT B.G. STONE, USN |
| SENADV, COMD NAVAL COMMAND (SA CTF 227) SAIGON | LCDR J.H. GAUL, USN (D) LCDR J. FERGUSON, USN (R) |

TRAN HUNG DAO CAMPAIGN ADVISORY ORGANIZATION/AREA
OPERATION COORDINATOR (AOC)

| | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| AOC COASTAL | SA MOBILE SEA OPS CMD | CAPT T.I. KOLSTAD, USN |
| SA DEPCOMTHD BINH THUY | CTF 116 | CAPT R.S. MOORE, USN |
| AOC NORTHERN LONG BINH | SA THIRD RIVERINE AREA | CDR V. MCDONOUGH, USN |
| SA THD 24 BEN LUC | VNN TG 214.1 | LCDR D. MICALCHUCK, USN |
| SA THD 27 PHU CUONG | VNN TF 216 | CDR V. MCDONOUGH, USN |
| SA THD 25 TUYEN NHON | VNN TG 212.2 | LCDR J.C. ROGERS, USN |
| AOC EASTERN CAN THO | SA FOURTH RIVERINE AREA | CDR WARDELL, USN |
| SA THD 26 DONG TAM | VNN TF 217 | CDR W. WARDELL, USN |
| AOC SOUTHERN CA MAU | SA ATF 211/ TF 210 | CAPT P.C. GIBBONS, USN |

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| | | |
|-------------------------|--------------|---------------------------|
| SA THD 4 NAM CAN | VNN TG 214.2 | CDR H. V. SHORES, USN |
| SA THD 6 RACH SOI | VNN TG 212.5 | LCDR G. STEFENCAVAGE, USN |
| SA THD 21 CA MAU | SATF 210 | CAPT P. C. GIBBONS, USN |
| AOC WESTERN TAN CHAU | SA COMTHD 18 | CDR A. WRIGHT, USN |
| SA THD 18 TAN CHAU | VNN TF 218 | CDR A. WRIGHT, USN |
| SA THD 20 HA TIEN | VNN TG 219.1 | LT D. C. SNYDER, USN |

SENIOR ADVISOR, FLEET COMMAND, SAIGON

| | | |
|--------|-----------|-----------------------|
| SENADV | FLEET CMD | CAPT J. F. DRAKE, USN |
|--------|-----------|-----------------------|

AMPHIBIOUS TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (ATF 211)

| | | |
|--------------------------------|--|-------------------------|
| SA PHIBCOMD CA MAU | | CAPT P. C. GIBBONS, USN |
| SA RAID SEVEN ZERO KIEN AN | | LT R. C. MONSON, USN |
| SA RAID SEVEN ONE KIEN AN | | LT S. L. HOLMES, USN |
| SA RAID SEVEN TWO KIEN AN | | LT R. J. LINDSTEDT, USN |
| SA RAID SEVEN THREE KIEN AN | | LT K. E. KOLARICK, USN |
| SA RAID SEVEN FOUR CA MAU | | LT C. ARMENTROUT, USN |
| SA RAID SEVEN FIVE CA MAU | | LTJG R. BOLLER, USN |

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RIVER PATROL TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 212)

| | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| SA RIVPATCOMD BINH THUY | CDR G. E. PIERCE, USN |
| SA RPD FIVE ONE CAT LAI | LT J. R. FRONDORF, USN |
| SA RPD FIVE TWO PHU CUONG | LT J. R. RECKNER, USN |
| SA RPD FIVE THREE BEN LUC/TRA CU | LT J. R. JONES, USN |
| SA RPD FIVE FOUR BEN KEO/GO DAU HA | LT R. ARMITAGE, USN |
| SA RPD FIVE FIVE CHAU DOC | LTJG T. ROUNDS, USN |
| SA RPD FIVE SIX MOC HOA | LT J. B. GIBNEY, USN |
| SA RPD FIVE SEVEN NHA BE | LTJG E. HENDRICKSON, USNR |
| SA RPD FIVE EIGHT MY THO | LT H. M. HIGHLAND, USN |
| SA RPD FIVE NINE TAN CHAU | LT W. A. GOODWIN, USN |
| SA RPD SIX ZERO THUAN AN/DANANG | LT B. WATERMAN, USN |
| SA RPD SIX ONE RACH SOI | LT J. SCOVILL, USN |
| SA RPD SIX TWO RACH SOI | LT P. J. GASKIN, USN |
| SA RPD SIX THREE PHUOC XUYEN | LT R. B. FIORE, USNR (D) LT R. C. HULL, USN (R) |

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SA RPD SIX FOUR
TUYEN NHON

LTJG J. D. COLE, USNR

MOBILE SEA OPERATIONS COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 213)

SA MOBILE SEA OPERATIONS CMD
CAM RANH BAY

CAPT T. I. KOLSTAD, USN

SA COSFLOT ONE
DANANG

LCDR D. C. WILSON, USN

SA COSRON TWO ONE
QUI NHON

LT G. H. ROBERTS, USN

SA COSRON TWO TWO
CAM RANH BAY

LCDR R. W. LOWMAN, USN

SA COSFLOT THREE
VUNG TAU

LCDR R. S. WATKINS, USN

SA COSFLOT FOUR
AN THOI

LCDR J. G. TONTI, USN

SA COSFLOT FIVE
NAM CAN

LCDR J. MCCORMICK, USN

SA HARDU CRB
CAM RANH BAY

LT P. A. LINTON, USN

GENERAL RESERVE TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 214)

SA GENRESCOMD
CAT LAI

CAPT L. A. DWYER, USN

SA RTE DIV EIGHT ONE
CAT LAI

LT J. M. STEUSSY, USN

SA MID NINE ONE
CUU LONG

LT J. W. HAMILTON, USN

SA MID NINE TWO
CUA VIET/HUE

LT T. A. COMER, USN

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SA MID NINE THREE
NHA BE/TAN CHAU/CA MAU

LT R. F. ELLIOTT, USN

SA SEAL AND UDT UNIT
SAIGON

LT G. W. DORAN, USN (D)
LT B. VANHEERTUM (R)

SA SALVAGE UNIT
CAT LAI

LCDR E. H. SHIPP, USN (D)
LT R. J. SECORD, USN (R)

SA RID FOUR ZERO
GO DAU HA/TRA CU

LT R. O. MILHAM, USN

SA RID FOUR ONE
TAN CHAU

LT R. A. DORSI, USN

SA RID FOUR TWO
DONG TAM

LT C. VOTAVA, USN

SA RID FOUR THREE
PHU CUONG

LTJG T. B. WAGENSEIL, USN

SA RID FOUR FOUR
BEN LUC/TAN AN

LT G. C. COOLEY, USN

SA RID FOUR FIVE
NAM CAN

LT C. F. TIBBETTS, USN

SA RID FOUR SIX
DONG TAM

LT W. C. SMITH, USN

SA RID FOUR SEVEN
NAM CAN

LT W. TAYLOR, USN

SA RID FOUR EIGHT
CHAU DOC

LT W. R. RUSLING, USN

SA RAG TWO SEVEN
NHA BE

LT W. GOTTSCHALK, USN

FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 231)

SA FIRST CZ
DANANG

CDR P. MCLAIRD, JR., USN (D)
CDR A. VIESSMAN, USN (R)

SA CG ONE ONE
CUA VIET

LT R. DUMINIAK, USNR (D)
LT R. ANDERSON, USN (R)

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SA CG ONE TWO
THUAN AN

LT R. N. MYERS, USN

SA CG ONE THREE
CU TU HIEN

LT J. SCOTT, USN

SA CG ONE FOUR
HOI AN

LTJG R. G. MCCAIN, USN

SA CG ONE FIVE
CHU LAI

LT D. ROBINSON, USN (D)
LT J. TAYLOR, USN (R)

SA CG ONE SIX
QUANG NGAI

LT W. R. OWENS, USNR

SA RAG THREE TWO
HUE

LT G. L. MAGER, USN

SA HARDU DANANG

LT D. W. WIRICK, USNR

SA CSC DANANG

LT P. M. SCOTT, USN

SECOND COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 232)

SA SECOND CZ
NHA TRANG

CDR A. S. JEFFERIS, USN

SA CG TWO ONE
DE GI

LT J. K. ENGELKEN, USN

SA CG TWO THREE
SONG CAU

LT E. L. SIWINSKI, USNR (D)
LT F. J. BLAKE, USN (R)

SA CG TWO FIVE
DONG HAI

LT D. G. THOMAS, USN

SA CG TWO SIX
BINH BA ISLAND

LT J. P. MCGRATH, USN

SA CG TWO SEVEN
NINH CHA

LTJG P. MILLER, USN

SA CG TWO EIGHT
PHAN THIET

LT G. NORDLAND, USN

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|--------------------|-----------------------|
| SA HARDU NHA TRANG | LT J. E. BINGHAM, USN |
| SA HARDU QUI NHON | LT B. VALENTINE, USN |
| SA CSC NHA TRANG | LT S. C. AREY, USN |
| SA CSC QUI NHON | LCDR P. J. CISEK, USN |

THIRD COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 233)

| | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| SA THIRD CZ VUNG TAU | CDR J. G. SULLIVAN, USN |
| SA CG THREE THREE VUNG TAU | LTJG C. JOHNSON, USN |
| SA CG THREE FOUR THANH PHO | LT E. J. GIBSON, USN |
| SA CG THREE FIVE THU VINH | LTJG T. E. ARNOLD, USN |
| SA CG THREE SIX LONG PHU | LTJG D. C. BOGER, USN |
| SA HARDU VUNG TAU | LT N. BARBOUR, USN |
| SA CSC VUNG TAU | LT D. R. ROGUS, USN |

FOURTH COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 234)

| | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| SA FOURTH CZ AN THOI | CDR M. J. SHINE, USN |
| SA CG FOUR ONE POULO OBI | LT R. JOHNSTON, USNR |
| SA CG FOUR TWO AN THOI | LT O. R. COLE, III, USN |
| SA CG FOUR THREE HON TRE ISLAND | LT M. A. SOBYNA, USN |
| SA CG FOUR FOUR HA TIEN | LT D. C. SNYDER, USN |

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SA CSC AN THOI

LT P. D. MCCURDY, USN

THIRD RIVERINE AREA ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 216)

SA THIRD RIVERINE AREA
LONG BINH

CDR V. MCDONOUGH, USN

SA RAG TWO TWO/TWO SEVEN
NHA BE

LT J. CALABOUGH, USN

SA RAG TWO EIGHT
LONG BINH

LT R. M. ANDREWS, USN

SA RAG THREE ZERO
PHU CUONG

LT R. M. ANDREWS, USN

SA REG FOR RPG
CUU LONG

LT C. E. ROBE, USN

FOURTH RIVERINE AREA ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 217)

SA FOURTH RIVERINE AREA
CAN THO

CDR W. WARDELL, USN

SA RAG TWO ONE/THREE THREE
DONG TAM

LT K. J. PLIS, USN

SA RAG TWO THREE/THREE ONE
VINH LONG

LTJG R. E. BROWN, USN

SA RAG TWO FIVE/TWO NINE
CA MAU

LT R. J. GILLESKIE, USN

SA RAG TWO SIX
CA MAU

LTJG R. W. BASS, USNR

RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 228)

SA RSSZ
NHA BE

CDR D. A. STEWART, USN

NAVAL TRAINING CENTER ADVISORY ORGANIZATION

SA NTC NHA TRANG

CDR P. R. FOURNIER, USN

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SA NTC CAM RANH BAY CDR R. R. WARD, USN

SA NTC SAIGON CDR R. A. WILD, USN

LOGISTIC SUPPORT COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION

SA VNN LSC AND SA VNN DCOS LOG RADM P. S. MCMANUS, USN

SA VNNSY CAPT F. T. SHAVER, USN

SA VNNSC CDR C. H. BARSTAD, USN

SA LSB AN THOI LCDR R. W. HOTZ, USN

SA ISB NAM CAN LCDR R. BLEDSOE, USN

SA LSB BINH THUY CDR R. J. COEN, USNR

SA ISB RACH SOI LT D. E. WARD, USN

SA ISB CA MAU LT D. CHALFANT, USN

SA ISB LONG XUYEN LCDR A. THIEL, USN

SA LSB CAM RANH BAY CDR C. MCINTOSH, USN

SA ISB QUI NHON LCDR T. A. HEAD, USN

SA LSB CAT LO LCDR S. UNGEMACH, USN

SA ISB LONG PHU LT J. R. MURRAY, USN

SA LSB DANANG CAPT E. MOUNTFORD, USN

SA ISB THUAN AN LCDR J. STEVENS, USN

SA LSB DONG TAM CDR R. E. GREER, USN

SA ISB VINH LONG LCDR J. LASWELL, USN

SA ISB CHO MOI LCDR B. BURGETT, USN

SA LSB NH BE CDR A. L. BADER, USN

SA ISB BEN LUC LCDR C. E. ALBAUGH, USN

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SA ISB CAT LAI

LT J. F. MAYER, USN

SA YRBM ALPHA UNIT

LCDR G. CRAWFORD, USN

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APPENDIX II

Glossary of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text.

| | |
|--------------|---|
| ABF | <u>Attack By Fire</u> |
| AMMI PONTOON | A multi-purpose barge, standard size 28'x90' |
| AO | Area of Operations |
| ARVN | Army of the Republic of Vietnam |
| ASPB | Assault Support Patrol Boat |
| ATC | Armored Troop Carrier |
| ATSB | Advanced Tactical Support Base |
| A/W | Automatic Weapons |
| BDA | Battle Damage Assessment |
| BLACK PONY | OV-10 Aircraft, twin engine turboprop counterinsurgency |
| CCB | Command and Communication Boat |
| CG | Coastal Group |
| CHICOM | Chinese Communist |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CMD | Capital Military District |
| COMTHD | Commander, TRAN HUNG DAO |

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| CORDS | Civic Operations for Rural Development Support |
| COSVN | Communist political and administrative organization responsible for Communist operations in the Republic of Vietnam. |
| CSR | Camp Sentinel Radar |
| CZ | Coastal Zone |
| DIW | Dead In the Water |
| DUSTOFF | Medical evacuation by helicopter |
| ENIFF | Enemy Initiated Firefight |
| EOD | Explosive Ordnance Disposal |
| FANK | Cambodian Army |
| FOM | French Patrol Boat |
| FSB | Fire Support Base |
| FWMAF | Free World Military Assistance Forces |
| GDA | Gun Damage Assessment |
| GVN | Government of Vietnam |
| H&I | Harassment and Interdiction fire support |
| ISB | Intermediate Support Base |
| JGS | Joint General Staff (Vietnamese) |
| KIA | Killed In Action |
| LAW | Light Anti-tank Weapon |
| LCPL | Landing Craft, Personnel, Large |

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|-----------|--|
| LDNN | Vietnamese equivalent of USN Underwater Demolition Team and Seals. |
| LF | Local Forces (VC terminology) |
| LHFT | Light Helicopter Fire Team |
| LOH | OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter |
| LRRP | Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol |
| MACV | Military Assistance Command, Vietnam |
| MEDCAP | Medical Civic Action Program |
| MID | Mining Interdiction Division |
| MNK | Cambodian Navy |
| MONITOR | Heavy armored LCM-6 (40mm cannon or 105mm Howitzer) |
| MR | Military Region |
| MSD | Minesweeper, Drone |
| MSR | Minesweeper, Remote |
| MSF | Mobile Strike Force |
| MSSC | Medium Seal Support Craft |
| NAVCAT | Naval Civic Action Team |
| NAVLEDRAC | Naval Liaison, Delta Regional Assistance Command |
| NGFS | Naval Gunfire Support |
| NILO | Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer |
| NIOTC | Naval Inshore Operations Training Center |

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|-----------|---|
| NMCB | Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (Seabees) |
| NOC | Naval Operations Center |
| NOD | Night Observation Device |
| NSA | Naval Support Activity |
| NSAD | Naval Support Activity Detachment |
| NVA | North Vietnamese Army |
| OJT | On the Job Training |
| OTC | Officer in Tactical Command |
| PADD | Portable Acoustic Doppler Detector |
| PBR | Patrol Boat, River |
| PCF | Patrol Craft, Fast |
| PERINTREP | Periodic Intelligence Report |
| POL | Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants |
| PRU | Provincial Reconnaissance Unit |
| PSA | Province Senior Advisor |
| PSDF | Popular Self-Defense Forces |
| PSYOPS | Psychological Operations |
| PW | Prisoner of War |
| RAC | River Assault Craft |
| RAD | River Assault Division |
| RAG | River Assault Group (VNN) |
| RAID | River Assault and Interdiction Division (VNN) |

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| | |
|---------|---|
| RECH | Recharger (boat) |
| REF | Refueler (boat) |
| RF/PF | Regional Force/Popular Forces |
| ROK | Republic of Korea |
| RPD | River Patrol Division |
| RPG | Rocket Propelled Grenade or River Patrol Group |
| RSSZ | Rung Sat Special Zone |
| RVNAF | Republic of Vietnam Air Force or Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces |
| SA | Senior Advisor |
| SAR | Search And Rescue |
| SEAL | Navy commandos (<u>S</u> ea, <u>A</u> ir, <u>L</u> and) |
| SEAWOLF | UH-1B helicopter, heavily armored, USN operated |
| SHADOW | C-119 aircraft |
| SKIMMER | 20-foot fiberglass motorboat |
| SLICK | Lightly armed helicopter used for troop inserts and administrative purposes. |
| SPOOKY | C-47 aircraft |
| SSB | Swimmer Support Boat (Skimmer) |
| TAD | Temporary Additional Duty |
| TAOR | Tactical Area Of Responsibility |
| TP/PT | Convoy designation for ships travelling up the Mekong River from Tan Chau to Phnom Penh and vice versa. |

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|--------|---|
| USARV | United States Army, Vietnam |
| VAR | Visual Air Reconnaissance |
| VNMC | Vietnamese Marine Corps |
| VNN | Vietnamese Navy |
| VNNSC | Vietnamese Naval Supply Center |
| VNNLSC | Vietnamese Naval Logistics Support Command |
| VNNTC | Vietnamese Naval Training Center (Nha Trang) |
| WGBP | Waterborn Guard Post |
| WIA | Wounded In Action |
| ZIFPO | Flame thrower-equipped ATC or Monitor |

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