


CNO COP-09891E

09B91E

DECLASSIFIED

**Monthly
Historical
Summary**



JUN 1971

DECLASSIFIED

012496

4-12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED


DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
U.S. NAVAL FORCES, VIETNAM
FPO SAN FRANCISCO, 96626

FF5-16/N-4114
5750
Ser: 0884
3 August 1971

From: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam
To: Distribution List

Subj: U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Monthly Historical Summary
for June 1971

1. The U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Monthly Historical Summary
is forwarded for information and retention.



E. P. TRAVERS
By direction

Distribution:

CINCPACFLT (4)
COMUSMACV (Doctrine Branch, J-343)
COMUSMACV (Hist. Branch, SJS)
COMUSMACV (COC, JOD)
COMUSMACV (J3-12)
COMUSMACV (Office Management Division, MAC-AM)
CNO (OP-09B9) (3)
CNO (OP-09B91E)
CNO (OP-03, 04, 05, 06) (1 ea.)
CNO (OP-34)
CNO (OP-92)
CNO (Ops. Eval. Group)
OPNAV (OP-601V)
CINCLANTFLT
COMFIRSTFLT
COMSECONDFLT
COMSIXTHFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT
CHNAVMAT (Code 04)
COMSEVENTHFLT (Hist. Team)
PRES NAVWARCOL
COMPHIBLANT
COMCBPAC

DECLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

012496

412

COMCBLANT

~~COMINWARFOR~~~~COMDT AFSC~~

Commandant, U.S. Army War College (Attn: Library U-393)

COMNAVFACENGCOM

SUPT USNA

CHINFO

CO NAVPHIBSCOL LCREEK

CO NAVPHIBSCOL CORONADO

PHIBTRADET MARIS

NSRDC PANFLA

NIOTC MARIS

Project Manager, Naval Inshore Warfare Project

CHNAVSEC C&GS COL

CHNAVSEC Air University (Attn: AUL(SE) 69-10)

USA SPECWARSCOL (Attn: USN/MC Liaison Officer)

USMC Rep., USA Infantry School

DIA (DIAAP 4A2/Pentagon)

COMNAVSHP R&D CEN

COMNAVORDSYS COM (ORD-08)

COMNAVSPECWARGRU, ATLANTIC

COMNAVSPECWARGRU, NSAS

NAVFORV/NAVADVGRP/MACV NOTE C5216 of 1 May 1971

List I M, K, GG

List II A(4), B

List III A, B

List IV A, B, C

List V A

List VI A

DECLASSIFIED

COMMANDER

U.S. NAVAL FORCES

VIETNAM

MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY

June 1971

Force Historian..... LCDR Edward F. Sienicki

Field Historians..... LT George C. Womble

LT William Y. Frentzel, II

LTJG Barnaby S. Ruhe

JO3 Robert S. Drew

Historical Journalist..... JO2 Don H. Stephenson

DECLASSIFIED

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
<u>FOREWORD</u>	iii
<u>CURRENT OPERATIONS</u>	1
<u>NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP SUMMARY</u>	
Task Fleet 21	2
TRAN HUNG DAO II	4
TRAN HUNG DAO IV	10
TRAN HUNG DAO V	16
TRAN HUNG DAO VI	18
TRAN HUNG DAO VIII	21
TRAN HUNG DAO IX	27
TRAN HUNG DAO X/XVII	28
TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII	35
TRAN HUNG DAO XIX	41
TRAN HUNG DAO XX	47
TRAN HUNG DAO XXIII	48
Long Tau Shipping Channel	54
Rung Sat Special Zone	55
<u>CTF 211</u>	58
<u>CTF 212</u>	59
<u>CTF 214</u>	60
<u>RIVER ASSAULT GROUPS</u>	61
<u>SPECIAL WARFARE</u>	62
<u>CTG 116.7</u>	63
<u>CTG 116.8</u>	64
<u>COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCES (COASTAL ZONES)</u>	66
<u>PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY</u>	91
<u>ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY</u>	99
<u>NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON</u>	105

	<u>Page</u>
<u>NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES</u>	117
APPENDIX I - Task Fleet 21/22 Organization	121
APPENDIX II - COMNAVFORV/CHNADVGRP Organization	122
APPENDIX III - CHNAVADVGRP Task and Advisory Organization ..	123
APPENDIX IV - Glossary of Abbreviations	133

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREWORD

The enemy in the Delta appeared to be returning to an earlier stage of guerrilla warfare, emphasizing resupply, regrouping, and political warfare, as naval activity continued at a low level in June. Three AOs were essentially dormant, and six AOs made only minor contact with the enemy. The lull in Kien Hoa Province, under TRAN HUNG DAO XIX, was ended in June. The status in the Delta brought about a significant restructuring of operations, as TRAN HUNG DAO X was disestablished and the AO added to TRAN HUNG DAO XVII, while the support bases at Ca Mau and Song Ong Doc were disestablished in a concomitant gesture. Four Mekong convoys reached the beleaguered Cambodian capital during the month, restoring the exhausted POL stocks on each trip.

The mobile US Navy Seawolf helos, along with their Black Pony cohorts, dominated the combat action in the Delta again during June. Seawolves were credited with most enemy casualties and enemy assets destroyed in each naval AO. For example, in the TRAN HUNG DAO XIX AO, Seawolves accounted for 80 enemy killed to four killed by ground forces, while the enemy casualties were 10 to one in the TRAN HUNG DAO II AO. Tallies in the other Delta areas also indicated that the helos had an edge over ground and water forces. Sampans were almost exclusively helo targets,

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and over 200 were destroyed. Black Ponies, ranging over the entire Delta region, accounted for 215 enemy killed during the same period.

While booby traps perpetually plagued ground troops, enemy sappers also took their toll in June. In the Cua Viet area, there were 12 sapper attempts; and, with 83 mining attempts occurring there since the first of the year, the Cua Viet is clearly a sapper focal point, with one half of all the minings in Vietnam occurring there. Elsewhere, the harbor security was again revealed to be unsatisfactory at Qui Nhon when the SS AMERICAN HAWK was mined and an ARVN ammo dump was dramatically blown up. Sappers also struck once in Cam Ranh Bay and once on the Cai Nhap in the TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO.

Amid diplomatic and press flurries, 13 NVA POWs were sent north on the USNS UPSHUR for repatriation. The special operation, TRAN HUNG DAO XXIII, was aborted on 4 June when North Vietnam rescinded their agreement to take them.

In the crucial logistics arena of ACTOV, advances were made with the turnover of Intermediate Support Base Rach Soi and nine support craft in June. The Blue Water Vietnamese Navy received the Coast

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Guard Cutter BERING STRAIT; the Brown Water Navy received four Army PBRs for harbor security. Task Fleet 21 began an ambitious program in the last week of June to overhaul all river craft in the Delta by December.

The U.S. Navy in-country strength continued to decline in June. As of 24 June there were 10,983 naval personnel in South Vietnam, a reduction of just less than one thousand men in the course of the month.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CURRENT OPERATIONS

VNN Designations

TRAN HUNG DAO II (TG 214.1)
TRAN HUNG DAO IV (TG 214.2)
TRAN HUNG DAO V (TG 216.1)
TRAN HUNG DAO VI (TG 212.5)
TRAN HUNG DAO VII (TG 221.1)
TRAN HUNG DAO VIII (TG 217.1)
TRAN HUNG DAO IX (TG 212.3)
TRAN HUNG DAO XV (TF 213)
TRAN HUNG DAO XVII (TF 210)
TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII (TF 218)
TRAN HUNG DAO XIX (TG 217.2)
TRAN HUNG DAO XX (TG 219.1)
*TRAN HUNG DAO XXIII
RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE (TF 228)

USN Designations

GIANT SLINGSHOT
SOLID ANCHOR
READY DECK
SEARCH TURN
SEA TIGER
NONE
BARRIER REEF
MARKET TIME
(Inner Barrier)
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE

* No task group designator.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

TASK FLEET 21

Repair and maintenance were again the key words in the plans of TF 21, as an ambitious program to overhaul all rivercraft in the delta by December of this year was initiated during the last week in June. This promised to be a job of tremendous magnitude and predictions were that LSBs and ISBs would be taxed to the limit of their endurance and resources to accomplish this task.

June saw a great restructuring of the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO as a result of the disestablishment of the bases at Song Ong Doc and Ca Mau. With this action, the TRAN HUNG DAO X AO was disestablished and the area added to TRAN HUNG DAO XVII, making it the largest AO in the delta.

Four POL convoys were able to reach the beleaguered Cambodians capital of Phnom Penh during the month, encountering only very light opposition on the river.

During June, there were two bright developments in the air warfare portion of ACTOV. First, VNAF pilots and aircrewmen began integration into Seawolf Detachments in the initial steps of what is to be a gradual turnover of assets to the GVN. Secondly, June saw the first successful use of the Di Mau Brevity Code in many areas

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

of the delta; it was especially effective in the TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO and has also been used in TRAN HUNG DAO V and VIII AOs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~TRAN HUNG DAO II

Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO II AO was light, contrasting with the heavy enemy infiltration reported by intelligence sources. There was a general inability for TRAN HUNG DAO II assets to confront the infiltrators, and the mobile Seawolf helos dominated the action for the month. The Seawolves of Detachment Four, based at Ben Luc, flew roughly 105 intelligence and opportunity missions, and scrambled approximately 16 times. In only five runs they accounted for all of the 42 sampans destroyed in the AO for the month, and altogether struck 64 bunkers. The Seawolf tally of 16 enemy killed by air rather outshone the figure of one VC killed in action recorded for the river craft. Other effective assets in the area were the DUFFELBAG teams located at Tra Cu and Tuyen Nhon. While the results were generally unknown, the system provided pinpoint coordinates for the 105mm and 155mm howitzers to shoot at, which they did on approximately 77 different occasions .

On 4 June, at 1735H, USN Seals commenced a mission to capture a VC weapons cache located five miles northwest of Ben Luc at XS 576 795. Acting on intelligence from a Hoi Chanh, the Seals inserted by MSSC and patrolled to the cache, which contained 53 B-40 rockets. They removed 40 of the rockets and destroyed the rest after a snake was

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

discovered in the bunker. There was no contact with the enemy and hence no casualties.

On 7 June, at 1035H, three Seawolf missions placed multiple strikes on a suspected VC/NVA camp area located 10 miles west of Tra Cu, around XT 315 025, and accounted for a formidable tally. Nineteen sampans were destroyed and 11 damaged, while nine bunkers were struck. On the same morning, and close to the first strike, at XS 334 964, Seawolves sighted a suspicious sampan and placed machine gun fire after obtaining proper clearance, sinking the craft. The Seawolves, later in the day, at 1720H, inserted Seals to search the sampan and provided air cover during the search. The Seals recovered five 60mm mortars, five rifle grenades, and 18 B-40 rocket boosters, but were forced to leave a sizable cache behind with the approach of nightfall. They had expended all their explosives on a mission earlier that morning, and could not explode with small arms fire the numerous rockets remaining. Visual reconnaissance flown the next day discovered that all the equipment in the sampan had been unloaded by the enemy during the night. The above Seal contact indicated that the enemy brazenly used daylight as well as nighttime to move supplies across the Plain of Reeds into South Vietnam, facilitated by the monsoon inundations. Intelligence reports noted that sensor activations from Tra Cu and Hiep Hoa had increased since the end of May, with

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REF ID: A66300
DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the highest number of activations occurring in the early morning hours.

On 7 June, at 1505H, Seawolves placed strikes on numerous bunkers and sampans located ten miles northwest of Tra Cu at XT 315 555. With no return of fire, 12 sampans and three bunkers were neatly dispatched, adding sizeably to the tally for this most eventful day for the Seawolves.

On 8 June at 1755H, two PBRs of RPD 64, while returning to ATSB Tuyen Nhon from MoBase II, were ambushed, receiving B-40 rocket and automatic weapons fire from the north bank of the Vam Co Tay at XS 410 775, seven miles east of Tuyen Nhon. The Seawolves were scrambled at 1805H while the PBRs returned fire. Fifteen minutes later the Seawolves arrived to place a strike, and orbited for 20 minutes until an additional PBR arrived. One PBR was hit by a B-40 rocket at the onset of the firefight, resulting in the death of a Vietnamese sailor, the wounding of another, while the PBR was only slightly damaged. Enemy casualties were undetermined.

During an aerial reconnaissance mission, the Long An Province Senior Advisor on 10 June sighted six sampans beached at XS 485 801 on the Bo Bo Canal. Two additional sampans were sighted approximately 15 kilometers northwest of the first sighting at

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XS 353 905. The reconnaissance aircraft received 25 rounds of small arms fire in the area, and a strike was requested. After two strikes, a USN Seal team was inserted, revealing three sampans destroyed in the strikes. There was no equipment of military interest found in the sampans, though a rest area was discovered nearby, with well used trails leading to the area. Marshy reeds were waist high, and in some places they were over six feet tall. The destroyed sampans were out in the open marshy plains and not on one of the small channels in the area. The level of water in the area was deep enough to push a loaded sampan across the open terrain, revealing the ease with which the enemy was able to move men and supplies across the Plain of Reeds from the Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia into South Vietnam.

On 18 June, at 1320H, an LCM-8, enroute to Tra Cu on a fuel and resupply mission from Ben Luc, was attacked, two miles southeast of Tra Cu in the vicinity of XS 507 964, receiving one B-40 rocket out of five fired. Two USN advisors were slightly wounded (SK2 King and ET1 Leman); the LCM suffered minor damage and continued to operate. Two ASPBs of RID 44 arrived to assist, and Seawolves placed strikes at 1330H, with unknown results. The attack coincided with the end of a GVN sweep nearby.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On 21 June, at 0825H, Seal Team One, Quebec Platoon, and Luc Luong 66's, acting on aerial photo intelligence, conducted a mission 12 miles southeast of Ben Luc near XS 716 587, against a VC meeting area. The Seals were inserted by an MSSC and patrolled to the suspected hootch, which was found to be vacant. They then searched the area, detecting a campfire, patrolled to the site and opened fire on six evading persons, who returned the fire with heavy automatic weapons. The Seals then called in Seawolves, with the final result being five VC killed, and no friendly casualties incurred.

On 27 June, at 2300H, crewmembers on two RID 44 craft in waterborne ambush heard movement on the west bank of the Vam Co Dong, and opened fire. The enemy returned fire with small arms, and the resulting firefights lasted five minutes, with no damages inflicted to the VNN, and none known to the VC.

On 28 June, at 2040H, Detachment Four Seawolves scrambled for VNN Seals surrounded at XS 570 795, six kilometers northwest of Ben Luc. They provided overhead cover for the MST 2 Detachment Alfa unit which extracted the Seals. CTG 214.1 commended the judgement and skill of the MST detachment in the tight combat situation.

A message on 25 June from the Senior Advisor of CTG 214.1 detailed the problems and possible solutions to the problems confronting him in the AO.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REF ID: A66775
DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The message requested a troop airlift capability for TRAN HUNG DAO II, since the ARVN air assets for quick reaction were nonexistent. Highly trained reconnaissance personnel could be available on 10 minutes notice, with clearances obtained for the target area in 10 - 30 minutes. Air support was available, and the intelligence sources were excellent. The only factor lacking was the means by which to transport the assets to the target area. As it was, the enemy was moving supplies and troops with relative impunity. The Senior Advisor stated that "River patrol craft are unable to effectively cope with this infiltration due to enemy dispersal short of and quick transit over river boundaries of the target area". In an effort to increase the utilization of RPD 54, boats were shifted such that there were six boats each at Tan An, Ben Keo, and Ben Luc; with two employed on random patrol during the day and two employed in WBGPs each night at intelligence selected locations. Still, four large arms caches discovered near Ben Luc during the month evinced aggressive enemy infiltration, and numerous agents' reports also mentioned heavy infiltration of troops into the area. Nevertheless, the upcoming "big offensive" predicted in numerous intelligence reports throughout the month again failed to materialize, despite these movements.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~TRAN HUNG DAO IV

In late May and early June, various intelligence sources predicted a sharp upsurge of enemy activity in southern An Xuyen Province. The terrorist activity was to occur from 18-24 June during minimum lunar illumination, and was to feature attacks on the town of Nam Can, on the National Police at Nam Can, and on various outposts in the area. These attacks did not materialize and, in fact, combat activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO diminished for the fourth straight month. There were 11 firefights resulting in five friendly troops wounded and eight enemy killed. There was one apparent mining on the Cai Nhap Canal, but when the ASPB of RID 46 was salvaged, evidence was uncovered that pointed to sabotage.

Seawolf helicopters attached to HAL-3, Detachment One, patrolled An Xuyen Province and engaged the enemy on 24 occasions. The "Wolves" killed one enemy soldier and probably accounted for six more; thirty sampans and junks, 26 structures, and nine bunkers were destroyed while six bunkers and 24 structures were damaged.

The waterborne elements of TRAN HUNG DAO IV, including RID 46, RID 47, and COSDIV 511, engaged in sporadic firefights, only one resulting in casualties or damage.

Two companies of ARVN Rangers were inserted by helicopter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

at WQ 045 542 on 3 June to conduct search and clear operations. Starting at the insertion point, the companies swept in an easterly direction and netted three VC, two sampan motors, and five pounds of documents captured; 20 bunkers, 12 mines, and six sampans were destroyed. One ARVN soldier was wounded by a mine. A blocking force of PCFs on the Rach Duong Keo in support of the operation engaged in a brief firefight with the fleeing enemy troops. There were no casualties incurred by the PCFs and no known enemy casualties.

On 14 June at 0800H the VC attacked watercraft of RID 46 with launch bombs on the Cai Nhap Canal at WQ 087 781. No hits were scored by the enemy, and the boats quickly landed two platoons of ARVN soldiers to sweep the area. Results of the sweep were four launch bombs and six launchers captured. There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties were unknown,

On 17 June, at 1430H, the monitor attached to RID 47, HQ 6543, hit a previously sunken Alfa boat, and beached at WQ 081 747 to preclude sinking. Water continued to enter faster than the pumps could dewater, necessitating the prompt dispatch of a portable pump from Nam Can to avert a disaster. The craft was repaired and returned to Nam Can under its own power.

Also, on 17 June, the second attack of the month occurred at

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

1520H, this time from the east bank of the Rach Cai Nhap, long a favorite ambush site of the enemy. Two of the three B-40 rockets launched from WQ 081 750 heavily damaged ASPB HQ 5111, causing it to beach. Three VNN sailors were seriously wounded, and PCFs were called to medevac the wounded crewmen and to lift VNN EOD and Seal personnel to the sink site to provide security.

The Cai Nhap Canal was also the scene of the next battle between RID 46 and the VC when, on 23 June, at 1023H, A romeo boat, HQ 9174, was hit by one B-40 rocket causing minor damage and slightly wounding one VNN sailor. The attack occurred at WQ 077 775, and a reaction force of Biet Hai were swiftly landed. As a result of this tactic, two VC were killed and one AK-47 captured. Seawolves scrambled, and even with no U.S. advisors present with the ground forces, placed successful strikes and coordinated a medevac flight for the wounded crewmen, using the new Di Mau Brevity Code.

The determined An Xuyen guerrillas struck again on 23 June at 1830H when they attacked two PCFs on routine Cua Lon patrol at WQ 220 685. The VC struck using AK-47 rifles, but their fire was quickly suppressed. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were undetermined. The "Swifts" continued to ISB Nam Can.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Following the now familiar scenario, the VC ambushed a convoy of RID 47 craft from the east bank of the Cai Nhap Canal, at WQ 083 750. The attack occurred at 2130H and was carried out with B-40 rockets. There were no hits and the boats quickly returned and suppressed the enemy fire.

Seals of Team One, Detachment Golf, Oscar Platoon, conducted an operation on 6 June at 0430H. In conjunction with Seawolf air assets, the Seals and Australian Air Service personnel inserted at WQ 248 779 by Sealord helicopters to destroy an enemy supply cache. They patrolled to the target area, directed air strikes onto the supplies and, shortly thereafter, were extracted by Sealord aircraft and returned to Nam Can. The air/ground team destroyed 20,000 pounds of unfinished rice, 1,000 pounds of finished rice, eight structures, two sampans, two sewing machines and four kilos of soft goods.

On 18 June at 0650H, an ASPB of RID 46, HQ 5174, reported that it had hit a mine and was sinking at WQ 081 750, six miles northeast of Nam Can, on the Cai Nhap Canal. Four wounded Vietnamese were medevaced by Seawolf helicopters. On 27 June Harbor Clearance Unit One salvaged the craft and could determine no battle damage. The sea strainers were broken, however, and sea valves were wide open.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The 20mm bow mounted gun had been removed and no evidence could be found of battle damage in this area. The Senior Advisor of CTG 214.2 recommended that the VNN investigate the matter.

In salvage operations conducted on the Rach Cai Nhap on 20 June, the unsung salvors of HCU-1, assisted by RID 47 units and USN UDT personnel, raised HQ 5111 at WQ 085 730. The damaged craft was towed back to ISB Nam Can without incident and arrived at 1830H.

"Iron Bottom Canal", or the Rach Cai Nhap, as it is more familiarly known was the scene of another successful salvage operation on 28 and 29 June. Using two LCMs, the salvage team first lifted the craft, HQ 5142, sunk on 15 April 1971, and then had to completely demud the vessel before patching it and returning it to ISB Nam Can on 28 June.

The VC also made their presence felt by harassing local wood cutters using booby traps. They caused two minor casualties, one each on 15 and 16 June; and in another booby trap incident, one of the cleverly concealed devices wounded a man, woman, and child near the ISB. A Sealord helicopter medevaced the trio to Ca Mau but unfortunately, the man died enroute.

Commander Martin F. Corcoran, USN, was relieved as CTG 116.1 and Lieutenant Commander Donald Ayre, USN, was relieved as Senior

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Advisor CTG 214.2, by Commander Howard V. Shores, USN, on
11 June at 1900H.

The 42nd ARVN Rangers were relieved by the 32nd ARVN Rangers
on 17 June.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRAN HUNG DAO V

Activity declined to a low level in the TRAN HUNG DAO V AO during June. CTG 216.1 reported that his forces engaged in four firefights resulting in no casualties on either side. The Seawolf helicopters of HAL-3, Detachment Six, flying from Phu Loi, struck the enemy 34 times during the month, destroying 20 sleeping platforms, four sampans, one bunker and two bridges; one of the enemy was probably killed by air attack.

The river units of TRAN HUNG DAO V reported very little activity this month in sharp contrast to May, when a FOM was sunk, two VNN crewmembers were killed, and several other craft were damaged. In one of two reported incidents of the month, nine RAC of RAG 22 on day-time patrol received small amounts of AK-47 fire from the west bank of the Lower Saigon River (XT 703 210) on 1 June. The boats returned the fire; no friendly material damage or personnel casualties resulted from the engagement, and enemy casualties were undetermined. The second incident occurred on 29 June. In midafternoon, eight RAC of RAG 30, providing support for an RF company, sighted an unmanned VC bunker. One of the RAC personnel fired an M-79 grenade at the bunker at what must have been point blank range, for he was struck in the chest by shrapnel from his own round. The man was subsequently medevaced to Long Binh.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

During the month there were a number of proposed changes to the TRAN HUNG DAO V assets. There was a plan under consideration to move RPD 52 north from Phu Cuong to Dau Tieng. Another plan under discussion was the relocation of a Seal team to the TRAN HUNG DAO V AO.

A new command structure of Task Group 216.1 was promulgated on 23 June:

<u>Task Designation</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Boats Assigned</u>
CTG 216.1 LCDR Phu	COMTHD 5	
CTU 216.1.1 LCDR Phu	RAG 24	17
CTU 216.1.2 LT Dao	RPD 52	20
CTU 216.1.3 LT Nguyen	RAG 30	12
CTU 216.1.4 LCDR Dao	RID 43	14

Effective 5 June, LT James R. Reckner relieved LT James R. Jones as Senior Advisor RPD 52.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRAN HUNG DAO VI

Enemy activity dropped to a low level in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO. During June, Commander CTG 212.5 reported that his forces engaged the enemy in six firefights, a significant decrease from the 20 of last month, suffering two VNN wounded, while 95 of the enemy were slain. Three VC suspects were captured. Seawolves of HAL-3, Detachment Eight, staging from Rach Gia, struck at the enemy 24 times, destroying 38 sampans and three structures, and accounting for most of the 95 enemy dead in the AO. Black Ponies from VAL-4 flew six missions in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO destroying three enemy military structures and damaging ten others.

The significant decrease in enemy activity this month was probably due to two reasons. First, several asset transfers took place during June. RPD 58 transferred from ISB Rach Soi to OP Base Sa Dec on 7 June, leaving the OPCON of CTG 212.5; also on 7 June, RPD 63 arrived at ISB Rach Soi from ATSBs Song Ong Doc and Ca Mau, coming under the OPCON of CTG 212.5. In addition, RPD 61 shifted OPCON from CTF 210 to CTG 212.5 when it moved from OP Base Kien An to ISB Rach Soi on 26 May. These transfers undoubtedly cut down the number of patrols in this AO, and the fact that new units were operating in an unfamiliar AO also probably reduced the effectiveness of the patrols. Second, the enemy suffered

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

heavy losses last month in several melees with RPD 58 and Seawolf units, and consequently, the VC/NVA were probably lying low to regroup and resupply.

On 2 June, two males in a sampan approached two PBRs of RPD 61 19 kilometers southeast of Rach Gia (WR 150 870). One man stated his desire to "Chieu Hoi", while the other said he was an ARVN soldier captured by the VC on 30 Oct 70 and had been held until 20 May 1971. The PBRs took the men to the Rach Gia Chieu Hoi Center and to the Province Chief respectively.

The Kien Giang Province VC made their presence felt during a boat ambush on 8 June, 22 kilometers south of Rach Gia (WR 158 862). The VC fired one B-40 rocket at PBRs 7711 and 7715 of RPD 61. The boats returned the fire with all weapons while the VC fired four more rockets but without effect. Meanwhile, two other boats joined the melee while Seawolf helicopters scrambled and placed strikes in the area. Three females ashore in the vicinity of the ambush surrendered to the PBRs and were turned over to a outpost nearby. The Seawolves sighted one sampan and two other persons in the target area. They sank the sampan, probably killing two of the enemy. There were no friendly casualties or damage in the scrap. No US advisors participated in the operation, however, the Vietnamese patrol officers used the air brevity code to direct a Seawolf strike for the first time under combat conditions.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

The Kien Giang guerrillas struck again on 18 June, attacking PBRs 7700 and 7718, attacking from both sides of the Cai Lon River (WR 208 768) with heavy small arms, automatic weapons, and B-40 rocket fire. One rocket hit PBR 7700's M-60 machine gun, seriously wounding two crewmembers. The PBRs medevaced the wounded to Cai Nuoc outpost (WR 160 805), where Seawolves evacuated the men directly to Binh Thuy. Enemy casualties were undetermined.

The Camp Sentinel Radar System at OP Base Kien An was instrumental in breaking up a possible ground attack during the evening of 24 June. At 2030H, the operator of CSR Three reported the approach of three distinct groups of people, approximately 25 persons per group. Two groups approached from a small canal south of WR 126 893. The third group approached the bank of the Cai Lon River from WR 130 894. All three groups converged bearing 175 degrees true, 300 meters from the base. At 2105H, one group approached along a bearing 180 degrees true to within 200 meters of the base. The base responded with 81mm mortar and machine gun fire. This fire seemed to drive off the majority of the people; however, radar continued to detect movement in the vicinity of the southern end of the canal (WR 126 893) until 2400H. There were no friendly casualties; enemy casualties were undetermined.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

TRAN HUNG DAO VIII

During the month of June, activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO VIII AO increased over that of the previous month but was still considered light in comparison to the past. CTG 217.1 units participated in 48 troop movements or support missions for the Seventh ARVN Division and the RF and PF forces, while 17 convoy escort and political warfare missions were conducted. TU 217.1.1 supported the Dinh Tuong and Kien Phong joint operations. TUONG PHUONG centered around the Wagonwheel area (WS 990 550) for the last 17 days of the month. Waterborne units engaged the enemy on eight occasions, resulting in undetermined damage to enemy assets. Two Vietnamese sailors were killed and six wounded.

CTG 116.8 and 116.7.7 air units flew 19 sorties in support of TRAN HUNG DAO VIII assets resulting in 23 enemy killed and in the destruction of 18 bunkers and four sampans. In addition, various supplies were captured in the ensuing troop sweeps.

The important naval repair center at LSB Dong Tam was mortared on 13 June by one round of undetermined size, while on 17 June the base was hit by a number of rounds on two separate occasions a few hours apart. Fortunately, no casualties or damage resulted from the barrage on either occasion.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

The attacks occurring during the month on LSB Dong Tam were predicted by intelligence sources in a series of reports. On 10 June, an intelligence report indicated that the section chief of the 273rd Artillery Battalion of VC MR-2 had completed the reconnaissance for the placement of mortars to be used in the shelling of the Dong Tam Base. The report further stated that the shelling would be in support of VC main and local forces which would accompany the attack. The 273rd Artillery Battalion had been reported previously as targeted against the Dong Tam Base and My Tho City. Although accompanying attacks failed to materialize, the report proved to be rather accurate in its predictions and information.

The source of enemy weapons and especially the long range mortar used was the subject of another report issued in the latter part of the month. NILO My Tho reported that, on 22 June, the VC in Cai Loy District, Dinh Tuong Province received an arms shipment of approximately 96 122mm mortar rounds, 160 82mm rounds, 82 75mm rounds, 70 anti-tank mines, 47 cases of grenades, 67 B-40 rounds, and 70 blocks of TNT. The shipment was reportedly received at the terminus of the Khung Chien Canal (XS 137 555) by a 37 man rear services unit of VC My Tho in three sampans. With this shipment, it was predicted that the 273rd Artillery Battalion planned to shell Dong Tam Base around the beginning of July.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Waterborne units engaged the enemy on eight separate occasions; five were enemy initiated resulting in five craft being struck by B-40 rockets. In every incident, the craft responded with devastating suppressive fire and continued to operate. On 11 June at 1745H, two PBRs of RPD 53 on routine patrol of the Kinh Xang (XS 357 541), 11 kilometers northwest of Dong Tam, received an unknown number of B-40 rockets. One rocket struck the after section of HQ 7543 causing minor fiberglass damage. Other rockets fired by the VC missed their mark as the PBRs responded with devastating fire. Seawolf aircraft were scrambled to assist, and with the use of the brevity code, the VNN officers were able to direct the attack. However, prior to arrival on scene, the enemy broke off the engagement and control passed to the NOC. The PBRs proceeded to an ARVN outpost and picked up reactionary troops for a sweep of the area. Two Vietnamese sailors were wounded in the encounter and the damage to PBR 7543 was considered minor.

On 13 June at 0015H, two RID 42 craft, while in ambush position on the Kinh Tong Doc Loc (XS 365 585), 18 kilometers northwest of Dong Tam, were attacked by an unknown number of VC with B-40 rockets and AK-47 fire. Alfa boat 5156 was struck by two B-40 rockets but returned the fire for the five minutes that the attack continued before contact was broken.

Three VNN sailors were wounded and evacuated by a Dustoff helo arriving

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

on scene at 0150H with a Night Hawk gunship. While the operation was taking place, the gunship silenced the remaining sniper fire and at 0225H, the medevac was completed and Alfa 5156 resumed operations.

On 25 June at 1120H, PBR 7545 returned to My Tho with minor hull damage after being struck with B-40 rockets on the Kinh Xang. The rocket causing the major damage struck the canopy and then exploded. A troop sweep was immediately conducted with no contact being established, however, one B-40 rocket was found on the ground in the vicinity.

On the same day at 1800H, two PBRs of RPD 53 on routine patrol of the Kinh Xang, two miles northwest of Dong Tam, were attacked with B-40 rockets fired from the west bank in the vicinity of XS 388 475. One of the PBRs received one hit resulting in minor damage and one Vietnamese sailor was killed and two were wounded. The two PBRs, assisted by two additional PBRs and two boats of RAG 21/33, returned the enemy fire, and reactionary forces from a nearby outpost inserted to sweep the area. The troops reported no contact but recovered one unexpended B-40 rocket.

Again on the same day at 2355H, two boats of RID 42 in a night ambush position, were attacked with an unknown number of B-40 rockets 12 miles northwest of Dong Tam (XS 265 584). An ASPB received three rockets resulting in one Vietnamese sailor being killed and slight

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

damage to the boat. After the third rocket was fired, contact was immediately broken by the enemy. A reactionary force inserted at first light, with no significant results recorded.

The Dong Tam Naval Base was mortared on two occasions during the month causing no casualties or damage. On 13 June, one rocket round impacted, probably a zeroing round for the attacks to follow. At 2135H on 17 June, 20 rounds of harassing fire impacted at XS 411 431. Two hours later, five rounds impacted at XS 412 432. Investigation of the attack by Sector S-2 revealed that the 2135H fire was due to the Sam Giang Artillery Base responding to a contact. The 2335H fire was due to enemy activity, possibly the 273rd and 309 F Artillery Battalions operating in the area.

TUONG PHUONG, a joint operation from Dinh Tuong and Kien Phuong Provinces, was launched on 15 June when 12 boats of RAG 21/33 inserted a platoon of infantry and afterwards patrolled the canals in the operating area. Twelve boats of RAG 21/33 conducted psychological warfare operations on the Kinh Hai and Muoi Tam by distributing literature, medical supplies, and clothing, and talking to the inhabitants. The operation was launched to try to blunt the VC activity in the area estimated by Seventh ARVN Intelligence to have 6,000 VCI. Eight VC battalions operate in the AO with the 261A and 514C of major concern since they

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

They have operated principally around the Kinh Xang and Kinh Tong Doc Loc. The manning level of a VC battalion is estimated at 250 men of which 30% are North Vietnamese infiltrators.

To counter this force, RAG 21/33 has been employed on the western waterways, Kinh Hai Muoi Tam from XS 100 465 to Wagonwheel (WS 990 550), north on Kinh Tong Doc Loc to XS 025 585 and northwest on Kinh Tai Muoi to WS 983 565 . This area was expanded with the advent of the rainy season and was expected to cover the majority of Kinh Tong Doc Loc. Four RAG 21/33 boats and four RPD 53 PBRs were on the My Tho River from XS 390 415 to XS 910 350. Six PBRs were on the Kinh Xang from Dong Tam (XS 412 427) to XS 312 577. Nine RID 42 boats were on the Tong Doc Loc from XS 203 600 to Kinh Xang at XS 358 598. An overlapping area between the PBRs and "Heavys" was required as the area is an east to west location for VC traffic, and a majority of contacts in the AO occur at this point. Nightly ambushes were set on all patrolled waterways and were coordinated with ARVN outposts in joint PF/VNN participation. Two U.S. Army helicopter squadrons were employed for the troop insertions and extractions from the Seventh ARVN Division. By the end of the month, the operation was proceeding smoothly with undetermined results.

In a change of command, LT Charles F. Tibbets, USN, relieved LT Fleming Mauney, USN as the Senior Advisor of RID 45 on 19 June.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

TRAN HUNG DAO IX

Action on the waterways of the TRAN HUNG DAO IX AO was again dormant. No firefights occurred and the ten boat unit of RPD 62, based at Phuoc Xuyen, did not engage the enemy. Seawolf helicopters of Detachment Nine, based on YRBM 21 at Tan Chau, continued their support of outlying army and RF/PF outposts, engaging the enemy on 22 occasions. The Seawolves suffered no casualties and enemy losses could not be determined. Although the Seawolf actions did not occur within the AO, since the outposts are all in adjacent infiltration areas, the airstrikes certainly have major importance to the area.

DUFFLEBAG sensors helped RF troops score a victory on 26 June when sensor activations pinpointed a party of VC marauders. The PF troops set an ambush at 2105H at WS 239 990. Results of this ambush and subsequent artillery fire directed by activations were four enemy killed; one 60mm mortar, one M-16, and one AK-47 were captured.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
TRAN HUNG DAO X/XVII

During the month of June, the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO was highlighted by wholesale changes in its boundaries and the disestablishment of two bases, ATSB Song Ong Doc and ATSB Ca Mau. The TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO was restructured to include the TRAN HUNG DAO X AO, upon its dismantling on 5 June at 0800H, thus becoming the largest AO in the Delta. CTG 212.6 was relieved of responsibility for the area by CTF 210.

Operation TRAN HUNG DAO X was initiated on 28 September 1969 and ended on 5 June 1971. During the almost two years of its existence, units attached to the operation killed 457 enemy troops and captured 143, while destroying 728 sampans. There were 53 friendly sailors killed and 373 wounded.

ATSB Song Ong Doc was formally disestablished on 4 June at 1800H. This base had been a bulwark in the defenses on the western side of the Delta and had the distinction of being overrun once, on October, 1970, at its old location near the mouth of the Song Ong Doc. Undaunted by this temporary setback, the base was re-established in November 1970, further into enemy territory, about halfway between the mouth of Song Ong Doc and Ca Mau, where it stood until the decision was made to abandon the site, a decision made because of the reduction of U.S. Navy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Support LSTs and the indefensible disposition of the base itself.

The only other naval base in the area, ATSB Ca Mau, was disestablished on 17 June, due to pressure from the Senior Province Advisor and a hostile civil populace, who did not like the base, an obvious target, to be near their homes. As a result of these base disestablishments, the only U.S. Naval personnel left in the Ca Mau area were the Seabees who are constructing ISB Ca Mau, personnel attached to CTF 210 at the MACV Compound, Seal Team One, Detachment Golf, Papa Platoon, and Seawolf Helicopter Detachment Three at Ca Mau Long Strip.

Combat activity diminished in the area during June as the total number of waterborne firefights dropped to five; one VC was killed while friendly casualties were one PF soldier killed, seven Vietnamese and American sailors, and six PF soldiers were wounded. There were no minings, a considerable improvement over previous months, and no watercraft were lost. There was one terrorist incident in Ca Mau to remind the GVN that there were still VC lurking almost everywhere.

Seawolf helicopters of Detachment Three at Ca Mau and Detachment Eight at Rach Gia were active in virtually all parts of the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII OP area. 116.7.3 flew 26 missions killing two VC and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

probably killing two more, while destroying two bunkers, 25 sampans and eight structures. 116.7.8 flew only six missions in TRAN HUNG DAO XVII but they were highly successful; 18 enemy soldiers were killed, another 22 were probably killed; two bunkers, and 12 sampans were destroyed while eight bunkers and 18 structures were damaged.

On 5 June at 0900, a LCM-8 was hit with one B-40 rocket at VR 870 003 on the Song Ong Doc. The escorting boats of RAG 26 returned and suppressed all enemy fire and the convoy continued to Ca Mau. One USN officer, LT J.D. Pickett, received slight wounds and the vessel suffered a six inch hole in the port side forward. Enemy casualties were undetermined.

The Kinh Can Gao was the setting for another attack on 5 June; this time the audacious VC ambushed a convoy of TG 210.1 less than one mile from OP Base Kien An. The lead boat, an ASPB, was nearly hit by two B-40 rockets, but no casualties were inflicted by the errant rockets and the convoy was able to proceed to the 33rd Regimental CP without further incident.

On 21 June at 0830H, a four boat convoy of RAG 26, proceeding northwest up the Song Ong Doc with one RF company embarked, was attacked by the VC with 10-12 rounds of B-40 rockets and AW fire. The boats returned and suppressed the enemy fire, and the troops

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED 1973

were inserted for a sweep at WR 020 055. One VC was killed, and friendly units suffered one killed, eight wounded, and minor damage to two FOMs.

The persistent VC of Song Ong Doc District struck again on 28 June at 0945H when a five boat convoy of RAID 74 was fired upon at WR 008 047 by an unknown number of the insurgents using B-40 rockets. There were no hits, fire was suppressed by the combat air patrol, consisting of Black Pony Aircraft, and the rivercraft continued to Ca Mau without further incident. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were undetermined.

On 29 June, at 1900H, in the northern U Minh, two Americans and five Vietnamese were wounded when their LCP, a RAID 72 craft, was struck with two B-40 rockets. The attack occurred at VR 965 730 on the Kinh Can Gao. Both boats returned the fire and ARVN artillery support was called in. The rivercraft proceeded to the 33rd Regimental CP where the wounded were medevaced. The boat suffered no damage in the attack; Communist casualties could not be determined.

Terrorists of the Ca Mau City cell struck on 5 June, at 2115H, when two males, one clad in black, the other in white, astride a Honda, threw a grenade into a group of Vietnamese, outside a restaurant, near the main market place. Results of the attack were one civilian killed, seven VNN wounded (four serious), two National Police and two civilians injured.

CONFIDENTIAL

Seals of Team One, Detachment Golf, Papa Platoon, engaged in two operations in June. In the first operation conducted on 5 June between 1715H and 1745H, Seals, assisted by Luc Luong 66s, inserted from two SEALORD Slicks at VR 848 159. Seawolf helicopters suppressed all ground fire and the commandos patrolled to the target area. They observed two armed men fleeing and opened fire with small arms, but were not able to locate any casualties. While in the area, one structure, two bunkers, two grenades, one stove, and 20 kilos of rice were destroyed; Seawolves accounted for two enemy killed while none of the friendly forces reported casualties.

On 26 June at 1710H, Seals, a KCS guide, and an interpreter, inserted at VR 828 169 by SEALORD Slicks to interdict VC infrastructure. They patrolled 25 meters to the target hootch, set security, and searched with negative results. The Seals then patrolled back to the LZ and called for a normal extraction. Results of the operation were two enemy probably killed by Seawolf helicopters; one hootch, and one bunker destroyed.

Salvage teams were not as active during June as in previous months; however, they did salvage two rivercraft, one at Ca Mau on 1 June and one on 18 June in the U Minh near the 32nd Regimental CP. After these two operations the much praised salvors of HCU-1 and their VNN

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

counterparts changed operational control to TRAN HUNG DAO IV.

In early June, units of TRAN HUNG DAO XVII played a major part in one of the most impressive political coups of the Vietnam war. On 1 June, the 21st ARVN Division, currently engaged in very successful search and clear operations in the U Minh Forest, celebrated its 12th anniversary amid visits from such dignitaries as President Thieu, General Abrams, and Ambassador Bunker. Also on hand for the festivities at the 33rd Regimental CP were approximately 3,000 civilians, who, in order to travel to the location, had to transit the notorious Song Trem Trem and Kinh Can Gao in sampans; both waterways are very susceptible to terrorist attack, but units of CTF 210 secured them and prevented any incidents. The ceremonies were held in the heart of a formerly impregnable enemy stronghold without a single terrorist incident to mar the day, a great accomplishment for GVN forces. Units of CTF 210 were commended by DEPCOMTHD for this significant achievement.

A crisis developed during June, when, with the imminent closing of ATSB Ca Mau on 17 June, it was realized that the Navy would no longer have a teletype communication circuit. With assistance from all parties concerned, namely COMNAVFORV, U.S. Army 52nd Signal Battalion, CTG 212.6, and TF 210 Staff, CTF 210 made a great effort and succeeded in moving the teletype facilities from

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

the ATSB to the ARVN 21st Light CP in Ca Mau, thus ensuring the stability and continuance of Naval communication to the Ca Mau area of the Delta.

On 30 June at Kien An OP Base, SP5 G. C. Hinsdale, USA, was killed while heroically maneuvering a burning, JP-4 filled LCM away from the pier where two other petroleum filled craft were moored. He steered the craft toward the opposite shore and when he was sure of its direction, jumped from the stern of the vessel. His body was recovered and death was due to drowning. His actions undoubtedly saved other lives and tremendous material damage.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII

During the month of June four convoys carried 5,325,500 gallons of critically needed POL stocks to the Cambodian capital city of Phnom Penh. Two of the minesweepers leading the convoys were attacked in the forward naval element, but no serious damages were incurred, and otherwise the convoys had few problems in reaching Phnom Penh.

Mekong Convoy TP-21, composed of two merchant ships, the old standby KHMERE TRADER with 569,400 gallons of POL, and two tugs, departed Tan Chau assembly area at 0500H on 2 June. The convoy had been delayed three hours from the original departure time because of a two-company size enemy force with heavy weapons reported by intelligence sources to be moving towards the river to points WT 237 370 and WT 215 357. At 0900H, the merchant ship FELICITY went aground six miles south of Neak Luong at WT 260 350. The tug VIKING assisted the merchant ship and she rejoined the convoy at 1020H, and the convoy arrived unscathed at Phnom Penh at 1550H. The return convoy, PT-21, departed Phnom Penh at 1000H the next day with two merchantmen, two tankers, and a tug, and arrived at Tan Chau at 1645H without incident.

During the first week in June, industrialists and private citizens alike in Phnom Penh continued to wait anxiously for the next arrival of a Mekong POL convoy, and the pattern repeated itself each week

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

following, as the convoys managed to satisfy only the most pressing needs of the city. Residential and commercial districts went up to ten hours per day without electricity. Before the 10 June convoy arrived, stocks of auto and industrial diesel and fuel oil were completely exhausted, and MOGAS was critically low. Convoy TP-22 considerably relieved the problem, and each successive convoy restored the capital city anew. The situation fundamentally improved at the end of June when new contracts for additional shipping took effect.

Convoy TP-22, consisting of two merchantmen, two tankers, three tugs and a Leapdal towboat, and carrying a total of 1,772,100 gallons of POL, departed Tan Chau at 0300H, on 10 June, and arrived at 1500H the same day. The return convoy, PT-22, composed of two merchantmen, two tankers, four tugs, and a Leapdal towboat, carried one barge with 1600 tons of rice, and left Phnom Penh at 1320H on 11 June, arriving at Tan Chau at 1930H without incident.

Mekong convoy TP-23, left Tan Chau at 0200H on 17 June harboring four merchantmen, four tankers, and a Leapdal towboat, carrying a total of 1,214,000 gallons of POL. At 0500H, the minesweepers ahead of the convoy were attacked with five B-40 rockets at WT 27 57, seven miles north of Neak Luong. No hits or damage was reported. While the ships returned the enemy fire, FANK units, responding in 10 minutes, swept the area with unknown results. This was the first

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

incident where the enemy attacked the lead naval element of a convoy since TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII began in January of this year.

The convoy arrived in Phnom Penh at 1630H with no further incident.

The last previous ambush occurred a month earlier on 17 May. The return convoy, PT-23, composed of a merchantman, two tankers, and a Leapdal towboat, departed Phnom Penh at 1045H and arrived at Tan Chau seven hours later; carried by the monsoon current on the Mekong, the convoy made the trip from Phnom Penh to Tan Chau in half the time that the upriver trip takes.

Mekong convoy TP-24 left Tan Chau at 2100H on 24 June, with a composition of one merchantman, three tankers, three tugs, and two Cambodian ferry boats, carrying a total of 1, 770, 000 gallons of POL. At 2325H the convoy was attacked approximately two miles north of the border with 14 B-40 rockets. The tanker VIRA II received one hit in the engine room, resulting in one crewman being wounded and a momentary steering casualty. The attack was broken by the quick reaction of the escorting PBRs, and by air strikes from USN Seawolves, Black Ponies, and USAF Shadows, all under the control of USAF Rustic. This was the southernmost attack on the convoys since TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII began, and the second attack of the month. There had been frequent previous reports of enemy units operating in the area of the attack. Two attacks on nearby outposts, at WT 203 058 and WT 204 055, took place approximately six hours prior to

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

the convoy attack. The extensive movement and activity in the area just north of the border indicated that the enemy intentions were to secure the territory for themselves. As convoy TP-24 continued up the river, the advance element of MSRs came under attack for the second time in the month. At 0620H in the vicinity of WT 195 670, the enemy fired five B-40 rockets, missing the boats and hence inflicting no casualties.

On 30 June, a special convoy, consisting of an LSSL, two LCUs, two LCM-8s, two PCFs, one ATC, one ASPB, and a Zippo, enroute from Neak Luong to Tan Chau, was attacked at 2105H at grid line 29. The LSSL received three 57mm recoilless rocket hits resulting in two personnel slightly wounded, and minor damage. The wounded were transported later to YRBM 21 by PCF.

The seemingly token support of the Mekong convoy operations by the Khmer Navy was a subject of concern by COMNAVFORV, as detailed in a message on 2 June to COMUSMACV. The first part of the message read: "The MNK has reduced their craft contribution for Mekong convoy operations to four PBRs. While it is recognized that MNK has other commitments, preservation of the Mekong LOC must be assigned their highest priority. At the present time, their contribution is below their capability. Mekong convoy operations require their dedicated

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

effort about two days each week. By careful scheduling it should be possible to accommodate other requirements." On 29 June the American Ambassador to Cambodia, Ambassador Swank, went to Tan Chau to review the convoy operations in response to the message.

American air assets provided invaluable assistance to the convoys during the month in an escort capacity. On the morning before the 24 June convoy, Seawolves struck ten structures where 15 VC were believed to be hiding in an ambush posture, at an area just south of the border on the west bank of the Mekong. Results of the strike could not be determined. Later that day, at 1820H, two outposts on the west bank just south of the border, in the vicinity of WT 204 055 and WT 203 058, came under attack twice, and on the second attack, a USN heavy fire team immediately responded. Artillery strikes were lifted for the Seawolves as they made passes, and the enemy fired at the helos each time, but no casualties were incurred and damage to the enemy was unknown.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



YRBM-21, anchored just north of Tan Chau on the Mekong, is the focal point for Cambodian participation in the Mekong Convoy Operations, and was recently the target for several mortar attacks.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

TRAN HUNG DAO XIX

The lull persisting in the TRAN HUNG DAO XIX AO during the month of May came to an end as the enemy took advantage of rest and refitting to challenge friendly forces throughout the length of Kien Hoa Province. The enemy operations, selective, consisting mainly of ambushes, indicated a well organized plan for the destruction of material and personnel with the minimal loss of attendant assets. CTG 217.2 units recorded five firefights, resulting in the sinking of one LCM and the wounding of 72 friendly troops (two Vietnamese sailors). Four VC were killed and countless enemy supplies were destroyed.

CTG 116.8 and 116.7.7 air units flew 18 sorties in support of TRAN HUNG DAO XIX units resulting in the destruction of three bunkers, five sampans, and four structures. In addition, they were credited with killing 80 enemy soldiers.

The passage of men and materials into Kien Hoa Province, reported in the past, was again the focus of a series of intelligence reports during the month of June. On 5 June, an intelligence report related that a Y-4 Rear Services Team of VC Ben Tre was operating in the area, composed of about 29 men with an unknown number of RPG-2s, AK-47s and K-54s. The unit also had an unknown number of motorized boats used to receive and distribute ammunition and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

weapons within Kien Hoa Province. The report further stated that the motorized sampans were disguised as fishing boats, and that they were used to offload ships anchored offshore (XS 815 017). The materiel was then transported for caching to the area of the Bun Canal in Thanh Phu District (XS 705 038). The materials were not generally stored in this area for a long period of time for fear of their being discovered by friendly forces.

On 14 June, another report indicated the enemy was actively using a supply route between the Rach Ba Tu (XS 886 297) in Go Cong Province and the Rach Khem (XS 908 263) in the Binh Dai Secret Zone. The supplies were moved at night by motorized sampan from the Binh Dai Secret Zone along the My Tho River to various places in Dinh Tuong Province.

With the continuing intelligence reports of the infiltration of supplies into Kien Hoa Province, it would seem that the enemy does not lack from shortages of material to prosecute his guerrilla operations. However, this premise was apparently disproved after the debriefing of a Hoi Chanh who stated that, at present, the VC in Kien Hoa are suffering major shortages of medicines, food, and ammunition, and that province units are being supplied by drawing on existing caches. District LF units and guerrillas must attain self sufficiency by capturing weapons and ordnance.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

He further stated that to improve the supply system, the 8th Battalion of the 516th was recently formed in Thanh Phu District to receive supplies sent from Hanoi by sea. The battalion has about 80 men and is also responsible for the security of a radio station in Thanh Phu. He also stated that in 1970, there were two shipments to Kien Hoa by "submarine", one in early 1970 and one in November 1970. The later "submarine" supposedly was sunk by GVN forces after running aground in the vicinity of XR 87 85.

The later "submarine" to which the report refers was probably the SL-3 trawler sunk on 21/22 November at the same location identified by the Hoi Chanh. Two crewmembers of the SL-3 were captured after the trawler was sunk.

CTG 217.2 waterborne units engaged the enemy on five different occasions, and the ambush technique of the enemy played a significant role in the success they achieved. In the most severe attack of the month, LCM 1565 was assailed on the Cai Cam Canal (XS 415 322) as it turned toward the bank to insert troops on 6 June. The resulting devastating fire laid down by the enemy killed one soldier and wounded 62. The LCM took one hit in the storage compartment aft of the well deck, one hit (a large hole five inches in diameter) in the outer hull at the water line, one hit through the upper right hand corner of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

the bow ramp, and finally hit in the wooden well deck overhead. All in all, two 57mm recoilless hits were counted along with numerous small arms holes. LCM 1565 was refloated on 7 June by LSSL 230 and RAG 23/31 salvage craft and was sent to Vinh Long in company with LCM 1553 and a Monitor. EN3 Brienza, RPD 56 advisor onboard performed in an outstanding manner, treating the wounded and subsequently preparing them for medevac by helicopters.

On 16 June, two PBRs of RPD 56, while in WBGP on the Mo Cay Canal (XS 492 251), were fired upon with AK-47s by three or four occupants in one sampan as it approached the unaware crewmembers. PBR 7617 returned the fire, destroying the sampan, but not before one Vietnamese sailor was seriously wounded, and numerous AK-47 rounds penetrated the PBR. No bodies from the sampan could be found and it was presumed that the occupants died. As an aftermath of the review of the operation by the Commanding Officer, TRAN HUNG DAO XIX, the patrol officer was censured for breaking the assigned ambush and being caught unaware.

In a combined operation of ground and naval units on the Bai Lai River (XS 555 360), seven RAG 23/31 boats and Monitor, HQ 6520 transported troops to an outpost which had come under attack, but was no longer in contact, on the morning of 18 June. Two companies of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Regional Force troops swept along the bank of the river and kept pace with the river craft. At approximately 1030H, the boats were ambushed by a small VC unit on the south bank of the river. The monitor was hit by a B-40/41 rocket and small arms. The other craft suppressed the fire and Seawolves were called in for additional firepower, but were refused permission to fire due to friendlies in the area. No personnel casualties were incurred and the Monitor had slight damage but continued on. As the RAG craft exited the Bai Lai River, they were again ambushed at XS 568 356, probably by the same ambush team. No damage was incurred and again the enemy fire was suppressed. The combined group finally arrived at the outpost (XS 555 363) but found it had been overrun and all nine defenders killed, wounded, or missing. This was the second outpost overrun in three days.

On 26 June, a combined operation of the First Battalion, Tenth Regiment, and naval units (approximately 220 men) departed from the old OP area (XS 507 267) in RID 45 boats and proceeded to the Ben Tre ferry landing for further transport by helicopter to the West Bai Lai river area, (bounded by XS 575 335, XS 585 367, XS 520 391, and XS 520 345). One company landed north of the river and two to the south and all proceeded to sweep toward the Bai Lai River where eight RAG 23/31 boats were acting as a blocking force. No contact was

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

established on the first day of the operations, however, the following day, ARVN troops killed five VC, and captured two weapons and 15 grenades. On 29 June, RPD 56 PBRs medevaced two wounded ARVN from the west Bai Lai River (XS 545 363) to a waiting ambulance at the Kinh Moi ferry (XS 556 307). In addition, a RAG Psyops Team provided medical attention, haircuts, and supplies to the inhabitants, plus played tapes and distributed leaflets emphasizing the GVN pacification theme. By month's end, the operation was continuing with undetermined results.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRAN HUNG DAO XX

The TRAN HUNG DAO XX AO was characterized by very light activity during June. There were no naval firefights and no friendly casualties, while the enemy lost three killed to ground operations in adjacent areas.

Seawolf helicopters from Detachment Five at Chau Doc, continued to strike at infiltration routes from the northern end of the TRAN HUNG DAO XX AO to Chau Doc, centering around Ba Chuc and Tien Bien, both well known focal points of infiltration. The "Wolves" flew 19 missions in the area; four were combination strike/Psyops missions with the remainder strikes only. GDA was unknown because the area of the strikes was enemy infested and ground sweeps were not conducted there.

On 7 June, the one water-borne incident during the month occurred when a PCF, HQ 3809, captured a heavily laden junk filled with 2,000 kilograms of salt. The occupants had no papers and would not reveal their destination or the intended use of the salt. Results of the capture were one suspect detained, and one junk with 2,000 kilograms of salt impounded.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

TRAN HUNG DAO XXIII

TRAN HUNG DAO XXIII was a Prisoner of War (POW) repatriation aborted at the last minute which involved 13 motley North Vietnamese prisoners and a dazzling international retinue of accompanying reporters. Planning started after the South Vietnamese government announced on 26 May that it had accepted Hanoi's terms for the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners held by the South. At 1130H on 4 June, it was confirmed that the North Vietnamese government had rescinded their agreement to take the POWs, due mainly to the meager number involved and possibly the loss of face that would be evident as a result of the refusal by many others to accept the repatriation.

The diplomatic imperatives of the mission gave the 13 motley and morose North Vietnamese prisoners a highly inflated status, with a disproportionately large retinue. The government of South Vietnam selected RADM Tran Van Chon, the VNN CNO, to head the operation. CAPT Richard O. Paddock, the commanding officer of NSF DaNang, led the 87-man American military element, which included 46 U.S. Navy men, who served in communications, operations, security, medical administrative, and public information roles. Also included in the entourage were a 19-man MSC transportation unit of US Navy men, staffs of RADM Chon and CAPT Paddock, and representatives of the International Red Cross, as well as two embassy officials. Swarming

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

over the 13 prisoners were 85 newsmen, representing nearly every major news service in the world.

The focal point of the operation was the U.S. Navy Ship UPSHUR, a Military Sealift Command (MSC) operated 19,600 ton troop transport which ordinarily hauled ROK troops to and from the war zone. The North Vietnamese delegation in Paris had stipulated that a civilian ship would be employed to transfer the POWs to the rendezvous site.

Originally the Republic of Vietnam had planned to turn over 570 POWs, but representatives of the International Red Cross who interviewed them could find only 13 willing to return to the North. These POWs, ranging from a 44 year old military and political agent to a 20 year old private, were all sick or wounded, and were all captured in the past five years. The GVN held at the time 37,914 prisoners, only 9,381 of which were NVA.

At 1800H on 3 June, the UPSHUR got underway and steamed towards the rendezvous point a mile north of the DMZ. The weather was overcast, with light swells, and winds were at 13 knots. An Allied cease-fire was declared for a 30 kilometer radius of the landing zone. The destroyers USS HULL and HMAS BRISBANE were in the area, outside the cease-fire zone, both on normal deployment with the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


DECLASSIFIED

A Hanoi broadcast early in the morning of 4 June relayed their Paris delegation's statement that since the GVN was going to repatriate a scant 13 POWs, the repatriation was annulled. Subsequent high-level consultations failed to reach a happier outcome for the POWs, and the operation was cancelled as of 0330Z on 4 June. According to a strict adherence to the Geneva Convention on POWs which is Allied policy, while hostilities are going on, there can be no forcible repatriation of POWs.

Nearly a year ago, on 11 July 1970, a similar POW repatriation operation, TRAN HUNG DAO XII, successfully deposited 24 North Vietnamese fishermen and 62 sick and wounded POWs into NVA hands on a beach just north of the DMZ. Primarily a VNN operation, TRAN HUNG DAO XII had USN personnel acting in an advisory capacity, with U.S. Seventh Fleet ships standing by.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED



POWs, wearing their faded maroon prison uniform, at pierside in Danang after their flight from Bien Hoa Air Base near Saigon.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



American and South Vietnamese medical personnel discuss preparations for caring for the sick and wounded POWs on the UPSHUR. The medics are, from left: LT Nguyen Dieu, LT William Fike, PO3 Gary Lacefield, LT Terry Schuarke, CPO John Smith, and PO3 Dennis Gumbart.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



Operations personnel stand ready in the command center onboard UP SHUR to respond to changes in their orders. RADM Tran Van Chon, commander of the POW mission, is seated second from right. Fourth from right is CAPT Richard A. Paddock, commander of the American military element assigned to the mission.

LONG TAU SHIPPING CHANNEL

For the seventh consecutive month, enemy efforts on the Long Tau Shipping Channel were nil. But the minesweepers of MID 93 continued to find troubles in other ways. While on the return leg of a sweep of the Long Tau, MSR HQ 1801 was involved in a collision with a PBR. The MSR was sweeping the starboard bank when a PBR approached and passed between her and the bank. A second PBR then came right and cut across the bow of the MSR. The minesweeper reportedly maintained course and speed until the time of the collision because of reduced maneuverability with her sweep gear extended. While the MSR sustained no damage, the PBR was extensively damaged, and the two minesweepers present took the PBR to LSB Nha Be for repairs.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE

Operations in the Rung Sat were characteristically aggressive during June, as the Chuong Duong combined sweeps took their toll of enemy assets, but contact with the enemy remained light. Still, 28 of the enemy were killed for the month, as well as five enemy captured, with one Hoi Chanh. Four enemy sampans were destroyed. The GVN forces sought out the enemy and initiated six firefights, while the VC did not start any. There were also six unilateral firings during the sweeps. The Seawolves flew 17 intelligence and reconnaissance missions, and flew in close support of Chuong Duong operations seven times. They were responsible for at least three enemy deaths. The loss of the Vietnamese intelligence officer, Thieu-Ta Dan, was dearly felt by the ground troops as well as the naval units, as he had spiritedly and shrewly masterminded numerous immediate reaction thrusts at the enemy based on intelligence.

On 2 June, the airmobile watermobile operation, Chuong Duong 26-71, began in an area centered 17 miles southeast of Nha Be. RF units conducted the sweep, supported by Seawolves and Slicks and boats of RPD 57 and RAG 27. Two enemy base camps and two bunkers were destroyed at YS 08 53 during the two day sweep. In a corresponding sweep, Rung Sat PRUs came into contact with enemy units on two separate occasions in the area centered 15 miles east of Nha Be,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

around YS 168 823. The two brief firefights occurred at 0430H on 3 June, and the VC fled during both contacts. The results of the sweep conducted were one VC killed, and seven base camps destroyed.

Three Rung Sat RF companies conducted operation Chuong Duong 27-71 on the 7th and 8th of June in an area centered 13 miles southeast of Nha Be, around YS 01 58. The troops made numerous insertions, and although they experienced no contact, four enemy bodies, believed to be the results of a previous Seawolf strike, were located during the sweeps.

At 0700H on 15 June, two RF companies commenced Chuong Duong 28-71 in an area centered 8 miles southeast of Nha Be around YS 06 78. U.S. Army gunships placed strikes in an area of confirmed enemy concentration, and RFs were inserted after the strikes to determine the results, locating 12 VC killed by air strikes. On several occasions the RF troops came into contact with the enemy, killing three additional VC and capturing one, as well as four weapons and two B-40 rockets. They also destroyed two enemy base camps, including ten bunkers and 11 sleeping platforms. Later that day, at 1800H, a Rung Sat RF company, enroute to a night ambush position, sighted six VC in a sampan 15 miles southeast of Nha Be (YS 199 709). The RFs initiated fire, killing two VC and capturing the sampan. Four

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

VC, evading the area, were fired on by the Seawolves, with unknown results. Operation Chuong Duong 28-71 concluded on the 18th after four days of activities. The total results were: 18 VC killed and two captured; 21 individual weapons and 22 radios captured; two sampans, four base camps and seven mines were destroyed. A notable loss occurred, however, when the VNN intelligence officer was killed in a C/C helo crash. The officer, Thieu-Ta Dan, had often pinned down the enemy's location through aggressive and shrewd intelligence; Dan molded a reliable network since his arrival in August 1970, and with his charisma inspired the VNN and RF personnel to spirited action.

Chuong Duong 29-71 commenced at 0800H on 23 June, and was centered in an area 14 miles east of Nha Be around YS 16 74. Numerous sweeps were undertaken, with one base camp and five bunkers located and destroyed. At 2140H, while in a night ambush position, one mile southeast of Nha Be, RF personnel came in contact with four VC, resulting in the death of one VC and one AK-47 captured, while the RFs emerged unscathed. On 25 June, at 0830H, RF units conducting a sweep, came into contact with an unknown number of VC 18 miles south of Nha Be at YS 198 728. The ensuing firefight resulted in two VC killed and one sampan and a small quantity of documents captured.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CTF 211

The following was the disposition of the RAID units at the end of June:

<u>RAID</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>
70	CTG 210.1	Kien An
71	CTG 210.1	Kien An
72	CTF 210	Kien An
73	CTF 210	Kien An
74	CTF 210	Ca Mau
75	CTF 210	Ca Mau

Each RAID is composed of approximately eight ATCs, five ASPBs, two MONs, one CCB, and one REF. The RAIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.

On 27 June RAIDs 72 and 73 shifted from the Mekong convoy operation, TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII, to CTF 210 at Kien An.

DECLASSIFIED

CTF 212

The following was the disposition of RPD units at the end of June.

<u>RPD</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>
51	CMD	Cat Lai
52	216.1, 228	Phu Cuong, Nha Be
53	217.1	My Tho
54	214.1	Ben Keo, Tan An, Ben Luc
55	218.2	Tan Chau, Chau Doc
56	217.2	Vinh Long
57	228	Nha Be
58	212.5	Sa Dec
59	218.2	Tan Chau
60	213.1	Hoi An
61	210.4	Rach Soi
62	212.6	Phuoc Xuyen
63	212.5	Rach Soi
64	214.1	Tuyen Nhon/Moc Hoa
65	Training	Binh Thuy

Each RPD is composed of approximately 20 PBRs and is reviewed in the operation in which it operates.

CONFIDENTIAL

CTF 214

The following was the disposition of RID units at the end of June:

<u>RID</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>
40	214.1	Go Dau Ha
41	218.2	Tan Chau
42	217.1	Dong Tam
43	216.1	Phu Cuong
44	214.1	Tra Cu
45	217.2	Dong Tam
46	214.2	Nam Can
47	214.2	Nam Can
48	218.2	Tan Chau

Each RID is generally composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, six ASPBs, one CCB, one Zippo, one REF, and one RECH. The RIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

RIVER ASSAULT GROUPS

The following was the disposition of RAG units at the end of June:

<u>RAG</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>
22	CTG 216.1	Phu Cuong
24	CTG 216.1	Phu Cuong
26	CTF 210	Ca Mau
27	CTF 228	Nha Be
28	Commander, Third River Area	Long Binh
30	CTG CTG 216.1	Phu Cuong
32	Commander, First Coastal Zone	Hue
21/33	CTG 217.1	Dong Tam
23/31	CTG 217.2	Vinh Long
25/29	CTG 210.3	Ca Mau
81	Convoy Escort Fourth Riverine Area	Cat Lai

Each RAG is composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, one ASPB, for CCBs, and six LCM-6s. The RAG are reviewed in their respective operations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Special Warfare

The following was the disposition of the Seal Detachments operating in a combat capacity throughout the country at the end of June:

<u>Detachment</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Officer-in-Charge</u>
Team One Det Golf November Platoon	217.1	Dong Tam	LT Fletcher
Team One Det Golf Papa Platoon	116.2	Ca Mau	LT Antrim
Team One Det Golf Quebec Platoon	116.12	Ben Luc	LTJG Taylor LTJG Campbell
Team One Det Golf Oscar Platoon	116.1	Nam Can	LT Ward
Team One Det Golf Romeo Platoon	116.5	Rach Soi	LTJG Boyhan LTJG Dundas

Seal units are reviewed in their respective operational areas.

CTG 116.7

The following was the disposition of HAL-3 Detachments at the end of June:

<u>Det.</u>	<u>Task Org.</u>	<u>Location</u>
1	116.7.1	Nam Can
2	116.7.2	Nha Be
3	116.7.3	Ca Mau
4	116.7.4	Ben Luc
5	116.7.5	Chau Doc
6	116.7.6	Phu Loi
7	116.7.7	Dong Tam
8	116.7.8	Rach Gia
9	116.7.9	YRBM 21 (Tan Chau)

Seawolf units are reviewed as a part of the operations in which they participate. A detachment usually consists of nine pilots and nine enlisted door gunners and two UH-1B helicopters. Only routine maintenance is done at the detachments, major tasks are accomplished at Binh Thuy, the "home" of the squadron.

In June the Seawolves flew 974 missions of which 106 missions were in contact with the enemy; 98 enemy were killed. 160 structures, 109 bunkers and 171 sampans were damaged or destroyed.

CTG 116.8

During June the "Ponies" flew 272 missions of which 77 were in contact with the enemy. 215 enemy were killed; 111 structures, 44 bunkers, and 46 sampans were damaged or destroyed.

The following are some of the highlights of 116.8 operations in support of allied units during June.

On 4 June "Ponies" placed strikes in support of MAT 148, Choang Thien Province, when the outpost came under attack by an unknown size enemy force armed with 57mm recoilless rifles and B-40 rockets. The aircraft received 12.7mm anti-aircraft fire but sustained no damage. Results of the strikes were 24 NVA/VC killed.

In Vinh Binh Province on 9 June, Black Ponies struck a VC bunker complex and were credited with five enemy casualties; one fuel storage tank, two bunkers, four structures and two sampans were destroyed.

Scrambling in support of the 21st ARVN Division on 10 June in the U Minh, OV-10 aircraft placed strikes for troops in contact with an unknown size force of NVA. After the enemy assault was blunted, the ground sweep counted 12 enemy soldiers killed as a result of the bombardment.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

The enemy in Bac Lieu outsmarted himself on 22 June when, prior to performing a mission, Black Ponies requested smoke from friendlies to mark their position. The enemy, obviously listening on the circuit, responded also, but with the wrong color, thereby marking their position for the aircraft. The results of this error were 13 enemy killed.

Finally, on 25 June, the airmen placed a strike in Ba Xuyen Province on a VC infested treeline. Results of the strike were 10 VC killed; two structures, and one bunker destroyed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCES

MARKET TIME forces continued to maintain an effective barrier against the sea-borne infiltration threat during June. USN units inspected 1,246 craft during day and night patrols, boarded 368 and detained none. The VNN Inner Barrier units boarded 9,485 junks and sampans, detaining 16 persons. The coastal surveillance units, as a whole, accounted for three of the enemy probably killed, and 12 enemy structures and six bunkers destroyed.

The new MARKET TIME reorganization, the "Cloud Concept", was still under evaluation at the close of the month. CTF 213 established the first task unit under the OPCON of CTG 213.4. Designated TU 213.4.3, the task unit consisted of one PCE (OTC), the Inner Barrier patrol units assigned to areas 8C, 8D, 8E, 9C, and supplemented, when available, by PCFs from CTG 214.2. CTU 213.4.3 was responsible for patrolling the coastline between the Bo De River mouth (WQ 465 955) to Song Ong Doc River mouth (WQ 78 97).

As well as restructuring the Inner Barrier patrol units, some changes to the Outer Barrier units were made. The outer MARKET TIME areas were subdivided into approximate 30 mile areas, and oscillating boundaries were designated. In addition, COMNAVFORV and CTF 115 discussed altering P-3 patrol flights so that a NOVEMBER (advancing barrier) track could be flown daily. This track theoretically would

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


raise the probability of detection of a south bound infiltration trawler from 80 to 90-95 percent. After staffing and approval, a one month trial of the NOVEMBER track was planned.

On 5 June, MARKET TIME units got the chance to try out their new organization. At 1830H CTF 115 sent a report received from SHOTGUN aircraft to CTG 213.3 of a possible trawler off the coast of the Long Toan Secret Zone. The Senior Advisor, CTG 213.3 deployed Outer Barrier units 6B and 7B (MSOs USS EXCEL and GALLANT) to the area of the suspected trawler, while the VNN directed units 6H (PCF 37) and 7C (WPB 708) to the area. Senior Advisor, CTG 213.3 requested Black Pony aircraft for visual reconnaissance at 1930H. The Vietnamese commander contacted Coastal Groups 35 and 36, which sent junks to block the mouth of the Co Chien and Ham Luong Rivers. USS GALLANT swept Inner Barrier areas on track from the vicinity of XR 45 35 to WQ 60 90, and EXCEL, the Inner Barrier areas from XR 97 63 to XR 50 44. At 2225H, WPB 708 boarded the suspicious contact at XR 47 27 and classified it as non-suspicious. The rapid response shown by MARKET TIME units in this action caused COMNAVFORV to make the following comments to CTF 115 and 213:


Your rapid response in deploying assigned forces to intercept the suspected infiltration trawler reported by SHOTGUN aircraft is noted with pleasure. Keep up the good work, ... RADM Salzer.¹

1. COMNAVFORV msg dtg060641Z June 1971

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DECLASSIFIED



A VP-1 Orion swoops in to inspect a small freighter steaming off the coast of South Vietnam.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NVA TRAWLERS DETECTED 1965 - 1971

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pos. Detected</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Disposition</u>	<u>Detector</u>
<u>1965</u>				
16 FEB	12-52N 109-27E	UNK	destroyed	Helo
31 DEC	07-49N 105-16E	SL-5	aborted	outer barrier ship
<u>1966</u>				
09 MAY	08-45N 105-16E	SL-5	destroyed	inner barrier WPB
19 JUN	08-38N 107-58E	SL-4	captured	aircraft
23 DEC	14-28N 110-18E	SL-4	aborted	aircraft
<u>1967</u>				
01 JAN	08-27N 105-11E	UNK	destroyed	inner barrier PCF
14 MAR	15-27N 109-25E	SL-4	destroyed	aircraft
11 JUL	15-23N 109-38E	SL-4	captured	aircraft
<u>1968</u>				
21 FEB	15-00N 110-54E	SL-5	aborted	aircraft
28 FEB	09-54N 109-29E	SL-4	destroyed	aircraft
29 FEB	14-24N 111-27E	SL-4	aborted	aircraft
29 FEB	15-20N 110-43E	SL-3	destroyed	aircraft
29 FEB	12-31N 110-43E	SL-2	destroyed	aircraft
<u>1969</u>				
24 AUG	16-02N 113-05E	SL-6	aborted	aircraft
16 NOV	07-24N 105-08E	SL-4	aborted	aircraft
23 DEC	10-54N 112-13E	SL-6	aborted	aircraft
<u>1970</u>				
10 MAR	10-00N 110-30E	SL-4	aborted	aircraft
21 APR	05-51N 109-00E	SL-4	aborted	aircraft
19 MAY	12-00N 114-07E	SL-4	aborted	aircraft
29 MAY	19-02N 114-14E	SL-3	aborted	aircraft
10 JUN	08-15N 104-40E	SL-4	aborted	aircraft
06 JUL	07-31N 109-45E	SL-4	aborted	aircraft
02 AUG	18-01N 113-23E	SL-4	aborted	aircraft
28 AUG	11-24N 112-37E	SL-4	prob. infiltrated	aircraft
04 SEP	08-25N 109-20E	SL-6	aborted	aircraft
09 OCT	18-13N 112-32E	SL-3	aborted	aircraft
28 OCT	12-00N 113-41E	SL-4	aborted	aircraft
17 NOV	08-46N 107-30E	SL-3	destroyed	aircraft
<u>1971</u>				
17 FEB	11-27N 111-39E	SL-8	aborted	aircraft
22 MAR	16-16N 115-17E	SL-8	aborted	aircraft
27 MAR	08-42N 110-44E	SL-4	aborted	aircraft
12 APR	08-51N 105-24E	SL-8	destroyed	aircraft

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

On the evening of 14 June, U.S. Navy MARKET TIME patrol gunboat CANON rescued six Vietnamese from a civilian fishing boat, drifting helplessly in heavy seas, 37 miles off the central coastline of RVN. CANON took aboard three adults and three children, and towed their boat to Qui Nhon.

USS ANTELOPE and USS READY departed Vietnam for home in June, after performing yeoman service as MARKET TIME units. USS ANTELOPE was instrumental in sinking the SL-8 infiltration trawler on 12 April.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

FIRST COASTAL ZONE

The enemy maintained a steady pressure in the First Coastal Zone by ABFs and mining incidents during June. 122mm rockets fell on DaNang on two separate occasions, the target being the harbor area. No damage or casualties resulted. Further north, an enemy attack with one B-40 rocket holed the roof of the administration building of MID 92 at OP Base Cua Viet, again resulting in no injuries. Also on the Cua Viet, the number of mining incidents decreased to 12 as opposed to 17 last month. However, enemy water sappers did manage to sink one rock barge in the channel, temporarily blocking traffic for the larger vessels; damage one LCPL; and to wound a USN sailor by sniper fire. Furthermore, the personnel of MID 92 had to contend with an offshore mining threat when two NVA swimmer sappers successfully planted an influence mine just off the mouth of the Cua Viet just prior to their capture, thereby touching off intensive sweep operations to locate this mine. In addition, VNN units in the Hue-Tan My area began preparing for enemy activity on the Song Huong (Perfume River), having received indications of the enemy's intentions in this direction last month.

As an indication of the stress the enemy put in mining activities on the Cua Viet, there have been 71 mining incidents during the period

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

1 January to 1 June, 1971, on the Cua Viet - Dong Ha waterway. This represents exactly half of the 142 mining incidents reported in all of RVN during the same period. During this period, seven craft were sunk while six were damaged. This equated to one craft sunk or damaged out of every five incidents reported. Yet, this was a relatively low casualty rate compared to the Delta where three craft were sunk or damaged for every four incidents reported. In absolute numbers of craft casualties, TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO in the U Minh Forest posed the highest threat with nine craft sunk and eight damaged during the period. Thus, although the most persistent and intense enemy watermining effort occurred on the Cua Viet, the enemy has been more effective in other areas of Vietnam. The contrast in effectiveness of the enemy mining campaigns between the Cua Viet and the Delta regions can be explained, in part, by the fact that in the Delta, the majority of incidents involve command detonated mines having a high "hit probability", whereas on the Cua Viet, the often used, untended pressure influence mine is susceptible to technical problems, as well as the highly effective sweeping efforts of MID 92¹.

Reviewing the month's events on the Cua Viet, a number of watermines exploded but caused little or no damage. Explosions occurred on 2 June,

1. CNFV INTSUM 133-71 dtg 050944Z June 71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

on 27 June, on 28 June, and on 30 June. In each instance, the detonations caused large waterspouts. Also, during June, USN/VNN EOD teams recovered and rendered harmless a number of mines. On 17 June, 5.5 kilometers north north east of Dong Ha (YD 267 667), Gio Linh Popular Forces engaged a platoon of VC, capturing and turning over to VNN EOD Team Zero Two, five 30 pound blocks of C-4 explosive and five dud CHICOM grenades. On 18 June, 1.5 kilometers west of OP Base Cua Viet (YD 320 638), a fisherman reported a mine in a fishing net. USN EODTEUPAC Team 82-1 located and disarmed the mine, a new type, containing 120 pounds of C-3, C-4, and TNT booster blocks attached to a full size Soviet made truck inner tube. The mine, a pressure type first discovered in the Cua Viet on 26 April, 1971, had been in the water less than 24 hours. Also on 18 June, the EOD team recovered two 30 pound sapper satchel charges found by Gio Linh PFs at YD 283 668. The EOD team personnel recovered additional watermines on 24 June, on 27 June, on 28 June, and on 30 June. Most of these mines fishermen discovered, and they were paid 5,000 piasters from a special VIP fund for each mine recovered.

However, not all the mine incidents reported during June resulted in harmless explosions or captured mines. On 2 June, one kilometer north east of OP Base Cua Viet (YD 345 700), the Quang Tri Province watersappers got lucky when an LCM "minidock" (LCM 826) detonated

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

one of their pressure mines. The explosion caused extensive damage to the engine room machinery and structures. However, the hull was undamaged, as was the LCPL carried in the well deck. There were no personnel casualties. On 18 June, the watersappers achieved one of their major aims by sinking a rock barge, blocking the channel temporarily for larger vessels. The barge, filled with 500 tons of crushed rock, towed by the Luzon river tug SKUNK, detonated a watermine four kilometers north east of Dong Ha (YD 273 639). The port bow of the barge caught the brunt of the force of the explosion, resulting in the crushing of the bow compartments. The tug suffered no underwater hull damage, however, both engine mounts were broken, and the port main engine oil pump and crank case were cracked. The tug tried to pull the barge to Dong Ha, but fruitlessly, as the barge grounded by the bow at YD 258 623, blocking the channel. A salvage team successfully removed the crushed rock cargo, refloating the barge. The barge was then towed to Dong Ha.

Several other incidents occurred on the Cua Viet in June. Five kilometers north east of Dong Ha (YD 277 647), a MID 92 LCPL on routine patrol received sniper fire from the vicinity of YD 280 641, on 5 June. The one round fired wounded a U.S. Navy sailor. Late in the evening of 12 June, Coastal Group 11 received information that a number of fishing junks were in a restricted zone at YD 31 77. No friendly

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

vessels were in the area, therefore, CG 11 personnel requested permission to take the vessels under fire. Permission was denied pending visual inspection of the contacts by VNN TRAN HUNG DAO XV units. The contacts were inspected, and 21 vessels were detained. A thorough search yielded no contraband.

Late in the night of 25 June, PSDF troops captured two VC swimmer sappers. Upon interrogation, the sappers revealed that they had planted one 200 pound magnetic pressure mine at the mouth of the Cua Viet (YD 350 679). The entrance to the river was subsequently closed, and a USN/VNN EOD team was dispatched to the scene to conduct a search. The POWs identified the mine as a HAT-2 (NVA designation)/AMD-2 (Soviet designation) acoustic detonating type. The POWs also revealed the location of a bunker complex (YD 282 767) where, supposedly, more mines were located. On the afternoon of 27 June, the CG 11 sweep team, a VNN EOD team, and MID 92 personnel and advisors conducted a search operation with one of the NVA sappers and found three VC bunkers. The group, while destroying one of the bunkers, came under mortar and small arms attack. The team returned the fire and extracted. USS HULL, firing her 5"/54 guns, raked the area, effecting one secondary explosion. There were no friendly casualties; one of the enemy was probably killed in the encounter.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Meanwhile, no one could find the HAT-2 mine. The Cua Viet waterway was closed, and an MSO was requested from CTF 115 to help sweep for the mine. USS PLUCK (MSO 464) commenced sweep operations on 28 June, but was hindered by shallow water and sand bars. The PLUCK still had not located the mine at the close of the month.

Also on 25 June, several hours after the two NVA water sappers were captured, a CG 11 Yabuta junk sighted two other swimmers near the north bank of the river, 3.5 kilometers northeast of Dong Ha (YD 268 630). The junk made a concussion grenade run, and two bodies floated to the surface immediately after the grenades exploded. The bodies then sank and were not recovered.

On 29 June, an accident resulted in the sinking of another rock barge 500 meters east of the OP Base Cua Viet (YD 338 696). An Army sentry slipped and dropped a concussion grenade between two of the rock barges, the resulting explosion sinking one of the barges.

Elsewhere in the First Coastal Zone, other coastal groups were active throughout June. On 2 June, a CG 12 ambush team detained 14 sampans and 31 people for violating curfew, while in the Chi Lang I AO; on the same date, two Yabuta junks from Coastal Group 14, acting as

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

a blocking force for a sector operation, observed six VC attempting to cross the De Vong River to avoid a helo airstrike (vic BT 190 577). The Yabutas took the six under fire, probably killing two. There were no friendly casualties. Later in the month, also in the Chi Lang I AO, two RPD 60 PBRs stationed in a WBGP 18 kilometers southwest of CG 14 OP Base (BT 147 528), spotted a suspicious vessel underway without lights on 29 June. The PBRs fired on the vessel, killing five of the enemy and capturing one kilo of documents, one K-54 clip, one U.S. grenade, five U.S. and two CHICOM blasting caps, one sampan, assorted clothes, food, and fishing equipment.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECOND COASTAL ZONE

The enemy units in the Second Coastal Zone during June adopted the tactic of waging strictly guerrilla warfare against allied units. Enemy initiated activities consisted of one standoff ABF and one sapper attack in the Cam Ranh Bay area; a ship mining in the Qui Nhon Harbor; an ABF and sapper attack on the ARVN ASP, Qui Nhon; and several other low key terrorist incidents.

The successful enemy attacks on SS ROBINHOOD on 27 March and on SS AMERICAN HAWK on 15 June, both resulting in serious damages, were clear indications of unsatisfactory harbor security at Qui Nhon. This was the third successful attack on U.S. shipping in 15 months, the AMERICLOUD having sustained sapper damages there in March, 1970. A number of procedures were recommended to improve pier security such as better lighting along the waterline, and the placing of camels between the ship and the pier; both measures were to improve chances of spotting possible sappers along the waterline of moored vessels.

Harbor security in Qui Nhon presently is the responsibility of the U.S. Army. The Army will turn over this responsibility in the near future to the Vietnamese Navy, and to prepare for this event, co-manning of USARV PBRs commenced on 24 June.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

During June, Coastal Group 23 was the most active of the coastal groups. Early in the morning of 2 June, a CG 23 ambush team attempted to stop a sampan running without lights. The sampan's lone occupant dove into the water and attempted to swim to shore. Accurate fire from an M-60 MG dispatched the swimmer. A search of the sampan revealed a paper containing a numerical code. Late in the evening of 4 June, CG 23 personnel helped thwart an attempted penetration by a VC sapper squad on the National Police/Song Cau District Headquarters compound. The police and a CG 23 sentry spotted the enemy and opened fire. CG 23 provided continuous illumination of the area, and the sappers were unable to penetrate the compound. There were no friendly casualties; enemy casualties were undetermined. The enemy struck the headquarters again on 19 June; six 82mm mortar rounds impacted near the 105mm artillery battery. No damage or casualties resulted.

The enemy attempted a number of low risk ABFs throughout the Second Coastal Zone in June. At 0020H on 11 June, the 14th Aerial Port and the 483rd TAW Air Force Facility, Cam Ranh Bay, were hit by four and three rounds, respectively, of unknown ordnance. Luckily no damage or casualties resulted. However, the Communist guerrillas scored heavily on 15 June when they mined the S.S. AMERICAN HAWK at the U.S. Army De Long Pier (CR 109 237), Qui Nhon. The damage

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

was extensive: a 12 by 15 foot hole in the after number three hold, 13 feet below the waterline. This caused the hold and engine room to flood with oil and water to within three feet of the top of the boilers. The ship settled at her berth with a 7.5 degree list. The explosive charge was determined to be at least 300 to 400 pounds; the blast injured one ROK stevedore. At about the same time as the attack on the AMERICAN HAWK, an explosive charge detonated among a group of four barges (CR 105 233). The blast caused minor damage to the barge nearest the beach. About one hour later, a short distance to the east of the barges, an unidentified explosive device detonated at an ARVN tank farm (CR 109 227). The explosion breached the blast wall around the installation on the seaward side. There was no damage to the POL tanks. Intelligence reports stated that these three attacks appear to have been a coordinated effort by a competent sapper team, probably elements of the 598th Water Sapper Company (CNFV INTSUM 141-71). A USN salvage team embarked in USS COHOES arrived at Qui Nhon on 16 June to begin salvage operations on the AMERICAN HAWK. At the close of the month, the off loading of the cargo, the de-watering of the holds, and the constructing of a steel patch were proceeding satisfactorily.

The enemy continued his activity in the Qui Nhon area at the close of the month. On 29 June, explosions from 82mm mortars

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED


destroyed five ammunition pads containing approximately 2755 metric tons of 105mm ammunition at the ARVN ammunition dump. The very next day, a series of five large explosions, caused by possible satchel charges, damaged 11 ammunition pads at the ASP (CR 06 23). The blast wounded two ARVN and heavily damaged the Vietnamese dependent housing located in the area.

A tragic accident claimed the lives of two children near Nha Trang on 27 June. An LCPL from the VNNTC was carrying approximately 20 children from Nha Trang to Hon Tre Island for a picnic when the front ramp gave way, spilling several children into the water, and then running over them. The vessel then filled with water and sank about 20 meters from shore.

On 18 June, Commander P.R. Fournier, USN, relieved Commander R.R. Tarbuck, USN, as Senior Advisor VNNTC, Nha Trang.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED



Two "Swift" boats (PCFs) undergo repair at the Naval Support Facility, Cam Ranh Bay.

DECLASSIFIED



LT James P. McGrath, Senior Advisor Coastal Group 26, chats with a civilian administrator at Binh Ba fishing village about a self-help project now underway to construct new school rooms in the village. McGrath visits the village nearly every day to see if there is anything he can do to help the people living there.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

THIRD COASTAL ZONE

Enemy activity remained light to moderate throughout June. Intelligence sources reported that the enemy was concentrating on weakening the GVN pacification program through the exploitation or abduction of PSDF personnel. Since mid-March, the VC have abducted, or caused to defect, approximately 50 PSDF personnel. The VC have targeted the PSDF for two reasons: first, the PSDF are the least organized, least motivated, of the GVN forces, and second, youth just nearing draft age are in the PSDF and would be of more value to the VC for an extended period of time.¹

With the monsoon season in full swing, the coastal transshipment threat has increased. A particularly vulnerable area for this transshipment, the Binh Dai, Thanh Phu and Long Toan Secret Zones, located between the mouths of the Song My Tho and the Song Hau Giang (the mouths of the Mekong), were the subject of much discussion during the month. COMNAVFORV proposed creation of a special task unit composed of three PCFs supported by an LST to operate specifically in this area.

On 28 June, WESTCHESTER COUNTY proved the feasibility of using an LST for NGFS in this shallow water region when she fired 51

1. Third Coastal Zone IO msg dtg 111113Z June 71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

rounds of three inch ammunition against an enemy supply area (XR 679 585). The spotter reported excellent target coverage.

In accordance with the decreasing American posture in Vietnam, American advisors assigned to coastal groups have been reduced. COMNAVFORV was working toward a concept of a mobile advisory team that could visit the various groups as the need arose. However, the Senior Advisor, Third Coastal Zone, recommended for his zone that at least three advisors would be needed at each group due to the physical isolation of several coastal groups, the need to have U.S. personnel control crypto equipment, and the need for parallel U.S. advisor reports.

On 5 June, Senior Advisor, Third Coastal Zone, received a telephone report from CTF 115 of a possible infiltration/transshipment junk off the Binh Dai Secret Zone. The Commander, Third Coastal Zone, ordered two PCFs to maintain station off the Binh Dai. The PCFs failed to find anything suspicious. A LHFT conducted a low level visual reconnaissance and spotted a ten foot loaded sampan with a lone occupant trying to evade discovery. The helos could not obtain the necessary clearances to fire in time to prevent the sampan's escape.

During the month, the Third Coastal Zone Advisor expressed concern about adequate material support for Third Coastal Zone units.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

The Binh Dai operations, in addition to normal TRAN HUNG DAO XV commitments, put a premium on a high state of craft readiness. LSB Cat Lo was not providing the necessary prompt service requested by the Commander, Third Coastal Zone and Commander, COSFLOT 3. The Third Coastal Zone Advisor also had difficulty in procuring replacement outboard motors for the coastal groups, and parts for the radar station on Con Son Island.

In June, Commander Wyatt P. Watson, USN relieved Commander Lyle Pellock, USN as Senior Advisor, Third Riverine Area. On 5 June, LCDR E. A. Lanier, USN relieved LCDR M. N. Barton, USN as Third Coastal Zone Intelligence Officer. Also, LTJG J. A. Hall, USNR, relieved LTJG T. G. Arthur, USNR, as NILO, Vinh Long. In addition, LCDR R. S. Watkins, USN, relieved LCDR J. J. Dooley, USN, as Senior Advisor, COSFLOT 3.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

FOURTH COASTAL ZONE

In the Fourth Coastal Zone the daily level of enemy initiated incidents fluctuated between light and moderate during June. Enemy activity was scattered throughout the Fourth Riverine Area with approximately 72 percent of the activity targeted against outposts and troop positions. The majority of the incidents were harassments of light intensity.¹

The enemy's heavy losses due to airstrikes and boat/ground interdictions caused him to shift to sea-borne infiltration attempts. The Fourth Coastal Zone IO received a report of 300 NVA staging in the vicinity of VS 766 287 and preparing to cross the Gulf of Thailand to an area in the vicinity of VR 897 859, on the night of 1 June. The Commanding Officer CG 43 deployed his own force and requested reinforcements. The Fourth Coastal Zone Commander directed two junks from CG 41 to proceed to Hon Tre as reinforcements. At 2300H, the Fourth Coastal Zone Commander directed PCFs 3813 and 3820 to proceed to the scene from patrol stations 9H and 9I respectively. Then at 2317H, TOC Rach Gia reported helos taking fire from a sampan at VR 91 87. All this time, the Fourth Coastal Zone Commander did not have direct communication with his units, but rather had to rely on a relay

1. Fourth Riverine Area IO msg dtg 251120Z June 71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

through the Rach Gia TOC, and this relay was by telephone. At 0155H, the Fourth Coastal Zone Advisor received word from Rach Gia TOC (US side) that they had double confirmation of a large troop concentration centered at VS 82 26, and that air observers were watching NVA leaving the beach in sampans. Clearance to fire was requested from the Fourth Coastal Zone Commander. At first, the Fourth Coastal Zone Commander granted permission to fire at 0245H, but rescinded permission at 0250H, because there was no request from Rach Gia (VN side). During the remainder of the night, the coastal group junks and the PCF's searched several junks and sampans, but found nothing suspicious. All units returned to normal patrol at 0800H, 2 June.

On 9 June, a fishing junk, fishing in the Gulf of Cay, was forced by four armed VC to take them to the coast of the Giong Ke area (VS 717 303). Immediately after coming ashore, 30 VC materialized and carried boxes and plastic bags aboard, loading them in the junk. About one hour later, the four armed VC ordered the junk operator back out to sea in the direction of Rach Gia. The junk operator was finally released unharmed after depositing the group on the beach near Rach Gia.

On 24 June, CSC An Thoi received a report from CTF 115 of a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

300 ft contact near the mouth of the Song Bo De. WPB 724 originated the report, but was unable to catch the contact.

On 25 June, LCDR Charles W. Kirchhoff, USNR, relieved LT Joe A. Munn, USN, as the Fourth Riverine Area IO ACO. During the month, the Fourth Coastal Zone IO at Rach Gia recommended to COMNAVFORV that the present NILO posts at Ha Tien, An Thoi, and Vi Thanh be closed and that the Fourth Coastal Zone IO billet be changed to NILO Rach Gia. He believed that the Rach Gia, Ca Mau, and Nam Can posts could adequately cover the Fourth Coastal Zone, and that the Fourth Riverine Area IO could assume operational/administrative control of these posts without difficulty. The Fourth Coastal Zone IO further reported that operational results based on NILO intelligence was declining as U.S. forces and assets draw down, and that it was becoming increasingly more difficult to get the Vietnamese to react to U.S. developed intelligence.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY

During the month, Beach Jumper Unit One, Team 13, initiated a loan policy on a temporary basis of its broadcasting equipment to advisory units and Vietnamese commands desiring to make Psyops broadcasts in their various AOs. BJU-1 equipment had already been loaned to RSSZ and DaNang Polwar advisors for the past several months and it was anticipated that other units would also avail themselves of this equipment. The reason for the loan of the Psyops equipment was, first of all, due to the surplus of 11 broadcasting systems on hand, and secondly, because a more effective use of the equipment could be made by the individual AO commanders. Although this was a change, the BJU-1 team continued to effectively carry out their mission, keeping nine operators in the field conducting psychological operations.

Coastal Groups and units of the Coastal Surveillance Forces reported several psychological operations and civic action projects during the month. In the First Coastal Zone the results of one Psyops project were clearly seen when several mines were found in the Cua Viet area by local fishermen who notified Coastal Group 11. During recent months the Psyops effort in this area has encouraged fishermen to locate mines and collect a 5,000 piaster reward. In Gio Linh, 3.5 kilometers north northeast of Dong Ha, on 17 June, five water mines were captured and turned over to the MACV advisory team and then to CG 11 EOD personnel

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

for detonation. The EOD team captured 150 pounds of C-4 explosive used in these mines. A fisherman reported a mine in his fishing net to CG 11 junks on 18 June at YD 320 688. It was found to be a new type of mine with approximately 120 pounds of explosives with a full size Soviet made truck inertube attached. EOD team members disarmed the mine by separating the booster cap from the firing device with a blasting cap. On 18 June Gio Linh PFs discovered another cache of explosives at YD 283 668, seven kilometers northeast of Dong Ha, and the EOD team was dispatched to recover two 30 pound sapper satchel charges composed of C-3 explosive with TNT booster blocks installed. Seven more mines were discovered in the area by fishermen who hailed CG 11 junks on patrol and collected a 5,000 piaster reward.

Second Coastal Zone Navy personnel in conjunction with the U.S. Army Polwar Office of Khanh Hoa Province, and ARVN troops distributed 4,113 articles of clothing at Duc My, Ninh Hoa District. Clothing was distributed to families whose homes and personal belongings were destroyed due to VC terrorist attacks in April. Clothing was obtained through donations from organizations in the United States. CG 25 held a MEDCAP on 6 June and treated 82 medical and 25 dental patients. CTF 213 at Cam Ranh Bay conducted two MEDCAPs during the month on Binh Ba Island.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In the Third Coastal Zone USN advisory personnel helped provide materials for the construction of a school in Cat Lo, conducted English language classes, provided wood for construction of a polio rehabilitation center in Vung Tau, and also held weekly dental clinics at Le Loi Hospital in the port city. CG 34, in conjunction with the VN Hospital Ship HAI GAINI, treated 500 civilians at the CG 34 base. RAG 28 embarked the Third Riverine Psywar Team and held a MEDCAP on 2 June at Hung Long (XS 795 802), treating 23 people for various minor ailments and giving 18 haircuts. A shipment of Project Handclasp material was received at Cam Ranh Bay and distributed on 19 June. One pallet of wonder horses was received via Project Handclasp and consigned to Vinh Binh Orphanage in Tra Vinh. Fourth Coastal Zone units assisted in the painting, repairing roof and desks, and building a blackboard of a school on Hon Tre Island. Cement was provided to a wounded Navy veteran for the construction of his home.

MARKET TIME Support Ships USCGC RUSH (WHEC 733) and USCGC MORGENTHAU (WHEC 722) participated in MEDCAPs on the Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of Thailand again this month. On 11 June, MORGENTHAU, in conjunction with a VNN Hospital Ship present at Hon Rai Island treated 93 people for various medical ailments. On 13 June, MORGENTHAU treated 75 people on Hon Mau and Poulo Dama. RUSH's medical staff and VNN liaison officer treated

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100 people in an eight hour MEDCAP on Hon Rai Island on 24 June.

In the Food Supplement Program at Cam Ranh Bay, the CTF 213 project farm was producing about 20 eggs per day. Livestock (four boars, seven gilts, and 69 feeder pigs) were distributed to Vietnamese Navy units by CTF 115 Protein Project. The Vietnamization of the CTF 115 Swine Distribution Center continues to have problems according to the CTF 213 Staff Polwar Advisor at LSB Cam Ranh Bay. The VNN are displeased with the working hours. A duty section arrangement was set up with the Vietnamese to allow them a chance to visit their families in Saigon for four days every four weeks to help build up morale. This plan did not work because after Dai-Uy Lac (Polwar Officer for CTF 213) drove the men to Saigon and back, they did not return to the Distribution Center. Since 24 June there has been only one Vietnamese enlisted man working on the farm. In view of the problems mentioned it was recommended that the turnover of the distribution center be postponed past the scheduled 1 August date.

During the month, construction continued on a livestock distribution center at COSFLOT One headquarters. Projects were begun at ISB Nam Can, RAG 26, OP Base Vinh Long, with coops and pens under construction. Forty-one pigs arrived at the First Coastal Zone headquarters on 23 May and pilot projects were started with these assets

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

at LSB DaNang, RAG 32, and Coastal Groups 12, 15, and 16. Feeder pigs were sold to the VNN units at 3,500 piasters each. Twenty eight more pigs arrived 5 June and were sold to the First Coastal Zone pilot projects underway.

Mrs. Anna Chennault, widow of the late General Claire Chennault, and the newest sponsor of the Helping Hand Foundation, visited animal husbandry and housing projects at Cuu Long Saturday, June 5, for a first hand look at what the foundation is doing to help Vietnamese Navy men and their families. Located near the VNN shipyard, Cuu Long is the site of the Saigon VNN Livestock Breeding and Distribution Center. It serves as a swine breeding farm, chicken hatchery, and the central feed distribution point. Also located at Cuu Long is a VNN community at which 108 dependent shelters have been completed and 84 more are under construction. There are three specific programs included in Operation Helping Hand. These are animal husbandry, agricultural and fishing projects, the construction of dependent shelters and community facilities, and the building of a VNN veteran's dependent community close to the VN government training center at Cat Lai. A group of U.S. business and professional men in Saigon, recognizing the pressing need for helping the VNN become self sufficient, founded the non-profit Helping Hand Foundation in March 1970 to assist in gathering contributions from interested citizens in the RVN and U.S.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

In the Dependent Shelter Program, CBMU 302 was tasked with the construction of 220 units at ISB Nam Can. Materials were on site and work began by 2 June. On 26 June, ISB Nam Can reported that the VNN headquarters had provided a revised dependent shelter requirement list which reduced the initial increment for Nam Can to 160 units. CBMU 302 completed 47 of 163 units under construction at Thuan An by the end of the month. Tasks were established at Hoi An - 48 units to be begun March 72, Chu Lai - 16 units to be started next month, and Cu Lao Re - 12 units to be started next month by CBMU 302. Sites at Cua Viet, Cau Hai, and Quang Ngai were prepared for dependent shelter construction. At An Thoi, 170 of 334 tasked dependent shelter units were completed by the Seabees, 40 of the total are to be done by VNN self help.

In DaNang, there was a question during the month of ownership of the land and the French structures at Camp Tien Sha. It was believed that the French turned the structures over to the Vietnamese Armed Forces, and the status of USN ownership or a loan agreement was not held by NSF. The turnover of 126 completed dependent shelter units was held in abeyance pending results of the ownership question. In the Cam Ranh Bay area, at Tran Hung Dao Village, near VNNFC Cam Ranh, there are now 117 families in residence. In Cam Binh Village (LSB Cam Ranh) there are 187 completed and turned over

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

units. 140 more units outside the base perimeter should be finished by October, and the well has already been dug.

On 23 June, CNO provided the following guidelines for the RVNAF Dependent Shelter Program through 1975:

- A. U.S. effort will primarily be through provision of materials.
- B. Average cost of the overall program to the U.S. is limited to \$600 per unit.
- C. Overall management and coordination of the service programs is vested in COMUSMACV.¹

The General Accounting Officer conducted a financial and administrative audit of the RVNAF Dependent Shelter Program during May and June.

Seabees reported the following civic action projects for the quarter ending 30 June: Volunteers aided Vietnamese personnel in the construction and installation of two 15,000 gallon and two 5,000 gallon water storage tanks for Ho Nai Catholic Hospital; tons of fill were provided to the Cam Ranh City Protestant mission; Seabees provided Tan Binh Orphanage in Cam Ranh with excess desks, chairs, children's clothing and toys; they also provided scrap firewood, English books, clothing, and candy to Tan Mai Orphanage in Bien Hoa and constructed numerous student desks for Saigon area schools. Seabee Team 0318 in Kien Hoa Province, 50 miles south of Saigon, has a training program with 15 villagers learning construction skills. These include four

1. CNO msg dtg 222106Z June 71

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

former VC who have rallied. One project underway is a maternity hospital in Ham Long District.

On 4 June, a member of BJU-One, Team 13, RM2 Tommie Ralph Chason, USN, was injured in an auto accident in Cai Lay District, Dinh Tuong Province, while proceeding on a routine Psyops broadcasting mission. Travelling on a narrow dirt road in the vicinity of My Phuoc Tay, Chason swerved his jeep to avoid an oncoming bus and hit a pile of construction gravel and overturned. Chason was thrown out and his left arm and leg injured. The POIC of the Moc Hoa BJU detachment moved to My Tho to replace the injured man, thereby disestablishing the Moc Hoa detachment.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY


ACTOVLOG again dominated the events for the month, as the turnover program proceeded on schedule in its final stages. An intermediate support base was turned over at Rach Soi, and nine support craft were also turned over during the month. Operational craft turned over in June included the Coast Guard Cutter BERING STRAIT, to Market Time forces, and four Army PBRs to the Capital Military District for security patrol.

A new addition to the deep-water fleet of the VNN is always a big affair, and when the U.S. Coast Guard high endurance cutter BERING STRAIT was turned over, the VNN CNO and COMNAVFORV were on hand for the June 24 ceremony at the Saigon Naval Shipyard. The 311 foot, 1,766 ton vessel, renamed the VNS TRAN QUANG KHAI (HQ-2), now serves the VNN Fleet Command, a sea-going force which conducts off-shore patrols, provides naval gunfire support for shore-based units, and transports personnel and materiel. The 27 year old veteran cutter underwent extensive modernization as her new Vietnamese crew was being trained for the turnover. Commanded by Thieu-Ta An, the HQ-2 is the second of two cutters to be transferred under ACTOV.

The last half of the month witnessed various craft turnovers,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED



CAPT Edward P. Travers, Chief of Staff for Logistics at the U. S. Naval Forces Headquarters in Saigon, and CAPT Nguyen Van Lich, Commander of the Vietnamese Navy's Logistic Support Command, shake hands after signing documents transferring Intermediate Support Base Rach Soi from U. S. to Vietnamese Navy command.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

however, the first of June saw two LCM-8s turned over at LSB Dong Tam. On 15 June an LCM-8 was turned over to ISB Qui Nhon. The security mission at Newport outport was aided with the turnover of four PBRs from the U.S. Army to the VNN Headquarters and Capital Military District on 23 June. The final complement for the Harbor Police which will be met soon, is seven PBRs. The last day in June saw a rash of nine turnovers. At Logistics Support Base Nha Be, an LCM-8, two LCM-3s, and two LCM-6s were turned over; while two pickets for the Harbor Defense Unit and two LCM-6s for logistics support were turned over at LSB DaNang.

Another in a line of intermediate support bases was placed in Vietnamese hands as ISB Rach Soi was transferred on 29 June. The base was the second of its type to be turned over, and the 19th base turned over under the ACTOV program. The mission of the base is to provide logistic support and repair facilities for VNN forces operating in and around the U Minh Forest. Prior to 1965, the support base at Rach Soi was in Vietnamese hands, where engines for the resident junks were repaired. Captain Travers, COS for Logistics at NAVFORV headquarters, signed the turnover document, along with Captain Lich, Commander of the VNN Logistic Support Command.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

While the ACTOV program was on schedule, doubts were viewed on the overall VNN logistics structure. CINCPACFLT, in a message of 29 June, stated, "The critical stage of VNN logistics development, technical skills and leadership shortages, and final stages of base expansion and development mitigate against near term feasibility of implementing complementary economic and military assistance programs."¹ Thus, while the ACTOV program was proper and on schedule, the uncertain outcome overall made assistance planning for the future hazardous.

The crucial training program proceeded quietly onward in June. On the first of the month, Task Force 212 completed "on-the-job" training for 90 persons, who were then assigned to Harbor Defense PBRs at Qui Nhon and Newport. The same program commenced again on 19 June, with another 90 persons participating. Also in June, the VNN OCS graduated another class at Newport, Rhode Island, with 56 aspirants completing a similar program to the American officer candidates at Newport.

The ACTOVRAD program proceeded on schedule during the month, highlighted by the manning and operation of the site at Vung Tau at the month's end, though no sites had been turned over by the end of June.

1. CINCPACFLT msg dtg 290607Z June 71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


DECLASSIFIED

The ACTOVRAD program, when completed, will take over the mission of the USN P-3 aircraft patrolling off the coast of Vietnam in support of the Market Time operation. The 15 coastal surveillance centers are being built for direct turnover to the Vietnamese, who commenced training for their role on 1 March, 1971. Construction on the sites began in February 1970, and the entire system is expected to be in operation by 30 June, 1972. The firm of RMK-BRJ was constructing six of the sites, and USN CBs were working on two others during the month.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTOVLOG

DECLASSIFIED



CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON

The general inadequacy of the Vietnamese Navy supply system continued to be of great concern to naval commanders in Vietnam. A CINCPACFLT Logistics Assistance Team visited RVN in April and May and recommended the hiring of six U.S. civil service personnel to serve as advisors to the VNN supply center and supply bureau. Management analysts, computer programming analysts, and supply systems analysts were to be hired on the condition that they had a basic understanding of Vietnamese. On 15 June a presentation was made to the VNN CNO, Rear Admiral Chon, by COMNAVFORV, Rear Admiral Salzer, concerning supply problems contributing to the current inadequacy of the VNN supply system to fulfill its role in Vietnamization. In a discussion following the presentation, Admiral Chon and Admiral Salzer concurred in providing maximum USN effort in preparing procedures, training syllabi, and formal training for VNNSC and field activities. In conjunction with this topic, NSAS hosted a conference of all COs, OICs of NSAS detachments, ships and major craft, and of all senior advisors to LSBs and ISBs, on 24-25 June in Saigon. Subjects discussed were logistics, ACTOVRAD support, drug abuse, the drawdown of ships and craft, proper support channels, base maintenance, Logistic Assistance Teams, contract overhauls, ARVN support, and post-turnover experiences at the An Thoi and Cat Lo bases.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

At 2115H, on 2 June, personnel aboard YR 71 and YRBM 21, anchored in the Mekong River four kilometers north of OP Base Tan Chau, discovered a man digging on the east bank. The ships fired illumination flares, the man ran away, and small arms fire directed at the ships, broke out from the area where he had been detected. Seawolf Detachments Five and Nine scrambled to commence attacks on the enemy muzzle flashes and tracer fire, and LCM-6s from both YR 71 and YRBM 21 moved into the bank returning fire with M-16s, M-79 grenade launchers, and 50 caliber machine guns. At 2230H, Black Ponies arrived and commenced an attack on DUFFLEBAG activations on the east bank. The fire was suppressed, and there were no friendly casualties. The following day a team from YRBM 21 and YR 71 made a reconnaissance patrol of the east bank and at WS 243 461 found one L-shaped bunker dug behind a haystack, with the long leg of the "L" centered on YRBM 21. Four VC bodies were found on the beach at WS 240 900. The enemy was probably planning a rocket attack of YRBM 21. However, this setback failed to deter the enemy, for on 9 and 26 June, YR 71 personnel, embarked in the LCM-6 night patrol craft, engaged the VC in minor skirmishes with negative results.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

During June there were two unfortunate non-hostile incidents. On 11 June at 2030H, the YR 71 LCM was on a routine run to Tan Chau when it ran over an unlighted sampan which was towing a large, lit up festival boat. The sampan rolled over and sank immediately. A Vietnamese police boat came and picked up two survivors within five minutes. The third member of the sampan's crew was recovered later. The festival boat towed by the sampan was a party celebrating a Hoa Hao religious festival. The birthplace and center of the Hoa Hao faith is Hoa Hao Village, located in southern Tan Chau District, Chau Doc Province. On 18 June NILO Tan Chau reported that the Hoa Hao Party Secretary raised the possibility of demonstrations against the U.S. if a satisfactory solution to the incident, apparently meaning prompt payment of damages for the sampan and motor, could not be found. Because of the local situation and the interest of the Hoa Hao faith in political activity in Vietnam, a prompt and fair settlement was recommended by NILO Tan Chau. The owner of the sampan appealed his claim through the ruling council of the Hoa Hao faith and discussions were held in Tan Chau District Town involving the district chief, the district senior advisor, and various Hoa Hao party officials. The results of this conference and subsequent discussions were undetermined.

On 14 June or early in the morning of 15 June, a sailor from

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

USS BRULE drowned after a night of drinking in Saigon, as he was attempting to return to Newport, where BRULE was temporarily anchored. BRULE sailors FN Robert L. Koon and FN James A. Souther, and another man, left the Snow Bar in Saigon at 2300H and caught a cab near the USO to return to Newport. At some point, probably the check point on Highway One prior to the Bien Hoa Bridge, the three were told the cab could go no further. Walking back to Newport the three got lost and somehow ended up along the west bank of the Saigon River, north of the Bien Hoa Bridge. They started south along the river bank trying to get to Newport. At one point the three had to cross a small stream where Koon had to be helped by the others. They then got a ride a short way downriver in a Vietnamese boat. The Vietnamese would not take them under the bridge for fear of being shot by the bridge guards and put them ashore a little north of the bridge. The three started out to wade in knee to waist deep water under the bridge to the Newport piers. Suddenly they found themselves in deep water. Koon was apparently helped to a bridge piling near the west bank by Souther, who then disappeared along with the other sailor. At about 2330H an Army MP PBR on duty at the PBR piers heard shouts, saw Koon at the piling, and pulled him out into the PBR. A search was begun immediately for the two missing sailors by MP PBRs of the 458th Transportation Company and continued until 0230H, 15 June, without success, as far

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

south as five miles downriver. Koon's recollections of the incident were blurred by fatigue and alcohol, and several questions were left unanswered, such as the identity of the mysterious third sailor whom Souther had met at the bar. He was supposedly from Souther's homestate and also a crewmember of the BRULE. Souther's body was found eventually several days later.

U.S. Naval Support Activity maintenance and repair support for June was as follows:

<u>Base</u>	<u>Personnel supported</u>	<u>Craft supported</u>
Nha Be	2,366	233
Binh Thuy	2,175	132
DaNang	1,727	0
Cat Lo	130	54
Dong Tam	887	5
MoBase II	78	17
YRBM 21	259	81
Cam Ranh Bay	1,511	157
USS KRISHNA	163	0

NSAS support ships deployed during the month were as follows:

USS ASKARI (ARL 30)	Dong Tam
USS SATYR (ARL 23)	Long Xuyen
USS TUTUILLA (ARG 4)	Nha Be
USS KRISHNA (ARL 38)	Binh Thuy
USS WHITFIELD COUNTY	VQ 68 97, departed 18 June
USS BRULE	Delta resupply
USS PARK COUNTY	Delta resupply, 28 June outchop for Subic
APL 21	Nha Be
APL 30	Nha Be
YRBM 21	Tan Chau
YR 71	Tan Chau (turnover to VNN 1 July)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

YF 866
PBR McBase II
USS WESTCHESTER COUNTY

Nha Be
Tan An
YS 0000, arrived 21 June

Plans were made to lease USS MARK (AKL 12) to the Chinese Navy in Taiwan. YFR 890, YD 174, YR 9, YFU 55, and YFU 1498 spent the month being overhauled in Subic Bay, and YRBM 16 in Guam. YRBM 18, currently moored at Guam, was recommended for inactivation on 23 June by CNO, to be placed in reserve with INACTSHIPFAC, Pearl Harbor. USS COHOES (ANL-78) supported Red and China Beaches in the DaNang area repairing POL and JP-4 lines, and on 25 June, went to Qui Nhon to direct and support salvage operations on SS AMERICAN HAWK.

USS WHITFIELD COUNTY, which departed late in the month, was commended by RADM McManus. In a message he stated: "Particularly noteworthy was the support you provided riverine combat operations at the ATSB Song Ong Doc, including the invaluable assistance provided during its rapid disestablishment. The dedication and competence of the crew during the last five weeks enabled WHITFIELD COUNTY to make a valuable contribution to the allied effort in the Republic of Vietnam."¹

NSAS units transported a total of 181,034 pounds of cargo by air and 3,345 tons of cargo, 464,000 gallons of fresh water, 77,000 gallons of fuel, and 8,768 passengers by surface during the month of June.

1. NSAS msg dtg 261033Z June 71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

By 4 June ISB Qui Nhon reported having transferred the craft maintenance department, transportation shop, electrical branch, utilities branch, Public Works Department, and Supply Department to VNN control, and having established complete separate messing. Construction work at ISB Cat Lai (ACTOV base) was in final construction stages with the boat shop, dispensary, and potable water system completed. LSB Nha Be and ISB Ben Luc are scheduled to begin repair and overhaul of river assault craft (RAC) in the near future. Since they have not been previously outfitted with RAC repair parts, NSA sent them a complete allowance.

On 17 June ATSB Ca Mau was disestablished. SA CTG 212.6 and CTG 116.2 and staffs moved to OP Base My Tho. A joint USN/VNN inventory was conducted and all items slated for turnover were received and signed for by the VNN representative. The base, formerly occupied by PRUs, was returned to the An Xuyen Province Chief. ISB Ca Mau, which will eventually become the headquarters for the area, remained under construction.

Other problems reported during the month included the flooding of the advisors' quarters at OP Base Sa Dec. The advisors moved temporarily to Vinh Long where RPD 56 made berthing and messing arrangements. ATSB Tuyen Nhon reported drainage problems, and NSF

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


Cam Ranh Bay reported on 2 June that all outside communication by phone and some on base phone communication was rendered impossible, due to a general disrepair of the telephone system. Senior Advisor to ISB Cho Moi pointed out discrepancies on 12 June in base construction - boat ramp breakage, asphaltic hardstand erosion due to rains, electrical power to shop areas completed only to power panels, and incomplete pier lighting.

On 28 June at 0925H, LSB Nha Be received a report of a fire at the Shell Tank Farm and dispatched all available fire fighting equipment and personnel. The fire was brought under control and put out by 1005H. A large gas(AV GAS) storage tank, about 40 feet high and 100 feet in diameter, exploded as it was being cleaned. The tank top was blown off and the tank fell on its side. Fourteen Vietnamese civilians were treated for burns at LSB Nha Be; four more had more than 20% second degree burns and were retained at the Nha Be Dispensary.

The drug amnesty program, announced on 30 May by Admiral Zumwalt, began on 1 June and by 10 June 20 men had been received at the Nha Be rehabilitation center aboard the APL 30 from various NSADs, LSBs, and ISBs. By the end of the month almost 100 Navy men has submitted themselves for rehabilitation from drugs under

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED



The focus of the Navy's Drug Rehabilitation Program is the APL-30 resting at Nha Be Logistics Support Base. The limited access to the barracks ship is ideal for the complete control of patients who still harbor the desire for the drug habit they are trying to break.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the program without fear of prosecution. The program was extended indefinitely over the original 30-day limit on 30 June. Each USN command, the Senior Advisor or senior OIC at all LSBs and ISBs, was tasked with designating in writing one or more amnesty representatives for their commands. Withdrawal from drugs was undertaken at LSB Cam Ranh Bay, NAF Cam Ranh Bay, LSB DaNang, LSB Dong Tam, LSB Binh Thuy, and LSB Nha Be. After the initial detoxification occurs, the subject is then taken to the APL 30 moored at LSB Nha Be, where further rehabilitation is effected through such means as group therapy, guidance counseling discussions, and organized recreation. Throughout the month, reports were received and processed from personnel at various Navy commands requesting amnesty and rehabilitation from the use of heroin, marijuana, mescaline, LSD, etc. Disposition of the subjects after the rehabilitation period ranges from transfer to the "States" for further psychological treatment and separation from active duty to returning to in-country duty.

Also during June a urine test became a requirement for all U.S. military personnel departing Vietnam in order to discover heroin users. Urine samples were fed to a device which gave a positive or negative result, the positive pointing to the presence of opiates in the urine.

For Navy personnel, collection points have been set up at the Annapolis BEQ and the Outprocessing Center in Saigon, NSF DaNang, and NAF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Cam Ranh Bay. Personnel returning to the U.S. for separation reported to the collection point not later than two months prior to expiration of enlistment to give a urine sample. Those testing positive were transferred to the NAVFORV Drug Rehabilitation Center (APL 30). No disciplinary or administrative action followed upon detection by means of the test.

On 19 June a marching platoon of U.S. Navy men joined the nearly 10,000 South Vietnamese military personnel who paraded through downtown Saigon for the Vietnamese Armed Forces Day celebration. The 41 man Navy contingent, led by LT William E. Stockslager, USN, Protocol Officer for NAVFORV, was made up of sailors from LSB Nha Be and the NSAS staff. This was the first Armed Forces Day Parade to be held in Saigon since Communist forces rocketed the city during festivities in 1967 and nearly hit the reviewing stand from which President Nguyen Van Thieu was watching the parade. No enemy action occurred this year and some 10,000 Vietnamese troops were reported to have been in position around the city to guard against enemy infiltration.

On 30 June an Equal Opportunity Council meeting of USN base COs and senior advisors was held in Saigon by COMNAVFORV to discuss racial discrimination in the ranks of the U.S. Navy. It was pointed out that Blacks and Whites tend to segregate themselves into separate groups at Navy installations in Vietnam. The subject of a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

special R&R program for Filipinos was presented, and a clarification of COMNAVFORV policy on field promotions was called for.

During the month COMNAVFORV travelled extensively with Major General Wagstaff, visiting NSA detachments at Ben Luc, Ben Keo, Go Dau Ha, and Tra Cu on 3 June to meet with the advisors and discuss their problems. With RADM Price, RADM Salzer visited LSB Nha Be on 6 June for a briefing on RSSZ operations, a tour of the base and a discussion with advisors and the PMS team. On 8 June RADM Salzer toured the Vung Tau Coastal Surveillance Center and radar site with RADM Chon, CAPT Lautermilch, and BMCM Bradberry, the Senior Enlisted Representative.

LCDR Bernard Burgett relieved LT James E. Crumrine as the Senior Advisor to ISB Cho Moi on 8 June. CDR David R. Winiker relieved CDR Walter R. Prossler as OIC Fleet Air Support Unit Binh Thuy on 4 June. Captain William M. Weisskopf, SC, USN, assumed duties as Director for Supply and Fiscal on 10 June, relieving Captain Edward F. Gaetz, SC, USN. RADM W.R. Dowd, Jr., SC, USN, arrived in Saigon on 20 June for an extended stay to assist in training and upgrading VNN supply systems. On 26 June he visited An Thoi on an inspection tour.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES

Heavy rains and three mining casualties hampered the Seabee effort during June as work progressed slowly at the three major project sites: Mui Dinh, Ta Kou, and ISB Nam Can. Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 302 continued to work on shortfall reconstruction at several ACTOV bases. Team 7409 deployed on 13 June from Dinh Tuong Province, where it had been engaged in USAID pacification projects, to its homeport, Gulfport, Mississippi.

New projects tasked to Seabee units during the month included the rehabilitation and minor alteration to buildings at the MACV Annex in Saigon. This work is for the purpose of facilitating the movement of personnel processing, disbursing, and field issue activities, now done at the Annapolis BEQ, which is to be closed in August. CBMU 302 was tasked with this project on 7 June. CBMU 302 continued work on mess facilities at Binh Thuy and Cam Ranh Bay, the Saigon VNN shipyard warehouse, a non-potable water system at Cat Lo, dependent shelters at Cat Lai, and electrical upgrading at Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay. Work began on shortfall construction at OP Base Chau Doc by NMCB 5; projects tasked were building a rocket screen, correcting pier access ramp deficiencies, and installing hot water heaters in the advisor's mess. Self help projects (to be done by the VNN) included installing a barbed wire security

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

fence, improving drainage for dependent shelter units there, and constructing hose racks.

NMCB 5, Detail Maverick's road work at ACTOVRAD Site #8, Mui Dinh, was curtailed by the heavy rains of the month, but by 16 June was reported as 73% complete. Detail Mustang at ISB Ca Mau completed the temporary camp there; Detail Colt in Quang Xuyen District (RSSZ) finished the pier facility for the Marines, and was tasked to make a 40 foot extension onto it.

Several pieces of equipment were lost and three Seabees, including the OIC of Detail Bronco, sustained injuries this month from minings of Route 341, which leads to ACTOVRAD Site #9, Nui Ta Kou. On 13 June three separate mining incidents occurred. At about 0815H the third vehicle in a sweep team, a five ton dump truck, detonated approximately 25 pounds of plastic explosives in a slapstick mine with the left front wheel. The crater formed was four feet in diameter and three feet deep. The mine had been placed over a culvert in well-compacted earth. The dump truck had a tire blown off, the cab and fuel tank destroyed, the frame bent, and a passenger, BU3 Michael Dezik, thrown from the truck and seriously injured with a compressed fracture to the C-7 vertebra. A little later in the morning and 3,000 feet further north on Rt. 341, a three wheel lambretta preceeding the sweep team

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

detonated a mine believed to be a homemade C-4 type; the lambretta was completely destroyed and three Vietnamese were killed. Then at noon, 12,000 feet from the Nui Ta Kou site, another five ton dump truck detonated another 20-30 pound slapstick mine with its right front wheel. The wheel, doors, hood, and right front fender were blown off, the engine destroyed, and two Seabees in the truck were wounded by shrapnel. They were LTJG J. A. Larson, CEC, USN, the OIC of the detail, and CM3 J. F. Ross. They were medevaced to FSB Mace nearby and then to Bien Hoa and later in the month returned to Ta Kou. Dezik was medevaced to FSB Mace and then to the 24th Evacuation hospital in Long Binh where surgery reduced his fracture; Dezik was initially paralyzed over the entire length of his body but improved steadily, regaining motor responses in the trunk. On 20 June, he was further medevaced to the U.S. Army hospital at Camp Zama, Japan.

There was one other mining incident reported on 13 June, 12 miles northeast of ISB Ca Mau at WR 17 13 on the Phung Hiep Canal. The second boat in an LCM convoy detonated a mine with its stern. No damage resulted.

On 17 June, three flake TNT mines with slapstick detonators were found on Rt. 341. Each contained approximately 30 pounds of TNT. The first two were found by a mine dog recently sent to work with the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Seabees at ZS 148 947 and ZS 137 959. These were blown in place. The third mine was detonated by a scraper at ZS 137 960 after the area was checked by a sweep team with negative results. On 18 June at 1650H another scraper returning from the job detonated a mine at ZS 170 957.

A total of 14 mines have been discovered on Rt. 341 since the arrival of Detail Bronco, resulting in three Seabees wounded, three Vietnamese killed, and in damage to six pieces of equipment. A total of 23 mines have been found on the road since the start of construction. Most have been discovered by sweep teams prior to detonation. Rains during the evening have made detection the following day difficult, and RF ambushes during the night have not lessened the enemy action. One observation platform, perfect for the control of command detonated mines, has also been uncovered. The damage to equipment and the constant cratering of the road the Seabees are at work on slows the progress of the project. NMCB 5 appealed to COMNAVFORV for assistance to the mining threat, pointing out that as work progresses up the mountain road, additional sweep areas are required, COMNAVFORV in turn appealed to MACV for Army assistance.

COMNAVFORV has also in turn appeals to MACV for Army assistance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPENDIX I

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

APPENDIX III

NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP ORGANIZATION

CHNAVADVGRP U.S. MACV	RADM R. S. SALZER, USN
SENAVADV	CAPT B. G. STONE, USN
SA FLEET COMMAND, SAIGON	CAPT J. F. DRAKE, USN
SA CMD NAVAL COMMAND (SA, CTF227) SAIGON	LCDR J. H. GAUL, USN

TRAN HUNG DAO CAMPAIGN ADVISORY ORGANIZATION/AREA OPERATION
COORDINATORS (AOC)

AOC, COASTAL	SA, CTF 213	CAPT C. R. QUANSTROM, USN CAPT T. I. KOLSTAD, USN (R)
SA, DEPCOMTHD BINH THUY		CAPT W. J. CROWE, USN
AOC, NORTHERN	SA, THIRD RIVERINE AREA	CDR L. E. PELLOCK, USN(D) CDR V. McDONOUGH, USN(R)
SA THD 2 BEN LUC	VNN TG 214.1	LCDR P. S. GESSWEIN, USN
SA THD 5 PHU CUONG	VNN TG 216.1	LCDR W. W. WERNDLI, USN
SA, THD 9 TAN CHAU	VNN TG 212.3	LCDR B. COUSINS, USN
AOC, EASTERN	SA, FOURTH RIVERINE AREA	CDR W. WARDELL, USN
SA THD 8 DONG TAM	VNN TG 217.1	LT K. J. PLIS, USN
SA THD 19 VINH LONG	VNN TG 217.2	LT R. E. BROWN, USN
AOC, SOUTHERN	SA, ATF 211	CAPT P. C. GIBBONS, USN
SA THD 4 NAM CAN	VNN TG 214.2	CDR H. V. SHORES, USN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SA THD 6 RACH SOI	VNN TG 212.5	CDR W.S. BROWN, USN(D) LCDR J.C. ROGERS, USNR
SA THD 21 CA MAU	VNN TF 210	CAPT W.J. GIBBONS, USN
AOC, WESTERN	SA, COMTHD 18	CDR A. WRIGHT, USN
SA THD 18	VNN TF 218	CDR A. WRIGHT, USN
SA THD 20 AN THOI	VNN TG 212.4	LT J.D. GILBERT, USN

AMPHIBIOUS TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (ATF 211)

SA PHIBCMD CA MAU		CAPT P.C. GIBBONS, USN
SA RAID SEVEN ZERO KIEN AN		LT R.J. LENDSTEDT, II, USN
SA RAID SEVEN ONE KIEN AN		LT S.L. HOLMES, USN
SA RAID SEVEN TWO KIEN AN		LTJG W.C. KUSTER, USN
SA RAID SEVEN THREE NEAK LUONG		LT R.C. MONSON, USN
SA RAID SEVEN FOUR CA MAU		LT C. ARMENTROUT, USN
SA RAID SEVEN FIVE CA MAU		LT J. GLUTTING, USN

RIVER PATROL TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 212)

SA RVPATCMD BINH THUY		CAPT R.E. SPRUIT, USN
SA RPD FIVE ONE CAT LAI		LT J.M. LAWLESS, USN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SA RPD FIVE TWO
PHU CUONG

LT J. R. RECKNER, USN

SA RPD FIVE THREE
MY THOLT A. HILDEBRAND, USN
LTJG J. R. FRONDORF, USN(R)SA RPD FIVE FOUR
BEN KEO/TAN AN/BEN LUC

LT R. ARMITAGE, USN

SA RPD FIVE FIVE
CHAU DOC

LT R. E. MOORE, USN

SA RPD FIVE SIX
VINH LONG

LT J. B. GIBNEY, USN

SA RPD FIVE SEVEN
NHA BELT J. B. BURNESKIS, USN(D)
LTJG E. HENDRICKSON, USNRSA RPD FIVE EIGHT
SA DEC

LT H. M. HIGHLAND, USN

SA RPD FIVE NINE
TAN CHAU

LT W. A. GOODWIN, USN

SA RPD SIX ZERO
HOI AN

LT B. WATERMAN, USN

SA RPD SIX ONE
RACH SOI

LT J. SCOVILL, USN

SA RPD SIX TWO
PHUOC XUYENLT T. C. VOIGHT, USN(D)
LT P. J. GASKIN, USN(R)SA RPD SIX THREE
RACH SOI

LT R. B. FIORE, USNR

SA RPD SIX FOUR
TUYEN NHON/MOC HOALT T. J. FLYNN, USN(D)
LTJG J. D. COLE, USNR(R)COASTAL SURVEILLANCE TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 213)SA CSCMD
CAM RANH BAYCAPT C. R. QUANSTROM, USN
CAPT T. I. KOLSTAD, USN(R)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SA COSFLOT ONE
DANANG

LCDR D. C. WILSON, USN

SA COSFLOT TWO
QUI NHON

LT G. H. ROBERTS, USN

SA COSFLOT THREE
VUNG TAU

LCDR R. S. WATKINS, USN

SA COSFLOT FOUR
AN THOI

LCDR J. G. TONTI, USN

SA COSFLOT FIVE
MY THO

LCDR J. McCORMICK, USN

SA HDU CRB

LT J. L. JANSEN, USNR(D)
LT P. A. LINTON, USN (R)

GENERAL RESERVE TYPE COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 214)

SA GENRESCMD
CAT LAI

CAPT L. A. DWYER, USN

SA RTE DIV EIGHT ONE
CAT LAI

LT J. M. STEUSSY, USN

SA MID NINE ONE
CUU LUONG

LT J. W. HAMILTON, USN

SA MID NINE TWO
CUA VIET

LT T. A. COMER, USN

SA MID NINE THREE
NHA BE/TAN CHAU/CA MAU

LT R. F. ELLIOTT, USN

SA SEAL AND UDT UNIT
SAIGON

LT G. W. DORAN, USN

SA SALVAGE UNIT
CAT LAI

LCDR E. H. SHIPP, USN

SA RID FOUR ZERO
GO DAU HA

LT R. O. MILHAM, USN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SA RID FOUR ONE
CHAU DOC

LT R. A. DORSI, USN

SA RID FOUR TWO
BEN TRE/DONG TAM

LT C. VOYAVA, USN

SA RID FOUR THREE
TRA CU

LTJG T. B. WAGENSEIL, USN

SA RID FOUR FOUR
BEN LUC

LT G. C. COOLEY, USN

SA RID FOUR FIVE
DONG TAM

LT C. F. TIBBETTS, USN

SA RID FOUR SIX
NAM CAN

LT W. C. SMITH, USN

SA RID FOUR SEVEN
NAM CAN

LT W. TAYLOR, USN

SA RID FOUR EIGHT
TAN CHAU

LT W. R. RUSLING, USN

SA RAG TWO SEVEN
NHA BE

LT W. GOTTSCHALK, USN

FIRST COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION

SA FIRST CZ
DANANG

CDR P. McLAIRD, JR., USN

SA CG ONE ONE
CUA VIET

LT R. DUMINIAK, USNR

SA CG ONE TWO
THUAN AN

LT R. N. MYERS, USN

SA CG ONE THREE
CU TU HIEN

LT J. SCOTT, USN

SA CG ONE FOUR
HOI AN

LTJG R. G. McCAIN, USN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

SA CG ONE FIVE
AN HOA

LT D. ROBINSON, USN

SA CG ONE SIX
CO LUY

LT W. R. OWENS, USNR

SA RAG THREE TWO
HUE

LT G. L. MAGER, USN

SA HDU DANANG

LT D. W. WIRICK, USNR

SA CSC DANANG

LTJG R. M. SCOTT, USN

SECOND COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION

SA SECOND CZ
NHA TRANG

CDR A. S. JEFFERIS, USN

SA CG TWO ONE
DE GI

LT J. K. ENGELKEN, USN

SA CG TWO THREE
SONG CAU

LT E. L. SIWINSKI, USNR

SA CG TWO FIVE
DONG HAI

LT E. F. GIER, USN

SA CG TWO SIX
BINH BA ISLAND

LT J. P. McGRATH, USN

SA CG TWO SEVEN
NINH CHU

LTJG P. MILLER, USN

SA CG TWO EIGHT
PHAN THIET

LT G. NORDLAND, USN

SA HDU NHA TRANG

LT J. E. BINGHAM, USN

SA HDU QUI NHON

LTJG B. VALENTINE, USN

SA CSC QUI NHON

LCDR R. SAGEHORN, USN

SA CSC NHA TRANG

LT S. C. AREY, USN

THIRD COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SA THIRD CZ
VUNG TAU

CDR J. G. SULLIVAN, USN

SA CG THREE THREE
RACH DUA

LT F. M. LEMON, USN

SA CG THREE FOUR
TIEM TOM

LT B. R. MOFFETT, USN

SA CG THREE FIVE
HUNG MY

LTJG T. E. ARNOLD, USN

SA CG THREE SIX
LONG PHU

LT C. L. DOBSON, USN

SA HDU VUNG TAU

LT N. BARBOUR, USN

SA CSC VUNG TAU

LT D. R. ROGUS, USN

FOURTH COASTAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION

SA FOURTH CZ
AN THOI

CDR M. J. SHINE, USN

SA CG FOUR ONE
HA TIEN

LTJG S. T. O'NEAL, USNR(D)
LTJG R. JOHNSTON, USNR(R)

SA CG FOUR TWO
HA TIEN

LT O. R. COLE, III, USN

SA CG FOUR THREE
HON TRE ISLAND

LT M. A. SOBYNA, USN

SA CG FOUR FOUR
HA TIEN

LTJG D. C. SNYDER, USN

SA CSC AN THOI

LT P. D. McCURDY, USN

THIRD RIVERINE ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 116)

SA THIRD RIVERINE ZONE
LONG BINH

CDR L. E. PELLOCK, USN(D)
CDR V. McDONOUGH, USN(R)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SA RAG TWO TWO
PHU CUONG

LT J. CALABOUGH, USN

SA RAG TWO FOUR
PHU CUONG

LTJG R. L. CANON, USNR

SA RAG TWO EIGHT
LONG BINH

LT R. M. ANDREWS, USN

SA RAG THREE ZERO
LONG BINH

LT R. M. ANDREWS, USN

SA REG FOR RPG
CUU LONG

LT C. E. ROBE, USN

FOURTH RIVERINE ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 217)

SA FOURTH RIVERINE ZONE
CAN THO

CDR W. WARDELL, USN

SA RAG TWO ONE/THREE THREE
DONG TAM

LT K. J. PLIS, USN

SA RAG TWO THREE/THREE ONE
VINH LONG

LTJG R. E. BROWN, USN

SA RAG TWO FIVE
CA MAU

LT R. J. GILLESKIE, USN

SA RAG TWO NINE
BAC LIEU

LT W. T. MAGEE, III, USN

SA RAG TWO SIX
LONG XUYEN

LTJG R. W. BASS, USNR

RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE ADVISORY ORGANIZATION (TF 228)

SA RSSZ
NHA BE

CDR D. A. STEWART, USN

NAVAL TRAINING CENTER ADVISORY ORGANIZATION

SA NTC NHA TRANG

CDR P. R. FOURNIER, USN

SA NTC CAM RANH BAY

CDR R. R. WARD, USN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SA NTC SAIGON

CDR R. R. GROVE, USN(D)
CDR R. A. WILD, USN(R)

LOGISTIC SUPPORT COMMAND ADVISORY ORGANIZATION

SA VNN LSC AND SA VNN DCOS LOG
DEP SA VNN LSC

RADM P. S. McMANUS, USN
CAPT E. P. TRAVERS, USN

SA VNNSY

CAPT F. T. SHAVER, USN

SA VNNSC

CDR C. H. BARSTAD, USN

SA LSB AN THOI

LCDR R. W. HOTZ, USN

SA ISB RACH SOI

LT D. E. WARD, USN

SA ISB QUY NHON

LCDR T. A. HEAD, USN

SA ISB BEN LUC

LCDR C. W. ALBAUGH, USN

SA LSB CAT LO

LCDR S. UNGEMACH, USN

SA LSB DONG TAM

CDR W. M. COLE, USN

SA LSB CAM RANH BAY

CDR C. McINTOSH, USN

SA LSB DANANG

CAPT R. PADDOCK, USN

SA LSB NHA BE

CDR A. L. BADER, USN

SA ISB THUAN AN

LCDR J. STEVENS, USN

SA LSB BINH THUY

CDR R. J. COEN, USNR

SA ISB LONG XUYEN

LCDR A. THIEL, USN

SA ISB LONG PHU

LT J. R. MURRAY, USN

SA ISB VINH LONG

LT W. McALISTER, USNR

SA FB CAT LAI

LT J. F. MAYER, USN

SA ISB NAM CAN

LCDR R. BLEDSOE, USN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SA ISB CHO MOI

SA ISB CA MAU

SA YRBM ALFA

SA ISB MOC HOA

LCDR B. BURGETT, USN

LT D. CHALFANT, USN

LCDR G. CRAWFORD, USN

LT D. BOULDIN, USN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPENDIX IV

Glossary of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text:

ABF	Attack by fire
AMMI PONTOON	A multi-purpose barge, standard size 28'x90'
AO	Area of operations
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
A/S	Air Strike
ASP	Ammunition supply point
ASPB	Assault Support Patrol Boat
ART	Artillery
ATC	Armored Troop Carrier
ATSB	Advance Tactical Support Base
A/W	Automatic Weapons
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
BLACK PONY	OV-10 Aircraft, twin engine turboprop counterinsurgency
CCB	Command and Communications Boat
CG	Coastal Group
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group - mercenaries of Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian descent who fight primarily around their own villages.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CMD	Capital Military District
CONUS	Continental United States
CRIP	Civilian Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon
CSR	Camp Sentinel Radar
CZ	Coastal Zone
DIW	Dead in the water
DUSTOFF	Medical evacuation by helo
ENIFF	Enemy Initiated Firefight
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FOM	French Patrol Boat
FSB	Fire Support Base
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
GDA	Gun Damage Assessment
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HAFT	Helicopter Attack Fire Team
H&I	Harassment and Interdiction fire support
ISB	Intermediate Support Base
JCS	Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)
KIA	Killed In Action
KIT CARSON SCOUTS	Former Viet Cong who have come over to the side of the Saigon government and serve with allied military units.
LAFT	Light Attack Fire Team

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LAW	Light Anti-tank Weapon
LCPL	Landing Craft, Personnel, Large
LDNN	Vietnamese equivalent of USN Underwater Demolition Team
LF	Local Forces (VC terminology)
LHFT	Light Helo Fire Team
LOH	OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter
LP	Lookout Post
LRRP	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
LSSC	Light Seal Support Craft
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MATSB	Mobile Advance Tactical Support Base
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
MID	Mining Interdiction Division
MONITOR	Heavily armored LCM-6 (40mm cannon or 105mm Howitzer)
MR	Military Region
MSB	Minesweeper, boat
MSD	Minesweeper, drone
MSF	Mobile Strike Force - mercenaries who deploy and go anywhere
MSSC	Medium Seal Support Craft
NGF	Naval gunfire
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NILO	Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer
NIOTC	Naval Inshore Operations Training Center
NMCB	Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (Seabees)
NOD	Night Observation Device
NSA	Naval Support Activity
NSAD	Naval Support Activity Detachment
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
OJT	On-the-job training
PBR	Patrol Boat, River
PCF	Patrol Craft, Fast
PF	Popular Forces
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
PRU	Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
PSA	Province Sector Advisor
PSDF	Popular Self-Defense Forces
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
RAC	River Assault Craft
RAD	River Assault Division
RAG	River Assault Group (VNN)
RAID	River Assault and Interdiction Division (VNN)
RAP	Rocket Assisted Projectile
REF	Reefer (ship)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RF/FF	Regional Forces/Popular Forces
RMK/BRJ	Civilian construction company in Vietnam
ROK	Republic of Korea
RPD	River Patrol Division
RPG	Rocket propelled grenade (or) River Patrol Group
RSSZ	Rung Sat Special Zone
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Air Force (or Armed Forces)
SA	Senior Advisor
SAR	Search And Rescue
SEAL	Navy commandos (<u>S</u> ea, <u>A</u> ir, <u>L</u> and)
SEAWOLF	UH-1B Helo, heavily armored, USN operated
SHADOW	C-119 aircraft
SKIMMER	20-foot fiberglass motorboat
SLICK	UH-1B, USA operated
SPOOKY	C-47 aircraft
SSB	Swimmer Support Boat (Skimmer)
STAB	Strike Assault Boat
TAOR	Tactical Area Of Responsibility
TAW	Tactical Air Wing
TF/PT	Convoy designation for ships travelling up the Mekong River from Tan Chau to Phnom Penh and vice versa
USARV	United States Army, Vietnam

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USASUPCOM	United States Army Supply Command
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN	Vietnamese Navy
VNNSC	Vietnamese Naval Supply Center
VNNTC	Vietnamese Naval Training Center (Nha Trang)
WIA	Wounded In Action
ZIPPO	Flame thrower-equipped ATC of Monitor

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~