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**Monthly
Historical
Summary**



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FOREWARD

While the Army of the Republic of Vietnam waged a vicious assault on the Ho Chi Minh Trail network in the Laotian Panhandle in February, American and Vietnamese Naval forces struck at enemy strongholds 500 miles away in the Ca Mau Peninsula. The southern North Vietnamese and Viet Cong proved no less tenacious than their comrades in Laos as they attacked the allies' Advanced Tactical Support Bases at Nam Can, Ca Mau, and Song Ong Doc, and sank five river boats in the U Minh Forest. The enemy also began to retake the initiative along the northern coast when he repeatedly attacked VNN units and mined five river craft on the Cua Viet River. Between these two geographical extremes, hostile activity remained at a low level.

Rear Admiral Chon, CNO, VNN joined Vice Admiral King, COMNAVFORV, in Hawaii on 13 February to accept the USS CAMP (DER 251) from the U.S. Navy. As all small combat craft of the Brown Water Navy had been turned over by the end of 1970, the scope of the ACTOV Program was enlarged to include augmentation of the Vietnamese Navy's offshore patrol capability.

Coastal Surveillance Forces of Operation MARKET TIME,

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including the last U.S. Naval units afloat under the command of COMNAVFORV, detected an SL-8 trawler off Vietnam's shores in February, the first since November 1970. The alien craft, tracked with "covert surveillance" techniques, never attempted to land.

16,220 Naval personnel remained in-country at the end of the month.

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CURRENT OPERATIONS

<u>VNN Designation</u>	<u>USN Designation</u>
TRAN HUNG DAO I (TG 212.4)	NONE
TRAN HUNG DAO II (TG 214.1)	GIANT SLINGSHOT
TRAN HUNG DAO IV	SOLID ANCHOR (TG 116.1)
TRAN HUNG DAO V (TG 216.1)	READY DECK
TRAN HUNG DAO VI (TG 212.5)	SEARCH TURN
TRAN HUNG DAO VII (TG 221.1)	SEA TIGER
TRAN HUNG DAO VIII (TG 217.1)	NONE
TRAN HUNG DAO IX (TG 212.3)	BARRIER REEF
TRAN HUNG DAO X (TG 212.6)	BREEZY COVE
TRAN HUNG DAO XV (TF 213)	MARKET TIME Inner Barrier
TRAN HUNG DAO XVII (TF 210)	NONE
TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII (TF 218)	NONE
TRAN HUNG DAO XIX (TG 217.2)	NONE
RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE	NONE

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Operation SOLID ANCHOR

Enemy activity in the SOLID ANCHOR AO during February seemed moderate only in comparison with the heavy onslaughts of the several preceding months. The Nam Can ATSB survived two mortar attacks, and the allies sustained two killed and 11 wounded during the month while killing 21 of the enemy.

Materiel difficulties remained a crucial factor in naval operations in the lower Ca Mau Peninsula during the month. In the first week of the month, the failure of an oil tanker to make a scheduled POL supply run to the isolated ATSB forced a brief curtailment of combat operations. Commanders of RIDs 41 and 44 reported that, on the average, 57% of their craft were available for operations - a slight improvement over last month. The COSE LOT V PCF armada fared somewhat better with an average of 65% availability. On 24 February the USS WASHTENAW COUNTY (LST 1166) relieved the USS WINDHAM COUNTY (LST 1170) as the SOLID ANCHOR support ship.

The SOLID ANCHOR Advanced Tactical Support Base, mortared on four separate occasions in January, sustained two more mortar attacks during February. On the evening of 18 February, enemy troops lobbed approximately 25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire into the vicinity of the Nam Can base from a position due south of the ATSB. Only four rounds

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impacted within the perimeter, and the remainder fell along the waterfront and into the Cua Lon River. One Vietnamese sailor was killed and three were wounded. All boats were gotten underway without damage as Seawolves and counter-battery crews fired at the suspected enemy position.

This familiar scenario was repeated on a smaller scale on the last day of the month when three 82mm rounds landed near the Nam Can helicopter pad as another three impacted within the Ranger camp on the south bank. There were no friendly personnel or materiel casualties.

Several American advisors and Vietnamese sailors of RIDs 41 and 44 and COSFLOT V PCFs were wounded in riverine ambushes during the month. Two VNN Sailors sustained slight fragmentation wounds when ATC 1209 was hit by two B-40 rockets 17 kilometers southwest of SOLID ANCHOR (VQ 838 600) on 9 February. The allied boats were patrolling in the area where for several months Viet Cong had been restricting local woodcutters from using certain canals.

After inserting a Ranger unit on the west bank of the Rach Ong Dinh (WQ 014 639) on 19 February, two RID 44 ASPBs were attacked with rocket and small arms fire from the opposite bank. Seawolf helicopters and OV-10 aircraft scrambled to assist the moderately damaged boats. Two Vietnamese and two Americans, EM2 W. E. Buchhorn and EM2

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R. R. Porter, were slightly wounded. An ARVN platoon transferred to the east bank and discovered several land mines, B-40 rocket launchers, and a large bunker complex.

On 26 February a command detonated mine exploded five meters from ASPB 5173 at WQ 077 772 as the boat was returning to SOLID ANCHOR from New Nam Can. The mine, consisting of approximately 60 pounds of C-3 explosives and moored to the canal bottom, inflicted only moderate damage on the ASPB. The boat beached immediately to allow ground troops to disembark for a sweep, but no Viet Cong were found.

PCF 3903 became the last riverine casualty of the month when it was struck by a B-40 rocket 22 kilometers east of SOLID ANCHOR (WQ 209 697) on the afternoon of 26 February. The "Swift" boat, providing escort for a tug traveling eastward on the Song Bo De, lost use of one engine but was able to continue its mission. There were no personnel casualties.

Seals of Detachment Golf, Whiskey Platoon assumed responsibility for the VCI eradication program in the entire SOLID ANCHOR AO when Zulu Platoon departed without replacement in February. On the 11th of the month, Whiskey Platoon Seals attempted to interdict a seven man squad of a Viet Cong company operating nine kilometers northwest of

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the Nam Can ATSB. After setting an ambush site at VQ 934 743 at 0230H, the squad called in 105mm artillery on a prearranged area. The scheme worked, and enemy troops in blue and green uniforms exposed themselves to the Seawolves waiting to strike. At dawn, the Seals ambushed two uniformed soldiers and a sampan with two men in it. The Seals extracted by air at 1000H and reported probably killing three VC during the operation.

Whiskey Platoon Seals joined with Yankee Platoon Seals from Bac Lieu and a host of helicopters and gunfire support ships to destroy a VC weapons and supply center on 13 February. Acting on Hoi Chanh intelligence, 24 Seals, seven Kit Carson Scouts, and a UDT squad inserted along the Tac Ong Thay Canal 42 kilometers east of SOLID ANCHOR (WQ 293 745). In several hours of patrolling, during which the USCGC RUSH (WHEC 733), USCGC MORGENTHAU (WHEC 722) and Army and Navy helo gunships saturated the area with fire, the Seals discovered and destroyed approximately 45 hootches and bunkers. There were numerous VC flags and documents in the hootches, confirming the area as a Communist stronghold. Additionally, the Seals discovered approximately 100 women and children inhabiting the complex but did not detain any of them.

A SOLID ANCHOR Seal squad was only partially successful in

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eliminating an 11 man Viet Cong unit occupying two hootches in the Dam Doi District on the morning of 27 February. The commandos, assisted by a KCS and two LDNN personnel, inserted at WQ 105 845 and patrolled to the objective, eight kilometers northeast of the Kai Keo outpost. The squad divided in half so that one group could storm into each hootch, but movement in one of the hootches caused the Seals to open fire. They killed three VC but were forced to immediately extract by helicopter without attacking the second dwelling.

The Biet Hai (Naval Rangers) counter-guerrilla force assigned to Operation SOLID ANCHOR operated almost daily during February to interdict Viet Cong supply routes and ferret out enemy defensive positions in the Nam Can AO. While the vast majority of sweeps were uneventful, a ten man unit engaged in a vicious battle at midday on 17 February. After disarming eight booby traps and patrolling through a mine field, the Naval Rangers came upon a VC trench line and bunker complex nine kilometers southeast of SOLID ANCHOR (WQ 072 662). Two VC were lying on a bunker and another appeared to be sleeping in a hammock. The patrol initiated fire and instantly killed the three exposed guerrillas. At this point an estimated 30 enemy troops hidden inside the bunker returned a withering volume of fire, including RPG and B-40 rockets. The allied patrol leader, LTJG Tran, was

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killed instantly, and two other other Biet Hai troops were wounded.

A Biet Hai killed two more of the enemy when he tossed a hand grenade into the bunker. The fierce battle raged at close range for nearly 20 minutes until the allied unit could withdraw.

The wounded Biet Hai were medevaced, and OV-10 aircraft, Seawolf helicopters, and the 44th ARVN Ranger artillery pounded the enemy stronghold. After completion of the bombardment, a reaction force of Biet Hai and Rangers set out for the original battle site on boats of RIDs 41 and 44, only to be ambushed by small arms while in transit. The force arrived uninjured at the bunker complex at 1510H and did not meet any resistance. An ASPB which was establishing a blocking force on a nearby canal was slightly damaged by a B-40 rocket, and crew members killed one Viet Cong with return fire.

Troops of the 44th ARVN Ranger Battalion assigned to CTG 116.1 made sporadic contact with the enemy in February during a series of search and destroy missions and nocturnal ambushes in the environs of the Nam Can base. On 3 February an ARVN company, supported by RID craft as it swept down the east bank of the Rach Ong Quyen, made contact with a small Viet Cong unit at WQ 04 65. The enemy withdrew after a brief exchange in which one ARVN soldier was slain. Another ARVN company engaged a second guerrilla element of unknown size

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six kilometers south of SOLID ANCHOR (VQ 991 628) at midday on 25 February. The allies killed one Viet Cong and captured another. ARVN troops labored throughout the month to complete construction of the new 105mm howitzer artillery emplacement on the north bank of the Song Cua Lon, adjacent to the SOLID ANCHOR base. On the 20th of the month, the two big guns were ferried across the river from the old fire support base to the new location.

Captain E. I. Finke returned to Nam Can after a three month respite when, on 21 February, he relieved Captain R.E. Spruit as CTG 116.1 when the latter departed on emergency leave.

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TASK FLEET 21

The three southernmost naval operations in Vietnam, SOLID ANCHOR, TRAN HUNG DAO X, and TRAN HUNG DAO XVII, continued to meet fierce enemy opposition during February. TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII, the Phnom Penh POL resupply operation, operated with increased effectiveness after experiencing a hectic beginning in January. Action on the rivers of Military Region III was again light and virtually ceased along the Cambodian border.

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TRAN HUNG DAO I

Vietnamese Army and Navy operations against enemy strongholds in Cambodia were largely responsible for the low level of hostile activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO I AO during February. PBRs and PCFs conducting the Cambodian border patrol along the Vinh Te Canal engaged the enemy in only six brief firefights in which one Communist guerrilla was killed. There were no friendly casualties for the month. As in all other Delta operations, the quick reacting Navy Seawolf helicopters flew almost daily missions against Viet Cong staging areas and logistics routes.

Three "Swift" boats, one belonging to CTG 212.4 and two to the Fourth Coastal Zone, narrowly averted being blown up by a mine on 24 February on the Vinh Te Canal, 17 kilometers northeast of Ha Tien (VS 530 600). At 1055H PCF crew members saw three Viet Cong fleeing a position along the canal bank. A reaction team landed to pursue them and, after briefly exchanging fire with an estimated 30 VC in a nearby treeline, succeeded in killing one of the initial three guerrillas. The reaction team then discovered a wire which led from a foxhole on the bank into the canal. Divers from one of the boats retrieved a 100 pound command detonated mine lying midstream in ten feet of water. The uninjured boats made a final firing run on enemy positions before departing the area.

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By February, the normal dry season reduction in border interdiction operations and the shift of assets to provide support for the Mekong convoy operation (TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII) had resulted in complete inactivity in the central and eastern sectors of the TRAN HUNG DAO I AO. Rear Admiral Matthews, Commander, TRAN HUNG DAO, consequently recommended to CNO, VNN, that the operation stand down, and that the Fourth Coastal Zone commander be assigned responsibility for the Vinh Te Canal. This suggestion was being reviewed at month's end.

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TRAN HUNG DAO II

Activity generally continued at a low level in the TRAN HUNG DAO II (GIANT SLINGSHOT) AO, despite reports from various sources indicating enemy plans to conduct a significant number of attacks after TET. The Viet Cong were apparently taking advantage of the dry season to resupply their units, as intelligence sources indicated enemy plans for an offensive taking place from March to May. ARVN operations nearby in Cambodia apparently made the necessary resupply difficult. Priority targets continued to be major bridges, such as the Go Dau Ha Bridge, and patrol boats on the Vam Co Dong River. There was a continuing emphasis on small unit tactics in the TRAN HUNG DAO II AO. Numerous sightings of sapper swimmers in the area of MOBASE II at Tan An lent credence to this.

On 7 February members of RPD 54, while on day patrol, located a series of 30 spider holes and what appeared to be a sampan loading area, located on the southeast bank of the Vam Co Dong in the vicinity of XT 100 465.

At 2010H on 14 February four PBRs enroute to a WBGP were taken under fire with two B-40s, which passed astern, and light A/W fire from the north bank of the Vam Co Tay (XS 220 816). The PBRs

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made three firing runs, then cleared the area for the Seawolves that were called in. Modulation jamming was experienced by ATSB Tuyen Nhon. There were no results observed. This was the first enemy initiated firefight in the area in the last five months, and the local NILO felt that it was intended to cover movements of VC units in the area.

On 15 February, at 2240H boats of RID 47 from Go Dau Ha in a WBGP observed and engaged three VC traversing a field on the west bank in the vicinity of XT 385 255. There was no return fire, and the results were unknown.

At 1845H on 19 February two PBR's of RPD 64 received three rockets and heavy small arms fire from the south bank of the Vam Co Tay (XS 445 735) on their way to a WBGP. They made two firing runs, and then called in the Seawolves as well as two other RPD 64 units. Three VC were observed and believed killed. Later that night, at 2020H, and 14 kilometers northwest of Moc Hoa, VNN PBRs of RPD 64 in a waterborne guardpost sighted two swimmers and took them under fire, with undetermined results.

On 11 February, at 2051H the MACV compound and adjacent airfield area in Moc Hoa received three rounds of 82mm mortar,

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with no effect. Twelve days later, at 230010H, the ATSB Moc Hoa was again attacked, receiving ten 60mm mortar rounds. At the same time the MACV Team 85 compound received six rounds. Seawolves scrambled but were unable to place strikes due to the presence of friendly forces in the area. There was only slight damage incurred, and no personnel were injured. The attack continued the pattern of periodic harassing fire against the city and of apparent decrease in intensity since the end of November.

The Third Riverine Area Intelligence Officer provided a detailed study concerning the infiltration of supplies and personnel through the lower THD II AO. From the confluence of the two Vam Co Rivers to XS 628 733, enemy traffic consisted of mainly guerrillas in groups of two or three who crossed to avoid ground operations or to resupply their own small caches. He further commented that there was probably no major infiltration of men or supplies in this area. Near Ben Luc, the headquarters of THD II, waterborne crossings were practically nonexistent because of the allied concentrations there. The area between the Thu Thua canal (XS 581 767) to the Xang canal (XS 569 855) was probably the most important section of the lower Vam Co Dong river since it contained crossing points for infiltration into Gia Dinh Province and Saigon. In the area from the Xang canal to the Horseshoe, enemy groups infiltrated to resupply caches with

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as many as ten to 15 persons in a group. The third RAIO stated that the primary means of interdicting enemy traffic across the lower Vam Co Dong River has been the waterborne guardposts.

The NILO at Tra Cu noted that the Loc Giang radar site had not yet reported significant detection of infiltration through the An Ninh corridor, nor had the Tra Cu radar site recorded any through Duc Hoa. The NILO commented, however, that though these radars had not yet picked up infiltration from the west, the increase in activity in northern Hau Ngia Province indicated that main force units, notably the 1696 Battalion, were being supplied during the dry season. Also, various sources indicated that enemy resupply routes were in a state of flux. (NFV Instsum 026-71).

Units of TG 214.1 - about 16 PBRs and ten RACs - were called away from TRAN HUNG DAO II activities to act as a blocking force for operation TOANTHANG 71 just inside of Cambodia on the upper Vam Co Dong River. The operation, which began on 18 February, involved combined Vietnamese forces, the naval portion of which was commanded by CTG 214.1 headquartered at Tay Ninh City. The boats acted as a blocking force on the Prek KamPong Spean from about WT 958 607 to WT 875 627 as the ARVN Task Force 225, composed of four to five battalions, drove the enemy north

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to the river. The boats reported contact with only one lone VC as of the end of February.

As no more than ten boats at a time were called away for the Cambodian operation, the THD II mission was never seriously impaired.

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TRAN HUNG DAO V

For the second month in a row, allied units of River Patrol Division 52 and River Assault Group 24 failed to inflict a single enemy casualty in sporadic skirmishes on the Upper Saigon River. Two American advisors and seven VNN sailors were wounded during February.

Binh Duong Province Viet Cong effectively employed their familiar quick ambush tactics when they crippled one PBR with a well placed B-40 rocket on 2 February, 35 kilometers northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 523 395). The single rocket exploded on the engine cover of one boat of a five boat column and injured two Vietnamese sailors and their American advisor. Bm1 C.C. Newcomb was mortally wounded sustaining wounds over his entire body.

At dusk on 7 February, seven River Assault Craft of RAG 24 transiting north to a WBGP position received five B-40 rockets and automatic weapons fire 30 kilometers northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 578 308). Three sailors were wounded on the command boat by a rocket explosion amidships, and a B-40 detonation on the Monitor caused minor damage. A third rocket exploded in the engine compartment of an LCVP, seriously wounding one Vietnamese and forcing the craft to go aground. Army gunships and dustoff helicopters from Long Binh

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arrived over an hour later to medevac the wounded. Elements of the 25th ARVN Infantry provided nocturnal security for the damaged LCVP, and the following day it was towed to Phu Cuong for repairs.

A Viet Cong rocket squad staged a third attack on six PBRs and six RACs 36 kilometers northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 545 351) on the evening of 24 February. Three B-40 rockets struck the command boat causing slight material damage but wounding five ARVN troops and one sailor. The medevac helicopter arrived over an hour and a half later, but the request for Army gunships was never honored.

Because of chronic lack of air support and rapid medical evacuation, CTG 216.1 requested the establishment of a helicopter detachment at Phu Cuong. He additionally asked that a Seal platoon be sent to the Upper Saigon River AO to assist in ferreting out the elusive VC ambush teams. Because of pressing operational commitments in the Mekong Delta, Commander TRAN HUNG DAO denied both of the requests, but promised that a Seal detachment might be provided on an ad hoc basis for specific, limited missions.

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TRAN HUNG DAO VI

Hostile activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO during February reached its lowest level since the Vietnamese Navy assumed control of the operation four months previously. Allied boats engaged Communist guerrillas in 15 firefights in which three allied sailors, including one American, were wounded, and CTG 212.5 reported that his men slew 57 Viet Cong. Communist terrorists continued harassment of the civilian residents of Rach Gia City when they lobbed two 107mm rounds into Kien Giang Province's major population center on 3 February. Six civilians were wounded.

The month's only major riverine confrontation in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO occurred on the evening of 11 February. Crew members of two River Patrol Division 58 PBRs positioned in a WBG 15 kilometers northwest of Rach Gia (WS 029 170) unleashed a heavy barrage of fire on 15 people whom they saw moving 200 meters inland from the south bank. The American advisor on the PBRs believed that the unit his boats interdicted was the group which had recently attacked two ARVN outposts south of his position and was now moving north to attack a third outpost in the area. Seawolf helicopters, followed by OV-10 aircraft from Binh Thuy, placed repeated air strikes in the area and caused three secondary explosions. The advisor reported probably killing six Viet Cong in the attack.

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An alert Vietnamese seaman in Rach Soi Village assisted in collecting seven Hoi Chanhs on 28 February. The RPD 61 sailor, on liberty from an operation in the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO, learned of several Viet Cong in the village and reported to his commanding officer who in turn led a landing party to investigate. The Vietnamese found seven cooperative Hoi Chanhs who turned in a radio and a carbine. Two of the former guerrillas who claimed to have knowledge of Viet Cong frogmen were given to the Seals for interrogation, and the remainder were turned over to the An Hoa Village police.

Navy Seals of Detachment Golf, Romeo Platoon were the most active allied forces in Kien Giang Province during February. An eight man squad, led by a guide and Kit Carson Scout, encountered a small Viet Cong unit while enroute to a hamlet to capture a Communist village finance and education chief on 6 February. As the commandos patrolled an area 17 kilometers south of Rach Soi (WR 125 834), they saw a light 75 meters from their position. Closer investigation revealed five armed VC whom the Seals immediately attacked. After the brief skirmish, the squad began receiving automatic weapons fire from the east as it searched the canal and fields for bodies and weapons. Seawolves arrived overhead to suppress enemy fire and cover the Seals as they proceeded to the targetted hootch. The dwelling was deserted but contained Viet Cong flags. The Seals extracted safely, and reported

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killing two VC in the initial exchange.

At midday on 13 February, Romeo Platoon Seals conducted a helicopter raid on a suspected 14 man Viet Cong mortar team 14 kilometers south of Rach Soi. After Seawolves had placed air strikes on the area, the Seals inserted at WR 179 860 and began patrolling through tall grass toward a treeline. They encountered three VC whom they killed and then discovered and destroyed a 20 man rest area. The Seals returned to ISB Rach Soi without sustaining any casualties.

The only Seal casualties for the month resulted from a mine explosion on the Rach Soi - Kien Luong Road on 21 February. Two Americans were slightly wounded when their truck detonated a suspected 82mm round buried in the road.

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TRAN HUNG DAO VIII

Enemy activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO VIII AO came almost to a standstill during February as only two firefights were recorded by TG 217.1 units. Although the lull persisted on the waterways, however, the Logistic Support Base at Dong Tam came under attack on two separate occasions on the 12th of February. Intelligence reports have indicated that the enemy's 267 B Sapper Battalion was located in Son Giang District, Dinh Tuong Province, and was probably responsible. Accordingly, on 16 February, the C.P. was located approximately seven kilometers northwest of Dong Tam (XS 340 465) and was accompanied by a security force of 18 troops. The unit was armed with numerous large CHICOM mines and an unknown number of satchel charges. The unit's main mission was to attack and disrupt the allies LOGs at and around the Dong Tam Base.

The Seals had an uneventful month and took advantage of the inactivity by changing command. Seal Team One, Detachment Golf, Victor Platoon, CTE 116.12.1.2, commanded by LTJG R. Clapp, relieved Seal Team Two, Detachment Alfa, 8th Platoon, CTU 116.6.3, commanded by LT A. Davis, on 15 February.

On 10 February at 1630H, a RID 45 Tango boat in company

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with an Alfa boat on patrol of the Hai Muoi Tam Canal (XS 006 537) in Dinh Tuong Province was struck by three B-40 rounds from the northeast bank and AK-47 fire from the southwest bank. One VNN was killed and three wounded in the clash, and the Tango boat which received the brunt of the attack had to be towed back to Dong Tam with extensive hull and engine damage. ARVN troops were called and responded with an uneventful sweep of the banks of the canal.

On 21 February at 2055H, RAG 21/33 boats, an LCM-6, and two LCVPs on patrol of the Touy Doc Loc Canal (XS 253 586), five kilometers southeast of My Phuoc Tay in Dinh Tuong Province, were attacked by B-40 and small arms fire. LCM-6, HQ 1503, was struck by a B-40 round from the south bank which caused material damage to the 20 millimeter gun mount and slight superstructure damage. The two LCVPs were fired upon with B-40 fire but fortunately sustained no damage. One VNN sailor was killed; two VNN and two RF troops were wounded. Seawolves were called and responded with several strikes in the vicinity.

ATSB Dong Tam came under attack on 12 February at 1220H when five rounds of unknown ordnance landed within the perimeter causing no damage and again at 2050H when three rounds were received causing no damage or casualties. The two attacks signified that the

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base was still targeted by enemy units as a primary objective because of its location and logistic capability. The importance of this base was stressed when on 20 February, a DEPCOMNAVFORV Repair Coordinator was established in order to coordinate repair effort for all assets assigned to Operations TRAN HUNG DAO VIII and XIX. The Repair Coordinator will assign repair priorities for all craft assigned to both AOs and schedule craft for movement to and from repair facilities. In addition, he will coordinate the assignment of repair priorities for craft from outside the two AOs, other coordinators, COMNAVSUPPACT, and CTF 214 as appropriate for repairs at LSB Dong Tam.

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TRAN HUNG DAO IX

For the second month in a row, riverine assets of CTG 212.3 did not engage the enemy in a single firefight. YRBM-16, formally the afloat headquarters of Commander, TRAN HUNG DAO IX, took advantage of the lull to depart the area after lengthy service.

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TRAN HUNG DAO X

While riverine assets of Operation TRAN HUNG DAO X, including RPD 62 and RID 43, were involved in comparatively few firefights (14) during February, the enemy made his presence felt with attacks on the Ca Mau and Song Ong Doc Advanced Tactical Support Bases. Allied casualties in all hostile action included four VNN sailors killed, two missing, and 16 wounded and 11 American Navymen wounded. CTG 212.6 reported that his men killed 23 guerrillas during the month.

As with the SOLID ANCHOR operation to the south, base defense remained the most crucial problem for TRAN HUNG DAO X forces at Ca Mau and Song Ong Doc. DUFFLEBAG sensor activations, often running as high as 30 per night, indicated almost constant movement around the bases. By the end of February, CTG 212.6 was implementing a plethora of innovations to diminish his susceptibility to close range enemy attack.

The first attack following the TET holidays proved to be the least effective. In the early morning hours of 3 February, the Ca Mau Advanced Tactical Support Base received four rounds of 82mm mortar fire, and units of RPD 62 on patrol in the immediate vicinity received automatic weapons fire from the south bank. The ATSB and

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boats responded with mortar and automatic weapons fire which quickly silenced the enemy guns. PFs and PRUs swept the area and recovered two 107mm launch bombs and three B-14 rockets. There were numerous spider holes directly across the canal from the base, and the PRUs found numerous blood trails leading to the south. There were no allied casualties.

Four days later, guerrillas fired 16 B-40 rockets, ten 82mm incendiary mortar rounds, and small arms fire into the ATSB from the west bank. A direct hit on a U.S. Army LCM-8 killed one American soldier, and one VNN and two USN sailors on the base were wounded. Several enemy mortar rounds landed in the populated area on the west bank and set fire to about 20 hootches. One civilian died, and six children were badly burned in the conflagration. The allies returned fire, and Seawolves and Army gunships saturated the west and north banks with fire. A Vietnamese Air Force dustoff was requested for the wounded but refused to fly. Additionally, the Ca Mau hospital refused entry to the wounded children because they were too badly burned. A U.S. helicopter finally medevaced the wounded.¹

Local intelligence indicated that the VC attacking force was split into several elements on the north and south banks of the canal.

1. CTG 116.2 MSG DTG 071750Z FEB 71

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The aggressors had infiltrated their weapons into the area in sampans during the afternoon and hid themselves in hootches along the canal.

CTG 116.2 reported that the lack of coordination between PF and RF troops and the VNN gravely weakened the Ca Mau security posture. While the PRUs had patrolled nightly the area to the north of the base, the PF forces had never fulfilled their pledge to guard the southern approaches.

While the ATSB was probed or attacked seven times from the south since 27 December 1970, neither the PF platoons nor the PSDF units responsible for the security of that area reported any contact during that time. Deputy COMNAVFORV consequently ordered that one USN and one VNN "advisor" would accompany all PF ambush teams in the future.

Communist guerrillas shifted emphasis to the west on 15 February when they attacked the Song Ong Doc ATSB with 107mm and B-40 rocket and small arms fire. The blistering attack lasted only five minutes before base personnel and Seawolves suppressed fire, but four Vietnamese sailors were killed, eight VNN and seven USN sailors were wounded, and seven boats were damaged. Three Alfa boats of RID 43, one RPD 62 PBR, and the American advisor hootch all sustained direct rocket hits. American helicopters

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medevaced all the wounded to Binh Thuy. Once again, an urgent request for a VNAF helicopter was never honored. Following this attack, the allies began construction of a rocket fence across the river from the ATSB and cleared off the areas around the floating base.

The only significant riverine activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO X AO during February occurred on the 7th of the month when LCM-8 and units of RID 43 were ambushed at VR 895 002, nine kilometers west of Old Song Ong Doc. Two Vietnamese, including the boat captain, were blown overboard by a direct hit and never recovered. Two Americans and four other Vietnamese were wounded. Seawolves and PBRs from the Song Ong Doc ATSB assisted in suppressing enemy fire. RF troops inserted, and four of their number were wounded in a brief battle with the enemy. The boats were attacked again as they returned to the ATSB. A total of six boats were damaged.

LT Moran's Ninth Platoon (Seal Team Two, Detachment Alfa) continued to compile an impressive record during February. Acting on informant intelligence revealing the location of a Viet Cong hamlet chief, a Seal squad inserted at WR 248 030, 16 kilometers southeast of Ca Mau on 9 February. As the commandos approached the targeted hootch, the Viet Cong inside began to fire at the

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accompanying Army helicopters. When the gunship returned fire, the Viet Cong tried to flee but were quickly cut down. The Seals pursued and captured four VC, two of whom were wounded and died later in the day. Four other Communists were killed by the air strikes. Documents carried by the captives, identified as hamlet level VCI, revealed that the allied raid had broken up a financial meeting in the hootch.

Two days later the Ca Mau Seals struck at a Viet Cong rest area 24 kilometers southeast of Ca Mau (WQ 369 992). After a gunship saturated the immediate area with fire, the squad discovered and burned a rest complex for approximately 80-100 men. One Seal was slightly wounded with fragmentation from the Army helicopter strike.

On 17 February, Ninth Platoon Seals and their guides inserted at VR 857 038, 32 kilometers west of Ca Mau, with the intention of capturing several high level VCI Communists. The squad searched several hootches under the cover of air support and finally found one lone VC hiding in a subterranean bunker. The guide identified him as an important VC leader, but the captive, while admitting to being a member of the Communist Party for 15 years, claimed that he had quit the Viet Cong three years previously. The

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Seals returned to Ca Mau and turned their captive over to provincial authorities.

Seals, assisted by Cobra gunships and gunfire support from the USCGC RUSH (WHEC-733) attacked an NVA hootch on 20 February, 30 kilometers west of Ca Mau (VR 883 088). A local agent reported that the allied attack killed one Chinese propaganda cadre member and wounded two North Vietnamese and three Chinese proselytizing cadre members.

A Detachment Six Seawolf crashed in the Gulf of Thailand on the morning of 17 February. The helo had just left the flight deck of USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (APG 838) when engine failure forced it down. A helicopter from the USS MARS (AFS 1) operating nearby quickly rescued the uninjured crew members. No attempts were made to salvage the sunken aircraft.

The Brown Water "Heavies" of RID 48 relieved the boats of RID 43 in the Ca Mau AO by the end of February. RID 43 returned to Operation TRAN HUNG DAO II which it had left three months earlier when it came to the Song Ong Doc area to replace American craft preparing for turnover to the VNN.

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TRAN HUNG DAO XVII

Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO was low to moderate in February only in comparison to the furious activity which had plagued this operation since its inception in Decemebr 1970. The predominant activity centered around the enemy's use of the water mine and the subsequent salvage operations by CTF 210 units which, as in the past, could not keep up with the sunken craft at hand. To alleviate the problem of the constant mining threat, Mine Division 93 craft were ordered to report to SENADV CTF 210, and eight MSDs and four LCMs of MID 113 were requested to be transferred from Nha Be to the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO. In addition, SENADV CTF 210 requested on 4 February that salvage divers be made available along with EOD personnel for the clearance of sunken craft at the Kien An Naval Base.

While these preparations were made to offset the bourgeoning threat which the enemy posed, the mining of craft continued. On 4 February at 0840H, an ATC (HQ 1234) was struck by a command detonated mine while transiting south on Rach Cai Tau Creek (WR 005-365) in company with eight other boats of RAID 74, 25 kilometers northwest of Ca Mau. The mine exploded below the waterline, moderately damaging the ATC. Two Vietnamese sailors were wounded in the action, and the crippled vessel was towed to the 32nd

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On 13 February at 0750H, a Zippo boat (HQ 6533) of RAID 75 was mined with explosives placed by sappers while the boat was in a normal night position, 25 kilometers northwest of Ca Mau (VR 990 382). After the explosion, the Zippo sank at the stern with the attendant loss of one Vietnamese sailor killed and one USN and six Vietnamese sailors wounded. One VC was killed, possibly the sapper who placed the mine on the Zippo boat.

On 17 February at 1310H, a VNN LCM-6 (HQ 1536) of Rag 25/29 and an ARVN LCM-8 (HQ 1212) were mined while transiting the Song Trem Trem, 32 kilometers northwest of Ca Mau. Two mines were detonated, sinking the LCM-6 and slightly damaging the LCM-8. Fire was not initiated on the suspected enemy due to the presence of friendlies in the area. Two Vietnamese sailors were wounded in the action.

Although the number of boats mined was fewer than in the past two months, the method of February attacks nevertheless indicated the possible strategy of the enemy in the U Minh Forest. The mining effort on the waterways has been part of a campaign against the 21st ARVN Divisions presence in the U Minh, consistent with their general tactics of dispersion, low mobility, and economy-of-force

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types of operations. The recent lull in convoy minings may be explained by a Hoi Chanh debrief that reported a plan to increase attacks on GVN OP's in the lower portion of Kien An District leading up to a series of attacks that would overrun outposts, heading north toward Rach Gia, the ultimate target. This push, starting in February, would be coordinated with a general offensive in Laos and Cambodia. The enemy might have been conserving mine ordnance for the start of this new offensive, designed to have major logistical and psychological repercussions.

Another possibility for the lull in minings might have been the effectiveness of psychological operations employed against the enemy in An Xuyen, Kien Giang, and Chung Thien Provinces. According to NILO Ca Mau, informants had read Psyops leaflets concerning the recovery of enemy mines and then agreed to lead operations which resulted in the recovery of two large launch bombs of approximately 125 millimeters, ten M-26 grenades, 1000 rounds of M-16 ammunition, and the destruction of a VC workshop containing anti-personnel mines, 105 millimeter rounds, one 250 pound bomb, and material used to manufacture mines. Also, information provided by approximately 40 of the 330 Hoi Chanhs who have recently rallied in Rach Gia was used to identify, locate and target sapper groups in the upper U Minh. Although enemy watermining was

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expected to continue in the area, Psyops was proving to be one of the most effective counter-measures available.

To lessen the possibility of the employment of enemy mines in the future, two RADRAG detectors were furnished by NRDL, Panama City, for use in the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO. The RADRAG detects the presence of an underwater wire having some portion exposed to the atmosphere. The operating principle is that RF energy from a commercial radio station will cause the exposed portion of the mine control wire to function as an antenna for a radio receiver towed along the bottom of the canal. When this occurs, a signal will be detected by RADRAG and transmitted through the towing cable to an operator in the towing craft.

Salvage operations in the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO expanded to try to raise the boats sunk in the past three months since the initial incursion into the U Minh and at the same time to keep up with the recent sinkings.

On 3 February, a survey team of AOIC HCT ONE, a salvage advisor, and four VNN divers arrived at the sinksite (XS 052 455) of HQ 6002. Before their efforts could start, a hail of enemy small arms fire greeted them, and the operation ceased until the enemy fire was suppressed. A .30 caliber machine gun and an M-79 recoilless

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rifle were retrieved on the assumption of operations. The salvage of the boat was discontinued until the survey reports could be examined.

On 9 February, salvage divers from Kien An completed pumping and patching HQ 5152 which was sunk in the vicinity of VR 97 74. The boat was later transferred to Kien An for additional repairs. This achievement was noted by COMNAVFORV when he congratulated the LDNN Mobile Diving Team on its ingenuity and dedication in accomplishment of this difficult task. At about the same time, the Zippo boat which was sunk on 13 February was turning out to be a problem when after the well deck was pumped dry, it failed to float. Another effort was scheduled using additional U.S. salvage personnel.

HQ 1212, sunk on 18 February was salvaged the next day. COMNAVFORV declaring his elation at this sudden salvage effort, in a message to Commander Task Force TWO ONE ZERO stated, "Salvage of HQ 1212 is good news. Score one up with 18 to go. Keep pressing."¹

On 19 February, EOD personnel with explosives arrived at the 32nd CP and destroyed an old sunken French RAG boat. On the same day, the weapons on the sunken LCM-6 were removed near the 31st CP.

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On 21 February, PBR 7715 was raised sufficiently to be towed to shallow water near Tac-Cau where it was temporarily beached; underwater holes were plugged, and the craft pumped out. PBR 7715 was then towed to ISB Rach Soi for repair. Examination on the skids showed two rocket penetrations side by side and one major hole caused by a warhead explosion.

On 23 February, HQ 1258 was surveyed and found to be in two sections. As salvage was not feasible, it was recommended that the parts be blown in place in order to facilitate the clearance of the blocked channel.

On 28 February, TRAN HUNG DAO XVII divers attached and detonated large explosive (C-4) charges to the severely burned and unsalvageable pumps and engines of the sunken PBR 7654. The remnants of PBR 7654 were scattered over a large area, and the operation was concluded.

It was a busy month for the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII divers and EOD personnel. Although they salvaged or destroyed in place numerous craft, their problems were significant. The experienced USN divers who had shouldered the responsibility of salvage operations in the past began to assume the role of advisors. During salvage operations of

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HQ 1212 it was apparent that the OINC could not effectively conduct the operation and simultaneously train the VNN divers. It was necessary for an officer advisor assisting the team during salvage operations to work closely with the VNN divers. Although this problem of supervision was brought to the attention of COMNAVFORV, a date of 24 March was tentatively set for the relief of the officer advisor. After that date, an evaluation of requirements would take place and a proper response to the matter would be made.

On 13 February COMNAVFORV ordered the HCU One representative to sail an LCM-8 and a CSB-3 from Long Xuyen on 15 February and conduct TRAN HUNG DAO XVII salvage operations. CNO VNN was requested to provide escort for salvage craft departing from Long Xuyen and on site security until the completion of operations. On 18 February, the two salvage craft arrived at the site of the sunken HQ 1212 but were without the services of EOD personnel which were requested. HQ 1212 was successfully salvaged but not without some mechanical difficulties being experienced by the CSB and the LCM-8. On 23 February, the CSB-3 arrived at Kien An but not before it had run aground several times during transit and damaged both screws. By month's end repairs were still being effected.

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The first half of the month was rather quiet for the waterborne assets of CTG 210 but in the last half, six firefights in which three U.S. sailors were wounded, the inadvertent tripping of a booby trap in which one Vietnamese sailor and one civilian were wounded, and the rally of 21 Vietnamese in sampans on 19 February to PBRs 7711 and 7713 were recorded.

The most significant firefight occurred on 11 February when units of RAID 74 on patrol in the vicinity of WR 007 363, two kilometers south of the 32nd CP on the Cai Tau River, came under B-40 and automatic weapons fire. LT Armentrout and Petty Officer Thawley received shrapnel wounds while acting as advisors on HQ 6526 as it was enroute to a waterborne guard position. EN2 Bise, advisor on another boat which was commencing its transit to Ca Mau in the same convoy, received cuts and bruises to his body when he was lifted about ten feet in the air as a result of the explosion of a watermine that struck the boat. No VNN casualties were reported.

One other firefight of mention occurred on 17 February in Kien Giang Province (WR 197 773), 24 kilometers southeast of OP Base Kien An when PBRs transiting to an assigned patrol area on the Cat Lon River were fired upon from both banks. PBR 7715 was struck by B-40 rounds on the port side near the waterline just aft of the

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canopy and beached at WR 197 773 to prevent sinking. No casualties were incurred, and the combined firepower of the PBRs and Seawolves surpressed the enemy fire.

The month ended on a tragic note when on 28 February, personnel on PBRs 7700 and 7718 in the vicinity of an outpost at WR 365 690, eight and one half kilometers south of Kien Hung, inadvertently tripped a friendly booby-trapped grenade. Two Vietnamese sailors were wounded, one seriously. The advisors administered first aid to the serious casualty who was being transferred by truck from Kien Hung to Rach Gia Hospital due to the unavailability of a VNAF helo for urgent medevac. The lack of a helo for urgent medevac seriously jeopardized the life of the wounded PF soldier, and it was only through the timely first aid by advisor personnel (EN1 Deck, GMG1 Allen) that he lived to reach Kien Hung.

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TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII

TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII was initiated on 12 January 1971 as a combined operation between VNN and Khmer naval forces to provide escort for merchant shipping convoys on the Mekong River in Cambodia. These convoys have been the primary POL source since Route 4 was closed from the port of Kompong Som to Phnom Penh. TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII has been successful at easing the critical POL stock levels at Cambodia's capital city.

On 30 January the first attempt to send a truck convoy from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh since the reopening of Route 4 was unsuccessful. The enemy, however, allowed a convoy to make the trip on Route 4 without incident on 22 February, and his rationale was unclear. The Mekong River continued to be considered the most reliable route during the month.

On 10 February Convoy TP-6, composed of two tugs and five merchant ships, left Tan Chau, accompanied by TU 218.1.3, composed of one LSSL, 20 PBRs, eight PCFs, six MSMs, and 18 RACs. At 0615H the TU was attacked with 75mm rocket rounds at WT 260 330, with no results. At 1300H a second ambush occurred at WT 120 720. Vietnamese marines landed and made contact with the enemy. The marines lost five men, killing 42 of the enemy, and through this aggressive interdiction diverted the enemy from the

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convoy. At 1545H the tug Viking did, however, receive 75mm rocket and B-40 fire from the enemy. The convoy arrived at Phnom Penh at 1920H with 5,600 metric meters of POL.

Mekong Convoy TP-7, composed of two merchant ships with general cargo, two tugs with barges of ammo and two barges of POL, one tanker with POL, one LCM-8 with ammo and one LCV with food, departed Tan Chau on 22 February. The convoy came under B-40 rocket, 57mm recoilless rifle, and small arms attack on three occasions. At 1040H the merchant ships were hit 25 miles southeast of Phnom Penh, receiving a total of six hits which caused minor damage. At 1300H the convoy came under small arms fire but incurred no damages or casualties. The third and final attack came at 1400H 12 kilometers southeast of Phnom Penh. One of the tugs was heavily damaged, one ammo barge was sunk and one was set afire, with four civilian crewmen wounded. The burning barge was later retrieved, extinguished, and towed to Phnom Penh. The convoy arrived at Phnom Penh at 1515H with more than one and one quarter million gallons of POL. The emptied convoy returned to Tan Chau the next day without incident. A 35 truck convoy on Route 4 was ambushed the same day, incurring no damages.

POL consumption in Phnom Penh was approximately 20,000

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tons per month before the closing of Route 4, but by February had dropped to about 5,000 tons per month. Gasoline was not officially rationed in the Khmer capital and was sold until it ran out. There was, however, widespread black market sale of gasoline by the South Vietnamese, much of which was transported by auto from Tan Chau.¹

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TRAN HUNG DAO XIX

Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO XIX AO was moderate, and terrorist activity continued to hamper the GVN pacification efforts during February.

The month started with the establishment of the TRAN HUNG DAO XIX operational command at the rear base headquarters in Kien Hoa City. The 10th ARVN Infantry Battalion left the Mocay area and transferred operations to the southern area of Kien Hoa Province. The AO was expanded to the Ben Tre and Bac Lai Rivers.

Three firefights involving TG 217.2 waterborne units were recorded, and the majority of the action centered around the Seal platoon attached to the TRAN HUNG DAO XIX AO. Ten Seal operations were executed during the month of February with attendant casualties of eight Americans wounded, seven of whom were injured in the last operation of the month. Two other USN sailors (ENC Dryden and BM1 Troy) were wounded in a firefight on the Ham Luong River (XS 560 180) when on 3 February at 1435H, RID 42 units on normal patrol were attacked from the east bank by B-40 rocket fire. One round hit ASPB 5154, wounding the two USN advisors. Shotgun 10, Seawolves, and Black Ponies were immediately called and suppressed the enemy fire while RPD 56 evacuated the wounded which were later picked

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up by Dustoff. Shotgun 10 coordinated the air strikes that followed, raking the east bank from XS 556 187 to XS 570 180. One Vietnamese was wounded during the subsequent firing and medevaced by Seawolves. This was the first incident in the past three months in this AO which was executed with planned intent on destroying river craft and possibly resulted from VC intelligence of VIPs aboard these CTG 217.2 units.

An outpost approximately two hundred kilometers from Ben Tre City was overrun with no reported resistance. The commander of the outpost was in Ben Tre City during the action on 4 February at 0430H. It was reported that approximately 15 VC came through the wire and captured every soldier in the OP plus weapons and ammunition.

In another incident on the same day, the enemy's Tan Hoa Base Area in Giong Trom District, Kien Hoa Province was assaulted in order to establish a new GVN outpost in the area. The enemy was waiting, however, and caught the troops in a severe crossfire as they were debarking the aircraft. By 1500H when enemy fire was finally suppressed, four Slicks had been damaged, two helos had been shot down, and 21 friendly troops had been killed and ten wounded (two US). Enemy casualties were unknown.

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The three related incidents demonstrated that the enemy not only had the capability to harass, but also to carry on limited but effective offensive operations. The possibility exists that the lack of communication security on the part of the VN Army and Navy may have proved fatal in Giong Trom District and harrowing on the Ham Luong River. It was very likely that the enemy unit principally involved in these well executed operations was the D 236 Battalion. If this were so, it would mark their first presence in the field since they were badly mauled in June 1970 when they lost over 77 personnel.

On 6 February RPD 56 units on night ambush spotted a sampan with three occupants crossing the Ham Luong River to the north in the vicinity of XS 654 162 at 2130H. On being recognized, the three occupants dove into the water and were immediately taken under fire with the possible result of three enemy killed. The sampan was captured along with a CKC rifle.

The interdiction of the enemy's lines of communication continued to be of prime importance in the unrelenting struggle to control the main portions of Kien Hoa Province. Seal Team One, Detachment Golf, Xray Platoon continued its harrasing techniques and applied considerable pressure on the enemy in areas where substantiated intelligence reports revealed enemy presence. Of the

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ten operations conducted, the most significant occurred on 6, 10, and 28 February.

On 6 February, 11 Seals, one LDNN, one interpreter, and one guide embarked on an MSSC and LSSC and conducted an interdiction mission approximately 40 kilometers south east of Ben Tre City (XS 915 157). During the extraction, the Seals sighted an armed VC whom they immediately shot. The Seals then made a sweep in the area, locating and destroying three structures and three bunkers. Six grenades, 300 pounds of rice, one kilogram of documents and 30 pounds of assorted supplies were captured. There were no friendly casualties resulting from this operation in the Binh Da Secret Zone. Intelligence gathered from detainees from boarding and search operations on major delta waterways reflected the enemy's continued use of principal waterways for the movement of weapons, munitions and other supplies. Specific mention was made of Binh Da Secret Zone as a delivery point of supplies transported on the Mekong River by sampan from Cambodia.

On 10 February at 0400H, 11 Seals and one LDNN boarded an MSSC and departed Ben Tre for a VC district worksite at XS 395 183. At 0835H, the patrol spotted a group of VC crossing the canal

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and initiated fire with grenades and automatic weapons. The Seals inserted at the heavily booby-trapped worksite area and proceeded to burn the hootches. Black Ponies were called in for additional fire power. The air strikes set off a booby trap which slightly wounded YN3 Allen L. Vaden, who was eventually medevaced to the 93rd Evacuation Hospital, Long Binh. Assorted ammunition and parts that could be used for the purpose of manufacturing booby traps were captured. Enemy casualties were unknown.

The most devastating attack of the month began with seven Seals, one interpreter, and one guide conducting a cache recovery operation on 28 February at 1430H in Truc Giang (XS 569 223) in Kien Hoa Province. After completing the cache recovery operations in which 20 pounds of TNT and 20 pounds of sulphur were captured, the allied unit continued to transit the Ham Luong Canal and destroyed a series of bunkers with a LAAW. At 1545H a B-41 rocket slammed forward of amidships on the starboard side of the Seals' LSSC. One Vietnamese was killed, and another Vietnamese and seven Americans were wounded (three serious and four minor). The badly battered unit returned fire as it extracted from the canal under the cover of additional air support. Immediate medical attention was granted at the 10th Regiment Fire Support Base (XS 531 223) and later the

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wounded were properly medevaced for further treatment. The uninjured remnants of the contingent arrived at Ben Tre at 1640H.

On 3 February VNN CNO, Rear Admiral Chon, visited units of TRAN HUNG DAO XIX presently operating on the Ham Luong River. Admiral Chon addressed the men aboard the LSIL command ship and later in the day departed for Ben Tre.

An event unrelated to the operations of TRAN HUNG DAO XIX but one of serious morale and logistics consequence developed on 24 February when SA CTF 212/ SA RIVPATCMD requested that the move orders for RPD 56 be cancelled. He asked that the unit not be transferred to Sa Dec because of its exhausting combat involvement, its lack of maintenance and overuse, and above all because adequate preparation had already been made to house and mess all VN crews and advisors at ISB Vinh Long. The problem surfaced as a result of a CNO VNN order to relocate RPD 56 to Sa Dec where serious problems which have been overcome or eliminated at Vinh Long would certainly reoccur. COMNAVFORV, responding to the request, indicated that he would review jointly with CNO VNN the future deployment of RPD 56. By month's end, the decision was still pending.

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RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE

Effective 1 February, the RSSZ AO was increased to include a known staging area for rocket attacks against Saigon and the Nha Be tank farm and for ambush sites against ships transiting the Long Tau Channel. The expansion includes the area south of a line drawn from XS 941 819 along the stream east north east to XS 977 837 then south south east to XS 979 831 then north north east to XS 986 837 then following the Rach Ong Keo south south east to YS 038 790. There was debate during the month whether additional forces would be required to perform the security role in the enlarged AO.

RF companies and PRU units in the RSSZ made troop insertions throughout the month in Army Slicks with RPD 57 and RAG 27 craft in support. Several enemy bunker complexes and supply caches were found on these troop sweeps, but there was little contact with the enemy.

On 5 February RSSZ forces commenced Operation TOAN THANG 06-71 in the vicinity of XS 97 82 (in the recently extended part of the AO, Nhon Trach District of Bien Hoa Province). Troops of RF Companies 999 and 908 inserted and swept northeast. At 1115H they discovered a bunker and two sleeping platforms and 100 pounds of rice. At 1430H they captured one VC. Cumulative results of the three-day TOAN THANG 06-71 Operation were two VC KIA (BC), five probably killed, two

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VC WIA (probable), one VC CIA, 40 kilograms of rice destroyed, and the following items captured: one M-60 machine gun, an M-16, a K-50, a B-40 launcher, eight M-79 rounds, 10 M-16 magazines, one kilo of documents, and one kilo of medical supplies. Also on 5 February, 27 RSSZ PRUs swept through Can Giouc District of Long An Province, 15 kilometers southwest of the Nha Be Navy Base and discovered and destroyed two camouflaged trenches (vicinity XS 881 671), and another one an hour later at XS 879 672 with 250 kilos of rice. On the same day the Can Gio Intelligence Squad with advisor inserted by sampan in the vicinity of YS 073 513 and, acting on intelligence and sweeping northeast, found and partially destroyed an enemy base camp (bunkers and sleeping platforms) at YS 074 514 . The Can Gio Intelligence Squad discovered another enemy base camp on 7 February at YS 076 514 and captured one kilo of medical supplies and 50 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition.

On 8 February at YS 06 95, RSSZ PRUs made contact with a small enemy force, killed four of them, captured one, and also captured six AK-47 magazines, four M-16 magazines, one AK-47, 50 fuses, 200 meters of electrical wire, 50 kilos of military clothing, medical supplies, and surgical instruments. The PRUs also destroyed six enemy bunker complexes and one sampan. The next day another supply cache was found at YS 115 586 by Can Gio District forces guided by a VC

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who had rallied to RF 875 headquarters that morning. The cache consisted of one CKC rifle, 50 rounds of .50 caliber ammo, five gallons of kerosene, and five kilos of personal gear. The supplies were destroyed along with seven sleeping platforms and one large bunker. The Hoi Chanh aided the Psyops team in a Chieu Hoi appeal broadcast in the area.

From 10 to 13 February Operation TOAN THANG 07-71 was underway in the vicinity of XS 99 59, south of the area of TOAN THANG-06-71. On 10 February RF Company 121 personnel on a troop sweep found eight booby-trapped grenades, and RF Company 601 personnel found and destroyed two enemy bunkers and captured some documents with a map of Saigon. The next day RF Company 117 troops made contact at XS 989 659 with three VC; they killed two and captured one, along with a .45 caliber pistol, an AK-47, and assorted documents. At approximately the same time RF Company 121 troops on a sweep in the vicinity of XS 966 627 discovered 11 turtle mine casings with the explosives removed.

On 13 February (Operation TOAN THANG 06-71), PRUs found a large supply cache at YS 084 915. Captured were: 1 M-1 Carbine, 500 AK-47 rounds, 147 fuses, one K-54 magazine, one amp meter, 375 meters of electrical wire, two kilos of documents, and assorted

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medical supplies. Four enemy base camps were destroyed along with 200 kilos of rice at the site of the discovery. On 18 February another supply cache was found by RF Company 809 troops at YS 095 515.

On the morning of the 19th RSSZ PRUs found two VC base camps (15 bunkers) at YS 100 937 which they destroyed. Captured were one M-16, one kilo of documents, and 10 paper VC flags. The troops reinserted at 1300H at YS 103 913 and at 1500H made contact with about ten VC in the vicinity of YS 100 910. One VC was killed and 20 more bunkers were destroyed.

On 21 February at 2310H Ly Nhon Village received two B-40 rounds which wounded one civilian. At 2330H RSSZ PF Platoon 7 in a night assault position made contact nearby with three VC at XS 937 585, killing one and capturing a Thompson submachine gun.

The Rung Sat allies made two final contacts with the enemy on 23 February. At noon RF Company 362 troops found an occupied base camp at YS 045 782. One RF was wounded slightly, and the VC evaded to the northeast. The LHFT was called in to conduct an air strike which destroyed two bunkers and two sampans. After the strike, the RFs reswept the area and captured one RPG-4, two B-40 rounds, two claymore mines, one reel of electrical wire, and ten hammers. At

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YS 176 963 at about the same time PRUs found and destroyed 50 bunkered fighting positions and killed one VC. On 25 February, following a Hoi Chanh who had rallied on 20 February after reportedly killing two of his comrades, PRUs captured two CKC rifles and destroyed 50 liters of gasoline and 200 kilos of rice at YS 075 925.

PBR HQ 7624 of RPD 57 sank at the Nha Be pier on 23 February one-half hour after returning from patrol. Later in the morning the craft was refloated and removed by the Nha Be Repair Facility.

During February, RSSZ forces accounted for nine enemy KIA (BC), three CIA, one Hoi Chanh, 12 individual weapons captured, and three crew-served weapons captured.

Units of Mine Division 113 and MID 93 spent the entire month futilely making chain drag sweeps in search of the LCM HQ 1024 which collided with another craft and sank on 30 January 15 kilometers south of Nha Be. The body of a missing crewmember, however, was discovered on 1 February. A second drowning occurred on 6 February when a Royal Thai Navy PO1, while disembarking from a liberty boat alongside the Thai LST-3, fell overboard. The body was recovered by divers from the USS TUTUILA (ARG-4).

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LONG TAU SHIPPING CHANNEL

Enemy activity on the Long Tau Shipping Channel was quiet for a change during February. No mining incidents were reported. Five feet of conductor wire was recovered on 21 February from the river during a MID 91 minesweep.

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CTF 211

The following was the disposition of the RAID units at the end of the month:

<u>RAID</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>
70	CTG 210.1	Kien An
71	CTG 210.1	Kien An
72	CTU 218.1.3	Cambodia
73	CTU 218.1.3	Cambodia
74	CTF 210	Ca Mau
75	CTF 210	Ca Mau

CTF 212

The following was the disposition of RPD craft at the end of February:

<u>RPD</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>
51	228	Cat Lai
52	216.1	Phu Cuong
	228	Nha Be
53	217.1	My Tho
54	214.1	Ben Keo
55	218.2	Tan Chau/ Chau Doc
56	217.2	Vinh Long
57	228	Nha Be
58	212.5	Rach Soi
59	218.2	Tan Chau
60	213.1	Hoi An
61	212.5	Rach Soi
62	212.6	Ca Mau
63	212.3	Phuoc Xuyen
64	214.1	Moc Hoa/Tuyen Nhon
65	Training	Binh Thuy

Each RPD is composed of 20 PBRs and is reviewed in the operation in which it operates .

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CTF 214

The following was the disposition of RID craft at the end of February:

<u>RID</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>
40	210.1	Kien An
41	116.1	Nam Can
42	217.2	Ben Tre
43	214.1	Tra Cu
44	116.1	Nam Can
45	217.1	Dong Tam
46	214.1	Tra Cu
47	214.1	Go Dau Ha
48	212.6	Ca Mau

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RIVER ASSAULT GROUPS

The following was the disposition of RAG units at the end of

the month: Location

<u>RAG</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>
22	CTG 216.1	Phu Cuong
24	CTG 216.1	Phu Cuong
26	Commander, Fourth Riverine Area	Long Xuyen
27	CTF 228	Nha Be
28	Commander, Third Riverine Area	Long Binh
30	Commander, Third Riverine Area	Long Binh
32	Commander, First Coastal Zone	Hue
21/33	CTG 217.1	Dong Tam
23/31	CTG 217.2	Vinh Long
25/29	CTG 210.3	Ca Mau

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SPECIAL WARFARE

The following was the disposition of the Seal Detachments operating in a combat capacity throughout the country at the end of February:

<u>Detachment</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Officer-in-Charge</u>
Team One, Det Golf Xray Platoon	217.2	Ben Tre	LT Collins
Team One, Det Golf Victor Platoon	217.1	Dong Tam	LTJG Clapp LTJG Young
Team Two, Det Alfa Nine Platoon	116.2	Ca Mau	LT Moran
Team One Det Golf, Yankee Platoon	116.12	Bac Lieu	LTJG Horst LTJG Campbell
Team Two, Det Alfa Ten Platoon	116.12	Vi Thanh	LTJG Ganoung LTJG Kirkwood
Team One, Det Golf Whiskey Platoon	116.1	Nam Can (SOLID ANCHOR)	LTJG Couch LTJG Sandoz
Team One, Det Golf Romeo Platoon	116.5	Rach Soi	LTJG Boyhan LTJG Dundas

Seal units are reviewed in the operation in which they operate.

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COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCES

MARKET TIME patrol units of the USN inspected 1249 craft on day and night patrols during February, boarded 59 and detained none. The VNN MARKET TIME units on Inner Barrier patrols boarded and searched 7,860 junks and sampans. The coastal surveillance units accounted for an estimated three sampans and four structures destroyed and three VC KIA (reported by the USS MORGENTHAU [WHEC 722] during a NGFS mission on the 4th of the month at VR 886 697).

On 22 February, the USS HENDERSON (DD 785), enroute to a NGFS station near Pt. Virna, discovered two bodies floating in the water. A sweep of the area disclosed seven more bodies, all Vietnamese military except for one female.

On 28 February the USCGC MORGENTHAU, after putting ashore a MEDCAP team, struck an uncharted submerged obstacle near Poulo Dama Island off the southwestern coast of RVN. Initial inspection by USS KRISHNA (ARL 38) divers of the 2,700 ton ship indicated minor hull damage and damage to the external propulsion system and sonardome. The ship immediately struck out for the Philippines for a complete inspection and repairs.

A possible infiltration trawler was sighted on 24 February by

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VP-50 aircraft on MARKET TIME reconnaissance patrol at 11-27N 111-39E. The trawler, which photographs confirmed to be an SL-8 infiltrator, appeared loaded and began a long circuit of the South China Sea. MARKET TIME craft and VP aircraft were still maintaining constant surveillance of the trawler at month's end.

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FIRST COASTAL ZONE

Enemy mining activity in the first Coastal Zone was heavy during the month, and enemy contacts were frequent. Shortly after midnight on 1 February, an unknown number of VC were hanging a flag by the Hau River at BT 031 729, four kilometers south of DaNang, when a VNN patrol of three boats happened by. The patrol was taken under fire and returned it. Enemy casualties were unknown, but the flag was captured after the VC retreated. The following day on the Ben Hai River, six men were seen in a sampan in the eastern DMZ carrying 20 watermine pressure actuating devices and a large amount of TNT and plastic explosives. At the same time units of CG 14 and RPD 60 spotted one VC in a sampan at the bank of the Truon Giang River (BT 173 500) and took him under fire. He evaded into the treeline and was pursued by the CG 14 sweep team. The sweep team and boats drew AK-47 fire from an estimated squad of VC in a bunker complex (vicinity BT 175 500), and then RPD 60 units drew fire from bunkers in the vicinity of BT 168 495. The friendly units returned fire while the sweep team extracted and withdrew.

On 4 February, eight kilometers south of Hoi An, the boats of CG 14 inserted an RF platoon at BT 168 496 and the CG 14 sweep team at BT 180 490. The inserted units each received small arms

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fire and returned it. Helo gunships were called in and the CG 14 units withdrew. Nine detainees were captured in the operation, and enemy casualties were unknown.

On 14 February Dong Ha received 25 rounds of 122mm rocket fire, but the damage and casualties were minor.

On 15 February while at a night position on the Ky Lam River 10 kilometers west of Hoi An (BT 036 569), the crews of four RPD 60 boats sighted an enemy sampan attempting to cross the Vinh Dien River and took it under fire. The next day three bodies, one 8mm mortar round, and documents were recovered.

During February there were five mining incidents in the First CZ in the Cua Viet River area. On 4 February a MID 92 Skimmer detonated a mine at YD 270 640 but escaped damage. On 16 February troops preparing an ambush at YD 264 633 discovered two VC beginning to float a mine downstream. Friendly fire detonated the mine which resulted in the obliteration of one of the sappers. The second sapper's body, clad in a new, well-equipped wet suit, was recovered along with three CHICOM grenades, two MK 2 grenades, and three one-pound blocks of TNT. In the same location the next day, five VNN sailors were killed when their LCPL of MID 92 detonated a mine and

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
sank. These were the first mining deaths since 17 August 1970. Again in the same area (four kilometers downstream from Dong Ha) on 19 February, a 50 pound pressure influence mine was recovered by MID 92.

On 20 February, four kilometers southwest of CG 11 headquarters, another water mine was detonated by an ARVN LCM. The explosion wounded four Vietnamese sailors.

On 24 February at 0245H, three kilometers northwest of Cua Viet, two Army craft, the TUDOR, a 65-foot hydrographic survey craft, and a sandcaster dredge were mined, presumably by swimmers using limpet mines. The TUDOR sank and was recovered from the channel later. The dredge was damaged. One U.S. civilian was wounded in the explosions and three Filipino, one Korean, and two Vietnamese civilians were reported missing in action. One Filipino and one Vietnamese were found dead in the wreckage soon afterwards, and on 27 February five more bodies were found. The last mining incident for the month, on the 27th, damaged an ammi pontoon moored at the old ATSB Cua Viet LST ramp. There was no security watch at the time because of lack of personnel and lack of value of the ammi.

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SECOND COASTAL ZONE

In the Second Coastal Zone there was a rash of enemy activity early in the month with 31 incidents of enemy contact reported to NILO Qui Nhon from 311000H January to 011000H February. On 31 January at 2000H in Tuy Phuoc Province (CR 058 371), an unknown number of VC detonated a mine during a PSDF meeting, killing three friendlies and wounding nine. The same night the Song Cau District HQ (at CQ 08 80) received six 82mm mortar rounds. One PF was wounded. At 0615H the next day, a platoon of PF Company 68 received 12 rounds of B-40 rocket fire in Phu My Province (BR 908 475) and at about the same time, Phu Cat AFB (BR 89 43) received six rounds of 122mm rocket fire. An hour later Phu My District HQ received one 60mm mortar round and PF 223 at BR 904 828 received 40 82mm rounds. At 1000H Hoai Nhon District HQ received eight 82mm mortar rounds. At 1028H troops of RF Companies 334 and 396 were overrun by an estimated two NVA companies employing B-40 and M-16 fire. Fourteen RFs were killed and three wounded.

The fiercest battle of the month occurred two days later when on 3 February at 0130H one company of the Ninth NVA Battalion 22nd Regiment infiltrated at CQ 155 956 and at 0730H attacked Vinh Hoa Hamlet. A reaction force of two RF companies engaged the enemy and CG 23 PBs and PCFs were dispatched to the scene. At 0815H an

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L-19 aircraft arrived on scene and spotted 30-40 NVA in sand dunes attacking the PFs. The aircraft attacked with rockets, and helos arrived by 0830H to bombard those North Vietnamese who were caught in the open. At 0900H Navy PBs, PCFs, and Yabuta junks arrived to take the NVA under fire at CQ 165 935. At this time, the enemy was blocked from leaving the peninsula by two RF companies and one ROK company. From 1100H to 1300H VNN units provided fire support and evacuated refugees. A combined ROK/RF/PF assault was made against the hamlet after heavy fighting. An air strike after this assault reduced the NVA strong point and released 100-200 refugees. The fight in the hamlet continued until dark when PF Company 31, which had been the original defending unit, was extracted by junk. The RF/PF/ROK companies assumed night defensive positions and nine naval units blocked the peninsula from the sea. At first light on 4 February, ROKs swept the area with negative contact. Results of the battle were eight VN RF/PF/PSDF killed, 22 VN military and civilian wounded, 57 enemy KIA, one M-60, 16 AK-47s, three M-16s, three PRC 25s, four M-79s, one GRC 29, one 60mm mortar, and 100 CHICOM grenades captured. Enemy troops were spotted in the area on 5 February and fighter bombers were called to bomb the area; this resulted in two secondary explosions.

On 10 February small arms fire was received by a CG 28 unit

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towing ten small fishing vessels that had been discovered in a restricted zone at CP 130 200. Twenty detainees were turned over to the National Police. On 17 February a four-man team from CG 28 disguised as fishermen and using a sampan was stationed in this area to decoy VC into the open, but there was no contact.

PCF 3850, while at the NSF Cam Ranh Bay pier, exploded on 18 February, and one VNN sailor was wounded. The engineman had cleaned the engine with gasoline. Because the engine compartment covers were not opened, fumes from gasoline were probably ignited by a spark from the wiring when a crewman tried to start the engines. Personnel from USS READY (PG 87) berthed across the pier arrived and extinguished the blaze.

On 20 February at 2315H the Qui Nhon base received four rounds of B-40 rocket fire. At 210057H explosions occurred at an ARVN compound nearby killing two firemen and destroying two fire trucks. At 210100H the 41st Signal Company received four rounds of 82mm mortar fire, the 527 Transportation Company received one round, and the 61st Medical Battalion received three. Results of this rocket attack were 11 U.S. personnel wounded. The area attacked was close to the port.

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THIRD COASTAL ZONE

Activity in the Third Coastal Zone was light. Seals of Detachment Golf, Victor platoon, operating four kilometers northeast of CG 36 headquarters, inserted at XR 317 669 on 1 February and killed a man in a sampan who evaded when challenged. On 3 February Seals patrolling along canals 40 kilometers northwest of the CG 36 base mortared a VC squad area (WR 994 936) and a 30-man VC base area (WR 993 928). They also destroyed one VC hootch and detained one suspect.

Two units of CG 34, the CG 34 ambush team and PCF 3835, and KCSs on a troop sweep killed one VC and destroyed ten kilograms of pungii sticks on 16 February.

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FOURTH COASTAL ZONE

In the Fourth Coastal Zone the effects of Operation TRAN HUNG DAO XVII were felt clearly in the number of Hoi Chanhs. The IV CZ Intelligence Officer reported that during the first 12 days of the month approximately 200 Hoi Chanhs rallied at the Rach Gia Chieu Hoi Center. By the 18th the total went to 330. These ralliers said they feared helo strikes and ARVN operations and that many hamlet level VC units were losing 75 to 90% of their men to the Chieu Hoi program.

A VNN PCF gathered up seven Hoi Chanhs on 1 February, 20 kilometers north of Nam Du Island. They had left Khanh Lam Village (VR 952 403) in the U Minh Forest and were attempting to reach Phu Quoc Island by sampan and junk when the "Swift" boat picked them up. The PCF took them to An Thoi where the Hoi Chanhs were debriefed. They revealed that due to defoliation and ARVN Operations in the U Minh Forest, 200-500 enemy troops use the foliated areas along the coast (VR 820 515 to VR 820 425) for shelter.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY

Anti-mining Psyops activity in the form of distribution of handbills and leaflets offering rewards for mines discovered was renewed after a rash of enemy mining incidents in the Cua Viet area during the first two months of 1971. Broadcasts and leaflet drops were made by units of the First Coastal Zone with the assistance of the BJU-1 team. Four mines had been reported by the end of the month.

In the Rung Sat Special Zone the Psyops team reported making 12 Chieu Hoi loudspeaker broadcasts during the month, several of which were in conjunction with ground operations by RSSZ RFs and PRUs. Nine MED/DENT CAPs were conducted at villages in the RSSZ in which a total of 370 medical and 204 dental patients were treated.

In the SOLID ANCHOR AO during the month, Psyops personnel distributed 598,500 leaflets (Chieu Hoi), treated 53 people for medical ailments, detained 14, and made nine hours of loudspeaker broadcasts. The fifty-nine Carbines and two buildings (school house and dispensary) in Thi Tran Hamlet were scheduled to be turned over to the hamlet officials and the PSDF on 1 February; the event was delayed until the 22nd of the month due to the death of the Nam Can District Chief. On 4 February, 30 VC entered Ham Rong Village and took five weapons

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from the PSDF. On the 16th, a PF ambush uncovered five VCI and two PF deserters. On 22 February at 0400H, four armed VC approached a PSDF watch post in Ham Rong. In the ensuing firefight two of the VC and one of the PSDF were killed and two PSDF wounded.

In the Fourth Coastal Zone from 11 to 18 February, Psyops loudspeaker broadcasts were conducted in the U Minh Forest area in conjunction with Army operations. Enemy Psyops broadcasts were also reported by RPD 61 personnel, and on 4 February propaganda leaflets urging ARVN soldiers to desert were found. During the first two weeks of the month over 200 Hoi Chanh rallied to the Rach Gia Chieu Hoi Center. On 12 February one Hoi Chanh swam to a CG 43 junk at VR 820 540, and on 17 February a brief firefight resulted in one VC KIA and one Hoi Chanh at VR 890 860. Crew members of VNN PCF 3818 on 14 February searched and detained a junk carrying an estimated 10,000 pounds of rice. During the search the men of the junk admitted being VC and requested Chieu Hoi status. On the same day eight Hoi Chanh rallied to the District Chief of Duong Dong on Phu Quoc Island; interrogation by NILO An Thoi revealed all had heard Psyops broadcasts and seen leaflets.

Elsewhere in the Republic during the month Navy units contributed

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to the Psyops effort. RAG 28 and the Third Riverine Psywar Team treated 100 medical patients and gave 30 haircuts at Phuoc Loc (XS 845 827) and conducted an hour broadcast. CG 33 conducted two MED/DENT CAPs in nearby villages and distributed 150 pounds of Psyops literature. In Chau Doc, 26 people were treated for various medical ailments, 5 Hoi Chanhs rallied, and 43,000 leaflets were dropped. Medical teams from USCGC MORGENTHAU (WHEC 722) and USS KRISHNA (ARL 38) conducted a MEDCAP on 7 February near Hon Tre in which they treated 185 people and diagnosed two cases of congenital heart disease in children requiring surgery. The MORGENTHAU group conducted another MEDCAP off Poulo Dama Island where malaria was present and treated 82 people.

Seabee units in RVN reported treating 866 people for medical ailments and training 188 VNN in construction skills. Teams 0105, 0107, 7105, and 7407 were at work on upgrading roads during February, and Teams 0106, 0319, and 7409 hauled fill for orphanage sites. Team 7105 built four bridges in Go Cong Province, Team 7104 completed two school houses in Ba Xuyen Province, and Team 7407 completed a 20-bed medical facility in Dinh Tuong Province.

During the month dependent shelter construction projects were

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
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underway at Ben Luc, VNNTC Cam Ranh Bay, An Thoi, Cuu Long, An Khanh, Tien Sha (DaNang), Thuan An, and Rach Soi. On 7 February the first dependent shelter units for families of Vietnamese Navymen at Camp Tien Sha were officially opened. The 116 housing units were begun early last year when Seabees started converting two-story wooden tropical barracks into living quarters. Older masonry-type French barracks were remodeled.


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Helping fellow Navymen move into their new dwellings, Vietnamese sailors unload furniture into one of the new dependent shelter units recently opened at NSF Da Nang.

(Official U. S. Navy photograph by PH1 R. J. Sylverter)



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ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY

The turnover of craft to the VNN was of a residual nature by February, 1971, with only a few craft left to be turned over.

On the first of February three LCM-8s and one LCU were turned over to the VNN LSB at NAVSUPPFAC DaNang. The 73 foot long LCM-8s and the 118.7 foot long LCU were accepted by LCDR Nguyen Huu Xuan, VNN. Three more LCM-6s and one LCM-8 were transferred to the LSB at NAVSUPPFAC, DaNang on 27 February. The transfer brought the number of boats (including skimmers) turned over to the VNN by NSF DaNang to 76 since the DaNang accelerated craft turnover program began in September of 1969. The same day two LCM-6s were turned over to the LSB at Nha Be. Finally, two LCM-3/6s were transferred to the support base at Binh Thuy.

A major event in the ACTOV program occurred on 13 February when the USS CAMP (DER 251) was decommissioned, transferred, and commissioned in the VNN as TRAN HUNG DAO HQ1. The ceremony took place in Pearl Harbor, with RADM Chon, the CNO of the VNN, and VADM King, COMNAVFORV, flying in from Vietnam to effect transfer. CAMP was commissioned in September 1943, and provided convoy protection for the Normandy Invasion. In July 1965 CAMP joined the MARKET TIME Forces off of Vietnam. The CAMP crew had

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completed all decommissioning actions by the end of April 1970, but Congress balked on the transfer approval, and it was only within hours of the final adjournment of the 91st Congress that legislation was finally passed. Hence the Vietnamese turnover crew did not arrive on board until December 1970, and they found the ship in need of much work in basic shipboard maintenance that the skeleton USN crew of 30 men had been unable to attend to. Much hardwork on the part of the Vietnamese and Americans alike brought the ship up to the appearance of a "show ship". CAMP was turned over with most of her sophisticated electronics equipment removed to fit her new mission of coastal patrol.

Another DER, the USS FORSTER, is scheduled for turnover on 15 November 1971, with a crew of 90 men remaining on board to accomplish pre-turnover work.

On 21 February the commencement ceremony was held for the manning of the support base at Long Phu. Manning of the support base at Cat Lai was completed on 28 February.

ACTOVLOG phase-ins continued on schedule. The rapid expansion of the VNN, including the acquisition of four LSTs, two PCEs, two WHECs, and one DER within the past year naturally resulted in severe personnel problems. The availability of qualified and experienced

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petty officers to man additional ships placed strong constraints on the timing of future turnovers.

A significant accomplishment during the month of February was the establishment of messes at various support bases. Ten combined USN/VNN messes were commenced, and five messes were begun in newly activated units having separate VN food supply service. Nine of the 35 support bases had already achieved the goal of separate messing.

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U.S. NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON

On 1 February at DaNang, three LCM-8s and one utility boat were turned over to the VNN First Coastal Zone, and on 27 February four more boats, LCM-3, hull number 18, and three LCM-6s, were turned over. LCDR Nguyen Huu Xuan, First Coastal Zone Chief of Staff, accepted the boats from LCDR T. A. Head, NSF Operations Officer, in a ceremony at the lighterage causeway. Since the craft turnover program began in September 1969, NSF DaNang has turned over 76 boats. NSF DaNang also turned over the first of its dependent shelters for families of the VNN when, on 7 February, 116 were accepted by the VNN at Camp Tien Sha. The housing units, converted from former USN tropical barracks, became available to any married VNN officer or enlisted man. As U.S. personnel continue to depart Camp Tien Sha, which once sheltered 10,000 men at the USN's largest overseas shore command, more buildings are being converted into dependent shelters.

Two NSAS support ships ended their careers in Vietnamese waters during the month. The USS BENEWAH (APB 35) was decommissioned on 26 February at Naval Station, Subic Bay after four years of Vietnam service; YRBM 16, another long-time veteran of Vietnam departed on 23 February in preparation for eventual turnover to the VNN. Since her

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arrival in Vietnam after her third commissioning on January 28, 1967, BENEWAH had served as Flagship for Commander Task Force 117 with the Second Brigade Ninth Infantry Division of the Mobile Riverine Force. She had also served as Flagship for Commander Riverine Strike Group on the Vam Co and Soi Rap Rivers and support ship for BARRIER REEF operations on the Upper Mekong River. She then acted as Flagship for First SEALORDS during TRAN HUNG DAO XI operations in Cambodia. BENEWAH was the communications center and tactical operations center for the complex control functions of riverine warfare; her helopad had recorded about 16,800 landings during her four year stay in the Republic. The last major operation for BENEWAH was TRAN HUNG DAO XVI, a joint operation with the Vietnamese Navy. YRBM 16 arrived in Nha Be in June 1966 soon after the establishment of NSAS and was outfitted as a berthing and repair adjunct to the base. In June 1967 YRBM 16 moved to Can Tho to assume CTF 116 operations support and PBR maintenance while the new detachment became operational. On 24 November 1967 in Ben Tre YRBM 16 suffered a swimmer placed mine explosion and fire which caused the deaths of five people and the temporary disestablishment of the Ben Tre detachment as the heavily damaged craft was towed to Dong Tam. She returned from repairs in August 1968 to serve on the Upper Bassac River in support of TF 116 (GAME WARDEN) PBRs engaged in Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT.

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During February YRBM 20 was tasked with providing emergency support for Cambodian naval units at Tan Chau and responded by issuing POL, ammunition, general supplies and repair parts on demand, in support of Cambodian border patrols and combat operations.

During February the first NSAS Mobile Base Maintenance Team, complete with its own LCM, arrived at ATSB Ben Keo on 27 February. Tasked with the rehabilitation of the advanced tactical support base, the team will repair buildings and base defense structures and complete minor construction projects in preparation for the upcoming turnover of the support base to the VNN. The Repair Facility of NSF Cam Ranh Bay began the repair of VNN junks of Coastal Divisions 25, 26, 27, and 28. Vietnamese Navy personnel transferred from the Junk Repair Facility at Nha Trang became instructors for this new operation.

Also at NSF Cam Ranh Bay, a Communications Radio Control Center to link the allied forces in the area was established within the Security Division. The installation of antenna poles for the communications systems under construction at An Thoi and Dong Tam detachments was underway at the first of the month; material for communications installations at Vinh Long, Cat Lai, Long Phu, Cho Moi, and Ca Mau ISBs was in the staging process during the month; and the COMSEC system at VNNTC Nha Trang neared completion.

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NSAS extended more disbursing services to support personnel by establishing two new outlets and extending operating hours. The new units opened on 16 February at the Vietnamese Naval Shipyard and at the NAVFORV Compound in Saigon.

LSB Dong Tam received five mortar rounds at noon on 12 February and three rounds again that night, all of which caused no damage. The only casualty reported by NSAS and its detachments was the suicide on 26 February of SK2 Walter H. Nayar, USN, at FASU DaNang.

Visitors to NSAS and detachments during the month included the Australian Chief of Naval Staff, VADM Richard L. Peek, 23-27 February, MCPO D.F. Bradberry, the Senior ~~Enlisted~~ Representative for NAVFORV (to naval facilities in the Cam Ranh Bay area during the week of 22 February), and CPO Don Smith of COMNAVAIRPAC's drug education team, who visited NSF Cam Ranh Bay 13-15 February and presented a series of drug education programs.

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32nd NAVAL CONSTRUCTION REGIMENT

Seabees endured few hostile incidents in February while continuing work throughout the Republic of Vietnam on dependent shelter and ACTOV projects. On 3 February Detail Libra at Hill 37 received three mortar rounds which caused no casualties. On 10 February one Seabee suffered a minor leg injury from sniper fire on Route QL-1 in Quang Nam Province three miles south of LZ Baldy. A five-ton Seabee tractor was damaged by a mine detonation in Quang Nam, and on 20 February, an NMCB 74 LCM-6 was ineffectively fired upon from a sampan while enroute to Long Phu.

During February Seabees of NMCB 74 were tasked with the construction of ACTOVRAD (radar) facilities at Ta Kou in MR3, 15 miles south west of Phan Thiet and Mui Dinh in MR2, 14 miles south of Phan Rang. Permanent base camps at the radar sites were constructed by Details Kilo and Juliet. At the Ta Kou site efforts to construct 8 miles of road from QL1 to the radar site met VC resistance in the form of mine emplacements and ambush attempts. On the 11th of the month, Seabees detected one mine, 200 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition, and one Vietnamese with a B-40 weapon (possibly rocket launcher). The VN escaped Seabee fire, and the mine was detonated in place. On the 26th Seabees found a booby-trapped 155mm round with a prong

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detonating device, which they destroyed in place.

On 1 February, Golden Gate Bridge on Route 1-D was blown, and by the 5th Seabees had completed repairs. Detail Libra completed rebuilding the storm damaged 400-foot London Bridge near Hill 37 on Route TL-540. The bridge was opened to traffic on the 22nd.

NMCB 74 Seabees continued work on ACTOV bases at Nam Can (85% complete at month's end), Long Phu (90%) and Cho Moi (83%). The base at the Cho Moi was manned on 10 February, and the VNN moved into the Long Phu base later in the month. NMCB 74 reported the ATSB at Tu Hien was 25% completed and the Nam Can runway 76% completed.

Seabees of NMCB 3 Detail Borealis at work on the ACTOV base at Ca Mau which was begun last month met with delays in material transportation to the site during February. They graded the access road and built a security fence. Detail Neptune, working on the Cua Viet pier facility (YD 333 693) which was also begun last month, reported 36% of the main piling and decking complete.

So far in the Dependent Shelter Program Seabees have completed 140 of 480 units at Thu Duc (XT 901 828) and 141 of 160 units at Chau

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
Doc (WS 246 715), and construction of dependent shelters continues at Nam Can, Long Phu, and Cho Moi. At these five sites, 522 units have been completed of the assigned 1660. At ISB Ben Luc NAV CAT 5 completed 98 units and one five-room school by 27 February.

During February Seabee units in Vietnam suffered one fatality, HM1 D. A. Davison, a member of Seabee Team 1020, who died in his sleep. Seabees were awarded one Navy Commendation Medal, one Navy Achievement Medal, four Good Conduct awards, and one Combat Action Ribbon during February.


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COMNAVFORV & CHNAVADVGRV STAFF ORGANIZATION

1 FEBRUARY 1971



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COMNAVFORV & CHNAVADVGRP Organization

1. (C) Task Force 115 Organization

CTF 115	Coastal Surveillance Force (Cam Ranh Bay)	CAPT C. R. Quanstrom, Jr.
CTG 115.1 through CTG 115.5		Unassigned
CTG 115.6	MARKET TIME Offshore Reaction Group (CRB)	CAPT Quanstrom, USN
CTU 115.6.1	MARKET TIME Offshore Reaction Unit One	Senior CO, Offshore Patrol Area One
CTE 115.6.1.1	Northern DMZ Barrier Patrol Element	CO, Patrol Unit assigned
CTU 115.6.2	MARKET TIME Offshore Reaction Unit Two	Senior CO, Offshore Patrol Area Two
CTU 115.6.3	MARKET TIME Offshore Reaction Unit Three	Senior CO, Offshore Patrol Area Three
CTU 115.6.4	MARKET TIME Offshore Reaction Unit Four	Senior CO, Offshore Patrol Area Four
CTU 115.6.5	MARKET TIME Offshore Reaction Unit Five	Senior CO, Offshore Patrol Area Five
CTU 115.6.6	MARKET TIME Offshore Reaction Unit Six	Senior CO, Offshore Patrol Area Six
CTU 115.6.7	MARKET TIME Offshore Reaction Unit Seven	Senior CO, Offshore Patrol Area Seven
CTU 115.6.8	MARKET TIME Offshore Reaction Unit Eight	Senior CO, Offshore Patrol Area Eight
CTE 115.6.8.1	MARKET TIME Support LST Assigned by NSAS	CO MARKET TIME Support LST
CTU 115.6.9	MARKET TIME Offshore Reaction Unit Nine	Senior CO, Offshore Patrol Area Nine

CTG 115.7		Unassigned
CTG 115.8	Operational Readiness Group (CRB)	CAPT Quanstrom, USN
CTG 115.9	Harbor Surveillance Group	CAPT Quanstrom, USN
CTU 115.9.1	Harbor Surveillance Test Unit OIC NAVSEARANDCEN Military Detachment	LT D. Ussery
CTU 115.9.2	EOD Team Unit - OIC EOD Tm 36	LT Cowan

2. Task Force 116 Organization

CTF 116	COMDELTA NAVFOR SENADV CTF 212	CAPT Spruit, USN
CTG 116.1	SOLID ANCHOR Commander	CAPT Spruit, USN
CTU 116.1.0	Deputy CDR	LCDR Tuyen, VNN
CTU 116.1.1	Surface Ops Unit	LCDR Tuyen, VNN
CTE 116.1.1.1	Assault Element One, CO RID 44	LT Be, VNN
CTE 116.1.1.2	Assault Element One, CO RID 41	LT Thrieu, VNN
CTU 116.1.2	Ground Ops Unit	As assigned
CTE 116.1.2.1	Ground Element 44th ARVN Ranger BN	MAJ Thi, ARVN
CTE 116.1.2.2	CIDG Unit, CO Assigned CIDG Unit	As assigned
CTU 116.1.3	SPECWAR Unit, SPECWAR Coordinator	LT Telfer
CTE 116.1.3.1	Seal Element One - OC Seal Team One Det Golf Zulu Plt	LT Telfer
CTE 116.1.3.4	Seal Support Element Two OIC MST Two Det Charlie	LT Natter
CTE 116.1.3.5	Seal Element Three- OIC Seal Team One Det Golf Whiskey Plt	LT Couch

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CTE 116.1.3.6	Tightjaw Element OIC MON Tm 5	WO Thoan, VNN
CTE 116.1.3.7	Ordnance Disposal Element OIC EOD Tm 82 Element	WO1 Wharton
CTE 116.1.3.8	Demolition Element-OIC UDT 13	LTJG Moser
CTU 116.1.4	ATSB Unit Base CO	LCDR Campbell
CTE 116.1.4.1	Swimmer Defense Element	As assigned
CTE 116.1.4.2	Unassigned	
CTE 116.1.4.3	Logistic Support Element - OIC Logistic Support Craft	As assigned
CTE 116.1.4.4	Base Support Element - OIC Base Support Craft	As assigned
CTE 116.1.4.5	Biet Hai Element OIC Biet Hai	As assigned
CTE 116.1.4.6	Regional Force Element RF Co. CO	As assigned
CTU 116.1.5	Support Craft Unit	As assigned
CTE 116.1.5.1	NGFS Element - CO PG assigned	As assigned
CTE 116.1.5.2	PCF Element, Senior OIC PCF	As assigned
CTE 116.1.5.3	Support Ship Element Senior CO LSIL/LSSL Assigned	As assigned
CTU 116.1.6	Unassigned	
CTU 116.1.7	Psyops/Polwar Unit OIC BJU Tm One Det Thirteen	As assigned
CTU 116.1.8	HAL-3 Det One OIC	CDR Steiner
CTG 116.2	BREEZY COVE SENADV	LCDR Dannheim
CTU 116.2.1	HAL-3 Det 3 OIC	LCDR O'Connor
CTU 116.2.2	HAL-3 Det 6 OIC	LCDR Hoffman
CTU 116.2.3	SPECWAR Unit - OIC Seal Tm Two Det Alfa 9th Plt	LT Moran

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CTE 116. 2. 3. 1	Seal Support Element OIC MST Two Det Foxtrot	LTJG Berg
CTG 116. 3	THD IX Advisor SA CTG 212. 3	LCDR Cousins
CTU 116. 3. 1	HAL-3 Det Nine OIC	CDR Strand
CTU 116. 3. 2	EODMUPAC OIC EOD Tm 39	LTJG Mixter
CTG 116. 4	THD I Advisor SA CTG 212. 4	LCDR Barbour
CTU 116. 4. 1	HAL-3 Det 5 OIC	CDR Kehrli
CTG 116. 5	THD VI Advisor SA CTG 212. 5	LCDR Brown
CTU 116. 5. 1	HAL-3 Det Eight OIC	LT Joplin
CTU 116. 5. 2	SPECWAR Unit-Seal Tm One Det Golf Kilo Plt	LT Marsh
CTE 116. 5. 2. 1	Seal Support Element OIC MST Two Det Echo	LTJG Freeman
CTG 116. 6	THD VIII and XIV Advisor 4th Riverine Area Advisor	CDR Wardell
CTU 116. 6. 1	Hal-3 Det 7 OIC	LCDR Gordon
CTU 116. 6. 2	SPECWAR Unit - Seal Tm One Det Golf XRay Plt	LT Collins
CTE 116. 6. 2. 1	Seal Support Unit OIC	CWO2 Shepard
CTU 116. 6. 3	SPECWAR Unit Seal Tm Two 8th Plt	LT Davis
CTE 116. 6. 3. 1	Seal Support Unit OIC MST Two Det Delta	LTJG Platt
CTG 116. 7	HAL-3/Seawolf Commander CFAD Binh Thuy/ CO HAL-3	CAPT Twite
CTU 116. 7. 1	HAL-3 Det One OIC	CDR Steiner
CTU 116. 7. 2	HAL-3 Det Two OIC	CDR Briggs
CTU 116. 7. 3	HAL-3 Det Three OIC	LCDR M. B. O'Connor

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CTU 116.7.5	HAL-3 Det Five OIC	CDR Kehrli
CTU 116.7.4	HAL-3 Det Four OIC	LCDR Caldwell
CTU 116.7.6	HAL-3 Det Six OIC	LCDR Hoffman
CTU 116.7.7	HAL-3 Det Seven OIC	LCDR Gordon
CTU 116.7.8	HAL-3 Det Eight OIC	LCDR Joplin
CTU 116.7.9	HAL-3 Det Nine OIC	CDR Strand
CTG 116.8	Black Pony CDR CO VAL-4	CDR Rausch
CTG 116.9	RSSZ Advisor SA RSSZ	CDR Williams
CTU 116.9.1	HAL-3 Det Two OIC	CDR Briggs
CTG 116.10	THD II Advisor, SA CTG 214.1	LCDR Gesswein
CTG 116.11	Psyops/Polwar Unit - OIC BJU Tm One Det 13	LTJG Stevens
CTU 116.10.1	HAL-3 Det Four OIC	LCDR Caldwell
CTG 116.12	FORSPECWAR OIC	LT Defloria
CTU 116.12.1	SPECWAR Group One OIC Seal Tm One Det Golf	LT Defloria
CTU 116.12.2	SPECWAR Group Two OIC Seal Tm Two Det Alfa	LT Yeaw
CTU 116.12.3	SPECWAR Support Element OIC MST Two	LT Selzer
CTE 116.12.1.1	SPECWAR Unit - OIC Seal Tm One Det Golf Yankee Plt	LTJG Horst
CTE 116.12.1.2	SPECWAR Unit OIC Seal Tm One Det Golf Victor Plt	LTJG Clapp
CTE 116.12.1.3	SPECWAR Unit OIC Seal Tm One Det Golf XRay Plt	LT Collins
CTE 116.12.1.4	SPECWAR Unit - OIC Seal Tm One Det Golf Kilo Plt	LTJG Marsh

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CTE 116.12.1.5 SPECWAR Unit - OIC Seal Tm One LT Telfer
Det Golf Zulu Plt

CTE 116.12.1.6 SPECWAR Unit OIC Seal Tm One LT Couch
Det Golf Whiskey Plt

CTE 116.12.2.1 SPECWAR Unit OIC Seal Tm Two LT Davis
Det Alfa 8th Plt

CTE 116.12.2.2 SPECWAR Unit - OIC Seal Tm Two LT Moran
Det Alfa 9th Plt

CTE 116.12.2.3 SPECWAR Unit - OIC Seal Tm Two LTJG Ganoung
Det Alfa 10 Plt

CTE 116.12.2.4 EODMUPAC OIC EOD Tm 38 WO1 Huffman

CTE 116.12.3.1 Seal Support Element OIC MST Two CWO2 Shepherd
Det Alfa

CTE 116.12.3.2 Seal Support Element OIC MST Two LTJG Finnerty
Det Bravo

CTE 116.12.3.3 Seal Support Element OIC MST Two LT Natter
Det Charlie

CTE 116.12.3.4 Seal Support Element OIC MSR Two LTJG Pratt
Det Delta

CTE 116.12.3.5 Seal Support Element OIC MST Two LTJG Freeman
Det Echo

CTE 116.12.3.6 Seal Support Element OIC MST Two LTJG Berg
Det Foxtrot

CTE 116.12.3.7 Seal Support Element OIC MST Two LTJG Bremer
Det Golf

3. Naval Advisory Group Organization

CHNAVADVGRP U.S. MACV

VADM J.H. King, Jr., USN

SENAVADV

CAPT E. I. Finke, USN

SA VNNLSC and SA DCOS LOG VNN

RADM P.S. McManus, USN

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SA FLEET COMMAND **DECLASSIFIED**

SA CTG TWO TWO SEVEN

SA CTG TWO TWO EIGHT

Amphibious type command advisory organization

SA PHIBCMD

SA RAID SEVEN ZERO

SA RAID SEVEN ONE

SA RAID SEVEN TWO

SA RAID SEVEN THREE

SA RAID SEVEN FOUR

SA RAID SEVEN FIVE

River Patrol type command advisory organization

SA RIVPATCMD

SA RPD FIVE ONE

SA RPD FIVE TWO

SA RPD FIVE THREE

SA RPD FIVE FOUR

SA RPD FIVE FIVE

SA RPD FIVE SIX

SA RPD FIVE SEVEN

SA RPD FIVE EIGHT

SA RPD FIVE NINE

CAPT B. G. Stone, USN
(R) CAPT J. F. Drake, USN

LCDR J. H. Gaul, USN

CDR J. G. Williams, USN

CAPT W. J. Crowe, USN

LT T. W. Southworth, USN

LT C. Armentrout, USN

LT W. Weikel, USN

LT C. T. Hardy, USN

LT F. B. Ryland, USN

LT L. Harrison, USN

CAPT R. E. Spruit, USN

LT J. M. Lawless, USN

LT J. R. Jones, USN

LT S. A. Wood, USN

LT W. D. Dubois, USN

LT D. Ursprung, USN

LT J. D. Gilbert, USN

(R) LT B. L. Gravatt, USN

LT J. B. Burneskis, USN

LT H. M. Highland, USN

LT. J. E. Pepper, USN

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SA RPD SIX ZERO

LT J. E. Warren, USN

SA RPD SIX ONE

LT G. M. Zemansky, USN

SA RPD SIX TWO

LT T. C. Voight, USN

SA RPD SIX THREE

LT R. B. Fiore, USNR

SA RPD SIX FOUR

LT T. J. Flynn, USN

Coastal surveillance type command advisory organization

SA CSCMD

CAPT C. R. Quanstrom, USN

SA COSFLOT One

LCDR T. J. Berger, USN
(R) Lcdr D. C. Wilson, USN

SA COSFLOT TWO

LCDR R. Lowman, USN

SA COSFLOT THREE

LCDR J. J. Dooley, USN

SA COSFLOT FOUR

LCDR L. G. Tonti, USN

SA COSFLOT FIVE

LCDR R. Foberg, USN
(R) Lcdr J. McCormick, USN

SA HDU CRB

LT J. L. Jansen, USNR

General Reserve type command advisory organization

SA GENRESCOMD/CTF 214

CDR S. Vanwestendorp, USN
(R) CDR L. Dwyer, USN

SA RTE DIV EIGHT ONE

LT J. P. Deaton, USN

SA MID NINE ONE

LTJG H. G. Law, USNR

SA MID NINE TWO

LTJG D. K. Crone, USN
(R) LTJG T. A. Comer, USN

SA MID NINE THREE

LT P. N. Johnson, USN

SA Seal and UDT Unit

LT G. W. Doran, USN

SA Salvage Unit

LT M. C. Eggar, USN

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SA Salvage Unit	LTJG C. Hardeman, USNR
SA Salvage Unit	LT E. H. Shipp, USN
SA RID FOUR ZERO	LT R. W. Kirtley, USN
SA RID FOUR ONE	LT S. Ethridge, USNR (R) LT D. L. Vroom, USN
SA RID FOUR TWO	LT C. Votava, USN
SA RID FOUR THREE	LTJG S. J. Mihalic, USNR (R) LTJG G. C. Cooley, USN
SA RID FOUR FIVE	LT F. Mauney, USN
SA RID FOUR SIX	LT J. A. Sinkovec, USN
SA RID FOUR SEVEN	LT W. Strobel, USN (R) LT W. Taylor, USN
SA RID FOUR EIGHT	LT W. Stoehs, USNR (R) LT R. Milham, USN
SA RAG TWO SEVEN	LT J. P. Zaretki, USN (R) LTJG W. Gottschalk, USN
First Coastal Zone Advisory Organization	
SA FIRST CZ	CDR P. McLaird, Jr., USN
SA CG ONE ONE	LTJG R. Duminiak, USNR
SA CG ONE TWO	LT C. L. Roller, USN (R) LT R. N. Myers, USN
SA CG ONE THREE	LTJG R. F. Pascal, USNR (R) LTJG P. A. Romanski, USNR
SA CG ONE FOUR	LT D. M. Pence, USN
SA CG ONE FIVE	LT D. Robinson, USN
SA CG ONE SIX	LT C. A. Pennington, USN
SA RAG THREE TWO	LT G. L. Mager, USN

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SA HDU DaNang

LTJG D. W. Wirick, USNR

SA CSC DaNang

LT W. Maljan, USNR

Second Coastal Zone Advisory organization

SA SECOND CZ

CDR J. L. Marriott, USN
(R) CDR A. S. Jefferis, USN

SA CG TWO ONE

LT J. Engelken, USN

SA CG TWO THREE

LT M. W. Lingo, USN

SA CG TWO FIVE

LT E. F. Gier, USN

SA CG TWO SIX

LT M. M. Fowler, USN

SA CG TWO SEVEN

LT E. Siwinski, USNR

SA CG TWO EIGHT

LT G. Nordland, USN

SA HDU Nha Trang

LT J. E. Bingham, USN

SA HDU Qui Nhon

LT D. C. Ogden, USN

SA CSC Qui Nhon

LCDR R. Sagehorn, USN

Third Coastal Zone Advisory Organization

SA THIRD CZ

CDR K. P. Hughes, USN
(R) CDR J. G. Sullivan, USN

SA CG THREE THREE

LT F. M. Lemon, USN

SA CG THREE FOUR

LT B. R. Moffett, USN

SA CG THREE FIVE

LTJG T. E. Arnold, USN

SA CG THREE SIX

LT C. L. Dobson, USN

SA HDU Vung Tau

LT G. C. Rogers, USN

SA CSC Vung Tau

LTJG D. L. Pryber, USNR

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Fourth Coastal Zone Advisory Organization

SA FOURTH CZ	CDR M. J. Shine., USN
SA CG FOUR ONE	LT G. K. Payne, USNR
SA CG FOUR TWO	(R) LTJG R. Johnson, USN LTJG J. D. Holman, USNR (R) LT O. R. Cole, III, USN
SA CG FOUR THREE	LT S. L. Pfiester, USNR (R) LT H. C. Giffin, USN
SA CG FOUR FOUR	LTJG D. C. Snyder, USN
SA CSC An Thoi	LTJG J. H. Pell, USNR

Third Riverine Zone Advisory Organization

SA THIRD RIVERINE ZONE	CDR L. E. Pellock, USN
SA RAG TWO TWO	LT K. E. Parks, USN (R) LT J. Calabough, USN
SA RAG TWO FOUR	LT K. A. Wagner, USN (R) LTJG R. L. Canon, USNR
SA RAG TWO EIGHT	LT J. T. McWilliams, USNR (R) LT. R. M. Andrews, USN
SA RAG THREE ZERO	LT M. P. Stoppa, USNR (R) LT J. M. Powell, USN

Fourth Riverine Zone Advisory Organization

SA FOURTH RIVERINE ZONE	CDR W. Wardell, USN
SA RAG TWO ONE/THREE THREE	LT R. L. Lassiter, USN (R) LT K. J. Plis, USN
SA RAG TWO THREE/THREE ONE	LTJG R. E. Brown, USN
SA RAG TWO FIVE	LT R. J. Gilleskie, USN
SA RAG TWO SIX	LTJG R. W. Bass, USNR

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SA RAG 29

LT R. Oversier, USNR

Naval Training Center Advisory Organization

SA NTC Nha Trang

CDR R. Tarbuck,, USN

SA NTC Cam Ranh Bay

CDR L. W. Ames , USN

SA NTC Saigon

CDR R. R. Grove , USN

Logistics Support Command advisory organization

SA LSB An Thoi

LCDR M. Andrasko, USN

SA ISB Rach Soi

LT M. A. Cox , USN

SA ISB Qui Nhon

LCDR M. Austin , USN

SA ISB Ben Luc

LT G. C. Meiers , USN

SA LSB Cat Lo

LCDR V. J. Vawter, USN
(R) LCDR S. Ungemach , USN

SA LSB Dong Tam

CDR R. Johe , USN

SA LSB Cam Ranh Bay

CDR J. G. Connelly, USN

SA LSB DaNang

CAPT M. A. Horn , USN

SA LSB Nha Be

CDR D. J. Moss, USN

SA ISB Thuan An

CDR W. Hunter, USN
(R) LCDR J. Stevens , USN

SA LSB Binh Thuy

CDR R. F. Dugan , USN
(R) CDR G. A. McGee, USNR

SA ISB Long Xuyen

(R) LCDR A. Thiel, USN

SA ISB Long Phu

LTJG J. D. Ramsey, USNR

SA ISB Vinh Long

LTJG A. Casares, USNR
(R) LTJG W. McAlister, USNR

SA ISB Cat Lai

LTJG J. F. Mayer , USN

SA ISB Ca Mau

LT C. McClain, USN

SA ISB Nam Can

LCDR T. Campbell, USN

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APPENDIX III

Glossary of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text:

ABF	Attack by fire
AMMI PONTOON	A multi-purpose barge, standard size 28'x90'
AO	Area of operations
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
A/S	Air strike
ASPB	Assault Support Patrol Boat
ART	Artillery
ATC	Armored Troop Carrier
ATSB	Advance Tactical Support Base
A/W	Automatic Weapons
BLACK PONY	OV-10 Twin Engine Turboprop Counter-insurgency aircraft
CCB	Command and Communications Boat
CG	Coastal Group
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group - mercenaries of Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian descent who fight primarily around their own villages.

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CMD	Capital Military District
CONUS	Continental United States
CRIP	Civilian Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon
CZ	Coastal Zone
DUSTOFF	Medical evacuation by helo
ENIFF	Enemy initiated fire fight
FOM	French Patrol Boat
FSB	Fire Support Base
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
GDA	Gun Damage Assessment
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HAFT	Helicopter Attack Fire Team
H&I	Harassment and Interdiction Fire Support
JGS	Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)
KIT CARSON SCOUTS	Former Viet Cong who have come over to the side of the Saigon government and serve with allied military units
LAFT	Light Attack Fire Team
LAW	Light Anti-tank Weapon
LCPL	Landing Craft, Personnel, Large
LDNN	Vietnamese equivalent of USN Underwater Demolition Team
LHFT	Light Helo Fire Team
LOH	OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter

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LRRP	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MATSB	Mobile Advance Tactical Support Base
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
MONITOR	Heavily armored LCM-6 (40mm Cannon or 105mm Howitzer)
MR	Military Region
MSB	Minesweeper, Boat
MSD	Minesweeper, Drone
MSF	Mobile Strike Force - mercenaries who deploy and go anywhere
NGF	Naval Gun Fire
NGFS	Naval Gun Fire Support
NILO	Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer
NIOTC	Naval Inshore Operations Training Center
NOD	Night Observation Device
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
OJT	On the job training
PBR	Patrol Boat, River
PCF	Patrol Craft, Fast (Swift Boat)
PRU	Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
PSA	Province Sector Advisor
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations

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RAD	River Assault Division
RAG	River Assault Group (VNN)
RAID	River Assault and Interdiction Division (VNN)
RAP	Rocket Assisted Projectile
RAS	River Assault Squadron
RF/PF	Regional Forces/Popular Forces
RPD	River Patrol Division
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade or River Patrol Group
RSSZ	Rung Sat Special Zone
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Air Force (or Armed Forces)
SAR	Search And Rescue
SEAWOLF	UH-1B Helo, heavily armored, USN operated
SHADOW	C-119 aircraft
SKIMMER	20-foot fiberglass motorboat
SLICK	UH-1B Helo, USA operated
SPOOKY	C-47 aircraft
SSB	Swimmer Support Boat (Skimmer)
STAB	Strike Assault Boat
TAOR	Tactical Area Of Responsibility
USARV	United States Army, Vietnam
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN	Vietnamese Navy
ZIPPO	Flame thrower - equipped ATC or Monitor

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