


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Table of Contents

	Page
<u>FOREWORD</u>	ii
<u>CURRENT OPERATIONS</u>	1
<u>CHANGE OF COMMAND</u>	2
<u>NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP SUMMARY</u>	
Task Fleet 21.....	5
TRAN HUNG DAO II.....	7
TRAN HUNG DAO IV.....	10
TRAN HUNG DAO V.....	18
TRAN HUNG DAO VI.....	23
TRAN HUNG DAO VIII.....	26
TRAN HUNG DAO IX.....	31
TRAN HUNG DAO X.....	32
TRAN HUNG DAO XVII.....	36
TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII.....	50
TRAN HUNG DAO XIX.....	54
TRAN HUNG DAO XX.....	58
Rung Sat Special Zone.....	60
Long Tau Shipping Channel.....	68
<u>CTF 211</u>	69
<u>CTF 212</u>	70
<u>CTF 214</u>	71
<u>RIVER ASSAULT GROUPS</u>	72
<u>SPECIAL WARFARE</u>	73
<u>COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCES (COASTAL ZONES)</u>	74
<u>PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY</u>	93
<u>ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY</u>	97
<u>NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON</u>	111
<u>THIRD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BRIGADE</u>	121
APPENDIX I - COMNAVFORV/CHNAVADVGRP Organization.....	126
APPENDIX II - CHNAVADVGRP Task and Advisory Organization.....	127
APPENDIX III - Glossary of Abbreviations.....	134

FOREWORD

Overt enemy actions continued at a moderate level during the month of April, while mining attempts persisted in plaguing allied patrols and shipping in the Cua Viet River, U Minh Forest, and Ca Mau Peninsula, and, for the first time in over a year, the Upper Saigon River in the TRAN HUNG DAO V AO. On the Cua Viet, the VNN patrol craft and local fishermen encountered 12 mines during the month, which was eight less than the preceding month, a decrease explained by the close of the Laos LAMSON 719 Operation, which reduced the number of lucrative waterborne targets. Also, the enemy was believed to be refitting from the high point reached in the preceding month, as well as shifting to the coastal area to lay mines north of the DMZ.

While the war continued to be prosecuted, the Accelerated Turnover Program, ACTOV, achieved several milestones. The first of April marked the turnover of the last U.S. Naval operation in Vietnam, SOLID ANCHOR, to the Vietnamese Navy, the operation being redesignated as TRAN HUNG DAO IV. With the commissioning of the VNN's first destroyer, VNS TRAN HUNG DAO (HQ-1) the ex-USS CAMP, on 22 April, the Vietnamese augmented their offshore patrol capability. At the end of the month the major support bases

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at Cat Lo and Ben Luc were turned over, as well as seven lesser support bases and seven logistics support craft. These multiple turnovers of logistics assets underlined the turn in emphasis of the ACTOV Program to ACTOVLOG.

In the first trawler engagement for the year 1971, an SL-8 trawler was sunk by the combined U.S. Naval, U.S. Coast Guard, and Vietnamese Navy forces off the mouth of the Cua Ganh Hao River after a two hour surface engagement on 12 April. This was the first trawler sunk since November 1970.

The U.S. Navy in-country strength continued to decline in April. As of 29 April there were 12,166 Naval personnel in South Vietnam, a reduction of over 3,000 men over the course of the month. The Coast Guard strength dwindled down to 15 officers and 84 enlisted men.

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CURRENT OPERATIONS

<u>VNN Designation</u>	<u>USN Designation</u>
TRAN HUNG DAO II (TG 214.1)	GIANT SLINGSHOT
TRAN HUNG DAO IV (TG 214.2)	SOLID ANCHOR
TRAN HUNG DAO V (TG 216.1)	READY DECK
TRAN HUNG DAO VI (TG 212.5)	SEARCH TURN
TRAN HUNG DAO VII (TG 221.1)	SEA TIGER
TRAN HUNG DAO VIII (TG 217.1)	NONE
TRAN HUNG DAO IX (TG 212.3)	BARRIER REEF
TRAN HUNG DAO X (TG 212.6)	BREEZY COVE
TRAN HUNG DAO XV (TF 213)	MARKET TIME Inner Barrier
TRAN HUNG DAO XVII (TF 210)	NONE
TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII (TF 218)	NONE
TRAN HUNG DAO XIX (TG 217.2)	NONE
TRAN HUNG DAO XX (TG 219.4)	NONE
RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE	NONE

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CHANGE OF COMMAND

On 5 April at 0001Z, Rear Admiral Robert S. Salzer, USN, relieved Vice Admiral Jerome H. King, Jr., USN and assumed command of U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam. In addition, he reported to COMUSMACV for additional duty as Chief Naval Advisory Group, MACV. No formal change of command ceremony was held and the assumption of command took place without the benefit of the presence of Vice Admiral King who was incapacitated by illness. Vice Admiral King stated, upon being relieved:

"Today, 5 April, I have been relieved as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam and Chief, Naval Advisory Group, MACV, by Rear Admiral Robert S. Salzer. I would like to express to 'All Hands' my admiration for your dedicated performance during my tour in command, both in combat and in pursuing the Navy portion of the Vietnamization Program which is of such vital importance to both the United States and to the Republic of Vietnam.

In the turbulent months since I relieved Admiral Zumwalt on 15 May 1970, the Navy in Vietnam has undergone an almost complete transition from an operating force to an advisory organization. Exceptions to this transition are the remaining Naval Combat Forces, plus certain portions of the Naval Support Activity. Even among these, the pattern of operations and the resources available have changed markedly.

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Vice Admiral Jerome H. King, USN, COMNAVFORV May 15, 1970 - April 5, 1971

Despite the inevitable problems which have accompanied the transition, I have been deeply gratified at the performance of U. S. Navymen in Vietnam. In the final tally, progress has meaning only in terms of how well we have assisted the Vietnamese Navy toward the ability to continue, on their own, the fight against the enemy. In these terms, I believe we can view the past with quiet pride.

To each and every one of you I offer my best wishes for continued success."¹

Rear Admiral Salzer previously served in Vietnam from November 1967 to November 1968 as Commander, River Assault Flotilla One; Commander, River Support Squadron Seven; and Commander, Riverine Assault Force (Commander Task Force 117) where he instituted an imaginative program to develop and expand the mobility of riverine forces by implementing operations deep within the Viet Cong infested Mekong Delta. In early October 1968, he planned and subsequently carried out the combined Naval and ground Operation SEALORDS which, for the first time in the history of the Vietnamese conflict effectively integrated the efforts of the major U.S. Navy Task Forces in Vietnam, the Vietnamese Marine Corps, and the Vietnamese Navy, thereby thwarting the enemy's effort in the Mekong Delta and supporting the U.S. Army's dry season campaign.

1. COMNAVFORV and CHNAVADVGRP msg dtg 051511Z Apr 71.

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TASK FLEET 21

Military activity in the two lower regions of Vietnam continued to abate, but the problem of logistics continued to increase as many locations reported base facilities and maintenance to be lacking. The Cambodian oil resupply operation, TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII continued unabated as five more convoys were successfully escorted to Phnom Penh.

The new concept of using a brevity code, understandable to both USN and VNN personnel, to control Seawolf aircraft, continued to be utilized along with on-the-job training being conducted at various locations throughout the Delta. Another innovation being investigated is the introduction of Vietnamese "backseats" (forward air controllers) to ride in OV-10 and UH-1B aircraft to enhance communication with forces on the ground.

Operation TRAN HUNG DAO XX became fully operational in April after being initiated on 10 March to replace TRAN HUNG DAO I. The TRAN HUNG DAO XX AO differs from the TRAN HUNG DAO I AO in that it covers only the western third of the Vinh Te Canal whereas the other operation included the complete canal. Assets to be employed in the new command are 22 junks, a raider company composed of members drawn from Coastal Groups 41, 42, and 43, and four PCFs

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previously attached to TRAN HUNG DAO I.

On 1 April, Operation SOLID ANCHOR was turned over to the VNN and renamed TRAN HUNG DAO IV. Units assigned and area responsibility did not change.

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TRAN HUNG DAO II

Activities in the TRAN HUNG DAO II AO remained characteristically light during the month of April, with two sampans captured but little contraband, while intelligence reports indicated that some major infiltration attempts were succeeding in the AO. This raised the question of the actual effectiveness of the operation, since the sparse contact with the enemy could no longer be considered an indication that the enemy was not attempting active and major infiltrations.

The actions occurring sporadically in April were typically minor. On March 30 at 1955H, 25 kilometers southeast of Moc Hoa on the Vam Co Tay, two boats of RPD 64 came under B-40 and automatic weapons fire, which they returned with the aid of Seawolves that were called in. Four VNN personnel were wounded, two seriously, with one enemy confirmed dead and an AK-47 captured. On the 31st of March at 1205H, nine kilometers southeast of Tuyen Nhon, Seawolves struck to assist in the cover of a downed Army helo, killing one of the enemy. Two PBRs of RPD 64 detected a sampan two miles northwest of Tra Cu on the Vam Co Dong River (XT 463 015) on the 13th at 1535H. The PBRs initiated fire on the sampan, killing five of the enemy and capturing the boat, which contained an AK-47 and numerous documents. No friendly casualties were incurred.

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Shortly after midnight at 0140H on the 18th of April, ATSB Moc Hoa received three rounds of 82 mm mortar fire, which continued the chain of infrequent and minor mortar attacks on the city. Two of the rounds landed on the north bank of the river adjacent to the base, and the other round landed in the river. There were neither casualties nor any damage incurred.

Three PBRs of RPD 54 detected the second sampan captured in the month coming from a canal on the southwest bank of the Vam Co Tay, eight miles southeast of Tan An on the night of 23 April at 2000H. The VC fled the sampan and the PBRs took them under fire, killing three of the enemy. The sampan was duly captured and contained an AK-47 and various items of clothing.

Intelligence agents reported that various successful infiltration efforts occurred during the month of April. According to a 525 MI agent report, four VC in two sampans passed through the Binh Duc Village area in Ben Luc District (XS 533 806) in early April. Some VC later reconnoitered the area for later establishment of commo-liaison routes for the transport of plastic explosives for sapper and waterborne operations in Saigon and the Long An Subregion. Another agent reported a 22-man unit crossing the Vam Co Dong on 31 March in the vicinity of XS 557 805, near Ben Luc. The unit had come from the Ba Thu area of Cambodia. The suspected route travelled was a

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historical infiltration route utilizing the Bo Bo Canal (XT 26 03 - XS 56 81). The movement furthered the troop augmentation occurring in the TRAN HUNG DAO II AO with troops coming in from Cambodia for the wet season. The NVA 83rd Rear Services Group reportedly was gathering foodstuffs and military equipment to support an offensive in Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia Provinces during the wet months. Finally, agent reports were received of VC tax collection on both the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong Rivers and further exemplified the increased use of the rivers by the enemy.

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
TRAN HUNG DAO IV

The first of April marked a significant milestone for both the U.S. and Vietnamese Navies as Operation SOLID ANCHOR, the last U.S. Navy area of operation in Vietnam, was turned over to the Vietnamese Navy and renamed TRAN HUNG DAO IV. In ceremonies held at Nam Can Captain Eugene I. Finke, USN, was relieved as Operational Commander by LCDR Nguyen Van Tuyen, VNN. Nam Can Naval Base, the home and operational control center of TRAN HUNG DAO IV, will temporarily remain in U.S. hands until the Vietnamese are ready to assume the responsibility for logistical support.

SOLID ANCHOR, originally known as SEA FLOAT, was begun in June 1969 when an advanced tactical support base was towed up the Cua Lon River and placed opposite the remains of the city of Nam Can, destroyed in the "Tet" Offensive of 1968. After fierce fighting both on land and in the rivers, the floating base was moved ashore in September 1970, and the name of the operation changed to SOLID ANCHOR, connoting the now solid nature of the base. As a result of this operation, a firm government presence has been established; 9,000 people have moved back into the area and have resettled into two hamlets. And most importantly, the Viet Cong have lost the ability to control this area.


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Admiral McManus turns operational control of Operation SOLID ANCHOR to Admiral Chon, VNN CNO.

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SOLID ANCHOR base at Nam Can.

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Activity was somewhat diminished during April in the TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO as a total of 15 firefights took place claiming 20 friendly wounded in action (two USN, 18 VNN) and 30 VC killed in action and 15 captured. There was one mining incident and one abortive attack on ATSB Nam Can.

Although action on the rivers and canals slackened this month, when it did occur, it was very fierce. The first incident occurred on the early afternoon of 8 April when HQ 3923 and HQ 3918 were ambushed on the Cua Lon River at WQ 195 708. The enemy, striking from well concealed positions on the north bank fired ten B-40 rockets and automatic weapons at the "Swift Boats," scoring one B-40 hit which slightly damaged HQ 3923 and wounded two Vietnamese crewmen. Seawolf helicopters were called to suppress enemy fire, and the engagement was broken off. Enemy casualties were undetermined.

On 12 April the enemy again ambushed "Swift" boats on the Cua Lon River in the vicinity of WQ 140 698, this time from the south bank, but with no success as all three B-40 rounds missed their mark. Seawolves were immediately requested and responded with devastating fire in the vicinity of WQ 140 677. Results of the strike were unknown.

During a routine patrol on 14 April, units of RID 44 in convoy (Monitor 6531, ASPB 5133, ATCs 1213 and 1215) were proceeding up the Cai Nhap Canal in the vicinity of WQ 078 769 when a concussion grenade from the lead boat activated a watermine. There were no casualties or material damage, and the patrol continued on duties assigned.

The most bitter battle of the month came at 0920H on 15 April when a two element unit of RID 46 river craft, consisting of ATC (HQ 1276) in the lead and ASPB (HQ 5142) following, was ambushed on the Cai Nhap Canal at WQ 081 747. The ATC took only one round amidships, spraying shrapnel from stem to stern, incurring no casualties. The ASPB however, was not so lucky and took at least three and possibly five B-40 rounds, wounding all personnel on board and heavily damaging the craft. The ASPB was beached, and the ATC came about to render aid. In rapid succession the ATC started suppression fire, requested a Seawolf airstrike, and picked up the wounded men from the stricken ASPB. The Seawolves arrived on the scene and succeeded in suppressing enemy fire after which they medevaced the wounded VNN crewmembers to Nam Can. Meanwhile the ASPB slid off the bank of the canal and sank. Friendly losses were one ASPB sunk and six VNN wounded. Enemy losses were undetermined.

Seal Team One, Detachment Golf, Whiskey Platoon, at Nam Can was busy again attacking lines of communication, destroying supplies, and generally harassing the enemy deep in his own territory.

On 5 April Seals of Whiskey Platoon, acting on intelligence gleaned from a PF agent, were inserted southwest of Nam Can at VQ 962 663 at 0100H by an MSSC. They commenced patrolling in a northwesterly direction toward a suspected VC base camp, and at 1200H, they came upon the camp and a vicious firefight ensued. The outnumbered commandos pressed the attack, destroyed parts of the camp, wounded two VC, and under cover of "awesome and unrelenting fire" by Seawolf and SEALORDS aircraft, were extracted and returned to the "warmth and safety of the SOLID ANCHOR base."¹ Seawolf aircraft revisited the area after the extraction operation and completely leveled the complex. ATC P. J. McKnight who was wounded in the firefight, has been recommended for the Bronze Star Medal for his actions during this patrol.

On 7 April at 0200H, four Seals commanded by LT Couch, plus two SAS, two KCS, one guide, and one interpreter embarked in an MSSC for a search and capture mission aimed at VCI in An Xuyen Province. At 2245H, the Seal team interdicted two VC in a sampan

1. SEALORD Spotrep No. 314, P071420 Apr 71.

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at WQ 159 756 who promptly evaded in dense nipa palm growth, leaving their equipment behind. The enemy equipment was confiscated, and the sampan was sunk. The Seal team proceeded to the insertion point and patrolled northwest to WQ 152 769, and captured the VCI. After patrolling to WQ 110 756 and gaining no further results, the operation was concluded and the team returned to SOLID ANCHOR at 0300H.

The final Whiskey Platoon action of note came on 11 April at 0130H when Seals aided by Luc Luong 66 personnel (formerly Kit Carson Scouts) inserted 12 kilometers north of Nam Can at VQ 995 801 on a search and destroy mission. The Seals patrolled to the target area VQ 997 824, and on approach, received heavy automatic weapons fire from a hootch. The fire was returned, and the enemy fire suppressed. The hootch was then searched and found to contain three dead and two wounded VC along with two radio receivers, a pistol, and a grenade. The hootch was destroyed, and all friendlies returned safely to Nam Can.

The last significant action in TRAN HUNG DAO IV for April occurred on the night of 25 April when a night ambush position of the 42nd ARVN Rangers Battalion broke up an attempted attack on the base at Nam Can by sampan-borne Viet Cong. Airstrikes were

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called in, and illumination was furnished by the artillery unit at the base. There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties were undetermined.

On 14 April at 2130H a CS canister was thrown between USN and VNN barracks at the Nam Can base. Due to the prevailing wind at that time the CS agent penetrated the VNN barracks and caused an evacuation of the area. The perpetrator of this act was thought to be someone attached to the U.S. base defense force.

In another unfortunate incident, on 10 April at 1115H, on the east bank of the Kinh Ngang Canal (VQ 997 686), two soldiers from the 42nd ARVN Rangers were "fishing" with an MK-26 fragmentation grenade. A premature detonation occurred on release of the handle resulting in one dead soldier and one seriously wounded.

The following changes took place with regard to units attached to TRAN HUNG DAO IV. On 2 April the 43rd ARVN Rangers were replaced by the 42nd ARVN Rangers. On 18 April RID 41 departed on a six day transit to Ben Luc. Waterborne units attached to TRAN HUNG DAO IV effective 30 April 1971 were as follows:

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Senior Advisor</u>
CTG 214.2	RID 44	LT G. C. Cooley
	RID 46	LT J. A. Sinkovec
	COSDIV 511	

TRAN HUNG DAO V

Lack of effective communications in the TRAN HUNG DAO V AO was a continuing problem during the month of April. In March the Senior Advisor CTG 216.1 reported that patrol units operating approximately half way in the AO had no reliable direct communications with the NOC at Phu Cuong.¹ A retransmission site located at FSB Phuoc was suggested to alleviate this problem. The senior advisor to River Patrol Division 52 also reported having problems in the area of repair and maintenance of communications gear, and requested the assignment of additional personnel to correct this situation.²

Measures were also taken in April to improve the communications security posture of the TRAN HUNG DAO V AO. COMNAVFORV requested a block of cleared frequencies from Commander, TRAN HUNG DAO, for the construction of a rota for simultaneous change of call signs and frequencies in order to make the enemy's communication intelligence difficult.³

Enemy activity in April significantly increased over that of the past few months. Two mining incidents were reported, the first such incidents in over a year. Intelligence reports attributed the increased activity to

1 SA CTG 216.1 msg dtg 101113Z MAR 71

2 SA RPD 52 msg dtg 081145Z APR 71

3 ADMIN COMNAVFORV msg dtg 0111005Z APR 71

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units of the 101st NVA Regiment and the 268th MF GP, both very aggressive units.⁴ The enemy apparently tried to force the return to the AO of the 25th ARVN Division, the ground unit responsible for the TRAN HUNG DAO V AO, presently employed in interdicting the enemy's supply lines in Cambodia.⁵

On 3 April a joint VNN/ARVN operation was launched involving naval units of Riverine Assault Group 22, River Patrol Division 52 combined with the 49th/25th ARVN Division. The operation, TOAN THONG 1032Z/ 49, consisted of a major sweep of the Hobo Wood area (TAO bounded approximately by XT 586 322, XT 516 295, XT 510 230, XT 680 225, and the Saigon River). The operation was to have jumped off at approximately 0630H but mechanical difficulties with the boats caused several hour's delay. This time lag and numerous communications security violations gave the Binh Duong Province Guerillas the time and the intelligence needed to utilize their familiar ambush tactics. Units of RPD 52 and RAG 22 were attacked by B-40 rockets and a command detonated mine while transiting to the troop insert point. At 0905H in the vicinity of XT 595 325, a PBR was struck on the port side of the forward .50 caliber machine gun mount by a B-40 rocket causing minor material damage and slightly wounding one VNN and one USN sailor.

4 COMNAVFORV INTSUM 085-71 101005Z APR 71

5 COMNAVFORV INTSUM 082-71 070944Z APR 71

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At the same time a troop laden LCM suffered a near miss from a command detonated 105 or 155mm artillery shell mine, wounding one ARVN soldier slightly. During the same encounter, a command boat was hit on the port side at the mortar pit by a B-40 rocket causing minor material damage but wounding two and killing one ARVN soldier. Contact with the enemy was broken at 0920H and the wounded were medevaced while Seawolf helicopters from Ben Luc placed strikes in the area and provided air cover on the remainder of the journey to the troop insert point.

The ground operation itself yielded poor results. Some of the problems brought out by post operation analysis were: the ground strikes were too large for effective sweep operations; boats were sorted by radio; radio silence prescribed by the operation order was not observed during the transit thereby compromising the operation; and the nonexistence of an effective contingency plan in the event of boat casualties.

Units of RAG 22 were again attacked the following day. While on patrol prior to setting a night WBGP an LCVP and an old French FOM received RPG(B-40 rocket) fire at 1710H in the vicinity of XT 671 279. One rocket struck the LCVP but fortunately failed to explode. Later on in the evening a PBR of RPD 52 while transiting to rendezvous with another PBR spotted four VC attempting to cross the river carrying

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two bags. The PBR took the men under fire, probably killing one. The bags were recovered and contained food, two fragmentation grenades, two detonating caps, personal letters and other documents. During the time of the incident, the PBR was unable to establish communications with the NOC and was unable to relay through any other units to the NOC, again highlighting the continual communications difficulties in the TRAN HUNG DAO V AO.

PBRs were also attacked by small arms and RPG fire on 24 and 26 April resulting in no casualties. The naval intelligence liaison officer (NILO) at Lam Son speculated that these attacks were probably initiated by a rear service element engaged in resupplying the 101st NVA regiment.⁶

The second mining incident of the month in the AO occurred on 21 April. A floating mine was discovered by units of RAG 22 six kilometers north west of Phu Cuong (XT 731 205). The mine consisted of about five kilograms of plastic explosive wrapped in a green plastic material and was kept buoyant by a one foot diameter red life ring. A plastic detonating cap was used as the fuze and was connected to wires leading to a shore. As a result of the new appearance of mining on the Saigon River, Commander, TRAN HUNG DAO V instructed both RAG 22 and RAG 24 to prepare two LCVPs with chain drags

⁶ NILO Lam Son msg 300730Z APR 71.

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for mine sweeping operations.

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TRAN HUNG DAO VI

Hostile activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO remained at a moderate level during April. The VNN commander, CTG 212.5, reported that his forces engaged the enemy in 30 firefights in which one U.S. helicopter crewman was killed and three VNN sailors were wounded. The enemy suffered 35 killed in these actions.

During one of these actions, on 2 April, PBRs of River Patrol Division 58 observed 25 to 30 VC moving southeast along a canal six kilometers northeast of Rach Gia (WS 139 110). The boats opened fire and a Black Pony patrol was dispatched to the scene. Upon conclusion of the air strikes, the PBRs placed heavy 40 mm and 60 mm H&I fire in the contact area. There were no friendly casualties sustained; enemy casualties sustained were unknown.

The only friendly fatality of the month occurred on 19 April. While on a strike in the vicinity of WR 076 985, a Seawolf helicopter of HAL-3 Detachment Eight received enemy fire resulting in an explosion inside the aircraft. A crewmember, AO3 James Arthur Wall, USN, received fatal wounds from exploding shrapnel.

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Throughout the month, units of RPD 58 operated in conjunction with the Ninth ARVN Division along the Luynh Quynh Canal in the Three Sisters area. Although contact with the enemy was slight, fresh bunkers not more than three days old were found on 23 April (vicinity VS 855 230), 29 kilometers northwest of Rach Gia, proof of enemy activity in the area.

On 26 April the Kien Giang guerrillas tried to lure RPD 58 PBRs into an ambush four kilometers northeast of Rach Gia. Three PBRs were in a WBGp when they observed an attack on a nearby outpost. The attack appeared to be of a diversionary nature, so the units prudently remained in place while calling in the Black Ponies for an air strike on the enemy positions. No friendly casualties resulted while the extent of damage to the enemy was unknown.

Both U.S. Seals and Vietnamese LDNNs although very active had few concrete results in the Kien Giang Province AO throughout the month. U.S. Navy Seal Team One, Romeo Platoon, Detachment Golf, operating out of ISB Rach Soi, carried out missions on 4 and 12 April against VC infrastructure (VCI) and VC rear service areas, however, no contact with the enemy was reported. Vietnamese LDNN Group Alfa inserted on VCI interdiction raids on 3, 14, and 16 April. On the first two dates the results were negative while on the third, one VC suspect was captured.

During April, plans were promulgated by VN Headquarters to transfer Vietnamese personnel at the Sa Dec Naval Base to the Nam Can base. The Commanding Officer RPD 58 was ordered to manage the Sa Dec base after the departure of the presently assigned personnel. The Commanding Officer RPD 58 and the Senior Advisor RPD 58 visited the Sa Dec Naval Base during the afternoon of 12 April in order to inspect the base and to ascertain any problem areas involved in the transfer. The major problem uncovered was the termination of the present mess in conjunction with the withdrawal of NSAD and VNN personnel. Other problems encountered were faulty generators, and the lack of adequate water and sewage disposal facilities. To help alleviate the messing problem, personnel of ISB Vinh Long were to be sent to Sa Dec to assist the Commanding Officer RPD 58 in opening his mess. In addition, COMNAVFORV promised aid in the resolution of the other problems prior to 1 May.

VNN patrol officers of RPD 58 continued to progress noticeably in air strike control training. Senior Advisor RPD 58 reported that the VNN officer performance has been excellent during training sessions, but that further training, especially in working out of narrow canals, was necessary prior to qualifying patrol officers in actual combat air controlling.

TRAN HUNG DAO VIII

Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO VIII AO was light to moderate during the month of April. Although only five firefights were recorded, the severity of the attacks are of mention and demonstrate the cunning and ferocity of the enemy. Three PBRs, one Monitor, and an LCM-6 were struck by B-40 rocket rounds wounding one American advisor and 15 Vietnamese sailors. In addition, Seals from Victor Platoon, CTE 116.12.1.2, commanded by LTJG Clapp, combined with CTG 217.1 units in four operations on the VC infrastructure, killing five VC and capturing seven.

During the month, intelligence reports were forecasting the possibility of attacks on both Dong Tam and My Tho Naval Bases. A 6 April report stated that a company of the 273rd Artillery Battalion was located about three miles west of Dong Tam (XS 357 423) and was armed with two 82 mm mortars, 120 mm mortars, two 12.8 mm AA/MGs, and an unknown number of RPG/LMGs and AK-47s. This report was later reaffirmed by another received on 9 April of the 267 B Engineer Sapper Battalion being located about 10 kilometers northwest of Dong Tam. (COMNAVFORV INTSUM 084-71 of 9 Apr 1971).

On 26 April, an intelligence report stated that the VC My Tho City Command had instructed its subordinate elements to conduct sabotage activities including assassinations, kidnappings, and acts of

terrorism against GVN and ARVN personnel on International Force Day, 1 May. Cadre of the VC armed security force would be disguised as cyclo drivers and students in order to carry out their missions. Targets also included placing plastic C-4 explosives at bars frequented by Americans, at ARVN night stations, and at GVN installations within the city.

While the prognosticators were bringing forth reports of impending disaster on My Tho and Dong Tam, the true destruction that occurred happened on the Kinh Xang Canal. The enemy was successful on three different occasions with the deadly B-40 rockets and demonstrated his ability to inflict casualties and damage to the waterborne assets of TRAN HUNG DAO VIII.

On 1 April at 1540H, PBRs of RPD 53 were on patrol on the Kinh Xang Canal (XS 356 550), 13 kilometers northwest of Dong Tam when they were ambushed by the enemy using B-40 rockets and small arms fire. PBR 7541, the lead boat in the PBR formation, was struck immediately, beached and burned. BMI Gray, the advisor on board, and two Vietnamese sailors were wounded in the encounter, which was put down by the rapid response of devastating fire laid down by the other PBRs, and by the subsequent on scene arrival of the Seawolves who were called in for added support. The three wounded were medevaced by Dustoff for treatment to Binh Thuy. The burned PBR was later pulled off the beach and towed to Dong Tam with its hull mostly destroyed above the waterline.

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On 4 April, RPD 53 craft were ambushed on the Kinh Xang Canal (XS 354 558) 14 kilometers northwest of Dong Tam in Dinh Tuong Province by B-40 rocket fire from the east bank. PBRs 7551 and 7790 were both put out of commission as a result of being struck at vital areas. EN3 J. L. Riordan, advisor on board, was wounded in the attack but required no medevac. Seawolves were called in and made a strike on the east bank. At the conclusion, both PBRs were towed to My Tho, the home of RPD 53. As a result of this attack, only four operational craft remained out of the 19 assigned for duty on the waterways. It is interesting to note that this attack was in the same location as the ambush which took place on April 1.

On 22 April, two LCVPs were on patrol on the Kinh Xang Canal (XS 398 458) when the screws of one boat became fouled. The boat was beached and the crew attempted to clear the screw when an explosive device detonated on the canal bank. The explosive device, suspected to be a grenade, was set off as a crewmember walked along the bank near the water's edge. There were no suspicious personnel in the vicinity of the incident which caused the wounding of two Vietnamese sailors who were subsequently medevaced by LCVP to Dong Tam. No damage to the boat resulted from the explosion.

On 26 April, a Monitor HQ 6502 and one LCM-6 each were struck by B-40 rocket rounds and small arms fire from the east bank

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of the Kinh Xang Canal in Dinh Tuong Province. The boats were struck as they were preparing the beach with 40 mm and .30/.50 caliber machine gun fire. A sweep of the area by RF troops with Seawolf support located spider holes used for the B-40 launch sites. Nine Vietnamese sailors were wounded (four seriously) in this sudden attack while enemy casualties were unknown. The LCM-6 suffered minor shrapnel damage to the canopy but no hull damage. The Monitor had a B-40 rocket round enter the coxswain's flat causing light damage to the superstructure and control panel wiring and gauges. Both craft continued on their own power to the repair facility at Dong Tam.

The Seals of Victor Platoon continued to interdict the enemy LOCs and subvert the VC infrastructure. Based upon intelligence, they made raids on various locations resulting in the capture of an ARVN deserter and the My Tho City Sapper Squad Leader, and the detaining of four suspected males.

On 10 April, CHNAVADVGRP, MACV requested that the Senior Advisor RIVPATCMD provide the reasons for the lack of RPD 53 boat availability. With the attack on 4 April, RPD 53 only had four operational boats out of an assigned 19. Senior Advisor RIVPATCMD responded on 12 April citing the six PBRs which sustained combat damage in the last two months, the transfer of PBR repair facilities from My Tho to

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Dong Tam, the lack of maintenance support at Binh Thuy due to the renovation of maintenance spaces, and the lack of maintenance support from ISB Vinh Long and HQ 800 due to nonavailability of PBR spare parts and personnel for all maintenance operations. He qualified his statement that this was only temporary and that eventually maintenance support should be available for the RPDs assigned to TRAN HUNG DAO II, VIII, and XIX. To further enforce a repair policy that was stagnating, LT John H. Duncan had relieved LT T. Hardy as DEPCOMNAVFORV Repair Coordinator on 19 April. It was requested that all units utilizing the repair facilities at Dong Tam to coordinate with LT Duncan as soon as possible in order to alleviate the tremendous backlog of work presently stagnant at LSB Dong Tam.

TRAN HUNG DAO IX

Action in the TRAN HUNG DAO IX AO was very light in April as only two firefights were initiated resulting in no friendly casualties and no recorded enemy dead. Intelligence sources had indicated that infiltration of enemy units was increasing in this AO but no substantiating proof of this infiltration was evident. During this month RPD 62 and 63, assigned to this AO, continued to provide escort for merchant craft transporting petroleum to Phnom Penh.

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TRAN HUNG DAO X

Action in the riverine environment near Ca Mau and Song Ong Doc was limited to 12 firefights during April. The cunning VC of An Xuyen Province highlighted the month by directing a 15 round 82 mm mortar barrage at the Song Ong Doc subsector. Casualties were light on both sides as the enemy sustained four killed and five captured. One Vietnamese sailor was wounded.

The month started with the probing of the base defenses at Ca Mau by enemy personnel. At 2230H PBRs of RPD 62 spotted five men less than 100 meters from ATSB Ca Mau. The men evaded and were taken under fire with no evidence of enemy casualties.

On the morning of 4 April, 15 kilometers southwest of Ca Mau at VR 870 001, aggressive enemy guerrillas ambushed units of RID 48 at 0955H on the Song Ong Doc. Firing from cleverly concealed positions, the enemy attacked with B-40 rockets and small arms and hit an ASPB (HQ 5782) in the coxswain flats, slightly wounding one VNN sailor. An accurate fusilade from the river craft plus a quick airstrike from the Ca Mau Seawolves suppressed all enemy fire. Four mud covered female suspects were detained, and two sampans, and an American type helmet was captured.

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The enemy attacked by fire once again on 6 April when a PF outpost three kilometers south of Song Ong Doc at VQ 971 987 was hit by rockets, mortars, and small arms. Little damage was inflicted on the outpost, but two civilians living nearby were seriously wounded. A medevac helicopter was requested from VNAF assets but was denied. The victims were subsequently carried to the hospital in Ca Mau by PBRs of RPD 62.

Dufflebag sensors proved their worth on 12 April when heavy vibrations were detected at 2010H at VR 963 014 near the Song Ong Doc base. PFs were dispatched to the scene, a known enemy mortar position, and in the brief firefight that ensued a PF soldier was killed and two VC were slain.

The Song Ong Doc area (VR 915 010) was the scene of a unique action on 16 April at 1105H when craft of RID 48, HQ 1295 and 1298, received one B-50 round, incurring no casualties. Seawolf helicopters were scrambled from Nam Can and placed a strike on the area. The boat crews went ashore after the strike and captured two B-50 launchers but found no other material or evidence of casualties. The advisor stated that he had seen a thin wire stretched across the river and just as the boats hit the wire the rocket fired, lending credence to the theory that this was a booby trap device.

The last firefight of the month occurred on 30 April on the Song Ong Doc at 1045H. Units of RID 48 on routine patrol at VQ 850 998 were attacked with one B-40 round and heavy small arms fire. The river craft returned the fire and requested a Seawolf airstrike. After suppressing the fire from the bank, the river craft beached and conducted a sweep of the area with no evidence of enemy casualties. There were no friendly casualties.

Seal Team Two, Detachment Alfa, Nine Platoon based at Ca Mau under the leadership of LT Moran, stood down on 10 April for rotation back to the United States. Relieving Nine Platoon was Papa Platoon led by LTJG Antrim. Papa Platoon forayed deep into enemy territory, interdicting lines of communications and creating havoc with the VC infrastructure.

On the night of 29 April at 1830H, Seals of Papa Platoon were inserted by SEALORD Slicks at VR 821 735 to interdict VC tax collector operations. Seawolves supplied air cover and upon insertion, the platoon split into two squads and patrolled approximately 150 meters to separate hootches. One group spotted a male evading, took him under fire and presumably killed him. When the hootches had been captured and security set, the area was searched revealing a male hiding in a bunker under the first hootch and a man and a

woman in the second hootch. The commandos then spotted another evader, took him under fire, and probably killed him. At 1910H they called for extraction and SEALORD and Seawolf units received intense enemy fire on approach to the LZ. The men were finally extracted at 1930H at a cost of one pilot and aircrewman wounded. The Seal commander later said of the Seawolves, "Their professionalism alone prevented the Seals from incurring heavy casualties."¹

The ATSB at Song Ong Doc was the scene of a tragedy late in the afternoon on 5 April when a Vietnamese sailor attached to RID 48 returned to the base apparently intoxicated and started to argue with the American (EN2 A. N. Cascio) RPD 62 advisor. The sailor threatened EN2 Cascio with a knife and actually inflicted superficial cuts on two other USN sailors who were witnesses to the melee. The Vietnamese sailor was restrained by his shipmates and taken to his boat whereupon he immediately tried to turn a .50 caliber machine gun on the Americans. He was again restrained but not subdued. He then picked up a concussion grenade and was advancing on the Americans when BM1 Marvin Ballard, an advisor to RID 48 appeared on the scene and attempted to disarm him. In the struggle the grenade exploded, blowing off the VNN sailor's hand and rupturing BM1 Ballard's eardrum. Both men were medevaced to Binh Thuy by a SEALORD helicopter.

1. Seal Spotrep 300730Z Apr 71.

Operation TRAN HUNG DAO XVII

Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO was moderate with the focus being on an increase of enemy mining of friendly boats patrolling along the Can Gao Canal and the Rach Tieu Dua River. During the month of April, two LCMs and two ASPBs were mined, resulting in the sinking of the ASPBs, while three attempted minings, and 13 turtle mines and two launch bombs were discovered. In addition, waterborne units of CTG 210 were involved in five firefights, resulting in four VC killed and one captured while friendly units sustained four Vietnamese killed, six wounded, and one missing; three Americans were wounded.

The enemy was obviously placing greater emphasis in mining VNN craft since 25 mining incidents have occurred in this AO since the first of the year. The U Minh has long been an established area of enemy strength. Since the ARVN and VNN began their operations in the area, the enemy has tried to retaliate with as little risk to himself as possible. By mining, he has attempted to interdict waterborne resupply routes to the 32nd and 33rd Command Posts with little risk of loss of life or of engagement. Recently captured enemy documents listed plans to attack outposts along the Can Gao and adjacent canals, indicating that the VC and NVA want to secure this area as much as possible. With the GVN outposts destroyed, the

guerrillas would have more freedom of movement along the canals and less chance of civilians betraying their operations to the allies. With the GVN outposts gone and the GVN pacification program defeated, the civilians would be sympathetic to the VC for fear of terrorist reprisals. The recent absence of Hoi Chanh from this area could also indicate a raised enemy morale due to his mining successes. Suggestions on how the allies would counter the enemy mining threat included more efficient sweep operations, more civilian informants, or an elimination of the convoys altogether. If the latter were accepted, supplies could either be flown in to the 33rd CP or the aircraft operating out of the CP could refuel at Rach Soi as they did before the convoys began .

Because of the length of the canal and the dense vegetation along the banks, the enemy can easily retain his ability to plant mines undetected. Since the first of the year, there have been 10 mining incidents on the Can Gao and seven incidents on the Rach Tieu Dua. On 13 April, an intelligence source reported the intentions of the LF Company in Kien An District (VR 840 512) to conduct a training course on reconnaissance and sapper techniques. During February, the 525 MI GP received reports of a three month training course in watermining sapper techniques, teaching selected students from various village units in Kien An District; the school was reportedly located about eight kilometers north of the April school report.

Infiltration into the U Minh by enemy forces has been noted by intelligence sources during the past few months and has continued to present a problem during April. Hoi Chanh have identified the Muong-Dao Creek (VR 833 625), Rach Ong Lam (VR 840 664), and the Kim-Qui Creek (VR 827 575) as insertion points of seaborne infiltration craft into the U Minh. Successful infiltration in these areas reportedly occurred in January, February, and March.

With these many Hoi Chanh reports received concerning coastal infiltration into the Delta region, it is obvious the enemy is placing great emphasis in this method of resupply. It would be hard to ascertain how many times the enemy has infiltrated in this manner without detection, but the figures would probably be high (COMNAVFORV INTSUM 097-71). With the ARVN disruption of the enemy's overland supply routes in Laos and Cambodia, the enemy can be expected to increase his seaborne infiltration efforts.

Seven mining incidents were recorded in April. Also, two launch bombs and 13 turtle mines were recovered. While the number of these instances highlights the enemy's desire to mine friendly craft, the fact that these mines were recovered at the same time points to the dilligent efforts executed by TRAN HUNG DAO XVII assets.

On 5 April, U.S. personnel discovered a swimmer/sapper placed watermine attached to a U.S. Army LCM-8 alongside a pier at the

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Kien An Op Base (WR 128 897). The Vietnamese EOD team 15 and its advisor were transported to Kien An to disarm the mine. The mine was found to be a small shaped charge, turtle mine, weighing about 25 pounds and rigged for time detonation. No wires were attached to the mine and it had been tied to the LCM-8 with nylon line. Further inspection of the mine revealed that it had been triggered but that the main charge had failed to explode.

Although this is the first swimmer sapper placed turtle mine discovered in the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO, there have been two other incidents involving swimmer sapper placed mines in the area since February. The other incidents occurred on the Cai Tau River about 500 meters apart (VR 990 382) on 13 February and 27 March.

On the same day, 5 April, two minesweepers of MID 93, HQ 1018 and HQ 1853, were both mined in the vicinity of WR 054 452 while leading a convoy of RAG 25/29 and RAID 75 units from Ca Mau enroute to the 31st Regimental Command Post (WR 212 683). The second minesweeper maneuvered to assist and was mined about twenty meters from the first. Both craft stayed afloat and were towed to the 31st Regimental Command Post. Two Americans, BM2 R. B. Fejaranez and EN2 Terry M. Tanner, and three Vietnamese sailors, were wounded. In addition, one VNN was missing.

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The majority of mining incidents that have occurred in this AO have been attributed to command detonated mines and it is likely that these mines mentioned above were command detonated even though no confirmation had been issued.

On 9 April, an RF/PF unit patrolling the bank of the Can Gao Canal (VR 96 73) in advance of a major fuel and ammunition convoy from Kien An to the 33rd CP, discovered two freshly emplaced launch bombs rigged for command detonation. The first bomb, with a 30 kilogram warhead, was located about two inches below the surface of the canal, approximately 50 meters from the first. Both bombs had about 70 meters of electrical wire leading to positions off the west bank.

On the morning of 15 April, HQ 5151, an ASPB of RAID 71, was rocked by a small mine explosion while shifting positions at the 33rd Command Post (VR 945 619). The mine detonated under the fantail, blowing one of the .50 caliber mounts over the side. The .50 caliber was later recovered, cleaned and remounted on the ASPB. No friendly casualties were incurred and only minor damage resulted to the boat.

Since the first of the year, there have been nine separate mining incidents on the Can Gao Canal. The last reported mining in the vicinity of the one above occurred on 13 January when two floating mines were detonated within 100 meters of this area.

On 18 April, the 407th RF Company discovered 13 turtle mines in an area about five kilometers south of the 33rd CP (VR 951 551). The mines were not rigged and did not contain explosives. Examination of the mines revealed that they were identical to the turtle mine found attached to the hull of the U.S. Army LCM moored at ATSB Kien An on 5 April. The mines were recovered from the area between canals 24 and 30 which had been mentioned as the area of operations of the enemy U-3 mine/munitions worksite. Personnel associated with the U-3 have been involved in technical preparations for every known watermining incident on the Can Gao Canal, and it is believed that thorough and detailed sweep operations of the area would uncover additional caches. (COMNAVFORV INTSUM 096-71).

On 20 April, a watermine detonated about 15 feet off the starboard side of the lead boat (ASPB) in a 16 boat convoy proceeding north to the 32nd CP on the Rach Tieu Dua (WR 009 360). This detonation was approximately one kilometer within the site of the recent mining of an ASPB and LCM.

TRAN HUNG DAO XVII waterborne assets continued to patrol the myriad waterways in support of the many outposts that have been set up to pacify the U Minh Forest. As an example, an outpost in the vicinity of WR 166 788 on 1 April at 0130H requested assistance from an assault of an estimated 30 VC which had penetrated positions

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south of the outpost. The PBR boats got underway and proceeded to rake the south bank when enemy fire was spotted. While in the process, two swimmers were spotted swimming towards the craft and were taken under fire with small arms and hand grenades. As the craft proceeded southeast down the Cai Lon River (WR 200 770) with PBR 7714 in the lead, one B-40 or B-41 round was fired from the north bank. The enemy movement was finally silenced in the area which has been termed as the crossing point for enemy forces who have been harassing the ATSB Kien An. There were no friendly casualties, and it was presumed that the two VC swimmers were killed.

On 7 April at 1230H, HQ 1235 was beached on the east bank of the Cai Tau River (WR 013 347) in An Xuyen Province on an assigned daytime operation. The crewmen searching the area on the bank inadvertently tripped a booby trap resulting in two Vietnamese sailors being killed.

On 14 April, PBRs 7708 and 7713, while in a waterborne guard-post in the vicinity of WR 230 741 seven and one half meters west of Kien Hung, Kien Giang Province, provided gunfire support for an outpost under attack. As the attack continued, B-40 and/or B-41 rocket fire and small arms fire were received by the craft until the 105 millimeter howitzer was unleashed by the ARVN soldiers from Kien Hung District. No friendly or enemy casualties were recorded.

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On 15 April, PBRs 7707 and 7719 were proceeding woutheast on the Song Cai Lon with PBR 7707 in the lead when nine B-40 or B-41 rocket rounds were fired by the VC. Five of the rounds were near misses, while one impacted amidships on PBR 7719 and wounded BM1 K. L. Morey, the advisor on board. PBRs 7702, 7704, 7709, and 7712 were in the immediate vicinity and responded with devastating fire on the attackers and helped rescue the three beleaguered craft. The continuous suppressive fire forced the enemy to flee their bunkered positions and rocket launchers. PBRs 7708 and 7713 joined with the group and beached near the scene, crewmembers conducting a sweep of the area. No enemy personnel could be found, and the operation was discontinued. The two wounded sailors, one American and one Vietnamese, were medevaced to the operating base at Kien An for further treatment.

While the number of craft sunk had considerably diminished in the last few months, the number to be salvaged was still considerable. Those still to be salvaged as of 2 April were as follows:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
Can Gao Canal	U. S. Army LCM-8	1099th Trans. Co.	VR 990 768
"	LCM-8 HQ 8008	VNN TG 210.1	VR 955 700
"	Commandament 6001	RAG 26	VR 970 745
"	ATC HQ 1256	RAID 71	VR 945 667
Nga Ba Cai Tau	LCM-6 HQ 1526	RAG 26	WR 280 700
River and Xang	LCM-8	ARVN	WR 265 739
Cut Canal	LCM-6 HQ 1507	RAG 26	WR 364 687
Cai Tau and	Zippo HQ 6533	RAID 75	WR 980 383
Trem Trem	ATC	RAID 40	WR 945 415
Rivers	Command, HQ 6002	RAG 25/29	WR 050 460
	LCM-6 HQ 1506	RAG 25/29	WR 025 390


Salvage efforts on these listed and on the two ASPBs sunk during the month proceeded as in the past with energetic efforts put forth by HCU-1. These personnel, working under conditions considered by almost any standard to be austere, raised HQ 1256, the U.S. Army LCM-8, HQ 5134, and a French Commandament, HQ 6001. In addition, salvage and survey efforts continued in dawn to dusk operations on the other wrecks in the canals.

The salvage of HQ 1256 which began last month finally was completed as the craft was pulled on to the beach during the early part of April. The mine which crippled this craft severely damaged the bow to such an extent that for the time being it rested on land until repairs could be effected that would enable it to float.

On 14 April, the U.S. Army LCM-8 sunk on 26 March was successfully raised by salvage personnel. With two ASPBs as escorts, the craft was towed out of the Can Gao Canal toward Kien An. However, before it could be safely beached and secured, the wreck sank again in the water just off ATSB Kien An. The LCM-8 rested on the bottom in 25 feet of water about 30 yards off the east end of the Kien An pier.


On 18 April, less than 24 hours after it was sunk on the Can Gao Canal at VR 992 769, HQ 5134 was refloated by USN salvage personnel. HQ 5134 was towed to Kien An in convoy with three ASPBs, two LCMs,

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ATC HQ 1256, as found by HCU-1 salvage forces on the Can Gao Canal in the vicinity of VR 945 667.

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HQ 1256, which has been removed by the Harbor Clearance

Unit Team One, rests on the banks of the Cai Lon River.

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one ATC, and one VNN LCM-8. The convoy arrived at 1630H at Kien An without incident. Senior Advisor, Deputy TRAN HUNG DAO stated:

"The rapid response of the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII Salvops Team in raising the HQ 5134 within 24 hours after it was sunk on the Can Gao Canal has once again demonstrated the highly professional and dedicated service that has typified your salvage operations in the U Minh Forest waterways. The men of the entire team have my appreciation for a job well done."¹

On 23 April, the salvage team raised the RAG 26 Commandment HQ 6006, whose hull was badly damaged by several mine explosions. The wreck was underwater for seven months in the vicinity of VR 973 750. With the help of an ARVN bulldozer as deadman, the wreck was pulled onto the beach near the 33rd Regimental CP.

The RADRAG system which was to have alleviated the mining threat by use of electronic sensors during operational sweeps was still not operational and was an item of considerable anguish for both COMNAVFORV and Senior Advisor CTF 210. On 16 April, COMNAVFORV requested that a report on the initial operational sweep with RADRAG be made and that appropriate comments be included by the Senior Advisor

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1. SA DEPCOMTHD msg dtg 220739Z APRIL 1971.

ATSB Kien An. He also desired a daily situation report from the Senior Advisor CTF 210 on the employment of RADRAG, including hours employed, results, false alarm rate, and problem areas. The reasons for the urgency of the use of the system were the obvious need to reduce craft losses to watermines and the need to determine if RADRAG is a workable countermeasure to the command detonated mine. The Senior Advisor CTF 210 was concerned with the safety of the sweeping units employing the RADRAG system, since these units were more vulnerable to mining than those employing chain drag tactics, and as the RADRAG system has no built-in capability to disarm mines. He requested that the use of the RADRAG system be delayed until completion of the LCM-8 conversion, thereby limiting injury to personnel.

On 22 April, COMNAVFORV recommended that RADRAG be taken on an abbreviated mission down the canal from Kien An, so that a feel for the number of alarms to be expected could be established. He also commented on the use of springs which were being used in the conversion of the LCM-8 stating that in shock tests, springs only store energy, they do not dissipate energy. However, he did point out that his thoughts were not to stifle initiative but only to provide information.

On 26 April, the Senior Advisor CTF 210 reported that the LCM-8 conversion was basically complete and that a planned test would take place on 2 May. He also advised COMNAVFORV that styrofoam instead of springs would be used as the deck shock absorber.

NAVLE DMAC responded to CTG 210.4's criticism of Dustoff operations which were posed in the previous month to DEPCOMNAVFORV as a result of the time lag, unsatisfactory service, and possibly, dual standards existing for American and Vietnamese casualties. In a terse message, he stated that Dustoff precedence for pickup, as quoted from USARV Regulation 40-10 set the following priority: U.S. Armed Forces, citizens of the United States, RVNAF, RF/PF, PW (enemy), and civilians. Wounded civilians would be picked up when there were other wounded in the first five categories and were at the same pick up point. Medevac missions were not flown in response to civilian wounded unless wounds were incurred by U.S. actions. He further requested COMNAVFORV to advise all personnel on Dustoff priorities and response times and to substantiate all unsatisfactory performances in the future.

RADM H. S. Matthews was relieved of his duties as DEPCOMTHD by Commodore Tanh, Vice CNO VNN on 2 April, and on that date became Senior Advisor DEPCOMTHD. This new position was in the operational advisory chain of command for USN advisors which parallels the VNN operational chain of command. The Senior Advisor DEPCOMTHD reported directly to Chief Naval Advisory Group, MACV.

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TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII

The month of April passed with five more Mekong convoys successfully transporting critically needed POL to the Cambodian capital from the Tan Chau staging area in the Republic of Vietnam. Despite heavy enemy efforts to interdict two of the convoys, the successful coordination of the various elements participating in the operation - Cambodian, Vietnamese, and American - kept the entire contents of the convoys intact. With the destruction of the Kompong Som Refinery at Phnom Penh in the previous month, the convoys took on a greater importance.

In the waning hours of March, Convoy TP-12 was stalled halfway between Neak Luong and Phnom Penh while ARVN and Force Armée Nationale Khmer troops, with the aid of U. S. air support, tried to dislodge a large enemy force which was dug in on the east bank of the Mekong. After a 16 hour halt, the convoy proceeded to Phnom Penh with no further incident, arriving on the first of April at 1030H. The convoy was composed of a merchant ship, two tugs, two Leapdal towboats and a VNN tanker which accompanied the convoy as far as Neak Luong.

The return convoy, PT-12, consisting of a merchant ship, a tug with two empty barges, the two Leapdal towboats, and a VNN LST carrying refugees, arrived back in Tan Chau on 1 April at 2100H without incident.

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Convoy TP-14, consisting of two merchant ships, three tugs, four POL barges, two ammo barges, and two towboats, departed Tan Chau at 0001H on 7 April. It arrived at Phnom Penh the same day without encountering enemy contact. The return convoy, PT-14, consisting of one merchant ship, three tugs and two towboats with five empty barges, left Phnom Penh at 0930H on 8 March and arrived at Tan Chau 10 hours later without incident.

Convoy TP-15, composed of two merchant ships carrying general cargo, a tanker carrying POL, a tug with two ammo barges under tow, four Leapdal towboats and two POL barges, a VNN tanker with POL, and two ARVN LCUs, departed Tan Chau at 0030H on 16 April and arrived at Phnom Penh 13 hours later without incident.

The return convoy, PT-15, was composed of three merchant ships, a tanker, two tugs, and a Leapdal towboat. It departed the Khmer capital at 1030H on 17 April. At 1430H a UH-1L smoke screen helo which was providing security for the convoy was forced to land one mile north of Neak Luong at 1900H due to a loss of fuel oil pressure. The helo was lifted by a CH-47 (Chinook helo) shortly after the landing, with no damages incurred. The convoy, having experienced no delay, arrived at Tan Chau at 1430H.

Convoy TP-16, consisting of one merchant, a tanker, three tugs, a towboat, two general cargo barges, two ammo barges, and three POL barges, carrying in all 1,150,000 gallons of POL and 833 tons of ammunition, departed Tan Chau staging area at 2330H on 22 April. It arrived on 23 April at 1230H, having experienced no enemy contact. The return convoy, PT-16, composed of four merchant ships, four tugs and four barges, left Phnom Penh at 0945H on 24 April and arrived at Tan Chau nine hours later without incident.

The fifth and final convoy of the month, TP-17, proved the most ill-fated. It departed Tan Chau at 0001H on 29 April, with a sizeable massing of five merchant ships, a tug towing two ammunition barges, a Leapdal towboat with 150,000 gallons of POL, and a tanker with 600,000 gallons of POL. At 0322H the convoy came under attack, receiving 40 B-40 rockets and automatic weapons fire, at WT 255 300, ten miles inside Cambodia. The convoy was again attacked 18 minutes later with 10 B-40 rockets. The SS OCEAN LIFE, SS PROSPERITY, and SS VIRGINIA reported light damage from the attack. Without further incident, the convoy arrived at Phnom Penh at 1300H. A fire broke out later aboard SS PROSPERITY in the after hold, which was believed to have been caused by a .50 caliber tracer round lodged in the cargo of refrigerators and styrofoam. The fire was put out by local fire trucks and a port fire boat and the ship listed about 15 degrees from water used to douse the fire, but was never in any danger of sinking.

Convoy PT-17, composed of a tanker, a tug, and two towboats with two barges, departed the capital city at 0930H on 30 April and arrived nine hours later without incident.

According to the COMNAVFORV INTSUM of 20 March, the Kompong Som Refinery, which was demolished in early March, was far from being repaired to any usable capacity. Three alternatives were given towards regaining a semblance of oil stocking capacity: the first was total reconstruction of the refinery, which would cost \$4,000,000 and one year's labor. Temporary repair, the second alternative, would cost \$500,000 and would last for two years. The third alternative and the recommended choice was to do nothing to fix the refinery as yet, since the area was still not secure even for repair crews. Thus for the foreseeable future, Nha Be and Singapore would provide Phnom Penh's POL. The remaining stocks at the devastated Kompong Som Refinery were being transferred to Phnom Penh via the Mekong River.

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TRAN HUNG DAO XIX

Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO XIX AO was light and probably indicated the GVN pacification that has been steadily increasing with each succeeding month. Three firefights were recorded by CTG 217.2's waterborne units and in addition, these units acted on three occasions as the blocking force for the ARVN 10th Regiment in their ground operations. No naval casualties were incurred although one ARVN soldier was wounded on 30 April in a combined operation. Five VC were killed and one captured. Three Vietnamese sailors were wounded and one PF soldier killed in separate incidents involving friendly troops.

Intelligence reports of resupply by sea into the areas of MR 4 continued to be received. Kien Hoa and Kien Giang Provinces were the areas where most of this activity was supposed to have taken place. Three separate 525 Military Group reports received in the last five months had indicated the resupply "from the sea" had been taking place off Kien Hoa Province, with the material destined for VC use in the Binh Dai Secret Zone. The D-100 Navigational Group had been mentioned as the unit responsible for this activity.

The disappearance of enemy activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO XIX AO could be explained by the current intelligence reports that emphasized a low posture on engagements and a concentration of

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supplies for a later offensive. On 12 April an intelligence report related the operations of an enemy transportation company delivering war material into Kien Hoa Province. The unit was bringing the supplies in from the north on sampans by way of various rivers and canals. On 16 April another report indicated that sometime in early April, an NVA ocean-going ship unloaded an unknown amount of ammunition and weapons near the mouth of the Cua Dai River (XS 995 300) in Kien Hoa Province. The report further indicated that two previous shipments occurred in late November and early March.

A Hoi Chanh, who rallied on 8 April, related operations of the 3001 Sapper Battalion located at the mouth of the Bo De River (WQ 25 67), including the unloading of an "infiltration trawler" on 8 February. Recently captured documents had also indicated that the 962nd MF INF BN of VC in MR 3, operating in the same area as the 3001, was also responsible for the unloading of infiltration trawlers.

The waterborne units of CTG 217.2 were engaged on three different occasions during the month, and although this would indicate that they were idle, the case was not so since they were also involved in blocking operations for the 10th ARVN Regiment. On 11 April, RAG 23/31 and RID 45 craft were attacked with four B-40 or B-41 rockets and two 75 mm recoilless rifle rounds in the vicinity of XS 592 148. All rounds missed the craft and a reconnaissance

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company was immediately inserted without contacting the enemy. No friendly or enemy casualties were reported.

On 19 April, RAG 23/31, RID 45, and RPD 56 craft acted as a blocking force in support of the 10th ARVN Regiment in Kien Hoa Province from XS 615 245 to XS 575 295. The ARVN troops were inserted by helicopters along with a Regional Force Company at XS 611 239. They met brief resistance but eventually overcame the enemy and in the process, killed five VC and captured one B-40 rocket and 23 individual weapons. Seventeen large bunkers were destroyed by 40 mm and 105 mm Monitor guns during the operation. CTG 217.2 stated that he considered this operation to be the best coordinated operation TRAN HUNG DAO XIX units have ever participated in.

The problem of discipline arose in the ranks of the Vietnamese Army and Navy personnel. On two separate occasions, personnel were wounded by irresponsible friendly forces. On 22 April, Fireman Thai from RID 45 Monitor HQ 6538 was walking across a bridge (XS 517 312) in Kien Hoa Province when for some unknown reason, he proceeded to discharge two shots into the air, and as his intentions were misinterpreted, he was in turn shot by the ARVN guard with four M-16 rounds in the abdomen. The RID 45 advisor from the Monitor medevaced him to the local hospital where his condition remained critical.

On 25 April, a Vietnamese patrol officer and the boat captain of PBR 7614 attached to RPD 56 in Kien Hoa Province were wounded in the legs by friendly fire in the vicinity of XS 453 328. The wounding of the two VNN occurred when crewmembers of PBRs 7614 and 7605 were accosted by two intoxicated PF soldiers who were firing their weapons in the air and tossing grenades into the water. In their attempt to disassociate themselves from the two PF soldiers and in the process of casting off, the VNN crewmembers were suddenly fired upon by the PF from behind trees and in the exchange that took place, one PF was killed and two VNN were wounded. The USN advisor stated to the commanding officer and senior advisor to RPD 56 and province officials that PBR personnel were not at fault and that on previous occasions, sporadic fire had been received from this area.

TRAN HUNG DAO XX

The strategic Vinh Te Canal straddling the border between Vietnam and Cambodia lay dormant for the second month in a row as a combination of ARVN pressure on enemy elements in Cambodia and low water in the canal served to preclude an outbreak of hostility. The one friendly casualty occurred at Chau Doc when CM3 Roger M. Carter fell from an ammi into the swift current and drowned. He was assisting in lashing material to the ammi for transport when the accident occurred.

Although hostile action was almost nonexistent, the logistics and support problems were vigorously pursued by the base commanders at Chau Doc and Tan Chau as they jointly submitted a lessons learned message about various inadequacies in habitability, sanitation, and base layout at their locations. Suggestions for improved habitability included replacing heat radiating galvanized steel roofing with heat reflecting aluminum type material, obtaining more self help material to allow base personnel to improve their living quarters, and overhead fans for living and working spaces.

Under a general heading of sanitation and public works it was further recommended that continental type toilets be installed in future construction because of its relative simplicity when compared

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to American type plumbing. Additionally it was recommended that the sewage and water systems be given a greater capacity and more powerful pumps as well as a back up capability. Concern was also expressed about the overloading of generators at both bases. It was pointed out that they are running at close to capacity and probably could not weather a 150% overload as is called for in generator specifications. Two other concerns in the electrical domain were improper and unsafe connections to dependent housing and the lack of emergency power for the NOC bunkers.

The other major area of concern was base layout. The base officials noted that erosion is a serious problem and could lead to worse problems if proper culverts, drainage systems, and seawalls are not constructed. There also exists a requirement for a large, open air, covered assembly hall and some recreational areas such as basketball and volleyball courts. Another problem area is that there is not a flagpole or ceremonial area at either base, the absence of which is a source of irritation to the Vietnamese personnel.

In conclusion the officials stated that the work had been carried out by the Seabees according to plans but the designs were not adequate in the areas mentioned.

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RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE

Activity in the Rung Sat Special Zone was light to moderate during the month of April as the RF and PF personnel with their advisors kept up the relentless pursuit of the enemy through the dense swamps of the area. The insertions of units under the CHUONG DUONG search and destroy operations were successfully ferreting out the enemy and exerting continuous pressure such that the VC in the Rung Sat were reported to be breaking into groups of three to five men and keeping on the move constantly to avoid detection. The month's sweeps accounted for 21 VC killed, 14 captured, and the destruction of 15 bunker complexes. There were 22 friendly casualties: 16 RFs, two VNN, and four civilians wounded. Significant enemy captures included: 453 kilos of rice, a 750 lb. bomb, 13 kilos of documents, four anti-personnel mines, four blasting caps, and a large amount of medical supplies and field equipment.

On 2 April, 27 RSSZ PRUs were inserted by U.S. Army Slick aircraft and by two PBRs from RPD 57 into Can Giuoc District, Long An Province, 15 kilometers south of LSB Nha Be. In the process of sweeping the area, they located and destroyed three bunkers. On 3 April RSSZ RF Company 117, while enroute to an insertion position aboard a Vietnamese River Patrol Craft, received one B-40 rocket

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round from three VC approximately 24 kilometers south of the Nha Be LSB in Quang Xuyen District. The troops returned the fire and the VC fled south. Two RF soldiers were slightly wounded. The next day a unit of RPD 51 on routine patrol of the Tac River came under B-40 rocket and AK-47 fire. The B-40 hit the lead boat about two feet aft of the bow and exited the port side, failing to detonate. The crews immediately returned the fire, with unknown results. Two Vietnamese sailors were wounded in the encounter.

On 6 April a RSSZ RF Company 999 soldier on a CHUONG DUONG 17-71 troop sweep detonated a booby-trapped grenade at YS 200 804. The resultant explosion wounded the soldier who was promptly medevaced to Long Binh. On 7 April, the Quang Xuyen Intelligence Squad, while enroute to a guard post by sampan, received approximately three B-40 rounds in the vicinity of XS 964 738. The squad returned the fire and the VC fled. Five PF soldiers were wounded, two seriously, and the friendly sampan destroyed.

On 8 April, 36 RSSZ PRUs were inserted by Slick aircraft 17 kilometers northeast of Nha Be (YS 076 936), for the purpose of sweeping the area which had been reported as being VC infested. Upon insertion, one VC was captured immediately. Continuing the sweep in pursuit of an unknown number of VC, the PRUs captured

another VC at YS 093 935 and again made contact with the enemy at YS 073 940. Three VC were killed when they attempted to evade. Two base camps and 200 kilos of rice were destroyed and one kilo of documents was captured.

On 9 April, in Can Gio District, 30 kilometers southeast of the LSB Nha Be, RSSZ RF Company 875 troops on a sweep found one VC base camp in the vicinity of YS 083 515. Troops destroyed four bunkers, four blasting caps, three grenades, one water tank, and a cooking pot with three kilos of rice. A few minutes later two VC were sighted evading north and were pursued but with no success. The troops found a fresh grave with one body approximately 48 hours old at YS 081 517; the death of the VC was attributed to USN and USA H&I fire on 7 April. A USA LHFT, providing coordination and cover for the troop movements, sighted and placed A/S fire on four VC at YS 073 516, killing all of them. Later in the afternoon the RSSZ Psyops team conducted a loudspeaker broadcast in the area urging the VC to Chieu Hoi.

On 11 April at 2025H, Phuoc Khanh Village in Nhon Trach District of Bien Hoa Province, four kilometers east of Nha Be, received small arms fire from approximately four VC. Ten minutes later a USN LHFT vectored to the vicinity and placed H&I fire along the suspected evasion route with unknown results. Phuoc Khanh Village

is strategically located on the Rach Muong Canal. Intelligence sources reported that on 25 March six VC came into the village carrying B-40 or B-41 rockets and explosives, possibly for use against ships moored in the Nha Be area.

On the same day, 11 April, the RSSZ PRUs again showed their talents when they captured seven VC at XT 469 128, 90 kilometers northwest of Nha Be in Duc Hoa District, Hau Nghia Province. The prisoners were turned over to the MR III Interrogation Center.

On 12 April, the Can Gio Intelligence Squad with an advisor were inserted by sampan in the vicinity of YS 107 517, and while sweeping southwest, found a 750 pound bomb (a dud). Members of EOD Team 41 were inserted by Slick to destroy the bomb in place.

On 15 April at 1300H, 18 RSSZ PRUs were inserted in Nhon Trach District 20 kilometers northeast of Nha Be and made contact with 12 VC at YS 092 933. One VC was killed and one captured. At 1315H another group of PRUs were inserted at YS 101 908 and sighted three females evading to the south. The three women were captured along with three kilos of documents.

On 18 April RSSZ RF Company 361 troops detonated one anti-personnel mine while disembarking from an LCVP in Can Gio 34 kilometers southeast of LSB Nha Be. One RF was seriously wounded

while one civilian was slightly wounded. A sweep of the area discovered another anti-personnel mine which was destroyed in place. The mines and booby-trapped grenades placed in Can Gio during the month were confined to a strip from one to two kilometers wide north of the Dong Hoa - Can Gio Road and running the length of the road.

On 19 April at 1100H, while on a security sweep, RSSZ PF Platoon 007 sighted an estimated squad of VC in a base camp in the vicinity of XS 965 745, in Quang Xuyen District. The troops took the VC under fire and the enemy fled. One hootch and six sleeping platforms were destroyed. On the same day at YS 016 570, RSSZ RF Company 601 troops found one body, approximately 10 to 14 days dead, believed to be the result of USN LHFT H&I fire on 3 April. Also on 19 April in Can Gio District, the Can Gio Intelligence Squad found and destroyed in place another anti-personnel mine at YS 156 519. Later in the day RSSZ PF Platoon 15, participating in DONG KHOI Phase III, was inserted by sampan in the vicinity of YS 095 523 and found and destroyed one three-kilo anti-personnel mine, one bunker, and assorted cooking utensils.

On 20 April RSSZ RF Company 117 and RSSZ PF Platoon 005 troops, while in an assault position in Quang Xuyen District at XS 950 568, made contact with approximately three VC. One of the

enemy was wounded as he evaded to the east and one AK-47, three AK-47 magazines, and one VC flag were captured. The following day a troop sweep of the area discovered the body of a man identified as the Ly Nhon Guerrilla Unit Squad Leader. The VC's death was attributed to the RF Company 117 and PF Platoon 005 encounter.

In Go Cong Province at XS 727 397 on 20 April, a truck detonated a road mine. Two RF soldiers and two women were wounded and the truck was destroyed. This incident was the first road mining to occur in over one and a half years in the province. The NILO at Go Cong reported that the incident tended to support the presence of sappers in the Coconut Grove area of the province. He further stated that the VC assassinated a 76-year-old woman on 19 April and kidnapped a PSDF trooper who later escaped on 23 April. The NILO at Go Cong believed this interdiction by the enemy was a display to show the people that they were still strong in a pacified province. The GVN planned to demonstrate to the people that they could subdue any VC concentration at will with an upcoming operation. During April two base camps were found in the province and 10 VCI were neutralized (one Hoi Chanh and nine KIA).

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On 22 April RSSZ PRUs were inserted in Can Giuoc District and captured 10 kilos of medical supplies and destroyed one bunker at XS 894 662. During a sweep in Can Gio District on the same day, RF Company 647 troops tripped another booby-trapped grenade at YS 136 533, resulting in three RFs wounded (one seriously). The wounded were medevaced within an hour to Cong Hoa Hospital in Saigon.

Operation CHUONG DUONG 19-71 was initiated in Quang Xuyen District on 22 April and immediately located an enemy base camp, a mine, and two bunkers at XS 973 732. all of which were destroyed. Later in the afternoon RF Company 902, while at a night assault position, inspected and detained two sampans with eight suspects at XS 973 735. The suspects were taken to Quang Xuyen District Headquarters for investigation.

On 23 April at 2330H an 80 kilo mine was detected by a ship's crewmember being placed alongside the Shell Tanker ACTEON by two VC swimmers at the Shell Tank Farm two kilometers northwest of LSB Nha Be. The security force was alerted and the two swimmers were taken under fire; they were probably killed, but no bodies were recovered. The mine drifted approximately 500 meters upriver and was detonated by fire from the security force.

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On 24 April RSSZ forces located and destroyed two bunkers at YS 063 787, Nhon Trach District. On the same day in Can Gio District at YS 085 542, a bunker complex and 50 kilos of rice were destroyed.

On 30 April PRUs were inserted by Slick in Bien Hoa Province at YS 097 928, and made contact with an unknown number of VC in a base camp at YS 104 928. Two VC were killed and the base camp destroyed. The remaining VC fled southwest with the PRUs in pursuit. At 1350H the troops made contact with some VC in a base camp at YS 099 907. One VC was killed and again the base camp was destroyed. At 1445H the PRUs made still another contact with the enemy in a base camp at YS 069 939, killing two VC. In addition, one VC and 10 kilos of clothing and equipment were captured. After the departure of the successful PRUs, USA and USN LHFTs placed airstrikes on the area, killing five more of the enemy and destroying the base camp.

Long Tau Shipping Incidents

For April there were no attacks or harassment incidents on ships transitting the Long Tau Shipping Channel to and from Saigon. The most recent incident occurred on 1 November 1970, perhaps indicating the effectiveness of RSSZ allied operations.

CTF 211

The following was the disposition of the RAID units at the end of April:

<u>RAID</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>
70	CTG 210.1	Kien An
71	CTG 210.1	Kien An
72	CTU 218.1.3	Cambodia
73	CTU 218.1.3	Cambodia
74	CTF 210	Ca Mau
75	CTF 210	Ca Mau

Each RAID is composed of approximately eight ATCs, five ASPBs, two MONs, one CCB, and one REF. The RAIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.

CTF 212

The following was the disposition of RPD units at the end of April:

<u>RPD</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>
51	228	Cat Lai
52	216.1, 228	Phu Cuong, Nha Be
53	217.1	My Tho
54	214.1	Ben Keo
55	218.2	Tan Chau, Chau Doc
56	217.2	Vinh Long
57	228	Nha Be
58	212.5	Rach Soi
59	218.2	Tan Chau
60	213.1	Hoi An
61	210.4	Rach Soi
62	212.6	Phuoc Xuyen
63	212.3	Ca Mau
64	214.1	Moc Hoa, Tuyen Nhon
65	Training	Binh Thuy

Each RPD is composed of approximately 20 PBRs and is reviewed in the operation in which it operates.

CTF 214

The following was the disposition of RID units at the end of April:

<u>RID</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>
40	210.1	Kien An
41	116.1	Nam Can
42	217.1	Dong Tam
43	214.1	Tra Cu
44	116.1	Nam Can
45	217.2	Ben Tre
46	116.1	Nam Can
47	214.1	Go Dau Ha
48	212.6	Ca Mau

Each RID is generally composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, six ASPBs, one CCB, one Zippo, one REF, and one RECH. The RIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.

RIVER ASSAULT GROUPS

The following was the disposition of RAG units at the end of

April:

<u>RAG</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>
22	CTG 216.1	Phu Cuong
24	CTG 216.1	Phu Cuong
26	Commander, Fourth Riverine Area	Long Xuyen
27	CTF 228	Nha Be
28	Commander, Third Riverine Area	Long Binh
30	Commander, Third Riverine Area	Long Binh
32	Commander, First Coastal Zone	Hue
21/33	CTG 217.1	Dong Tam
23/31	CTG 217.2	Vinh Long
25/29	CTG 210.3	Ca Mau
81	Convoy Escort Fourth Riverine Area	Cat Lai

Each RAG is composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, one ASPB, four CCBs, and six LCM-6s. The RAGs are reviewed in their respective operations.

Special Warfare

The following was the disposition of the Seal Detachments operating in a combat capacity throughout the country at the end of April:

<u>Detachment</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Officer-in-Charge</u>
Team One Det Golf Victor Platoon	217.1	Dong Tam	LTJG Clapp LTJG Young
Team One Det Golf Papa Platoon	116.2	Ca Mau	LT Antrim
Team One Det Golf Quebec Platoon	116.12	Bac Lieu	LTJG Taylor LTJG Campbell
Team Two Det Alfa Ten Platoon	116.12	Vi Thanh	LTJG Ganoung LTJG Kirkwood
Team One Det Golf Whiskey Platoon	116.1	Nam Can	LTJG Couch LT Sandoz
Team One Det Golf Romeo Platoon	116.5	Rach Soi	LTJG Boyhan LTJG Dundas

Seal units are reviewed in the operation in which they operate.

COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCES

During April, MARKET TIME patrol units of the USN inspected 1,148 craft during day and night patrols, boarded 36 and detained none. The VNN MARKET TIME units on Inner Barrier patrols boarded 9,083 junks and sampans, detaining four persons. The Coastal Surveillance units accounted for six structures and two bunkers destroyed, and one SL-8 trawler infiltrator sunk.


The highlight of the month for the MARKET TIME units was the engagement and sinking of a North Vietnamese SL-8 infiltrator trawler on the morning of 12 April.

The trawler was first sighted at 1742H on 8 April by MARKET TIME VP aircraft. The trawler's position was 09-44N 111-27E. The trawler was tracked along a southerly course by the aircraft until 1845H on 9 April when the USCGC MORGENTHAU executed a swap with the VP aircraft.


The MORGENTHAU continued to track the trawler covertly as the infiltrator continued on a southerly course. The trawler approached the Great Natuna Island and then abruptly changed course, skirting the south coast of the island. The infiltrator then proceeded north towards the Republic of Vietnam.

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SL-8 TRAWLER INFILTRATION INCIDENT 11-12 APRIL 1971



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SL-8 TRAWLER SUNK 12 APRIL 1971 (U.S. NAVY PHOTOS)

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Surveillance of the trawler was continued by USCGC RUSH, which had relieved MORGENTHAU at 1040H, 11 April. At approximately 2318H the trawler entered the territorial waters of the Republic of Vietnam. At 2343H, after the trawler failed to respond to a challenge and a warning shot fired across her bow, the USS ANTELOPE initiated destructive fire. A running surface engagement ensued lasting nearly two hours as the trawler vainly tried to evade the MARKET TIME units and reach the mouth of the Cua Ganh Hao. The ANTELOPE was joined in the melee by the RUSH, MORGENTHAU, Black Ponies of VAL-4, VNN PGMs 603 and 619, and VNN PB 715. The Black Ponies reported receiving return fire from the infiltrator, possibly from 37 mm AA guns. On 12 April at 0145H, the trawler exploded in a huge ball of flame, reputed by the Black Pony pilots to have been nearly 1500 feet in height, and then disappeared from the radar screens. The sink site was initially reported as being just off the coast in about 30 feet of water in the vicinity of WQ 472 872 (08-53.3N 105-25.3E).

The exact sink sight of the SL-8 trawler remained the object of an intensive search for most of the month. Then on 29 April the sink site was definitely located at WQ 478 883. Only the bow and stern sections remained intact and debris was scattered over a wide area. Salvage operations continued at the close of the month.

On 21 April another possible SL-8 trawler was sighted by MARKET TIME units in the vicinity of 17-05N 111-45E. The contact, designated 21S-01, was proceeding on a southeasterly course at a speed of 12 knots. The trawler was accompanied by several other ships, two of which were Kiangnan class DEs. The ships proceeded to the Paracel Islands where the trawler anchored. Continuous surveillance was discontinued on 22 April.

In other actions throughout the month, MARKET TIME units provided needed gunfire support for ARVN troops operating in the nefarious U Minh Forest. On 5 April MORGENTHAU fired 80 rounds of 5 inch 38 caliber ammunition in support of the 21st ARVN Division, resulting in two structures and one sampan damaged. On 22 April in the vicinity of VR 832 560 RUSH fired a mission resulting in six structures destroyed, three structures damaged and two bunkers destroyed.

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FIRST COASTAL ZONE

Enemy activity in the First Coastal Zone decreased significantly during April over that of March. On the Cua Viet River only 12 mining incidents were reported throughout the month as opposed to the high point of 20 minings reached in March. The reasons for this decrease in enemy activity were probably threefold. First, the enemy needed time to refit after the high point of activity last month. Second, the conclusion of the Laos Lam Son 719 operation reduced logistic craft traffic on the Cua Viet River, and hence, reduced the number of lucrative targets available for mining. Third, intelligence sources reported that the enemy was making an intensive effort to sow mines just off the coast north of the DMZ in order to hamper any attempted amphibious invasion of North Vietnam.¹ Thus it is possible that units normally operating in the Cua Viet area were diverted for this defensive mining effort.

The personnel of Mine Interdiction Division 92 and Coastal Group 11 continued their outstanding performance throughout the month. During the week of 28 March to 3 April, six mining incidents were reported; no casualties occurred, and two NVA pressure mines were recovered. On the night of 5 April, a CG 11 ambush team had a brief skirmish with two VC. The Quang Tri Province guerrillas apparently spotted the ambush team's insertion three kilometers southwest of

1. COMNAVFORV INTSUM 081-71 of 6 Apr 71; 085-71 of 10 Apr.

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Op Base Cua Viet (YD 300 675). While attempting to evade, the VC were in turn spotted and taken under fire. An MSM provided additional fire, however, the VC managed to get away. No friendly casualties were incurred.

Between 3 April and 17 April, no further mining incidents were reported, the longest period of inactivity since December of last year. However, low activity is common in this AO during the early period of the month as water sappers prefer to operate during the low levels of lunar light that occur near the end of the month.


On 18 April, this mining moratorium was broken by a rash of incidents beginning with the recovery of a bird cage actuator of an NVA pressure influence mine two kilometers northeast of Dong Ha (YD 256 623). The mine was estimated to have been in the water about one week. On 21 April, a MID 92 skimmer detonated two possible pressure mines with scare charges three and one-half kilometers southwest of the Cua Viet base (YD 313 674). Again there were no injuries. On the following day, two kilometers southwest of the base (YD 314 685) EOD personnel recovered a chemical arming device with a pressure bird cage which was estimated to have been in the water two or three days. EOD personnel were again busy on 23 April when an 81 mm mortar shell booby trap attached to a restricted area signpost was found and safely detonated, while on 25 April, at noon, a MID 92 skimmer suffered 40%

damage when two pressure mines were detonated close aboard by scare charges. On 26 April fishermen discovered a pressure mine in their nets, a new type containing internal wiring and 80 lbs. of explosive, and on 27 April another fisherman detonated a mine in his net two kilometers northeast of Dong Ha (YD 264 625). Also later in the same day, an LCM-6 on a routine patrol using a chain bottom drag detonated a mine three kilometers northeast of Dong Ha, slightly damaging the chain drag, while even later that same day EOD personnel recovered a pressure mine from a chain drag at the Op Base Cua Viet. The mine was determined to have been in the water only a few hours.

The last mining incident of the month on the Cua Viet took place on 29 April two kilometers northeast of Dong Ha (YD 257 622). A MID 92 skimmer detonated a possible pressure mine with scare charges with no injuries resulting.


Activity in the First Coastal Zone was not confined solely to the Cua Viet River. On 16 April south of DaNang in the CHI LANG I AO, a Coastal Group 14 sweep team engaged two sampans, resulting in two VC probably killed and two VC captured, on the Ba Ren River. On 23 April the sweep team in conjunction with River Patrol Division 60 PBRs and the 324th Regional Forces Company, conducted a sweep in the vicinity of BT 142 519; two VC were flushed and taken under fire, one of them probably being wounded. Duffiebag sensors were implanted

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PBRs of RPD 60 patrol the Ba Ren River south of Hoi An on 29 April.

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FOD personnel of Coastal Group 14 prepare to blow a VC bunker
found during the ground sweep of 29 April

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in the area and two bunkers were destroyed. Another sweep was conducted on 29 April resulting in three bunkers destroyed.

Elsewhere in the First Coastal Zone, COMCOSFLOT ONE units on 9 April conducted Operation WOLF PACK II in the restricted area from BT 060 780 to BT 095 310. Fifty-seven sampans and 209 persons were searched and three people detained.

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SECOND COASTAL ZONE

Enemy activity was low to moderate in the early part of April in the Second Coastal Zone. Toward the end of the month enemy activity increased as the VC kicked off their spring-summer campaign with a series of attacks by fire throughout the zone.

On the night of 17-18 April, a combined operation was conducted against suspected enemy personnel located in a cove of Qui Nhon Harbor approximately five kilometers northeast of the city (CR 14 25). An RF platoon, a U.S. infantry platoon, a long range reconnaissance patrol team, and a Naval Support Activity Detachment (NSAD) EOD team were inserted by boat to act as a ground blocking force. Two VNN PCFs maintained a blocking position on the ocean side of the peninsula, while Army PBRs blocked the harbor entrance of the cove. A combined NSAD and harbor skimmer force conducted a search of the harbor resulting in 26 junks and 46 persons detained. All detainees were turned over to the National Police after initial search and interrogation.

During the early morning hours of 20 April, Naval Air Facility and Air Force Security, Cam Ranh Bay, patrol boats spotted two swimmer sappers near the pilings of the My Ca Bridge (CP 053 258). With the use of concussion grenades and the aid of Army sentries, one swimmer was wounded and subsequently captured. The other swimmer

apparently escaped. The swimmer captured was clad only in a loincloth and was using wooden noseclamps. Initial interrogation revealed the PW to be a member of the K-93 Sapper Battalion which traditionally targets the Cam Ranh Bay area.

During the late hours of 25 April, the U. S. Army Support Command and the Cam Ranh Air Facility Base received an attack by fire consisting of an estimated nine rounds of 107 mm rockets. Only light damage resulted from this attack. The suspected launch site was fixed in the Hill 576 area (BP 993 223), approximately eight kilometers southwest of the airbase and just within the maximum range of 107 mm rockets.

During the early morning hours of 26 April, the VC launched a series of attacks by fire in Binh Dinh Province. One attack occurred at the ARVN Ammunition Supply Point (CR 06 23) two kilometers west of Qui Nhon City. These explosions resulted in two ARVN killed, about 17 ARVN wounded, and an unknown number of civilians injured. One pad containing 2,000 five hundred pound bombs and one pad of retrograde ammunition were also destroyed. The other attack occurred at the Qui Nhon Supply Command where approximately 14 82 mm mortar rounds impacted, resulting in at least five U. S. personnel wounded, five buildings destroyed and several vehicles damaged.

The coastal groups in the Second Coastal Zone were very active during the month. At the close of March, Coastal Group 23 received two rounds of 60 mm

mortar fire from a launch site in the vicinity of CQ 073 902; fortunately, no casualties resulted.

Coastal Group 25 reported the most activity in April. On 8 April, yabuta junks with CG 25 personnel participated in a combined sweep with 80 PF troops (in an area bounded by coordinates CQ 200 030, CQ 230 060, CQ 300 050, CQ 340 010, CP 320 960) resulting in three detainees, two of whom were confirmed as VC. Subsequent interrogation led to the implication and arrest of the Dam Mon Hamlet Chief for conspiring to harbor VC and draft dodgers. On 10 April CG 25 conducted a one-day patrol of the coast of Ben Goi Bay, Cua Lon, Port Daypt, and Lach Cua Be, detaining three junks for fishing violations. On 13 and 25 April, CG 25 conducted training reconnaissance patrols with VN student rangers from Duc My. And on 17 April, CG 25 units supported the 71st Regional Forces from Ninh Hoa in a combined amphibious operation.

MARKET TIME Inner Barrier forces were active throughout the month in the Second Coastal Zone. On 3 April in the vicinity of CR 12 46, VNN PCF 3853 detained two suspects for fishing in restricted waters. Four grenades without primers were found in the boat.

Salvage operations continued throughout April on the SS ROBIN HOOD, mined last month in Qui Nhon Harbor.

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THIRD COASTAL ZONE

During April, enemy activity remained light to moderate.

Enemy initiated firefights against patrol boats in the Mushroom area of the Saigon River (XT 59 31) increased during the month. Intelligence sources reported that enemy units have moved from the Angel's Wing area of Cambodia to the area along the Tay Ninh - Hau Nghia Province border. These reports may possibly mark the beginning of the movement of enemy forces back into Vietnam from Cambodia with the onset of the wet season.¹

The coastal groups were very active during April in patrolling the coast, searching sampans and in conducting civic action programs. On 3 April, two kilometers southeast of the Coastal Group 36 base (XR 272 612), a junk on routine patrol was hailed from the shore by a Vietnamese civilian and informed of the existence of a mine five kilometers from the river bank. The civilian and his son got the mine and returned it to the CG 36 junk. It was found to be a claymore type weighing between 50 and 100 pounds, wired for electrical detonation. The mine was then transported back to the base where it was disarmed by EOD personnel.

On 6 April, in the vicinity of XS 490 025, Coastal Group 35 suffered two personnel killed and two wounded when a CG 35 junk pulled

L. COMNAVFORV INTSUM 096-71

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into the bank to eat lunch. One of the men stepped on a grenade trap while attempting to climb a tree in order to secure fruit for lunch.

Coastal Group 33 carried out an active civic action program throughout the month. On 3 April, a MED/DENTCAP was held at a village located at YS 430 523. Medical aid was given to 30 persons, dental aid to 20, and haircuts also to 20 persons. In addition, five pounds of Psyops magazines and assorted leaflets were distributed. The two dentists and the one doctor were from the USS JASON (AR-8). On 14 April, dental aid was given to about 27 persons at Ap Dinh (YS 376 582). Again, Psyops material was distributed.

Vietnamese Seals were also active during the month. On 11 April, one LDNN of Detachment Sierra, Group Charlie, and several guides inserted and captured a village level commo-liaison VC in the vicinity of XR 197 736. This operation had originally been planned for the previous day but had been postponed due to mechanical failure of the Seal Support Craft (MSSC). The man captured was actually the brother of the man sought and was apprehended as he was trying to evade by sampan. This man turned out also to be a confirmed commo-liaison VC. Upon debrief of the mission at the village police station, it was discovered that one of the LDNNs had informed the Long Phu District, Ba Xuyen Village police chief (a personal friend) of the impending operation who had in turn informed the Vinh Binh District police chief by radio. Thus the VN police had apprehended both suspects on 10 April to hold them for the

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LDNN arrival. When the police learned that the operation had been postponed, the suspects were released. A mission compromise such as this could have had tragic consequences if the VC had decided to set up an ambush for the LDNNs on 11 April.

Various craft in the Vung Tau Harbor continued to report thefts and pilferage. On 1 April, the Luzon Tug BEAVER, while on skids aboard a barge awaiting transit to DaNang was boarded by approximately ten Vietnamese in full battle dress armed with M-16s and M-79 grenade launchers. These men forced the tug's crew into the engine room at gunpoint and then stole 720 feet of nylon line, several suitcases of personal belongings, 5700 plasters, and then disabled the tug's radio and search light. The thieves were embarked in a green LCVP which fled north in the direction of Cat Lo.

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FOURTH COASTAL ZONE

Activity in the Fourth Coastal Zone continued at a moderate level during April. Vinh Binh and Kien Hoa Provinces reported the highest level of activity in the Fourth Coastal Zone and were probably enemy focal points for the month. A number of intelligence reports were received during April concerning the resumption of the infiltration of men and supplies into the Fourth Coastal Zone from Cambodia. Infiltration routes that existed prior to the Vietnamese cross-border operations into Cambodia and Laos have been re-established.

The Vinh Te Canal has recently been a common area of enemy infiltration. Throughout the month, five separate after-the-fact reports have been received of enemy units crossing the canal.

Also, reports of resupply-by-sea into areas of the Fourth Coastal Zone have continued to have been received. Kien Hoa and Kien Giang Provinces were the areas where most of this activity was taking place.¹

On 30 March Seawolf helicopters discovered a camouflaged trawler 17 kilometers south southeast of Nam Can (WQ 102 534). On 31 March, a combined Seal/UDT/EOD team inserted and found the craft in a narrow waterway. It had a steel hull painted pea green, had been stripped down, and had no armament. Numerous machinery parts
1. COMNAVFORV INTSUM 079-71 dtd 3 April 71.

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were on deck, indicating possible engineering difficulties. The engineering plant itself was submerged. The insertion team set off disabling charges inside the hull to prevent the enemy from moving the trawler after the team extracted. The trawler appears to be an SL-6 and North Vietnam is believed to have only one SL-6 in its inventory. This trawler was last sighted in Haiphong Harbor on 4 November 1970. Because of the condition of the paint on the discovered trawler, it was estimated to have been at its present position at least four to six months.²

2. COMNAVFORV INTSUM 080-71 dtd 5 April 1971.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY

During April the Psyops team of SOLID ANCHOR reported treating 269 people for various medical ailments. One man of the detachment worked with Beach Jumper Unit One (BJU-1) and an ARVN unit in a psychological operation in the U Minh Forest. Due perhaps to the turnover of the SOLID ANCHOR Operation to the Vietnamese and to the temporary relocation of Psyops personnel to Ca Mau, there was only one hour of broadcasting reported for April.

The RSSZ Psyops team made loudspeaker broadcasts from Slicks during April at suspected enemy positions in Can Gio, Quang Xuyen, and Nhon Trach Districts. MED/DENTCAPs were conducted on 7 and 18 April at Binh Khanh (YS 945 790) and Thanh An (YS 166 578) Villages where 94 and 71 people, respectively, were treated. At Binh Khanh 66 health kits were distributed.

MARKET TIME Support Ship USS MORGENTHAU (WHEC 722) held five MEDCAPs during April on the Vietnamese Islands in the Gulf of Thailand, Hon Minh, Hon Tre, Poulo Dama, and Poulo Obi. In all 123 people were treated for medical ailments, 45 vaccinated against smallpox, and 37 dogs and 3 cats immunized against rabies. Also on Hon Tre Island MORGENTHAU personnel repaired and painted two school houses and a midwife house on 8 April.

Navy men at Chau Doc held a MEDCAP in nearby Con Tien Village (WS 242 735) and treated 66 people and distributed 450 newspapers, 175 magazines, and 10 pounds of candy on 15 April.

BJU-1 reported the following Psyops conducted during April:

<u>Detachment</u>	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Broadcasts (hours)</u>	<u>Hoi Chanhs</u>
Moc Hoa	111,500	13	5
Ben Tre	800 (pamphlets)	19	
Chau Doc	14,000	15	
My Tho	1,050,000	82	
Rach Gia	211,000	3	10
DaNang	35,000	36	

In addition, BJU-1 established a new detachment at Tan An in lieu of Ben Luc to exploit the area around Tra Cu where there have been many recent radar contacts. During April they saturated the area with 1,600,000 leaflets and 80 broadcast hours from land, air, and waterborne units. In My Tho the Vietnamese Psyops personnel had three contacts with the enemy 12-24 April while making 53 hours of Psyops broadcasts in Dinh Tuong Province.

Navy helicopter squadrons HAL-3 and VAL-4, in response to COMNAVFORV's request last month for unit reports on community action projects, reported contributions to neighboring orphanages

and periodic MEDCAPs in their AOs. HAL-3 had been providing the Can Tho Provincial Orphanage with medical supplies, clothing, toys, and volunteer work; several contributions had been solicited and received from organizations and individuals in CONUS to support this program. Some squadron members had made applications to adopt children from this orphanage. The squadron flight surgeon had participated in MEDCAP missions in the area around Binh Thuy in cooperation with NSAD Binh Thuy and USA and USAF medical teams. Squadron members have volunteered services to act as shore patrol in the Be Xe Moi/ Can Tho area in an effort to improve U.S./VN relations during liberty hours; this action has been successful. VAL-4 reported construction underway to provide a playground for local children, intramural sports participation between squadron teams and local Vietnamese military teams, and weekly visits to isolated villages by the attached flight surgeon.

In the dependent shelter program, 1350 of CBMU 302's tasked 3,000 dependent shelter units have been completed and turned over so far by NAVCAT teams throughout RVN. On March 15 on An Khan Island, 94 units were turned over to the Vietnamese government and 160 were completed at An Thoi (Phu Quoc Island) by the end of the month. The dependent shelter projects begun by Seabees of NMCBs Three

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and 74, who redeployed to CONUS during the month, at Long Phu, Cho Moi, Nam Can, and Chau Doc, remained to be carried on by the Vietnamese units at those ACTOV bases. At Chau Doc NMCB 3 Detail Aquarius nearly completed the 160 dependent shelters assigned before departure. With the great reduction of USN construction forces in RVN, the burden of dependent shelter construction at many sites has fallen on Vietnamese shoulders. However, according to CHNAVADVGRP and CNO VNN (joint msg dtg 031352Z Apr 71), since December 1970, the participation by VNN/VNMC at dependent shelter construction sites has steadily decreased from 110 to a March 1971 low of 34, markedly reducing the dependent shelter construction rate.

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ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY

On 3 April, 1971, RADM Salzer, COMNAVFORV, stated:

"ACTOVLOG does not refer solely to construction of bases or portions of bases, but rather connotes the overall program for building up the VNN logistic infrastructure including complete bases, transportation, supply, pay, subsistence, base and craft maintenance, and all other aspects of the logistics program." The import of this statement was more than substantiated as the U.S. Navy's ACTOV Program achieved several milestones during the month of April, with logistics support dominating the field. The first of April marked the turnover of the last U.S. Naval operation in Vietnam, SOLID ANCHOR, to the VNN, and redesignated as TRAN HUNG DAO IV. Amid much fanfare the VNN commissioned its first destroyer, the VNS TRAN HUNG DAO (HQ 1) (ex-USS CAMP) on 22 April. Two Coast Guard WHECs previously turned over complement the VNN infant Blue Water Navy. Seven logistics support craft turned over during the month again underlined the turn in emphasis towards ACTOVLOG. The Logistics Support Base at Cat Lo was turned over on the 28th, and eight lesser support bases followed suit as the VNN took major strides in independent support for their operating units.

While the commissioning of the VNN destroyer TRAN HUNG DAO took the spotlight for April, support craft exclusively were turned

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over throughout the Republic. On 15 April YFR 889 was turned over at Nha Be. The last two ACTOV salvage craft were turned over on 29 April with CTF 214 assuming operational control of all VNN salvage craft and the COS, VNN (for operations), determining all salvage priorities. U.S. salvage assets remaining were an HCU-1 Detachment of two officers and 21 enlisted men and three LCM-8s. The Naval Supply Facility at DaNang turned over support craft in bulk on 30 April. The craft included YOG 131, LCM-8 921, LCM-6 26, LCM-6 29, and finally, picket boats 15 and 37.

Far removed from the war, the USS GARRETT COUNTY (AGP 786) was turned over to the Vietnamese Navy in Guam, on April 23, ending the American phase of a long and busy career in Vietnam. In March, 1967, she made her initial appearance in country and was assigned to the support of River Division 543 in the RSSZ. In June of that year she moved to the Lower Bassac River in support of CTF 116 and River Division 511. December of 1967 found the GARRETT COUNTY shifting to the Co Chien River as command ship for River Division 52, and supporting the 9th ARVN Infantry Division, where she was involved in the action of TET '68. In March 1969 she went to the Upper Mekong for BARRIER REEF operations after having come from a month's overhaul in Guam. September 1969 found GARRETT COUNTY in the Gulf of Thailand supporting River Division 554 under Operation SEARCH TURN, CTF 194.3. A month later she shifted to Operation BREEZY COVE, CTF 194.2.

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In March 1970 she left for Ha Tien after a month's respite in Subic Bay, becoming PBR support ship for River Divisions 513 and 515. When the Vietnamese Army thrust into Cambodia in May of 1970, GARRETT COUNTY assisted the Cambodian Navy boats, and then became command ship for the VNN operation CU LONG II, a MARKET TIME operation. In July of that year she departed RVN enroute to Guam for turnover repairs, but was diverted to Subic Bay. In September she was back in the war supporting Operation BREEZY COVE, where she remained until January of 1971, whereupon she left for Guam and ultimately was turned over to the VNN.

The Vietnamese Navy commissioned its first destroyer April 22, as the VNS TRAN HUNG DAO (HQ-1) officially joined the Republic of Vietnam's burgeoning fleet. The 1,740-ton destroyer escort radar picket ship, formerly the Pearl Harbor - based USS CAMP, was the first ship of its class to be transferred to the Vietnamese fleet. As the USS CAMP, the ship spent 30 months on MARKET TIME patrol. Re-christened in honor of the first naval hero of the Vietnamese Navy, the TRAN HUNG DAO had been turned over to the VNN on February 6, 1971, at Pearl Harbor. The ship's crew spent a year training aboard CAMP and at U.S. Naval training facilities in the United States prior to turnover. The commissioning was attended by General Abrams, COMUSMACV, as well as RADM Salzer, COMNAVFORV, and several foreign ambassadors.

By the end of April, the ACTOVCRAFT status was as follows:

Coastal Surveillance

<u>Type</u>	<u>ACTOV Prog</u>	<u>Turned Over</u>	<u>Remaining</u>
DER	2	1	1
PCE	2	2	-
PCF	107	107	-
WHEC	2	2	-
WPB	<u>26</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>-</u>
Sub total	139	138	1

River Security

PBR	293	293	-
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River Assault

ASPB	84	84	-
ATC	100	100	-
CCB	9	9	-
MON	17	17	-
MON/Z	5	5	-
RECHG	5	5	-
REFUL	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>-</u>
Sub total	224	224	0

Harbor and Mine Defense

Boston Whaler	26	26	-
LCM 3/6	19	19	-
LCPL	24	24	-
MSM	8	8	-
MSR	6	6	-
Picket	<u>24</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>2</u>
Sub total	107	105	2

Logistics and Support Craft


AGP	2	2	-
APL	2	2	-
ARL	1	-	1
Boston Whaler	51	-	51
CSB	4	4	-
LCM 3 Fire	1	1	-
LCM 3/6	48	12	36

LCM 3 Pusher	3	-	3
LCM 6 Pusher	3	-	3
LCM 6 Fuel Utl.	1	1	-
LCM 8	40	30	10
LCU	8	6	2
LST	3	3	-
UTB	6	4	2
Utility (50 ft.)	2	-	2
YD	2	-	2
YFR	1	-	1
YFU	1	-	1
YLLC	3	3	-
YOG	3	2	1
YR	1	-	1
YRBM	2	1	1
YTL	4	4	-
YTM	<u>3</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>3</u>
Subtotal	195	75	120
TOTAL	958	835	123

CSB - a logistics craft, 56 feet long, displacing 90 tons
 LCM-8 - a logistics craft, 73.5 feet long, displacing 127 tons
 Picket - a patrol craft, 45 feet long, displacing 20 tons
 YLLC - a salvage craft, 119 feet long, displacing 415 tons

After nearly four years of service in the northernmost regions of the Republic of Vietnam, River Patrol Boat Mobile Base One retired from the war on the first of April. On that day its functions were turned over to the newly-constructed intermediate support base at Thuan An, and the Mobile Base was towed to the U.S. Naval Support Facility at DaNang to await further transfer to Subic Bay, Philippines. Built in 1966 as the prototype of a new support base for naval river patrol boats (PBRs) in Vietnam, it was delivered to DaNang in December 1967. The base, composed of four pontoons, 110 feet long and 30 feet wide, provided complete repair facilities for PBRs in the northern part

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PBR Mobile Base One as it looked when it was supporting river patrol craft in the Tan My area of northern Military Region 1.

(U.S. Navy photo)

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of Military Region I, in addition to supplying emergency repairs for other Brown Water Navy craft. At one time the base was staffed by over 300 men engaged in such specialties as electronics, machinery repair and fiberglass hull construction. The size of the base grew as eight barges were later added to the original four, allowing space for an all hands club, a ship's store, a dispensary and an armory. The repair unit was kept open 24 hours a day. An overhead bridge trolley crane made it possible to lift small boats from the water and place them on deck for repairs. When the USN's River Division 521, which had been operating out of the base, turned over all of its craft to the VNN's River Patrol Division 60, PBR MoBase One became a key part in the Navy's Vietnamization Program for Military Region I.

The Logistics Support Base at Cat Lo, 40 miles southeast of Saigon, was turned over to the Vietnamese Navy on April 28, first of seven such primary support bases to be turned over under the ACTOV Program. RADM Salzer, COMNAVFORV, was present to turn over the base to RADM Chon, VNN CNO. Logistic Support Bases are the largest and most refined of the bases now controlled by the Republic of Vietnam Navy. Cat Lo provides logistic support for coastal patrol craft of the VNN's Coastal Surveillance Flotilla Three which operates along the South China Sea coastline of Military Regions Three and Four. It has the facilities and personnel necessary to provide major overhauls

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Naval commanders and commanding officers salute the colors as the Vietnamese flag replaces the Stars and Stripes at Cat Lo Logistic Support Base. They are (from left) LCDR Ngo Qui Mo, Commanding Officer of the base; RADM Tran Van Chon, Chief of Vietnamese Naval Operations; RADM Robert S. Salzer, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Vietnam; LCDR S. A. Ungemach, the last American Commanding Officer of the base; and RADM Herbert S. Matthews, Jr., Deputy Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam.

on patrol craft. The base also serves as headquarters for the VNN's Third Coastal Zone, and is the home base for Detachment Alfa of the USN's Harbor Clearance Unit One and an American explosive ordnance disposal team. The base was completely turned over to the VNN the previous week and the Naval Support Activity Detachment personnel remained on board as advisors.


The Vietnamese Navy assumed full control of the Intermediate Support Base at Ben Luc on 29 April, 1971. The base, 20 miles southwest of Saigon, was the first of eleven such ISBs to be transferred. The intermediate support base at Ben Luc provides logistic support and repair facilities for Naval forces operating from Advanced Tactical Support Bases around the Parrot's Beak region of Cambodia, in the TRAN HUNG DAO II AO. Since 2 April, the VNN has commanded and directed all riverine combat operations and fighting units in the Republic. The transfer of support facilities signified the Vietnamese's ability to take on the responsibility of supporting their combat units.

Six Advanced Tactical Support Bases, were turned over all across Vietnam at the end of April, including the ATSBs at Ben Keo, Go Dau Ha, and Moc Hoa on the 27th, and the ATSBs at Tra Cu, Tuyen Nhon, and Phuoc Xuyen on the 30th. The Op Base at Sa Dec was turned over on the 30th also.

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Commodore Lam Nguon Tanh (right), Deputy Chief of Vietnamese Naval Operations, and Rear Admiral Philip S. McManus, Commander of U.S. Naval Support Activity, Saigon, signify the turnover of the Ben Luc Intermediate Support Base from American to Vietnamese control with a handshake.



* Base already turned over

During the month of April, formal turnover agreements were signed by RADM Salzer and RADM Chon for the following: Naval Base Chau Doc, Op Base Ha Tien, Naval Base Kien An, Op Base Phu Cuong, and Naval Base Tan Chau.

A summary of the bases turned over as of the end of April follows:

<u>Base</u>	<u>Date</u>
OPBASE My Tho	29 November 1969
OPBASE Phu Cuong	16 October 1970
OPBASE Long Binh	30 November 1970
OPBASE Kien An	6 December 1970
OPBASE Chau Doc	11 December 1970
OPBASE Tan Chau	17 December 1970
OPBASE Ha Tien	18 December 1970
ATSB Ben Keo	27 April 1971
ATSB Go Dau Ha	"
ATSB Moc Hoa	"
LSB Cat Lo	28 April 1971
ISB Ben Luc	29 April 1971
ATSB Phuoc Xuyen	30 April 1971
OPBASE Sa Dec	"
ATSB Tra Cu	"
ATSB Tuyen Nhon	"
OPBASE Chu Lai (provisional turnover)	

The Intermediate Support Base at Long Xuyen was commissioned on 19 April. Once commissioned, a base begins its operational phase, marking the end of its outfitting phase.

With the turnover of Operation SOLID ANCHOR, the last of the U. S. Navy operations came to an end in the Republic of Vietnam. The list of operations and turnover dates are as follows:

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<u>USN Designator</u>	<u>VNN Designator</u>	<u>Date</u>
READY DECK	TRAN HUNG DAO V	20 April 70
GIANT SLINGSHOT	TRAN HUNG DAO II	5 May 70
SEA TIGER	TRAN HUNG DAO VII	31 May 70
BARRIER REEF	TRAN HUNG DAO IX	1 August 70
SEARCH TURN	TRAN HUNG DAO VI	6 November 70
BLUE SHARK	NONE	15 November 70
STABLE DOOR	NONE	25 November 70
BREEZY COVE	TRAN HUNG DAO X	29 December 70
SOLID ANCHOR	TRAN HUNG DAO IV	1 April 71

At the Vietnamese Naval Academy in Nha Trang, midshipman Class 23 experienced an unfortunate crisis. On April 19, a midshipman died of acute kidney failure a week after reporting to class. A full investigation brought forth 25 midshipmen with medical complaints including asthma, tuberculosis, broken arms, deafness, heart murmurs, and two other cases of kidney trouble. By the 26th another midshipman was dead from kidney trouble. A U.S. Navy doctor was called in who spotted a third midshipman in critical condition and medevaced him to the 3rd Field Hospital in Saigon. The presence of some toxic agent was suspected. The class experienced delays due to the recurrent physical examinations effected that should have taken place before the aspirants were sent to the academy.

Progress towards changeover to a two-year academic curriculum continued, although a shortage of qualified full-time faculty members at VNNA still existed. Books were still arriving from USNA and PERS C23. Also, of 106 officers allowed on board the VNNTC, 67 were assigned, 32 of which were Warrant Officers who have had little or no

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formal officer training. Midshipmen at the VNNA undergo nine weeks of basic training at Quang Trung before starting the 12-month course of professional training at Nha Trang. Since its founding in 1952, the VNNTC has graduated 1,794 midshipmen, 427 petty officers, 506 specialists and 13,718 seamen.

On 12 April, the VNNOCS Class #8 graduated at Newport, R. I., and concurrently Class #12 convened. The seventh and final class of VNN officers graduated from the Communications Officer Course, ACTOVCOMM School, at the Naval Communications Station in Cam Ranh Bay, on April 22.

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NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON

During April preparations were made by the NSA detachments, ISBs, LSBs, and ATSBs for separate messing of the Vietnamese and U.S. personnel. On 25 April USN mess halls were required to begin providing food, utensils, and payment for fresh foods for their counterparts.

On 1 April PBR Mobile Base ONE was towed to the U.S. Naval Support Facility, DaNang after its functions were turned over to the newly constructed Intermediate Support Base (ISB) at Thuan An. PBR MoBase One served for nearly four years in the northernmost regions of RVN. ISB Long Xuyen was commissioned on 19 April, with the assignment of Dai Uy Pham Ngoc Kinh, VNN as the commanding officer, and LCDR A. A. Thiel, Jr., USN as deputy commander. By 28 April all USN NSA detachment sailors had departed from the recently turned over ATSB at Phuoc Xuyen.

Recent reductions in personnel at NSAD Binh Thuy had significantly reduced the number of USN sailors available for base security. The Vietnamese provide for approximately 75% of the base defense and security posts, but do not have enough weapons. At the present time the VNN at the detachment await the transfer of weapons from USN personnel as they depart instead of requesting arms and ammunition

from the ARVN. Personnel reductions at Binh Thuy and at Dong Tam also increased the workload for the boat repair facility at LSB Dong Tam. As the large enlisted force reduction (from 252 to 171 personnel) was effected, the VNN assumed a larger portion of LSB operational responsibilities. On 1 April the Repair Department transferred responsibilities to the VNN as did the Public Works Department on 5 April. The USS ASKARI (ARL 30) was tasked to assist in repairing boats at Dong Tam, arriving 23 April from her permanent operational location at Song Ong Doc.

"Keystone Robin" the Marine redeployment of personnel and equipment was in full operation at the DaNang piers during April. The operation ended on 25 April with five Seventh Fleet amphibious ships loading and deploying from the DaNang harbor, the sixth increment of U.S. Marines and equipment to depart Vietnam and other areas of the Pacific which began in January of this year.

The men of NSF DaNang assisted in fighting two fires during the month. Early on the morning of April 13 the NSF fire department dispatched two pumper trucks and a 5500 gallon tanker to a large structural fire 300 meters south of the deep water piers. The Coastal Security Service Club was ablaze and out of control when the NSF units arrived but was quickly put out. A letter of appreciation was received from Vietnamese Navy Commander Nguyen Viet Tan,

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Commanding Officer of the Coastal Security Service. On April 27 NSF DaNang aided other DaNang area commands in bringing a large fuel fire under control at the DaNang Air Base. Incoming enemy rockets ignited the blaze after lines were ruptured at a large fuel storage tank at 0200H. 150,000 gallons of jet fuel was set afire as a result of the attack. In all, seven tankers and six pumpers from fire stations throughout the DaNang area were employed by scores of Marine, Navy, Air Force, Army, and Vietnamese firemen as they battled the fire for nearly 19 hours. The NSF fire department played a crucial role in controlling the billowing clouds of fire as they had the only equipment necessary for the application of "Light Water," a smothering agent, to extinguish the blaze.

There were several serious accidents suffered by NSA personnel during the month. On 5 April between Sa Dec and Vinh Long on the Mekong River, a Vietnamese Navy Monitor and a Filipino tug (FAYE B) collided. SM2 Karl Robert Berbert, advisor on the Monitor (HQ 6505), was killed in the collision. His crushed body was recovered from the river three days later. The Monitor was in a convoy of boats proceeding downstream when the tug cut in front of it. Although flares were fired, still the tug struck the Monitor. During the collision, the commander of the convoy, on the Monitor, was catapulted onto the tug. He made an effort to divert the tug and return to the scene of the

collision but was ordered off the tug at gunpoint and forced to use a life ring to make his way back to his boats. The tug was taken under small arms fire from the convoy but maintained course and speed and was lost in the darkness. The following morning, two PBRs from RPD 56, convoy units, and two Seawolves from Dong Tam assisted in the search for the missing sailor. SM2 Berbert was recommended posthumously for the Navy Commendation Medal with combat distinguishing device for his work as advisor to RAG 81 and as convoy advisor for convoys between Saigon and Bac Lieu/Soc Trang.

On 12 April, outside Nha Be Navy Base, a USN mail truck struck three Vietnamese civilians, a mother and her two children, and crashed into their home after reportedly being run off the road by an oncoming U.S. vehicle and experiencing mechanical difficulty to the brakes. The mother and one child were killed in the crash and solation payment and a courtesy call by the commanding officer of LSB Nha Be were made immediately afterwards. Two days later, at LSB Nha Be, EOCN Thomas E. Mackey, USN, was killed when a tree he was removing toppled onto him. On 16 April, five kilometers northeast of Saigon, three Navymen in a Boston Whaler on a picture taking expedition received automatic arms fire in a canal near Newport. One man, CYN3 David R. Kowitz, attached to NAVBROCEANO Saigon

was killed by three or four rounds. Due to the nature of the expedition fire was not returned; local RF forces at a bridge downstream assisted with first aid. CYN3 Kowitz died before medevac help arrived from Advisory Team 44.

ISB Qui Nhon experienced increased enemy activity during the month. Support personnel sighted 16 enemy moving within half mile of the base on the morning of 4 April. Base mortars, artillery, and aircraft delivered fire on the area with varying reports of two to six enemy bodies sighted. At 2015H Hill 131 reported incoming rounds. At 2150H sensors in the vicinity of CR 128 223 were activated and the area was saturated with high explosives. Army PBRs also entered the cove and strafed the AO during the night. Then on 17-18 April a combined sweep of the coves north of the base was conducted by elements of the RF, USA and USN/VNN EOD teams, NSAD Qui Nhon Ambush Team, and an 81 mm mortar crew. The troops, inserted by LCM-8s and skimmers at night, surprised 26 junks that were in the coves. By 81 mm illumination, 23 personnel were apprehended and turned over to the National Police for nonexistent or improper identification papers. There were no other hostile incidents reported.

A sweep boat of YRBM-21 in Kien Phong Province, five kilometers north of Tan Chau Op Base on 10 April, reported taking small arms fire from a darkened sampan in the vicinity of WS 991 229, 50 feet astern of the Mogas ammi anchored 250 yards off the YRBM's port bow. After receiving six initial semi-automatic rounds and observing muzzle flashes and hearing rounds pass within several feet of the sweep boat, the sweep watch personnel, one ENFN and one SN, returned four semi-automatic rounds of M-16 fire at the muzzle flashes from the sampan. At 0435H YRBM-21 sounded general quarters and notified Tan Chau Op Base, and reported an enemy sampan 500 yards south of its original position. The sweep boat followed for a while as the sampan left and then broke off surveillance.

YRBM-20 deployed from RVN for the last time as a USN asset and arrived in Subic under tow of the USS MOLALA (ATF 106) on 12 April. The 11 river patrol boats for the Cambodian Navy were turned over after fitting out at Binh Thuy on 9 April.

DEPSEA has designed and tested a simple water purification system using coagulation, settling, filtration, and chlorination. Based on the test results, a prototype has been constructed at ISB Ben Luc with assistance from base personnel and NSAS. The prototype was designated for a 30 gpm rate but is being operated at 34 gpm

to meet the water demands at Ben Luc. This unit is expected to continue to supply water until the larger system of the same design is completed. The development was sponsored by NRDUV and administered by NCEL, PORHUE, under projects 30/31-70.

Distinguished visitors to NSAS, NSFD, and detachments during the month included Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor. From 25 April to 4 May he visited with USARV and ARVN commanders and the province chiefs and senior advisors in Binh Dinh Province. With his party but on a separate itinerary was John G. Kester, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, who concerned himself with morale, drug, and fragging problems among Army men. The new COMNAVFORV, RADM Salzer, and his counterpart, RADM Chon, visited NSA detachments at Dong Tam and Cam Ranh Bay, PBR MoBase II at Tan An, and NSF DaNang on 19-20 April, studying the ACTOV craft, dependent shelter progress, and ACTOVRAD sites. On 2 April CAPT Robert A. Powell, USN, prospective Assistant Chief of Staff for logistic plans at NSAS, arrived in DaNang for a briefing and tour of NSFD. Vietnamese Navy Captain Ho Van Ky Thoa, Commander of the First Coastal Zone accompanied him on a tour of MR I the following day. On 12 April, two U. S. senators, the Honorable T. F. Eagleton (D-Mo.) and T. F. Stevens (R-Ark.) arrived in DaNang

for a briefing on Vietnamization and a study of environmental pollution. They were accompanied by Mr. Stephen Vossmeier legislative assistant to Senator Eagleton, and Colonel Joseph E. O'Leary, Secretary of the Army Representative.


On 9 April, Commander William M. Cole, USN, relieved Commander Richard E. Johe, USN, as Officer-in-Charge NSAD Dong Tam and Commanding Officer, LSB Dong Tam. On 30 April CAPT Richard A. Paddock, USN, relieved CAPT Maurice A. Horn, USN, as Commanding Officer Naval Support Facility DaNang and Senior Advisor LSB DaNang. Also on 30 April, NSF DaNang's operations department turned over six boats to the Vietnamese Navy's First Coastal Zone: three LCMs, one YO, and two picket boats.

During April, the following NSAS ships supported allied operations in RVN:

- USS ASKARI (ARL 30)
- USS SPHINX (ARL 24)
- USS SATYR (ARL 23)
- USS TUTUILA (ARG 4)
- USS BRULE (AKL 28)
- USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (AGP 838)
- USS WASHTENAW COUNTY (LST 1166)
- USS HOLMES COUNTY (LST 836)
- AFDL 23 (enroute Subic Bay 21 April)
- APL 21
- APL 30
- YFR 890
- YFR 889
- YRBM 21
- YRs 70, 71, and 9
- USS TOM GREEN COUNTY (LST 1159)

In addition, USS COHOES (ANL 78) spent the month repairing POL and JP-4 lines at Chu Lai and Red Beach (DaNang). USS BRULE was nominated for the National Defense Transportation Award, with the recently departed USS MARK (AKL 12) as alternate. Since the first of FY 70, BRULE has carried 2148 tons of cargo, 670 tons of ammunition, undertaken 15 tows and one salvage operation, and transferred 28,526 gallons of water. When in RVN MARK averaged 1687 miles per month on supply runs on rivers and coastal routes of the Delta. On April 23 USS GARRETT COUNTY (AGP 786) was decommissioned at the Ship Repair Facility in Guam. After a few moments the patrol craft tender was flying new colors as the Republic of Vietnam Ship CAN THO (HQ 801), commanded by VNN LCDR Vo Duy Ninh.

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Rear Adm. Robert S. Salzer (left), the commander of U.S. naval forces in Vietnam, is met on his arrival in Saigon by Rear Adm. Philip S. McManus (center), commander of Naval Support Activity Saigon, and Rear Adm. Herbert S. Matthews Jr., deputy commander of U.S. naval forces in Vietnam. Adm. Salzer replaced Vice Adm. Jerome H. King Jr. on April 5 as the U.S. Navy's senior officer in the Republic of Vietnam. (U.S. Navy photo by PH2 Marty Rust)

THIRD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BRIGADE

The month of April was marked by a great reduction in Seabee personnel in Vietnam. The April redeployment to CONUS of NMCBs 3 and 74 left a total of 350 construction force personnel in RVN, down from last month's total of over 1500. NMCB 74 redeployed from Bien Hoa 20-24 April; NMCB 3 redeployed from DaNang and Bien Hoa 21-26 April. The Seabee camp at Red Beach in DaNang, Camp Haskins, was transferred to the U.S. Army 57th Transportation Battalion on 18 April; the Seabee Center in Bien Hoa changed hands on 22 April, becoming the headquarters of CBMU 302. The remaining personnel of the 32nd NCR departed from Vietnam on 30 April.

On 26 April CBMU 302 moved to Bien Hoa due to lack of space at NSF Cam Ranh Bay which was crowded with Vietnamese Navymen aboard to learn the methods of base operation and maintenance in preparation for the turnover of the facility. Also the majority of the dependent shelter sites, which are the unit's major project, are in the Delta, and Bien Hoa offers closer communications and better transportation opportunities. CBMU 302 has turned over a total of 1350 units to date in MRs II, III, and IV.

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Sharing the Bien Hoa Center with CBMU 302 is the newly arrived NMCB 5, which relieved NMCBs 3 and 74 during April and began work on three projects left by the two departing battalions: ACTOVRAD sites #8 at Mui Dinh and #9 at Nui Ta Kou and ISB Nam Can. The tasking for construction of an ISB at Tan An was cancelled due to a forecasted lack of time during the deployment of NMCB 5 and a late start. Other Seabee units remaining in RVN are the Third Naval Construction Brigade and, temporarily, small delay parties of NMCBs 3 and 74.

NMCB 3, completing this month its fifth deployment to the RVN, spent the month finishing up construction projects. Detail Neptune completed construction of a berthing pier and mine fence for the VNN Op Base at Cua Viet. Detail Quasar completed the paving of LTL-4 between Route 1-D and Hill 37. Detail Taurus installed a pontoon berthing pier and POL tank facility for the VNN Op Base at Chu Lai. Detail Jupiter completed the shoulder upgrading of QL-1 south between Thanh Quit and Tam Ky. In the Delta, Detail Aquarius completed work on the construction of dependent shelters and two schools at Chau Doc ACTOV Base, and Detail Borealis was actively engaged in the construction of foundations for and the erection of pre-engineered steel buildings at Ca Mau until its departure 26 April.

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NMCB teams remaining in RVN are 0318 in Ben Tre and 0319 in Xuan Loc (YT 050 450) at work on community projects for USAID. There are also two teams of NMCB 10 deployed to Vietnam, 1019 in My Tho and 1020 at Phu Vinh (XR 463 973). Team 0105 left Vietnam on 14 April after being relieved by Team 7409 in Bac Lieu. Seabee Team 1019 redeployed from Rach Gia to My Tho and relieved 7407 which redeployed to CONUS.

During April two Seabees were killed in non-hostile accidents and two were wounded. On 3 April EO1 Archie B. Coleman, USN, attached to NMCB 3 and at work on Route QL-1, was shot by a sniper two kilometers north of Dien Ban, Quang Nam Province, and suffered a fractured arm. On 18 April CM3 Roger N. Carpenter, USN, drowned at the Detail Aquarius site near Chau Doc. His remains were discovered two days later. On 19 April SW3 Kenneth M. Hatcher, of Team 0319 near Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Province, died of burns and injuries suffered in an airplane crash the day before. The cause of the crash of the light observation plane was still under investigation at month's end. Remains were taken to the Tan Son Nhut Morgue for further transfer to CONUS. On 16 April, CECN Robert W. Hajek of CBMU Detachment Ben Luc suffered a compound fractured arm.

Sweep teams found a total of seven mines this month on the Route 341 road under construction at the ACTOVRAD site at Ta Kou. NMCB 5 Detail Bronco personnel detonated the mines in place, causing craters approximately three feet deep and five feet in diameter. Two members of Seabee Team 0518 on 27 April struck a piece of ordnance while bulldozing a road in Ba Xuyen Province at XR 222 486. Two PF security troops suffered minor injuries from shrapnel.

NMCB 5 Detail Mustang arrived at the Ca Mau site on 20 April to relieve NMCB 3 Detail Borealis and was immediately tasked with the repair of the road between Ca Mau City and the PRU base nearby. Of the other projects assumed by NMCB 5, the Nam Can ACTOV base is already 94% complete with 400 of the 600 dependent shelters under construction completed. Also completed in April were the 275 foot Cua Viet Pier and two oversized "Wonder Arches" (aircraft shelters) for FASU DaNang. NMCB Five Detail Bronco (68 men) spent the first week of their deployment at Ta Kou building generator sheds and shower facilities and upgrading Route 341; Detail Maverick (37 men) worked at the other ACTOVRAD site at Mui Dinh. Seabees departed the following sites as indicated: Long Phu on 16 April, Cho Moi on 21 April, Chau Doc on 21 April, and Tan Chau on 19 April. At last report, CBMU 302 completed

130 units of dependent shelters at Thu Duc and the 32nd NCR completed 160, with 40 units complete except for the rear section. The remaining dependent shelter construction work at these sites will be completed by Vietnamese units. The barracks at Cam Ranh Bay vacated by CBMU 302 in its move to Bien Hoa will be transferred to the Vietnamese Navy.

On 22 April, RADM Salzer, COMNAVFORV, wished the departing Seabee units a bon voyage to CONUS. To NMCB 74 he stated: "Congratulations to you and your men on completion of a successful 1970-71 deployment in the Republic of Vietnam. You can look back on this past six month's construction accomplishments at Nam Can, Long Phu, and Cho Moi, and commencement of radar sites at Ta Kou and Mui Dinh, with pride and knowledge that these facilities are helping to strengthen the capabilities of the Vietnamese to defend themselves against the aggression of world communism." And to NMCB 3 he stated: "Your road and bridge work in the recovery of MR I from the recent disastrous floods, the paving of LTL-4, construction of the Cua Viet pier and FASU aircraft shelters have been significant achievements among the many important projects in Vietnam. In addition, your contribution at Tan Chau, Chau Doc, and Ca Mau VNN Naval Bases and dependent shelters will help assure the continued success of the Republic of Vietnam in their fight for freedom."

APPENDIX II
NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP ORGANIZATION

CHNAVADVGRP U.S. MACV	RADM R. S. SALZER, USN
SENAVADV	CAPT E. I. FINKE, USN (ATAD)
SA FLEET COMMAND, SAIGON	CAPT J. F. DRAKE, USN
SA CMD NAVAL COMMAND, SAIGON (SA, CTF 227)	LCDR J. H. GAUL, USN

TRAN HUNG DAO Campaign Advisory Organization

SA, DEPCOMTHD Binh Thuy	RADM H. S. MATTHEWS, USN
SA THD 2, Ben Luc (VNN TG 214.1)	LCDR P. S. GESSWEIN, USN
SA THD 4, Nam Can (VNN TG 214.2)	LCDR D. AYRE, USN
SA THD 5, Phu Cuong (VNN TG 216.1)	LCDR W. W. WERNDLI, USN
SA THD 6, Rach Soi (VNN TG 212.5)	LCDR W. S. BROWN, USN
SA THD 8, Can Tho (VNN TG 217.1)	CDR W. WARDELL, USN
SA THD 9, Tan Chau (VNN TG 212.3)	LCDR B. COUSINS, USN
SA THD 10, Ca Mau (VNN TG 212.6)	LCDR W. DANNHEIM, USN
SA THD 17, Ca Mau (VNN TF 210)	CAPT W. J. CROWE, USN
SA THD 18, Chau Doc (VNN TF 218)	CDR A. WRIGHT, USN
SA THD 19, Can Tho (VNN TF 217.2)	CDR W. WARDELL, USN
SA THD 20, An Thoi (VNN TG 212.4)	CDR M. J. SHINE, USN

Amphibious Type Command Advisory Organization (ATF 211)

SA PHIBCMD, Dong Tam	CAPT W. J. CROWE, USN
SA RAID 70, Kien An	LT T. W. SOUTHWORTH, USN (R) LT R. J. LENDSTEDT, II, USN

SA RAID 71, Kien An		LT S. L. HOLMES, USN
SA RAID 72, Cambodia	(R)*	LT J. H. DUNCAN, USN
	*	LT W. WEIKEL, USN
SA RAID 73, Cambodia	*	LT C. T. HARDY, USN
	(R) *	LT R. L. TAYLOR, USN
SA RAID 74, Ca Mau		LCDR R. B. RYLAND, USN
SA RAID 75, Ca Mau		LTJG J. GLUTTING, USN

* Advisor attached to SA PHIBCMD Staff while RAID is deployed in Cambodia.

River Patrol Type Command Advisory Organization (TF 212)

SA RIVPATCMD, Binh Thuy		CAPT R. E. SPRUIT, USN
SA RPD 51, Cat Lai		LT J. M. LAWLESS, USN
SA RPD 52, Phu Cuong/Nha Be		LT J. R. JONES, USN
SA RPD 53, My Tho		LT A. HILDEBRAND, USN
SA RPD 54, Ben Keo		LT W. D. DUBOIS, USN
SA RPD 55, Tan Chau/Chau Doc		LT D. URSPRUNG, USN
SA RPD 56, Vinh Long		LT J. D. GILBERT, USN
SA RPD 57, Nha Be		LT J. B. BURNESKIS, USN
SA RPD 58, Rach Soi		LT H. M. HIGHLAND, USN
SA RPD 59, Tan Chau		LT J. E. PEPPER, USN
SA RPD 60, Hoi An		LT J. E. WARREN, USN
SA RPD 61, Rach Soi		LT G. M. ZEMANSKY, USN
SA RPD 62, Song Ong Doc		LT T. C. VOIGHT, USN

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SA RPD 63, Phuoc Xuyen LT R. B. FIORE, USNR

SA RPD 64, Tuyen Nhon/Moc Hoa LT T. J. FLYNN, USN

Coastal Surveillance Type Command Advisory Organization (TF 213)

SA CSCMD, Cam Ranh Bay CAPT C. R. QUANSTROM, USN

SA COSFLOT ONE, DaNang
(R) LCDR T. J. BERGER, USN
LCDR D. C. WILSON, USN

SA COSFLOT TWO, Qui Nhon LCDR J. D. SARVER, USN

SA COSFLOT THREE, Vung Tau LCDR J. J. DOOLEY, USN

SA COSFLOT FOUR, An Thoi LCDR J. G. TONTI, USN

SA COSFLOT FIVE, My Tho LCDR J. McCORMICK, USN

SA HDU Cam Ranh Bay LT J. L. JANSEN, USNR

General Reserve Type Command Advisory Organization (TF 214)

SA GENRESCMD, Cat Lai CAPT L. A. DWYER, USN

SA RTE DIV 81, Cat Lai LT J. P. DEATON, USN

SA MID 91, Saigon
(R) LTJG H. G. LAW, USNR
LT J. W. HAMILTON, USN

SA MID 92, Cua Viet LT T. A. COMER, USN

SA MID 93, Nha Be/Tan Chau/Ga Mau LT P. N. JOHNSON, USN

SA SEAL and UDT Unit, Saigon LT F. W. DORAN, USN

SA SALVAGE UNIT, Cat Lo LCDR E. H. SHIPP, USN

SA RID 40, Kien An LT R. O. MILHAM, USN

SA RID 41, Nam Can LTJG T. E. SPEERS, USN

SA RID 42, Ben Tre, Dong Tam LT C. VOTAVA, USN

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SA RID 43, Song Ong Doc	LTJG T. B. WAGENSEIL, USN
SA RID 44, Nam Can	LT G. C. COOLEY, USN
SA RID 45, Dong Tam	LT F. MAUNEY, USN
SA RID 46, Tra Cu	LT W. C. SMITH, USN
SA RID 47, Go Dau Ha	LT W. STROBEL, USN (R) LT W. TAYLOR, USN
SA RID 48, Ca Mau	LT J. A. SINKOVEC, USN
SA RAG 27, Nha Be	LT W. GOTTSCHALK, USN

First Coastal Zone Advisory Organization

SA 1st CZ, DaNang	CDR P. McLAIRD, JR., USN
SA CG 11, Cua Viet	LT R. DUMINIAC, USNR
SA CG 12, Thuan An	LT R. N. MEYERS, USN
SA CG 13, Cu Tu Hien	LT P. A. ROMANSKI, USNR
SA CG 14, Hoi An	LT D. M. PENCE, USN
SA CG 15, An Hoa	LT D. ROBINSON, USN
SA CG 16, Co Luy	LT W. R. OWENS, USNR
SA RAG 32, Hue	LT G. L. MAGER, USN
SA HCU DaNang	LT D. W. WIRICK, USNR
SA CSC DaNang	LT W. MALJAN, USNR

Second Coastal Zone Advisory Organization

SA Second CZ, Nha Trang	CDR A. S. JEFFERIS, USN
SA CG 21, De Gi	LT J. K. ENGELKEN, USN

SA CG 23, Song Cau	LT E. L. SIWINSKI, USNR
SA CG 25, Dong Hai	LT E. F. GIER, USN
SA CG 26, Binh Ba Island	LT J. P. McGRATH, USN
SA CG 27, Ninh Chu	LT M. W. LINGO, USN
SA CG 28, Phan Thiet	LT G. NORDLAND, USN
SA HDU Nha Trang	LT J. E. BINGHAM, USN
SA HDU Qui Nhon	LT D. C. OGDEN, USN
SA CSC Qui Nhon	LCDR R. SAGEHORN, USN
SA CSC Nha Trang	LT R. FERGUSON, USN

Third Coastal Zone Advisory Organization

SA Third CZ, Vung Tau	CDR J. G. SULLIVAN, USN
SA CG 33, Rach Dua	LT F. M. LEMON, USN
SA CG 34, Tiem Tom	LT B. R. MOFFETT, USN
SA CG 35, Hung My	LTJG T. E. ARNOLD, USN
SA CG 36, Long Phu	LT C. L. DOBSON, USN
SA HDU Vung Tau	LT G. C. ROGERS, USN
SA CSC Vung Tau	LT D. F. ROGUS, USN

Fourth Coastal Zone Advisory Organization

SA Fourth CZ, An Thoi	CDR M. J. SHINE, USN
SA CG 41, Ha Tien	LTJG S. T. ONEAL, USNR
SA CG 42, Ha Tien	LT J. D. HOLMAN, USNR
	(R) LT O. R. COLE, III, USN
SA CG 43, Hon Tre Island	LT S. L. PFIESTER, USNR
	(R) LT M. A. SOBYNA, USN

SA CG 44, Ha Tien LTJG D. C. SNYDER, USN

SA CSC An Thoi
(R) LTJG J. H. PELL, USNR
LT P. D. McCURDY, USN

Third Riverine Zone Advisory Organization (TF 216)

SA Third Riverine Zone, Long Binh CDR L. E. PELLOCK, USN

SA RAG 22, Phu Cuong
(R) LT K. E. PARKS, USN
LT J. CALABOUGH, USN

SA RAG 24, Phu Cuong LTJG R. L. CANON, USNR

SA RAG 28, Long Binh
(R) LT J. T. McWILLIAMS, USNR
LT R. M. ANDREWS, USN

SA RAG 30, Long Binh
(R) LT M. P. STOPPA, USNR
LTJG H. GUSTAFSON, USN

SA REG for RPG, Cuu Long LT C. E. ROBE, USN

Fourth Riverine Zone Advisory Organization (TF 217)

SA Fourth Riverine Zone, Can Tho CDR W. WARDELL, USN

SA RAG 21/33 Dong Tam LT A. J. MICHEL, USN

SA RAG 23/31, Vinh Long LTJG R. E. BROWN, USN

SA RAG 25/29, Ca Mau LT R. OVERSIER, USNR

SA RAG 26, Long Xuyen LTJG R. W. BASS, USNR

Rung Sat Special Zone Advisory Organization (TF 228)

SA RSSZ, Nha Be CDR J. G. WILLIAMS, USN

Naval Training Center Advisory Organization

SA NTC Nha Trang CDR R. TARBUCK, USN

SA NTC Cam Ranh Bay CDR R. R. WARD, USN

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SA NTC Saigon

CDR R. R. GROVE, USN

Logistic Support Command Advisory Organization

SA VNN LSC and SA VNN DCOS Log

RADM P. S. McMANUS, USN

DEP SA VNN LSC and COS NSAS

CAPT E. P. TRAVERS, USN

SA LSB An Thoi

LCDR M. ANDRASKO, USN

SA ISB Rach Soi

LT D. E. WARD, USN

SA ISB Qui Nhon

LCDR M. AUSTIN, USN

SA ISB Ben Luc

LT G. C. MEIERS, USN

SA LSB Cat Lo

LCDR S. UNGEMACH, USN

SA LSB Dong Tam

CDR R. JOHE, USN
(R) CDR W. M. COLE, USN

SA LSB Cam Ranh Bay

CDR J. G. CONNELLY, USN

SA LSB DaNang

CAPT M. A. HORN, USN

SA LSB Nha Be

CDR D. J. MOSS, USN

SA ISB Thuan An

LCDR J. STEVENS, USN

SA ISB Binh Thuy

CDR R. J. COEN, USNR

SA ISB Long Xuyen

LCDR A. THIEL, USN

SA ISB Long Phu

LT J. R. MURRAY, USN

SA ISB Vinh Long

LT W. McALISTER, USNR

SA ISB Cat Lai

LTJG J. F. MAYER, USN

SA ISB Nam Can

LCDR R. BLEDSOE, USN

SA ISB Cho Moi

LT J. CRUMRINE, USNR

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APPENDIX IIIGlossary of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text:

ABF	Attack by fire
AMMI PONTOON	A multi-purpose barge, standard size 28'x90'
AO	Area of operations
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
A/S	Air strike
ASPB	Assault Support Patrol Boat
ART	Artillery
ATC	Armored Troop Carrier
ATSB	Advance Tactical Support Base
A/W	Automatic Weapons
BLACK PONY	OV-10 Aircraft, twin engine turboprop counterinsurgency
CCB	Command and Communications Boat
CG	Coastal Group
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group - mercenaries of Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian descent who fight primarily around their own villages.

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CMD	Capital Military District
CONUS	Continental United States
CRIP	Civilian Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon
CZ	Coastal Zone
DUSTOFF	Medical evacuation by helo
ENIFF	Enemy Initiated Firefight
FOM	French Patrol Boat
FSB	Fire Support Base
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
GDA	Gun damage assessment
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HAFT	Helicopter Attack Fire Team
H&I	Harassment and Interdiction Fire support
JGS	Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)
KIT CARSON SCOUTS	Former Viet Cong who have come over to the side of the Saigon government and serve with allied military units.
LAFT	Light Attack Fire Team
LAW	Light Anti-tank Weapon
LCPL	Landing Craft, personnel, large
LDNN	Vietnamese equivalent of USN Underwater Demolition Team
LHFT	Light Helo Fire Team
LOH	OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter

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LRRP	Long range reconnaissance patrol
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MATSB	Mobile Advance Tactical Support Base
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action program
MONITOR	Heavily armored LCM-6 (40 MM Cannon or 105 MM Howitzer)
MR	Military Region
MSB	Minesweeper, boat
MSD	Minesweeper, drone
MSF	Mobile Strike Force - mercenaries who deploy and go anywhere
NGF	Naval gunfire
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NILO	Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer
NIOTC	Naval Inshore Operations Training Center
NOD	Night Observation Device
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
OJT	On-the-job training
PBR	Patrol boat, river
PCF	Patrol craft, fast (Swift Boat)
PRU	Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
PSA	Province Sector Advisor
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
RAD	River Assault Division

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RAG	River Assault Group (VNN)
RAID	River Assault and Interdiction Division (VNN)
RAP	Rocket assisted projectile
RAS	River Assault Squadron
RF/PF	Regional Forces/Popular Forces
RPD	River Patrol Division
RPG	Rocket propelled grenade (or) River Patrol Group
RSSZ	Rung Sat Special Zone
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Air Force (or Armed Forces)
SAR	Search and rescue
SEAWOLF	UH-1B Helo, heavily armored, USN operated
SHADOW	C-119 aircraft
SKIMMER	20-foot fiberglass motorboat
SLICK	UH-1B Helo, USA operated
SPOOKY	C-47 aircraft
SSB	Swimmer Support Boat (Skimmer)
STAB	Strike Assault Boat
TAOR	Tactical area of responsibility
USARV	United States Army, Vietnam
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN	Vietnamese Navy
ZIPPO	Flame thrower-equipped ATC or MONITOR

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