From: Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam  
To: Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet (Code 12)  

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Ref: (a) CINCFACTL intr. ser 1/6925 of 2 October 1967  

Enc: (1) Operation SEA LORDS Summary  
(2) Coastal Surveillance Force Summary  
(3) River Patrol Force Summary  
(4) Riverine Assault Force Summary  
(5) USN Statistical Summary  
(6) Naval Advisory Group Summary  
(7) VN/VNMC Statistical Summary  
(8) Selected Psychological Operations  
(9) USN Civic Action Statistical Summary  

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) through (9) are submitted.  

2. The data contained in enclosures (5), (7) and (9) is based on information available this date. Any adjustments to enclosures (5), (7) and (9) will be reflected in December's Historical Supplement.  

J. P. RIZZA  
Chief of Staff  

Copy to:  
CONUSMACV (Hist. Branch, SJS)  
CNO (Cp-09B913)  
Director of Naval History
OPERATION SEA LORDS SUMMARY
December 1968

During the month Operation SEA LORDS continued to expand the U. S. Navy area of operations on the inland waterways of the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. Working with both U. S. and Vietnamese ground units, the combined efforts of the three Navy task forces made significant progress in the interdiction, pacification, and harassment campaigns.

Interdiction patrols continued on the Rach Gia-Long Xuyen Canal in Kien Giang Province and along the Cambodian border on the Rach Giang Thanh and Vinh Te Canal. Combined FBR/ASPB patrols on the Rach Gia-Long Xuyen Canal were supplemented by frequent Regional Force (RF) sweeps along the canal banks. On the Vinh Te enemy opposition encountered early in the month was met by occasional employment of RF and CIDG sweeps and adding ATC's to the patrol force until falling water levels prevented ATC operations late in the month. An ATC was also employed with the PAVN's operating on the Rach Giang Thanh. Here it was found that night patrols using night observation devices gave the patrol units an advantage over the enemy in ambush situations. U. S. Navy SEAL operations were also carried out along the Vinh Te Canal early in the month. Enemy opposition to these two interdiction campaigns decreased significantly toward the end of December.

A third interdiction campaign was initiated with Operation GIANT SLING-SHOT on 6 December. River Patrol Force and Mobile Riverine Force units have operated on the Van Go Tay and Van Go Dong up to 35 miles west and 50 miles northwest of Saigon in an effort to cut enemy infiltration from the "Parrot's
The operation has met with both heavy enemy opposition and notable success in the discovery of enemy arms caches. Cooperation with U.S. Army units northwest of Saigon has been excellent with several joint operations being carried out along the Tan Be River in early March.

Various ground reconnaissance efforts operations from 20th March through 30th March were unsuccessful.

Strike operations by A-4 and F-4 aircraft were carried out from the area of the Tan Be River southeast of Vinh Long Province from the 1st of March until mid-March. An operation with 525th units on the west bank of the Nui Son River southeast of Tan Ho was conducted beginning mid-March.

After completing Operation SHERMA MACS on the Cuu Lon River in an NVA province, the 1st Air moved into the area south of Yen Cia in Kien Giang Province and began operations along the Cuu Cao Canal on 30 December.

Operation SHERMA MACS was carried out between 21 and 22 December with the objective of destroying barriers erected on the Cuu Lon River at the southern tip of Vietnam which had prevented "Swift" boat raids there since late November. This first AG strike operation into an enemy stronghold in that area was easily able to open the river against light opposition. Numerous "Swift" boat incursions, air attacks, and naval gunfire continued to pressure the enemy in southern Khanh and Nui Giang provinces. In addition to the river incursions from the Gulf of Thailand and south, "Swift" boats of the Coastal Surveillance Force on patrol on the lower Mekong, Ben Long, and Budi Tap rivers carried out frequent incursions in...
the adjoining rivers and canals and naval gunfire support missions.

The overall results of Operation 501 include the following:

1. Persons detained 146
2. Hostile fire incidents 59
3. Enemy casualties:
   a. killed 12 (TF 115 - 2, TF 116 - 2, TF 117 - 2, MNC - 1, LCA - 1)
   b. wounded 118 (TF 115 - 23, TF 116 - 35, TF 117 - 25, ANH - 3, TN - 3, TAN - 20, MNC - 1, CNA - 3)
   c. captured 2
   d. missing 1 (CA - 1)
4. Friendly casualties:
   a. Killed 12 (TF 115 - 3, TF 116 - 6, TF 117 - 5, MNC - 1, LCA - 1)
   c. Captured 4
   d. Missing
5. Enemy material losses:
   a. Destroyed:
      1) Junks or sampans 237
      2) Structures 53
   b. Captured (see TF 116 statistical summary)
   c. Damaged:
      1) Junks or sampans 127
      2) Structures 132

Inclusion (1)
6. CAS material losses:
   a. Destroyed:
      (1) Surface craft 0
      (2) Helicopters 0
   b. Damaged:
      (1) Surface craft 12 (HT 115-15, HT 116-17, TP 117-20)
      (2) Helicopters 2

Note: These figures are partially repetitive of those in the "CAS Statistical Summary" but are restricted to CAS CASO operations. Casualties to supporting friendly forces are only those incurred by hostile fire against CAS forces.
Coastal activity increased during December as detections of junks and sampans rose by nearly 15,000 to 47,814. Task Force 115 units checked 74 percent of the craft detected by carrying out 19,686 inspections and 11,353 boardings. A total of 1,119 persons were detained for improper papers or other suspicious activity. There were 1,400 detections of steel-hulled vessels in MARKET TIME areas during the month. No suspicious activity was disclosed by the 970 inspections and 32 boardings carried out to check these vessels. In addition to normal surveillance operations in the MARKET TIME areas, "Swift" boats assumed patrol duties on the lower portions of the Co Chien, Ham Luong and Soirap Rivers. This permitted redeployment of Task Force 116 patrol craft for Operation SEA LORDS' counter infiltration campaigns. On the rivers, PCF's of Task Force 115 detected 11,687 craft, inspected 2,407, and boarded 6,617.

Naval gunfire support and river intrusion operations also increased during December. Of the 43 river operations carried out, all but two took place in IV CTZ as a part of Operation SEA LORDS. Also in support of Operation SEA LORDS, two "Swift" boats conducted daily patrols of the Rach Giang Thanh to counter enemy infiltration along the Cambodian border. Hostile fire was encountered on 23 of the river incursions, resulting in three USN and one VNN killed, 28 USN and one VNN wounded, and 17 "Swift" boats damaged. Enemy losses to gunfire from the MARKET TIME units during

Enclosure (2)
the river raids and 899 additional gunfire support missions came to 1,495
raft and structures destroyed plus 1,006 heavily damaged, 119 killed
(68 body count plus 51 probable), and 47 wounded (10 body count plus 37
probable).

On the morning of 6 December, PUF 36 and PUF 38 were patrolling up
the Bach Giang Chanh when they were ambushed seven miles northeast of
Ha Tien. The enemy fired on the two patrol craft from both banks of the
river with small arms, 57-mm recoilless rifles and B-40 rockets. Machine
gun, small arms and grenade fire from the "Swift" boats partially suppressed
the hostile fire as they cleared the ambush area. The craft beached at Tra
Pho, a short distance upriver, to care for the nine crewmen wounded (three
seriously). In addition, one crewman was killed in the action and one VNN
lost overboard and another wounded. No B-40 or recoilless rifle rounds
scored direct hits, however, both craft were damaged by numerous small
arms hits. During the return downriver through the ambush area, cover
was provided by a Task Force 116 light helicopter fire team that saturated
the enemy positions with rockets and machine gun fire. Due to the dense
cover along both banks the enemy was unseen throughout the engagement and
enemy losses were unknown.

On the morning of 10 December, PUF 70 and PUF 39 entered the Cua Dai
River 12 miles southeast of Danang to take enemy bunkers upriver under fire.
As the two craft were proceeding back out to sea after destroying seven
bunkers, heavy automatic weapons fire was received from three sites at
very close range. The enemy fire was returned killing at least one 
Viet Cong. After clearing the area, the craft proceeded to the Coastal 
Group 14 base for treatment of five wounded crewmen. A naval gunfire 
support mission was fired on the ambush site by USS OKLAHOMA CITY 
(CL-5) with unknown results.

When an Army unit was taken under fire by an estimated NVA 
company 15 miles north of Quang Dai on the 13th, PCF 18 was called 
for urgent naval gunfire support. Quickly responding with 39 rounds 
of mortar fire, the enemy attack was repulsed. A sweep of the area 
revealed eight bodies and numerous blood trails plus other human parts 
indicating heavy enemy losses.

An Operation SNA LCS mission on 27 December took six “Swift” 
boats supported by helicopters, fixed wing air strikes and a Seventh 
Fleet destroyer into the previously unpenetrated Hang Ho, Bo Gui and 
Dam Doi rivers. Moving north up adjoining canals, the MARK I TIME 
units probed a Viet Cong headquarters area near the southern tip of 
Vietnam. During the five-hour-long operation, 30 sampans, 15 
structures and four river barriers were destroyed. Another 30 sampans 
and 24 structures were damaged. During a brief but intense battle, as 
the craft headed back to sea via the Oua Lan River, one Viet Cong was 
killed and two crewmen received minor wounds.

On the night of 26 December, PCF 88 closed the shore three miles 
west of Ha Tien to illuminate a possible contact. The illumination

Enclosure (2)
rounds apparently revealed the positions of a Khmer Kampuchea Krom (KKK) and Viet Cong unit because a fire fight broke out between the two units ashore that lasted for several hours. Friendly units at Ha Tien stated they were not involved and intelligence reports indicated that the Viet Cong had lost 22 killed and the KKK 13 killed and 7 wounded.
The operations being conducted in support of Operation SEA LORDS, e.g., Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT, Vinh Te Canal Campaign and Rach Gia-Long Xuyen Canal Campaign, have taken some RV/PATROL units off the major rivers of the Delta. Accordingly, there has been a corresponding decrease in numbers of contacts detected and number of persons checked as was expected when moving these units to less dense areas of population and traffic. By assiduous use of previous experience and tactical intelligence, Task Group commanders have positioned their remaining patrols to counter the enemy in the most active areas. This has balanced somewhat the decrease in detections and search and is believed to be the best solution possible under the above circumstances. To further offset the decreased patrol capability of the major rivers by GAME WARDEN units, PCF's of TF 115 began patrolling the lower Ham Luong River as part of Operation SEA LORDS. On 12 December TF 115 was further tasked with patrolling the lower Co Chien and Soi Rap rivers as part of SEA LORDS. On 28 December TF 115 relieved TF 116 of patrol responsibilities of the lower Ham Luong and Co Chien rivers. During this month PCF's of TF 116 detected 190,913 watercraft and conducted 45,313 inspections and 81,218 boardings.

Intelligence reports during the month looked for the start of the enemy's winter-spring offensive. Initial reports indicated that a large scale offensive could be expected by the 22nd of the month, this was
later revised to the 25th and eventually was forecast to occur sometime in January. The delay in the start of the offensive was attributed to the apprehension of a considerable number of enemy sapper/commo-liaison agents within the Capital Military District and the disruptive effect of allied operations, in particular the GIANT BINC-HOT patrols of the Van Go Cong/Vam Co Tay rivers, on enemy movement of personnel and supplies.

There were four attacks against merchant ships on the Long Tau during this reporting period. On 3 December, a mine detonated about 10 meters astern of the SS SOPHIA STATE and 500 meters ahead of the SS COTTONWOOD with no friendly casualties or damage. On 4 December, a detonation occurred midships, outboard side, of the SS KARA which was moored alongside the Shell Pier at the Nha Be Fuel Farm. The vessel suffered minor damage but there were no friendly casualties. On 17 December, the SS ship CAPT SAN MARTIN came under attack while proceeding north on the Long Tau. All rockets missed the ship. On 20 December, the SS PIONEER MING was attacked by rockets about 18 miles south-southeast of Saigon with no friendly casualties.

On the evening of 1 December, a PBR on routine patrol encountered a junk 75 feet away from the quay wall at Tra On sub-sector compound, about 10 miles southeast of Can Tho. When approached by the PBR's the junk exploded. Investigation revealed that three persons were in the junk as well as a 105-mm howitzer round rigged as a booby trap. The trio had earlier attempted to take the booby trap into the Tra On sub-sector compound but were turned away and told to dump it into the river. The trio remained

Enclosure (3)
on the river approximately one hour prior to the arrival of the PBR's. After the junk exploded, the PBR's approached the Tra On sub-sector compound. Upon receiving two sniper rounds from the town complex they withdrew. As the PBR's were withdrawing, a hand grenade exploded in the midst of the civilian crowd which had gathered outside the compound, killing nine civilians and wounding 17. Intelligence evaluation concluded that this incident may have been initiated by a Viet Cong terrorist squad with Tra On sub-sector compound as the primary target and the PBR's as a probable alternate target of opportunity.

While on surveillance patrol in the early evening of 2 December, Scoxwolves 76 and 73 observed 12 sampans, about 12 miles northeast of Rach Gia, in the process of loading/reloading. They proceeded to place multiple strikes on the target until they had expended all of their ammunition. They observed three direct rocket hits on extremely heavily loaded sampans with occupants and other loading personnel hit by heavy weapons fire. Damage estimates were six sampans destroyed and six damaged. Enemy personnel casualties were listed as eight probably killed and seven probably wounded. There were no U. S. casualties.

TU 116.7.3 proceeding to an harassment and interdiction mission in response to intelligence on the morning of 12 December came under heavy automatic-weapons and 3-40 rocket fire from both banks of a canal 5 kilometers east of Sa Dec. The cover boat was hit by a 3-40 rocket which caused it to lose steering control. When the lead boat reversed course in order to make a covering firing run both units again came under intense
B-40, recoilless-rifle and automatic-weapons fire. Both boats received B-40 and numerous weapons hits. Seawolves and additional PBR's came to the assistance of the attacked boats and they were able to withdraw to a friendly outpost. Both boats beached and the wounded were medevaced by Seawolves. One of the PBR's was then towed to Sa Dec while the other was left for future salvage. Salvage attempts on the 13th were unsuccessful but on the 14th with the aid of two LCI's the PBR was pulled to higher ground where rocket hits beneath the waterline were plugged and the water pumped out. After refloating the PBR, it was towed to Sa Dec. Friendly casualties were two killed in action and four wounded. Enemy casualties based on a report of a reliable Vietnamese agent were placed at 17 killed by PBR and Seawolf fire.

At approximately three o'clock in the morning on 13 December, PBR 731 and ASPB-111-5 were patrolling the Yam Co Tay River, as part of Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT, when they were ambushed 8 miles southeast of Xoc Hoa. The ambush site was 100 meters long on both banks of the river with one .50 caliber machine gun at each end of the site on the north bank. Initial firing by the enemy knocked out communications on primary radios on both boats. After about 15 minutes the ASPB was able to contact the special forces personnel at Xoc Hoa on a PROC-25. Two Army gunships were scrambled to go to the aid of the boats. The PBR and ASPB returned the fire of the enemy and the Army gunships made one firing run on the north bank suppressing fire. Additional PBR's, ASPB's and Seawolves were sent to the area.
to provide security. The PBR was beached and the wounded medevaced. The
ASPB with PBR's and Sea Wolves providing security was towed to Tuyen Khun.
The PBR proceeded to KHD-13 under its own power. The PBR had suffered
three APC-7 and numerous small arms hits. U.S. casualties were five
wounded on the PBR and three on the ASPB. Enemy casualties are unknown.

Late in the afternoon of 14 December, KM's 717 and 720, operating
as T-174-6-1, a part of Operation KM-7 T-174-6-1, completed a scouting
mission for an artillery strike and were returning to their patrol of
the Van Co Dong River when they came under heavy automatic-weapons and
rocket fire about 3 miles west of Phu Quong. The fire was returned and
the units cleared the kill zone. Sea Wolves scrambled and additional
surface units came under attack about 3 miles north-northwest of Hiep Hoa
while enroute to the scene. An Army helo team which had also been scrambled
placed a strike in the area and the LIFT provided cover and security for the
PBR's. Four of the more critically wounded Navymen were medevaced, one of
these subsequently died of wounds. Two other PBR personnel were also
wounded. Enemy losses are unknown.

While transiting south on Van Co Dong River mid-afternoon on 29
December, PBR's 8131 and 8134, GIANT SLINGSHOT T-194-9-4, received
E-40 rocket and automatic-weapons fire from the south bank of the river
about five miles south of Tay Minh. The units returned the fire and cleared
the area. One rocket struck PBR 8134 starboard side coxswain flat armor
plate causing massive splinter damage. U.S. casualties were the patrol

Enclosure (1)
officer killed and three others wounded, one of them seriously. Enemy
casualties are unknown.

During the month, a number of enemy arms caches were uncovered and
seized. A listing of the items seized at the larger caches may be found
on page 2 of enclosure (3). In addition to the arms caches two incidents
involving medical supplies occurred. One of these was a sunken sampan
on the east bank of the Van Co Jong River, which contained over 60 morphine
syringes and 10 suturing kits. The site was later identified as one that
had been used previously as a Viet Cong medical aid area. The other
incident involved an ARVN soldier found aboard a water taxi without the
proper papers for the A6 bottles of various type anti-biotics he was
transporting. He was turned over to the Senior Advisor Kien Hoa Province
for disposition. A routine inspection of a junk by a PBR on 15 December
resulted in the confiscation of over 2700 pounds of U.S. Handelasp
powdered milk and 60 gallons of Handelasp salad oil by U.S. authorities
and the turning over of 3100 pounds of unmanifested sugar to MILC My Tho
for disposition.
RIVERINE ASSAULT FORCE SUMMARY
December 1968

Riverine warfare in December was again characterized by interdiction, escort and patrol, base area search and pacification operations. Small unit actions over wide areas in Kien Hoa, Kien Giang, Chau Doc Thien, and An Kuyen provinces accounted for 450 Viet Cong killed. Mobile Riverine Group ALPHA operations were confined for the most part to activity in Kien Hoa Province, and the support of the 2nd Brigade, U. S. Ninth Infantry Division. Mobile Riverine Group BRAVO operations consisted largely of a variety of special operations in the southern delta region in coordination with units of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions of Vietnamese Marine Corps.

The following table shows river assault craft employment in a typical day in December and is indicative of the present scope of operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY/OPERATION</th>
<th>NFP CRAFT ASSIGNED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Brigade, U. S. 9th Infantry</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Battalion VNTC Brigade</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation GIANT SLEWISHOT</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh Te Campaign</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rach Gia - Long Xuyen Campaign</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chop to CTG 116.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNIN Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Riverine Base &quot;A&quot; Defense</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years

Enclosure (4)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY/OPERATION (CONT'D)</th>
<th>ASPB</th>
<th>ATC</th>
<th>MCN</th>
<th>CEB</th>
<th>REMAINDER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Riverine Base &quot;B&quot; Defense</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Support CTG 117.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support CTG 117.2</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Casualty report</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overhaul/Conversion/Backfit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chop to CTG 115.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** | 14  | 104 | 20 | 10 | 4 |

**TASK GROUP 117.1 OPERATIONS**

During December, Mobile Riverine Group ALPHA engaged in a series of operations (designated Kidney Flush) designed to keep constant pressure on the Viet Cong. With frequent insertions in Ham Long, Ho Cay and Truc Giang districts of Kien Hoa Province, Army ground elements continued to seek out and destroy the enemy. These operations employ riverine, air and ground assets and have produced significant attrition against the enemy. The daily toll to the Viet Cong has been approximately 10 dead coupled with loss of supplies and equipment. Of the many detainees taken during these actions, about 20 percent are subsequently classified as Viet Cong, while the remainder are determined to be innocent civilians.

Night ambush patrols have now been incorporated into the operations of the 3/60th Infantry. This is a definite change in MRF procedures, as night landings were previously avoided as too dangerous. The procedure being followed is to rest the troops during the day, land them after dark,

Enclosure (4)
and extract them the following morning. This is the same method successfully employed by units of the Ninth Infantry Division in Long An Province and last month in Giong Trun District of Kien Hoa Province.

During the month RAD 92, with infantry embarked, escorted two Army supply convoys composed of LCU's and LCM-3's from Dong Tam to the Special Forces camp at Noc Hoa. Directed from a command and control helicopter, these convoys were heavily supported by artillery, assault helicopter companies and embarked troops and proceeded via the Cho Gao Canal, Vam Co and Vam Co Tay rivers. The convoys are providing support for airfield improvement in the Noc Hoa area.

RAD 132 with six ASPB's from RAD 9 and 11 sailed to MBQ "A" on 30 November and shopped to CTG 117.1 on 1 December. The units then joined elements of TF 116 in Operation GIANT SLEIGHSHOT in the Vam Co Tay and Van Co Dong rivers. CTG 194.0, FIRST SEA LORD, directs the conduct of this operation.

The following hostile fire incidents are selected to briefly outline the circumstances under which two Navy men were killed in action and seven sailors were wounded:

1. While inserting an Army intelligence gathering Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) at a position 3 miles southwest of My Tho, units of RAD 91 received 3-40 rocket and A/A fire. ATC-91-8 received three 3-40 rocket hits, one forward and two below the waterline. One U. S. Army soldier was killed, eight were wounded and seven Navy crewmen were wounded.
2. On an Operation SHOT mission on 24 December, two ASPs's enroute to a preplanned ambush site with 1st Air Cavalry elements on board, came under fire at a position 7 miles south of Khe Sanh on the Van To Tong River. During the attack, the boat captain of A-82-5, DMZ, Wallace GOMEZ, USN, was killed. Another crewman was wounded. There was only light damage to the ASP's.

3. On 27 December, at 2105H, a patrol in support of Operation SEA LIGHT and consisting of one ASP, three PBR's and one ATC was proceeding south on the Rach Gia - Long Xuyen Canal when the patrol was attacked at a position 3 miles northeast of Rach Gia. One sailor was killed and three others were wounded as the ATC received three B-40 rocket hits. Fire was returned as the patrol withdrew to the south. Two "Guswoolf" LHFs were scrambled and placed strikes on the suspected enemy positions.

TASK GROUP 117.2 OPERATIONS

The first five days of the month were utilized for the completion of boat maintenance in preparation for subsequent operations.

On 5 December, NAM 15 got underway from the MRF at Can Tho with 30 assault craft for operations in base area 480. Three companies of the 4th Battalion VNMC came aboard on 6 December and the task unit proceeded to the area to begin operations which lasted until the 11th. Throughout the period VNMC troops conducted ground sweeps in selected locations and the RAR patrolled in the general area within a 10 mile radius to the south and southeast of Khe Sanh on the Cai Lon River. Enemy reaction to the MRF
presence came in the form of 12 B-40 rocket ambushes during the period. The fire was returned and suppressed in all but the one instance in which there were friendly troops in the area. Two assault craft were damaged as a result of these actions and four USN wounded. On two separate occasions, B-40 rounds became lodged in the styrofoam on an ATC and a Zippo, and failed to detonate. This operation proved to be one of the most successful to date and resulted in 55 Viet Cong killed. Only one friendly USN was killed. In addition to the large body count, a Viet Cong prison camp was discovered by 730th units, resulting in the release of 10 Vietnamese prisoners. Several tons of weapons, ammunition and military supplies were captured or destroyed. The units returned to the XAS on 11 December.

The Mobile Riverine Force concept was projected into the open sea for the first time attendant to the conduct of Operation SILVER WAGG (TG 194.2) in the western end of the Cua Lon River. Operating as units of Operation SEA LIONS, monitors, ASPB's and ATG's, with one mobile strike force company from Binh Thuy embarked, began late on the night of 16 December and transited Phong Dinh, Chuong Thien and Kien Giang provinces and the western coast of South Vietnam in 36 hours. Meanwhile, the USS KECHE (APB39) with another MRF company and a 30 man UDT/EOD element embarked, USS SATIR (ARL23) and USS INDEP AL COUNTY (LST839) (support/resupply LST) proceeded to the rendezvous point in the Gulf of Thailand in three separate transits via the South China Sea and around the southern tip of Vietnam. Rough seas delayed the commencement of the operation designed to destroy a series of 12 fish.
trap type barricades erected across the western end of the Cua Lon River. After encountering difficulty on mud flats at the Cua Lon entrance, the task unit succeeded in transiting the shallows with the aid of a VN junk pilot. Strike forces were positioned on the bank and UDT/SEAL units commenced destruction of the barricades. Meeting light enemy resistance, the SILVER WAVE forces had completed barricade destruction on the morning of 22 December, and the task unit began withdrawal from the area.

On 31 December, during reconnaissance in force operations along the Can Cao Canal in the area 15-20 miles southwest of Rach Gia, enemy ambushes against the assault craft produced significant friendly casualties on two occasions. While underway to land units of the 2nd and 3rd battalion VNMC, RAC 15 craft encountered B-40 rocket and automatic weapons (A/W) fire from both banks at 1108L/59. Although enemy fire was returned and suppressed, one ATC and one monitor were damaged by rocket hits and seven USN were wounded. Later that night between 1950H and 2045H, in the same area, the RAC, again with VNMC troops aboard, came under attack three times and received 10 to 50 B-40 rockets and heavy A/W fire. ATC-151-12 received four B-40 hits, ATC-152-13 received one B-40 hit and ATC-151-6 sustained three B-40 hits producing heavy casualty figures of 10 USN, 28 VNMC and 3 VNUN wounded. Enemy fire was returned by the RAC in all cases and at 2145 two "Seawolf" gunships and USAF "Spooky" expended 21,000 rounds on the suspected enemy positions.
CONFIDENTIAL

JEN STATISTICAL SUMMARY
December 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MARKET TIME</th>
<th>GAME WARDEN</th>
<th>MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detections</td>
<td>49,264</td>
<td>120,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspections</td>
<td>29,656</td>
<td>43,513</td>
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<tr>
<td>Craft detained</td>
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<td>Boardings</td>
<td>11,435</td>
<td>61,213</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persons detained</td>
<td>1,472</td>
<td>1,474</td>
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<tr>
<td>Viet Cong suspects</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile fire incidents</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enemy casualties:
- Killed: 68(EC)+51(EST) 64(EC)+55(PACB) 154
- Wounded: 20(EC)+34(EST) 8(EC)+23(PACB) *
- Captured: 5 16 22

USN casualties:
- Killed: 3 4 (1-DON) 2 USN/15 USA/6 VN TIGER
- Wounded: 28 47 17 USN/113 USA/47 VCM/6 VN TIGER/3 VAN
- Captured: 0 0 0
- Missing: 0 0 0

Enemy material losses:
- Destroyed:
  - Junks or sampans: 669 106 131
  - Structures: 736 152 1,276
- Captured:
  - Junks or sampans: *
  - Weapons: *
  - Ammunition (rounds): *
  - Rice (tons): *
- Damaged:
  - Junks or sampans: 313 72 *
  - Structures: 693 113 *

USN material losses:
- Destroyed:
  - Surface craft: 0 0 0
  - Helicopters: 0 0 *
- Damaged:
  - Surface craft: 17 17 23
  - Helicopters: 0 5 *

SAR missions: *

Remarks: * Information not applicable or not available this date.
** Includes 2,327 grenades.
*** Includes 221 B-40 rockets, 115 mortar rounds, and 8 bangalore torpedoes.

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years

Enclosure (5)
ATTACHMENT AND WEAPONS CAPTURED AS A RESULT OF TF 116 OPERATIONS:

177,600 ROUNDS OF SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION
1,600 ROUNDS OF 12.7mm HEAVY MACHINE GUN AMMUNITION
  6 ROUNDS 75mm RECOILLESS RIFLE
  10 ROUNDS 57mm RECOILLESS RIFLE
479 ROUNDS 82mm MORTAR
856 ROUNDS 60mm MORTAR
100 MINES OF VARIOUS TYPES
40 CHI COM TORPEDOES RECOVERED AS WATER MINES
1,478 PLUS THE CONTENTS OF TWO 55 GALLON DRUMS OF EXPLOSIVES OF ALL TYPES
  (RPG CONCUSSION, Fragmentation)
  45 122mm ROCKETS
  38 FUSES (ROCKET AND MORTAR)
  59 RPG BOOSTERS
116 CASES OF 8-10 CHARGES
  1 120mm MORTAR INCHEMENT
20 FOUND PACKETS OF C-4
  9 15-INCH STICKS OF C-4

1 CHI COM ROCKET SIGHT
1 120mm MORTAR WITH TRIPOD AND BASE PLATE
1 LIGHT MACHINE GUN WITH TRIPOD
1 60mm MORTAR WITH BASE PLATE AND SIGHTING DEVICE
1 MACHINE GUN CRADLE

50,000 FT OF BLASTING CORD
38 BLASTING CAPS
360 BATTERIES

Enclosure (5)
Four more PCF's were turned over to the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) this month to bring the total of VNN PCF's to 12. On 27 December, two PCF's conducted the first VNN river patrol in conjunction with Operation SEA LORDS when the Cai Lon River was penetrated into areas never before reached by VNN craft. This first mission was designed as a familiarization with SEA LORDS operations; there was no enemy contact made during the 25-mile trip. In addition, derivative benefits came from a VNN craft flying the Vietnamese flag throughout the passage and in the small Delta village of Kien Hung.

Brigade A, Vietnamese Marine Corps (VMMC), composed of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Battalions and Battery B, VMMC Artillery Battalion, operated in the vicinity of Tay Ninh under the operational control of the 25th ARVN Infantry Division during Operation SONG THAN. The brigade met with no significant enemy contact during the deployment of 1-9 December. On 10 December, the brigade retired to the base camp at Thu Duc.

Brigade B was composed of the 4th Infantry Battalion and Battery D, VMMC Artillery Battalion from 1 through 18 December and participated in Operation SONG THAN under the operational control of the 21st ARVN Inf. Division in Chuong Thien Province. On 10 December, the marines were with 11 enemy killed and 6 captured along with a large quantity of weapons and ammunition. The VN marines suffered seven wounded during this mission.

The 2nd Infantry Battalion relieved the 4th Infantry Battalion on
and on 24 December the 3rd Infantry Battalion joined the brigade. On 28 December the marines, under the operational control of the 21st ARVN Infantry Division, participated in amphibious operations in close coordination with the U. S. Mobile Riverine Force in the northern U Minh Forest area. On 31 December the marines incurred 28 wounded when the RAS craft in which they were riding came under enemy attack. A firefight ensued with unknown enemy casualties.

The newly instituted Amphibious Task Force (ATF), composed of the 3rd Infantry Battalion, VNRC 21/33 and the ARVN 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions, began conducting operations in the My Tho/Ba Tre areas this month and participated in operations SON THAN and KIDNEY FLUSH. The fledgling ATF recorded little enemy contact during its first month of operations.

The 5th and 6th Infantry battalions operated in and around Tay Ninh this month conducting reconnaissance-in-force and small unit patrols on individual assignments. The 5th Battalion was committed to the U. S. 1st Air Cavalry Division and the 1st Airborne Brigade while the 6th Battalion pursued the enemy under the operational control of the ARVN 5th and 25th Infantry Divisions.
**VTH/VINC STATISTICAL SUMMARY**

**VIETNAMESE NAVY:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coastal Force</th>
<th>Daily Average</th>
<th>Searched</th>
<th>Detained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Junks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>17,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>22,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>12,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>10,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-totals:</strong></td>
<td><strong>62,911</strong></td>
<td><strong>264,233</strong></td>
<td><strong>85</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FLEET COMMAND PATROL SHIPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Upper</th>
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<th>Junks</th>
<th>People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>2,335</td>
<td>10,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
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**RIVERINE AREA CRAFT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Upper</th>
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<th>Junks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>130.0</td>
<td>128.7</td>
<td>9,945</td>
<td>30,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
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**GEN RESERVE FORCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Upper</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Junks</th>
<th>People</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>19,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>65,653</td>
<td>65,653</td>
<td>221,332</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Captured</th>
<th>Suspects detained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC/NVA</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VINC</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Provided 51 gunfire support missions.*

*Includes MAC 27, MACG and RPC 51*

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**GROUP 4**

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years.
This month 25 Hoi Chanks rallied to naval forces. The total for this year stands at 235, which is a 46 percent increase over last year's total. The vast majority (153) of these people have rallied during the last four months.

In conjunction with Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT, loudspeaker operations were conducted extensively along the Tan Co Dong River. Quick reaction leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts exploited the psychological vulnerabilities of the enemy generated by the presence of U. S. Naval forces, and in particular Navy SEALs, in the areas of the Cai Lon, Bo De and Cng Doc rivers, the Rach Gia-Long Xuyen Canal and Phu Quoc Island. The presence of U. S. Forces along the Rach Gia-Long Xuyen Canal has had a strategic effect upon pacification by gaining vital lines of communications and allowing refugees to resettle in their former homes under secure conditions. Psychological operations in this area were also conducted in the form of MEDCAP and MILCAPS to solidify the gains made in the pacification program. The response of the people to these efforts was enthusiastic. Speaker operations and MEDCAPs were also continued along the major Mekong River complex. An insight into the value of waterborne speaker operations might be gained from the following incident: In My Tho through various sources the names of seven members of the Viet Cong infrastructure were gained. These people were appealed to by name in speaker operations urging them...
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to rally to the government cause and guaranteeing their personal safety. Two of those appealed to subsequently rallied to the government.

In the Rung Sat Special Zone a major effort was made in pacification to upgrade Ly Thien village, formerly rated a contested area. PSYOPS were conducted during the month in the form of MEDCAPs, entertainment troops and speeches by the District Chief urging the people to rally behind the government. The results were most effective as evidenced by the radical change in attitude by the populace for the government.

Throughout the rest of the country daily PSYOPS were conducted utilizing the themes of voluntary informant, Chieu Hoi, support of the government and the progress of the Paris Peace Talks. There was also continued use of Armed Propaganda Teams (ex-Viet Cong) participating in live speaker broadcasts.

During the month in excess of 50 MEDCAPs were conducted and 13,862 persons were treated.
**UNCLASSIFIED**

**USCIVIC ACTION STATISTICAL SUMMARY**

**December 1968**

**TOTAL NUMBER OF MAN-DAYS PERSONNEL OF UNITS ENGAGED IN CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS:**

2,855

**COST OF SUPPLIES CONTRIBUTED BY MILITARY RESOURCES FOR CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS:**

VND 2,327,562

**VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS:**

VND 302,025

**PERCENTAGE OF U.S. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED JOINTLY WITH:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other FMAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVNAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. civilian voluntary agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average percent of self-help by VN civilians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PROGRAMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Development</th>
<th>Man Days</th>
<th>Expenditures (VND)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>541,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td>2,161</td>
<td>1,952,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>113,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>305,154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INSTITUTIONS ASSISTED:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals/Dispensaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orphanages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Enclosure (3)**

**UNCLASSIFIED**