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NAVAL FORCES VIETNAM

MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY

APRIL 1966

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
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INCIDENTS / OPERATIONS



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NAVFORSY

ESTABLISHMENT OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES, VIETNAM

Will be given

The vast, continuing increase in Free World Military Forces in Vietnam in 1965 and 1966 has brought with it a corresponding increase in United States Navy forces. In early 1965 U.S. Navy activity in Vietnam was limited to support functions in the Saigon area, construction and medical activities, and advising the Vietnamese Navy and Marine Corps. In March of 1965, the first operational U.S. Navy units commenced counter-infiltration patrols. The Vietnam Coastal Patrol Force under CTF 71 was designated Operation MARKET TIME on 24 March. On 30 July, TF 71 was deactivated and operational control was shifted to CTF 115 in Saigon. MARKET TIME has continued, with addition of surveillance aircraft, U.S. Coast Guard units, and the high speed PCF (SWIFT) coastal patrol boats.

Late 1965 saw planning for the second major influx of operational U.S. Navy units. Operation GAME WARDEN, designed to supplement Vietnamese units in patrol of the Mekong Delta and Rung Sat Special Zone waterways, was to come into operation during 1966, with high speed River Patrol Boats (PBRs) as the principal patrol units.

With these operations came the requirement for construction of new facilities. Navy Civil Engineer Corp personnel, assigned to the Officer in Charge of Construction, Vietnam, were designated to supervise the bulk of military construction, although the

majority of the work was being performed by civilian contractors. Included in this construction were new MARKET TIME and GAME WARDEN bases.

Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon was destined to transfer its functions to the Army by May of 1966, but some of its personnel and facilities were to be incorporated into Naval Support Activity, Saigon to provide logistic support for U.S. Navy activities in the II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones. Naval Support Activity, DaNang, activated in 1965 for support of Marine and Navy operations in the I CTZ, was to be expanded to support all Free World Military Forces in the I CTZ.

Also under construction were harbor facilities to support the military buildup. U.S. Navy Harbor Defense and Harbor Clearance units were to be assigned to these areas. In addition, mine countermeasures forces were to be employed, both on the main ship channels to Saigon and in the harbor and coastal areas. The possibility of a U.S. River Assault Group was under consideration to supplement the Vietnamese Navy RAGs in operations in the Mekong Delta and the Rung Sat Special Zone.

With the continually increasing United States Navy commitments in Vietnam, early 1966 brought the requirement for better integration of all U.S. Navy activities assigned to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Three months of planning culminated in the establishment of U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam on 1 April. In early January the requirements for a Naval Component Commander were forwarded to COMUSMACV.¹ At this time the Commanding General

¹ "An Examination of the Naval Component Commander Requirements for the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam," prepared by Naval Advisory Group, MACV, 3 January 1966.

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III Marine Amphibious Force, with headquarters in DaNang, was performing the task of Naval Component Commander for MACV; and Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines was navy area coordination authority. Commanding General III MAF's many functions encompassed the direction of the bulk of the war effort in the I Corps Tactical Zone in addition to discharging the Naval Component Commander functions in South Vietnam (with the exception) of those functions performed by Chief, Naval Advisory Group). His many duties in the I. CTZ resulted in the NCC being unable to adequately supervise many NCC functions in the II, III and IV CTZ. In addition, the presence of the Commanding General, III MAF was almost continually required in the I CTZ, a 340 mile separation from COMUSMACV Headquarters in Saigon. This prohibited frequent personal contact between COMUSMACV and his Naval Component Commander.¹

With the increase in U.S. naval forces, there also existed the need for a more responsive organization to provide for supervision of uni-service Navy matters. Again, geography prevented effective supervision by Commanding General, III MAF, and to an even greater extent prevented effective participation by Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines.

Chief, Naval Advisory Group was unavoidably involved in naval matters not necessarily related to NAVADVCRP functions. As CHNAVADVCRP, he was a member of COMUSMACV staff, as such not in command of a naval organization, but tasked to advise COMUSMACV on

¹Ibid., p. 17.

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naval matters. In addition, he was CTF 115 and CTF 116. Yet, as involved as he was, he had no fully appropriate channels to the Naval Component Commander, the Fleet Commander nor the Pacific Fleet type commanders.

With the continuing growth of the Navy establishment in Vietnam and the problems of a Naval Component Commander remote from the center of naval operations, the need existed for a change in the Naval Component Commander structure to provide an organization more responsive to the needs of COMUSMACV and the Navy. It was proposed that a major Navy command with a flag officer be established in Saigon under the command of Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and under the operational control of COMUSMACV.¹ This command would exercise operational control under COMUSMACV of the Coastal Surveillance Force, the River Patrol Force, and other Navy units as specifically assigned. In addition, the command would serve as Navy area coordinator for South Vietnam.

On 13 January COMUSMACV proposed to CINCPAC the formation of just such a major Navy command, and that it be titled U.S. Naval Forces, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (NAVFORV).² Under this proposal COMNAVFORV would have the additional duty of CHNAVADVGRP because of the prestige and possible political gain to the Vietnamese Navy and Vietnamese Marine Corps. In addition COMUSMACV proposed: that III MAF be designated as a separate uni-service command within MACV; that a flag officer junior to COMNAVFORV be Commander Naval Support Activity, DaNang; and that

¹Ibid., p. 18.

²COMUSMACV msg 130159Z Jan 66 (S).

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COMNAVFORV through NAVSUPPACT DaNang provide logistic support to all U.S. Forces in the I CTZ; that Navy captains be ordered to command of Task Force 115 and Task Force 116; and that NAVFORV be established at the earliest possible date.

In late January the proposal was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.¹ Approval was granted on 14 February,² and more definite requirements were worked out. Estimates of personnel requirements were prepared and forwarded to CINCPACFLT on 13 February. On 14 March CINCPACFLT forwarded the proposed tasks for COMNAVFORV, and recommended that the transfer of Naval Component Commander functions and the activation of NAVFORV be effected on 1 April.³

On 1 April, in ceremonies aboard USS LOWE (DER-325) in Saigon Harbor, Rear Admiral Norvell G. Ward established and assumed command of NAVFORV. He retained the posts of CTF 115, CTF 116, and CHNAVADVGRP. On 16 April Admiral Ward was relieved as CTF 115 by Captain Clifford L. Stewart. On 21 April CINCPACFLT defined the terms of reference for COMNAVFORV as a uni-service commander.⁴

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INTELLIGENCE

Coincident with formation of NAVFORV, the intelligence section was expanded to meet the growing intelligence requirements of the

¹CINCPAC msg 251120Z Jan 66 (S).

²JCS msg 142250Z Feb 66 (S).

³CINCPACFLT msg 142351Z Mar 66 (S).

⁴CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 5440.11; See Appendix I.

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new command. During the first week of April the first of ten graduates of the Army's special basic intelligence course for Vietnam, conducted at Fort Holabird, arrived in country. They are to be assigned to AEWV Sector Operational Intelligence Centers in Coastal and Mekong Delta sectors. Previous personnel assigned as Navy Intelligence Liaison Officers at Sector Operational Intelligence Centers had only a cursory introductory course prior to arrival in country. This represents an expansion from ten to twenty of the number of SOICs with Naval Intelligence Liaison Officers.

In addition, assistant intelligence officers have been assigned to each of the four Coastal Zones to assist the intelligence officer at Coastal Zone Headquarters. Three intelligence analyst billets have been created for DaNang, Nha Trang and Can Tho.

As a final note, again coincident with formation of NAVFORV, the daily intelligence summary was sent to out-of-country commands, and is now being forwarded to CINCPACFLT and CNO.

* * * * *

OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CONSTRUCTION, VIETNAM

The Officer in Charge of Construction, Vietnam, under Bureau of Yards and Docks, as the Department of Defense's construction agent in Southeast Asia, has negotiated more than \$150 million in military construction completed in South Vietnam since 1956. As of

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April, construction was proceeding at a rate of \$17.5 million per month, with an expected increase to \$40 million a month by October. U.S. civilian contractors now have a total of over 33,000 workers in Vietnam, in addition to seven Navy Mobile Construction Battalions and 15,000 Army Engineer Corps personnel.

Major construction projects in progress include the development of major ports in seven areas of Vietnam to complement the port of Saigon: Hue, DaNang, Chu Lai, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, Vung Tau, and Cam Ranh Bay. It is anticipated that ten deep draft piers will be completed at these locations by the end of October. LST ramps at DaNang, Chu Lai, and Vung Tau are under construction in addition to the deep draft piers. Anticipated completion date is June 1966. In addition this program includes construction of major permanent airfield complexes at Cam Ranh, Qui Nhon, Chu Lai and DaNang.

The earlier serious shipping bottleneck in South Vietnam is improving, with an average turnaround time for ships in Vietnam of twelve days. This has improved the flow of construction materials, previously a serious constraint. At present, approximately \$185 million of construction material and equipment is in the procurement and shipping phase.

* * * * *

HARBOR CLEARANCE

Harbor Clearance Unit One was established on 1 December 1965 to provide a harbor and river clearance capability. Assigned the permanent duty station of Subic Bay, Philippines, HCU-1 is composed

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of four Harbor Clearance Teams (HCT) and two Light Lift Craft (LLC). Each Harbor Clearance Team is composed of two officers and fourteen enlisted, all of whom are qualified divers. Each LLC has a crew of two officers and eleven enlisted.

In what was regarded as a much needed extension of Navy capability in Vietnam, Harbor Clearance Team One, in company with LLC-1, arrived at Cat Lo aboard USS COLONIAL (LSD-18). While in Vietnam they will be under the operational control of COMNAVFORV. Equipped with a complete set of salvage, diving, dewatering and lift equipment, HCT-1 and LLC-1 proceeded directly to their first job. Utilizing the underwater object locators of two MSBs, they commenced a survey of a section of the Soirap River where a wreck had been reported. This task was undertaken in preparation for the opening of the Soirap Shipping channel. Nothing was discovered, but another step was completed in rendering the Soirap River safe for shipping.

HCT-1 will eventually move to a permanent base at Phu An outside of Saigon. There they will be incorporated into what is being projected as a maritime disaster recovery unit for the Saigon Harbor and the shipping channels leading into Saigon. HCT-1 can be supplemented by immediate airlift of equipment and personnel from Subic Bay, where special packaged components of salvage equipment have been prepared for air shipment.

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COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCE

During April, MARKET TIME units recorded their highest level of activity since activation of the Coastal Surveillance Force on 30 July 1965. Additionally, for the three month period ending 1 May 1966, the total number of vessels inspected, boarded and searched was more than twice the total for the previous six months.¹ The continuing increase in inspections, boarding and search operations and other activities can be directly attributed to the increasing number of MARKET TIME patrol units and to the experience gained through nine months of operations.

In addition to regular patrols in the nine patrol areas, MARKET TIME units participated in four concentrated boarding and search operations during the month. Diversification continues to be the order of day as MARKET TIME units rendered services to beleaguered outposts in the form of gunfire support, assisted stricken junks, performed psychological warfare missions and carried out two hydrographic survey operations.

* * * * *

TEE SHOT III/IV

The TEE SHOT patrol concept, based on concentration of MARKET TIME patrol units in a specific area in anti-exfiltration patrols supporting land operations, was applied twice during the month. Operation TEE SHOT III was conducted in support of the U.S.

¹For nine month totals of MARKET TIME operations, see Appendix III.

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Marine operation NEVADA in northern Quang Ngai Province. The Marine sweep was scheduled for an area between Highway One and the coast, and intelligence sources indicated the possibility of Viet Cong exfiltration by sea to avoid contact. To counter this possibility, surface patrols were established between Cape An Hoa on the north and Din My village on the south. USS ENGAGE (MSO-433) was designated operational commander and support ship for the PCF and WPB. Other MARKET TIME units participating were one PCF, with a relief crew berthed in Chu Lai, one WPB, and USS WOODPECKER (MSC-209). The participation of Coastal Groups 15 and 16 was scheduled through Vietnamese channels. In addition, VNN PGM 601, already in the area, joined the operation on her own initiative.

TEE SHOT III commenced on 12 April. At noon the same day a surveillance aircraft spotted four junks, each with ten men aboard, proceeding to sea. USCGC POINT CAUTION was vectored to the four boats, but by the time she arrived the four boats had been beached and deserted. No personnel were spotted in the area. Coastal Group 15 picked up five suspects later the same day.

On the evening of 14 April VNN PGM 601 left the area for DaNang but was replaced by VNN PCE-10. The PCE filled the gap left when both the MSO and the MSC left the area on 16 April to replenish. The PCE, with Coastal Groups 15 and 16, held all fishing traffic inshore during this period.

Coastal Group 16 saw most of the action during TEE SHOT III. Early in the morning of 16 April Coastal Group 16 units detected a junk crossing a narrow estuary in the vicinity of their base.

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The Coastal Group 16 advisor immediately requested illumination from USCGC POINT WELCOME, who responded with 16 rounds of 81mm mortar flares. Coastal Group 16 and the junk exchanged small arms and automatic weapons fire. One Viet Cong was killed during the action and one carbine and four grenades captured. One junkman was wounded. Later the same day, Coastal Group 16, searching near the Sa Ky River, discovered a quantity of steel plate and some corn not native to the area. The possibility that these items had been infiltrated was good and continued radar surveillance was recommended.

During the operation Coastal Group 16 also transported 1500 refugees from the operation area to a secure village. The refugees were to be returned to their native area when it had been secured.

✓ TEE SHOT III was terminated on 18 April. When compared with previous similar operations, the outstanding participation of the Vietnamese Navy emerged as the highlight. Requests initiated for Coastal Group participation met with an immediate response from Vietnamese Navy Headquarters in Saigon to the First Coastal Zone Commander. The subsequent Coastal Group participation in the operation was excellent. In addition, the two Fleet Command ships provided able assistance on their own initiative.

✓ TEE SHOT IV commenced on 24 April in support of Operation AUSTIN northeast of Phan Thiet. MARKET TIME units in areas five and six had been instructed to intensify close-in search starting 18 April, but TEE SHOT IV did not get underway until the First Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division moved close to the coast.

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Patrol units included USS IMPLICIT (MSO-455), USS PERSISTENT (MSO-491) and USCGC POINT PARTRIDGE. Coastal Group 28 at Phan Thiet was integrated into the operation after a conference on board IMPLICIT on 24 April.

Intensive close-in boarding and search was conducted from Phan Thiet on the south northward to Long Hung village. On the 25th IMPLICIT detained six suspects clothed in ARVN-type fatigues. They had in their possession two U.S. Mark 26 grenades and a large box containing U.S. issue helmets, knives and ammunition. The suspects were determined to be Popular Force deserters and were turned over to Coastal Group 28. As there was nothing else suspicious on the boat, the master and the remainder of the passengers were released and allowed to proceed.

In a second incident on the evening of 25 April, PERSISTENT fired warning shots at an evading junk with no initial response. When additional shots were fired close aboard, the junk reversed course and came alongside PERSISTENT for inspection. Search revealed nothing suspicious, and the junk was released. One suspect without papers was detained and turned over to Coastal Group 28.

During the three days of TEE SHOT IV, 810 junks were boarded and 104 suspects were turned over to Coastal Group 28. The operation was terminated on 21 April.

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VNN ROUNDUP III/IV

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Two joint Vietnamese Navy/MARKET TIME unit ROUNDUP operations, both of one day duration, were conducted during April. The ROUNDUP concept employs a concentrated search and detection of junks in a specific area, with the junks directed by the detecting unit to one or more ships designated as check points where they are searched. The operations are of brief duration.

VNN ROUNDUP III was conducted on 7 April. The operation utilized two PCFs and two WPBs from MARKET TIME patrols, the Vietnamese Navy Fleet Command ships PGM 611 and MSC 114, and the junks of Coastal Groups 44 and 45. The concentrated boarding operation area extended from Khoc La Bay to Point Hun Dot in the Gulf of Thailand. MARKET TIME units were directed to maintain a high speed barrier patrol, directing all units detected to the VNN ships for inspection. The Coastal Group junks were to conduct close-in boarding and search.

Early in the morning of 7 April, Coastal Group 45 units received heavy small arms fire from the beach. USCGC POINT MAST responded to Coastal Group 45's call for assistance, strafing the beach with .50 caliber machine gun fire. Permission for naval gunfire was requested and received from the province chief, and a Forward Air Controller dispatched to the scene. Targets were designated as a Viet Cong troop concentration and bunkers. From 1200 to 1400 USCGC POINT COMFORT and USCGC POINT MAST delivered

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135 rounds of 81mm mortar fire into the area. Fourteen Viet Cong bunkers or shelters were destroyed and two Viet Cong confirmed killed.

330 junks and sampans were searched during the operation, with no detection of suspicious junks or persons. The operation was evaluated as well planned and well executed.

VNN ROUNDUP IV was held in the same general area in the Gulf of Thailand, this time extending from Point Nai to Cape De Ia. The same tactics were employed as before, with three PCFs and two WPBs providing the outer barrier, VNN LSIL 225 and PGM 604 the searching units, and Coastal Group 45 the close-in patrol.

The operation commenced on 21 April and was terminated the following day. No junk concentrations and no suspicious contacts were detected. It is believed that bad weather curtailed most of the junk and sampan traffic. Evaluation of the operation was not possible due to the bad weather and the low number of contacts. Coordination of forces was regarded as good.

* * * * *

SUPPORT OF SPECIAL FORCES

On three occasions during April, MARKET TIME units and Vietnamese Navy units came to the assistance of Vietnamese Special Forces and their U.S. Advisors operating north of An Thoi on Phu Quoc Island in the Gulf of Thailand. On 11 April, a Special Forces patrol with two U.S. advisors reported it was surrounded by two

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platoons of Viet Cong, and made an urgent call for gunfire support. USCGC POINT MAST, two PCFs, VNN PGM 604, and Coastal Group 46 responded. While the sea patrol ships provided 81mm mortar and .50 caliber machine gun fire, Coastal Group 46 evacuated the beleaguered unit.

On 18 April, the Special Forces had established a base camp north of An Thoi on the western shore of Phu Quoc Island. PCF 10 had been dispatched to the area to supply the camp with additional ammunition with Coastal Group 41 in company to assist in the supply mission. Early in the evening the Special Forces reported they were under attack by an undetermined number of Viet Cong. PCF-10 and VNN LSIL 225 soon arrived on the scene, providing gunfire support and 81mm mortar flare illumination. The Viet Cong soon broke off contact and the Special Forces were able to maintain their operating base. Coastal Group 46 then transported the ammunition to the beach.

The final support mission came on 20 April, when the Special Forces, in the same area as before, reported they were surrounded and under heavy Viet Cong fire. USCGC POINT MAST was again the first unit on the scene, arriving in the early afternoon and saturating the Viet Cong concentration with 81mm mortar fire. POINT MAST assisted in holding off the Viet Cong attack throughout the afternoon. Upon arrival of Coastal Group 46, the Special Forces were evacuated.

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PCFs

Twenty new PCF arrived in-country during April in the largest monthly influx of these units. PCFs 34 - 41 arrived in Cam Ranh Bay on 2 April and the following day made the 170 mile transit to Vung Tau to become part of Division 103. PCFs 42 - 48 arrived in Cam Ranh Bay on 17 April, followed by PCFs 49 - 54 on the 27th.

PCF Division 104, with thirteen PCFs, was activated at Cam Ranh Bay on 12 April, bringing to four the number of divisions now operational. Other divisions include 101 at An Thoi with seven boats, 102 at DaNang with ten boats, and 103 at Cat Lo with thirteen boats. While base facilities are under construction at Cam Ranh Bay, berthing and support facilities are located aboard an APL, a non-self propelled barracks ship, anchored in Cam Ranh Bay. Approximately one half the spaces aboard the APL have been modified to provide repair shops and other support facilities.

* * * * *

PCF HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY OPERATIONS

PCFs of Division 103 at Cat Lo conducted two hydrographic survey operations during April to provide data for possible future amphibious operations. The first survey, conducted in treacherous shallows near the mouths of the Cua Dai and Cua Tieu Rivers, proved to be more eventful than expected. At 1300, while taking soundings near the Cua Tieu channel, the two PCFs came under fire from Viet Cong positions on the beach. The two units

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returned the fire and withdrew to a safer position, calling for air support from the USS TORTUGA fire team. The fire team was dispatched to the scene, delivering a strike and suppressing the fire. The survey was then resumed.

Later in the afternoon the two units went aground briefly while surveying in the large shallow region south of the Cua Dai River mouth. A third PCF in the area was called in case support was necessary. However the two PCFs soon were afloat, having suffered no damage. Operations were completed by nightfall.

On 26 April, a second operation was conducted on the Thi Vai River, starting in the Rung Sat Special Zone at a point fourteen miles north of Vung Tau. The TORTUGA fire team conducted a reconnaissance flight prior to the arrival of the two PCFs. The fire team then remained on call in the area throughout the survey. The operation was completed that afternoon without incident.

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RIVER PATROL FORCE

Operation GAME WARDEN entered its fledgling stages during April as the first PBRs became operational and patrolled the waters of the Rung Sat Special Zone. As the new crews received area indoctrination and training, construction of new bases in the Mekong Delta area continued in preparation for the arrival of the first patrol units during the forthcoming months.¹

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JACK STAY FOLLOW-UP/RSSZ PATROLS

The departure of the Seventh Fleet Marine Amphibious Force from the Rung Sat Special Zone on 7 April signalled the termination of Operation JACK STAY. Highly successful in terms of equipment and facilities captured or destroyed, JACK STAY also resulted in 63 Viet Cong killed. The likelihood was great that Viet Cong forces in the area would attempt to re-infiltrate into the Rung Sat Special Zone and establish once again their secure bases.

To counter this possibility by denying the Viet Cong use of the major waterways in the Rung Sat Special Zone, the river patrols established during JACK STAY were maintained after completion of the operation. The ten patrol stations were to be manned by five WPEs and four PCFs. Two LCPLs, the UH-1B fire teams, and the MSBs were to assist. The PBRs were scheduled to phase in when operationally


¹For concept of Operation GAME WARDEN, see Naval Advisory Group, MACV, Historical Review, December 1965, p. 7.

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LEGEND:

- RIVER PATROL STATIONS
- SEAL AMBUSHES
- ✕ VC SAMPANS DESTROYED
- ➔ VC INFILTRATION ROUTES



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ready. Vietnamese Navy assistance was also requested. Operational control was to be exercised by CTG 116.2 at Nha Be. On 6 April, the CTF 115 units chopped to operational control of CTG 116.2, and commenced patrol.

On 8 April, Vietnamese Navy units relieved two stations, freeing one WPB and one PCF for MARKET TIME patrol. River Assault Group units, consisting of one commandment, one FOM and one monitor, assumed patrols on the upper Soirap River. Other VMN units patrolled the eastern reach of the Vamco River and the Dong Tranh River.

On 8 April, the PERs of River Patrol Section 541 commenced orientation patrols with the PCFs and WPBs on the Long Tau River stations. On 15 April, the PERs reported they were ready to assume any two stations. On the following day, the PERs commenced patrol, resulting in two PCFs and two WPBs released for MARKET TIME operations. This resulted in seven stations manned continually by United States units; two by PERs, three by WPBs and two by PCFs. PERs occupied one additional station vacated by Vietnamese Navy units on 16 April.

The Soirap River patrol stations continued to meet with success as the Viet Cong persisted in their attempts to utilize this waterway. On 17 April, PCF 23 illuminated a contact attempting to cross the Soirap River just north of the Vam Sat River mouth. The sampan maintained speed and opened fire with small arms. Four people in the sampan jumped overboard as PCF 23 returned the fire. The sampan was taken in tow but subsequently sank. Shore fire prevented a continued search of the area.

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At approximately the same location on 18 March, USCGC POINT PARTRIDGE detected a sampan with two people embarked attempting to cross into the Rung Sat Special Zone. When POINT PARTRIDGE approached to investigate, the sampan opened fire with small arms. The fire was returned with one Viet Cong killed and the other captured. Also captured were one carbine, three grenades, rice, papers, tobacco, and tea.

The effectiveness of the Soirap River patrols can also be measured in terms of the stepped-up harrassment of patrol units. On numerous occasions during the month the boats came under moderate to heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from the banks. Most of the harassing fire was received in the section near the mouth of the Vam Sat River, a known infiltration route terminal and the scene of considerable action during March and April. Shore fire was also received on two occasions near the mouth of the Soirap River.

Meanwhile the Long Tau River patrol stations continued relatively quiet. Intelligence reports during the month indicated a partial shift in Viet Cong infiltration patterns into the Rung Sat Special Zone, with traffic entering from the east, originating in Viet Cong strongholds in Phuoc Tuy Province. However, no evidence of this was uncovered by the Long Tau River patrols. One reason for this may exist in the fact that the Long Tau River, with its narrow, sinuous channel, presents a much more difficult patrol area than the wide, straight Soirap River. With

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the exception of the wide section near the mouth at Canh Rai Bay, transit across the Long Tau can be accomplished quickly, making detection difficult.

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UH-1B FIRE TEAMS

The Long Tau River fire teams, two detachments of UH-1B helicopters, made a significant contribution during April. The first team, which had operated from USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2) during JACK STAY, switched over to USS TORTUGA (LSD-26) when she relieved BELLE GROVE on 19 April. It was joined by a second detachment aboard USS FLOYD COUNTY (LST-762) on 12 April. Throughout the month they supported the Long Tau and Soirap patrol stations and the SEAL ambushes. On 22 April they came to the support of two PCFs which had grounded while conducting survey operations at the mouth of the Cua Tieu River. The timely arrival of the fire teams suppressed shore fire the boats were receiving.

Late in the afternoon of 29 April, the fire teams made their most successful strike. Numerous camouflaged sampans were spotted on a narrow waterway on the Long Thanh Peninsula just west of Can Gio village. Despite moderate ground fire, continual strikes were flown until darkness precluded further accurate fire. During the action, ten sampans were confirmed destroyed with an additional one damaged. Two Viet Cong were confirmed killed.

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SEAL TEAM

SEAL Team 1, Detachment Delta, operating from Nha Be, staged ambushes in the Rung Sat Special Zone at two and three day intervals throughout the month. Ambush sites were often based on intelligence data obtained by aircraft equipped with infra-red (Red Haze) detection devices. The teams were inserted by LCPLs, and supported by river patrol boats and the UH-1B fire teams.

Except for one successful ambush during JACK STAY, the SEAL team efforts had been fruitless during the first half of April. To be successful, a completely clandestine atmosphere is required, yet such an atmosphere did not exist. The SEALs were being loaded into the LCPLs at Nha Be, in full view of the civilian population. The likelihood of Viet Cong informers was high, as was the probability of their knowledge of the SEAL mission. The possibility of communication with Viet Cong in the Rung Sat Special Zone also existed. To counter this, it was decided to break the established forty-eight hour ambush cycle and wait one extra day. In addition the SEAL team equipment was to be loaded onto the LCPLs at Nha Be, but the SEALs themselves were to proceed to Saigon by vehicle to rendezvous with the LCPLs. This plan was put into effect the night of 18 April, when the ambush team got underway from Saigon.

Early the morning of 19 April the ambush team made contact with a sampan with three occupants. It was taken under fire and sunk, with the three occupants reported killed. Immediately after the action the SEAL team withdrew.

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On 13 April, a problem area of unilateral clandestine operations came to light. That night the SEAL ambush took a sampan with a single occupant under fire, killing him and then recovering the body. The body was taken to Nha Be and identified as that of a friendly Vietnamese intelligence agent working in the Rung Sat Special Zone. In an attempt to rectify this problem, the Rung Sat Special Zone advisors held discussions with their Vietnamese counterparts. It was reported that the Vietnamese zealously guard their intelligence operating procedures and would not reveal to their counterparts the areas of operation of their agents. They would continue, however, to disclose the location of Regional Force and Popular Force ambushes. The U.S. Navy has been equally secretive with their Vietnamese counterparts concerning SEAL ambush sites, feeling that revelation of the sites to the Vietnamese would increase chances of compromise. It was concluded that there was no way of avoiding this possible interference if the safety of the SEAL team was to be maintained; and that the chances of future such accidental ambushes was highly remote. It was decided to continue to exclude the Vietnamese from information regarding clandestine ambush operations.

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CURFEW PROBLEM

Another problem, this one of a continuing nature, received tragic emphasis during the month. Both GAME WARDEN and MARKET

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TIME units are charged with assisting in curfew enforcement in their patrol areas. Curfew effectiveness depends heavily on promulgation at the village and district level, and thus varies from area to area. One of the most thorough curfew promulgations was made in the Rung Sat Special Zone prior to JACK STAY. There, leaflet drops, loudspeaker announcements from aircraft, and notification at the local level were made, but even then serious problems arose.

The night of 11 April the Long Tau Fire Team spotted seven sampans in a restricted zone on Ganh Rai Bay near Can Gio village. The Fire Team requested permission to strike the sampans from CTG 116.2 at Nha Be, receiving permission after the Vietnamese Navy watch officer had made a check with Can Gio District Headquarters. After completing the strike, the Fire Team reported one sampan sunk and two damaged and one confirmed killed. Two hours after the incident it was discovered by the Can Gio advisors that the remainder of the boats had returned to Can Gio and that they were friendly fishermen. Two youths had been killed.

Although fully aware of the curfew regulations, the village chief had granted permission for the people to fish. Subsequent investigation revealed that the watch officer at Nha Be had in fact checked with the assistant district chief. He was unaware that people were fishing in the area and had granted permission for the strike. Although the curfew restrictions impose financial hardship on the people by limiting fishing time, their enforcement is necessary to successfully combat night-time

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infiltration. The problem lies most heavily with enforcement at the local and district level - a problem amplified by the financial kickback available to the dishonest village chief who will turn his head at curfew violations.

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MINE COUNTERMEASURES/LONG TAU DEFENSE POST

The MSBs and MLMSs continued their daily sweeps of the Long Tau River. Although no mines were discovered, electric cables were pulled up on two occasions. Hull damage suffered by one boat while coming alongside an LCVP in a swift current left only two MSBs operationally ready at the end of the month.

The first Long Tau River static defense post was established at a point eleven miles south-east of Nha Be during late April. Manned by one Regional Force company with two U.S. Army Advisors, conditions at the outpost are very primitive with no permanent structures yet completed. In addition, all food and water must be imported. To assist the advisors, the Long Tau river patrol units nearest the outpost were supplying fresh water at the rate of ten gallons per day until more permanent arrangements could be made.

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PBRs

The PBRs of River Section 541 reported ready for operations on 10 April, and the following day the first operational tests

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of the new GAME WARDEN units got underway. The PBR crews adapted well to the river patrol situation, assuming two Rung Sat Special Zone patrol stations at the onset and later in the month one additional station. The PBRs operated from the Inshore Support Ship USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2) until 19 April, when USS TORTUGA (LSD-26) relieved BELLE GROVE. On 27 April the units moved to Nha Be, operating from the interim GAME WARDEN base facilities at that location. The units were under the operational control of CTG 116.2 at Nha Be.

26 April saw the arrival of an additional twelve PBRs at Cat Lo. These units commenced shakedown cruises from the base at Cat Lo and from USS FLOYD COUNTY (LST-762), who had arrived in country on 12 April to become the second Inshore Support Ship. River Division 51 was activated on 27 April aboard USS TORTUGA in preparation for the first transit into the Mekong Delta in May. The new units were designated River Section 512.

While crew performance during the initial month of PBR operations was regarded as excellent, numerous problem areas arose in the boats themselves. Initial boarding and search operations indicated that the narrow vinyl beading which served as a fender was not adequate protection when boarding and searching larger junks, or when alongside a support ship. This resulted in damage to the side. To correct this, discarded helicopter tires have been obtained for use as fenders. Armor plating around the

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forward gun mount has been removed on all boats to improve gunner and coxswain visibility and communications between gunner and the coxswain. M-72, one time only anti-tank rockets, are being carried on all boats as interim ordnance pending approval and installation of the Mark 18, 40mm rapid fire grenade launcher. In another ordnance improvement, .50 caliber machine guns are being installed in place of the after .30 caliber machine guns.

On 17 April, a Maintenance and Engineering Evaluation Inspection Board met on USS TORTUGA to produce a report on the PBRs. Their conclusions were hardly optimistic.¹ Evaluation of sections of the damaged PBR 33 as well as other PBRs in the initial phase of active service concluded that the PBRs presently show many instances of minimal design philosophy, particularly regarding strength, rigidity and anti-corrosion treatment. It was predicted that life expectancy of the boats in South East Asia would be limited to six months except with high maintenance manhours and high spare parts usage. Construction processes were evaluated as inadequate, particularly with regard to fiberglass layer bonding in the hull. The main propulsion system (the Jacuzzi pump installation) showed many inadequacies, particularly with reference to the reverse gates. The ordnance was regarded as satisfactory.

Recommendations included the sending of a team of technical

¹River Patrol Boat (PBR) Maintenance and Engineering Evaluation Inspection, Final Report, 18 April 1966.

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experts in the fields of small boat design, fiberglass fabrication, and corrosion control to Vietnam to initiate corrective action. It was also recommended that manufacturer's fiberglass procedures be thoroughly examined. Recommendations for ordnance modifications, previously discussed as being effected, were included.

In general, it was observed that after one month in service, the PERs showed evidence of premature aging, and no justification could be found that time in service would improve this situation. Preliminary operations had been in the relatively protected waters of the Rung Sat Special Zone. It was predicted that rougher waters as the PERs start to work from the off-shore support ships and continued subjection to corrosive elements would take their toll.

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NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP

An active month for the Vietnamese Navy and its advisors, April witnessed five joint U.S./Vietnamese waterborne operations in addition to numerous unilateral Vietnamese operations. In the administrative arena, the reorganization of the Vietnamese Navy approached completion. Three Deputy Chiefs of Staff have been proposed for personnel, operations and logistics. Final details are being worked out prior to submission of the proposal to the Joint General Staff for approval.

The operating units will be controlled by the Fleet Command, subdivided into five divisions for sea patrol (PC, PCE), inshore patrol (PGM), river patrol (LSSL, LSIL), logistics lift (LST, LSM, LCU, AKL, YOG), minecraft (MSC, MLMS) and UDT. The Coastal Groups are under the operational control of the four Coastal Zone Commanders and the River Assault Groups under the control of the two Riverine Area commanders.

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FLEET COMMAND

During April PCs, PCEs and PGMs were utilized principally for offshore patrol in coordination with Operation MARKET TIME. In addition they were used for static defense or gunfire support when needed. The LSILs and LSSLs, although deployed briefly for sea patrol, were utilized primarily for river patrol and in support of riverine operations. LSIL 329 spent most of April as an escort for LSMH 400, the Vietnamese Navy hospital ship. LSILs

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also saw limited use as logistic lift ships. The MSCs remained divorced from their basic function and were employed primarily as sea patrol units.

In April commanding officer performance once again came in for heavy criticism by advisors. While some commanding officers displayed a high degree of professional competence, there still existed an unacceptable number of officers whose command performance was marginal or unsatisfactory. Among some, there existed an acceptance of inferior performance and no passion for improvement.¹ To attempt to counter this, the Vietnamese Navy CINC and the Fleet Commander have instituted a policy of holding commanding officers responsible for poor performance, enforcing it by removal from command. It is felt that if this policy is properly implemented, and administered consistently and equitably, it should result in better performance by commanding officers.²

The advisory situation improved in Fleet Command units during April. Many vacant billets were filled with new arrivals, and it is anticipated that by the end of May all advisor billets will again be filled. Most advisors report that commanding officers readily accepted their advice. However, there still existed isolated cases of commanding officers who refused to accept any advice given by an American.

A critical situation exists in the continuing shortage of

¹Senior Fleet Command Advisors Report, April 1966, p. 2.

²Ibid.

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technically qualified petty officers, particularly in the electronics ratings. There are some petty officers who display a high degree of initiative, leadership and professional knowledge, particularly those petty officers who have been exposed to the United States Navy, either through schools or aboard a ship of the Seventh Fleet. However, the mediocre majority continues to present a challenge to advisory personnel.

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LDNN (UDT)

On 3 April, the Vietnamese Navy LDNN (UDT) with their advisor deployed into the Rung Sat Special Zone to support the Vietnamese Marine Corps' deployment during operation JACK STAY. On 4 April, supported by three RAG craft, they performed river reconnaissance missions in three locations. Landing near the mouth of small river tributaries, they penetrated inland along one bank for a few hundred yards, returning to their starting point via the other bank. No Viet Cong contact was experienced.

However, this type of operation is a rarity for the LDNN. The LDNN is seldom used by the Vietnamese Navy, leading to a sense of frustration and lethargy which has hurt the team's morale. This has been compounded by the lack of a commanding officer, although one has been assigned to arrive in the near future.¹

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¹Senior LDNN Advisor Report, April 1966, p. 5.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ COASTAL GROUPS

Coastal group activities showed an increase during April, partially attributed by advisors to the improved leadership situation. Although leadership is still generally evaluated as only fair to good, new commanding officers are arriving at some of the coastal groups in a continuation of the program of providing higher caliber officers. All Coastal Zone commanders are regarded as good to excellent by their counterparts. In the Second Coastal Zone the commander and his executive officer are appraised by the senior advisor as outstanding in all phases of their work.¹ In the Fourth Coastal Zone the commander, on the job only three months, has shown himself to be aggressive in planning and a strong leader.² This type of leadership at the more senior levels appears to be starting to filter down to the commanding officers of the individual coastal groups.

Critical areas continue to exist, however, particularly in trained technical rates. This is subsequently reflected in the level of equipment and boat maintenance. Although there are indications of improvement at individual coastal groups, the general picture is one of relatively little maintenance until the equipment will no longer function.

Critical areas also exist in availability of certain supply items. Those most often cited in advisors reports are General

¹Senior Naval Coastal Zone Advisor's Report, Second Coastal Zone, April 1966, p. 3.

²Senior Naval Coastal Zone Advisor's Report, Fourth Coastal Zone, April 1966, p. 3.

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Motor 71 Series engine parts, electrical spares, 81mm mortar ammunition, and, at repair facilities, saw wood for hull repairs. The requirement for installation of machine gun mounts on the boats continues to be emphasized. The installation program is in effect, but is progressing very slowly.

Base defense continues to be a problem at many of the more remote coastal groups. One of the more acute defense problems exists at An Thoi on Phu Quoc Island. Although larger than most, it is fairly representative of many of the base defense problems. Here, base defense is reported in a state of constant change due to civilian contractor work on the airfield and base facilities. At present, two Regional Force companies are being utilized on constant day patrol and night ambushes. However, the defense perimeter is so close to the base that the base is highly vulnerable to mortar attack. To move the perimeter out to the required 4,000 yards will require additional troops not yet available. By September, it is expected that 120 additional Vietnamese Navy personnel will be available to assume some of the base perimeter defense chores.¹ Many junk bases report themselves faced with the same problem: lack of an adequate defense perimeter and high vulnerability to mortar attack.

As previously discussed in this Summary, the Coastal Force performed well in joint operations with MARKET TIME and other U.S. Forces. However, several uni-command operations, based on the planning and initiative of individual commanding officers,

¹Tbid. p. 6.

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are worthy of note. Most of these took place in the Third Coastal Zone. On 12 April Coastal Group 34 took their junks into the canals near Con Loi Village, a tidal area south of the entrance to the Han Luong River in Kien Hoa province. As they proceeded without resistance into the canal network, they found a series of deserted firing positions and bunkers spaced at 30 to 50 yards apart along the canal. All were in good repair and constructed of mud, reinforced with wood poles. The entire area was marked with "street signs", evidently so Viet Cong new to the area could find their way. Two diesel fuel tanks with a total capacity of 400 gallons and a series of houses and one small arms workshop were destroyed. Equipment captured included 11 20mm anti-aircraft machinegun tripods, one rifle, three pistols, small arms repair tools, assorted ammunition and two sets of audio equipment.

A joint Coastal Group 34/37 patrol pursued a Viet Cong junk ashore on 16 April, killing one Viet Cong and wounding another while suffering one junkman killed in action. In addition, three rifles, five grenades, ammunition, one junk and a quantity of equipment including uniforms, blankets and mosquito nets were captured from the Viet Cong. In similar action in the First Coastal Zone, Coastal Group 16 engaged the Viet Cong, with one Viet Cong squad leader confirmed killed and one rifle, five grenades and 100 rounds of ammunition captured. There were no friendly casualties.

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RIVER ASSAULT GROUPS

Numerous small scale riverine operations utilizing River Assault Group boats and Vietnamese Army troops were conducted during April. Although no large or conclusive victories resulted, riverine operations continued to be a vital element in counter-guerilla warfare. In addition, the RAGs were utilized in river patrol on the Rung Sat Special Zone waterways and on the Mekong Delta estuaries near Can Tho and My Tho.

On 16 April, a River Assault Group river patrol, operating near the mouth of the Cua Dai River, surprised a Viet Cong extortion group operating from three motorized junks. The group fled from their junks as the patrol closed them, leaving behind their junks and several sewing machines. Viet Cong casualties were not reported. The three junks were taken into custody.

During April, the nine River Assault Groups reported their 167 boats in a generally good state of repair. The main problems are centered in electrical and electronics maintenance, although two RAGs report some engine maintenance difficulties. An additional twenty-nine boats are attached to the River Transport Escort Group, assigned to protect river supply convoys enroute to outlying posts. An additional fifteen boats are maintained as a reserve.

Two operational problem areas were noted by advisors during April. Mine consciousness, a vital factor in riverine operations,

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still seems to be lacking. Only when intelligence reports indicate the possibility of mining do RAG personnel give thought to the required countermeasures. A second problem area is in utilization of the RAGs. Although they are being used properly, they are not being utilized to their fullest potential by Army Commanders.

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SHIPYARD AND SUPPLY CENTER

The shipyard advisor reports that ships continually submit work requests for trivia. The Shipyard Planning Officer rejects as many of these requests as possible, but in many instances he is forced by higher authority to accept these jobs.¹ This is a direct reflection of the continuing refusal of most ships to make their own repairs. Fleet Command is in the process of instituting a program whereby the Fleet Command Maintenance Officer will reject those jobs within the capacity of the individual ships, a program long needed in the Vietnamese Navy.²

The logistic lift unit of Fleet Command conducted 38 lift missions during April in support of Coastal Groups and RAG bases. The capability and performance of the logistic lift ships was generally considered to be adequate. A reorganization of the Logistics Department and overhaul of the delivery system is under study.

¹Senior Shipyard Advisors Report, April 1966, p. 4.

²Senior Fleet Command Advisors Report, April 1966, p. 3.

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In the Supply Center, procedures for a systematic review of all stock record cards for the purpose of replenishment of stocks has been successfully implemented. The procedures call for a review of certain federal stock number classes each week to be completed on a quarterly basis. It is hoped this will eliminate the hit and miss procedure of inexperienced stock clerks making the decisions as to when to place replenishment orders. This should reduce the occurrences of on-hand balances being reduced to zero before a replenishment order is placed.¹

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VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS

The First Battalion of the Vietnamese Marines experienced a high level of combat activity during April. From 5 to 11 April they were deployed to the DaNang Airfield as part of Task Force Alfa. On 11 April, the First Battalion was airlifted to Quang Ngai to participate in Operation NEVADA, a joint U.S./Vietnamese operation. Under operational control of the 2nd ARVN Division, the First Battalion accounted for five Viet Cong killed prior to termination of the operation on 18 April. On 21 April they swept back into action, this time with the Vietnamese Fifth Airborne Battalion. On a two day search and destroy operation near Quang Ngai, 150 Viet Cong were confirmed killed with advisors estimating another 300 killed by artillery. In addition, one 81mm mortar, four 75mm recoilless rifles, small arms and equipment were captured. Five Marines were killed in action and 30 Marines were

¹Senior Supply Center Advisor Report, April 1966, p. 1.

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wounded. The First Battalion remained in Quang Ngai on static security for the remainder of the month.

The Second and Third Battalions were also deployed to DaNang Airfield because of political unrest in that area. They remained there until 12 April, then returned to their base camp in Saigon. For the duration of April, they were on security in the Capital Military Region, conducting one search and destroy operation south of Saigon.

The Fourth and Fifth Battalions participated in Operation JACK STAY from 3 to 6 April. The Fourth Battalion was deployed by helicopters to the Long Thanh Peninsula, twice making contact with the enemy. Two Viet Cong were confirmed killed, one wounded and one weapon captured. There were no Marine casualties. The Fifth Battalion conducted a series of four amphibious landings, utilizing VNN RAG craft, in the vicinity of An Thit Village. There was no contact with the enemy. The Fourth and Fifth Battalions spent the remainder of the month in the Capital Military Region. Here they accounted for two Viet Cong killed, seven small arms captured and a quantity of food and equipment captured and destroyed during one search and destroy operation and one daylight ambush.

During one operation south of Saigon on the Cui Village River, the Marines utilized the new Dong Ngai boats to transport one battalion across rivers and down streams. The Dong Ngai boat is fourteen feet long, of fiberglass construction, with a

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draft of 26 inches fully loaded. It is powered by a forty horsepower outboard engine and is capable of carrying eight combat loaded Marines at a speed of 20 knots. At present, there is one boat platoon of 50 boats ready for use. The speed, capacity, and handling capabilities were evaluated as excellent and it is likely that future operations in the Rung Sat Special Zone and similar areas will involve the use of Dong Ngai boats.¹

Unit morale within the WMC remained high during April, and its leadership was knowledgeable and effective. The majority of operations were executed with enthusiasm and a good grasp of tactics, although coordination and control in dense jungle and swamp areas left something to be desired.²

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES

The Vietnamese Navy Hospital Ship Hat Giang (LSMH 400) deployed on 20 April for the Mekong Delta. From 23 April to 27 April she operated at Long Phu District (Coastal Group 36) in Ba Xuyen province; and from 28 April to 30 April at Tra On District, Vinh Binh Province. Approximately 1600 people received medical treatment and 175 people were administered dental care. Civic action material was distributed to 450 needy families in both areas. In addition, a Cultural Platoon was embarked to give performances of folk dances

¹Senior Marine Advisor Monthly Historical Summary, April 1966, p. 3.

²Ibid.

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and music. Two Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) broadcasts were conducted. The ship is due to remain in the Delta until the middle of May, return to Saigon for a ten day rest and replenishment, and then return to continue its civic action programs.

Over 22 tons of civic action materials were received during April from CARE, Catholic Relief Society and USAID for further distribution to units in the field for their civic action projects.¹ This quantity is somewhat lower than in previous months due to the inability of ships carrying the material to get into Saigon to offload. It is anticipated that these ships will start off-loading about the first week in May.

A combined Medical/PsyWar/Civic Action Team worked at Tam Thon Hiep in the Rung Sat Special Zone from 3 April to 6 April in support of Vietnamese Marines participating in Operation JACK STAY. Approximately seven tons of civic action materials were distributed to the needy in the village and 175 persons received medical treatment. Another combined civic action/psywar team was scheduled to fly to Tuy Hoa/Song Cau to continue work at the refugee settlement, but the trip was cancelled when transportation became unavailable after the mortaring of Tan Son Nhut Airfield. A team is scheduled to visit the settlement during May.

One child from the Rung Sat Special Zone and two from Saigon had successful cleft lip operations and two children previously

¹See Appendix II for a breakdown of the distribution of civic action and PsyWar materials.

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operated on for cleft lip had successful palate operations. The father of a fourteen year old girl operated on for cerebral palsy in January reported that his daughter is now walking very well.

In a special project in conjunction with JUSPAO, the VNN Psywar Bureau produced 10,000 special posters depicting the new Rung Sat Special Zone and Long Tau River security regulations. These were distributed to the Rung Sat Special Zone and the four surrounding provinces for posting.

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Status, Responsibilities and Tasks of Commander U. S. Naval
Forces, Vietnam, CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 5440.11

Ref: (a) JCS Pub 2

(b) General Order 19

1. Purpose. To define the terms of reference for Commander U.S.

Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV) as a uni-service commander.

2. Command and Operational Control. (As defined in paragraph
30201 and 30202 of reference (a)):

a. Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam is under the operational
control (OPCON) of Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
and under the command (less OPCON) of the Commander in Chief, U. S.
Pacific Fleet.

b. Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam exercises OPCON over
Naval Support Activity DaNang, Naval Support Activity Saigon and
their outlying detachments.

c. Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam commands the Naval
Advisory Group, Vietnam.

3. Geographical Boundaries. The limits of Commander U.S. Naval
Forces, Vietnam area of responsibilities are the geographical
boundaries of the Republic of Vietnam and the territorial waters
thereof.

4. Mission. Under the Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet,
Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam shall:

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of Naval History on 2/5/79, as per by
[Signature] [Initials]
accordance with [Circular Seal]

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Military Assistance Command, Vietnam in accordance with paragraph 30201 of reference (a).

b. Perform area coordination functions in Vietnam for purely naval matters in accordance with reference (b).

c. Perform such other Navy functions and assume such responsibilities directly connected with Vietnam as may be assigned by Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

5. Tasks. Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam under Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet performs the following tasks:

a. All of the functions of Naval Component Commander which are described in paragraph 30232 of reference (a) and which are a responsibility of a component commander to his service chief i.e., communications, internal discipline, training (readiness) tactics, service intelligence, and logistic functions normal to the component except as otherwise noted.

b. Naval communications and the coordination thereof, where necessary, with the appropriate unified command chain.

c. Plan for and coordinate naval base development planning with EVN.

d. Plan for, program, construct and operate port/beach facilities, depots and ancillary facilities including roads and bridges in I Corps Tactical Zone which are not included within the boundaries of an installation funded for and operated by another component commander.

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of Naval History on 3/5/79, action by
26 Naval Historical Center in
accordance with OPNAVINST 5510.1

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam on all naval matters less air and amphibious planning/coordination with Commander SEVENTH Fleet and less matters relating to employment of III MAF.

f. Provide NMCB support to III MAF.

[Faint, mostly illegible text, possibly a list of instructions or a report body]

Declassified by authority of the Director of Naval History on 2/5/79, action by [signature] Naval Historical Center in accordance with OPNAVINST 5510.1

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APPENDIX I

Status, Responsibilities and Tasks of Commander U. S. Naval
Forces, Vietnam, CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 5440.11

Ref: (a) JCS Pub 2

(b) General Order 19

1. Purpose. To define the terms of reference for Commander U.S.
Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV) as a uni-service commander.

2. Command and Operational Control. (As defined in paragraph
30201 and 30202 of reference (a)):

a. Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam is under the operational
control (OPCON) of Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
and under the command (less OPCON) of the Commander in Chief, U. S.
Pacific Fleet.

b. Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam exercises OPCON over
Naval Support Activity DaNang, Naval Support Activity Saigon and
their outlying detachments.

c. Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam commands the Naval
Advisory Group, Vietnam.

3. Geographical Boundaries. The limits of Commander U.S. Naval
Forces, Vietnam area of responsibilities are the geographical
boundaries of the Republic of Vietnam and the territorial waters
thereof.

4. Mission. Under the Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet,
Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam shall:

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a. Serve as Naval Component Commander for Commander U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam in accordance with paragraph 30201 of reference (a).

b. Perform area coordination functions in Vietnam for purely naval matters in accordance with reference (b).

c. Perform such other Navy functions and assume such responsibilities directly connected with Vietnam as may be assigned by Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

5. Tasks. Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam under Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet performs the following tasks:

a. All of the functions of Naval Component Commander which are described in paragraph 30232 of reference (a) and which are a responsibility of a component commander to his service chief i.e., communications, internal discipline, training (readiness) tactics, service intelligence, and logistic functions normal to the component except as otherwise noted.

b. Naval communications and the coordination thereof, where necessary, with the appropriate unified command chain.

c. Plan for and coordinate naval base development planning with RVN.

d. Plan for, program, construct and operate port/beach facilities, depots and ancillary facilities including roads and bridges in I Corps Tactical Zone which are not included within the boundaries of an installation funded for and operated by another component commander.

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e. Act as the single point of contact for Commander U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam on all naval matters less air and amphibious planning/coordination with Commander SEVENTH Fleet and less matters relating to employment of III MAF.

f. Provide NMCB support to III MAF.

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APPENDIX II

Civic Action and PsyWar Material distributed during April:

1. 27.5 tons of welfare material were made available for distribution by Vietnamese and U.S. personnel.
2. Over one ton of material was distributed to the families of VNN personnel who had their homes destroyed by fire in Saigon; and over $\frac{1}{2}$ ton was distributed to special VNN dependent welfare cases.
3. 7.5 tons was distributed to Rung Sat Special Zone Headquarters for use in their civic action program.
4. 3.5 tons was given to U.S. construction battalion teams for use with refugees at Tay Ninh.
5. 15 tons of welfare material and 1200 pounds of medicine were sent with LSMH 400 on its deployment to the Mekong Delta.
6. The PsyWar Bureau issued 22,900 magazines, 52,400 posters, and 91,500 leaflets to Vietnamese and U.S. units for further distribution.
7. 40,000 safe-conduct passes were issued for use during Operation JACK STAY.
8. 100 Vietnamese-English language books were distributed for use by MARKET TIME units in their language teaching and learning programs.

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APPENDIX III

Totals for First Nine Months of MARKET TIME:

TOTAL FOR FIRST SIX MONTH PERIOD ENDING 31 JAN 1966

<u>DATE</u>	<u>INSPECTED</u>	<u>BOARDED & SEARCHED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>JUNKS DETAINED</u>	<u>PERS DETAINED</u>
31 Jan 66	25,764	14,184	29,948	UNKNOWN	933

TOTAL FOR THREE MONTH PERIOD ENDING 1 MAY 1966

6 Feb 66	2,048	1,893	3,941	34	126
13 Feb 66	1,455	1,514	2,969	7	72
20 Feb 66	2,135	2,067	4,202	6	59
27 Feb 66	2,400	1,915	4,315	8	83
6 Mar 66	2,726	2,456	5,182	27	184
13 Mar 66	1,917	2,429	4,346	10	133
20 Mar 66	2,574	3,171	5,745	15	142
27 Mar 66	2,067	2,849	4,916	6	74
3 Apr 66	2,141	2,206	4,347	9	72
10 Apr 66	2,557	3,094	5,651	13	123
17 Apr 66	3,665	3,503	7,168	15	115
24 Apr 66	2,824	3,388	6,212	27	171
1 May 66	3,956	5,067	9,023	12	206
	<u>32,465</u>	<u>35,552</u>	<u>68,017</u>	<u>189</u>	<u>1,560</u>

TOTAL FOR NINE MONTH PERIOD ENDING 1 MAY 1966

58,229 49,736 107,965 2,493

8 May 66	3,071	3,460	6,531	11	180
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APPENDIX IV

Summary of personnel in Naval Advisory Group, CTF 115 and CTF 116

	<u>Allowed</u>	<u>On Board</u>	<u>Total</u>
NAVFORV	124	79	<u>79</u>
NAVADVGRP	810	745	<u>745</u>
GAME WARDEN			
Base and Support -	86		
Boats, Staff -	<u>198</u>		
	284	284	
LST/LSD - 356 *		<u>356</u>	
GAME WARDEN TOTAL -		640	<u>640</u>
MARKET TIME			
Base and Support -	229		
PCFs, BoatRon -	<u>573</u>		
	802	802	
5 DER @ 173 -	865		
6 MSO @ 62 -	372		
1 MSC @ 33 -	33		
2 AKL @ 74 -	148		
1 YR @ 60 -	60		
1 ARL @ 190 -	<u>190</u>		
	1668 *	1668 *	
Coast Guard		425	
VP-1		<u>135</u>	
MARKET TIME TOTAL -	3030		<u>3030</u>
TOTAL NAVADVGRP, TF 115, TF 116 -			<u>4494</u>

(* = Estimate based on type allowance)

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SECRET SUPPLEMENT

NAVAL FORCES VIETNAM
MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY
APRIL 1966


DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

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POINT COMFORT INCIDENT



LEGEND:

 PT BOAT ANCHORED
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SECRET SUPPLEMENT

USCGC POINT COMFORT/Cambodian PT Boat Incident

The evening of 28 April USCGC POINT COMFORT was on a routine patrol in area nine in the proximity of Hon Son, a small island close to the Cambodian Border. At about 2100 POINT COMFORT inspected junks anchored near the island. Inspection revealed these to be Vietnamese Navy junks. While proceeding to check several other junks in the same area she visually detected what appeared to be a bow wave of an approaching surface unit. A definite radar contact was picked up at a range of four miles closing POINT COMFORT on a reciprocal course. At first this was thought to be another Vietnamese Navy unit.

At 2123 POINT COMFORT received a flashing light challenge "AA", causing POINT COMFORT to re-evaluate the contact as a possible Vietnamese Navy Fleet Command ship (Vietnamese Navy junks have no signal gear, and Fleet Command ships often substitute the international "AA" challenge for the standard VNN/USN recognition signals). As the two vessels passed abeam at a range of 1000 yards, POINT COMFORT challenged using the standard VNN/USN challenge. No reply was received. At the same time the executive officer was able to examine the contact using the Starlight Scope night visual aid, determining the silhouette to be a Cambodian PT boat of a class previously seen in the border waters.

At 2125, immediately after passing abeam, a tracer round

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passed directly over POINT COMFORT, followed at five second intervals by three additional rounds. POINT COMFORT stated that this was forty millimeter fire, apparently directed about 200 feet overhead. POINT COMFORT went to general quarters and maintained her course away from the Cambodian. The PT boat soon changed course and proceeded deep into Cambodian waters. No further contact was made.

The next morning USCGC POINT BANKS observed a Cambodian PT boat of the 78-foot HIGGINS class anchored in the general area of the incident (see chart). This was the same type that had fired on POINT COMFORT.

Both the POINT COMFORT and the Cambodian PT boat were operating in Republic of Vietnam territorial waters, within the Republic of Vietnam Defensive Sea Area. At no time during the incident did POINT COMFORT violate the line of demarcation between Republic of Vietnam and Cambodian territorial water, nor did she take any action which might be construed as hostile or provocative, merely having issued a standard flashing light challenge. At the same time, the Cambodian committed a hostile, provocative act within the Defensive Sea Area of the Republic of Vietnam.¹

Commander in Chief, Pacific has recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a formal protest be lodged with the Royal Cambodian Government.² The American Embassy, Saigon has sent

¹JCS msg 8781, 162317Z Dec 65 (TS), Defines the boundary of the RVN Defensive Sea Area, and promulgates rules of engagement for MARKET TIME units. CINCPAC msg 122223Z Apr 66 (S), proposes adopting the slightly different VNN Patrol Boundary for simplicity and better VN-US coordination.

²CINCPAC msg 030040Z May 66 (S).

a concurrent recommendation to the Secretary of State.¹ It is felt that failure to make this protest could encourage Cambodian units to engage in similar acts in the future.

¹American Embassy, Saigon msg 020840Z May 66 (S).