

X

AIR FORCE PACIFIC FLEET
FIGHTER SQUADRON SIXTY THREE
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

VF-63/A9-2
KTW:jmm
Serial: 411

AUG 15 1951

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
(Attn: Aviation History and Research Section)

Subj: Historical Report, forwarding of

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTR 575.2

Encl: (1) Subject named report for the period 1 January -
30 June 1951

1. In compliance with reference (a), the Historical Report for the period 1 January 1951 to 31 July 1951 of Fighter Squadron SIXTY THREE is forwarded herewith.

F. J. Ball

HISTORICAL REPORT
OF
FIGHTER SQUADRON SIXTY THREE
1 January 1951 to 30 June 1951

LTJG [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] USNR
HISTORICAL OFFICER

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

CHRONOLOGY

1. LCDR Thomas J. BALL, USN, Commanding 12 February 1950 to date.
2. Fighter Squadron SIXTY THREE attached to CARRIER AIR GROUP TWO, under operational and administrative control of Commander, FLEET AIR ALAMEDA, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE PACIFIC FLEET.
3. Temporarily based ashore at A.L.F. SANTA ROSA, CALIFORNIA.
4. 1 January 1951 to 29 March 1951, temporarily based aboard the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) in the Japan Sea.
29 March 1951 to 9 June 1951, temporarily based aboard the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) in the Japan Sea.
9 June 1951 to 30 June 1951 temporarily based ashore at N.A.S. ALAMEDA, CALIFORNIA.
5. None
6. 29 March 1951 - "Operation Mix-up" - For, what is believed to be, the first time in the history of Naval Aviation, carrier air groups exchanged ships in a foreign port. CVG-2 transferred from the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) to the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) while CVG-11 moved from the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) to the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45). Considering the limited time, lack of adequate facilities, number of personnel involved and the large amount of equipment transferred this move was a success in all respects.

18 April 1951 ENS ██████████ ██████████, USNR, while in a low strafing run, hit high tension lines approximately five miles northeast of ORO-RI, KOREA. The lines went through the propeller slashed through the windscreen, ripped off the canopy, struck and removed Ensign ██████████'s crash helmet and on to remove the greater portion of the fin and rudder. He safely parachuted to the ground and signalled his position to his teammates overhead using the recognition signal mirror. Ensign ██████████'s rescue was facilitated and made successful by the "heads-up" thinking of his teammates. Thoroughly briefed on rescue procedures, they contacted the rescue helicopter from the U.S.S. Manchester (CA-83) and the rescue was made approximately one and one half hours later.

Ensign ██████████'s rescue is remarkable in three separate aspects: First, the high tension lines struck his helmet, just above the position of his temples. The helmet saved him from severe injuries if not death by deflecting the lines; Second, the altitude at which he bailed out is not known. Considering the type of attack being made, the fact that he struck high tension lines and that he had no control of

his aircraft, it was very low. It can best be judged by the fact that as he felt the shock of his parachute opening, his feet touched the ground; Third, Ensign [REDACTED] parachuted into an area which contained a large number of enemy troops. His rescue was effected under intense small arms fire.

24 April 1951. Ensign Clarence E. WEST, USN, was killed in action east, southeast of the Hwachon Reservoir while flying a close air support mission. Ensign West entered a napalm run from which he did not recover. His attack was successful; however, he was evidently mortally wounded while in the run as no attempt to recover was made.

19 May 1951. LTJG William R. BALL, USN, was killed in action while flying a close air support mission ten miles northeast of HONGCHON, KOREA. The exact cause of his death is not known. He abandoned his aircraft without making a transmission to indicate the nature of his emergency. His parachute opened and he was observed to touch the ground. He made no attempt to rise, remove his helmet and seek cover. It is surmised that he was killed by small arms fire as he descended in his parachute as he was forced to abandon his aircraft over a large concentration of enemy forces.

23 May 1951. LT Henry H. OSBORNE was declared missing in action when he failed to return from an armed reconnaissance mission near KOKSAN, NORTH KOREA. He made an unobserved strafing run and, from what is known from the few transmissions made, was forced to abandon his aircraft due to an emergency not specified. The wreckage of his aircraft was located; however, no trace of LT Osborne could be discovered. A thorough search of the vicinity neglected to reveal that any effort to signal rescue aircraft was made.

30 May 1951. The U.S.S. Philippine Sea (CV-47) was relieved on the "Line" and proceeded to Yokosuka, Japan to off load supplies in preparation to depart for CLUSA. This marked the end of the second tour of this squadron in the Korean Theater.

5 June 1951. CAPT Ira A. HOBBS, USN, Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Philippine Sea awarded the Air Medal with one star to the following pilots of Fighter Squadron SIXTY THREE for missions performed over KOREA: LCDR [REDACTED] LT [REDACTED] LT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] LTJG [REDACTED] LTJG [REDACTED] LTJG [REDACTED] LTJG
[REDACTED] LTJG [REDACTED] LTJG [REDACTED] LTJG [REDACTED] LTJG
[REDACTED] LTJG [REDACTED] LTJG [REDACTED] ENS [REDACTED]
ENS [REDACTED] ENS [REDACTED] ENS [REDACTED] ENS [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ENS [REDACTED] ENS [REDACTED] ENS [REDACTED] ENS [REDACTED]

A letter of commendation was awarded to the following personnel for meritorious service; LT [REDACTED] LTJG [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ADC, [REDACTED] AOC, and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] AD3.

9 June 1951. The U.S.S. Philippine Sea (CV-47) docked at N. A. S. Alameda, California. The squadron was off-loaded and moved into quarters aboard N. A. S. Alameda.

NARRATIVE

1. This squadron has just returned from its second tour in the Korean Theater. An evaluation of operational procedures and experiences show that the training and operational requirements, as outlined in enclosure (1) to the Historical Report for the period 1 July 1950 to 31 December 1951 of the squadron, still apply. One recommendation made in this letter was that an Intelligence Officer be assigned to each squadron. During this last tour, an Intelligence Officer, trained in gathering and disseminating pertinent information and in de-briefing, was assigned to this squadron. The operational effectiveness of this squadron showed marked improvement. An evaluation of Air Intelligence on the squadron level is made in appendix (1).
2. The MK II immersion suit is unsatisfactory, (VF-63 RUDM 7-51). This suit was required on all flights as water temperatures averaged forty degrees fahrenheit. The effectiveness of this suit as an aid to survival is indisputable, however, the discomfort and decreased efficiency of the pilot should and could be considered. The design of the suit should be modified in the following respects: (1) The suit is too bulky, it should conform more to the shape of the body. (2) The feet should be made on the order of stockings which would eliminate much uncomfortable folding under of excess material in the shoe. If this is not practicable, attach the leg of the suit to a sturdy water proof boot. (3) The material from which the suit is made is too fragile. The suit should be sufficiently strong to withstand any catching that maybe encountered during a bailout.
3. The effectiveness of the crash helmet is once more demonstrated by the circumstances surrounding Ensign [REDACTED]'s remarkable rescue. While at the present no directives require that aviator piloting F4U-4 aircraft wear crash helmets, it is squadron doctrine that they be worn. Ensign [REDACTED] was wearing the new type H-3 crash helmet when his accident occurred.
4. Expecting the loss of many "old" pilots and the influx of "new" pilots, much consideration was given to an effective method of indoctrinating the new pilots during the cruise back to CLUSA. Emphasis was placed on simplicity and thoroughness. A series of lectures and examinations was prepared to familiarize the new pilot with all aspects of the squadron organization, tactical procedures, and the aircraft assigned. (Appendix (2)). A familiarization syllabus was prepared which prepares the new pilot to effectively participate in squadron operations at the end of twenty five hours in type (Appendix (3)).

As each pilot reports to the squadron he is assigned a "buddy" pilot. It is the "buddy" pilots responsibility to see that the "new" pilot has the required lectures and examinations and follows the form syllabus. He answers all questions concerning the squadron and in general helps the new pilot find his place in the squadron. In this manner, the haphazardness that is all too prevalent in checking out pilots is prevented. The check-out is

written down and only one person is responsible to the Commanding Officer to see that this program is carried out. This program has been in effect for only one month, however, the results are marked. The period of time during which the new pilot must integrate himself with in the squadron has been measurably shortened.

APPENDIX

1. Air Intelligence on the Squadron Level
2. Lectures and Examinations
3. Familiarization Syllabus
4. Group Picture of Officers Attached to VF-63
5. Resume of Damages and Casualties Inflicted by VF-63
6. Presentation of Award to ENS [REDACTED], USNR

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**COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON AIR INTELLIGENCE ON
THE SQUADRON LEVEL**

GENERAL COMMENTS:

1. The best procedure for squadron use in disseminating and gathering combat information from pilots on accomplishments and observations made while over the target area is informal briefing and de-briefing. This procedure gives the squadron Intelligence Officer an excellent opportunity to become acquainted with his pilots, to know their personalities, tendencies to be factual, to exaggerate or minimize reports and thereby evaluate information obtained from them. In turn it gives the pilots an opportunity to know their Intelligence Officer and rely on the information he disseminates.

2. The system of an Air Group Intelligence Officer coordinating and directing the activities of the squadron Intelligence Officers, assembling and disseminating all information in a central location has proved to be excellent. This procedure insured the maximum dissemination of all pertinent information, the minimum dissemination of improper and incorrect information, and a free exchange of timely target information between squadrons.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Sufficient space should be allotted to the Intelligence Officer for the following essentials.

- 1) Files, including
 - a) Enemy activity, including air, sea, and ground.
 - b) Potential of enemy
 - c) Friendly air services activities and experiences
 - d) Information on target areas
 - e) Information copies of all de-briefs
 - f) Disposition, composition of Allied Forces

The items as listed above are a fraction of readily accessible information which must be available for maximum efficient briefing of pilots.

- 2) Complete sets of maps of target areas and storage facilities for same.
- 3) Pilot de-briefing

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This is most effectively accomplished in a quiet room in the immediate vicinity of the ready room where distractions are held to a minimum and all maps, etc. are readily accessible for reference by the pilots. This is particularly important as pilots are the major source of our combat information.

- 4) Facilities for proper storage of classified information (maps, target dossiers, area briefs, etc.). This should be in the squadron intelligence room in order that pilots may constantly and easily refer to it. In order to familiarize each pilot with the over-all picture of the job he is performing and related problems so that he may become more efficient in evaluating and interpreting what he sees, classified intelligence publications should be readily accessible to him. This information placed in a safe in an obscure portion of the ship is "dead" information and thus the entire purpose in publishing it is negated.

2. Pilots should be indoctrinated in intelligence procedures and requirements during Phases One and Two of the training of a carrier squadron as well as in flight tactics, gunnery, etc. Many unpleasant incidents that have occurred upon the arrival of new Air Groups to the Korean Theatre, even with experienced intelligence officers such as attacks on friendly forces, might possibly have been avoided. To accomplish this would require that experienced Intelligence Officers be permanently attached to each squadron and that he maintain an active intelligence program throughout the entire training period.

It is felt that each pilot should have a thorough knowledge of the following intelligence information before an Air Group departs for the forward areas:

- a) Terrain of expected areas of action
- b) Weather to be encountered
- c) Methods of camouflaging supplies, troops and vehicles
- d) Training in detection of camouflage
- e) What types of information are desired which will result in good intelligence coverage.
- f) General characteristics and habits of enemy personnel.
- g) Military tactics of expected enemy.
- h) Types of anti-aircraft fire expected, type weapons and effective range.
- i) Maps of type in current use to facilitate training and familiarization so that targets may be pinpointed accurately on the first mission rather than go through an otherwise almost inevitable period of area familiarization.

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3. Further consideration of items (c) and (d) above shows the obvious necessity of adequate training grounds and facilities, if any degree of effectiveness is to be obtained at the start. A program which would be mutually advantageous could be formulated in conjunction with an Army or Marine Corps camp. An area would be set aside as both a testing ground and training ground in camouflage. It should contain all materials of war such as vehicles, tanks, supplies, and field pieces. Pilots would search this area and report all camouflaged positions. In this manner not only would our pilots be trained in the art of detecting camouflaged, but ground forces could practice the art of camouflaging, and perfect it as well as evaluate new methods. With the keen competitive spirit which would inevitably arise between both units, each unit would put forth a maximum effort which in turn would result in a high quality of training. Through this training, each pilot could determine his ability to detect camouflaged equipment and positions, the commanding officer could use this relative pilot ability to aid in organizing combat teams, and the squadron Intelligence Officer would be aided later in his evaluation of pilot reports.

During this course, all types of maps and charts currently in use should be available for training, i.e., AMS maps, WAC charts, Pilotage charts, Target Approach charts, and Close Support or Gunfire Spotting charts. If possible, some foreign types of charts should be used in ground training so that pilots would be able to operate effectively with any charts which might be available in any area of operations. The Intelligence Officer should be well versed on how to get information from other branches of the Armed Forces.

4. The Squadron Intelligence Officer should know squadron operational procedure, squadron doctrine and most important, the aviators' view point. He must be able to produce information in which the pilot is interested and which an Intelligence Officer not familiar with the aviators viewpoint, would probably dismiss as not essential. This will encourage and build-up confidence in the Intelligence Officer and correspondingly the information be disseminates. Too many instances have occurred in which an Intelligence Officer with an excellent education and intelligence training has failed to gain this confidence and thereby impaired his value to the squadron.

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5. The Intelligence Officer should, during the period of training ashore, keep all of the pilots abreast of the world situation, the possible areas of conflict and present a thorough study of these areas. He should present the political, economic, and military aspects of these areas. He should know the capabilities and limitations of his organization so that he can collect information which will be of greatest benefit.

6. The Intelligence Officer should be well versed on how to get information from other branches of the Armed Forces. He should keep abreast of all military developments particularly those pertaining to aviation. This would include anti-aircraft weapons, their capabilities and limitations, tanks and their vulnerable spots, etc. The most important feature of this phase being in complete analysis, insofar as possible of enemy aircraft, operational and designed.

7. The Intelligence Officer, insofar as is practicable, should instruct the pilots in methods of escape and evasion. Particular stress should be laid on areas of possible conflict. Each new aid to escape and evasion should be carefully evaluated and if desired procured for squadron use.

SUMMARY:

The Intelligence Officer is an essential part of a smooth functioning, efficient squadron. This efficiency can only be obtained if he has sufficient time to thoroughly indoctrinate the pilots in the manner described. This training cannot be done in the forward area where time is of the essence. The Intelligence Officer in the forward area must dwell on the current aspects of the situation. He must brief on front line situations, specific targets, escape and evasion for a particular area, etc. The basic indoctrination of each pilot must take place during Phase One and Two of carrier squadron training. Maximum indoctrination will result in a more efficient fighting and heads up squadron.

F2U FAMILIARIZATION SYLLABUS

Prior to participating in regular flights with the Squadron, new pilots will complete the following syllabus under the direction and supervision of the Operations Officer.

First flight - 2 hours duration. Area check-out and familiarization by a designated squadron pilot.

Second flight - 1.5 hours duration. From take-off, go directly to altitude (6,000 to 10,000 feet). Do normal flight until feeling comfortable. Then proceed to get the "feel" of the plane by practicing slow flight. Try this with every combination of wheels, flaps and all power settings. Repeat while making turns in both directions. Stall it in all these conditions but do not spin. Recover immediately when the nose falls through. Make a note of the attitude and speeds at which stalls occurred and study them after landing. Observe engine operation closely. Refrain from aerobatics and do not make touch and go landings.

Third flight - 2 hours duration. Go to altitude, put plane in landing configuration and make simulated landings taking wave-offs. Practice slow flight. Return to field and make touch and go landings the last half of period.

Fourth flight - 2 hours duration. Review flights 1 and 2 and try some mild aerobatics, slow rolls, wing overs and a split S from 8,000 feet, noting altitude lost. Then split S and roll-out noting difference in loss of altitude.

Fifth flight - 2 hours duration. Section tactics and mild tail chase. Practice cross-unders and rendezvous.

Sixth flight - 2 hours duration. Division tactics, trying basic weave, break ups, and rendezvous.

Seventh flight - 2 hours duration. Dive angle calibration noting amount of altitude lost in recovery from various dive angles. All recoveries to be completed above 3,000 feet.

Eighth flight - 2 hours duration. Review flights 5 and 6.

Ninth flight - 2 hours duration. Type instruments in accordance with instrument syllabus.

Tenth flight - 2 hours duration. Same as flight 9.

Eleventh flight - 1.5 hours duration. Single plane aerobatics. Execute any maneuvers desired and permitted by squadron directives or applicable publications limiting maneuvers.

Twelfth flight - 2 hours duration. Review weave.

Thirteenth flight - 2 hours duration. Review syllabus and your weak points.

Fourteenth flight - 2 hours duration. Go to altitude 50,000 feet by divisions.

Appendix (3)

TARGET	DESTROYED
Buildings	264
Supply, fuel, ammunition dumps	7
Houses	586
Warehouses	6
Gun emplacements	1
Vehicles	27
Bridges	17
Railroad cars	40
Railroad track	415 feet
Barracks	14
Oxen - horses	5
Tanks	4
Railroad stations	4
Junks	3
Troops	1404*

* This is considered a very conservative figure in that these are confirmed dead. Figures could not be obtained on all close air support missions.

Ensign [REDACTED], USNR, was presented with the award of Korean Hillbilly after his rescue from enemy territory. The entire squadron took part in the party which centered around the award and cake cutting. Ensign [REDACTED] gave his squadron mates a few wise words in escape and evasion. The background is Fighting Sixty Three's ready room aboard the U.S.S. Philippine Sea (CV-47).

FIGHTER SQUADRON SIXTY THREE
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

VF-63/A9-2
KTW:JMM
Serial: 9

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FEB 26 1952

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Attn: Aviation History and Research Section)

Subj: Historical Report, forwarding of

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5750.2

Encl: (1) Subject named report for the period 1 July - 31 December 1951

1. In compliance with reference (a), the Historical Report for the period 1 July 1951 to 31 December 1951 is forwarded herewith.

Ward S. Miller
Ward S. MILLER

Copy to:
ComAirPac

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HISTORICAL REPORT

OF

FIGHTER SQUADRON SIXTY THREE

1 July 1951 to 31 December 1951

LT B. C. MC TAGGART, USNR

HISTORICAL OFFICER

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CHRONOLOGY

1. LCDR T. J. BALL, U. S. Navy, Commanding 12 February 1950 to 17 August 1951.
LT L. W. S. CUMMINS, U. S. Navy, Acting, 17 August 1951 to 20 August 1951.
LCDR Ward S. MILLER, U. S. Navy, Commanding 20 August 1951 to date.
2. Fighter Squadron SIXTY THREE attached to Carrier Air Group TWO, under operational and administrative control of Commander Fleet Air Alameda, Commander Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
3. Temporarily based ashore at N.A.L.F., Santa Rosa, California.
4. 1 July 1951 to 11 July 1951, temporarily based ashore at N.A.S., Alameda, California; 12 July to 25 November 1951 temporarily based ashore at N.A.L.F., Santa Rosa, California; 26 November 1951 to 16 December 1951, temporarily based ashore at N.A.S., San Diego, California; 17 December to 31 December 1951, temporarily based ashore at N.A.L.F., Santa Rosa, California.
5. None.
6. None.

NARRATIVE

GENERAL

The six months of this reporting period have been utilized in reforming and intensive training in preparation for the squadrons' third cruise to Korean waters. While the combat readiness of this squadron is not at the highest level desired it is felt that, in view of the circumstances under which this training was accomplished, this squadron has done exceptionally well. In order to view more clearly the problems with which this squadron was confronted, and that they may be presented in an orderly manner, each factor relating to combat readiness will be discussed separately.

FACILITIES

On 12 July 1951 this squadron was moved to NALF, Santa Rosa, California. This station had just recently reactivated and was being maintained on an extremely small monetary allowance. Facilities, while inadequate at best, could not be materially improved. Maintenance and Ordnance facilities were extremely poor. There were not adequate spaces for the shops required for proper, effective and efficient maintenance. The inevitable result of this was a considerable reduction in aircraft availability. The poor availability figures as shown in appendix (2) are not entirely contributable to this situation, however it is a major factor. While it is felt that the facilities available were used to the best possible advantage, effective pilot training depends to a great degree upon aircraft availability, and therefore it is considered that proper maintenance and ordnance facilities must be provided.

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AIRCRAFT

The squadron was tentatively assigned F9F-2 aircraft by OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3110.2 and during the period 14 September to 28 September actually received a total of eight such aircraft. Intensive ground school training was conducted for both pilots and maintenance personnel in preparation for the transition to jets. It is felt that in view of the number of jet aircraft aboard during that period, the number of hours flown and the availability achieved reflect the high degree of effectiveness of this training. Because of a severe F9F production lag and of a critical spare parts shortage the F9F-2 aircraft were replaced by F4U-4 aircraft. The F4U-4 planes were in deplorable condition. There were many service changes to be incorporated and maintenance due to replacement of worn parts was excessive. This in no small measure accounts for the low availability of aircraft during this period.

MAINTENANCE

The availability figures shown in Appendix 2 do not reflect a true picture of the capabilities of the maintenance organization of this squadron. The major factors resulting in this low availability, some which have been mentioned previously; were; lack of adequate facilities; the poor condition of the aircraft; lack of adequate material support; and loss of highly skilled personnel. The first two items have been discussed in preceding paragraphs and it is not felt that further discussion is necessary. The material support was not adequate. As can be noted from the figures in Appendix 4, the average length of AOG aircraft time was 6.07 days with the largest individual length of time being 39 days. It is felt that this is an excessive figure. This is due in part to the lack of readily available parts in the Alameda area and even on the entire West Coast, which necessitated the formation of a priority system in issuance of these parts.

Loss of highly trained and skilled personnel without replacements of the same caliber obviously had a direct effect upon the maintenance organization. This was a serious situation for which there was no remedy, especially with an imminent deployment date to meet. If proper training is to be conducted, upon which aircraft availability is directly dependent, every effort should be made to ensure that units preparing for deployment have their allowed complement on board in as permanent a status as early as possible in the training period. During the month of December personnel arrived and departed from the squadron as the rate of 1.5 men per day.

A specific maintenance problem, which reflects upon the caliber of the Navy contractors involved, is of interest. An exceedingly high incidence of failures of exhaust collectors on the Pratt and Whitney R-2800-18W engine currently installed in F4U-4 aircraft. During the month of October, twenty exhaust sections failed. Other squadrons reported similar failure rates. Operating and line maintenance measures were taken to reduce the number of failures without success. A Report of Unsatisfactory and Defective Material by the squadron resulted in an investigation of annealing treatment used. The annealing treatment was found to be faulty.

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TRAINING

In the process of reforming, eight pilots were received from the Training Command. The high caliber of these pilots is noteworthy. They succeeded in adjusting themselves to squadron doctrine easily and thus were readily integrated. While a true estimate of the effectiveness of the squadron indoctrination and training program is difficult, it has been noted by experienced pilots that the period of time required for indoctrination and attainment of an acceptable state of combat readiness had been materially reduced. Excellent tactical and operational performance is evidenced by relatively high weapons scores, as shown in Appendix 1.

The period of most intensive and productive training was the two weeks spent at NALF, Fallon, Nevada. The excellent facilities and weather allowed maximum utilization of the training period.

After completion of this period at NALF, Fallon, on 16 November 1951, weapons training was forced into the background, and emphasis was placed on preparation for night carrier qualifications aboard ship. During the last month and a half of this reporting period only 14 missions were flown in weapons training. The value of a night qualification program is not readily understood as night carrier qualification is considered to be a minor part of the combat readiness of a day fighter squadron, especially when a deployment date to the combat zone is imminent. It is felt that this time could have been far better spent in weapons training.

Close air support training was emphasized as much as possible in the circumstances as outlined above. The pilots reporting in to the squadron with no previous experience in close air support work were sent to the Amphibious Training Command, Pacific Fleet, for the Tactical Air Support Course. This course instructed these pilots in close air support organization and procedures. With these fundamentals, the squadron then utilized the impact area at NALF, Fallon, Nevada to provide actual air support training. In conjunction with the close air support program, the Intelligence Officer used this phase of training to good advantage. Using aerial photographs, charts, and his personal observation of the impact area, he located each target. Using vehicle tracks left by maintenance personnel estimated the amount and type of simulated enemy activity within the area. After a thorough pre-flight briefing, each flight was sent to the impact area where targets were hit as designated by the tactical air controllers. After the completion of each mission, the Intelligence Officer thoroughly interrogated each flight. Target data thus obtained was compared with targets known to be in the area, and the pilots report modified accordingly. It is felt that this training is of great value in that it should result in more reliable and accurate pilot reports, once in a forward area such as Korea.

With respect to training for the transition to jet type aircraft ^{it} is noteworthy that during the fourteen day period in which F9F-2s¹ were assigned to this squadron, a total of 86.8 pilot hours were flown, without incident with an average daily availability of four aircraft. Previous estimates, opinions and performance are confirmed that with short but intensive training a combat experienced propeller squadron can readily make the transition to jet type aircraft.

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APPENDIX

1. Training Statistics.
2. Aircraft Availability
3. Ordnance Expenditures
4. Logistics

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TRAINING STATISTICS

1 July - 31 December 1951

Total Flight Time:

F4U-4	3814.1
F9F-2	86.8
Total	3900.9

Flight Hours Per Pilot

110.9

Syllabus Hours

Familiarization	239.3
Weapons	1050.6
Field Carrier Landing Practice	303.2
Day	
Night	67.1
Carrier Operations	110.4
Instruments	666.2*
Tactics	408.2
Day	
Night	128.3

PILOT QUALIFICATIONS

	Outstanding	Excellent	Good	Satisfactory	Unqual.
Gunnery	7.15%	25.0%	7.75%	35.8%	14.3%
Strafing	75.0%	17.8%	3.6%	3.6%	0%
Glide Bombing	7.15%	57.15%	35.7%	0%	0%
Rockets	25.0%	71.5%	3.5%	0%	0%

Valid Instrument Cards 89%

* Includes Instrument Training in SNB.

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APPENDIX I

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AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY

	Average Number A/C on Board	Type	% Available	% Available Loss Due AOG
July	2	F4U-4	100%	0
August	6	F4U-4	83%	8%
September	3	F9F-2	56%	40%
	10	F4U-4	64%	17%
October	13	F4U-4	60%	29%
November	23	F4U-4	57%	22%
December	22	F4U-4	61%	18%

Percent Available based on $\frac{\text{Total Hours available}}{\text{Total Aircraft Hours}}$

Percent Loss Due to AOG based on $\frac{\text{Hours Loss Due AOG}}{\text{Total Aircraft Hours}}$

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ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES

Type	Expended	Allowed*
50 Caliber	75,198	156,000
Shotgun Shells	1,350	4,500
Minature Bombs	2,259	3,750
100# G.P.	55	60
500# G.P.	26	15
1,000# G.P.		15
100# W.S.F.		840
500# W.S.F.		30
1,000# W.S.F.	16	15
SCAR	1284	5460
HVAR	270	150
ATAR 11.75		75
Rocket		15
Napalm	30	15

* Allowance Based on 30 Pilots and Represents Half of That Allowed for Full Year.

~~SECRET~~



MATERIAL STATISTICS

STATISTICS FOR PERIOD 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 1951

Gallons Aviation Fuel Consumed	355,490
Gallons/Flight Hour	91.1
Gallons Lubricating Oil Consumed	6,624.85
Average Time AOG	6.07 Days
Longest Period AOG	39.00 Days

DECLASSIFIED

APPENDIX IV

~~SECRET~~
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~