



Address Reply to

Refer to No.  
VF-63/A9-1

FFB:br

Serial: ~~011~~ 011

AIR FORCE ATLANTIC FLEET  
FIGHTING SQUADRON SIXTY-THREE  
Care of Fleet Post Office  
New York, New York

JUL 27 1950

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron SIXTY THREE.  
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Aviation History Unit).

Subj: Semi-annual Historical Report for period 1 January 1950 -  
30 June 1950.

Ref: (a) AGL 18-49.

Encl: (1) Subject report.

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.

DEPARTMENT OF NAVY - OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
91C 1-2-54

T. J. Hall

Address Reply to   
Refer to No.

AIR FORCE ATLANTIC FLEET  
FIGHTING SQUADRON SIXTY-THREE  
Care of Fleet Post Office  
New York, New York



**DECLASSIFIED**

CHRONOLOGY:

1. Commanding Officers: LCDR Malcolm W. CAGLE, USN, 27 July 1948 to 13 February 1950. LCDR Thomas J. BALL, USN, 13 February 1950 to date.
2. No Changes.
3. No Changes.
4. No Changes.
5. Not Applicable.
6. Assigned F4U-4 Aircraft.

NARRATIVE:

Fighter Squadron SIXTY THREE began 1950 with a change of aircraft type from F8F-2 to F4U-4. Having helped to work the "bugs" out of the Bearcat, we were reluctant to part with them, especially in exchange for Corsairs. We had heard all the lurid tales of the treachery of the F4U, and some of us were slightly leary of them. After six months of heavy flying, we are convinced that there is nothing unusual in the flight characteristics of the F4U that cannot be found in other type aircraft. It is a safe reliable fighter as long as the pilot treats it with the same respect and consideration he would have for any other type.

February 1950 brought about two changes having a direct effect on SIXTY THREE; Lieutenant Commander M. W. CAGLE was relieved by Lieutenant Commander T. J. BALL as Skipper, and Commander G. B. CAMPBELL was relieved by Commander H. S. BOTTONLEY as Commander Carrier Air Group SIX. Under their leadership Fighter SIXTY THREE has continued to improve at an enviable pace. In spite of the fact that the greater majority of the pilots are inexperienced, we came within spitting distance of a new fleet rocket record for the squadron average.

ENCLOSURE (1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Address Reply to   
Refer to No.

AIR FORCE ATLANTIC FLEET  
FIGHTING SQUADRON SIXTY-THREE  
Care of Fleet Post Office  
New York, New York



**DECLASSIFIED**

NARRATIVE (CONT'D)

The first half of 1950 brought the usual routine flights in gunnery, bombing, and rockets with group gropes, formal exercises, and fighter director controlled hops scattered through the period. Air Group SIX has been experimenting with a method to counter attacking jet aircraft in recent group gropes. There are no statistics as yet to present either for or against the idea, however, since the effectiveness is indeterminate.

Two factors have done their share in hampering the efforts of VF-63. The first has been an influx of new, inexperienced pilots into the squadron coupled with a loss of officers who were combat qualified. The second has been the confusion following the Korean Incident. The latter, while not extreme, furnishes an indication of conditions to expect should a major crisis arise. Orders have been issued and immediately withdrawn, tentative decisions have been made only to be cancelled, and operational commitments have been planned then eliminated. Add these to the rumors always present in this type of situation, and the result borders on a mild case of chaos. We have learned by experience to wait from day to day and make no long-range personal plans.

ENCLOSURE (1)

AIR FORCE PACIFIC FLEET  
FIGHTER SQUADRON SIXTY THREE  
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

VF-63/A9-3  
KTW:rcb  
Serial: 04

DECLASSIFIED

JAN 24 1951

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Aviation History Unit)  
Subj: Semi-annual Historical Report for period 1 July 1950  
to 31 December 1950  
Ref: (a) ACL 18-49  
(b) ACL 73-50  
Encl: (1) VF-63 Historical Report  
(2) VF-63 Confidential ltr serial 03 dated 1 December 1950

1. In compliance with reference (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is  
herewith submitted.

Copy to:  
ComAirPac  
ComFairAlameda

DECLASSIFIED - GROUP 1 EXEMPT 580033  
BY 9/K DATE 1-2-91

*F. J. Ball*  
F. J. BALL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**AIR FORCE PACIFIC FLEET  
FIGHTER SQUADRON SIXTY THREE  
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**DECLASSIFIED**

CHRONOLOGY

1. Commanding Officer: LCDR Thomas J, BALL, USN, 13 February 1950 to date.
2. Attached to Air Group SIX, Air Force Atlantic Fleet, 27 July 1948 - 31 July 1950. Attached to Air Group TWO, Air Force Atlantic Fleet, 31 July 1950 - 9 August 1950. Home port changed from NAAS, Oceana, Virginia to NAS Alameda, California on 9 August 1950. Attached to Air Group TWO, Air Force, Pacific Fleet, 9 August 1950 to date.
3. 1 July - 12 August, aboard NAAS, Oceana, Virginia.  
12 August - 17 August, enroute to NAS, Alameda, California.  
23 August, Reported aboard U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)  
24 August departed United States.  
15 September, joined Task Force 77 in Yellow Sea.  
15 October, with Task Force 77 in Sea of Japan.  
23 October, departed Sea of Japan enroute to United States  
11 November, arrived NAS, Alameda, California.  
5 December, reported aboard USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45).  
6 December, departed United States.  
23 December, joined Task Force 77 in Sea of Japan.
4. Assigned F4U-4 aircraft.

NARRATIVE

During the period covered by this report, Fighter Squadron SIXTY THREE has become combat qualified. The months of peacetime training and exercise enabled the pilots to perform efficiently the missions flown in the Korean Theatre.

The month of July was spent in routine peacetime training. Every effort was made to extract the maximum of training from the Baker Allotment restrictions. The primary emphasis was placed on carrier qualifications of each pilot. At the end of July, all pilots were carrier qualified aboard the USS MIDWAY and the USS CORAL SEA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AIR FORCE PACIFIC FLEET  
FIGHTER SQUADRON SIXTY THREE  
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Refresher flights of air to air gunnery, bombing and rockets were flown. This was held to a minimum as formal exercises had just been completed during the preceding month.

On 1 August 1950, VF-63 reported to CVG-2 for operational and administrative command, for immediate deployment to the Korean Theatre. CVG-2 was composed of two original Air Group TWO fighter squadrons plus two fighter squadrons and one attack squadron of CVG-6. To coordinate and integrate these squadrons so that they would function efficiently together, we embarked in the USS CORAL SEA for a five day operational cruise on 2 August 1950.

The aircraft situation was critical. The assigned aircraft were in either the second or third service tour. The engines in ten aircraft had over 200 hours. Extensions were granted on over-age aircraft but all engines with over 200 hours had to be replaced.

This presented the problem of maintaining a sufficient number of available aircraft aboard ship for operational training and at the same time replacing engines. This problem was solved by leaving half of the maintenance crew at Oceana and ferrying aircraft to and from the ship as changes were completed.

A maximum of operational training was accomplished. Each pilot averaged five flights during this period.

On 12 August 1950, conditioning of aircraft was completed. All squadron personnel, not flying, with squadron and personal gear boarded a troop train and departed for NAS, Alameda. On 15 August the first of our aircraft departed.

This transfer was completed with only one casualty. The Commanding Officer experienced engine failure over Charleston, S.C. A successful forced landing was made at Charleston municipal airport.

The ease with which the transfer was effected is noteworthy. There were no delays due to lack of planning. Extensive preparations had been made at NAS, Alameda prior to our arrival which facilitated our transfer to the USS BOXER (CV-21).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**AIR FORCE PACIFIC FLEET  
FIGHTER SQUADRON SIXTY THREE  
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA**

**DECLASSIFIED**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On 23 August 1950, VF-63 embarked in the USS BOXER (CV-21). On the 24th of August the BOXER departed from NAS, Alameda for Pearl Harbor.

The trip to Pearl Harbor was necessitated by lack of close air support training by the Air Group. Three days were spent in intensive training in close air support on an impact area.

On the 14th of September the USS BOXER reached Sasebo, Japan. Seven hours were spent in replenishing the ship. The BOXER departed Sasebo after replenishing and rendezoused with Task Force 77 on the afternoon of 15 September in the Yellow Sea.

Our first strikes were flown on 16 September in close support of the Inchon amphibious landing. During the period 16 September to 23 October, 168 offensive missions were flown. Air Attack Reports VF-63 confidential report symbol OPREP-55-38 in CNO files. One pilot, LTJG Franklin (n) SMITH, USN, was lost at sea in a carrier landing crash during this period.

On 23 October the BOXER departed for the United States via Japan and Pearl Harbor. All aircraft still serviceable were flown off at Japan as spare aircraft for groups still operating in that area. At Pearl Harbor a group of "VIP" were picked up to be taken to the United States. One day of flight operations was scheduled to familiarize the VIP with the functions of an aircraft carrier.

The BOXER arrived at NAS, Alameda on 11 November 1950. On 15 November, fifty percent of our men and officers departed on 15 days leave.

The squadron was maintained in a leave status. Flying consisted of familiarizing eight new pilots with the area in the available aircraft.

On 2 December 1950, we received word that we were to be deployed immediately to the Korean Theatre in the USS VALLEY FORGE.

Leave was cancelled immediately. All officers and men were to report back by 0800 4 December. At that time 22% of our officers and 28% of our men were on leave. The recall efforts were effective. When the VALLEY FORGE departed on 6 December only five men were unaccounted for. All officers were aboard.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AIR FORCE PACIFIC FLEET  
FIGHTER SQUADRON SIXTY THREE  
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On the morning of 4 December, forty men were received from FASRon EIGHT. The new pilots were replaced by pilots from VF-23. A ground maintenance officer reported aboard. The need for this officer is discussed in enclosure (2) to this letter.

The aircraft situation was critical. We had three serviceable aircraft. By 5 December the squadron had received eleven aircraft from FASRon-8 and six from VF-194. Acceptance checks were not made at this time. They were made during the trip to Japan.

At 1200, 3 December, the AV USS PINE ISLAND arrived at NAS, Alameda. All squadron personnel, gear and personal gear was loaded aboard. At 1200, 4 December, the PINE ISLAND departed for San Diego. On 5 December, the aircraft were flown to San Diego. On 6 December the USS VALLEY FORGE departed from San Diego.

On 16 December the VALLEY FORGE arrived in Yokosuka, Japan. The ship was replenished and on 19 December departed Yokosuka.

Two days were spent in refresher landings. The majority of the pilots had done no flying since the departure from the Korean Theatre.

On the 22nd of December the VALLEY FORGE rendezvoused with Task Force 77 in the Sea of Japan. On 23 December our first strikes were launched covering the evacuation of Hungnam. Our first casualty occurred that day. Ens. John R. BRINKLEY was killed in a crash caused by small arms fire.

From the period 23 December to 31 December, we flew 32 strikes. The lessons learned and needed changes to squadron organization and operational training were evaluated and are discussed in enclosure (2).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FIGHTER SQUADRON SIXTY THREE  
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

VF-63/A9-9  
KTW:rcb

EXC 05

DEC 1 1950

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Attn: Deputy Chief of  
Naval Operations for Air)  
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Air Group TWO  
(2) Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet  
Subj: Comments and recommendations for VF Squadrons preparing  
to be deployed to forward areas or to extended foreign  
duty

DECLASSIFIED

1. This squadron has recently completed a tour in the Korean area. It is felt that observations made during the operations will be helpful to other carrier squadrons. Therefore this letter is very respectfully submitted with comments and recommendations as seen desirable by this command.

2. The comments and recommendations have been divided into sections by departments, with an introductory paragraph covering general recommendations.

3. GENERAL

(a) The present training syllabus is in general considered satisfactory, but there are changes of a minor nature needed plus additional requirements to be filled. These changes will be covered below. Twenty-three pilots per squadron is adequate if five squadrons are to be deployed on one carrier, in addition however there should be two ground officers permanently assigned to each squadron; a ground maintenance officer and an air combat intelligence officer. A pilot as maintenance officer during intensive flight operations does not have time to fly and exercise proper supervision over maintenance of aircraft, records, and reports. The need for a non-flying air combat intelligence officer is obvious.

(b) It is believed that operations within the squadron on an aircraft carrier would be more efficient if there were only three squadrons; each squadron to have twenty four to thirty planes each and thirty to forty pilots. Ready room facilities, of which there are only three discounting Ready room two in the wardroom which is not satisfactory, would be used to better advantage.

(c) Fighter squadrons should, three months prior to departure on any extended tour, equip themselves in preparation for combat, i.e. all armor plates should be installed, W.E.P. equipment activated in all A/C, gun heaters installed, rearming drills should be emphasized, etc. Personnel priorities should be given squadrons which are in this phase, and if possible in excess of allowance, particularly of ordnance man. If called into combat, these squadrons can more quickly adjust themselves to wartime conditions.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Subj: Comments and recommendations for VF Squadron preparing to be deployed to forward areas or to extended foreign duty (con't)

4. OPERATIONS

**DECLASSIFIED**

(a) The present syllabus of offensive and defensive tactics should not be changed. The present syllabus for rocket and bombing training is satisfactory. However, less emphasis should be placed on the 40 degree glide and more on hitting from non-standard type runs, i.e. starting the runs varying speed, altitude of pushover, angle of glide or dive, altitude of release and pull-out, and direction of recovery. Bombing and rocket facilities should be improved to include an impact area and ground observers (spotters). There should be more practice with full loads using 500 lb G.P. or water-fills, and an increase in allowance of 5" HVAR. It is recommended that a minimum of 20% of all bombing and rocket training should be made with 500 lbs. G.P. or waterfall and 5" HVAR. Each pilot should, prior to a cruise, fly at least 10 hours with a maximum load i.e. full rockets, 500# bomb, full belly tank to familiarize himself with the flight characteristics of the plane, take off, acceleration, deceleration, turning radius etc.

(b) Because of the rapidly changing situation in Korea, this squadron was deployed before it could participate in scheduled close support training with the Second Marine Division at Camp LeJune in the latter part of August. In the future, close support training over natural terrain in support of ground troops displaying panels and other front line markers should be definitely emphasized in the training syllabus of all squadrons. This training should include map reading, aerial photograph reading and target evaluation. They should be trained to distinguish primitive roads from tracks, bomb craters from artillery emplacements and AA positions, and how to pick out troop movements and camouflaged installations. This training should include live runs on an impact area (mentioned above) with a ground controller thus simulating close support on firing runs.

(c) While based aboard the USS BOXER, the air group, composed of five squadrons plus VE detachments (VFN, VAN, VFP, etc), operated from three ready rooms. One ready room with two squadrons is too crowded. The same number of pilots could be handled more efficiently as one squadron.

(d) Communications on overloaded channels were very poor between strike groups, TAD, and TAC. Valuable time was lost by strike groups awaiting target assignment. On several missions the strike group did not receive a target assignment in time to make a strike and return to the ship for the scheduled landing. Armament loads were consequently dropped into the sea. The situation could at least be partially corrected by installing radios with more channels, however the true solution is better voice radio discipline.

(e) Deep support hops should be prebriefed. Maps and aerial photographs should be used extensively for the briefing.

Subj: Comments and recommendations for VF Squadrons preparing to be deployed to forward areas or to extended foreign duty (con't)

-----

The aerial photographs were not available to the squadron until after the strikes in most instances. More photo pilots and planes are needed to get a coverage of anticipated targets for the following day.

(f) Each squadron should have two "photo packages" assigned which could be attached to the bomb rack of any aircraft. The plane with the camera would then fly with the strike group on each hop and follow it over the target to get information on strike damage, (such photographs would also be extremely useful in public information work). Squadrons should have a minimum of four pilots trained in the art of taking aerial photographs. These "photo packages" would be in addition to the regularly assigned photo planes aboard (in the VD detachment) which are normally used by the Task Group Commander, and would allow these regular photo planes to get pictures of anticipated future targets when not used by him.

(g) Rocket firing and strafing were in general accurate and effective. The standard boresighting range of 900' was found to be satisfactory for strafing.

(h) Controlled intercepts were satisfactory for both CAP and TARCAP. However some of the controllers did not have the necessary equipment to obtain the altitude of the bogey.

**DECLASSIFIED**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Subj: Comments and recommendations for VF Squadrons preparing to be deployed to forward areas or to extended foreign duty. (con't)

-----

## 5. ORDNANCE

**DECLASSIFIED**

(a) Personnel shortage was one of the most critical problems. This squadron has an allowance of 7 ordnanceman. The actual compliment of ordnanceman was 11. On numerous occasions these men were required to work all night in order to properly load the planes for early morning strikes. On numerous occasions personnel from other squadrons were required to assist in loading of aircraft. This assistance was possible only because of staggered hops between squadrons otherwise it would have been impossible to have loaded the aircraft in time to meet the schedule. It is therefore recommended that in addition to the present allowance, enough men, with or without ordnance experience be assigned to bring the compliment up to one ordnanceman per plane assigned to squadrons going into action.

(b) Rockets, 5" HVAR, were consistently brought up to be loaded only to find that the lug bands were improperly aligned or spaced. This being the case it is impossible to load these rockets on the Mk5 Mod 4 launchers. It is therefore suggested that a gauge, similar to an ordinary square, be made for checking proper alignment and a spacing of  $35\frac{1}{2}$  inches on these lug bands.

(c) It was found that numerous pigtails for the 5" HVAR, having been spliced in accordance with Ord A/L 2804, were difficult to adapt for use on the Mk5 Mod 4 launchers due to varied positions of the splice. It is suggested that all splices be made at one definite spacing or that clamps be provided to make these pigtails taut when loaded on the Mk5 Mod 4 launchers. It is believed that by doing this, the difficulties to be mentioned in items (d) and (e) of this section will be reduced considerably.

(d) The latch breakage was very high on the Mk5 Mod 4 launcher, Latch ass'y No P/N-R94-FEL H 7220. It is recommended that the face of the hook bearing against the after suspension band of the rockets, be made straight thus eliminating the notch in the bottom of the hook. It is believed that when firing rockets in various attitudes or with G's on the aircraft, that the rocket lug catches on the latch thereby snapping it. In some instances breakage was as high as 100%. Limited observations were made in this squadron and in all cases, breakage was very high when rockets were fired with positive G's on the aircraft.

(e) It is recommended that the securing nuts for the rear rocket launchers, Mk5 Mod4, be reinforced on the F4U-4. Refer to VF-63 RUDM 9-50 dated 19 October 1950.

Subj: Comments and recommendations for VF Squadrons preparing to be deployed to forward areas or to extended foreign duty (con't)

(f) Numerous instances of latches releasing on the Mk5 Mod 4 launchers were noted. On almost every occasion the two inboard rockets were in the ones released. It is believed that this release was caused by firing the machine guns before firing the rockets, in which case empty cartridge cases and links were thrown against the rocket pigtails causing the latches to be tripped. Scarred places were noted on the pigtails on each occasion. It is strongly recommended that a method of manual jettison of hung rockets be devised. Experience has shown that approximately 90% of hung rockets will be detached from the launcher upon an arrested landing. This creates a serious hazard to flight deck personnel.

(g) It is recommended that a rocket loading stand, collapsible, similar to engine repair stands or a ladder, be made for loading rockets on folded wings when aboard carriers. The ladder should be built to be supported by the two lower rocket launchers or modified to suit the type plane and extended to the deck. The top of the ladder should be approx 34" wide with hooks extending 3" on either side to hook over the rocket launchers. The lower section to be spread 4 1/2 feet, with four rungs. Each F4U-4 squadron should have two.

(h) On each occasion that this squadron received replacement aircraft or replaced a damaged wing, the planes required a bore-sight. It was necessary for the squadron ordnanceman to rig their own boresighting target. It is recommended that a suitable space be selected on the hangar deck of carriers and at each place, boresighting spots be painted on the bulkheads, with jacks available. Much valuable time would be saved as a results.

(i) Using the bomb hoists available it was found that excess time was consumed in loading bombs weighing 350 lbs. or less. It is therefore recommended that a bomb rack, made on the order of an ordinary stretcher be constructed for this work. One rack of this design was constructed by VF-23 and the five men required to use this rack could load three bombs in the time required for the same number of men to load one bomb by other means.

(j) It is recommended that a change be incorporated in the installation of the gun camera in the F4U-type aircraft. This change should be such as to enable the camera to take pictures with the wide dimension horizontal.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Subj: Comments and recommendation for VF Squadrons preparing to be deployed to forward areas or to extended foreign duty (con't)

6. AIR COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

**DECLASSIFIED**

(a) An immense improvement could be made in the post-flight debriefing facilities. A separate room for this purpose to which all pilots would be required to report immediately upon landing is a must. The squadron AI officers could establish a team work system of interrogation, which would produce speedier, more accurate and more detailed information.

(b) It is further recommended that standard escape - evasion packets be designed by ONI and stocked at points of embarkation as well as in forward areas for issue to individual pilots. These packets should be of either a vest-type or a pouch to be carried on a belt. Experience shows that a pilot can not depend on sufficient time in case of a forced landing, ditching, or bail-out to collect gear from the cockpit, therefore, the packet should be on his person. It is suggested that the packets be made in two-water-proof sections: One section to contain standard equipment, including such items as a first aid kit, pocket jack knife, magnifying glass, matches, concentrated food tablets, halizone tablets, atabrine tablets, benzedrine tablets, a survival booklet, and a medical first aid pamphlet; the second section should be readily removable and stamped to indicate the area for which it was designed. This second section should contain items such as a waterproof silk map of the area, a blood chit, a short pamphlet concerning the area, a pointee-talkie, local currency, and articles of trade value. It is felt that a vest type design, with extra pockets for the incorporation of additional articles which future experience may prove necessary, would be best.

(c) It is felt that the present reporting forms (Air Attack Report, Air Combat Report, Aircraft Vulnerability Report) do not provide accurate statistics or detailed information. The figures contained in these reports (such as air speed, angle of dive, slant range, etc) are seldom more than pure guesses. The pilot can not be expected to remember these figures and is too busy during an action to write them down on a knee pad. The forms themselves are useless at the squadron level, and their value to higher echelons is doubtful since the statistics may easily present an erroneous impression and lead to faulty conclusions.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(a) Information on water injection (or any War Emergency Power conditions, jet or conventional) should be disseminated to all concerned at the earliest practicable time. This information should contain the maximum power settings, adjustments that can be made to regulators, water pumps (and corresponding equipment in jet type aircraft) etc. Furthermore, a planned schedule of depreservation, test (operational at maximum power), and re-preservation of all aircraft WEP systems should be put into effect and left in effect during peace or war (such as is done in Air Pac, AirPac TL - 26 of 15 May 1950). This would insure that the equipment was operating properly, that pilots know how to operate it, that the mechanics know how to service and repair it, and that there would be an ample flow of WEP replacement parts flowing through the supply system.

(b) The RB 19 R-2 sparkplug was used while in the forward area on recommendation of VP squadrons in CVG-5. No difficulties were experienced with this plug. Prior to that time this squadron had used the RC 34S plug and had experienced no trouble. It is recommended that regardless of the type of plugs the provisions of TO 57-45 (with regard to stowage of sparkplugs, particularly the use of a "hot box") be complied with.

(c) The problem of spare parts is always a pressing one. It is therefore recommended that when an air group is moved from one coast to the other, provisions be made for the squadrons to carry some high usage items other than gaskets, seals, etc., or that a survey be made in advance to determine if the supply system can carry the additional load. This would be necessary only in cases like the last move of this command across the continent, where the load on supply for any one type aircraft is almost doubled, with practically no warning. In spite of the known difficulties, the supply of spare parts in the Korean area was outstanding.

(d) The past operation was conducted with 16 aircraft per squadron. In the event that in future operations the squadrons continue to maintain their own aircraft, and there are 18 aircraft assigned, it is recommended that two more rated mechanics (AD) one more rated structural mechanic (AM), and three more non rated men be assigned this squadron.

(e) It is interesting to note that during periods of operations usage was much higher than on the beach, and that our overall availability was also higher. Overall aircraft availability on the beach was 77%; on this cruise 88%.

Subj: Comments and recommendations for VF Squadron preparing to be deployed to forward areas or to extended foreign duty (con't)

-----

#### 8. MATERIAL

(a) Squadrons going overseas should if possible contact the Aviation Supply Officer (ASO) of the ship and discuss anticipated needs. This was done by all squadrons on our cruise and with much success.

(b) Squadron material officer should contact the ASO and arrange for the night-check crew to be able to draw material from "ready issue" anytime at night or whenever the Material Officer is not available to sign chits. We arranged this by having our men sign temporary chits and the following morning the Material Officer would exchange the temporary chits for authorized requisition stubs. This saved many man hours trying to "hunt up" someone authorized to sign stubs.

(c) The authorized personnel for the material department is considered adequate.

(d) Due to limited storage space, the metal collapseable cruise box should be utilized exclusively.

Subj: Comments and recommendation for VF Squadrons preparing  
to be deployed to forward areas or to extended foreign  
duty (con't)

-----

#### 9. ADMINISTRATION

(a) Copies of the Navy Combat Reporting Manual should be issued to each squadron at the earliest practicable time so that the squadron personnel will know what information will be required on each flight (in addition to the ACI reports).

(b) In an area of rapidly expending U.S. forces, new commands are frequently established without word of them reaching the lower echelons, as was the case with this command when ComFairJap was formed. It is therefore recommended that ships issue promptly and continuously up to date memo's containing the latest system of communications and interested commands. This was done by the USS BOXER, and there was no further confusion nor omission of interested addresses.

#### INFORMATION COPIES TO:

CVG-1  
CVG-3  
CVG-4  
CVG-5  
CVG-6  
CVG-7  
CVG-11  
CVG-17  
CVG-19  
CVG-101  
CVG-102

T. J. BALL