


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1980



CARRIER AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING SQUADRON  
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEEN  
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601

VAW-116/024/SVR  
5750  
Ser C04

4 MAR 1981

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From: Commanding Officer, Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron  
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEEN

To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-05D2)

Subj: Command History for Calendar Year 1980 (OPNAV Report 5750-1)

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5750.12C

- Encl:
- (1) Command Mission
  - (2) The Officers and Men
  - (3) Monthly Operating/Training Reports for the months of January 1980 - December 1980
  - (4) End of Cruise Report
  - (5) AEW Excellence Award submission
  - (6) Battle Efficiency Award Data Report
  - (7) Chief of Naval Operations Safety Award submission

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) through (7) are submitted.

*M. P. Morgen*  
M. P. MORGEN

Copy to:  
CINCPACFLT  
Director of Naval History

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COMMAND MISSION

Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE HUNDRED SIXTEEN (VAW-116) is a four plane, Airborne Early Warning (AEW) squadron under the administrative control of Commander, Carrier Air Wing TWO.

VAW-116 operates the five place, twin turboprop E-2C "Hawkeye" which is capable of all-weather carrier and shore-based operations. The E-2C is 57 1/2 feet long, has an 81 foot wing span and weighs 52,000 pounds when operationally loaded. Its most distinguishing physical characteristics are its four vertical stabilizers and its 24 foot diameter, dish-shaped rotodome mounted 6 feet above the fuselage.

The five man crew consists of a pilot, co-pilot, Combat Information Center Officer (CICO), Air Control Officer (ACO) and a Flight Technician/Radar Operator. This highly skilled crew, when working as a coordinated team, can perform the following missions.

1. Airborne Early Warning (AEW), the detection of unknown air contacts closing the Task Force.
2. Tactical Aircraft Intercept Control (AIC).
3. Strike flight following/control.
4. Surface/Subsurface Surveillance Coordination (SSSC) - (includes interface with S-3A via voice and Link-11)
5. Helicopter control.
6. Aerial mining control.
7. Tactical reconnaissance aircraft control.
8. Secondary approach assistance for carrier aircraft.
9. Communications relay (automatic and manual).
10. Airborne Search and Rescue Coordination (SAR).

Enclosure [7]

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I. (U) INTRODUCTION

a. (U) The CVW-9/USS CONSTELLATION 1980 deployment found the SUN KING's returning to "CONNIE" after a 5 year absence, this time for a good hard look at our new E-2C aircraft during concentrated CV operations at sea. The 1980 Western Pacific and Indian Ocean deployment can only be considered a complete success in all respects.

b. (C) Without a doubt the single most important highlight of the deployment was the transit phase of RIMPAC 80. This exercise was conducted from 1 March through 14 March 1980 in the sea areas between Southern California and Hawaii. The objective of the exercise was to test the readiness of combined battle groups (BGs) to carry out missions against a realistic threat under simulated wartime conditions. Airborne "Orange" threats were detected and countered at ranges which allowed CONSTELLATION to make the transit covertly. Recovery aboard, day and night under EMCON conditions, was effected by CAINS using expected ship's position and DR. During the exercise our aircraft acted autonomously, providing information to several warfare commanders simultaneously while attempting to prevent conflict of interests and anticipate problems before they became unmanageable. The success of this exercise prompted COMTHIRDFLT to remark that this was the first example of a Blue BG successfully accomplishing all of the major objectives in the history of the exercise.

c. (U) The tempo of operations during the 1980 deployment was such that we did not lack for operating days. During one at-sea period, covering an incredible period of sustained operations, the SUN KINGS established a new E-2C record of 386 flight hours flown in a single month.

d. (U) Indian Ocean contingency operations allowed the squadron to operate under very realistic conditions utilizing and exercising our assets and capabilities to the limits. The requirement for a fully operational weapon system on every launch demanded an aggressive and well-planned maintenance effort. The successes of Indian Ocean operations, which included extensive war-at-sea tactics exercises, surveillance of foreign air and naval units, contingency planning, and anti-air and anti-surface warfare training, are a matter of record and were accomplished with extreme pride.

e. (U) The successful completion of this arduous deployment was the result of solid teamwork and close cooperation. CVW-9 flew together for over seven months as professionals who had integrated their individual capabilities into an efficient instrument of national will. The SUN KINGS successfully met all challenges by clearly demonstrating, daily, the deadly effectiveness of E-2C command and control.

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Review on: 11 February 1994

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## II. CRUISE OPERATIONS

a. (U) General. The return of the Sun Kings to NAS Miramar marks the end of an arduous seven and one half month deployment. Through participation in numerous exercises as well as daily real world tasking, the Sun Kings fully demonstrated the capabilities of the F-2C when manned by a highly trained and professional crew. The CONSTELLATION and CVW-9 team participated in the very rigorous RIMPAC '80, had a very brief inport break, then operated for 110 consecutive days, setting a record for WESTPAC carriers; the major at-sea portion of this period was spent in the Indian Ocean. Other operations occurred in the South and East China Seas, the Philippine Sea, and the Western Pacific off of Guam.

### b. (U) 26 February - 29 February

Following departure from San Diego, the carrier and Air Wing conducted three days of refresher CO during which all VAW-116 pilots were day and night requalified. An anticipated two days of routine cyclic operations during which system evaluation and maintenance were to be performed was cancelled and the squadron immediately went into the around-the-clock EMCON operations of RIMPAC.

### c. (U) 1-14 March, RIMPAC '80

1. (C) A multi-national exercise involving air and surface units from the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan, RIMPAC '80 proved to be unprecedented in many respects. With COMCARGRU ONE acting as ComBlue and Third Fleet as ComOrange, the primary objectives were:

(a) Blue's covert transit from San Diego to Hawaii, including an EMCON battle group rendezvous.

(b) A long range (500 miles) interdiction strike against the ORANGE "stronghold", Hawaii.

(c) Further exercise of the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept.

2. (C) RIMPAC '80 was a triumph for the BLUE forces. Although there were many contributing factors, the single most important was the strict adherence to EMCON. Throughout the exercise, ship-to-ship UHF communication was only allowed for reasons of safety; aircraft use of UHF was kept to an absolute minimum with most transmissions "in the blind". During both day and night Air Wing

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operations, shipboard TACANS and radars were secured, as were all sources of HF. The carrier did not utilize any active sensor, but relied entirely on the Sun King UHF data link for an accurate surface and air picture. Initially, the E-2C did not activate its radar, relying on the Passive Detection System (PDS) exclusively. As the exercise progressed however, the E-2C's used intermittent radar sweeps for surveillance; these were made at infrequent intervals and only while outside a 200 mile radius from the CV (the EMCON circle was later reduced as the tactical situation warranted). The PDS operated extremely well throughout, with ORANGE P-3 and ARGUS aircraft initially detected passively by the airborne E-2C.

3. (C) The Air Wing F-14's patrolled large sectors autonomously. After launch, they checked in with the Sun King crew which assigned stations via link-4. All station-keeping and fuel management tasks were handled by the individual CAP crews. The link-4 "down-link" was useful in extending the surveillance area. During contact prosecution, the E-2C provided link-4 vectors to a VID, then back to station.

4. (U) The operational philosophy used to achieve the RIMPAC '80 goals was not without attendant difficulty.

(a) (C) Normal maintenance demand made it immediately clear that a number of critical AVCAL items were not aboard. This was especially costly since the force track and EMCON operations precluded airborne logistic support. This problem continued to plague operations for the entire cruise.

(b). (C) Also apparent was the degree to which a total EMCON environment precludes critical on-deck avionics maintenance. Unless avionics discrepancies were completely isolated while airborne, little could be done besides some prudent "box-swapping" on deck. Even this degree of maintenance was hampered by "FLEX DECK" operations during daylight hours and deceptive lighting or total "darken ship" at night, the latter severely limiting flight deck work.

(c) (C) Other factors which came to light are inherent in the E-2C outfitting. On numerous prior occasions the shortage of UHF radios in the E-2C has been discussed, a problem which was vividly re-emphasized in this "No HF" environment. The requirement for UHF link-4 and link-11, AAW C/R and Fleet Air Defense nets, left only one UHF; not nearly enough for SSSC, strike control and the other communications requirements dictated by the extensive E-2C tasking. Further aggravating was the presence of interference between UHF 3, 4, and 5.

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(d) (U) During the entire RIMPAC operations, Sun King crews experienced difficulties with computer loads and with the Digital Data Recorder Reproducer (DDRR). A multitude of faults were displayed to the operators without any apparent single cause. Computer failures during EMCON operations - which rely solely on the E-2C detection capability - were devastating. The computer would fail and reprogramming was time consuming; often success came only after repeated attempts in every conceivable configuration. A request for technical assistance was initiated since local efforts could not isolate or resolve the problem. However, assistance was not available until long after completion of RIMPAC '80.

(e) (C) The CWC concept as utilized in RIMPAC, with "Alpha Romeo" and "Alpha Sierra" aboard CV-64 and "Alpha Whiskey" aboard a CG, worked reasonably well except for severely limited coordination due to the EMCON restrictions. On numerous occasions the E-2C requested "AW" to release an asset to prosecute a contact. "AW", in turn, requested that "AR" launch an alert CAP which invariably arrived in addition to a CAP launched as a "scheduled" relief. Sun King controllers frequently found themselves with 2 or 3 F-14's on hot vectors to the same contact.

5. (C) In a latter stage of the exercise, CONSTELLATION received simulated battle damage to its communications circuits. Unable to maintain a tactical picture or the necessary battle group communications, "Alpha Bravo" tasked VAW-116 to provide a Hawkeye command center on the CONSTELLATION flight deck. A Sun King crew supplemented by a ship and flag TAO used sound powered circuits to relay information to and from flag and combat spaces aboard the ship. This technique proved to be a viable option for keeping the force commander informed in the event combat casualty or communication failure occurred aboard the flagship.

6. (C) A serious requirement exists for warfare commanders to outline the authority of the E-2 crew during EMCON periods. The E-2 is often the only task force asset simultaneously capable of maintaining communications with all players and also maintaining an excellent tactical plot, even in unrestricted electronic environments; crew authority to act should be clearly delineated ahead of time.

d. (U) 19 MARCH - 08 APRIL, TRANSIT TO THE PHILIPPINES

1. (U) Immediately following departure from Hawaii, the CONNIE/CVW-9 team participated in a MISSILEX at the Barking Sand Range with the E-2C providing range clearance and back-up control. The Air Wing expended a total of 12 missiles.

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2. (C) As CONSTELLATION approached Guam on 25 March, VAW-116 encountered the first Soviet surveillance flight of the cruise. PDS cuts on a "Mushroom" radar gave initial indications of inbound aircraft. Judicious use of PDS, station adjustments, limited use of active radar and proper placement of FORCE CAP by the Sun King crew turned this into a text book example of intercept and escort. The following day, without any prior intelligence warning to the battle group, two SNA Bear "F" aircraft in total EMCON proceeded toward CONSTELLATION. A "heads up" from the distant AAW picket, USS TRUXTUN, and a rapid response by the Sun King crew led to a successful intercept. A-7 assets already airborne for SSSC under E-2 control, rather than F-14 alert CAP still on deck, were utilized by the E-2 to intercept the Bears at 170 NM and escort them inbound. Thereafter, all transiting aircraft were fully investigated by this battle group.

3. (C) After rounding the northern Luzon coast, we received our welcome-to-WESTPAC AAWEX, "Beaver Snare". The proximity of the CV to the coast (approximately 50 miles) precluded early detection of the threat. As soon as the attackers were "feet wet" they were on top of the carrier and partially hidden from the E-2C by land drag and side-lobing. Future battle groups should give consideration to passing the coast with a greater separation.

e. (U) 08 APRIL - 19 APRIL INPORT SUBIC BAY, R.P.

1. (U) The respite of port for the fly-off crews was short-lived as, on 8 April, an inbound Bear necessitated the launch of a Sun King E-2C and an F-14 from Cubi Point. The intercepted Bear subsequently turned around at the ADIZ and returned to Vietnam.

2. (U) The remainder of the inport period was quite productive. Seventeen aircrewmembers took the opportunity to attend Jungle Environment Survival Training (JEST). Numerous systems flights with a FCCDSA representative enabled the squadron to attribute computer problems experienced during RIMPAC to tape transport brake failure in high-time DDDR units. Replacement of the four failed Recorder/Reproducers in Cubi with low-time units solved the immediate hardware problem. Institution of revised squadron program re-load criteria, designed to lessen the frequency of demand on the DDDR transport, paid off during the subsequent Indian Ocean operating period: only two additional units were required.

3. (U) Meaningful system training evolutions, while based out of NAS Cubi Point, were made possible by close coordination with Patrol Wing ONE, Det Cubi. The ASW Operations Center (ASWOC), located next to Cubi Operations in an enclosed compound, is one block from the VRC-50 line. After providing a clearance list to the ASWOC, squadron personnel were permitted access into the facilities. Liaison with the ASWOC and TSC paid off handsomely

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with participation in their extensive link 11 net; additional benefits were gained through access to CRYPTO keying and secure storage facilities. Advance liaison by E-2 squadrons is strongly recommended in order to take advantage of these services and possible training exercises.

4. (U) Air Wings operating from Midway Hangar at Cubi Point have traditionally suffered from poor GSE support and the resultant late launches. CVW-9 found the same problems exacerbated by the high daytime temperatures of the season, leading to frustration and exhaustion for maintenance and flight crews. Base Operations and facilities personnel are aware of the difficulties, but their sympathy and attempts to rectify the situation have not achieved the desired end. High-level attention to the solution of GSE and maintenance support facilities problems is strongly encouraged in order to optimize continued proficiency training operations for carrier Air Wings temporarily based out of Midway Hangar.

f. (U) 19 APRIL - 01 MAY TRANSIT TO INDIAN OCEAN

1. (U) Departure from Subic Bay marked the beginning of the longest at-sea period experienced by any West Coast carrier and its Air Wing. Real-world tasking became intense at the outset.

2. (U) On 19 April a Sun King alert was launched, again from the beach, in order to direct the intercept of Bear aircraft approaching the Philippine ADIZ. Intercept and escort was uneventful.

3. (U) During SSSC operations on 21 April, a Sun King controlled S-3 was vectored to identify a small surface contact over 150 NM from the E-2. The contact was a 36-foot wooden boat containing 42 Vietnamese refugees; they were subsequently rescued by the USS WORDEN.

4. (C) Participation in Merlion VIII provided the heaviest Sun King tasking since RIMPAC. In the difficult environment of limited airspace and high density surface traffic east of Singapore, Sun King crews simultaneously controlled war-at-sea and anti-PT boat strikes, dissimilar ACT, and AAW exercises, all while attempting to maintain real-world surveillance from a station necessarily in the middle of the activity. The resultant training in dealing with modern multi-threat warfare in a difficult near-land environment was to prove invaluable as preparation for GONZO station operations.

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5. (C) Through the Straits of Malacca and the Bay of Bengal, the CONSTELLATION/CVW-9 team prepared for the CORAL SEA PASSEX. In order to demonstrate the awesome capabilities of the E-2C/F-14/CG team in long-range defense of the carrier battle group, Sun King and fighter crews developed a multiple-layer defense with an outer perimeter in excess of 175 nautical miles. Two E-2C aircraft stationed at the lateral extremes of the threat wedge provided maximum surveillance; they were augmented by fighter radar coverage in each CAP sector. The inner arc of F-14s was controlled by battle group cruisers, providing for timely replacement of front-line defenders were they to be drawn off-station by the incoming raid. An internal layer of A-7 CAP, CG missile envelopes and the CONSTELLATION Terrier batteries completed the defensive umbrella. The majority of raid aircraft were intercepted beyond the 200 mile boundary by CAP under Sun King DOLLY control; none passed through the inner boundary to reach the CV. Defense-in-depth is an obtainable goal for carrier battle groups but, as proven in this exercise, requires reliable weapon systems, pre-planning, and professional inter-community coordination to succeed.

g. (U) 01 MAY - 05 AUGUST INDIAN OCEAN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

1. (U) Indian Ocean operations were always challenging and often trying evolutions. For the first time in the history of dedicated CV tasking in the Indian Ocean, two large-deck carriers (CONSTELLATION and EISENHOWER) and their E-2C/F-14 teams (of CVW-9 and CVW-7 respectively) were available to the Battle Group Commander. COMCARGRU ONE aboard CONSTELLATION acted as "AB", utilizing, also for the first time, an integrated CWC structure which provided for optimum coordination. Various responsibilities were rotated regularly between the two carrier groups; the normal routine saw each carrier supporting scheduled flight operations for six consecutive days, then standing down for one dedicated maintenance day and one training day. These eight day cycles were staggered to achieve continuous airborne or ready-alert operations. All alert postures were maintained in accordance with CTF-77 requirements.

2. (U) Daily Indian Ocean Operations.

(a) (C) E-2 Stationing. Throughout the period, the primary mission of the squadron was AEW. Considerable effort was devoted to station determination; Integrated Refraction Effects Prediction System (IPEPS) reports were always consulted in the selection of planned barrier altitudes in order to minimize the effect of expected atmospheric anomalies on the radar and communications. High stations (21 to 25,000 feet) which bisected the angle between the prominent coastlines to the north and to the west

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were utilized in most instances; false targets and land drag were rarely as much of a problem as has been documented by other squadrons. Unfortunately, low ducting areas inherent to the region severely affected UHF communications between tactical aircraft proceeding to station at intermediate altitudes and their surface ship controllers: VAW-116 often assumed PIRAZ duties as the platform best capable of communications with both.

(b) (C) CAP Control. The shared CAP concept with CGs assigned as primary CAP controller was utilized throughout the cruise. F-14 CAP acted semi-autonomously with the CG performing routine station keeping tasks (fuel states, tanker joinups) and either unit could initiate an intercept. If the E-2C required CAP for an intercept, control was automatically transferred. Often, on station F-14's maintained two way link-4 with the Sun Kings while conducting voice communications with the assigned CG. During surveillance flights by Soviet reconnaissance aircraft, F-14 CAP were relieved of escort duties as soon as practicable by A-7 CAP, allowing the F-14 to return to station to protect against subsequent threats. The E-2C handled intercept and escort control in excess of 50 NM from the CV, coordinating a complete handover to the CV once the raid entered this circle.

(c) (C) Alert Posture. Alerts were a way of life throughout the cruise. In the Indian Ocean, crew changes were effected at 0400 allowing a fresh crew to assume the duty prior to sunrise when most alert launches occurred. During daylight hours the alert posture required all scheduled aircrewmembers to be in the Ready Room; occasionally it was necessary to upgrade to a modified alert 15 which required the crew to man the aircraft. The validity of this posture was often questionable since the MMG-1A's required to maintain the avionics systems on-line were usually not available. From one-half hour after sunset until one-half hour prior to sunrise, one crewman remained in the Ready Room for final coordination in the event a launch was called away.

(d) (C) EOB. On a regular basis an Electronic Order of Battle update was performed off the Iranian coast. This task required a dedicated E-2C to monitor the EA-3, its F-14 escort, and an S-3 performing SSSC below the EOB track. With the E-2C stationed near 2400n/06100E, land drag caused little interference and radar coverage as well as UHF communications were possible along the entire track.

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(e) (C) SSSC. Approximately 4 to 6 non-CAP assets from both the first and last events of the day were routinely dedicated to SSSC. S-3's were used for double or triple cycle long-range search; F-8's and link-4/FLIR equipped A-7's were used within 150 NM of the CV. The A-7 with link-4 was the most frequently used SSSC asset. The C-2 (an excellent SSSC aircraft with a weather radar particularly effective at surface search) was used as a mid-range surveillance aircraft; the SH-3 patrolled in close.

(f) (C) PDS. The PDS system was used extensively and the squadron enjoyed tremendous success until late in the Indian Ocean at-sea period when supply support deteriorated. The inability to repair WRAs aboard ship, the lack of part piece support, the shortage of connectors, and the lengthy supply line effectively downed the PDS system whenever on board spares were not available. PDS detections of "Weteye" and "Look II" accompanied each May and Cub transit. It is speculated that surveillance aircraft varied the activation time of their radar systems since PDS detection sometimes did not occur until the surveillance aircraft were close to the CV. At other times the PDS provided the initial indication that Soviet aircraft were in the Modloc area and was a significant factor in the prosecution of long range intercepts with CAP.

3. (U) Proficiency Exercises. Numerous multifaceted exercises were conducted during our IO tenure, most requiring the Sun Kings not only to participate but also to orchestrate the entire evolution. Among the better coordinated exercises were GONZO-EX 3-80 and 4-80, and KERMITEX; each was conducted with one carrier fulfilling the Orange role and the other acting as Blue. These exercises enabled the CONNIE/CVW-9 team to test their tactics against an "equal" opponent. Daily WASEX's and AAWEX's were accomplished utilizing CONSTELLATION Battle Group assets.

4. (U) Special Exercises.

(a) (C) Frequently, opportunities arose for one-of-a-kind multi-national and inter-service exercises. We had the pleasure to work with the British in Multiplex 1-80 and 2-80; AAW reporting and mutual tracking exercises were a major feature of both. As part of the international training, the E-2C transferred control of two F-14's to the British for air intercept training. During Multiplex 2-80, a Sun King crew was targeting the British SAG for a long range WASEX 300 NM east of the CV when

information was received that Soviet aircraft were approaching the task group from the southwest. In rapid sequence, the Sun King crew modified their station to the south, assumed control of the alert CAP, and vectored them to an intercept at 200 NM from the CV. Another station revision allowed them to complete a highly successful link-4 controlled WASFX with little continuity lost during the interruption. Once again, the powerful versatility afforded the battle group by link-4 intercept and strike vectoring capabilities was demonstrated: F-14 "down link" effectively extended the E-2C surveillance area while the Corsair attack computer system handled the surface target acquisition utilizing the stored position initially provided by DOLLY.

(b) (C) Exercises with the Air Force allowed both compatibility demonstrations and capability comparisons. On two occasions, flights of B-52's entered the operating area under Sun King control for mine-laying exercises near a high interest unit. Separate occasions brought an E-3A AWACS into the area for inter-face training. The E-2C conducted UHF and HF link with the E-3A and coordinated a successful joint AAWEX. The final interservice exercise involved several visits by KC-135 tankers, allowing the airwing to practice tanking from Air Force aircraft and qualifying CVW-9 pilots in the event that long range tasking required KC-135 assistance. All contacts with the Air Force were examples of superb professionalism and cooperation; the interaction proved to be extremely productive for everyone involved. B-52 and KC-135 crews were extremely flexible, readily accepting E-2C vectors and modifying pre-briefed procedures as required by on-station operations.

5. (C) Fast Break. "Fast Break" was designed for and, previously, conducted exclusively by a nuclear task group. On 23 and 24 July, however, CONSTELLATION and her escorts sailed into the Gulf of Oman just southeast of the Straits of Hormuz. From this position, a day of normal EMCON full-cycle operations was conducted under Sun King control. Severe airspace limitations and the tremendous surface traffic density significantly hampered the AEW mission. Overburdened crews felt vulnerable in this land-locked environment, but confidence in the capabilities of well-trained crews with well-maintained weapon systems was once again bolstered after a highly successful day of operations.

6. (C) Harpoon Defense. CONSTELLATION and CVW-9 developed anti-surface missile defense tactics tailored to the potential threat of Harpoon missiles supplied to Iran by the United States. The advantage of precise information regarding Harpoon launch and performance parameters was more than offset by the uncertainty about Iranian intentions and the recognition of task force vulnerability due to station constraints. A surprise Harpoonex was

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guaranteed to break the monotony of the now-routine GONZO operations. A detailed response tactic, complex in structure but simple to execute, was developed and repeatedly practiced. Briefly, the tactic employed F-14 TARCAP, FLIR A-7 SURCAP, and AIRBOC-equipped SH-2 and SH-3 for chaff protection close-in to the CV. Time permitting, designated force cruisers or destroyers were to maneuver into a decoy position. The key coordination task was assumed by the airborne E-2C; once the threat or exercise codeword was broadcast, all capable aircraft were to divert from their assigned missions and check in with Sun King, with their weapon and fuel state, for optimum employment. Across the chain-of-command, considerable effort was expended in order to ensure that the battle group trained for the manner in which it would have to fight.

7. (U) Driftex. A mid-line period sortie to Diego Garcia in June enabled the ship and Airwing to perform needed maintenance; it also marked the beginning of the monsoon season in the Arabian Sea. The clear, sunny days and calm seas which had been the norm were replaced by haze that extended to 12,000 feet and seas of 14-17 feet. Case III approaches were constantly necessary for return to the pitching flight deck. The heavy seas, poor visibility, and bad deck conditions remained until CONNIE departed the Indian Ocean. Numerous problems with ducting were also encountered during monsoon season, requiring increased attention to IREPS and station selection.

8. (U) Safety. The long line period in the Indian Ocean precluded any major repair to the flight deck non-skid. Therefore, the condition of the flight deck deteriorated to the point that the pilot's preflight brief contained a portion dealing with slick flight deck operations. The absence of non-skid, high humidity, high winds and the large sail area of the folded E-2C wing made for some exciting moments. The CONNIE flight deck crew was well aware of the problem and took considerable precautions when taxiing the Hawkeye. Another positive step was the flight deck wash-downs accomplished on standdown days. Those areas that were considered to be the most hazardous were scrubbed and washed weekly.

9. (U) Administration. Prior to the deployment many of the problems associated with Indian Ocean contingency operations had been addressed by other commands and were nearing resolution when the Sun Kings arrived on GONZO station.

h. (U) 05-12 AUGUST SINGAPORE

1. (U) Singapore food and hotel room prices were equivalent to those in the United States. Bus travel is recommended, as 15 cents will buy a round-trip ride through the city. A ferry was provided at no cost, leaving the ship each hour for a leisurely and scenic 45-minute trip to the World Trade Center. From there, downtown was approximately a two-dollar taxi ride. Once again, ship's tours were the best deal in town.

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i. (U) 12 - 23 AUGUST MIDWAY MODLOC.

1. (U) Departing Singapore, the CONSTELLATION headed back through the Straits of Malacca and held a MODLOC west of Sumatra as a contingency asset until relieved by the MIDWAY. Flying was limited due to fuel constraints caused by the replenishment ship's engineering casualty.

2. (C) With a cheer at the sighting of the MIDWAY, CONSTELLATION steamed for the Philippines. Entering the area of vulnerability for encounters with "boat people", the PASSUMPSIC was assigned rescue ship duties. Delayed by the inevitable action, the PASSUMPSIC was 235 NM behind CONNIE (which was in the middle of an Airwing flyoff). When a request for AIREVAC of two severely ill refugees was received, a Sun King E-2C and an SH-3 were diverted to effect the pickup. The range involved required the helo to conduct mid-course HIFR from the TRUXTUN. The pickup was successful, but shortly after passing TRUXTUN on the return leg, the SH-3 developed rotor transmission problems. Vectors and coordination by the Sun King crew enabled the stricken helo to recover aboard TRUXTUN just as the transmission seized.

j. (U) 23 AUGUST - 6 SEPTEMBER SUBIC BAY.

1. (U) Prior liaison enabled the Sun Kings to utilize the VRC-50 line and maintenance spaces in Cubi during the CONSTELLATION's 14 day SRF period. This resulted in adequate GSE support and on-time launches. The use of VRC-50 spaces should be requested well in advance by all E-2 squadrons, not only due to the availability of GSE and the proximity of the ASWOC, but also because the convenient snack bar, a "squadron only" quonset hut, and the availability of mutual engine and airframe support make the VRC-50 flight line an excellent place to work.

2. (U) Numerous pilot NATOPS checks were conducted from Cubi; they would otherwise have been incomplete if performed at sea. Numerous FCLP periods allowed the "ball time" of which an E-2 squadron is traditionally deprived. The squadron completed the cruise with 7 pilots, 11 NFO's, and one flight technician achieving centurion status.

k. (U) 7 - 12 SEPTEMBER TRANSIT TO KOREA.

1. (U) Refresher CQ was conducted following departure from Cubi. Long range strikes along Korean low-level routes were accomplished prior to the ship's arrival in Pusan; since

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the Airwing was under E-2C control until feet-dry, it was imperative for the Sun Kings to be completely familiar with the operating area in order to avoid flight violations. Communications were difficult to establish with Korean control agencies as several different check-in frequencies were required, each depending upon the strike route. A single frequency for check-in and E-2 coordination should be arranged through liaison with the U.S. Air Force representative prior to future exercises in this area.

1. (U) 13 - 17 SEPTEMBER, PUSAN KOREA.

1. (U) In Pusan free bus service was provided from the ship to Texas Street and to the Army's Hialeah Compound. This convenience was significant: the best shopping was in the Hialeah Compound, Gate 3 and Texas Street areas; taxi service was somewhat expensive and an experience only the suicidally inclined would enjoy. The ship offered excellent factory tours. For the adventurous, the "Seoul train" trip is a must. In short, Pusan presented CONSTELLATION with many temptations - the response was a green shower which later required a special payday to counteract.

m. (U) 18 - 22 SEPTEMBER TRANSIT TO THE PHILIPPINES.

1. (U) Ambitious flight operations were conducted in the East China Sea following sortie from Pusan. In addition to a link-11 interface practice with the Air Force, dissimilar ACM training with Air Force F-15's and a command and control exercise with the Marine Corps took place in the Okinawa Operea. Link-11 utilization was extensive during the latter evolution, and VAW squadrons operating here in the future should expect similar tasking.

2. (C) Although IO contingency operations prevented utilization of an experimental CAINS/DOLLY interface program for the S-3, initial evaluation of this capability was performed during the return trip to Subic Bay. The S-3 CAINS/link-4 was found to be a reliable and accurate control link, and comprehensive testing leading to eventual fleet introduction is strongly encouraged. The considerable advantages of a multi-mission, multi-aircraft digital data link have been aggressively demonstrated by CVW-9; simultaneous control of FLIR-equipped S-3 and A-7 SSSC aircraft, A-7 strike aircraft, and F-14 CAP, all on one automatic voiceless net, enhances battle group offensive capabilities while allowing a more restrictive defensive EMCON posture.

n. (U) 23 - 26 SEPTEMBER CUBI.

1. (U) During the final Subic visit, the ship docked at Leyte Pier (Cubi-side). Access to Cubi or Subic facilities

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required bus or taxi service; both free buses and 15-cent buses were provided to Subic from the ship. Following an ordnance offload and personal furniture onload at Cubi, CONSTELLATION departed for San Diego.

o. (U) 26 SEPTEMBER - 15 OCTOBER.

1. (C) Ambitious flight operations were scheduled for the initial Cubi-to-Guam transit but several typhoons located along the ship's PIM required cancellation of most. Two Sun King E-2C's were airborne as the RANGER, approximately 500 miles to the east, was visited by Soviet Bear aircraft. Although the Bears did not surveil CONNIE, two Sun King E-2C's received and correlated reliable PDS data regularly despite the extensive range.

2. (C) As the last liberty port of the deployment, Hawaii was a wonderful sight, offering breathtaking scenery and a chance to relax in the sun. Most sailors enjoyed sightseeing on their own, as time was limited during the one day visit. Hawaii also allowed us to pickup 440 guests for the Tiger cruise. During the week on board, they were treated to tours throughout the ship, presentations on ship and airwing capabilities, and aircraft displays.

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