From: Commander Carrier Air Group TWO  
To: Commanding Officer, USS BOXER (CV-21)  
Ref: (a) CNO Restricted ltr OP 345 ser 1197P34 of 3 August 1950  
Encl: (1) Organization  
(2) Narrative of Operations  
(3) Tabulation of Sorties and Hours Flown  
(4) Material Damage  
(a) Enemy  
(b) Own  
(5) Personnel Casualties, Enemy and Own  

1. The following action report of Carrier Air Group TWO for the period 15-22 October 1950, required by reference (a), is forwarded for inclusion in the report of USS BOXER (CV-21).  

2. Operations against North Korean invasion forces and in support of United Nations forces advancing in North Korea were conducted by Carrier Air Group TWO on 15, 16, 18, 20, 21 and 22 October as directed by ComCarDiv ONE (CTF-77) OpOrder 3-50. Operations in general were hampered by poor weather and paucity of targets.  

3. Comment and Recommendations:  

(a) Air Operations.  

(1) The requirement that all air operations commence exactly at the scheduled time appears to be an artificiality which tends to prolong time into the wind. On many occasions the task force would have been turned into the wind and have enough wind over the deck to start launching aircraft a good five minutes prior to scheduled launching time. All hands would then wait until that scheduled time before they were allowed to launch. During the last war the idea that time into the wind be kept to a minimum was so closely adhered to that almost all carriers would prepare for catapulting the first few planes in the launch so that they could start launching even before the wind line was reached. It is believed that this practice is well worth keeping and that the ships of the task force should be free to commence either launching or landing for a scheduled event as soon as they consider local conditions suitable.  

(2) The method of breaking up a group and landing it aboard a carrier of a task group as laid down in USF 4 is unwieldy, impractical and well-nigh impossible to use. After many attempts to use it, following all its precepts faithfully, all groups of the Atlantic Fleet, strongly supported by the Carrier Division Commanders, have urged against its use and have recommended various revisions or other methods to replace it. To date, no action has been apparent to replace it. It is believed that with the reappearance of three and four carrier task groups, the problem will again be come urgent and that positive steps should be taken to remove from USF 4 this cumbersome method. Its major defect is that it commits too many single aircraft to the approach circle and gives them no definite place to go on wave-offs. It also makes no concession to the fact that with only two carriers in the formation there is no congestion using the
"old fashioned" break-up, and puts both carrier groups in a most disadvantageous position. It is a system which lends itself beautifully to illustrative diagrams in a text book but is impossibly cumbersome when used by aircraft flying around a carrier.

In its place could be substituted a very simple break-up. Altitudes for the various circles are the same. All circles are centered on the median of the carrier's sector. The radii of the circles become progressively smaller as they become lower. They are all tangent to the carrier and no aircraft is to go inside the carrier station circle except in the approach to a landing. If the pilots are thoroughly briefed on the inflexible rule that in the upper leg they must give room to the other carriers, there will be no interference. While there will always be occasions when individual pilots violate this rule, that problem can be hosed by training and air discipline. It can never be beaten by devising a system which is so complex that few of the junior pilots can even understand it.

(3) The flights scheduled were in general too short for the proper and thorough accomplishment of the mission assigned. The Corsairs could easily have flown a four hour flight since they carried one full external tank on all flights. The AD's could have flown a three and one-half hour flight loaded as they were. As the operation was originally set up, strike flights were required to check in with a ship in the Vonsen area prior to proceeding on their assigned mission. This necessitated a log of one hundred to one hundred twenty miles practically due west. Then upon being released to continue on mission assigned, the flight would have to turn north and fly anywhere from sixty to one hundred miles to get to his objective. The same trip was required in reverse on the return. This was changed when operations started to allow the strike flights to proceed direct to their target areas. Even so, the time allowed over the target was not sufficient. In all cases there was a heavy bomb target given as primary target followed by a road sweep. Covering the road sweep normally took about half an hour just to fly over the route. Any time spent in investigating possible targets and attacking targets found must be added to this time. The launching and rendezvous time was normally fifteen minutes. The Task Force was operating in the neighborhood of one hundred miles from the target areas. The run in took about forty-five minutes. The return in a light condition normally took about thirty-five minutes. This left about an hour and twenty-five minutes in the target area. Since this was insufficient time to do the job thoroughly and with precision, the only alternative would be to increase the length of the flights.

(4) It is recommended that the recognition turn for flights returning with radio contact be eliminated. When a flight has been in radio communication with the force for some time and his position has been checked with radar there appears to be very little use for this maneuver unless the TGCIC needs it for more positive identification. If that is the case he can order a maneuver at the time and it would be better if it were not some standard move that all aircraft were to make on that day. In the case of aircraft not in radio communication with the force, the maneuver should be retained but as a visual signal to be made as soon as the force is in sight.

(b) Tactics.

(1) Flights scheduled for road snoopies should be limited to four aircraft. Any more are too many to handle. This type of flight required that the aircraft be spread out and radio chatter is a must. Multiplying the number of aircraft involved multiplies all the difficulties attendant upon such a flight. It is recommended that in the future road snoopies be conducted by four fighter aircraft loaded with rockets and machine gun ammunition and that all aircraft with heavy loads be assigned definite targets with order of priority.

(c) Anti-Submarino Patrol.

(1) The lack of sonobuoys for VA aircraft greatly reduced the potential effectiveness of the hunter-killer unit.
(2) VA(S) configured aircraft are considered necessary for effective night operations. The range and sensitivity of the APS-20A radar pick up so many targets that it is impracticable for the aircraft to leave their screening stations to investigate. They could only be investigated by properly equipped aircraft.

(3) To increase further the effectiveness of ASW operations it is recommended that hunter-killer teams train as a unit prior to deployment to a ship-based air group.

(4) Since efficiency of the radar operator is greatly reduced after two hours of constant operation, flights should be limited to three hours duration if practical.

(d) Aircraft Ordnance.

(1) This air group has advocated the fifty-caliber installation of the F4U-4 aircraft as an excellent weapon. In order to clarify, the following is submitted. The pilots feel that in the particular action in which they have been using this installation it is highly satisfactory. Against personnel, light buildings and vehicles it is probably superior to the twenty millimeter installation owing to the greater saturation. However, as a general strafing and anti-aircraft weapon, against lightly armored vehicles, other aircraft, and ships, the twenty millimeter installation is considered superior.

(2) It is strongly recommended that the AD-4 aircraft should be equipped with four twenty millimeter guns in lieu of the present two. With these guns, the AD would equal the F4U as a fighter aircraft. Its strafing performance would also be greatly improved.

(e) Communications.

(1) While it was most gratifying to have a separate radio channel assigned each ship for use as a launch/land frequency, it is not believed that such a luxury could be afforded in a real war with several task groups operating in close proximity. It is realized that this practice grew up in the years since the war ended, in an effort to make carrier work even safer. This is right and proper. However, no attempt should be made to change the doctrine governing assignment of radio frequencies in war to cover this situation. The launch/land frequency can be eliminated whenever need dictates during war.

(f) Air Intelligence.

(1) Non-flying Air Intelligence officers are needed badly at the squadron and group level. It is noted that CNO has given each squadron an allowance to cover this need.

(2) Since photo configured aircraft are so scarce and it appears that only a few such specialized aircraft could ever be assigned to a carrier, it is recommended that a modification be designed for standard VF and VA aircraft somewhat similar to that in the TBM and F6F in the last war. Then it should be possible to have at least one plane on each strike which could take photos good enough for damage assessment and for each unit intelligence purposes. At present the VF(P) aircraft are solely for the use of the flag and are used to take pictures as ordered by the Task Force Commander for broader purposes.

(g) Personnel.

The latest allowance lists have taken care of the major shortages except that of about thirty percent more ordnancemen being needed in VA squadrons. This need still exists.
(h) Material Discrepancies.

(1) F4U-4. It is recommended that the RB-19 spark plug be
designated as the preferred spark plug for use in the R2800-42W engine.
The aircraft have held up remarkably well considering their advanced
age, both literally and in design. They are certainly a tribute to
Chance Vought Aircraft.

(2) F4U-5P.

(a) While most photography requested was for vertical
coverage, it was necessary to employ two photo aircraft on one flight
to achieve both vertical and oblique photography owing to the in-
operative condition of the rotating mount.

(b) A view finder would eliminate duplication and wasted
time by giving more precision in the coverage of assigned target area.

(c) The equipment now being used has not progressed with
the speed of modern photo aircraft. The cycling speeds of presently
used cameras dictate airspeeds so low that it is necessary to use
flaps in order to keep the camera axis level. By decreasing cycling
time, better runs could be made over dangerous targets with greater
safety for pilots and aircraft.

(3) Ordnance.

(a) The Mark 8 Mod 2 shackle has given no trouble on the
Corsairs. Adapters should be made available for use with the rocket
launchers (Mark 5 Mod 4) on the F4U-4 so that 200# and 220# bombs can
be carried as an alternate load.

(b) In both the F4U-4 and the AD-4 a system should be
installed for positive mechanical jettisoning of the rocket launchers.
At the end of the last war a dangerous situation existed because
unfired and unjettisonable rockets were being brought back and landed
aboard carriers. This situation still exists. While no personnel or
material casualties resulted from this cause during this cruise, the
fact remains that it is potentially very dangerous. A five inch
rocket catapulting up the dock after an arrested landing toward the
people and aircraft spotted forward cannot be ignored and must be
considered an unacceptable risk.

L. H. WHITE
ComCVG-2
13 Aircraft
22 Pilots

VF-64
Commander R. W. Rynd
16 F4U-4
23 Pilots

VF-63
Lieutenant Commander T. J. Ball
16 F4U-4
21 Pilots

VF-23
Lieutenant Commander C. E. Russell
16 F4U-4
22 Pilots

VF-24
Lieutenant Commander E. R. Coffman
16 F4U-4
22 Pilots

VT-65
Commander R. W. Phillips
16 AD-4
22 Pilots

Note: Figures reflect numbers of flyable aircraft and qualified pilots available at commencement of operations.
FLIGHT REPORT 15 OCTOBER

Flight operations commenced at 0800I with the launching of 1 F4U-5P and 1 F4U escort plus a strike group of 20 F4U's and 7 AD's. This group attacked a bridge at CA7505, another at 5192CV and the Eastern side of Sin-do island with 1000 lb GP bombs, 500 lb GP bombs, 5th HVAR's and NLPAIHM. They also strafed the general area. The bridge at CA5309 was severely damaged, while the bridge at CV51-50T received many close misses and was believed damaged. Sin-do Island was severely hit with HVAR's, NLPAIHM, and strafing. Six gun emplacements and many entrenchments were hit. A bridge west of the Choshin Reservoir was visibly shattered, about 60% damaged. The flight was recovered at 1120I.

The second flight was launched at 1100I consisting of 1 F4U-5P and escort, 9 F4U's on a road sweep from Koman to Fusen Reservoir and a strike group of 7 AD's and 12 F4U's. The road sweep attacked 4 trucks at CV6155 and CV7145 plus a supply dump at CV7243 with HVAR's, NLPAIHM and 50 Cal. Two trucks were destroyed, the other two damaged. Two railroad cars were destroyed, 3 damaged, and supplies and stores left burning. The strike group destroyed a bridge at CV8290 and damaged a bridge at CV7975. A locomotive at CV8089 was damaged by HVAR's and strafing. The flight was recovered at 1415I.

The third flight commenced at 1400I with the launching of 1 F4U-5P and escort, a strike group consisting of 12 F4U's and 8 AD's plus a fighter sweep of 11 F4U's. The fighter sweep hit bridges at CV91-36 and DV12-43 with 500 lb GP bombs HVAR's and NLPAIHM. Near misses on both bridges with holes resulting in highways plus one large factory and adjacent building burned out were reported. The strike group hit bridges at DV2433, DV4347, DV5555 and smaller bridges in the area. There was extensive damage on DV4347 and a direct hit on DV5555 with a 500 lb GP, while moderate damage was reported on DV2433 with 1000 lb GP bombs. Three small bridges between DV2541 and DV2447 received damage. All planes were recovered at 1715I. No enemy aircraft were encountered this date.
ACTION REPORT 16 OCTOBER

Flight operations commenced at 0855I with the launching of 1 AD-4 and 1 AD-4N as ASP, 1 F4U-5P and 1 P4U as Photo Hop plus 4 P4U’s as CAP. At 0930I, 8 F4U’s were launched as TARCAP also a strike group of 5 F4U’s and 6 AD’s. The weather was such that the strike group was unable to reach any targets and all the planes were recovered at 1230I.

At 1530I 4 F4U’s were launched as CAP and 1 AD-4W with 1 VAN as ASP. All aircraft were recovered at 1745I.

At 2050I 2 VAN and 1 AD-4Q were launched to be recovered by the VALLEY FORGE at 2400I. No enemy aircraft were encountered this date.

ACTION REPORT 17 OCTOBER

At 1740I our 2 AD-4N’s and 1 AD-4Q were recovered from the VALLEY FORGE.

ACTION REPORT 18 OCTOBER

Flight operations commenced at 0630I with the launching of 1 AD-4 and 1 AD-4N as ASP. 8 F4U’s were launched as CAP. The strike group consisted of 7 F4U’s and 8 AD’s. Attacking bridges and road targets in the YongYong-Dong and Chosen reservoir area with 1000 and 500 lb GP’s and HVAR’s the strike group damaged a bridge at CV5482 and struck a bridge at CV5587 causing heavy damage making it impossible. A bridge at CV5176 was hit on the Northern approach with a 500 lb GP. The flight was recovered at 0830I.

The second flight of the day was launched at 0930I. It consisted of a Photo plane and escort on a photo mission, an AD-4N and AD-4W on an ASP flight, an eight plane F4U CAP flight, four F4U on TARCAP plus a strike group consisting of 8 F4U’s and 8 AD’s.

The strike group was loaded with 1000, 500 and 100 lb GP bombs and HVAR’s. A railroad bridge at DV9178 East of Tanchon was hit with four 1000 lb GP’s and eight 500 lb GP’s and many damaging misses. It was heavily damaged. A gun emplacement at DV5423 three miles south of Pyongni, was hit with five 100 lb GP’s and 12 HVAR’s causing approximately twenty casualties and completely destroying the emplacement. A railroad bridge at DV9078 took a direct hit from a 5001b GP and one span was dropped. Fifteen horse-drawn carts were hit with HVAR’s and strafing, ten were destroyed and five damaged. Three gun emplacements at DV738 and four at DV224 were strafed and rocketed with light damage. This flight was recovered at 1230I.

The third flight was launched at 1230I and consisted of a photo mission, 1 F4U-5P plus 1 F4U-4 escort, a CAP flight of 8 F4U’s, a TARCAP of four F4U’s, and a strike group of 12 F4U’s and 8 AD’s. A bridge at EA-6162 received two direct hits and 3 near misses from 500 GP’s causing a thirty foot length to be knocked out. A bridge at EA5984 received one direct hit from a 5001b GP causing one span to be dropped. At DA9968 a railroad yard was hit by 8 HVAR’s but damage was undetermined. Another yard at DA8979 was hit by a 500 lb GP and railroad intersection tracks torn up. Tracks and undetermined number of box cars were hit with 5001b GP and 8 HVAR’s at EA8886. Two trucks at EA3589 were destroyed by 2 HVAR’s and strafing. A truck was...
strafed at EA2541 with many hits. Another truck was strafed at EA2632 with many hits. Four HVAR's were placed in a tunnel at EA2541. The tracks were damaged and white steam emitted from the tunnel. A high-
way bridge at EA6686 was hit with one 500 lb GP and sustained three holes from near misses of 1000 lb GP bombs, causing minor damage. Th
erailroad yards at Sindongni (EA1453) was hit with many HVAR's, damagi
ing a locomotive and thirty railroad cars. The flight was recovered at
1540I.

The fourth flight consisted of 8 F4U's on CAP and 4 F4U's on
TARCAP. They were recovered at 1745I.

The fifth flight was launched at 1740I consisting of F4U-5N's on
DADCAP, 2 AD-4N's on NIGHT Intruder missions and one AD-4N on AEW.
Nothing of importance was reported and the flight was recovered at
2050I.

The final night flight was launched at 2400I consisting of 1 AD-4W
and 2 F4U-5N's. Nothing of importance was reported and all aircraft
were recovered at 0310I. No enemy aircraft were encountered this da
ACTION REPORT 20 OCTOBER

The first launch at 0815I this date was an ASP and weather flight by 1 AD-4N and 1 AD-4W. They reported nothing of importance and were recovered at 1154I.

The second launch at 1010I consisted of 1 AD-4N and 1 F4U-5N for Itazuke with a passenger.

The third flight launched at 1115I consisting of one ASP mission of 1 AD-4W and 1 AD plus a CAP hop of 7 F4U's. They were recovered at 1450I.

The fourth launch at 1430I was an ASP flight of 1 AD-4N and 1 AD, and an eight plane CAP. All planes were recovered at 1745I although 6 planes were sent to the VALLEY FORGE because of a barrier crash on the BOXER and ensuing darkness. The plane was a strike but the pilot was unharmful. No enemy aircraft were encountered this date.

ACTION REPORT 21 OCTOBER

The first launch at 0630I consisted of one ASP mission with 1 AD-4P and 1 AD-4W plus 6 F4U's on CAP. This flight plus our planes that landed on the VALLEY FORGE the night before were recovered at 0945I.

The second launch consisted of 8 F4U's on CAP and 1 AD-4W plus 1 AD-4N on ASP. Nothing of importance was reported and all planes were recovered at 1230I.

The third flight launched consisted of 1 AD-4W for AEW and 2 F4U-5F for DADCAP. It launched at 2050I and was recovered at 2400I. Nothing of importance was reported and no enemy aircraft were encountered this date.
ACTION REPORT 22 OCTOBER

The first flight launched at 0415I. It consisted of 2 AD-4N's for DAICAP and 1 AD4W on ABM missions. Nothing of importance was reported and the flight was recovered at 0640I.

The second flight launched at 0630I and consisted of 1 AD-4W and 1 AD on ASP, a CAP of 7 F4U's and a strike group of 12 F4U's and 8 AD's. This flight went on a road sweep, hitting fishing boats at Songjin and Bw1703 with HVAR's and ammo, two boats were sunk and others damaged. A bridge at DV88-63 was hit by two 500 lb GP and one treasle knocked out. A bridge at DV87-96 recieved one hit and 4 near misses from 500 lb GP bombs. At Pyongyang, DV8778, a railroad bridge was hit with HVAR's and one 500 lb bomb. The bridge listed as damaged. A railroad bridge at EV1392 was destroyed by four hits and 7 near misses with 500lb bombs. Ten railroad cars at DV9278 were strafed with 20MM cannon and damaged. A highway bridge at DV6764 was hit with 23 HVAR's and heavily damaged. The planes on this launch were recovered at 0930I. One AD struck the barrier with minor damage, the pilot was not hurt.

The third launch at 0930I was for aircraft being transferred; 2 F4U-5P's, 7 AD4's, 1 F4U4 to the PHILIPPINE SEA; 8 AD4's, 1 AD4Q and 1 HO4S to the VALLEY FORGE; 1 F4U-5P, 1 F4U4 and AD4's to the LEYTE at 1000I recovered 2 VA and 1 AD4N.

The BOXER left the formation at about 1200I and set course for Sasebo, Japan.

Our final launch at 1528I was an ASP hop of 1 AD4W and 1 AD4N which was recovered at 1735I. No enemy aircraft were encountered this date.
TABULATION OF SORTIES AND HOURS FLOWN

15 - 22 October 1950.

Sorties:
- Offensive: 214
- Defensive: 141
- Total: 355

Hours flown:
- FAU: 747.2
- AD: 278.1
- HC3S: 20.0
- Total: 1045.3

Ammunition Expended:

- General Purpose: 66.2 tons
- Fragmentation: 2.2 Tons
- Napalm (Mk 12 and/or 1000 lb WBF): 35

Rockets:
- Five inch HVAR: 1573

Ammunition:
- 20 mm: 6509 rds.
- 50 cal: 58995 rds.
MATERIAL DAMAGE.

Damage to enemy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HT and RR Bridges</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR Cars</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Vehicle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing Boats</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse Carts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Dump</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshalling Yards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Damage to self:

(1) 1 F4U-4 received damage from enemy small arms fire resulting in engine and engine mount change.

(2) 2 F4U-4 received minor damage, one from rocket blast and one from bomb blast.

(3) 2 F4U-4 operational losses, one from engine failure during carrier approach, cause undetermined, and the other from strike damage caused by hard landing and subsequent barrier crash.

(4) 1 AD-4U operational loss from night landing and barrier crash. Strike recommended.

(5) 2 AD-4 received minor damage, repairable on board, caused by barrier crashes.

ENCLOSURE (4)
PERSONNEL CASUALTIES:

1. Enemy - Unknown.

2. Own - None.