From: Commander, Carrier Air Group TWELVE
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWELVE for the period 7 January through 11 February 1953; submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4
(b) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1A

Encl: (1) Subject Action Report

1. This report is forwarded as enclosure (1) for inclusion in the action report of the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) in accordance with references (a) and (b).

G. P. CHASE

[Signature]
ACTION REPORT
OF
CARRIER AIR GROUP TWELVE
FOR THE PERIOD
7 January through 11 February 1953

CONTENTS

PART I  MISSION AND COMPOSITION
PART II  CHRONOLOGY
PART III  ORDNANCE
PART IV  DAMAGE
PART V  PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES
PART VI  OPERATIONS
PART VII  SURVIVAL
PART VIII  AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL

PART I

MISSION AND COMPOSITION

MISSION:

1. The mission, upon returning to Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the area
   off the east coast of Korea as a unit of the United Nations Naval Forces,
   was blockading the North Korean coast and pursuing a systematic program
   of interdiction against enemy supply routes and destroying air facilities,
   power complexes, and manufacturing centers in North Korea to prevent further
   offensive action by the enemy. Close air support to frontline ground forces
   to be furnished upon request.

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** TOTALS ** | 79 | 63 | 122 | 121 | (122) |

* VF-121 Received three replacement aircraft on board during this period.
** VF-122 Received one replacement aircraft on board during this period.
% VF-124 Received two replacement aircraft on board during this period.
# VA-125 Received one replacement aircraft on board during this period.

LCDR A. H. GUNDERSON assumed Command of VA-125 upon the death of CDR J. C. MICHEEL on 1 February 1953.

The Air Group Commander flies alternately with VF-121 and VA-125. The Air Group Staff Operations Officer flies with VF-122. A doctor designated as a Naval Aviator, the Electronics Officer and three L.S.O.'s comprise the remaining five pilots on the Staff and they do not fly from the ship.
PART II

CHRONOLOGY

7 January - Departed YOKOSUKA, Japan, to join Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. Conducted air operations, exercises in conjunction with the U.S. Air Force, totaling fifty sorties.

8 January - Rough seas and weather forced cancellation of scheduled exercises.

9 January - Enroute to the operating area, fifty-two refresher sorties were flown.

10 January - No flight operations - replenishment.

11 January - No flight operations - weather.

12 January - No flight operations - rough seas and weather.

13 January - No flight operations - rough seas and weather.

14 January - No flight operations - rough seas and weather.

15 January - Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO returned to action flying fifty-nine sorties and dropping forty-one tons of bombs. The AD's and F4U's, flying close air support, destroyed nine bunkers and forty yards of trenches and damaged seven artillery positions. Both the props and the jets attacked supply concentrations and personnel shelters near the front lines. An estimated seventeen buildings were destroyed and twenty-eight damaged. Several secondary explosions were observed.

16 January - Early morning hecklers successfully attacked a military bivouac area south of HAMHUNG causing secondary explosions. The Skyraiders and Corsairs combined efforts in strikes on supply shelters southwest of SONGJIN and a mining area south of KILCHI. Eighteen buildings were destroyed and another twelve damaged. The F9F-5's, after flying north central reconnaissance routes, attacked fishing facilities at SIMPO. Poor visibility prevented observation of results. In the afternoon, jets flew flak suppression for the props attacking supply and personnel build-up areas south of CHANGYON-NI, along the eastern front lines. A secondary explosion was observed as two buildings were destroyed and eight damaged. Five boxcars were destroyed and ten damaged as a jet strike attacked railroad facilities near YANG-DOK. Fifty-two tons of bombs were dropped during the day's eighty-five sorties.

17 January - A flight of Panther jets attacked supply dumps just behind the enemy's front lines. Ten supply buildings were destroyed and four damaged.
Jets flying reconnaissance destroyed three supply storage shelters near PUKCHONG and killed six enemy troops caught repairing railroad tracks near HAMHUNG. The FltU's and AD's continued to press attacks against enemy supply concentrations behind the front lines. Eighty-five sorties were flown and fifty-nine tons of bombs dropped.

LTJG John C. DUCK, USNR, VF-87, successfully landed his flak-damaged FltU at K-16.

18 January — USS ORISKANY planes dropped forty-two tons of bombs during sixty-three sorties before air operations were cancelled because of bad weather and rough seas. The morning hecklers, covering the coastal recce routes, destroyed two barracks buildings and damaged eleven trucks, a transformer station and a highway bridge north of HUNGNAM. A jet strike severely damaged a mining complex near SONGJIN while jet recce damaged two locomotives, three railroad repair shops, a camouflaged tank and several boxcars in the HAMHUNG area. The propeller aircraft bombed supply build-ups and troop shelters east of PYONGANG. Damage assessment was hampered by smoke and dust over the target.

ENS Leo D. LINNARD, USNR, VF-783, was rescued uninjured by a helicopter when his F9F-5 was hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire, forcing him to ditch in WONSAN Harbor.

19 January — No flight operations — replenishment.

20 January — The AD's and FltU's flew close air support. The controller's evaluation was 100 percent coverage of the targets and 100 percent effective use of ordnance. Twenty supply stacks were destroyed and five damaged. The propeller aircraft strikes were against supply shelters along the bombline and factory buildings and warehouses north of WONSAN. Eight supply shelters were destroyed and five factory buildings and six warehouses were heavily damaged. Jets damaged seven buildings in a strike on a storage area near HONGWON. They killed six troops, destroyed a radar installation and damaged a large warehouse during the day's recce missions. Ninety-six sorties were flown and sixty-eight tons of bombs were dropped.

21 January — With jets providing flak suppression, two large secondary explosions resulted as the props covered an estimated ninety percent of a supply build-up area northeast of ANDO-RI. In strikes on storage buildings east of MAJON-RI and marshalling yards at WONSAN, the AD's and FltU's destroyed a roundhouse, two buildings and two railroad cars. Two storage buildings and four boxcars were damaged. The Corsairs and Skyraiders also flew close air support, killing twenty and wounding eighty-five enemy troops. Ten gun positions and 150 yards of trenches were damaged. The
jetsy attacked warehouses and troop billeting areas in strikes near MAJON-NI and HUNGNAM, destroying three buildings and damaging two others. The hecklers, searching west and north of WONSAN, destroyed seven and damaged six trucks. Sixty-four tons of bombs were dropped during the day's ninety-nine sorties.

22 January - USS ORISKANY propeller aircraft attacked supply shelters east of MAJON-NI and an oil processing plant at KILCHU. A large fuel fire was started, eight buildings were destroyed and twelve damaged. The jets destroyed four boxcars as they cut the railroad tracks in three places between KUM-NI and WONSAN. In the afternoon the props concentrated on cutting rails between ORI-RI-KYONGHUNG-NI and SONGJIN-KILCHU while the jets were bombing supply shelters in the vicinity of SANGHOE-RI near the front lines. Twenty-one railcuts were made by the AD's and Flhu's. The jets left five large fires burning in the supply area. Ninety-five sorties were flown and seventy-four tons of bombs were dropped.

23 January - Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO dropped sixty-seven tons of bombs during ninety-nine sorties. The AD's flew close air support while the Flhu's struck industrial buildings south of HAMHUNG. At the front lines, the Skyraiders destroyed three ammo dumps and damaged four gun positions while the Corsairs destroyed seven and damaged ten factory-type buildings at the industrial site. During the afternoon jets attacked military supply concentrations near the bombline and recooed northwest of HAMHUNG. The props flew three strikes, destroying six and damaging nine personnel shelters south of WONSAN. They destroyed two military barracks north of WONSAN and heavily damaged three buildings at a power sub-station west of TANCHON.

24 January - No flight operations - replenishment.

25 January - The early morning hecklers, searching recoo routes north and east of WONSAN, destroyed nine trucks and damaged twenty-four others. AD's and Flhu's, flying close air support, damaged seven bunkers and three artillery positions and destroyed one hundred yards of trenches. A jet strike near KILCHU destroyed one warehouse and damaged five. One great explosion and large fires were seen as three buildings were destroyed and four damaged on a prop strike against personnel billeting areas northwest of HOBYANG. One hundred three sorties were flown and sixty-eight tons of bombs were dropped.

26 January - Sixty-four tons of bombs were dropped during the day's ninety-nine sorties as both props and jets conducted strikes against enemy supply stockpiles and personnel shelters behind the eastern section of the enemy front lines. Ninety percent of the assigned target areas were covered. In two close air support missions the props damaged or destroyed twenty-six bunkers, three mortar positions and 150 yards of trenches. Bombs and napalm
were effectively employed against coastal gun positions north of WONSAN. Three of the four gun ports were scaled. The night hecklers, harrying traffic along the north central recce routes, destroyed seven and damaged nine trucks and set one fuel dump ablaze.

ENS D. L. BRENNER, USNR, VF-87½, was forced to ditch off HUNGNAM when probable enemy small arms fire damaged his FH-2 on a naval gun fire spotting mission. ENS BRENNER, uninjured, was rescued by a helicopter from the cruiser USS LOS ANGELES.

27 January – The Panther jets continued to devastate material build-up concentrations as they attacked supply shelters northeast of PYONGGANG, and southwest of CHANGYON-NI. Complete damage assessment was hampered by smoke and debris, but an estimated ten supply stacks were destroyed and fifteen damaged. Four secondary explosions were set off and three fires were left burning. The Corsairs and Skyraiders provided close air support and attacked warehouse facilities near NAJON-NI. Twenty-five bunkers were hit along the front lines while two direct hits and five secondary explosions were observed in the warehouse area. The day's totals were 103 sorties flown and sixty-seven tons of bombs dropped.

28 January – Jets, searching recce routes from KUWON west to SUNU-DONG, destroyed two buildings, killed fifteen troops in strafing runs on billeting areas and damaged twelve oxcarts. The props destroyed eight and damaged twelve warehouses as they attacked supply areas near PUKCHONG and south of TANCHON. Sixty-one sorties were flown with thirty-nine tons of bombs dropped before bad weather forced cancellation of flight operations.

29 January – No flight operations – partial replenishment in rough seas.

30 January – Continued replenishment delayed commencement of flight operations. In two strikes in the afternoon the jets attacked newly constructed barracks buildings above CHONGJIN and storage buildings just south WONSAN. Three barracks were destroyed and seven damaged. Poor visibility hampered damage assessment at the storage site, although ninety percent of the ordnance was dropped in the target area. The Skyraiders, diverted from close air support, attacked personnel buildings and shelters. They reported twelve destroyed and ten damaged as large fires were left burning. The Corsairs, attacking a vehicle refueling area near SANGNONG-NI, observed six secondary explosions and a large fire. The entire area, including possible underground storage facilities, was heavily damaged. The night hecklers destroyed six trucks and damaged at least twenty-three others. Thirty-two tons of bombs were dropped during the day's fifty-two sorties.

31 January – Throughout the day Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO planes from the USS ORISKANY conducted well-coordinated strikes against a variety of targets...
in and about WONSAN. In the morning, the jets attacked supply shelters and a sub-power station while the props bombed military billeting areas. Numerous secondary explosions and fires were seen. Heavy damage was apparent as ninety percent of the ordnance fell in the assigned target areas. The F9F-5's flew TARCAP during the afternoon as the AD's and F4U's bombed concrete hangars, fuel tanks, supply shelters, ammo storage revetments and underground storage facilities. Two fuel tanks were seen to be destroyed while one hangar and one fuel tank were damaged. Panther jets damaged eleven buildings, started three fires and caused a large secondary explosion in a strike on a military billeting area near PUKCHONG. One hundred sorties were flown and seventy-five tons of bombs were dropped.

1 February - Jet recce with prop strikes and close air support comprised most of the day's ninety-nine sorties during which seventy tons of bombs were dropped. Searching for moving targets along the main supply routes west and northwest of WONSAN, the jets damaged several trucks and scattered small columns of oxcarts. A jet strike on supply shelters near PUKCHONG caused a large secondary explosion and left seven shelters burning. The AD and F4U strikes were conducted against supply shelters near MAJON-NI and a vital highway bridge at OUSIL, close to the front lines. All the ordnance was dropped in the assigned supply shelter area, resulting in a large secondary explosion with several fires observed. The bridge was heavily damaged as two cuts were made by direct hits. The Skyraiders and Corsairs, on close air support, destroyed four bunkers and 260 yards of trenches. Eleven trucks were destroyed and fourteen damaged as the night hecklers disrupted traffic along the coastal recce routes.

CDR John C. MICHEEEL, USN, Commanding Officer of VA-923, was killed in action when his Skyraider crashed after a bombing run.

2 February - The jets searched recce routes from WONSAN north to CHONGJIN and inland to the CHOSEN Reservoir area. Eight storage buildings were destroyed and eight damaged. The Panthers also conducted strikes on a supply warehouse compound near CHANG-P-YONG-NI and supply shelters at SOKHYON. Five warehouses were destroyed and four damaged at the compound while a saw mill and five shelters were also destroyed. In addition, the jets provided TARCAP as the Skyraiders destroyed five and damaged six buildings in a storage area west of PUNGSAN. The Corsairs destroyed three railroad bypasses and scored seven rail cuts in attacks near the coast at SOHRI and LISIN-DONG. Both the AD's and the F4U's flew close air support, with six bunkers destroyed and ten damaged while six secondary explosions were seen. Total sorties, ninety-five, while sixty-eight tons of bombs were dropped.

LTJG B. L. IVES, USNR, VF-781, was forced to ditch his flak-damaged F9F-5 in WONSAN Harbor. He was rescued, uninjured, by the destroyer USS HAILEY.
3 February - No flight operations - replenishment.

4 February - The following changes in designation became effective this date: Carrier Air Group TWELVE vice Carrier Air Group ONE-HUNDRED TWO, VF-121 vice VF-781, VF-122 vice VF-783, VF-124 vice VF-874, VA-125 vice VA-923.

Carrier Air Group TWELVE aircraft, from the USS ORISKANY, flew ninety-five sorties and dropped seventy-one tons of bombs. The early hecklers, searching north and east of HAMHUNG, reported light traffic. Four trucks were destroyed and three damaged. Overcast conditions prevented damage assessment of a jet strike at PUKCHONG. The morning's close air support and strike missions by the props were diverted to weather alternate targets. The AD's scored ten hits in a warehouse area near WONSAN while the FMU's heavily damaged twelve supply shelters south of HONGJUN. The afternoon's prop missions were also diverted. The Skyraiders damaged a highway bridge and a railroad bridge near PUKCHONG. The Corsairs destroyed nine supply storage buildings in that vicinity.

5 February - Two sorties were flown and all remaining flight operations were cancelled because of weather.

6 February - Poor weather caused postponement of flight operations until mid-afternoon. Thereafter, thirty-six sorties were flown and thirty-two tons of bombs were dropped. A jet strike, diverted from its primary and secondary targets, bombed supply facilities near SONGJIN. Several buildings were damaged as an estimated fifty percent of the ordnance fell into the target area. The Skyraiders' close air support mission was diverted to its secondary target, a warehouse area west of WONSAN. Three buildings were destroyed and three damaged. The Corsairs' strike bombed the weather alternate, a supply area at SANGTONG-NI. It was estimated all bombs fell into the target area. Further assessment was prevented by clouds obscuring the target.

7 February - No flight operations - replenishment.

8 February - With jets suppressing flak, the props attacked personnel shelters and truck revetments near PONGJIN-DONG. Forty percent of the shelter area was bombed. Two large storage buildings were destroyed by a Panther jet strike near PONGIL-RI. In the afternoon, the Skyraiders bombed a supply building area near SANGMI-RI, destroying one and damaging four. The Corsairs provided excellent close air support to the ground troops, damaging twenty bunkers, six mortar positions, two automatic weapons positions and causing two secondary explosions. Ninety-eight sorties were flown and fifty-seven tons of bombs were dropped.
9 February - The day's jet strike bombed supply shelters and barracks buildings near CHIK-TONG. Five shelters and two barracks were destroyed while three shelters and four barracks were damaged. Jets searched recce routes from HAMHUNG to the CHANGJIN-GANG Reservoir and from ICHON north to MAJON-NI. They damaged five vehicle shelters, four warehouses, eleven ox carts and a supply stockpile. Prop strikes destroyed two camouflaged warehouses near SINGJONG-NI and damaged thirteen supply shelters in SONGJIN. On two close air support missions, the AD's and F4U's damaged twenty-one bunkers and caused two secondary explosions. The night hecklers, harassing vehicular traffic from WONSAN to CHONGJIN, destroyed two trucks and damaged four others. Fifty-eight tons of bombs were dropped during the day's ninety-two sorties.

10 February - Air Group TWELVE planes from the U.S.S. ORISKANY flew seventy-six sorties and dropped forty tons of bombs before weather forced cancellation of flight operations. In two strikes the Panther jets attacked open supply stockpiles near CHONGO-RI and an oil storage area west of CHONGJIN. The stockpile area was heavily damaged. Many fires were left burning and a large secondary explosion was observed. Two large flash fires were seen as the oil storage area was hit and six hits were observed in a barracks building compound nearby. The Skyraiders caused structural damage to a railroad bridge south of MOKCHOK-TONG. The Corsairs, meanwhile, damaged two boxcars and cut the railroad tracks in six places between SUNWON-DONG and CHONGJIN.

11 February - No flight operations - replenishment. Departed Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN enroute to NAGOYA, Japan. End of reporting period.
PART III
ORDNANCE

ORDNANCE

1. The performance of the 20MM guns in the F9F-5 aircraft for this period was excellent with an average of better than 1200 rounds per stoppage. Disconnecting the gun heaters produced no adverse effects on performance. E51 gun lubricating oil was used exclusively. Six 20MM driving spring guide plunger failures occurred. These plungers all sheared at the head and were of the new, improved type, part numbers 07236261 or 662651, as mentioned in the Bureau of Ordnance Material Letter GV 5-51.

2. Bomb racks employed by this Air Group are the Aero 14A, MK 51, MK 55, and the Douglas Bomb Ejector. No significant troubles or failures developed with these racks. Hung bomb percentage was less than one half of one percent of the total bombs dropped.

3. The need of a more adequate shipboard allowance for Douglas Bomb Ejector spare parts became apparent during this period, particularly in regards to piston rings and piston retaining keys. Piston rings are replaced on the average of every twenty-five shots while retaining keys are replaced after approximately forty shots. The present allowance for these parts is inadequate. During the first thirty days of this period, thirty-six rings and fourteen retaining keys were replaced. On the basis of this expenditure, it is recommended that the following thirty days spare parts allowance for ships supporting a squadron of sixteen AD aircraft operating in the Korean Area be established:

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(Usage plus 25% excess)

Action requesting the establishment of this allowance is being initiated.
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1 FEBRUARY - 11 FEBRUARY 1953

TOTAL ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE BY SQUADRONS:

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HUNG ORDNANCE:

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All hung ordnance remained on racks

III-3

ENCLOSURE (1)
### Damage Inflicted on Enemy 7 - 31 January 1953:

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### Combat Loss of Aircraft:

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IV-2  ENCLOSEURE (1)
### DAMAGE INFlicted BY ENEMY TO OWN AIRCRAFT:

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**IV-3**

ENCLOSURE (1)
OPERATIONAL LOSS OF AIRCRAFT:

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IV-h

ENCLOSURE (1)
PART V
PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

1. The performance of Air Group Personnel during this period is considered excellent. Many difficulties encountered earlier due to utilization of strikers in certain ratings have been overcome because of the added experience and training gained during the past months.

CASUALTIES

1. An AD piloted by CDR J. C. MICHEEL, 85362, USN, Commanding Officer of V-923, was observed to crash while on a combat mission over North Korea on 1 February 1953. Anti-aircraft fire is considered the probable cause of the crash. A wing was observed to separate from the aircraft while in a dive. Neither pilot nor chute was observed to leave the airplane. CDR MICHEEL is listed as killed in action.
PART VI
OPERATIONS

1. During this third period with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, Carrier Air Group TWELVE flew a total of 1951 flights and flew 4,066 hours during 21.5 scheduled operational days. Approximately 7.5 days' operations were cancelled because of weather. The Air Group averaged 92.6 flights per operating day. The average total number of flights per pilot for the propeller aircraft was 15.2 and for the jet pilots was 18.8.

2. During the first two action periods, pilots of Fighting Squadron ONE TWO FOUR experienced several instances of wing "snatch" during recoveries from glide-bombing dives in F6U-4's. This wing "snatch" is best described as a tendency to snap roll during a wings level pullout commenced at an indicated airspeed in excess of 365 knots. It was frequently preceded by a mild buffeting, followed by wing heaviness, and resulted in a violent roll, more often to the left, with the ailerons' effectiveness greatly reduced. In some cases where the ailerons were effective in returning the plane to wings level flight, a violent roll in the opposite direction immediately developed. Released back pressure and loss positive acceleration only slightly alleviated the condition after it was established. No cases of wing "snatch" were experienced by this squadron during this period as a result of employing the following doctrine:

   a. Approach the target at an indicated airspeed of 165 knots or less.

   b. Just prior to commencing the dive, set the rudder and aileron tabs at NEUTRAL and the propeller at 2200 r.p.m.

   c. When rolling into the dive, retard the throttle to twenty inches manifold pressure.

   d. Enter the dive at an altitude of nine or ten thousand feet above the terrain; commence the pullout 3000 feet above it.

   e. During completion of the recovery, restrict use of the ailerons for jinking maneuvers to about one quarter of the stick lateral travel.

3. Early in this period the "daisy-cutter" fuze was authorized for use on the 260 pound fragmentation bombs carried by the night hecklers and the effectiveness of that bomb against trucks was significantly increased.

4. On night heckler missions requiring the use of flares, VC-3 Detachment GEORGE, has enjoyed increased effectiveness by combating the flare's glare with the following procedure:
a. The attacking aircraft of a two-plane section drops flares from about 3000 feet above the target.

b. The other plane remains four thousand feet higher, directly over the flare, where sighting of targets on the ground is not seriously hampered by the flare's glare.

c. The higher pilot spots targets and directs the lower pilot to them.

5. When an aviator has bailed out over enemy territory, it is felt that his immediate rescue is, for the most part, dependant upon the actions of his flight members. The greatest urgency and importance is placed upon sighting the pilot and/or crashed aircraft immediately and not looking away until they are accurately marked on the ground with reference to prominent landmarks. The senior flight leader present assumes command of the RESCAP and notifies the Task Force Commander. If he is not immediately informed that his flight will be relieved on station by another RESCAP flight within twenty minutes, the senior flight leader, as CTF-77's representative, requests RESCAP via the nearest Tactical Air Direction Center from the U.S. Air Force, which has a RESCAP flight on fifteen minutes stand-by.

6. Coordinated jet flak-suppression with propeller aircraft strikes against well defended targets has been most successful. Without exception the enemy's anti-aircraft fire has been greatly reduced in intensity and denied any accuracy. The following considerations in the conducting of jet flak-suppression are offered:

a. Conduct a joint briefing of the propeller and jet pilots. Review all the known flak positions within a ten mile radius of the target. The strike leader presents his attack plan.

b. Jets effect a running rendezvous with the earlier launched propeller strike group before reaching the target. This is expedited when the strike leader reports passing predetermined fixes to the jet leader.

c. A jet flight immediately precedes each element of the propeller group in its attacks. Repeated jet attacks afford protection for the retirement of the flight ahead as well as flak-suppression for the following element. If it is not feasible for the jets to attack between propeller attacks, the jets should make repeated runs, avoiding interference with the propeller aircraft's attacks.

Those jets not actually in an attack watch closely to pin-point firing anti-aircraft positions.
f. Repeated firing runs into a flak area are most effective. If the jet pilot does not see the actual gun installation, it is vitally important that he exert maximum fire on the coordinate fix of the reported area.
### SUMMARY OF FLIGHTS 7 - 31 JANUARY 1953

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<th>VF-121</th>
<th>VF-122</th>
<th>VF-124</th>
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<th>VC-3</th>
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Average Flights
Per Pilot
13.1  12.2  10.4  10.9  11.4  9.4  13.8  10.4  11.6

Average Flight
hours per pilot
19.6  19.0  26.5  28.7  24.8  23.6  34.2  17.0  23.4
### DECLASSIFIED

**SUMMARY OF FLIGHTS 1 - 11 FEBRUARY 1953**

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Average Flights
Per Pilot: 6.3 6.6 4.3 4.5 3.4 3.4 6.0 4.6 5.3

Average Flight hours per pilot: 10.1 10.3 11.5 12.8 7.5 8.8 16.8 7.3 11.0

**VI-5**

**ENCLOSURE (1)**
PART VII
SURVIVAL

1. There were three cases of ditchings due to accurate enemy anti-aircraft fire, two P38-5’s and one F4U-4. All three pilots abandoned their planes with their parachutes strapped tight and encountered no difficulties in leaving. Only one pilot inflated his Mae West in the water. The other two pilots did not because of the buoyancy afforded by the Mk IV anti-exposure suit.

2. [The Corsair pilot did not undo his parachute straps immediately after entering the water and found himself floating with his posterior high and dry and his head and shoulders underwater. In paddling to keep his face above water, he was unable to take time out and unbuckle the parachute straps. He did not attempt to use the Mae West because the parachute harness chest straps were still buckled. The helicopter was over the pilot right after his entry into the water and after much paddling the pilot got an arm through the sling. Halfway out of the water he lost his grip and fell back into the sea. The next attempted pick-up was normal. In the water less than five minutes, the pilot was exhausted and ill from fighting and drinking the salt water.]

3. The two jet pilots unbuckled their parachutes upon entry into the water and utilized their pararafts. Rescue was prompt (within fifteen minutes) and routine, one being by helicopter and the other by a destroyer.

4. [The following recommendations on ditching were made by the pilots:

a. Carry nothing but the special gloves in the lower leg pockets of the anti-exposure suit for ready utilization.

b. Do not roll and tie the gloves in a bundle because it is very difficult to untie in the cold water.

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PART VIII
MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL

1. Auto-acceleration and loss of **throttle control** is still being experienced. All cases that occurred during this period were under conditions similar to the thirty-nine cases reported previously. Cases ranged from slight increases in acceleration, to one case of sudden surging, resulting in a rich flame-out. The addition of alcohol appeared to eliminate auto-acceleration. However, concentrations of an amber colored precipitate were discovered after forty hours of operation and corrosion of fuel pressure and shut off valves, P/N 185018-1, occurred. This corrosion resulted in several cases of the throttle mechanically sticking. Pending permanent solution to the problem of auto-acceleration and corrosion occasioned by moisture, the following procedure is used:

a. Addition of two quarts of alcohol in the after fuselage tank per 1000 gallons of fuel.

b. Draining of fuel traps prior to each flight until no trace of alcohol or precipitate is noted.

c. After each instance of throttle sticking attributable to corrosion of the fuel pressure and shut off valves, the fuel line to the pressurizing valve and shut off cock is disconnected at the fuel control, drained of fuel and refilled with lubricating oil. The line is then connected and the throttle worked vigorously several times. This information has been furnished to activities concerned.

2. Some trouble was experienced with F9F-5 brakes seizing. When aircraft were inactive on the flight deck for prolonged periods during heavy weather, salt spray caused corrosion in the recessed surfaces of the magnesium brake housing and the brake lining, P/N 9520641. This has been the subject of an RUDM.

3. Material support during this period was considered highly satisfactory. Over sixty-five percent of ACOG aircraft were down less than one day. The items holding aircraft ACOG more than one day were F9F-5 nose sections and tail hooks, AD-4W fuel quantity gage, FLU-4 voltage regulator, and FLU-4 port elevator. One aircraft was ACOG six days because of a shortage of F9F-5 tail hook assemblies in this area. Seven more F9F-5 aircraft would have been ACOG for approximately ten days except for waiving the provisions of T.O. 48-52 by BuAer to permit 120 landings on each assembly. The normal usage of jet hook assemblies over a ninety day period of Korean combat averages twelve hook assemblies per sixteen plane squadron. Practically all aircraft in each squadron reach the one hundred landing limit at approximately the same date. Action requesting an increase in allowance is being initiated.
## DECLASSIFIED

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