From: Commander, Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO,
To: Commanding Officer, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV - 31).

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO for period of
8 August 1951 to 5 September 1951.

Ref: (a) CNO Instruction OP 342 serial 408P34 of 1 July 1951.

1. This report is forwarded for inclusion in the Action Report of the
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) as required by reference (a).

2. Information, comment and recommendations are presented under the follow-
ing headings:

I. MISSION AND COMPOSITION
II. CHRONOLOGY
III. ORDNANCE
IV. DAMAGE
V. PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES
VI. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
   A. OPERATIONS
   B. INTELLIGENCE
   C. MAINTENANCE
   D. ELECTRONICS
   E. SURVIVAL
   F. MEDICAL
   G. COMPOSITE SQUADRON TRANS.
      1. VC-3
      2. VC-11
      3. VC-35
      4. VC-61

I. MISSION AND COMPOSITION

1. MISSION. Carrier Air Group 102 departed YOKOSUKA, Japan, 8 August 1951, aboard the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) for the third period of duty in the
operating area. The mission of the Air Group was to fly close air support, armed reconnaissance, and strikes in support of the United Nations effort in
Korea as assigned in the Daily Air Plan promulgated by CFF 77.

2. COMPOSITION.

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This does not include the Air Group Executive Officer who flies the AD
or the Ast. Operations Officer who flies the F4U-4. Four LSOs are also
attached to the Staff in a flight status. The Electronics Officer and Air
Intelligence Officers fly frequently in the AD-4Q as observers.
Subject: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO for period of
8 August 1951 to 5 September 1951

II. CHRONOLOGY

1. A well rested and relaxed Air Group sortied YOKOSUKA HARBOR aboard the
USS JOHN HENRY HICKS on 8 August 1951, to rejoin Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
in the Sea of Japan. Hopes were high for an early truce and proof expected but a few days of operations before the KAESONG meetings would begin bearing fruit. How wrong we were is brought out in this Action Report.

2. Rendezvous was made on 10 August and at 0745 Air Group 102 resumed
offensive action against the North Koreans and their Chinese Allies, when
the first strikes were launched. A total of 59 sorties were flown, 50 offen-
sive and 19 defensive. Twelve barracks type buildings were definitely de-
stroyed and five houses left burning after one close air support mission,
diverted to armed recoo, had worked them over with napalm and strafing. Jet
photo reconnaissance planes completed their assigned tasks. Defensive ADSs
and CAPs were without vectors. Two F4Us were hit and flak was intense
throughout the day. In many sectors heavy barrage type AA was encountered.

3. On 11 August 90 sorties were flown, 68 offensive and 22 defensive. The
evry morning hecklers destroyed a large warehouse which was left a mass of
flames with smoke billowing 3,000 feet in the air. A locomotive undergoing
repair was further damaged and 10 persons working in the area were killed.
On other strikes three railroad bridges were severely damaged with one or
more spans being seen to drop after direct hits with high explosives. Three
gun emplacements were silenced after napalm attacks. Two planes were lost
within minutes of each other, an F4U piloted by LT. VINES of VF-49 was
seen to explode in an orange ball of flame shortly after beginning his dive.
Two runs later, another F4U piloted by LT Fred HODGKIN of VF-87 was
seen to explode in a similar manner. Both pilots are presumed dead. Cause of
the accidents is not definitely known but there is a strong probability that
faulty VT fusing and premature detonation is responsible.

4. On 12 August the Task Force replenished, no air operations were scheduled.

5. Sixty-nine sorties, 57 offensive and 12 defensive, was the box score on
13 August. Three gun positions, one a 120 MM, were destroyed by one CAS
flight. A large convoy of trucks was sighted in the vicinity of WONSAN
with 13 destroyed and 15 damaged. Shortly after take-off the last strike
was ordered to return to the ship. Rumors of a truce were flying but they
turned out to be only that, -- rumors. Reason for the recall was threatening
weather.

6. The Air Group was back in action again, on a full time basis, on 14 Aug.
throwing 60 offensive CAS missions, armed reconnaissance, and interdiction
flights against enemy troops and supply lines. Today could well be called
truck busting day. A large build-up of enemy transportation was sighted
and when the cargo was over 34 vehicles had definitely been destroyed and
more than twice that number severely damaged. In addition one CAS mission
was responsible for the destruction of 35 enemy troops dug in on a hillside.
Bridge strikes knocked down 1 span of 3 different railroad bridges on a
successful interdiction mission. Jet reconnaissance continued the harass-
ment of enemy roads and railroad repair parties, strafing and killing 83
workers. 24 defensive missions were flown, all without vectors.

7. Eighty-one bridge strikes, photo recoo, close air support and armed recoo
was the offensive total on 15 August. One span of a railroad bridge was
knocked down and one highway bridge destroyed after direct hits by F4Us and
ADSs. A close air support mission was credited with 100% coverage on an
every held ridge. The target area was known to be thickly populated with
enemy troops but no actual count of enemy casualties was given by the con-
troller. Twenty-one defensive sorties were flown with no vectors.

8. August 16 was replenishment day.

9. Poor weather cut down the number of sorties on 17 August when 62 flights
were launched, 40 offensive and 22 defensive. Interdiction missions were
10. On 18 August marginal weather continued. Three spans of a highway bridge dropped after direct hits with 500 pound bombs. One gun emplacement was destroyed and 100 troops attacked with napalm and machine guns but controllers gave an estimate of casualties. Seven boxcars were left burning and one railroad bypass bridge knocked out by other interdictive missions. One AD was hit resulting in loss of tail rudder control and made a safe landing aboard. In all, 73 offensive sorties were flown. The 17 defensive sorties were without vectors.

11. Taking advantage of poor flying weather the ship replenished on 19 Aug.

12. On the 20th and 21st of August Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN retreated before a much more formidable adversary than the Communists, -- the typhoon "HURICAN," and no flights were made.

13. Weather recce and defensive missions were flown on 22 August. The nite bicklers finally succeeded in penetrating to the Korean Coast, but assessment of their damage was impossible because of darkness. The pilots recommended that the launches be moved up so as to allow the planes to reach the target areas at dusk and in this CTF 77 concurred. In all 20 sorties were flown, four offensive and 16 defensive.

14. On 23 August the poor weather continued and no flights were launched.

15. The 24th of August found the Task Force sailing under clear skies and calm seas. Eighty offensive sorties were launched on Close Air Support missions, bridge strikes, armed recce and photo recce hops. Two railroad bridges were effectively bombed with two spans of each knocked down. One building was destroyed and 80% coverage assigned by the controller to a close air support flight. While on a photo escort flight, an F9F piloted by LT HUGHES of VF 781 was hit and forced to ditch without the knowledge of the photo plane. Strikes were diverted to search for the missing plane but to no avail until a special search mission of two ADFs was organized and led by the Air Group Commander, CDR L. H. FUNK. With but the meager information, CDR FUNK sighted the doomed pilot floating in his raft about 25 miles from shore. He orbited and vectored a destroyer to the vicinity and the rescue was made. Another plane was lost when an F4U, piloted by LT. Tom ALLARD of VF 674, failed to remain airborne at the bow, started a spin and hit the water. He was badly bruised and shaken up on impact but was picked up safely by the helicopter.

16. On the 25th of August, operating further North than at any other time, 72 sorties were flown, 42 offensive and 30 defensive. Many choice targets were located, a locomotive and string of ten cars were left blazing after one attack. On another, four railroad bridges were destroyed completely and another locomotive destroyed. Operating close to the Russian border and within easy range of shore based jet fighters, the very important Combat Air Patrols and anti-submarine patrols were without vectors.

17. The 26th of August found the Task Force back in familiar operating territory where 100 sorties were launched, 61 offensive and 19 defensive. One CAS flight working over entrenched troops with napalm and frag bombs was credited with 95% coverage by the air controller. A bridge strike knocked out 75 feet of a railroad bridge and destroyed 11 of 15 boxcars, while an MFP mission was effectively silencing a troublesome gun position in the Words pond area, with a direct hit with a 500 pound bomb. One F4U, piloted by LT HENRIKSON, was hit in the oil-cooler and forced to land on an emergency strip south of the bombline.

18. On 27 August the ship replenished and no flights were scheduled.
19. Two F4U-5N on armed weather recon was the extent of operations on 28 August. After bombing and destroying eight small buildings they were unable to return to Task Force and landed at K18. They returned without incident later in the day.

20. Under clearing skies 110 sorties were launched on 29 August, 82 offensive and 28 defensive. The nite hecklers opened the offensive by scoring a direct hit with a 1000# bomb on a large factory. An armed jet recon jumped a locomotive and left it burning after 20 Mi hits. An interdiction mission bombed 4 spans of a large railroad bridge while a close air support flight dropped napalm squarely on a group of 100 troops. On another CAS flight 3 ammo dumps and 3 artillery pieces were destroyed. Jet photo recon completed 100% of their assigned mission. The 

21. Seventy-six offensive missions and 31 defensive sorties were flown on 30 August. A flight of F4Us and AEs found a perfect target consisting of a large string of loaded box cars. After the attack ten blow up violently and the ensuing fire was visible over 40 miles. Close air support missions were successful when an estimated 70 troops were killed and 50% coverage of the target area assigned by the air controller. On still another CAS mission 40 troops were killed after napalm and fire bomb attacks while an interdiction mission was completely knocking out two railroad bridges and the spans of a highway bridge. One F4U, piloted by LT. PEDERSON of VF 29, was hit and forced to ditch off the coast but the pilot was picked up by a helicopter from the USS NEW JERSEY. Jet photo recon flights successfully covered their assigned targets. The defensive sorties found all vectors friendly.

22. On 31 August a total of 103 sorties were flown, 73 being offensive and 30 defensive. Continuing their interdiction and harassment of enemy supply lines, the planes of Air Group 103 destroyed three railroad bridges and one highway bridge. Twenty boxes were destroyed and six houses burned as a result of accurate napalm bombing by F4Us and AEs. A close air support mission knocked out one machine gun emplacement with a direct hit. One F4U piloted by LT. FUNK of VF 874 was hit and forced to return to the Task Force. Despite a wound in the foot, the pilot made a safe landing without incident.

23. On 1 September the Task Force replenished and no air operations were conducted.

24. The Air Group with 74 offensive sorties and 16 defensive was back in action once again on 2 September. Three jets on armed recon found a perfect target when they surprised and attacked a concentration of 1200 enemy troops. After ammunition was expended it was estimated that there were approximately 300 killed. Close air support missions continued their good work. A fuel dump and artillery dump blow up as the result of bombs and strafing. Fifteen railroad cars were destroyed by AEs and F4Us on interdiction flights. Two planes were lost, one to enemy action, the other operationally. An AD, piloted by LT. Joseph PETERS of VA 993, experienced engine failure shortly after takeoff and was ditched, the pilot was recovered. An F4U, piloted by LT. "Roy" BELL of VF 783, was hit by enemy fire. The pilot bailed out and was picked up by patrolling U.S. Marines. He suffered first and second degree burns about the face and legs before bail out.

25. Eight-six sorties were launched on 3 September, 67 offensive and 19 defensive. Close air support missions continued paying big dividends. One flight led by the Air Group Commander was credited with 50 enemy counted dead. The air controller said that it was the best Close Air Support mission he had ever witnessed. Another CAS flight was credited with 90% coverage on troops in bunkers. In the course of this attack, the planes strafed enemy concentrations 50 yards in front of friendly troops. Reconnaissance, bridge strikes and photo hops rounded out the day. One gun emplacement was destroyed by a well directed napalm. One highway bridge was demolished by a 500# bomb hit and one span of a railroad bypass was destroyed, two trucks were destroyed, a tank damaged and a highway bypass...
bridge knocked out by another flight. 3 jets on a rocco mission strafed and killed 15 troops and rocketed and damaged a tunnel entrance. Photo planes completed 100% of their assigned missions. All defensive ASPs and GCAPs were without vectors.

26. On 4 September, 95 sorties were launched, 73 offensive and 22 defensive. A close air support mission destroyed one blockhouse and 70 enemy troops with napalm and strafing attacks. 90% coverage was awarded by the air controller. A bridge strike dropped the center span of one large railroad bridge and destroyed two highway bridges. Five jet planes on reconnaissance severely damaged one camouflage tank and silenced one 40 Mm AA position. The photo planes covered all of their assigned targets, while all defensive missions were without vectors. One F4U, piloted by ZNS, Chester KREIDEN of VF 874, experienced engine failure on takeoff and was forced to ditch. Despite the explosion of the napalm bomb the pilot was rescued by a helicopter. Another F4U, piloted by LTJG "Bob" KNOO of VF 874, crashed after being hit by 30 Mm anti-aircraft fire while on a close air support mission. The pilot was not seen to leave the plane and is presumed dead.

27. On 5 September the ship replenished and then set full sail for YOKOSUKA and a well deserved end needed rest.

III ORDNANCE

A. SUMMARY. The summary of ammunition expended by Carrier Air Group 102 during the period 8 August 1951 through 5 September 1951 is contained in the action report submitted by the USS HONOLULU RICHARD.

B. AP ORDNANCE DISCREPANCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The .50 cal. rack has held up well and given better service during this second operating period.
   a. Possible malfunction of the solenoid plunger has been corrected by shimming the solenoid plunger guide to prevent canting of the plunger and binding within the solenoid. It has been found that the rack will operate much better with this shim. It is suggested or recommended that further investigation be made of this procedure in order to determine its effectiveness.

C. 50 ORDNANCE DISCREPANCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. GUNS .50 CAL.

   There were several instances of gun explosions during this period, that are still unexplained. Three of the explosions took place in the breech end of the barrel while the others were within six inches forward of the breech end. Each of the barrels have had approximately 5700 rounds fired. It was found in one case that the shell-like insert was separated from the main barrel to about 1/4" in depth. The type barrels used were D711580 J941-3 713-100, J941-3-713, and J941-3-710 which is recommended by BuOrd.

   Investigation and experiments have produced no explanation of the difficulty. As the situation is very critical it is recommended that immediate action be taken.

   A HUDDLE is being forwarded to the Bureau of Ordnance by each squadron concerned.

D. 50 ORDNANCE DISCREPANCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Considerable difficulty has been experienced with rockets misfiring due to the rocket projectile being severed in flight. Upon return of the aircraft these rockets frequently break loose when the aircraft is arrested thus creating a hazard to personnel and equipment. It has been noted that the projectile is severed approximately one inch below the plug. It is recommended that this pigtails be reinforced to prevent breaking while in flight.

E. SUPPLY.

1. The supply problem is still critical. As reported in the previous action report, spare parts are still not available, although on order.

F. GUNS.

1. During this period of operations there was one instance of an explosion in a .50 cal. gun. The gun exploded in the barrel just forward of the gas port. There are several possible reasons for this occurrence, such as, overheated guns, a bad round of ammunition, or faulty barrel. There is no record of the ammunition fired in this gun.
### A. DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT

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### B. LOSS OF AIRCRAFT

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### C. SUMMARY OF ACCIDENTS:

1. 11 August 1951 - F4U-4 blew up over Korea while in dive. Believed to be VT fuse. Pilot lost.

2. 11 August 1951 - F4U-4, blew up over Korea while in dive. Believed to be VT fuse. Pilot lost.


4. 24 August 1951 - F9F-23. Pilot returning from photo escort ditched at sea because fuel was exhausted. Pilot rescued after six (6) hours in lifeboat.

5. 26 August 1951 F4U-4. Hit by flick while on close air support mission. Pilot crash landed at emergency strip and was returned to ship.

6. 29 August 1951 AD-3. Hit by flick while on close air support mission. Pilot crash landed at emergency strip and was returned to ship.

7. 30 August 1951 F4U-4 Hit by AA fire while on strike. Ditched in sea. Pilot rescued by helicopter and returned to ship by DD.


9. 2 September 1951 F4U-4 Hit by AA fire while on close air support mission. Pilot bailed out. Rescued and returned to ship.

10. 4 September 1951 F4U-4 Engine cut out on takeoff. Ditched in front of ship. Pilot rescued by helicopter.

11. 4 September 1951 F4U-4. Hit by AA while on close air support mission. Pilot and plane lost.
### D. DAMAGE INFlicted ON ENEMY:

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V. PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

1. Morale continued high during the reporting period. Efficiency of the officers and men increased with experience, allowing a little more time for rest and respite from the grueling operating schedule.

2. The biggest problem confronting the Air Group at the end of this period is replacement of the 122 reserve enlisted personnel being lost in compliance with AFRY 63 cc 73. Replacements have been ordered by ComAirPac. It is unfortunate that the Group has to lose these men (almost all key personnel) at the height of combat tour. Accelerated “on the job” training is the only solution and means an even heavier work load for all hands. The Group is highly appreciative of the prompt action of the ComAirPac Enlisted Personnel Section in ordering replacements.

B. CASUALTIES:

1. LT. James J. VERES, 428311/1315, USNR.
   On 11 August 1951, LT VERES was flying an F4U-4 on a bridge strike over Korea when the plane exploded at approximately 5000 feet as a dive was commenced. The explosion was believed to be caused by a VT fused bomb going off before release. The pilot is presumed to be dead.

2. LT. Fred L. KOCH, 463370/1315, USNR.
   On 11 August 1951 while flying an F4U-4, LT KOCH was seen to enter a dive at 5500 feet. At about 2500 feet there was an orange flash under his port wing which sheared off the wing, causing the plane to crash. The pilot is presumed to be dead.

3. LT. Thomas F. ALLARD, 240393/1315, USNR.
   On 26 August 1951, while being deck launched, the engine popped on the takeoff run. At the bow of the ship the plane did not have flying speed, the left wing dropped off and the plane hit about 300 feet in front of the ship at approximately a 45 degree angle. LT ALLARD was thrown clear of the wreckage. The plane broke up and sank. He was rescued by helicopter and treated for shock and bruises.

4. LT. Robert G. HUGHES, 403090/1315, USNR.
   While piloting an F9F-2E on a photo escort mission over Korea, LT HUGHES became separated from the photo plane. With his radio inoperative he became lost while returning to the force. Turning back for the beach he ditched his plane approximately 20 miles off the coast of Korea when his fuel supply became exhausted. LT HUGHES landed into the wind and consequently with the high sea, nosed into the one hundred swells. The impact of the wave pushed the 20 mm guns in the nose into the cockpit resulting in a broken leg and numerous cuts and bruises for the pilot. He was rescued six hours later by a destroyer directed to the scene by the search planes.

5. POCKET, R. V., AB3
   On 29 August 1951, as plane captain for F9F aircraft, POCKET attempted to move a chock from the wheel of his plane. The blast from the plane directly ahead resulted in pinning his foot against the wheel. Evidently the director did not see this and the plane passed over his right foot causing a fracture to the 3rd metacarpal.

6. LT. Frank PILTZ, 414311/1315, USNR.
   While on a bridge strike in an F4U-4 LT PILTZ’s plane was hit in the cockpit by anti-aircraft fire resulting in a laceration of the right big toe. He immediately returned to the force, landed aboard and was taken to sick bay for treatment.

7. LT. Robert BELL, 419888/1315, USNR.
   While flying a close air support mission, LT BELL’s F4U-4 was hit by
anti-aircraft fire in the main fuel cell and burst into flames. On the
bailout LE BELL received first and second degree burns on the face and legs.
He was rescued by front line U.S. Marines and returned to the ship the next
day.

6. **ENSIGN Chester B. RINGEISEN, 539532/1310, USN.**

The F4U-4 piloted by ENSIGN RINGEISEN quit cold immediately after take-off.
Brilliant pilot technique afforded a perfect water landing. However, on
impact, the napalm and belly tank exploded spreading considerable fire through-
out the crash area. After impact, the plane continued on a straight course
for approximately 100 feet and stopped. ENSIGN RINGEISEN cleared the cock-
pit and swam away from the fire. He was rescued by the helicopter and returned
to the ship for treatment of burns on the face and hands and a sprained back.

9. **LTJG William H. NOBO, 506072/1315, USNR.**

On a close air support mission in central Korea, LTJG NOBO entered a dive
on some gun batteries. Automatic weapons fire was heavy and he was seen to
be hit in the engine and cockpit by a burst of 40 MM anti-aircraft fire by
the Tactical Air Control Pilot. He never recovered from the dive and was seen
to hit the ground and explode. Pilot reported dead.
VI. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. OPERATIONS

1. During this period the Air Group reached its potential in smoothness of operation. Air discipline was excellent at the target and around the ship. Lifting intervals were consistently under 30 seconds with individual planes coming in with intervals as low as 15 and 16 seconds. Several times the AD and Corsair flights averaged intervals of 20.5 seconds. Pilots took great pride in their intervals. Records were kept by the Air Group Staff Operations of the interval of all planes on launchings and recoveries. Typed copies were given each Squadron Operation Officer who went over the intervals with the pilots each evening at General Quarters.

This procedure created an intense rivalry. In fact, competition became so keen and pilots were coming in so close together that it was nip and tuck whether or not the first barrier would be up in time for a cut. Although the Group proved that intervals of 15 and 16 seconds are possible, it is felt that such an interval is not consistent with safety. It results in late wave-offs, possibility of slip-stream and grey or lost hair by LSOs. This Group believes the optimum average is 25 seconds and it is now Group policy to shoot for a 25 second recovery.

Launchings were efficiently and expeditiously handled by a now-experienced and top-notch flight deck crew.

The outstanding performance of the Group during this period was no surprise to the Group itself, with talent that averages 1700 hours per pilot and includes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 GDE</th>
<th>26 LAW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 LODR</td>
<td>98 LF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93 ENS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. A constant evaluation of offensive tactics, accompanied by changes and experiments, has been made necessary by the tremendous increase of AA fire during this reporting period. During the early stages of this Group's combat deployment, AA fire was limited. Attacks on bridges could be made in an IFP pattern by spacing the planes for individual bombing runs, and leisurely blasting the target with little or no opposition. Recently, and particularly since the breakdown of coast-fire tracts, the AA has increased to such an extent that a shift toward World War II tactics has become necessary. More and more, this Group is sending in strikes using a high-speed run-in and diving from out of the sun.

Close Air Support flights which were hazardous from small arms before are now doubly hazardous by the enemy's use of automatic weapons for air defense of front line troops. Flak suppression tactics are constantly being studied to combat this new development.

The intensity of AA is indicated by a summary of operations of one day, 31 August 1951, when this Group suffered damage to aircraft as follows.

**Enemy Damage 31 August 1951**

- D 022 Bullet hole in port wing
- D 027 Bullet hole in windshield, port elevator and stabilizer
- D 212 Bullet hole through leading edge port wing
- D 401 Flak hole starboard flap
- D 403 Flak hole vertical stabilizer and rudder
- D 405 Flak hole port wing
- D 411 Bullet holes starboard wing butt, hydraulic line thru cockpit
- D 413 Flak holes in engine cowling (0955 Flight)
- D 506 Flak hole in starboard horizontal stabilizer (1515 Flight)
- D 508 Flak holes outboard starboard wing and starboard flap
Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO for period of
8 August 1951 to 5 September 1951.

D 510 Flak hole in starboard wing tip
D 511 Flak hole starboard elevator
D 515 Flak holes in port wing
(D200 and D 400 aircraft are F4U-4s; D500 aircraft are AD3s)

Since this Group began combat operations on 31 May 1951, it has suffered
damage by anti-aircraft or small arms fire to 207 aircraft.

B. INTELLIGENCE

1. General Briefings and debriefings have become a steady routine. In
this type of operation there is an average of at least ten (10) briefings
each day. These are divided among the squadron Air Intelligence Officers.
This Air Group has only one jet squadron based aboard, therefore, the air
Intelligence Officer of that squadron has more briefings to conduct. Also,
with only one and one-half (1 1/2) hour flights, he has more debriefings.
The prop squadrons are debriefed in their respective ready rooms. All Air In-
telligence Officers have been doing an excellent job at debriefing, and compiling
of the numerous reports required. The Intelligence Department is now a steady
routine, operating division with good coordination between the ship’s
Intelligence division and the Air Group Intelligence Officers.

2. REPORTS: As reported in the Action Report, 10 May 1951 to 28 July 1951,
the air attack report needs revamping. It was with great pleasure indeed, that
a representative from the Operational Evaluation Group of the Chief of Naval
Operations was received on board for a conference on this and other matters
pertinent to operations. Almost cooperation was given by Paul COODIN and
the Group Intelligence Officers are anxiously awaiting results of recommen-
dations arising from these conferences. Under separate cover recommendations
for changes in the reporting system are being forwarded to the Chief of
Naval Operations via interested commands.

C. MAINTENANCE.

1. A very important factor governing aircraft availability in this operation
is the large amount of metal work to be performed. To date, aircraft operat-
ing from this command have suffered 207 cases of battle damage and 57 cases
of operational damage, a total of 264 aircraft being grounded for metal repairs.
In some cases aircraft have returned riddled with holes, some as large as
four to five inches in diameter and passing completely through the fuselage
of war, ripping and tearing out all stringers, ribs or extrusions in the
path of the projectile. The main problem does not seem to be lack of man
power but lack of experienced man power, i.e., men that have had extensive
training in aircraft metal work.

2. The second problem is the lack of adequate metal working equipment, such
as heat treating ovens, welding units, dimpling tools, etc. At present,
equipment of this nature is not allowed a class "D" maintenance activity.
Aircraft is frequently damaged on the first day of operation and by not
having the trained personnel and proper equipment to repair the damage, the
aircraft remains a dud, taking up valuable hangar deck space for a period
of three to four weeks until the ship returns to port where the aircraft is
unloaded.

3. It was found necessary to assign an ADC to the flight deck control to
coordinate the movement of aircraft needing maintenance from the flight deck
to the hangar deck. Prior to this, each squadron was making separate requests
to have their aircraft moved to the hangar deck whether the maintenance
problem was of major or minor importance. Thus, aircraft on earlier flights
and not requiring serious hangar deck maintenance were taking up all the
available space on the hangar deck forcing later aircraft to remain on
the flight deck. Assignment of the ADC was expedited the movement of aircraft from the flight deck to the hangar deck to a satisfactory
degree. Since aircraft troubleshooters report the discrepancies to the
coordinator who decides where to route the aircraft to eliminate having
available aircraft boxed in by others undergoing extensive overhaul.
D. ELECTRONICS

1. The performance of the airborne electronic equipment during this period continued to improve and excellent results were obtained with operating performance. Services of the NASEU Technician available during the previous period were dispensed with and it appeared that such services are not required except during the initial phase of fleet operations.

2. Electronic supplies continued to be a problem mainly from the procurement standpoint. Several critically needed parts have been on order for over six weeks with no apparent availability date yet established. It has been necessary in some cases to resort to removing satisfactory parts from equipment that had one or two defective parts in order to put another unit in operation. One of the items that is still on the critical list and still not available in the forward area is the pulse forming network for the AF-3A equipment. M2383 crystal tubes for the equipment are also not available and the Section K Allowance is below that required for operating the six months period. It is again recommended that a review be made by personnel familiar with fleet operations of the Section K Allowance lists.

3. During this period the main electronic equipment used were the same as shown in our report of 28 May to 28 July 1951. These consisted of the communication transmitter-receivers (AN/ARC-1), homing devices (AN/LMK-6 and AN/LMK-2) radio altimeters (AN/APM-1), IFF units (AN/AFX-1, AN/AFX-2 and AN/AFX-6) and radar (AN/AFS-19A). Continuous use was also made of the AN/AFS 20A radar equipment in the AD-4W aircraft. Performance of the AN/AFS-19A equipment was erratic at times and difficulty was experienced with sticking of the parasitic dipole. It has been necessary to replace three dipoles. In this connection, the Section K allowance for six months is one! It was therefore necessary to operate two of these units on search only, which prevented the use of the planes for heckler missions where the radar is used for joining up after striking a target.

4. A high casualty rate is still being experienced with the AFN-1 radio altimeter antennas on P-51 aircraft due to their location. Various preventive methods have been used and some reduction in breakage has been obtained. It is not expected that the reduction desired can be obtained with the present location of the antennas. During the first three months of operating aboard the carrier it has been necessary to replace approximately 70 antennas which is 64 in excess of the Section K allowance for the same period.

5. In connection with the maintenance of airborne electronic equipment, the AN/ARC-1 equipment used aboard destroyers are now being serviced aboard the carrier by Air Group personnel. It is believed that this will improve communication and it is recommended that a routine procedure be established whereby all AN/ARC-1 operating in the Carrier Task Force be serviced at regular intervals by the Air Group personnel.

6. Comairpac Instruction NAV 16.1a dated 14 July 1951 specifies the crystal allowance for AN/ARC-1 VHF transceivers to be stocked aboard aircraft carriers. The amount shown is not sufficient to permit satisfactory operation after the loss of a few aircraft or the establishment of operating spaces readily available when failure occurs. To date, loss of planes by this command has been 22 and it has therefore been necessary to obtain additional crystals on a rush basis. It is recommended that the carriers be permitted to increase the allowance list of those crystals used in fleet operation to 30 percent of the aircraft installations.

E. SURVIVAL

1. Over Land - The materials for four (4) more droppable survival kits are now available and are being assembled. This will make a total of seven (7) kits on hand. A second kit was dropped accidentally and a system has been initiated to double-check the release switches to insure against this accidental release. With the arrival of the ten (10) survival kits, as outlined in ComAirPac dispatch 010144 of September 1951, there will be a total of
Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO for period of
8 August 1951 to 5 September 1951

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seventeen (17) kits aboard. With these, the Air Group will be well prepared
for any emergency in connection with survival over land.

emergency water landing approximately twenty-five (25) miles off the coast of
Korea. The wind was fairly strong with rough seas showing large white
caps. This hindered visual search for the one man raft. LT HUGHES used
nearly all his flares during the five hours in the raft in an effort to
attract the attention of several planes that were in the vicinity searching.
The point of carrying many flares cannot be over-emphasized. One pilot aboard
carries eleven (11) flares even at the sacrifice of other survival gear.

3. Conditioning Room - The decontamination spaces on the C-2 level, forward,
port side, were turned over to the Air Group survival officer for use as a
conditioning room for pilots of the air Group. This has proved very satis-
factory and is in constant use throughout the day. It is also available to
the ship officers. It is recommended that a rowing machine be allocated
each ship for use in the conditioning room.

F. MEDICAL.

1. Venereal disease has been the most important problem confronting the
Medical Department. Although advised of the problem before leaving San Diego
its full import was not realized until the past month. Certain measures were
adopted to minimize the incidence of V.D. Adequate warning and instructions
were given to each and every officer and man in the Air Group through lectures
and movies. Every man was advised that condoms and pro kits were available
and that penicillin and sulfadiazine tablets should be used after exposure.
In spite of this, a relatively high percentage of the cases reported did not
use all the facilities available, nor were they used properly. All Venereal
Disease treated by this department falls into two groups, Gonorrhea and
Chancroid. As yet, there has been no syphilis, lymphopathia venereum or
granuloma inguinale. The results of treatment have not been encouraging.
In approximately one-third of the cases of gonorrhea it has been necessary
to use more than one course of treatment. The treatment of chancroid has
been very satisfactory.

2. A thirty day medical restriction is automatically effected when a man
is diagnosed as V.D. If at the end of thirty days he is not considered cured,
he is kept on restriction until thought to be non-infectious.

3. Following is a table showing the number of cases of V.D. and incidence
rates by months:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gonorrhea</th>
<th>Chancroid</th>
<th>Incidence rates per thousand per annum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>122.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>613.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined totals for the 3 mos.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>253.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. COMPOSITE SQUADRON TRAINING.

VC-3S

1. Flares. At the present time the VA(N) aircraft are usually scheduled so that
they arrive over the target area during twilight. There are ample targets
to be found at this time and usually the ordnance load can be expended without
the aid of flares. Under certain weather conditions and when launching time
or position has been such that the aircraft have arrived over the target area
in total darkness, sufficient flares have not been available. In order to
conduct successful operations in total darkness, a flare container must be
made available for the carrier aircraft. One aircraft will have to carry all the
flares and be accompanied by two attack aircraft. A suitable flare load would
be fifty NF 8 flares. It is recommended that work on a flare container be given a high priority so that tactics for its use may be developed under combat conditions.

2. Aircraft. The night attack team from VC-35 has only two AD-4N aircraft. One AD-4N is used for the night ASP and the other is used as the lead plane for night hooker missions. AD-3 aircraft are used to accompany the AD-4N hooker. Aircraft have been equipped with anti-glare shields over the exhaust stacks and the lights and instruments have been given special attention to make them suitable for night work. The ASP-4 radar is installed prior to flight. The limitations of this aircraft for night or all-weather operation is realized. The pilots prefer to accept flying inferior aircraft rather than not fly the missions. It is recommended that VA(N) team be assigned four VA(3) aircraft.

3. Utilization. The pilots of the night attack team from VC-35 have been scheduled with the pilots of VA-925 on day strikes. It is recommended that night attack pilots continue to be scheduled on day strikes until there are sufficient night flights to allow each pilot to fly every day.

4. Night Landings. When aircraft enter the landing pattern, the pilots must fly half contact and half on instruments. This type of flying is hazardous and it accelerates pilot fatigue. Once the pilots reach the operating area there is no opportunity to practice instrument flying and pilot proficiency is not at a high level. One of the most dangerous parts of the approach is immediately following the break-off upwind. It is recommended that special visual lookout be assigned to keep track of all aircraft entering the landing pattern.

5. Turn and Bank Indicator. The black ball in the turn and bank indicator is not sufficiently illuminated for night flying in AD type aircraft. All the pilots have been using their flashlights to see this part of the instrument. Use of a flashlight spoils night vision. When the pilot desires to check this instrument he usually has both hands busy flying the airplane. It is inconvenient to operate the flashlight at this time. It is recommended that steps be taken to convert the lighting deficiencies of the turn and bank indicator.

6. Radio altimeter. The radio altimeter in the AD-4N is not as easy to read as the radio altimeter in the AD-3 when it is used during a carrier approach. This fact is due to the difference in scale markings. The AD-3 radio altimeter is calibrated for 400 feet on the low scale and has a prominent mark at 100 feet which approximates the desired reading during a carrier approach. The AD-4N radio altimeter is calibrated for 800 feet on the low scale and has no prominent mark at 100 feet. This radio altimeter is essential for safe operations at night because the pressure altimeter is not completely reliable. It is recommended that a study be made to determine a better method of marking the radio altimeter in the range used for a carrier approach.

7. Generator Warning Lights. The generator warning lights are so bright that they spoil night vision of the pilots. It is recommended that these lights be modified so that they may be dimmed at the discretion of the pilot.

OTHER VC UNITS

1. The other VC teams are not offering comment at this time.
VII CONCLUSION

1. The Air Group received several "Well Done" during this operating period. Statements such as "commendable initiative"; "skill demonstrated"; and "you've just made the best close air support I've seen in the Korean War" make Air Group 102 more convinced than ever that it is the best Air Group in the U. S. Navy.