From: Commander, Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HOMER RICHARD (CV-61)


Ref: (a) CNO Instruction OP 342 ser 408F34 of 1 July 1961

1. This report is forwarded for inclusion in the action report of the U.S.S. HOMER RICHARD (CV-61) as required by reference (a).

2. Information, comment and recommendations are presented under the following headings:

   I. MISSION AND COMPOSITION
   II. CHRONOLOGY
   III. ORDNANCE
   IV. DAMAGE
   V. PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES
   VI. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
      A. OPERATIONS
      B. INTELLIGENCE
      C. MAINTENANCE
      D. ELECTRONICS
      E. SURVIVAL
      F. MEDICAL
      G. COMPOSITE SQUADRON TEAMS
         1. VC-3
         2. VC-11
         3. VC-35
         4. VC-61

1. MISSION. Carrier Air Group 102 departed Yokosuka, Japan 17 September 1961 aboard the U.S.S. HOMER RICHARD (CV-61) for the fourth period of duty in the operating area. The mission of Carrier Air Group 102 was to fly close air support, armed reconnaissance, and strikes in support of the United Nations effort in Korea as assigned in the Daily Air Plan promulgated by CTF 77.

2. COMPOSITION.

   UNIT  | TYPE | A/C  | A/C  | PILOTS | PILOTS
   ----- |------ |------ |------ |-------- |--------
   CAG 102 | CDR H.J. JUNK |
   VF-781 | 18 |
   9/17  | 18  |
   10/18 | 31  |
   10/18 | 31  |
   VF-783 | 15 |
   LCDR C.L. OVELAND PRO2B |
   10/18 | 18  |
   10/18 | 26  |
   25    |
   VF-784 | 15 |
   LCDR J.O. ANTHONY F4U-4 |
   10/18 | 13  |
   10/18 | 26  |
   20    |
   VF-933 | 15 |
   LCDR D.L. WATTS F4U-4 |
   10/18 | 13  |
   10/18 | 27  |
   27    |
   10/18 | 20  |
   VC-3  | 3   |
   LCDR E.W. WILEY AD-3 |
   3     | 2   |
   2     |
   2     |
   LT R.R. WISE F4U-5NL | 4 |
   10/18 | 4   |
   10/18 | 6   |
   6     |
   VC-11 | 3   |
   LT L.E. KIRK AD-4W |
   3     | 3   |
   3     | 6   |
   5     |
UNIT  | TYPE | A/C  | A/C  | PILOTS | PILOTS  
-----|------|------|------|--------|--------  
VC-25 | A/C  | 9/17 | 10/18| 9/17   | 10/18   
LCDR A. WALDMAN | AD-4N | 2    | 2    | 6      | 6      
VC-61 | F9F-2F | 3    | 3    | 4      | 4      
LT W. WESTMORELAND |  

This does not include the Air Group Executive Officer who flies the AD or the Assistant Operations Officer who flies the F4U-4. Four LSOs are also attached to the Staff in a flight status. The Electronics Officer and the Air Intelligence Officers fly frequently in the ADs-4 observers.

II. CHRONOLOGY

1. Carrier Air Group 103 aboard the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD departed Yokosuka, Japan at 0600 on 17 September for its fourth combat cruise against the North Korean Communists and their Chinese allies. Three pilots, LT Tom Allard of VF-674, ENS Chester Ringelisen of VF-783, and LT Bob Hughes of VF-781 were left behind for further treatment of injuries sustained during the preceding tour. In addition to a new night fighter team, five replacement pilots were aboard to fill our ranks depleted by the accurate fire of the enemy.

2. An attempt was made on the 18th of September to refresh all new pilots but because of unfavorable winds, the effort had to be abandoned.

3. Rendezvous was affected with Task Force 77 in the Sea of Japan on the afternoon of 19 September and on the following day operations were begun with 91 sorties being launched, 75 offensive and 16 defensive. The tactical situation had changed little, if at all. The same bridges or their rebuilt bypasses were still there to be bombed and bombed again. The enemy had many more railroad cars to be sought out and destroyed, supply dumps to be burned, and motor vehicles to be intercepted. Last but not least, the anti-aircraft defenses were at the old stand operating with the same efficiency and accuracy. Nine 100-foot boats were destroyed by the early morning hoeklers; five rail-road bridges were hit with one or more spans knocked down; a Close Air Support mission was most effective with friendly troops being able to move in on an enemy held ridge shortly after the last plane had finished its run. The anti-aircraft fire was intense with three planes being hit on one strike.

4. The 21st of September started auspiciously when a night fighter piloted by LT Scudder of VC-3 on a pre-dawn launch drilled off the bow after a defective catapult shot. The pilot was picked up uninjured by the destroyer plane guard. In all, 98 sorties were launched, 82 being offensive and 16 defensive consisting of Close Air Support missions, bridge strikes, Naval gun fire spots, jet armed reconnaissance, photographic sorties, anti-sub patrols and Combat air Patroils. Two warhouses were destroyed by one flight after their primary mission, a large railroad bridge, had been knocked out. Jet armed reconnaissance worked over 150 troops but results were undetermined. F4Us on flak suppression knocked out two and silenced four gun positions. Photo planes completed one-hundred per cent of assigned missions, all defensive missions were without vectors.

5. On 22 September the Task Force replenished and no air operations were conducted.

6. One locomotive, three railroad bridges, eleven railroad cars and ten ox-carts were the offensive score on 23 September when 64 sorties were launched. In addition, the approaches to two other bridges were seeded with 2,000 pound delayed action bombs. Weather restricted the photo planes but they covered seventy per cent of their assigned targets.

7. Sixty-two offensive and 10 defensive missions were launched on 24 September. Despite vigorous anti-aircraft opposition, a flight of 14 ADs and F4Us knocked out two spans of one railroad bridge and planted a 1,000 pound delayed action bomb in the middle of another. The flight did not escape unscathed however. An F4U piloted by LTG Roberts of VF-874 was hit and forced to ditch in Wonsan Harbor. He was picked up uninjured by helicopter. Another strike had a field day hitting a large group of loaded box cars. When the last bomb had been dropped, 15 had been blown up and destroyed while 10 were left burning. The night hoeklers
closed out the day by destroying three buildings and kindling a large fire in a
factory.

8. Apple blossoms and dead Chinese littered the North Korean landscape on 25
September after a flight of 14 piston had bombed, napalmed, and strafed an
orchard and adjoining town reported to be a bivouac area containing over 1,000
enemy troops. The site was extremely well covered and strike leaders reported
that if intelligence was correct, the toll of enemy casualties must have been very
high. A bridge struck out its primary target in five places then proceeded to
destroy five trucks and 12 buildings. The jets surprised 200 of the enemy
encamped in a field and estimated one-third casualties. In all, 87 sorties were
flown, 15 defensive and 72 offensive. All defensive missions were without vectors.


10. On the 27th of September, the "police action" was resumed with interdiction
and armed reconnaissance missions along the enemy's main supply routes. One
strike accounted for six railroad bridges and one highway bridge in addition to
ten buildings destroyed and 12 others left burning. The jets scored three rocket
hits on a tank, destroyed three heavy trucks and killed an estimated 20 troops
accompanying the convoy. The Air Group lost two more planes to enemy action—
LRG Brown of VF-73 piloting an F4U was hit and forced to ditch his plane on a
river sand bar. A rescue was speedily organized by the strike leader, LGR Harnen,
and by continuous strafing and frag bombing, the enemy was prevented from
effecting the capture. After about an hour, a helicopter appeared and the rescue
was made. During the rescue, 20 troops were seen to fall, the victims of accurate
strafing and bombing. The second casualty was an AD-3 piloted by LT Bob Sennard
of Va-923. He was hit by small arms fire near bus but nursed his plane to the beach
before the oil pressure failed and he was forced to ditch. He was picked up
speedily by a helicopter. In all 84 missions were flown, 66 offensive and
16 defensive.

11. On 26 September and 29 September little was accomplished because of adverse
weather conditions in the target areas. Thirty-two sorties were flown these two
days, 10 offensive and 22 defensive. On the following day the Task Force
replenished.

12. On 1 October 13 defensive and 68 offensive sorties were launched, a rail-
road marshalling yard and roundhouse, the latter sheltering three locomotives,
was bombed and extensively damaged by one flight of ADs and F4Us. A railroad
bridge and five factory buildings were destroyed by another flight. Offensively
the enemy scored three hits on our planes. One F6F made a one-wheel landing
aboard the Son Hoine Richard with but minor damage.

13. A rocket that fell a little short of its intended target accounted for 15
enemy casualties to start off the day of 2 October when a total of 89 sorties
were launched. An F4U in armed reconnaissance spotted a group of 15 troops
crossing a wooden bridge. Before the pilot could press home the attack, the
enemy had taken cover under the bridge. Trying at least to destroy the bridge a
rocket attack was made, undershot and hit below and in the midst of the troops
blowing them up and incidentally the bridge. In addition, 13 large rail-cars
were made by a flight of piston aircraft and one large railroad bridge was
battered and rendered inoperable. All defensive missions were without vectors.

14. The enemy inflicted heavy losses on the Air Group on 3 October, knocking
three of our planes out of the sky. An F4U-4 piloted by LT L. A. GUNDER of
VF 874 was hit while on a Naval Gunfire spot, forcing him to bail out at low
altitude. His chute appeared to open in a normal manner but when a destroyer
reached him 15 minutes later, he was dead, apparently a victim of drowning.
LT GUNDER was one of the most capable strike leaders in his squadron. He was
the eighth Air Group pilot killed. Another F4U-4, piloted by LT Les DOWNS of
VF 763 was hit while on a bridge interdiction mission. He was able to fly his
plane to within 15 miles of the Coast before it finally burst into flames and
he was forced to bail out. He landed safely, a rescue was set up, and the
pilot was picked up by helicopter. He suffered painful but superficial burns
while abandoning the aircraft. An AD-3 piloted by LRG FRIDEB of VC-25 was hit
in the engine accessory section and forced to return to the Task Force. While
on the down-wind leg of his approach the badly smoking engine quit and a success-
ful water landing was made. The pilot was quickly picked up by the helicopter

(3)

of the HOP WIDOW RICHARD. Offensively the Group scored eleven rail cuts on an enemy rail line as well as knocking down one span of a large railroad bridge. In addition, a recce was flown over a downed South African pilot until the rescue was made. In all 75 sorties were flown, 10 defensive and 65 offensive.

15. October 4th was replenishment day for the Task Force and no flight operations were conducted.

16. On 5 October 62 sorties were launched, 16 defensive and 46 offensive. Three strike groups accounted for 53 different cuts on important enemy railroad supply routes. Four trucks and two buildings were burned and destroyed by the dawn hecklers. Photo reconnaissance completed 100% of their assigned missions while all defensive vectors were friendly. The enemy struck back, hitting another F4U with 40 MM fire forcing the pilot, LTG INGLIS, to ditch his plane in the middle of a shallow river. Once again a recce was set up and accurate strafing kept the enemy busy while the pilot waited for the helicopter which appeared after forty-five minutes to affect the rescue. Of particular interest was the manner in which the pilot aided his own cause by employing for the first time a method of indicating to friendly planes the quarter from which enemy fire was heaviest, and the direction in which the planes should strafe. It is a simple device consisting of a large piece of vivid red cloth cut in the shape of an isosceles triangle. The cloth, when placed on the ground or on the wing of the aircraft with apex pointing at the concentration of fire, is clearly visible from 1000 feet. Ironically enough the method was devised by LT INGLIS himself in his role of Survival Officer for his squadron. 

17. Six bridges, six trucks, one tank, two jeeps and 14 rail cuts were the offensive totals of 5 October. In all, 83 sorties were launched, 66 offensive and 16 defensive. On the debit side the enemy accounted for two more of our aircraft. LTG BAILEY, VA 93B, was hit and forced to ditch his AD off the North Korean Coast. He was picked up safely by helicopter. An F4U piloted by LTG SCHREER of VF 974 was also forced to ditch in the water after receiving 20 and 40 millimeter hits in the engine and was picked up in a matter of minutes by a motor launch from a U.S. cruiser.

18. Routine interdiction missions, armed and photo reconnaissance, combat air patrols and anti-submarine patrols were continued on 7 October. A total of 80 sorties were flown, 64 being offensive and 16 defensive. The jets surprised and destroyed five oxcarts and twenty-six enemy troops. One interdiction mission broke railroad lines in four places in addition to destroying five buildings and firing two oil dumps. Photo planes completed their job 100%, the defensive missions were without vectors.

19. On 8 October the Task Force replenished.

20. On the 9th of October a total of 80 offensive and defensive sorties were flown. Highlight of the day was a special strike, led by the Air Group Commander, on a strategic mining town and the battalion headquarters of the enemy. Complete tactical surprise resulted and before an enemy gun could be brought to bear the first bombs were raining down. Eighteen barracks, three locomotives and a transformer were destroyed. A large administration building (one of the primary targets) was saturated with napalm then blown to bits by a 1000 pound bomb. So complete was the destruction it was difficult to identify the wreckage as a building in the after strike photos. If there were in the area any Caucasians with pro-Communist leanings, they were exposed to a demonstration of the destructive power of a U.S. Naval Task Force. Rail snatches continued the harassment of enemy supply lines, breaking railroad in twenty-four places. Jets placed rockets in two tunnels, twisting and breaking the rails and killing seven of 18 workers in the vicinity. All defensive missions were without vectors.

21. Despite threatening weather and low ceiling on 10 October, ADs and F4Us succeeded in splitting enemy rail lines in 25 places. The day was climaxed when two jets on armed reconnaissance completely destroyed 40 oxcarts and 36 troops.

The carts, evidently loaded with ammunition, blew up violently after a few hits with 20 MM cannon fire. Impossible flying conditions cancelled out one piston strike and the site hecklers and a total of 58 sorties were flown.

22. On 11 October, 75 sorties was the contribution to the police action made by the Reserve squadrons of St. Louis, Oakland and Los Alamitos. Of these, 38 were offensive and 12 defensive. In addition to many rail cuts and three bridges destroyed, a flight of jets intercepted and destroyed five large, heavily loaded trucks. With the able assistance of our brothers in arms from the U.S.S. ESSEX a special strike mission, co-ordinated by CDR H. E. FUNK, was launched against a town said to contain many thousand troops. Eighty per cent of the buildings in the area were destroyed together with three large warehouses. Enemy troops were seen everywhere running for the doubtful shelter of buildings that a few minutes later were hit with 1000# bombs.

23. All hands relaxed on Columbus Day while the Task Force replenished.

24. Operations were drastically curtailed by poor weather on 13 October, a total of 38 offensive and defensive missions being flown. Two locomotives were damaged by strafing while two strikes succeeded in breaking enemy rail lines in 31 places.

25. Low ceiling and poor visibility continued to restrict offensive operations on 14 October when but 12 offensive and 4 defensive sorties were launched. However the damage inflicted on the enemy was out of proportion to the number of flights. The one and only strike group launched fell upon an estimated 600 to 800 enemy troops. Sixty-six strafing and bombing runs were made with pilots reporting an estimated 300 casualties.

26. Poor weather abated somewhat on 15 October when 66 offensive and defensive missions were flown. Interdiction and rail breaking strikes were continued with eleven rail cuts made and four buildings and two warehouses destroyed. Two troop carriers were hit by rockets and twenty of the enemy killed. Photo missions were able to complete all their assignments while all defensive missions were without vectors.

27. On 16 October a total of 80 sorties were flown, 68 offensive and 12 defensive. A jet sweep was diverted to attack a locomotive. The target was located and destroyed with 3 direct rocket hits. Pistols continued their effective disruption of enemy rail lines, breaking track in 36 places in addition to toppling one or more spans of four railroad bridges. Photo missions were able to complete all their missions and the defensive vectors were friendly.

28. On 17 October the Task Force replenished and late that evening set sail for YOKOSUKA for a well deserved rest.
DECLASSIFIED


DAILY SORTIES SCHEDULE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>OFFENSIVE</th>
<th>DEFENSIVE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>HURS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 20</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 September includes 16 close air support sorties. None have been flown since that date.

III. ORDNANCE

A. SUMMARY. The summary of ammunition expended by Carrier Air Group 102 during the period 18 September 1951 to 18 October 1951 is contained in the action report submitted by the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD.

B. ANNO 14 COMBINATION BOMB RACK AND ROCKET LAUNCHER. During this period it is noted that one squadron developed a little difficulty with the arming solenoid. It has been necessary in each instance to change the complete rack inasmuch as the solenoid is inaccessible. It is recommended by this command that close maintenance checks be conducted both before and after flights. One F9F-4 squadron in their maintenance checks has instituted a light oiling procedure which has proved quite effective.

C. BOMBS. An increase in the number of duds has been experienced during this period when the VT fuse and .50 second delay tail arming has been employed for the interdiction missions. When a VT fuse is employed, it is recommended that the tail fuse be non-delay.
Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO for period of 18 September 1951 to 18 October 1951

IV. DAMAGE

A. DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF PLANE</th>
<th>NUMBER HIT</th>
<th>CAUSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9F-2F</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4U-5NL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4N</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD-4Q</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9F-2F</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. LOSS OF AIRCRAFT

1. Not returned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Bu. No.</th>
<th>Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/20/51</td>
<td>VC-3</td>
<td>F4U-5NL</td>
<td>124556</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/21/51</td>
<td>VC-3</td>
<td>F4U-5NL</td>
<td>124657</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/24/51</td>
<td>VF-274</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>82076</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/51</td>
<td>VF-274</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>82088</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/51</td>
<td>VA-923</td>
<td>AD-3</td>
<td>122730</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/3/51</td>
<td>VT-274</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>97286</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/3/51</td>
<td>VT-274</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>81381</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/5/51</td>
<td>VA-923</td>
<td>AD-3</td>
<td>122738</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/8/51</td>
<td>VF-874</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>97207</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/16/51</td>
<td>VF-874</td>
<td>F4U-4</td>
<td>81488 (Essex off-load)</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Returned (Off-loads).

   a. F4U-4 Bu. No. 80765. Due to high winds wing loaded with bombs dropped to the extended position causing wing root damage.

   b. F4U-4 Bu. No. 97069. Port wing damaged by 40MM anti-aircraft fire while on flight over North Korea. Pilot returned to ship and landed without incident.


C. SUMMARY OF ACCIDENTS

1. On 20 September 1951, and F4U-5NL while on morning heckler mission over North Korea was hit by anti-aircraft fire approximately 20 miles west of Wonsan. Pilot ditched in Wonsan Harbor and was recovered by destroyer.

2. On 21 September 1951 - F4U-5NL lost directly ahead of the ship as it was being launched for pre-dawn heckler mission. Cause believed to be defective catapalt shot. Pilot was recovered by destroyer.

3. On 24 September 1951 - F4U-4 hit by anti-aircraft while on bridge strike. Pilot ditched in Wonsan Harbor and recovered by destroyer.

4. On 27 September 1951 - F4U-4 hit by anti-aircraft fire while on a bridge strike. Pilot crash landed on sandbar and was rescued by helicopter. Plane destroyed.
Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO for period of
18 September 1951 to 18 October 1951

6. On 27 September 1951 - AD-3 hit by anti-aircraft fire while on bridge strike.
Pilot ditched at sea and was rescued by helicopter.

6. On 3 October 1951 - F4U-4 hit by anti-aircraft fire while on naval gun fire
spot. Pilot bailed out as plane caught fire and was picked up by destroyer.
Pilot pronounced dead by duty corpsman when picked up.

7. On 5 October 1951 - F4U-4 hit by anti-aircraft fire while on rail cutting
strike east of Yangdok. Pilot attempted to make Wonsan Bay but forced to bail
out 30 miles west of Wonsan. Pilot rescued by helicopter.

8. On 5 October 1951 - AD-3 while returning to ship for emergency landing
after being hit by anti-aircraft fire, lost power in the traffic circle and
ditched forward of ship. Pilot rescued by helicopter.

9. On 5 October 1951 - F4U-4 hit by anti-aircraft fire while on strafing run.
Pilot crash landed in North Korea and rescued by helicopter. Plane destroyed.

10. On 6 October 1951 - AD-3 hit by anti-aircraft fire while on rail strike.
Pilot ditched at sea and rescued by helicopter.

11. On 6 October 1951 - F4U-4 hit by anti-aircraft fire while on naval gun
spot mission. Pilot ditched at sea and rescued by cruiser.

12. On 16 October 1951 - F4U-4 transferred to U.S.S. Essex for refueling follow-
ing emergency landing as a result of enemy anti-aircraft fire.

D. DAMAGE INFlicted ON ENEMY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
<th>PROBABLY DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotive</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad cars</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnels</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Dumps</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo Dumps</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Dumps</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ore Mine</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ore Mining Plant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roundhouses</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Station</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber Piles</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Tank</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops Killed</td>
<td>991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail cuts</td>
<td>291</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway cuts</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total number of troops killed are only those confirmed. There were a
total of 2697 troops attacked in the above flights. These figures do not
include a special strike flown jointly by the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD and
U.S.S. Essex against an estimated 300 buildings housing troops and ammunition.
When confirmed damage assessment reports of this strike are received, these
figures will be raised substantially.
DECLASSIFIED

Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO for period of
18 September 1951 to 18 October 1951.

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Personnel Performance

1. On 30 September, 100 enlisted men were transferred to the USS BOXER for return to the U.S. for separation with ALVAW 62 and 73. Replacements were under orders but only about half had arrived on 30 September. Practically all the men being separated were chiefs and rated men and the loss was keenly felt. The remaining men worked harder than ever to meet the rigid operating schedule. Morale was high and the job was done. Replenishment periods between 30 September and 17 October brought additional replacements and the Air Group forecasts no personnel problem for the remainder of the combat tour.

2. During this operating period, three aviators were temporarily grounded awaiting permanent revocation of duty involving flying by BuPers. Two were grounded at their own request; the third, physically as a result of weak eyes.

3. Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO left YOKOSUKA at the beginning of this period with a new night fighter team. The team that deployed with the Group was relieved after three months of combat operation. It is recommended that, for morale purposes, both the night fighter and night attack teams serve the same length of combat tour. The night attack team of this Group will have served a full combat tour of six months when the Group is relieved.

B. CASUALTIES

1. LT. R. E. SCHOBER, 364601/1315, USNR.
   On 21 September 1951, LT. SCHOBIR received mild abrasions of extremities and a strain of the lower back and neck as a result of a defective catapult shot. His F4U-5NL "taxied" off the bow on the morning launch. The pilot was picked up by the guard destroyer and returned to the ship.

2. LTO J. W. ROBERTS 504285/1315, USNR.
   On 24 September 1951 LTO ROBERTS received a small abrasion of the left index finger as a result of ditching his F4U-4 in WONSAN harbor. He was picked up by helicopter.

3. LTO R. C. BROWN, 499965/1310, USN.
   On 27 September 1951 LTO BROWN received abrasions of the extremities and chin as a result of a crash landing after his plane was hit by anti-aircraft fire. He was rescued by helicopter.

4. LT. L. A. GUNDELD, 157636/1315, USNR.
   On 3 October 1951 LT GUNDER received injuries, causing his death as a result of the ensuing fire after his plane was hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire. Recovering from a run he was seen to parachute from his burning Corsair at an altitude of approximately 500 feet. His parachute opened properly at approximately 150 feet and when picked up by the destroyer his "Go West" was inflamed but he was pronounced dead by the duty corpsman. He was reported burned and with water in his lungs. Definite cause of death is unknown by this command. LT GUNDER's body was transferred to Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, for disposition.

5. LTO R. L. DOWNS, 622169/1310, USN.
   On 3 October 1951 LTO DOWNS received first and second degree burns of the face, neck, knees, ankles and wrists as a result of the ensuing fire after his plane was hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire while on a strike mission. He parachuted from the burning F4U-4 at 36 miles west of WONSAN and was rescued by helicopter.

6. LT. R. C. INGLE, JR., 455365/1315, USN.
   On 5 October 1951 LT INGLE received multiple contusions and abrasions and a small shrapnel wound on the right cheek as a result of enemy anti-air-
Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO for period of 18 September to 19 October 1952

Craft fire. He crashed landed his F4U-4 in North Korea and was rescued by helicopter.

7. USS C. O. BAILEY, 507926/1310, USN
   On 6 October 1951 USS BAILEY received a sprain of the lower back as a result of ditching his AD-3 off the east coast of Korea. He was rescued by helicopter.

8. LNC R. O. SORENSEN, 470604/1315, USNR
   On 6 October 1951 LNC Sorenson received a sprain of the back and neck as a result of ditching his F4U-4 off the east coast of Korea. He was picked up by a nearby cruiser.

VI. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. OPERATIONS

1. The Air Group continues to operate with the alertness befitting a veteran organization. With the departure of the BOXER and CVG 101, Air Group 102 became the senior group in length of service in the Korean area. Take off, rendezvous, break-ups and landings became strictly routine. Woe-off's for poor approaches were rare and almost non-existent once the five replacement pilots, who came aboard at the beginning of this period, had two or three flights under their belt.

2. This reporting period will go down in the history of the Air Group as the "Lincoln" or "rail-splitting" era. With the exception of two "special" strike missions, Task Force 77 concentrated on knocking out the rail transportation system of Northern Korea. Reports were received that the enemy suffered from lack of supply of rails. By utilizing rail strikes by the prop aircraft, Task Force 77 made it increasingly difficult for the enemy to repair his rail system. By bombing and seeding the road bed between marshalling yards every mile or two, the enemy logistic problem became acute. As many as 23 cuts were scored by an Air Group 102 flight in a 12 to 15 mile stretch of track. Pilots especially improved this program since it tended to force the enemy to spread out his anti-aircraft defenses. Instead of repeated dives on bridges with highly concentrated defense fire, the pilots were covering an area with scattered anti-aircraft fire and usually making a single dive on a particular part of the roadbed.

3. As a result of this "rail-splitting" program plus the temporary turning over of Close Air Support to the Marines and Air Force, damage to aircraft from enemy small arms and anti-aircraft decreased substantially during this period. In addition, pilots are using the cunning gained by experience to outwit the enemy. Jinking, split attacks, surprise use of the sun, and similar tactics are constantly practiced to give the enemy gunners as tough a shot as possible. Planes are still getting hit, however. During this period, 43 planes were hit by anti-aircraft fire, eleven were losses. Since this Group began combat operations on 31 May 1951, it has suffered damage by anti-aircraft or small arms to 250 aircraft. One Corsair pilot has had his plane shot up on thirteen different occasions although he had not exposed himself to enemy fire any more than the average. It is doubtful if there are many, if any, World War II pilots who have been hit that many times. It's a mighty rugged police action!

4. At the end of this reporting period, the average pilot was nearing the 50-mission mark. The Air Group Commander headed the sortie list with 72 strike/flight missions in the combat zone.

B. INTELLIGENCE

1. Escape and Evasion. Pilots are constantly reminded of Escape and Evasion techniques with each briefing. During this period of operation the Air Group has had eleven (11) planes which failed to return to the ship. Of the eleven (11), only one pilot was lost. This loss is covered in the casualty
section of this report).

With the approach of winter the problem of survival on land and in the water is foremost in the minds of the pilots. In this connection it might be well to mention that the Air Group is looking forward to receiving the Survival Rides promised by Air Pac sometime ago (ComairPac dispatch 010442 of Sept. '51). It is hoped the three presently on hand will be sufficient for the next operating period.

2. Reports. The submission of required Air Attack Reports (OpNav 369-1 Rev 2-51) has lagged considerably due to the non-receipt of required stencils. It is requested that the system of procurement and supply be investigated and revised to assure expeditious receipt of the stencils.

3. Intelligence Material. All material needed for briefings is available to the squadron intelligence officers from the ship intelligence office. However, there is needed an adequate system for keeping a current flash index. Considerable difficulty has been encountered in accurately plotting the location of the Fleet's shipboard rescue helicopters. Instances have occurred (through no fault of the ship's intelligence office) when the location of a cruiser or other ship with a rescue helicopter has been reported in the daily Naval Summary as being at Hungnam when actually the ship was off the bowline. More accurate location of ships with helicopters is mandatory for Air Intelligence briefings on Air Sea rescue facilities.

4. Awards. It is strongly recommended that a common ground be determined for the granting of awards by all services. Similar action by two members of two different services often bring two widely divergent recommendations for awards.

5. MAINTENANCE

1. Piston type aircraft have held up very well during this period considering the type of operations and the age of the aircraft. Replacement has been very slow, possibly due to the high number of replacements required by all the operating units in the area. In some instances it has taken over 30 days to get replacements. In order to continue flying the number of strikes required, the maintenance crews have had to step up their availability because of the shortage of aircraft. It has been necessary to keep a running check on all aircraft i.e., working on the aircraft whenever possible and not waiting until the regular check period.

2. Fifteen sets of F3F-2 inboard flap panels were requisitioned for current replacement of damaged flaps and anticipated needs. Extensive flap damage is done by the towing bridle of the catapult during launching. Unless the equipment is modified there is no reason to believe the condition will change.

3. Fuel contamination has been noticed in the F9F. No serious emergency conditions have occurred in flight because of the precautionary measures being taken to prevent power plant failures. Compliance with ComairPac dispatch 138047% of October and other procedures are being accomplished. After approximately 120 operating hours over the Korea area during the summer months, there is noticeable accumulation of dirt in the tip tanks and main fuel cells. It is recommended that squadrons operating F9F-2 aircraft (without tip tank air vent filter) inspect tip tanks for cleanliness every 120 hours and clean if necessary.

4. Reported hook dropping while taxiing the F9F across the Davis barriers has been temporarily solved. In each instance where a hook dropped the starboard side was fully extended, thereby allowing the actuator switch to throw switch to interrupt the tail hook electrical circuit. Proper servicing has prevented any possible from extending to the full travel position thereby eliminating the cause.

5. The technique in fueling the F9F has recently been modified because of serious fire hazards on the hangar deck. Tip tanks are no longer fueled on the
flight deck prior to flight. Main fuel cells are also fueled on the flight
deck and only in special cases are they filled on the hangar deck. Fueling
is done with proportioners when possible, to get a uniform fuel-oil mixture.

8. Starting troubles have been minimized by a routine ignitor cleaning pro-
cedure. After six to eight hours of operation, B. O. Ignitors are cleaned and
test fired. If, after cleaning, they do not test fire with a blue spark they
are replaced. Replacement is seldom based on electrode spacing as the space
can be within limits and still not function properly.

D. ELECTRONICS

1. The performance of the airborne electronic equipment during this period
remained at a high level and excellent results were obtained. No major pro-
blems were encountered except the continuance of lack of certain critical
parts not easily available in the supply system.

2. During this period the main electronic equipment used was the same as shown
in our previous action reports. These consisted of the communication trans-
mitter-receivers (AN/ARC-1), homing devices (AN/ARW-6 and AN/ARC-2A), radio
altimeters (AN/ARC-1), 15F units (AN/AFX-1, AN/AFX-3 and AN/AFX-6) and
radar (AN/AFX-15A and AN/AFS-20A). Some use was made of the AN/AFS-4 radar
in connection with ASF escort using AD-type aircraft or when weather conditions
warranted additional measures for locating the Task Force.

3. The operation of the Aviation Electronic Shop under the supervision of the
Air Group Staff Electronics Officer continued with good results and permitted
assignment of personnel where required to handle any peak in the maintenance
work load.

E. SURVIVAL

1. Over Land—With the expected arrival of ten (10) promised Survival Kits
as outlined in ComAirPac dispatch C10144Z of September 1951, there will be a
total of sixteen (16) kits aboard. With these the Air Group will be well
equipped for any emergency that requires assistance over land or sea. Two kits
have been dropped accidently and on 21 September a third was dropped for use
of a downed pilot. This constitutes a total of three (3) kits that have been
dropped since leaving the States.

On 21 September 1951, while flying on a regular mission, a pilot from the
USS BOXER notified what appeared to be a parachute stretched out on the ground
below him. Having no access to a droppable kit he immediately requested one be
dropped by one of the Air Group 102 planes. The pilot answering the request
flew over the area two or three times to see if there were any signs of life.
There was no indication of any survivor; however, the pilot dropped the Survival
Kit to eliminate any doubt in his mind as to the possibility of anyone reaching
the equipment. No word has been received as yet regarding the opened chute or
kit.

2. Over Water—It is most appropriate at this time to mention that all
downed pilots of Carrier Air Group 102 have been reached and recovered. Enough
praise cannot be given for the magnificent job the helicopter pilots are doing.
Without them, the chances for survival would be very low. In addition to rescuing
pilots downed in the water the helicopters have gone inland as far as 50
miles to pick up a downed pilot. The cooperation of the pilots escorting the
helicopter while on dangerous rescue missions behind enemy lines has been out-
standing.

All pilots are survival conscious, both for themselves and their comrades.
A recent incident bears this out very strongly. LTG ROBERTS cut off his own
seat-back life raft dropping it to a pilot who was forced to ditch his plane and
had taken to the water sans life raft. ROBERTS circled the pilot two or three
times to determine that he was perfectly safe before returning to his ship. In
the meantime a helicopter had been alerted and the nearest destroyer also noti-
fied of the position of the man in trouble. The pilot was picked up within a

(12)
DECLASSIFIED

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO for period of
18 September 1951 to 18 October 1951.

Very short time and returned to his ship, none the worse for the experience.

The A3DA's, -4W's and -4D's of Air Group 102 are now equipped with extra life rafts that may be dropped to pilots downed in the water. The night fighters are also carrying their share of survival gear as well as extra life rafts. Pilots are carrying an ample supply of night flares, thus facilitating the visual search for one-man life rafts if necessary.

3. Immersion Suits - The temperature of the air and water around the operating area in Korea has dropped considerably. This is attested to by two of our pilots who recently ditched their planes. The water at Songjin has reached a new low of 45°F which isn't cold enough to freeze a man immediately, however, it has been decided to don immersion suits as a precaution. These suits, worn experimentally by all the pilots on a few missions, have been accepted favorably. They will be worn the next period of operations - around the first of November. With these immersion suits for water survival and the winter survival gear to be used on land, the chances for survival are greatly enhanced.

4. Conditioning Room - The forward decontamination room, now being used for a conditioning room for all pilots, is proving its worth in maintaining the physical condition of the pilots. The room is constantly in use, before and after hops, and serves as a morale factor for the pilots are confident of their chances of survival when their bodies are in excellent physical condition.

F. MEDICAL

No comment.

G. COMPOSITE SQUADRON TEAMS. VO-C1

1. CAMERAS.

Aerial cameras for the three photo planes are furnished by the ship and an adequate number has been available to change cameras when one becomes defective. Each aircraft takes two cameras; one in the vertical position and one in the horizontal position. The team has used the K-17 camera with the 12" cone almost exclusively, and considers it the best all around focal length of the three available. A 24" focal length camera would be excellent for mapping heavily defended areas with a large scale. The 24" camera will not fit in the present photo modification of the P-69-C, but it is recommended that provisions for installation of this camera be included in future modifications of fighters to photographic planes.

The 6" camera has been used very little. In the vertical position its only value is in cutting down the altitude necessary to get scales of from 1/30,000 to 1/30,000. Such small scales have rarely been called for, but since this camera will fit the mounts installed for a 12" or 24" camera, it is useful on occasion. In the horizontal position the 6" camera has no advantage over the 12" in the type of photography called for and it requires a lower altitude to get the same scale as the 12". For this reason it has not been used in this position since the 12" horizontal mounts became available in July.

The new camera case drives made available to the team in August are excellent. With a recycle time of slightly over one second they allow the pilot to take full advantage of the jet aircraft's speed. With the intervalometer set on its minimum time of 2 seconds, the pilots can now get the proper overlap at indicated airspeeds of 365 knots at 5000 feet instead of the previous maximum of 260 knots, with the old 3 second recycle caserdrive. The higher speed not only cuts down the chance of being hit by AA fire, but it increased the attitude control by the pilot while making a steep turn on to his flight line, holding the required altitude. Less time is also spent on long flight lines so the amount of drift is lessened considerably, and fuel consumption is decreased since scattered targets can be taken without slowing down from normal cruising speeds. With the shutter speed set at 1/250 of a second, no drop in the sharpness and quality of prints has been noticed since the pilots have
Subj:  Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO for period of
18 September to 18 October 1951.

started using the higher airspeeds. However, it is recommended that a camera
with a faster lens and shutter speed be developed, or made available, since the
limiting factor on the ground speed is now the apparent motion rather than the
overlap.

2. INSTRUMENTS

The present remote control compass in the F9F-2P is not entirely satis-
factory for photographic missions. In order to hit flight lines accurately with
the limited visibility forward and downward, the pilot must turn on to his
heading over the flight line in a steep bank. The compasses often lag or over-
shoot about 15 degrees from the heading the pilot wished to stop on. A separate
directional gyro is recommended for this purpose.

The G-2 compasses in the team's planes were swung before embarkation, but
are now off as much as 10 degrees from the magnetic compass. This is probably
true of a high percentage of the Air Group planes and it is suggested that a
compensation be painted on the dock in Yokosuka in such a position that the
planes could be lowered directly on to the compass rose by one of the cranes
available.

3. ESCORTS

Escorts furnished the photo planes by VT 781 have done an excellent job.
They have been very conscientious about keeping the photo plane in sight,
keeping a lookout for enemy aircraft and enemy anti-aircraft fire, and have
been able to cut down their fuel consumption to the point that they usually have
as much as the photo plane. However, a single escort with an unarmed photo
plane would not be adequate if enemy aircraft were encountered.

VII  CONCLUSION

1. The Air Group continued to receive praise for its work. CTF 77 dispatch
of 100914Z of October stated:

"AIR GROUP 102 DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB IN DESTROYING THE IMPORTANT
MINING CENTER AND NUMEROUS BUILDINGS AT CHOHANG YESTERDAY X WELL
DONE X RAEM J P CLARK SENDS X"

CTF 77 dispatch of 110914Z October stated:

"TO ESSEX AND BON HOG, E RICHARD SPECIAL MISSION
STRIKE GROUPS WELL DONE X"

H. R. HULSE