

From: Commander Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE  
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE  
(17 March 1951 - 21 April 1951)

Ref: (a) CNO Restricted ltr OP345 Ser. 1197P34 dated 3 Aug. 1950

1. This report, as required by reference (a), is forwarded for inclusion in the report of the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)

2. Information and recommendations are presented under the following headings:

- I - Mission and Composition
- II - Chronology
- III - Ordnance
- IV - Damage
- V - Personnel
- VI - Operations and Maintenance

### I. MISSION AND COMPOSITION

1. Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE operated off the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21) in support of United Nations operations in Korea and on special missions in the Formosa area during this period.

2. The composition of the air group was as follows:

<u>UNIT</u> (Commander)	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>OPERATION A/C</u> 3/17 - 4/21	<u>PILOTS</u> 3/17 - 4/21
CVG-101 (CDR W.W. BREHM) (LCDR W.E. WOODMAN, Acting 3/1 - 4/15)			
VF-721 (LCDR W.E. WOODMAN)	F9F2B	22 - 20	32# - 32#
VF-791 (LCDR J.B. KISNER)	F4U4	16 - 13	27# - 27#
VF-884 (LCDR G.F. GARMICHAEL)	F4U4	15 - 12	27 - 25
VA-702 (LCDR S.C. SEAGRAVES)	AD2 AD4Q	16 - 14 2 - 2	27 - 27
VC-3 Det. (LCDR G.E. HARTLEY)	F4U5NL	4 - 4	6 - 6
VC-11 Det. (LCDR R.I. HALEY)	AD4W	3 - 3	5* - 5*

VC-35 Det. (LT D.A. ARRIVEE)	AD4N	0 - 3	6 - 6
VC-61 Det. (LT H.A. TOMPKINS)	F9F2P	3 - 3	4 - 4
HU-1 (LT V.W. COLLINS)	H03S	1 - 1	2 - 2

# Includes one pilot each from Air Group Staff who flew regularly; does not include Air Group Commander, who regularly flew either F9F or F4U, nor three LSO's who flew occasionally.

\* Does not include two L355 officers on DIF.

## II CHRONOLOGY

Carrier Air Group 101, aboard U.S.S. BOXER, departed Pearl Harbor 17 March 1951 and rendezvoused with TF77 in the Sea of Japan on 26 March. Time in transit was devoted to usual maintenance and ground training operations.

The air group launched its first strikes against the enemy on 27 March from a position within sight of the Korean east coast near the 38th parallel. On that day 16 planes flew close air support missions under the leadership of U.S.S. PRINCETON planes, and damaged nine houses and one factory type building. Five pillboxes were destroyed and 40 enemy casualties were estimated by the ground controller.

Foul weather precluded further air operations until 30 March when 67 sorties were flown on close air support, railroad breaker, armed recco, and photo escort missions. Two air defense, four anti-submarine, and two photo recco sorties were flown during the day. The pilots destroyed one railroad bridge, one warehouse, and one truck. Unassessed damage was done to four bridges. One village was damaged and railroad track was broken at one point. One warehouse was 60 percent destroyed and two trucks were probably destroyed by strafing. Troop concentrations were strafed, bombed, and napalmed in many locations.

March 31 saw 79 sorties launched on close air support, railroad breakers, bridge breakers, photo escort, and rescap operations. Three photo and radar recco, two air defense and four anti-submarine missions were flown during the day. Aircraft destroyed one house and five larger buildings. Three barracks-type buildings and one bridge were damaged. One AD-2 was forced to a belly landing behind enemy lines as a result of damage received from enemy small arms fire. Pilot was picked up almost immediately by Army helicopter whose pilot witnessed the crash. Two other AD-2's made emergency landings at field K16 and K18 as results of damage done by enemy small arms fire. The two latter planes were repaired and recovered. Many enemy troops were strafed by rescap in area surrounding an Army helicopter which was shot down by enemy small arms while attempting to rescue 24 surrounded friendly troops.

Forty sorties were launched on 1 April on bridge breaking, railroad breaking, armed recco, photo recco, and defensive missions. Three railroad tunnels and two railroad bridges were damaged, and tracks were cut in 13 places. Five railroad cars were destroyed and an unknown number were damaged. One sawmill and lumber yard were heavily damaged by fire, and two warehouses and two other large buildings were damaged by bombing. A pilot bailed out of one AD2 in flames after receiving damage from enemy anti-aircraft fire. The pilot was recovered from behind the enemy line by the PRINCETON helicopter and was back aboard the BOXER within 40 minutes after the time his plane was scheduled to return. He had second degree burns about the face.

On 2 April 66 sorties were launched, of which 52 were on offensive missions; bridges were broken, railroad tracks were cut, power lines were dropped by strafing, railroad cars and other rail equipment were destroyed and damaged. Several enemy troop concentrations were strafed, bombed and napalmed by close air support missions and the controllers estimated a high percentage of casualties. One F4U-4 spun into the water while making a message drop over a friendly destroyer in Wonsan Bay. The pilot was recovered by the destroyer. The accident occurred while the plane was on a naval gunfire spotting mission over the Wonsan area. A second F4U-4 returned to U.S.S. BOXER with minor damage from enemy 30 calibre fire.

Only two sorties were launched on 3 April due to adverse weather conditions. No results were observed.

The weather improved on 4 April and 32 sorties were launched on offensive and defensive missions. Trucks and carts were destroyed and damaged. Railroad tracks were broken by two F4U-4's which had been sent on a gunfire spotting mission in the Songjin area and were diverted due to bad weather. Planes on close air support bombed, strafed and napalmed many enemy troop concentrations with excellent results. In one instance they successfully attacked enemy troops who were dug in approximately 100 yards from friendly troops.

On 5 April 81 sorties were launched, of which 48 were on offensive missions. Twenty-six sorties were photo and ECM recco sorties, four sorties were air defense, and two sorties were anti-submarine. An unidentified voice attempted to direct one close air support mission by radio, but when challenged was unable to give the proper authenticator. It was later discovered that the position the voice had attempted to direct the BOXER planes to was that of a UN military installation.

On 6 April 96 sorties were launched. Eighty-four were offensive, four were photo recco, four were air defense, and four were anti-sub. Some of these sorties were flown in connection with the landing operation scheduled for 7 April by a British commando party. One F4U-4 returned to USS BOXER with hole in wing caused by direct hit of enemy 23 mm anti-aircraft gun.

On 7 April 51 sorties were launched. Forty of these were offensive and 11 were anti-submarine. The offensive missions were flown primarily in support of the temporary landing but were severely hampered by adverse weather and were forced to drop their ordnance on dump targets. One F4U-4 was lost with pilot reported missing. The plane's engine froze from loss of oil, probably as result of enemy anti-aircraft fire. The pilot was last seen in cockpit as plane glided into fog bank. A ceiling-zero condition precluded any search by helicopter and prevented effective search by plane. A destroyer searched the area where the plane is believed to have gone down until complete darkness. All search efforts produced negative results.

8 April was replenishment day and no air operations were conducted.

On 9 April 40 sorties were flown. All were training flights while enroute to the Formosa area.

No air operations were conducted on 10 April as USS BOXER was in transit.

On 11 April 60 sorties were launched for air parade of southwest China coast, and 6 photo sorties were launched with six jet escorts for photo reconnaissance of Chinese coastal installations. Twelve sorties were launched for air defense and four for anti-sub defense.

No air operations were conducted on 12 April owing to adverse weather conditions.

On 13 April 65 sorties were launched for a second day of parades in the Formosa Straits. Four photo planes with four jet escorts were launched for photo reconnaissance of installations on southeast coast of China. Two sorties were launched to escort the parade mission, eight sorties were launched for air defense, and two were launched for anti-sub defense.

On 14 April a total of 28 sorties were launched. Eight were for air defense, four for anti-submarine defense, and two were for towing target sleeves for anti-aircraft firing. The other 14 sorties were for pilot training purposes.

Flying on 15 April was limited to defense and courier sorties while USS Boxer transitted back to the Sea of Japan.

On 16 April a total of 112 offensive and defensive sorties were flown over enemy held Korea. Of these 12 were photorecco, 12 were air defense, and 6 were anti-submarine, and the remainder of the sorties carried out attacks against enemy ground targets. One F9F-2B was ditched on downwind leg of landing approach circle due to flame out. The pilot was recovered within approximately five minutes by helicopter.

On 17 April a total of 103 sorties were flown over North Korea. Six of these were photo recco sorties with six jet escorts, 13 were air defense sorties, and six were anti-sub sorties. The remainder of the sorties attacked enemy ground installations. One F4U-4 stalled and ditched on takeoff from USS BOXER on early morning launch. The pilot was recovered by helicopter. One F9F-2B and one F4U-4 returned to USS BOXER with damage received from small arms fire.

On 18 April the carriers of TF 77 launched an all-out air attack against enemy troop concentrations and military installations in the Namhung area. During the day's operation USS BOXER launched 115 sorties, of which 89 were offensive. One F4U-4 struck high tension lines during a strafing attack and exploded in mid-air shortly thereafter.

A similar operation was planned against troop concentrations and military installations in the Wonsan area for the 19 April, but inclement weather interfered. A total of 12 sorties were flown of which only four were against enemy installations. The remainder were air defense and anti-submarine missions.

The ship docked at Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan on 21 April 1951, for rest period.

### III ORDNANCE

1. General. Napalm continues to be an excellent weapon against a variety of targets; however, as other groups have recommended, some improvements could be made: tanks in nesting halves for ease of storage, fins to allow higher altitude drops more accurately particularly in rugged country. This group used Japanese F-51 tanks, dropping altitudes have been 100 to 500 feet; few "duds" with double igniters, about 25% duds with single igniter, all ignited on strafing with either 20 mm or 50 cal. One fatal accident was attributed to striking power lines which apparently either pulled the arming wire on a 500 lb VT-fuzed bomb, causing it to arm and explode on the F4U, or ignited the auxiliary fuel tank. The exploded bomb did not have the additional jump-out pin (CONF. OPL444, 1st Rev., Ch.1) due to a shortage of extra pins received at last replenishment from the USS PARICUTIN. Installation of pins before delivery would shorten rearming time and lighten the load of overworked carrier and squadron ordnance crews as well as prevent such shortages.


Arming wires retained after ordnance is dropped are scratching wings badly. Frequent repainting is the only solution so far. One rocket with a split case ignited on deck and burned itself out, one tumbled causing damage requiring a wing change, numerous rockets skidded up the deck but caused no damage. MK5-Mod 4 launchers spread enough to allow rockets to fall off. (AAC52 not installed because of conflict with AAC17) Approximately 2% of all rockets loaded both HVAR and ATAR failed to fire.

2. F9F. Jet armed recco flights were loaded with full gun ammo and 6 rockets (HVAR and ATAR), photo escort and QLP with gun ammo only.

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## KOREAN THEATER

Indicating transportation routes disrupted by armed recon, railroad and bridge breaker, and heckler missions; strike areas at Hamhung and southwest of Songjin; and close air support area along bomblines. Noon positions of USS BOXER are indicated for all operating dates (27 March - 18 April) in the Korean Theater.



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There was no high altitude (above 20,000) work; gun performance was excellent. Pilots recommend retaining at least partial load of rockets until late in the flight, good targets usually appear just after rockets are expended. A quick detachable launcher is needed to decrease the drag when planes are to be used in aerial combat; squadron tests indicate that loss of airspeed due to launchers (without rockets) may vary from 33 knots (IAS) at 5000 feet to 7 knots (IAS) at 35,000 feet.

3. F4U. Two F4U's have been equipped with zero 14" launchers; work is almost impossible to accomplish on board underway owing to crowded conditions and heavy schedule. It is presently being accomplished during rest periods in port. Without launchers F4U's can be spotted and armed five abreast on deck without any waste space, or a splitspot of two AD's and two F4U's can be used; the M14A's add just enough width to make these deck combinations extremely difficult requiring either "locked" and inflexible ordnance over the catwalks. Pigtails of rockets on M14A racks were cut in the air, possibly by ejected brass; experiments with taping pigtails and using deflector plates are inconclusive as yet.

There were three explosions in blast tubes during this period (791 RUMS5-51&7-51) cause undetermined, possibly unburnt gas explosion in wing from crack tube, possibly malfunctioning projectiles.

4. AD. Use of M7 links for 20mm caused many jams in the first part of period, corrected after supply of M8 links became available again.

Tail fins from 2000 lb bombs on right bomb racks unscrewed in the slipstream; squadron is safety wiring them on as a temporary fix.

As has been pointed out by other squadrons, AD's are virtually impossible to load with wings folded, spreading wings to rearm causes deck delays; the hoist developed by Douglas may be effective if it doesn't take too long to rig for each wing.

5. Ordnance expended, by type of aircraft:

Ordnance	F4U	F4U	AD	Total
2000lb GP	-	-	64	64
1000lb GP	-	42	41	83
500 lb BP	-	217	281	498
260 lb Frag	-	-	166	166
250 " GP	-	-	252	252
220 " Frag	-	22	708	730
100 " GP	-	-	354	354
350 " DH	-	-	14	14
11.75 Rocket	-	-	10	10
6.5 ATAR	352	620	-	972
5.0 HVAR	211	1958	80	2249
3.25 Rocket	-	332	37	369
Napalm	-	95	156	251
20 mm	36,070	-	33,400	69,470
.50 Cal	-	337,800	-	337,800

IV DAMAGE

(1) Damage inflicted on enemy:

<u>TARGETS</u>	<u>PROBABLY DAMAGED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>DESTROYED*</u>
RR Bridges	13	9	1
RR Tracks			41#
RR Locomotives	3	2	3
RR Cars	112	40	19
RR Yards	4	2	
RR Tunnels	8	3	
HWY Bridges	5	4	9
HWY Tunnels	1		
Ammo Trucks	3	5	
Trucks	9	8	20
Vehicles	4	13	15
Carts	3	4	9
Warehouses	33		3
Ammo Dumps	1		1
Factories	2	1	1
Villages		25	4
Fuel Dumps		2	2
Buildings	59	29	152
Tanks	2	5	2
Milit. Inst.		8	4
Pill Boxes	3	2	3
Gun Empl.		3	2
Floating Mine			1
Troops Killed			276

\* No consideration has been given to items "possibly destroyed". It is felt that the above is a conservative account of damage. "Troops killed", for example, are confirmed through ground sources, seen to fall in course of strafing, or are not taken into account. Quite possibly thousands were killed, particularly in attacks on cities and villages but since it is impossible to guess correctly no guess at all has been made.

# (i.e., tracks were broken)

(2) Damage to own aircraft (first figure is "operational", cause code A; second figure combat-connected; all other causes)

<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>LOST</u>		<u>UNREPAIRABLE*</u>		<u>REPAIRED</u>	
F9F	1	0	0	1	4	7
F4U	2	2	1	1	1	2
AD	0	2	0	0	3	15

\* Transferred in damaged condition, awaiting action.

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(3) Comments. Summary of accidents listed above as lost or damaged beyond local repair is as follows:

- F9F2B ~ Flameout in landing circle, ditched, pilot broke hand, picked up by helicopter.
- F9F2B ~ Struck tree, too low on strafing run.
- F4U4 ~ Spun in while making message drop to ship, pilot slightly injured, picked up by DD.
- F4U4 ~ Ditched on takeoff, loss of altitude and control attributed to slipstream of plane ahead. Pilot picked up by helicopter
- F4U4 ~ Last seen entering fog bank, vicinity Tanchon heading to seaward, engine frozen from loss of oil due to enemy fire. Search negative, pilot reported as missing.
- F4U4 ~ Plane exploded following contact with power lines, vicinity Hamhang, pilot reported as dead.
- F4U4 ~ Tailhook shaft parted on arrested landing, plane into catwalk.
- F4U4 ~ Large anti-aircraft hole in left wing stub.
- AD2 ~ Crash landed following loss of power due to enemy fire on close air support mission, helicopter picked up pilot.
- AC2 ~ Aircraft caught fire from enemy anti-aircraft hit, pilot bailed out, received second degree burns, recovered by helicopter.

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V PERSONNEL

1. Pilots. Average missions per pilot in the various types are as follows:  
VAW: 10, VAN: 10, VF: 9, VA: 8, VFN: 8, Photo: 7, Jet: 5.

2. Ground Officers. In addition to the officers reported in paragraph I (2), there are four 1355's on the air group staff (Survival, Electronics-Communications, Maintenance, and Air Intelligence) and 15 in the four squadrons plus a On Mach (AI Maintenance, Personnel, and, in two squadrons, Ordnance Officers). The ground officers have been practically indispensable to the air group in its accelerated training and deployment.

3. Consolidation. This group organized the VC detachments and the air group staff as VC-1010 under the senior detachment commander; this works well administratively (correspondence, watches, musters); however, the system has at least two major drawbacks. Any tendency to make the staff a separate squadron either by overcomplementing it or assigning it aircraft and routine reporting responsibilities, reduces its effectiveness as a staff concerned with planning, coordination, and surveillance. Secondly, the VC units feel "left out," having no separate ready room, no full-time air intelligence officer, no close-knit organization. Perhaps the procedure of assigning VC units to a "foster parent" squadron a couple of months before deployment will integrate their organizations, particularly if they operate the same type aircraft (ADA, ADAW, ADAW, for instance.) The general lack of space mentioned throughout this report (four squadrons and four detachments in three ready rooms, for instance) is largely a result of expansion of ship's functions during peacetime when air groups were embarked for only short periods, in smaller numbers, and with less equipment.

4. Enlisted Personnel. New jet squadrons needed a nucleus of trained jet personnel even before the planes are assigned; VF-721 suffered throughout the early training period from shortage of trained enlisted personnel. Aviation Ordnancemen on carriers are required to perform much heavy lifting; ability to do so should be considered in selecting ordnance strikers.

5. Survival. With the assistance of staff and ship survival officers and squadron parachute riggers, the air group survival officer made up escape and evasion kits to be parachuted to survivors on land (CVG-101 ltr P11 of 26 March 1951 to BuAer via chain of command). There has been no occasion to use them; but in one accidental release and several instances of their use for parachuting ammunition the rigs worked perfectly. One is carried by an AD in each launch.

6. Casualties. The group suffered two casualties during this period:

LTJG Harold T. WALKER, 460735/1315, USNR-A, VF-884. (Aircraft hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire 7 April 1951; engine froze after loss of oil; last seen entering top of fogbank vicinity Tanchon, heading seaward; search negative; listed as missing)

LT Alfred W. THOMAS, 329367/1315, USNR-A, VF-884, (Aircraft struck power lines, Hamhung, 18 April 1951, exploded in mid-air shortly thereafter, either from VT-fuzed bomb armed by wires or from auxiliary fuel tank explosion. Listed as dead.)

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## VI OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE

1. Doctrine. The group launch-land doctrine, designed primarily as a guide for bad weather operation under conditions of radio silence, varies slightly from that of USF 4 and 73 in the following particulars; (1) rendezvousing aircraft proceed outbound along the sector edge while inbound aircraft use the sector median, (2) aircraft feed out of the squadron circle by divisions directly into the landing circle instead of via a division circle. In the present phase employing numerous small missions rather than deck load strikes, coordination is necessary to prevent confusion in rendezvousing, principally by allocation of various rendezvous altitudes if weather permits. No firm attack or defense doctrine has been written; however, the increasing rate and accuracy of small arms fire, both on attack and retirement, forced prop aircraft to abandon the IBP runs and attack by section or division fan, jinking during retirement. As usual the last plane in the formation normally gets most of the small arms fire.

2. Training. It is felt that increased emphasis on the following would have benefited this group and may benefit others: More coordinated VF-VA-Jet live-load strikes; more napalm and minimum altitude practice; more naval gunfire spotter work; practicing message drops; more jet work at low altitudes and speeds in armed recon type training.

3. Utilization of specially configured aircraft. The VC-11 Team is no longer an "aircraft early warning" unit due to obsolescence of its gear. AEW aircraft have been used solely for ASP. The "relay" function will not work satisfactorily until AEP 26 transmitter is replaced by higher powered transmitter and the ship's PG (terminal receiver) system is shielded against ship radar interference.

The ADAN is of little use on night ASP through lack of flares or searchlight and an aircrewman periscope. Its use on day ASP merely reduces the strike by one fully loaded AD when an FAU could be just as effective on ASP carrying aerial depth bomb and 3.25" rockets.

4. Jet Operation. As is the normal procedure, jet launches were frequently cancelled due to low visibility or lack of wind. No air opposition was encountered during this period by BOMER aircraft. Jets were scheduled for 1.5 hour armed recon, photo escort, or occasional CAP hops; they made it doctrine to return 10 minutes early with 1200 lbs of fuel and to extend hooks shortly after leaving the beach to allow time to try emergency measures if hook did not fully extend. One aircraft made normally arrested landing with hook initially in stinger position. The squadron maintained a senior jet pilot in Air Plot to advise the ship on handling of jet emergencies. All pilots used full takeoff flaps for both takeoff and landing. For detailed information on jet operation and maintenance see VF-721 Monthly Jet Operating Bulletin (to COMUSMACV).

5. Intelligence. Major problems in air intelligence were those of getting organized; lack of sufficient UTM gridded maps for complete coverage (ratio should be 1.5/pilot to allow each pilot individual portfolio plus briefing maps and usual losses), lack of adequate stowage space, adequate briefing and debriefing space, and adequate chart display space. These problems are aggravated by the difficulty of briefing for many small missions instead of large strikes. Initial difficulties may be avoided by sending a ship or group air intelligence officer to the forward area to TAD to a ship already operating. He should return to his own ship prior to its leaving Hawaii to assist in setting up the files and reporting procedures.

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Maps that may be used at night should not have information in red (as some of the UTM grids have). Maps such as those being used have many inaccuracies and pilots should be so warned; learn to navigate by using only "permanent" features. A system of indexing photographs of important landmarks and making them available to briefing officers would aid pilots in orienting themselves in new and difficult terrain. The relief charts are excellent. Information pamphlets, such as ComAirPac Pilots Information Handbook, in order to be useful to carrier pilots, should be of such construction that the pages will tear out and fit on a standard 5 x 8 kneepad. If a complete set of chartboard underlays were provided each ship or squadron, pilots could construct their own underlays for areas and detail desired by use of India Ink (several colors) and "Kodecal #2" plastic sheets.

6. Flight Gear. The present system of issuing combat and winter clothing is unsatisfactory in that proper size distribution is impossible. A system of fitting pilots before departure from the States or Hawaii on an individual issue basis, gear to be collected and stored by the squadron, would assure correct fit. The immersion suit, while its advantages outweigh its disadvantages, could be improved by a better fitting foot, and better fitting wrist ties which work loose. Burn ointment should be available in each pilot's flight suit or personal first aid kit. Pilots on naval gunfire spotting missions could use a compact lightweight binocular or telescope to good advantage; even close air support might benefit by its use.

7. Maintenance. Jet maintenance is covered thoroughly in VF-721 Monthly Jet Operating Bulletins (to ComAirPac). Parachutes are difficult to maintain on board ship; leaking canopies get them wet (a waterproof canopy cover has been used to advantage here), drying rooms are inadequate and slow; squadrons will need their full allowance at least. The constant battle against corrosion will be aided by spraying engine fronts and cables with pyralkytone before embarking. Post flight inspection must be thorough as small bullet holes can cause much internal damage to structural members. F4U-4's need RB19 plugs, RB37S and reconditioned plugs have given unsatisfactory service particularly on deck takeoffs with heavy load; reconditioned plugs are good only for about 30 hours. F4U-5N's had numerous cold weather starting problems and sluggish AEC operation on takeoffs when using 1120 oil, corrected by use of 1100 in accordance with recent BuAer directive. VAN unit recommends addition of APR1 RCM gear on one plane in addition to present APR9 to cover lower frequency bands. VAN Team was deployed without aircraft; of three aircraft received in the operating area, two needed engine changes and all were missing MK55 racks (which the unit fortunately brought along). Addition of a complete spare set of instruments to squadron allowance lists would enable crews to replace defective instruments and shop test them; crowded deck spot makes it difficult to do any test work on the aircraft. Plotting board allowance should be on a one/pilot basis to allow them to make personal boards for constant use; the demand for MK7A kneepad plotting boards still exceeds the supply. Spare parts supply for specially-configured aircraft is still unsatisfactory in many cases. AD4N's, though already rigged for M14A racks, have not been supplied with the necessary kits; their load carrying capacity is accordingly reduced.

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Maps that may be used at night should not have information in red (as some of the UTM grids have). Maps such as those being used have many inaccuracies and pilots should be so warned; learn to navigate by using only "permanent" features. A system of indexing photographs of important landmarks and making them available to briefing officers would aid pilots in orienting themselves in new and difficult terrain. The relief charts are excellent. Information pamphlets, such as ComAirPac Pilots Information Handbook, in order to be useful to carrier pilots, should be of such construction that the pages will tear out and fit on a standard 5 x 8 kneepad. If a complete set of chartboard underlays were provided each ship or squadron, pilots could construct their own underlays for areas and detail desired by use of India Ink (several colors) and "Kodecal #2" plastic sheets.

6. Flight Gear. The present system of issuing combat and winter clothing is unsatisfactory in that proper size distribution is impossible. A system of fitting pilots before departure from the States or Hawaii on an individual issue basis, gear to be collected and stored by the squadron, would assure correct fit. The immersion suit, while its advantages outweigh its disadvantages, could be improved by a better fitting foot, and better fitting wrist ties which work loose. Burn ointment should be available in each pilot's flight suit or personal first aid kit. Pilots on naval gunfire spotting missions could use a compact lightweight binocular or telescope to good advantage; even close air support might benefit by its use.

7. Maintenance. Jet maintenance is covered thoroughly in VF-721 Monthly Jet Operating Bulletins (to ComAirPac). Parachutes are difficult to maintain on board ship; leaking canopies get them wet (a waterproof canopy cover has been used to advantage here), drying rooms are inadequate and slow; squadrons will need their full allowance at least. The constant battle against corrosion will be aided by spraying engine fronts and cables with pyralkytone before embarking. Post flight inspection must be thorough as small bullet holes can cause much internal damage to structural members. F4U-4's need RB19 plugs, RB37S and reconditioned plugs have given unsatisfactory service particularly on deck takeoffs with heavy load; reconditioned plugs are good only for about 30 hours. F4U-5N's had numerous cold weather starting problems and sluggish AEC operation on takeoffs when using 1120 oil, corrected by use of 1100 in accordance with recent BuAer directive. VAN unit recommends addition of APR1 RCM gear on one plane in addition to present APR9 to cover lower frequency bands. VAN Team was deployed without aircraft; of three aircraft received in the operating area, two needed engine changes and all were missing MK55 racks (which the unit fortunately brought along). Addition of a complete spare set of instruments to squadron allowance lists would enable crews to replace defective instruments and shop test them; crowded deck spot makes it difficult to do any test work on the aircraft. Plotting board allowance should be on a one/pilot basis to allow them to make personal boards for constant use; the demand for MK7A kneepad plotting boards still exceeds the supply. Spare parts supply for specially-configured aircraft is still unsatisfactory in many cases. AD4N's, though already rigged for M14A racks, have not been supplied with the necessary kits; their load carrying capacity is accordingly reduced.

## 8. Statistics

	<u>A/C Hours Flown</u>	
	Total	Per A/C
VF-721	265.1	13
Photo	44.5	15
VF-791	712.8	51
VF-884	700.6	54
VFN	137.0	34
Vh-702	802.8	50
VAN	115.4	39
VAN	<u>46.9</u>	<u>16</u>
Total	2825.1	
FU-1	80.8	80.8

Missions Flown

<u>A/C</u>	<u>CAS</u>	<u>TRANS</u>	<u>STRIKE</u>	<u>RECCO</u>	<u>NGF</u>	<u>PHOTO</u>	<u>PHESC</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>ASP</u>	<u>NON</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
VFJ	-	-	-	88	-	-	41	8	-	20	157
VFP	-	-	-	-	-	41	-	-	-	-	41
VF	96	114	69	28	26	-	-	127	-	52	512
VFN	-	-	-	23	-	-	-	8	-	10	41
Vh	77	78	42	-	-	-	-	4	30	39	270
VAN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38	3	41
VAN	-	-	-	<u>3</u>	-	-	-	-	<u>10</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>14</u>
Totals	<u>173</u>	<u>192</u>	<u>111</u>	<u>142</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>147</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>125</u>	<u>1076</u>

Notes: Vh and VAN pilots flew additional missions in Vh aircraft  
 "Trans" includes railroad breaker and seeder, bridge breaker  
 "Strike" missions were aimed at area destruction  
 "Recco" includes night heckler  
 "Non-Combat" includes tow, courier, training, test, parade.

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