


UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
COMMANDER
CARRIER AIR GROUP ONE HUNDRED TWO (CVG-102)

ORIGINAL
CVG-102/REW:fl
A16-13
Serial: 032

4-3

27 December 1952

DECLASSIFIED


From: Commander, Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO for the
period 2 December through 27 December 1952; submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4
(b) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1A

Encl: (1) Subject Action Report

1. This report is forwarded as enclosure (1) for inclusion in the
action report of the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) in accordance with
references (a) and (b).

G. P. Chase
G. P. CHASE


ENCLOSURE (1)

20

DECLASSIFIED

ACTION REPORT
OF
CARRIER AIR GROUP ONE HUNDRED TWO
FOR THE PERIOD
2 DECEMBER THROUGH 27 DECEMBER

CONTENTS

PART I MISSION AND COMPOSITION
 PART II CHRONOLOGY
 PART III ORDNANCE
 PART IV DAMAGE
 PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES
 PART VI OPERATIONS
 PART VII AIR INTELLIGENCE
 PART VIII SURVIVAL
 PART IX AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL

PART I

MISSION AND COMPOSITION

MISSION:

1. The mission, upon returning to Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the area off the east coast of Korea as a unit of the United Nations Naval Forces, was blockading the North Korean coast and pursuing a systematic program of interdiction against enemy supply routes and destroying air facilities, power complexes, and manufacturing centers in North Korea to prevent further offensive action by the enemy. Close air support to frontline ground forces to be furnished upon request.

COMPOSITION:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL A/C</u>		<u>PILOTS</u>	
		<u>2 DEC</u>	<u>27 DEC</u>	<u>2 DEC</u>	<u>27 DEC</u>
CVG-102 CDR G. P. CHASE Commanding	NONE	NONE	NONE	7	6
VF-781 LCDR S. R. HOLM Commanding	F9F-5	15	12	25	25

21

DECLASSIFIED

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C		PILOTS	
		2 DEC	27 DEC	2 DEC	27 DEC
VF-783 LCDR J. W. WYRICK Commanding	F9F-5	14	13	25	25
VF-874 LCDR M. D. CARMODY Commanding	F4U-4	15	14	24	24
VA-923 CDR J. C. MICHEEL Commanding	AD-3/AD-4	16	14*	23	22
VC-3 (Det "G") LCDR G. W. STAEHELI Officer-in-Charge	F4U-5N	4	4**	5	5
VC-11 (Det "G") LT H. F. GERNERT Officer-in-Charge	AD-4W	3	3	5	5
VC-35 (Det "G") LT W. P. KISER Officer-in-Charge	AD-4N	4	4	5	5
VC-61 (Det "G") LT J. F. GROSSER Officer-in-Charge	F2H-2P/F9F-5P	3	3	5	5
TOTALS		74	67	124	122

* VA-923 received one replacement aircraft on board during this period.
 ** VC-3 Unit GEORGE received two replacement aircraft on board during this period.

Very early in this period the Commanding Officer of VA-923, CDR J. C. MICHEEL, was ordered to the Yokosuka Naval Hospital and he has not yet returned to duty. The Executive Officer, LCDR A. H. GUNDERSON, has been acting commanding officer.

The Air Group Commander flies alternately with VF-781 and VA-923. The Air Group Staff Operations Officer flies with VF-783. A doctor designated as a Naval Aviator and three L.S.O.'s comprise the remaining four pilots on the staff and they do not fly from the ship.

92

DECLASSIFIED

CHRONOLOGY

2 December - No flight operations. Departed YOKOSUKA to join Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

3 December - No flight operations. Enroute to operating area. A scheduled exercise was cancelled because of weather and rough sea caused by a cold front traveling southward from the SEA of JAPAN through the Korea Strait.

4 December - Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO returned to action flying ninety sorties and dropping fifty-six tons of bombs. The AD's and F4U's, aided by flak suppressing F9F-5's, covered an estimated sixty percent of their assigned supply dump and personnel billeting area targets. Other Air Group jets conducted additional strikes against fishing facilities and searched for targets along the recco routes. They destroyed two supply dumps and five buildings and damaged seven supply dumps, ten buildings and one factory.

An AD-4, Bureau Number 127862, piloted by ENS WILLIS RADEBAUGH, VA-923, was hit by anti-aircraft fire while attacking a supply build-up area near PYONG-GANG. He was able to get south of the main line of resistance before he bailed out without injury over friendly forces.

5 December - Supply stockpiles and personnel billeting areas were attacked twice by the propeller aircraft in the vicinity of PYONG-GANG. Two large secondary explosions were observed before thousand-foot columns of smoke prevented further observations. The jets attacked storage buildings and boat facilities north of WONSAN, destroying one boat and three buildings and damaging two boats and four buildings. Dock facilities, supply vehicles and box cars were attacked at SINPO by the jets. Ninety-three sorties were flown and fifty-four tons of bombs were dropped.

6 December - Jets, searching the recco route from KILCHU to HYESANJIN, attacked a train, destroying two cars and damaging eleven. Several cars were left burning. Other F9F-5's destroyed a large boat construction and repair facility near SINPO and set fuel facilities afire. The F4U's and AD's hit a supply and staging area near CHA-SAN-NI, destroying nine warehouses. The night hecklers, ranging westward and northward from HUNGNAM, destroyed two trucks and damaged twenty others. Ninety-five sorties were flown and fifty-five tons of bombs were dropped this date.

93

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

LT William P. HUGHES, USNR, VF-874, was forced to ditch at sea when his F4U-4, Bureau Number 81831, was hit by anti-aircraft fire over HUNGNAM. Upon notification, MONTE CARLO dispatched DD-804 which effected the rescue. He suffered no injuries.

7 December - No flight operations - replenishment.

8 December - Planes from the USS ORISKANY flew ninety-one sorties dropping forty-three tons of bombs. The AD's and F4U's attacked military billeting areas southwest of HUNGNAM in the morning and supply build-ups along the bomblines in the afternoon. The jets attacked rail facilities and warehouses along the recco routes. Throughout the day two trucks and twenty-six buildings were destroyed. Ten trucks, thirty-five buildings, one boxcar and a railroad bridge were damaged. In addition, five rail cuts were scored.

9 December - The early morning hecklers, attacking west and north of WONSAN, reported light vehicular traffic. They destroyed seven trucks and damaged thirteen. The AD's and F4U's, with F9F-5 escort, tarcap, and flak suppression, conducted a morning and an afternoon strike on HYESANJIN, adjacent to the Manchurian border. Railroad repair facilities, factory buildings, government buildings, waterworks and sawmills were destroyed or damaged. One hundred twelve sorties were flown and seventy-four tons of bombs dropped.

10 December - Alert hecklers, spotting a two-engined train midway between CHONGJIN and KILCHU, destroyed one locomotive and four cars. Four other cars were damaged. A strike by AD's and F4U's against HUNGNAM resulted in the destruction of three buildings while seven others, including two warehouses, were damaged. The afternoon jet strike in the vicinity of PUKCHONG obtained several direct hits on warehouses in this area and several large secondary explosions were observed. Six warehouses were destroyed. Sixty-nine tons of bombs were dropped during the day's ninety-six sorties.

11 December - No flight operations - replenishment.

12 December - The AD's and F4U's struck an enemy supply build-up area in the vicinity of P'ANGYO-DONG, a few miles behind the main line of resistance. With jets flying flak suppression, the Corsairs and Sky-raidiers caused several secondary explosions. During the afternoon the AD's and F4U's furnished close air support for the front line troops. The controller's assessment was ninety percent coverage and ninety percent effective. Jets, flying reconnaissance destroyed five buildings, three gun emplacements and three boxcars. Twelve other buildings were damaged. Ninety-two sorties were flown and sixty-one tons of bombs were dropped.

DECLASSIFIED

13 December - Jet reccos and propeller aircraft close air support comprised most of the day's ninety-five sorties during which sixty tons of bombs were dropped. The Corsairs and Skyraiders, supporting units of the I Corps, were credited with fifty percent coverage and effectiveness. The Panther jets bombed and strafed targets in the KILCHU area, destroying five buildings. Four other buildings and nine supply shelters were damaged. The hecklers destroyed twenty-one vehicles and damaged four others.

14 December - USS ORISKANY planes in ninety sorties dropped sixty-three tons of bombs on the supply build-up area near YODONG-NI and the material shelters near KILCHU. Damage assessment was hampered by smoke and debris over the target.

15 December - No flight operations - replenishment.

16 December - Despite the hampering effects of a low overcast, the hecklers destroyed two trucks and damaged two. The day's main effort was an all Air Group coordinated strike against the railroad repair facilities and small factories at HYESANJIN on the YALU River. The Air Group was the only one of three that reached the primary assigned target after an instrument climb-out, one hundred twenty-five miles through layers of clouds and an instrument let-down over the force through 6,000 feet of icing conditions upon return. Jets provided tarcap and flak suppression for the AD's and F4U's. The area was fully covered and later photo coverage verified complete destruction of a large railroad roundhouse. Afternoon flights were cancelled because of poor weather. Thirty-eight tons of bombs were dropped during the day's fifty-six sorties.

17 December - The hecklers destroyed an ammo dump near HAMHUNG after they had destroyed three trucks and damaged three others along the coastal recco routes north of the city. The jet strikes heavily damaged a sawmill north of HAMHUNG and fifteen boats near CHONGJIN. The AD's and F4U's bombed supply and personnel billeting areas in the vicinity of CHANGYON-NI. Additional attacks on supply storage areas were conducted in the afternoon in the vicinity of HAYON-NI, near the eastern terminus of the main line of resistance. Ninety-four sorties were flown and seventy-one tons of bombs were dropped.

18 December - The jets attacked the HONGWON supply storage area. Heavy damage was assessed. They also furnished flak suppression for the morning propeller aircraft strike against military equipment stored behind the front lines near SOKTUN-NI. Several secondary explosions were observed in the afternoon as the Corsairs and Skyraiders bombed storage areas at YONGP-YONG-NI, heavily damaging eight warehouses. Seventy-three tons of bombs were dropped during the day's one hundred one sorties.

25

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

19 December - No flight operations - replenishment.

20 December - With jets providing flak suppression, the F4U's and AD's destroyed thirteen buildings and damaged thirty-three others in attacks on camouflaged personnel shelters and supply buildings northwest of MAJON-NI and at YONGDAE-RI. Panther jets searched the reconnaissance routes from WONSAN to SONGJIN and northwest to the CHANGJIN-GANG reservoir. Large secondary explosions were reported upon bombing and strafing personnel billeting and supply storage areas in the vicinity of PUK-CHONG. Seventy-two tons of bombs were dropped during the day's ninety-eight sorties.

21 December - Thirty-nine tons of bombs were dropped during fifty-five sorties before high winds forced cancellation of the day's remaining events. The Corsairs and Skyraiders destroyed an estimated twenty-five personnel and supply shelters in the vicinity of CHANGYON-NI. An additional forty-five were damaged.

22 December - With jet tarcap, Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO ADs' and F4Us' attacked vehicle shops, storage facilities and billeting areas near HWANGSUWON-NI, believed to be a build-up of an air complex. Thirteen buildings were destroyed and fifteen damaged. The jets flew reconnaissance south from WONSAN reporting destruction of many supplies which were stacked just off the roads, presumably awaiting transportation to the front. Seventy-three sorties were flown with thirty tons of bombs and twenty-one napalm bombs dropped before bad weather forced cancellation of flight operations.

LTJG J. A. HUDSON, 532903, USN, VA-923, was killed in action when his Skyraider failed to pull out of a near vertical bombing run.

23 December - USS ORISKANY ADs' and F4Us' this morning attacked a communist supply concentration southwest of KANSONG with supporting jet flak suppression. Eighty-five percent coverage was achieved. Jet reccos damaged four boxcars. This evening the night configured ADs' and F4Us' on heckler flights destroyed nine trucks and damaged eight others south of WONSAN. Sixty-one tons of bombs were dropped during the day's seventy-eight sorties.

24 December - No flight operations - replenishment.

25 December - No flight operations - enroute YOKOSUKA, Japan.

26 December - No flight operations - enroute YOKOSUKA, Japan.

27 December - Arrived YOKOSUKA, Japan. End of reporting period.

DECLASSIFIED

PART III

ORDNANCE

1. Gun performance during this period was excellent. There were 155,831 rounds of 20mm ammunition expended with an average of 1,360 rounds fired per stoppage. The .50 caliber performance was 2,200 rounds per stoppage, with a total of 86,200 rounds fired. Gun maintenance consisted of frequent cleaning and oiling using E51 gun oil and S75G solenoid oil.
2. Satisfactory performance was obtained from all bomb racks with the exception of the Aero 14A combination bomb rack and rocket launcher:
 - a. Several of the sway braces on these racks have become inoperative due to the stripping of the threads on these braces. This is particularly evident on the AD and F4U aircraft.
 - b. Many shear pin failures have occurred on this rack when using it as a rocket launcher. Of three racks investigated, it was found that the main spring guide and sleeve contained in the rocket latch assembly were rusted and corroded, preventing the guide from sliding as the rocket was launched. Although the Aero 14A Handbook (AN 11-75A-7 states that no lubrication is required in maintaining this combination rack and launcher, it is believed that frequent lubrication of the rocket latch assembly would reduce corrosion. It is recommended that consideration be given to providing an oil port so that the rocket latch assembly may be lubricated.
3. In order to prevent rocket plugs pulling loose from their receptacles, a small metal retaining clip was utilized by VF-874. It was designed by E. A. RUYLE, AO1, of that squadron. Use of this clip eliminated the need for the bayonette plug lock pins which were working loose, allowing the rocket plugs to pull free of their receptacles. This clip was fastened to the receptacle and by means of a small slot in which the plug wing grip fits, the inserted plug was firmly held in place. Since the installation of this clip, not one rocket plug has pulled loose. A similar type clip is being made for trial on the F9F-5 aircraft. Plans for this clip are being forwarded to the Bureau of Ordnance for consideration.
4. The new Aero 12B bomb skid has proven to be most successful for flight deck operations. However, there are only seven of these skids now on board. It is recommended that a full allowance be provided at the earliest possible date.
5. To minimize the possibility of an accidental gun firing, a breach blocking tool for use in the 20mm guns was designed by G. R. ADDY, AOUL, VA-923, and employed successfully by that squadron. This tool fits over the gas cylinder sleeve and barrel behind the yoke in front of the push rods. With this tool in place, the breech is unable to go into the battery position. It is held back by the push rods which are engaged by

III-1

ENCLOSURE (1)

29

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

this tool, preventing the possibility of an accidental firing while inspecting and clearing the gun. Plans for this tool are being submitted to the Bureau of Ordnance for consideration.

6. Cold weather clothing now authorized and issued to ordnancemen includes mittens. However, the mittens are extremely awkward and it is impracticable for ordnancemen to fuze bombs and install arming wires while wearing them. It is recommended that an allowance for pliable, leather, fingered gloves with wool knitted liners be established for all ordnancemen operating in a cold climate.

7. The following ordnance items were critical in supply:

- a. Hydraulic gun chargers (Mk5 Mod 1, Aero 11A)
- b. Relay boxes (Mk4 Mod 1) for use in Mk 1 Mods 4 and 5 sighting systems
- c. Douglas Bomb Ejector parts
- d. Station Selectors (Mk2 Mod 0)

8. Of twenty-one Napalm bombs dropped during this period, six duds were reported. Investigation indicates that the ratio of thickener to gasoline was in excess of the desired six percent. This heavy mix was observed to gell to a solid state. These six reported duds were the first bombs prepared and under conditions of darkness on the flight deck with high wind velocities. Three of the dud napalm bombs were fuzed with the M16 gas cap igniters only while the remaining bombs were fuzed with both the M16 and M15 igniters.

DECLASSIFIED

TOTAL ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE BY SQUADRONS:

<u>TYPE</u> <u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>AD-3, AD-4</u> <u>(VA-923)</u>	<u>AD-4N</u> <u>(VC-35)</u>	<u>F4U-4</u> <u>(VF-874)</u>	<u>F4U-5N</u> <u>(VC-3)</u>	<u>F9F-5</u> <u>(VF-781)</u>	<u>F9F-5</u> <u>(VF-783)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2000#GP	37						37
1000#GP	409		22				431
500#GP	293	21	239	37			590
250#GP	1203	73	881		240	314	2711
FRAGS	156	14	102	249	458	348	1327
100#GP	305	134			184	126	749
NAPALM	12		9				21
ATAR, 5"	59		103		332	390	884
20MM	15,267	17,270		13,000	56,009	54,285	155,831
50CAL			86,200				86,200

HUNG ORDNANCE:

<u>TYPE</u> <u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>AERO 14A</u>	<u>MK 55</u>	<u>MK 51</u>	<u>MK 9</u>	<u>DOUGLAS BOMB</u> <u>EJECTOR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2000#GP						
1000#GP					1	1
500#GP			3			3
250#GP	7	12				19
FRAGS	4	1				5
100#GP	2	1				3
NAPALM						
ATAR, 5"	52					52

PERCENT HUNG ORDNANCE:

Air Group	0.53%
VF-781	0.57%
VF-783	0.51%
VF-874	0.48%
VA-923	0.58%
VC-3 "G"	0.35%
VC-35 "G"	0.40%

29

DECLASSIFIED

DISPOSITION HUNG ORDNANCE:

<u>TYPE ORDNANCE</u>	<u>LATER MANUAL RELEASE</u>	<u>RELEASE BY MANEUVERING</u>	<u>REMAINING ON RACK</u>	<u>DROP OFFS ON LANDINGS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2000#GP			1		1
1000#GP			3		3
500#GP			18	1	19
250#GP			5		5
FRAGS			3		3
100#GP			45	7	52
ATAR 5"					

III-4

ENCLOSURE (1)

30

DECLASSIFIED

PART IV

DAMAGE

DAMAGE INFLICTED ON ENEMY:

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>
Boats	5	35
Tanks	1	
Trucks	117	172
Locomotives	1	1
Ox Carts	51	11
Highway Bridges		7
Supply Dumps	9	15
Factories	1	4
Barracks	29	45
Buildings	159	328
Warehouses	2	5
Gun Emplacements	4	2
Lumber Piles		1
Storage Tanks	2	
Radar Installations		3
Power Installations		11
Bunkers	1	3
Marshalling Yards		3
R R Cars	12	47
Roundhouses	1	
Rail Cuts	32	
Ammunition Dumps		1
Highway Cuts		1
Troops	68 KIA	10 WIA
R R Tunnels		1

21

DECLASSIFIED

COMBAT LOSS OF AIRCRAFT:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>BUNO</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>	<u>CODE</u>
12-4-52	VA-923	AD-4	127862	Enemy anti-aircraft fire	L
12-6-52	VF-874	F4U-4	81831	Enemy anti-aircraft fire	L
12-22-52	VA-923	AD-3	122782	Possible enemy anti-aircraft fire	L

DAMAGE INFLICTED BY ENEMY ON OWN AIRCRAFT:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>BUNO</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>	<u>CODE</u>
12-6-52	VF-783	F9F-5	125312	Automatic weapons fire	D-3
12-8-52	VF-783	F9F-5	126047	Automatic weapons fire	D-3
12-9-52	VF-783	F9F-5	126005	Small arms fire	D-3
12-12-52	VF-874	F4U-4	82099	Automatic weapons fire	D-3
12-12-52	VF-874	F4U-4	97210	Small arms fire	D-3
12-12-52	VC-35	AD-4N	125734	Automatic weapons fire	D-3
12-16-52	VF-783	F9F-5	125541	Small arms fire	D-3
12-17-52	VF-783	F9F-5	125548	Small arms fire	D-3
12-20-52	VF-783	F9F-5	125955	Automatic weapons fire	D-3
12-22-52	VF-783	F9F-5	124462	Small arms fire	D-3
12-22-52	VF-783	F9F-5	126047	Automatic weapons fire	D-3
12-22-52	VF-783	F9F-5	125311	Small arms fire	D-3
12-23-52	VF-874	F4U-4	82099	Small arms fire	D-3

DECLASSIFIED

PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE:

1. The performance of Air Group personnel during this period is considered excellent.
2. Limited experience indicates that a hardship is imposed on propeller squadron pilots required to fly two missions during one day. A discussion based on this experience follows:

a. Pilots of propeller squadrons flying two missions in one day average approximately six hours in the air and two hours per sortie for briefing and debriefing. Planes are manned one half hour before launching. This results in the pilot working approximately ten to twelve hours in one day solely as a pilot. The efficiency of a pilot drops sharply after three hours in the air in a single-placed aircraft.

b. A recent despatch from Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN directs that pilots of AD and F4U aircraft not fly more than one combat mission of three hours duration on any one day unless so directed by him.

c. It is recommended that the pilot allowances for propeller aircraft squadrons be increased to 175% of their assigned aircraft. This recommended allowance is based on current schedules in the Korean Combat Theater and on average pilot losses due to combat and the reduction of average pilot availability as a result of illness.

d. The pilot allowance for jet squadrons under the present schedule requirements appears to be satisfactory. Two missions of the normal one and one half hour's schedule is no hardship for a jet pilot and is rarely required.

3. "Operation Morale", in which the families of the Air Group and the Ship's Company located in the San Diego and Alameda areas were photographed on sound movies to bring a Christmas message of cheer to their loved ones at sea off Korea during the Yuletide Season, was an enormous success.

CASUALTIES:

1. An AD piloted by LTJG J. A. HUDSON, 532903, USN, VA-923, was observed to crash while on a combat mission over North Korea on 22 December 1952. Anti-aircraft fire is considered a possible cause of the crash. Neither pilot nor chute was observed to leave the airplane. LTJG HUDSON is listed as killed in action.

DECLASSIFIED

PART VI

OPERATIONS

1. During this period Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO flew a total of 1449 flights and flew 3,125.2 hours during 14.5 scheduled operational days. Approximately one and one half days' operations were cancelled because of weather. The Air Group averaged 100 flights per operating day. The average total number of flights per pilot for the propeller aircraft was 11.6 and for the jet pilots was 13.1.

2. In order to expedite the simultaneous rendezvous of several flights of F9F-5 aircraft of two different squadrons, the following procedure was utilized with success:

a. The parent carrier's sector in the disposition was divided in half, centered on the median line. The clockwise half from the sector median was assigned to VF-783, the other half to VF-781. For example, with three carriers, the disposition axis 360°, the median lines extended from the disposition center on 360°, 120°, and 240°. The 60° arc clockwise from the median line for the USS ORISKANY was assigned to VF-783. The other half of the 120° sector was assigned to VF-781.

b. VF-781 and VF-783 were assigned even and odd altitudes respectively.

c. Rendezvousing was conducted below any overcast.

d. Rendezvous turns were standard rate and to the left with the orbit outside and tangent to the screen.

3. In some instances jet reconnaissance flights were briefed on specific targets on the assigned routes. If coverage of the routes did not afford worth-while targets of opportunity, this additional effort in preparation permitted the flights to expend ordnance effectively on enemy material of military significance.

4. The APA-70 was adequate equipment for ECM direction finding when employed against a radar station on a given frequency. However, it was incapable of accurate homing when it was necessary to differentiate between two stations operating on the same frequency simultaneously. It is recommended that an improved ECM direction finding equipment be provided single-engine, carrier-based aircraft, if possible, one presenting a 360° picture and permitting selection of horizontally or vertically polarized antennae.

5. The requirement for early warning aircraft equipped with a radar which is capable of a coverage of 360° and overhead from horizon to horizon is becoming more acute as the problem of detecting MIG or enemy jet aircraft is experienced. Visible detection is most ineffective unless condensation trails are in evidence.

VI-1

ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED

SUMMARY OF FLIGHTS

MISSION	VF-781 F9F-5	VF-783 F9F-5	VF-874 F4U-4	VA-923 AD-3,4	VC-3 F4U-5N	VC-11 AD-4W	VC-35 AD-4N	VC-61 F2H-2P F9F-5P	AIR GROUP
OFFENSIVE:									
Strike	59	59	227	219					564
Recco	68	81							149
Flak Suppression	73	57							130
NGF			11	3	2				16
ECM							18		18
ECM Escort			12	8					20
Photo								52	52
Photo Escort	26	27							53
CAS			28	28					56
TAR CAP	20	24							44
Heckler					31		32		63
Strike Escort	4	4							8
TOTAL OFFENSIVE	250	252	278	258	33	50	52		1173
DEFENSIVE:									
CAP	77	82							159
ASP						33	3		36
ASP Escort				17	4		15		36
AEW						2			2
AEW Escort			1				1		2
TOTAL DEFENSIVE	77	82	1	17	4	35	19		235
MISCELLANEOUS:									
			5	4	2				11
ABORTS:									
	8	6		9	5			2	30
TOTALS	335	340	284	288	44	35	69	54	1449
Average Flights Per Pilot									
	13.4	13.6	10.5	12.5	8.8	7.	13.8	10.8	12.
Average Flight hours per pilot									
	20.4	20.9	32.3	35.1	24.3	19.2	43.1	16.2	25.8

35

DECLASSIFIED

PART VII

AIR INTELLIGENCE

1. The most widely used flak plotting systems provide the location of known enemy anti-aircraft gun positions, the caliber, and intensity and accuracy of fire. Once plotted, however, there was no way of knowing what dates guns had fired or how many times firings had occurred. In order to furnish pilots with current, detailed enemy flak intelligence, the following system was devised and has been most effective.

a. All flak positions, whether reported via flak summaries, supplements, or pilot's reports, were recorded on 5 x 7 cards on which the following column headings had been printed:

- (1) Grid coordinates of the position
- (2) Type of gun
- (3) Number of times gun had fired
- (4) Date of last firing
- (5) Intensity of fire
- (6) Accuracy of fire
- (7) Type aircraft the gun had fired upon
- (8) Altitude of aircraft when fired upon
- (9) Visual sighting possible
- (10) Specific reference points relative to gun's estimated position

b. Enemy flak intelligence was recorded under the headings on the 5 x 7 cards as it was received, thus the morning flights furnished the latest flak data to the afternoon sorties. In addition, each night all available enemy flak intelligence received that day was reviewed and the information recorded on the cards.

c. The 5 x 7 cards were filed under main index cards for each grid sector. There was a 5 x 7 card for each of the sector's 100 grid squares wherein an enemy gun position was reported.

d. From these cards current flak information was plotted each night on 1:50,000 scale charts to be used the following day by Air Intelligence Officers during their briefings of various flights. The AIO's utilized the cards in the preparation of their briefing notes as well.

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

e. The flak data for reconnaissance routes and rail cut sections were cross filed. A separate set of cards were prepared for the area ten miles on either side of each route and rail cut section. An AIO was able to obtain all available flak intelligence needed to brief a reconnaissance or rail cut mission by pulling the respective set of cards for the assigned area.

[REDACTED]

VII-2

ENCLOSURE (1)

37

DECLASSIFIED

PART VIII

SURVIVAL

[REDACTED]

1. The Mk 4 anti-exposure suit received its first test in combat 6 December 1952. Lieutenant HUGHES of Fighter Squadron EIGHT SEVEN FOUR ditched without injury near HUNGNAM, Korea in water at a temperature of 40°F. After the F4U-4 came to rest in the water he freed himself of attachments to the plane, stood up on the side of the cockpit, and stepped over the right side into the water with the parachute still strapped to him. He inflated his Mae West which was very buoyant, floating him comfortably on his back. He had no difficulty unfastening the parachute harness fittings. Unfastening the harness in the cockpit on previous flights had always been extremely difficult. It is believed that the freedom of body action afforded in the water made this task easier. Inflating the pararaft was easily accomplished. He pulled himself into the inflated raft over its stern without difficulty after he'd been in the water an estimated eight minutes. After getting into the raft his hands became very cold. He'd taken off his flight gloves to manipulate the parachute harness and pararaft. He then put on the wet, large mittens contained in the pockets of the Mk 4 suit which brought warmth to his hands in about three minutes. He remained in the raft, which was about half full of cold water, for approximately twenty-five minutes. The air temperature was estimated to be lower than that of the water and higher than 31°F. He was comfortably warm enough in the water and in the pararaft. He was wearing cotton undershirt and drawers, the Mk 4 inner liner, and two pairs of cotton socks under the Mk 4 anti-exposure suit.

2. ENS RADEBAUGH, of Attack Squadron NINE TWO THREE, bailed out of an AD-3 aircraft over land with a Mk 4 suit on. He experienced difficulty in getting out of the plane because of the bulkiness of the suit. He is 5'7" tall and weighs 135 pounds.

DECLASSIFIED

PART IX

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL

1. Twenty-two cases of F9F-5 auto-acceleration and loss of throttle control occurred during the period covered by this report as follows:

<u>POWER SETTING</u>	<u>ALTITUDE MALFUNCTION</u>	<u>MINUTES AT ALTITUDE</u>	<u>ALTITUDE CONTROL REGAINED</u>	<u>MAXIMUM AUTO-ACCELERATION</u>
80%	18,500	20	16,000	ZERO
80%	22-28,000	25	20,000	ZERO
80%	20,000	25	*	92%
80%	20,000	20	*	87%
84%	22,000	20	17,000	93%
84%	22,000	40	22,300	ZERO
80%	24,000	40	20,000	92%
80%	22,000	25	20,000	ZERO
84%	22,000	20	17,000	ZERO
96%	21,000	45	18,500	ZERO
85%	21,000	45	21,000	93%
85%	20,000	60	19,500	94%
82%	20,000	60	18,000	96%
82%	20-30,000	40	19,000	90%
82%	20-30,000	40	19,000	98%
82%	20,000	20	*	88%
82%	20,000	35	*	92%
82%	20,000	25	*	94%
92%	26,000	20	20,000	ZERO
82%	26,000	15		ZERO
98%	20-30,000	5	19,000	ZERO
82%	27,000	20	*	94%

* Shifted to the emergency system and regained satisfactory control.

a. Malfunctions continued after the removal of servo filters, both Skinner and Pourolator, from eight aircraft.

b. Removal of isolation valve screens on two aircraft and draining of all external lines to reduce the possibility of moisture in the lower portions of the lines, did not eliminate auto-acceleration and loss of throttle control.

c. Tests using three percent lubricating oil additive were conducted with two aircraft. No malfunctions occurred. However, this is not considered conclusive because of the limited number of flights made. In addition, these few flights were accomplished under conditions dissimilar to those previously producing auto-acceleration and loss of throttle control.

39

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED] N

d. On 21 and 22 December a total of 20 flights were made above 20,000 feet. Seven aircraft had methanol added to the fuel in the ratio of one gallon of methanol to 1,000 gallons of fuel. No malfunctions were experienced with aircraft using the methanol-fuel mixture while seven cases of auto-acceleration occurred among the remaining thirteen aircraft. Tests using methanol-fuel mixture will be continued.

2. A constant and positive control of aircraft availability and status is a never ending problem aboard carriers. The Flight Deck Control Officer and maintenance crews require a carefully integrated program to facilitate necessary aircraft availability and completion of scheduled launches. To cope with this problem CVG-102 devised and put into operation a master aircraft status and availability board which is the control center and is in communications with the vital key centers of the Air Department and Squadrons on the 2JG circuit during Flight Quarters and by phone at other times.

a. The material requirements for this type of control are few when weighed against the end results. The following materials are required:

(1) Plexi-glass Master Board approximately 6' X 8' with the individual aircraft maintenance entries painted on it for each squadron and unit.

(2) Up-down board located in Flight Deck Control, plus individual squadron discrepancy boards.

(3) Six sets of headphones and microphones for use of talkers on the 2JG circuit.

(4) 2JG circuit connecting talkers in Flight Deck Control, master board and each of the four ready rooms.

b. The personnel requirements for this system are few. CVG-102 employs the following:

(1) One Chief Petty Officer (ADC).

(2) Three non-rated men.

(3) Squadrons furnish ready room talkers during flight quarters.

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED] N

c. Operationally the system is simple but positive. The location of the master control board on the hangar deck is paramount since it must be readily visible and yet not occupy or obstruct aircraft parking space. The master board is located approximately eight feet above deck on the starboard side of the hangar deck at frame 104. A catwalk is built completely around the board to facilitate movement by talkers and a small log book table is provided for keeping permanent and detailed records of all reported aircraft discrepancies. The master board is manned continuously by regularly assigned watches who also maintain the permanent log.

d. A CPO located in Flight Deck Control acts as master talker and control during flight quarters and obtains his information from key men in each squadron and unit. Primarily, he receives and dispatches information through the communication system, maintains the small aircraft operational up and down board and makes all entries on the individual squadron discrepancy boards, all of which are located in Flight Deck Control and plainly visible to the Aircraft Handling Officer.

e. Each squadron and unit of CVG-102 maintains a trouble-shooting crew on the flight deck to catch last minute difficulties and to make rapid diagnosis of malfunctions reported upon recovery.

f. The CPO in charge of the individual squadron maintenance crews and trouble-shooting crews are the only personnel qualified to report changes in status of aircraft. Placing the responsibility for such decisions upon a centralized few eliminates much confusion and error.

g. At the beginning of each day's operations the maintenance CPO stationed in Flight Deck Control contacts the master status board on the hangar deck for up to date information regarding the status of all aircraft aboard. This information is transmitted to the Aircraft Handling Officer through the up-down board in Flight Deck Control. The CPO further informs all squadron ready rooms of availability as well as assigned planes for each launch.

h. Upon completion of each recovery, the individual squadron trouble-shooting crews immediately report to the maintenance CPO in Flight Deck Control the status of all aircraft. This information is transmitted to the master status board, ready rooms and Aircraft Handling Officer. Discrepancies requiring hangar deck maintenance are sent to the hangar deck, minor "squawks" are repaired on the flight deck and the respot is thereby expedited. In the event aircraft have to be sent below for checks or other discrepancies, the information is entered on the individual squadron discrepancy boards located directly in front of the Aircraft Handling Officer's working area.

[REDACTED]

IX-3

ENCLOSURE (1)

41

i. Conversely, when an aircraft has been repaired on the hangar dock and is ready to be flown on the schedule or requires a turn up, the talker at the master status board enters the information on the board and the log and notifies Flight Deck Control and the ready room concerned.

j. The system herein described has operated most satisfactorily. Close supervision and cooperation by all departments concerned has resulted in minimum delays and positive control over aircraft status and afforded maximum scheduling usage.

3. Material support for this period was considered highly satisfactory. Fifteen plane-days were lost because of non-availability of Corsair wings with change 432 (Aero 14A rocket launchers) installed. Except for exchanging wing assemblies on downed aircraft this situation would have become more critical. One Banshee photo plane was ACOG twelve days for lack of nose wheel hinge arms and the break-away plate on the back of the pilot's seat armor plate.

4. Three cases of the accessory drive shaft in R3350-26WA engines being twisted beyond the allowable limits occurred during this period. These shafts were not carried on the ship's allowance list. They were obtained from new engines on board in order to keep aircraft in an "up" status. It is recommended that these parts be included in the allowance list.

AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>AVERAGE AIRCRAFT ON BOARD (EXCLUSIVE OF DUDS)</u>	<u>AVERAGE AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE</u>	<u>AVERAGE PERCENT AVAILABLE</u>
VF-781	F9F-5	12.8	10.	80.
VF-783	F9F-5	13.9	11.2	80.
VF-874	F4U-4	14.2	12.8	90.
VA-923	AD-3/AD-4	14.8	12.1	82.
VC-3 "G"	F4U-5N	3.6	2.6	72.
VC-11 "G"	AD-4W	3.	2.3	76.
VC-35 "G"	AD-4N	4.	3.5	88.
VC-61 "G"	F2H-2P/F9F-5P	3.	2.	67.
AIR GROUP		69.3	56.5	81.

49