

DECLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP ONE HUNDRED ONE

AS ORIGINAL 23
FIELD/CVG-101/A9
WWB:js
Ser. 030
27 August 1951

From: Commander Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE
(25 July 1951 - 24 August 1951)

Ref: (a) CNO Restricted ltr CP-345 Ser. 1197P34 of 3 August 1950

2. In compliance with reference (a) the following information is submitted for inclusion in the action report of the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21).

PART I MISSION AND COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES:

a. Mission: The primary mission of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE during this reporting period was interdiction of the enemy's supply lines on the eastern half of the Korean peninsula. Particular attention was paid to the hunting down and destruction of vehicles and rolling stock. The neutralization of bridges and highways by bombing and seeding was continued. The secondary mission was close air support of United Nations troops. On one occasion large bombs were used for blasting enemy troops who were dug in in bunkers along the front.

b. Composition of own forces:

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C		PILOTS	
		7-26	8-24	7-26	8-24
CVG-101 CDR W. W. BREHM		0	0	5*	5
VF-721 LCDR W. E. WOODMAN	F9F-2B	18	17	31	31
VF-791 LCDR J.B. KISNER	F4U-4	16	15	25	25
VF-884 LCDR G.E. HARTLEY	F4U-4	16	16	26	25
VA-702 LCDR S.C. SEAGRAVES	AD-2 AD-4Q	17 1	17 1	28	28
VC-3 (Det) LT J.D. ELY	F4U-5NL	3	2	5	5
VC-11 (Det) LCDR R.I. HALEY	AD-4H	3	3	5	5
VC-35 LT W. C. RAPOSA	AD-4N	3	2	5	5

DECLASSIFIED

FEL2/GVGL01/A9
Ser: 030

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C		PILOTS	
		7-26	8-24	7-26	8-2
VC-61 (Det)					
LT H.A. TOMPKINS	F9F-2P	2	3	4	4

* Air Group Commander, Operations Officer, and Senior Landing Signal Officer flew regularly with squadrons.

PART II CHRONOLOGY

Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE, aboard the USS BOXER, departed Yokosuka on 26 July to rejoin TF77 off the east coast of Korea.

On 27 July the USS BOXER conducted refresher flight operations and an F4U-4 flown by Ensign H.R. HERRIN, USNR, of VF-884 was ditched after a complete loss of oil pressure during a strafing run on a target sled. Ensign HERRIN was picked up unhurt immediately afterward by the helicopter.

On 28 July the USS BOXER rejoined TF77 and commenced combat operations. Operations against the enemy were handicapped by adverse weather conditions, but armed reconnaissance, bridge breakers, naval gunfire spotters, night hecklers, CAP's, and weather reconnaissance flights were flown. One F4U-4 was stricken after night heckler pilot LTJG H.L. O'HARA, USNR, crashed on deck during a night recovery. The pilot was uninjured.

On 29 July adverse weather conditions limited operations to four night heckler sorties and two ASP sorties.

On 30 July weather conditions improved, and 95 sorties were launched. Seventy-one sorties were offensive, while 24 were defensive.

On 31 July the Task Force replenished, but one "Guppy" plane and one investigator were launched for a dusk ASP.

On 1 and 2 August the only flight operations were CAP's and ASP's.

On 3 August adverse weather conditions still prevailed, but a close air support mission was flown. The flight of three AD-2's and four F4U-4's attacked enemy troops facing the Second Infantry Division. One AD-2 and one F4U-4 were damaged by small arms fire and landed at K-18.

On 4 August weather conditions improved and 92 sorties were launched. These included all types of missions with close air support going to the 8th ROK Division and the 24th Infantry Division, and inflicting approximately 70 casualties on the enemy. One F4U-4 piloted by LTJG H.B. RATHBONE, USN, VF-884, crashed immediately after take-off, and the pilot was not recovered. This was CVG-101's first operational loss.

On 5 August flight operations were hampered by adverse weather, but a total of 39 offensive sorties were launched. They included armed reccos, close air support to the 24th Infantry Division, bridge breakers, photo reconnaissance, and naval gunfire spotting in vicinity of Wonsan Bay.

On 6 August 92 sorties were launched. Seventy of these were offensive. They were the same type missions that had been flown the day before. Weather conditions in the bombline area hampered operations there, but close air support was given the 1st ROK Corps.

On 7 August 97 sorties were flown. Adverse weather conditions caused many of these to be diverted to secondary targets and targets of opportunity. One AD-2 flown by LT R.T. WALKER, USNR, VA-702, was ditched in

Wonsan Bay after being hit by ground fire. LT WALKER was rescued a few minutes later by the same helicopter from the same ship, USS TOLEDO, that had rescued him from a point approximately 15 miles northwest of Wonsan Bay less than a month earlier.

On 8 August bad weather and replenishment reduced flight operations, but in mid-afternoon two F4U-5NL's and two AD-4N's of VC-3 and VC-35 respectively, were launched on an "all weather" armed reconnaissance.

On 9 August weather conditions improved and 97 sorties were launched. Approximately three-fourths of these were offensive. All of the usual types of missions were flown except close air support, all of which were diverted to armed reccos as a result of bad weather on the bombline and the unusually heavy flow of traffic found on the east coast motor supply routes.

On 10 August 72 offensive sorties and 24 defensive sorties were launched. These included all of the usual type missions, and a special strike against 100 loaded boxcars in the Hamhung marshalling yard. Close air support was given 1st ROK Corps.

On 11 August 99 sorties including only 16 defensive sorties, were launched. All of the usual types of missions were flown, including close air support for the 1st ROK Corps. Spotty weather caused many diversions.

On 12 August flight operations were suspended while the task force replenished.

On 13 August 95 sorties were launched with 78 sorties being offensive. The missions were of the usual types with weather causing many diversions to armed reccos. The enemy continued, as in the three days previous, to use many vehicles during daylight hours. These included trucks, excarts, trains, and small boats, and made targets plentiful for armed reccos. Close air support was given the 2nd Infantry Division and the 1st ROK Corps.

On 14 August adverse weather conditions prevented flight operations.

On 15 August 90 sorties were flown on the usual type missions with close air support going to the 1st ROK Corps, 2nd ROK and 7th ROK Divisions.

On 16 August flight operations were again cancelled due to weather.

On 17 August parts of enemy held Korea were still obscured by low ceilings and rain, but 63 sorties were launched. Twelve of these were defensive. The offensive sorties included 15 AD-2's and 16 F4U-4's which delivered 38.3 tons of bombs to a heavily fortified hill that was being attacked by the 1st ROK Corps.

On 18 August 42 offensive sorties were launched bringing the days total to 46 sorties of all kinds. All of the usual types of missions were flown.

On 19 August the Task Force replenished.

On 20 and 21 August no flying was done as the task force sought refuge in the eastern portion of the Sea of Japan from the typhoon "Marge".

On 22 August three AD-4N's and one F4U-5NL were launched as early morning hecklers but they found enemy-held territory almost completely weathered in and all other offensive missions were eventually cancelled. Total number of sorties for the day was 14. USS DOXER was relieved on station during the afternoon, and the 23rd and 24th of August were spent enroute to Yokosuka.

PART III ORDNANCE

a. Machine Guns - In the F4U-4's .50 caliber machine guns explosions of the blast tubes continue to be a major problem. In one F4U-4 squadron five (5) of these explosions were experienced, three (3) of which necessitated wing changes. In the other F4U-4 squadron two (2) blast tube explosions occurred one of which required a wing change. As yet, it has not been possible to test extensively the theory that the incendiary rounds are causing the explosions; however, approximately 90 thousand rounds of ball ammunition were belted and fired without an explosion. In some instances the barrels have gauged out satisfactorily, and in others constrictions have been noted after explosions have occurred. The use of stellite barrels is being discontinued as rapidly as replacements are available. The high percentage of defective stellite liners in these barrels has cast a doubt upon their merit. Extra care has been taken in the maintenance of guns and blast tubes.

b. Jet Ordnance - Very few "hung rockets" were reported during this period. The motors of those malfunctioning rockets all bore very old manufacturer's dates.

A minimum amount of gun difficulty was encountered and these cases could probably have been alleviated if the proper equipment had been made available. After leaving port where the guns had been completely taken down, cleaned, and worn parts replaced, one reamer was received for installing the new 820392 firing pins. Rather than take the guns down again, the new firing pins were replaced as time permitted. No broken firing pins were encountered on any guns in which the new firing pins were installed. However, several firing pins were broken on guns in which the new firing pins did not get installed.

It was necessary to replace several T-2 gun heaters. Because jet aircraft usually fly a good percentage of flights at altitudes where gun heaters are required, these heaters are in constant use and require continual changing. The new and better heaters are not available as yet and until they are, the constant changing of these heaters involves a large number of man hours.

It has been necessary to change Mk 9 Mod 3 rocket launchers quite frequently. It is considered as stated in previous reports that these launchers are too weak for the speed and additional stress placed upon them in jet aircraft operations.

It is wise to check pressure switches occasionally. During this month the jet squadron experienced two cases of "light struck primers" resulting from defective pressure switches which were immediately replaced, remedying the situation.

The jet squadron enjoyed a high percentage of fire of both 20mm guns and rockets which it is felt is the result of continual preventative maintenance. It has been found that coating the external parts of 20mm guns continues to be advantageous for preventing rust and corrosion from sea spray.

c. 20 Millimeter guns: The VC-35 detachment reported erratic operation of guns until Bendix chargers were replaced by Interstate chargers.

d. Bombs and Racks - The Aero L4A installation on the F4U-4's has continued to be effective except for an occasional electrical failure. The following modifications are submitted for the improvement of the installation:

1. Substitute an automatic feature for simultaneously locking the two lugs on each rack.
2. Substitute one piece, lever-operated sway braces for the two piece crank-operated sway braces.

e. Ordnance Expenditures:

	F9F	F4U-4's	F4U-5NL's	AD's	Total Expend.
20mm	42190		10300	64375	116865
100# GP		1720	6	88	1814
250" GP			64	989	1053
500# GP		234	10	217	461
1000# GP		38		337	375
2000# GP				62	62
260# F			96	1125	1221
M-28 Cluster				8	8
M-29 Cluster		31		10	41
350# ADB		2	2	3	7
Napalm		102		189	291
ATAR 6.5"	329		12		341
HVAR 5.0"	188	276	12		476
Mk-6 Flares			26	39	65
3.25" Rocket			10	8	18
50 caliber		493465			493465

FOR 5 MONTHS OPERATIONS

3363,477 Tons of bombs expended
245,760 gallons napalm expended
11,324 rockets expended.



PART IV DAMAGE

a. Damage to enemy:

<u>TARGETS</u>	<u>PROBABLY DAMAGED:</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>
RR Bridges	2	19	37*
RR Tunnels		9	
RR Tracks			49#
RR Marshalling Yards		16	
RR Locomotives		2	
RR Cars	166	115	101
RR Handcars		1	1
RR Repair Bldgs		2	1
Highway Bridges		21	30*
Highways			75#
Trucks	83	52	79
Bulldozers		2	
Other Motor Vehicles	5	3	1
Truck Repair Shops		1	2
Carts	5	13	66
Beasts of Burden			30
Villages		137	
Factories		4	1
Saw Mills		1	
Warehouses	16	49	50
Other Type Bldgs	58	236	458
Supply Dumps	6	21	16
Fuel Dumps	1	1	2
Armo Dumps	2		
Lumber Piles		8	7
Troop Concentrations		54	
Casualties			255
Tanks		6	
Gun Emplacements	43	11	57
Surface Boats	35	12	32
Air Strips		1	
Hangars		1	
Barracks	41	35	2
Other Military Installations	3	3	4

* Rail and highway bridges with at least one complete break are counted as destroyed.

This is number of locations at which tracks were broken or highways cratered. These figures do not include damaged or destroyed highway or rail bridges, but do include bridge approaches. Not included are three rail bridges, two rail tunnels, one railroad track location and 14 highway locations all of which were seeded with delayed action bombs or antidisturbance bombs.

██████████

DECLASSIFIED

FM12/AVG-201/A9
Ser 030

PART IV

b. Damage to own forces.

A. F9F Damage (VF-721)

- 30 Jul 1951 Flak hit fuel cell. BuNo 123651
- 3 Aug 1951 Elevator tip damaged. BuNo 123660
- 4 Aug 1951 Flak in nose section. BuNo 123666
- 4 Aug 1951 Flak in nose section. BuNo 123651
- 6 Aug 1951 Flap change. Rocket burn. BuNo 123660
- 9 Aug 1951 No hook landing; overhaul damage. BuNo 123651
- 10 Aug 1951 Flak holes. BuNo 123660
- 14 Aug 1951 Ditched after catapulting. BuNo 123660
- 15 Aug 1951 Flak holes. BuNo 123653
- 15 Aug 1951 Flak holes. BuNo 123642

B. F4U Damage (VF-791)

- 28 Jul 1951 Damage to main fuel line by enemy. BuNo 97317
 - 31 Jul 1951 Damage to starboard elevator by enemy. BuNo 82084
 - 31 Jul 1951 Damage to starboard wheel door and wheel, AA flak. BuNo 81289
 - 3 Aug 1951 Damage to fabric on starboard aileron, AA flak. BuNo 97317
 - 6 Aug 1951 Damage to starboard wing by enemy flak. Hole in fabric, damaged inspection plate on top of wing, and minor damage to wing ribs. Starboard aileron had to be changed. BuNo 81712
 - 7 Aug 1951 Damage to lever, part no. VS-10493-2; bearing, part no. AN-206-DS-5; and fork end, part no. CV-55449 by enemy flak. BuNo 97305
 - 9 Aug 1951 Damage requiring fabric patch on wing and trim tab, by enemy flak. BuNo 82084
 - 9 Aug 1951 Damage to spar and ribs in wing fabric by enemy flak. BuNo 82084
 - 9 Aug 1951 Damage to ribs and after spar, vertical fin and rudder, starboard horizontal fin and starboard aileron by enemy flak. BuNo 81196
 - 11 Aug 1951 Damage to both port and starboard wings by enemy flak. BuNo 81715
 - 14 Aug 1951 Damage to hydraulic line on wing fold cylinder by enemy flak. BuNo 81715
- ██████████

C. F4U Damage (WF-884)

- 6 Aug 1951 Holes from small arms fire in left wing patched. BuNo 97045
- 7 Aug 1951 Explosion in right wing center blast tube. Wing change. BuNo 81936
- 7 Aug 1951 Explosion in right wing outboard blast tube. Wing change. BuNo 81764
- 10 Aug 1951 Holes from small arms fire in left wing patched. BuNo 81254
- 10 Aug 1951 Explosion in right wing center blast tube. Wing change. BuNo 97210
- 10 Aug 1951 Shrapnel damage to port wing rocket launchers repaired. (Believed to be own bomb blast). BuNo 97210
- 10 Aug 1951 Skin damage from small arms fire in belly repaired. BuNo 96940
- 10 Aug 1951 Shrapnel damage to port wing outboard flap. Flap changed. BuNo 97210
- 10 Aug 1951 Skin and minor structural damage from shrapnel in belly repaired. (Believed to be own bomb blast). BuNo 97208
- 11 Aug 1951 Shrapnel damage to port inboard link chute repaired. (Believed to be own bomb blast). BuNo 82086
- 11 Aug 1951 Explosion in right wing outboard blast tube. Wing change. BuNo 81969
- 14 Aug 1951 Explosion in right wing center blast tube. Wing change. BuNo 81969
- 14 Aug 1951 Prop pitted by shrapnel fragment; small arms fire in belly, left wing tip, batteries, radio equipment, right flap, and flap gap door. All damage repaired on board. BuNo 96940

D. AD Damage (VA-702)

- 2 Aug 1951 Damage to port wing, tail hook broken, rudder skin punctured; hit by flak. BuNo 122315
- 4 Aug 1951 Damaged skin of vertical fin - hit by .50 cal. BuNo 122248
- 6 Aug 1951 Damage to prop; port wing skin punctured - hit by flak. BuNo 122326
- 11 Aug 1951 Fuselage skin damaged by .30 cal. BuNo 122326
- 13 Aug 1951 Cowl flap punctured by flak. BuNo 122314
- 13 Aug 1951 Port wing skin broken in two places. Fuselage punctured. Speed ring in engine nose housing broken. Oil cooler scoop punctured. Hit by flak. BuNo 122315
- 13 Aug 1951 Fuselage skin punctured - hit by small arms fire. BuNo 122315
- 14 Aug 1951 Skin on starboard side fuselage punctured - hit by .50 cal. BuNo 122326
- 15 Aug 1951 Skin broken on rudder and starboard landing flap. Hit by .30 cal. BuNo 122314

E. F4U-5NL Damage (VC-3)

- 6 Aug 1951 Hole port side engine cowl. Bomb fragment. BuNo 124515
- 13 Aug 1951 Hole in underside fuselage. Bomb fragment. BuNo 124515
- 17 Aug 1951 Hole in port flap. .30 cal. bullet. BuNo 124515

F. AD-4N Damage (VC-35)

- 29 Jul 1951 Wing spar hit by .30 cal. bullet. BuNo 124142

PART V PERSONNEL

- a. Ordnancemen - The importance of keeping the ordnance department of carrier squadrons at a high level particularly in the F4U and AD squadrons cannot be over emphasized. Since deployment this air group has expended 3363.47 tons of bombs, 245,760 gallons of napalm and 11,324 rockets. This does not include the several million rounds of machine gun ammunition expended.
- b. Morale - The morale of enlisted personnel is considered to be excellent.
- c. Pilots - Since the arrival of the replacement pilots for VF-884 and VA-702 the pilot complements have been adequate.
- d. Casualties - LTJG Henry B. RATHBONE, 485508/1310, USN was lost on 4 August 1951, when his plane crashed into the sea on a normal carrier take off.

PART VI OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE

a. Operations -

(1) VF-721 - It has been noted that no jet aircraft have been damaged by rocket blasts or ricochets.

The following conditions are recommended for catapulting the F9F-2's fully loaded with fuel and 20mm ammunition:

ORDNANCE	ABSOLUTE MINIMUM WIND
No rockets	31 kts.
Two rockets	32 kts.
Four rockets	33 kts.
Six rockets	34 kts.

These figures were determined through actual operating conditions during which three aircraft have been lost on launches. It is to be noted that a margin of safety is permitted to allow for a slight decrease of full power output of aircraft or a weak catapult shot which would not be of sufficient fault to be classified as a malfunction. In all three instances of aircraft going in the water there have been simultaneous launches in which one aircraft remained airborne while the other did not. In each case full power output was indicated.

The procedure for ditching the F9F-2B which this squadron recommends is with gear up, flaps down, and in a nose high attitude. However, if the situation prevents getting the gear in the up position, it is recommended that extreme caution should be exercised to hold the aircraft in a nose high attitude while striking the water.

Because of the tendency of the arresting hook to drop down while taxiing out of the gear, it is the policy of this squadron to hold the hook retracting button in until the Davis barriers are crossed.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

One jet was taken aboard without a hook. All three (3) Davis type barriers were engaged but were ineffective as the main landing gear was sheared from the aircraft, and it was finally stopped by a row of flight deck tractors spotted forward. The policy is to have the F9F type aircraft extend their hooks before leaving the beach or twenty minutes prior to landing if on CAP. This permits planes with hook malfunctions to land ashore.

(2) VF-791 - Adequate briefing should be strongly emphasized. For convenience, briefing can be broken into two separate categories.

Target and general situation briefing: This is accomplished by the AIO and contains target information, alternate target, current situation, SAR information, weather, and known anti-aircraft positions.

Tactical briefing: This phase of the briefing is performed by the flight leader. Complete planning from launch to landing is considered necessary. While squadron doctrine takes care of the greater part of situations arising on each flight, such matters as direction of attack, type of attack, co-ordination of runs and recoveries must be thoroughly understood and adhered to by all pilots. There have been many instances in the past of planes making too many runs on the same target. This squadron has found adequate pre-flight and post-flight briefing to be the answer.

More VHF channels are needed to accommodate the communication load of the present type operations.

Liaison with Air Force and Army units ashore has been generally good, but on occasions there have been misunderstandings and time lost in finding the proper ground controllers.

(3) VF-884 - During this reporting cycle VF-884 has concentrated on effective use of ordnance, AA evasion, and coordination of attacks.

(4) VA-702 - The squadron has continued to change its daily tactics as required, and the pilots are using everything brought out in operations since entering the combat zone. The pilot's instrument training has contributed in a large measure to completion of missions conducted in marginal weather.

The new cushioned seat pans for the parachute bags has helped some, but further study is required to relieve pilot fatigue in the AD type aircraft.

(5) VFN Team - The VFN team continued to operate as night hecklers with moderate results. One F4U-5NL was stricken after shearing off the landing gear and breaking the fuselage on a night landing.

(6) AEW Team - AEW flights may be launched during varying weather conditions when conducting ASP. Strikes have been cancelled leaving the ASP investigator buried in the pack of planes on deck. As a result the plane actually launched as investigator has carried G.P. bombs instead of depth charges.

It is urgently recommended that more instructions be promulgated relative to the use of the investigator aircraft in attacking submarine contacts made. Speed of action is essential for ASW and cannot be delayed for radio transmission.

DECLASSIFIED

PART VI (7) OPERATIONS

A/G	CAS	TRANS	RECON	NGF	PHOTO	PHOTO ESCORT	CAP	ASP	AERO	OFF	DEF	TOTAL
VFJ			96			43	158			139	158	297
VFP					44					44		44
VF	98	248	10	48			8	12		404	20	434
VFN			21	2				9	2	23	11	46
VA	100	175	2					14		277	14	291
VAN		1	32					8	1	33	9	41
VAW								43	1		44	44
	<u>198</u>	<u>424</u>	<u>161</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>166</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>920</u>	<u>256</u>	<u>1795</u>
										Refresher and test		100
												1276

NOTES:

1. VAW and VAN pilots flew additional missions in VA aircraft, and VFN pilots flew additional missions in VF aircraft.
2. "TRANS" includes bridge breakers, railroad breakers, highway breakers, and seeders.
3. The VAN sortie listed in the "TRANS" column was a Radar Countermeasures sortie that accompanied a bridge breaking strike.
4. "RECON" includes armed reconnaissance of transportation routes and areas, and night heckler operations.
5. "NGF" missions spot gunfire for UN surface units along the eastern coast of Korea.
6. "AERO" sorties were weather reconnaissance.

SQUADRON OR UNIT	TOTAL HOURS	HOURS PER PILOT	FLIGHTS PER PILOT
VF-721	566.7	17.7	9.7
VF-791	658.7	28.3	9.0
VF-884	598.1	34.9	8.1
VA-702	984.1	32.9	10.0
VC-3 Det	112.2	22.4	7.0
VC-11 Det	161.1	32.2	9.2
VC-35 Det	143.1	28.6	11.0
VC-61 Det	80.3	20.1	11.0

DECLASSIFIED

VI B. Maintenance:

(1) JET MAINTENANCE:

A. There has been a continuation of failures of the TJC-1 fuel control unit aneroid assembly. The fact that these failures have continued to occur after a considerable period of operating with oil in the fuel indicates that the failures are not necessarily connected with the lack of oil in the fuel as was previously supposed.

B. Two more failures have been experienced of the flapper valve retaining spring with a resultant total loss of dampening action of the arresting hook recoil strut.

C. VF-721 has had numerous cases of the landing gear retracting very slowly. It is recommended that a landing gear selector valve incorporating stronger poppet valve return springs be incorporated. Installing new valves has not helped the situation for any appreciable length of time.

(2) F4U Maintenance:

A. Wing explosions, small arms fire, and minor aircraft handling accidents were the greatest contributors to the maintenance problem. Despite following the prescribed maintenance procedures and gun inspection, the wing trouble persists.

B. The supply situation has been greatly improved by increased stock and/or decrease in operating hours. Abnormal numbers of gun explosions caused one plane to be AOG for eight days for a wing.

C. Overhauled RB-19-2 spark plugs are in use and give an acceptable service life of about 85 hours.

(3) AD Maintenance:

A. It has been necessary to change two harnesses and repack and replace leads in two additional ones.

B. Two engines have been changed since the last action report; one (reference VA-702 RUDM 12-51) because of excessive bronze metal in the sump, and the other because of flak damage in the nose housing.

C. One aircraft was held AOG two weeks because the aviation supply department on board ship does not carry the AD type main landing gear fairing on their allowance list. It is strongly recommended that this be added to the ship's allowance list since a majority of barrier crashes will result in damage to the main landing gear fairing.

D. Weak radio reception in several cases was traced to corrosion occurring in the pilot utility receptacle. It is recommended that the oxygen trunk be secured in an accessible place in the cockpit and not be left plugged into the receptacle. The receptacle door can then be left closed to prevent moisture from corroding the electrical points.

DECLASSIFIED

FM12/GVG-101/A9

Ser: 030

[REDACTED]

E. K25 cameras installed on four aircraft worked efficiently during this period and have been of great value in assessing strike damage. They were attached to the Mk 55 bomb rack on station #7 and reinforced by running a heavy wire pulled taut over to the next rack. By proper use of these cameras, photo plane strike assessment can virtually be eliminated on AD and F4U strikes.

F. Working conditions on an aircraft carrier, while not inherently dangerous, are more hazardous than similar operations performed on large areas of land bases. With these facts in mind, VA-702 has undertaken a program to minimize all possible dangers to personnel without decreasing the efficiency or quality of work. In six months not one man hour has been lost due to injuries.

W. W. Brehm

W. W. BREHM