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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
AIR TASK GROUP TWO


1 November 1952

From: Commander Air Task Group TWO
To: Commanding Officer, USS ESSEX (CVA-9)

Subj: Action Report of Air Task Group TWO for period
of 5 September 1952 to 1 November 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INST. 3480.4 of 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Subject Action Report

1. This report is forwarded as enclosure (1) for inclusion
in the action report of the USS ESSEX (CVA-9) as required by
reference (a).


J. G. Daniels
J. G. DANIELS

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COMPOSITION OF FORCES

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL A/C</u>		<u>PILOTS</u>	
		<u>9-18</u>	<u>11-1</u>	<u>9-18</u>	<u>11-1</u>
VF-23 LCDR C.C. Aikins	F9F-2	15	14	24	23
VF-821 CDR. D.W. Cooper	F9F-2	15	15	24*	24*
VF-871 LCDR F.C. Hearrell Jr.	F4U-4	14	13	25**	24**
VA-55 CDR. L.W. Chick	AD-4	16	13	24	24
VC-3 (Det I) LT. C.W. Chapman	F4U-5N	4	4	5	5
VC-11 (Det I) LCDR D.W. Knight	AD-4W	3	3	5	5
VC-35 (Det I) LCDR E.H. Potter	AD-4N	4	4	6	6
VC-61 (Det I) LT. T.L. Neilson	F2H-2P	3	3	4	4

* Includes Commander Air Task Group TWO

** Includes Operations Officer Air Task Group TWO

MISSION

The mission of Air Task Group TWO is that set forth in CTF-77 OP Order NR. 22-51 (Second Revision) and CTF-77 OP Order NR. 25A-52. The mission of this force is to perform close air support, reconnaissance, interdiction, air bombardment missions and support of amphibious operations in order to destroy enemy forces, communications and installations and to support landing of amphibious troops.

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CHRONOLOGY

[REDACTED]

18 September	Enroute CTF 77
19 September	Enroute CTF 77
20 September	Total sorties - 89
21 September	Total sorties - 97
22 September	Total sorties - 111
23 September	Enroute Sasebo
24 September	FltActSasebo
25 September	FltActSasebo
26 September	FltActSasebo
27 September	Enroute CTF 77
28 September	No flight operations, bad weather
29 September	Total sorties - 95
30 September	Total sorties - 104
1 October	Total sorties - 112
2 October	No flight operations - replenishment
3 October	Total sorties - 102
4 October	Total sorties - 104
5 October	Total sorties - 105
6 October	No flight operations - replenishment
7 October	Total sorties - 94
8 October	Total sorties - 95
9 October	Total sorties - 94
10 October	No flight operations - replenishment

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- [REDACTED]
- 11 October Total sorties - 38
- 12 October Total sorties - 105
- 13 October Total sorties - 57
- 14 October Total sorties - 107
- 15 October Total Sorties - 47
- 16 October Total Sorties - 59
- 17 October Total Sorties - 111 - 2 planes shot down behind enemy lines by anti aircraft fire. One pilot was rescued by helicopter, the other pilot was not rescued due to darkness. Rescue operations were to be resumed at first light.
- 18 October Total sorties - 4. Replenishment. These sorties were flown from K-18 in Korea in search of pilot that was shot down on 17 October 1952. During this operation one plane was shot down and seen to crash in enemy territory. The pilot is listed missing in action.
- 19 October Total sorties - 98
- 20 October Total sorties - 128 - One plane was shot down in enemy territory. The pilot was rescued by helicopter despite severe burns.
- 21 October Total sorties - 56
- 22 October Replenishment cancelled - bad weather
- 23 October No flight operations - replenishment
- 24 October Total sorties - 105
- 25 October Total sorties - 100
- 26 October Total sorties - 5 - Replenishment
- 27 October Total sorties - 106
- 28 October Total sorties - 98
- [REDACTED]

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29 October Total sorties - 109 - One plane was forced to ditch due to damage received from enemy anti aircraft fire. The pilot was rescued by a destroyer.

30 October No flight operations - replenishment

31 October Total sorties - 92

1 November Replenishment - Enroute Yokosuka

29

NOTE: Sorties as listed above with the exception of 18 October were flown from the USS ESSEX (CVA-9). Fifty-five other sorties were flown from emergency or auxiliary fields in South Korea.

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OPERATIONS

Flight Summary by Sorties

	F9F	F4U	F4U-5N	AD	ADN	ADW	F2H-2P
Strike	280	344	---	343	---	---	---
Recco	372	2	---	---	---	---	---
RR Heckler	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
ASP (Day)	---	10	16	10	17	56	---
ASP (Night)	---	---	2	---	19	24	---
Night Heckler	---	---	67	---	51	---	---
NGF Spot	---	30	5	2	---	---	---
Photo	---	---	---	---	---	---	100
Photo Escort	83	---	---	---	---	---	---
CAP	343	---	---	---	---	---	---
ECM	---	---	---	---	27	---	---
CAS	---	98	3	165	3	---	---
Special Mission	---	---	1	---	---	---	---
RESCAP	---	11	19	8	---	---	---
TARCAP	67	---	---	---	---	---	---
AEW	---	---	---	---	1	4	---
Other	---	41	---	42	14	4	---
Total	1145	536	113	570	134	88	100

GRAND TOTAL 2686

Per Pilot Data

per Pilot	F9F	F2H	F4U-4	F4U-5N	AD-4	AD-4N	AD-4W	Group Average
Sorties	23.8	25.5	22.5	15	24	23	18	23.4
Flight Hrs	38.0	41.1	62.6	61.4	66.6	65	46	52.0
Carrier Landings	24.3	25.5	20.1	21.0	22.8	23	18.8	22.7

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Damage Inflicted by enemy.

DATE	SCDN	TYPE	BUNK	CAUSE	POSITION OF DAMAGE	CODE
SEP						
21	VF821	F9F-2	123571	AA(Med)	Stbd side cockpit	D-3
22	VF-23	F9F-2	123647	AA(Med)	Stbd horizontal stabilizer	D-2
22	VA-55	AD-4	129015	AA	Port aileron	D-3
22	VA-55	AD-4	123791	AA	Port flap, fuselage stabilizer	D-2
22	VA-55	AD-4	128930	AA	Port wheel door	D-3
22	VF-871	F4U-4	97225	AA(Med)	belly tank & oil cooler	D-3
29	VF-871	F4U-4	81403	AA	Nose section	D-2
29	VA-55	AD-4	127879	AA	Carburetor Air Scoop	D-3
29	VF-821	F9F-2	123451	AA(Med)	Port Flap	D-3
29	VF-821	F9F-2	123425	AA(Med)	Port Wheel Fairing	D-3
30	VC-61	F2H-2P	128858	AA(SA)	Stbd Tip tank	D-3
30	VF-821	F9F-2	123435	AA(Med)	Stbd Tip tank	D-3
30	VA-55	AD-4	129012	AA	Port Wing	D-3
30	VA-55	AD-4	129007	AA	Stbd wheel well	D-3
30	VA-55	AD-4	129013	AA	Port wheel well	D-3
OCT						
1	VF-23	F9F-2	122585	AA(SA)	Inboard flap	D-3
3	VF-23	F9F-2	123510	AA	Nose section	D-3
3	VF-821	F9F-2	123023	AA(Med)	Wheel well door & stub wing	D-3
4	VF-23	F9F-2	123703	AA	Stbd tip tank & aileron	D-3
5	VF-871	F4U-4	81574	AA(med)	Stbd outboard wing panel	D-3
8	VF-23	F9F-2	123521	AA(med)	Nose, port tip tank both intakes & stabilizer	D-3
11	VF-23	F9F-2	123435	AA(SA)	Sliding nose section	D-3
12	VF-23	F9F-2	123532	AA(Light)	Complete tail section	D-3
14	VF-23	F9F-2	123587	AA	Sliding nose section	D-3
14	VF-23	F9F-2	123513	AA(Light)	Stbd tip tank, stbd wing	D-3
14	VF-23	F9F-2	123647	AA(Light)	Stbd wing, port flap	D-3
14	VF-821	F9F-2	123452	AA(SA)	Port flap	D-3
14	VA-55	AD-4	128930	AA	Propeller	D-2
17	VA-55	AD-4	123922	AA(Med)	Engine Accessory Section	L
17	VA-55	AD-4	128920	AA	Stbd wing	D-3
17	VA-55	AD-4	127873	AA	Port elevator	D-3
17	VF-23	F9F-2	123513	SA	Nose section	D-3

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DATE	SQDN	TYPE	BUNR	CAUSE	POSITION OF DAMAGE	CODE
OCT						
17	VF-23	F9F-2	123072	SA	Left aileron	D-3
17	VF-23	F9F-2	123647	SA	Stbd cockpit	D-3
17	VF-871	F4U-5N	122015	AA(L)	Port wing panel	D-3
17	VF-871	F4U-4	97282	AA(SA)	Port & stbd wing & fuselage	D-3
17	VF-23	F9F	122585	AA(Med)	Unknown	L
18	VF-871	F4U-4	97230	AA(SA)	Stbd cowling, cylinder intake	D-3
18	VF-871	F4U-4	80782	AA(SA)	Port & stbd wings	D-3
18	VF-871	F4U-4	96941	AA(Med)	Unknown	L
20	VA-55	AD-4	127873	AA	Port fuselage	D-2
20	VA-55	AD-4	128952	AA	Port stabilizer, aileron, wing, stbd wing, aileron	D-3
20	VA-55	AD-4	123950	AA	Port flap, spray cover, wing, aileron stbd wing, flap wheel door	D-3
20	VA-55	AD-4	123813	AA	Engine	L
21	VF-23	F9F	123033	SA	Port tail fairing	D-3
24	VF-23	F9F	123016	SA	Sliding nose section	D-3
25	VF-23	F9F	123510	AA(L)	Fuselage	D-3
29	VA-55	AD-4	128958	AA	Engine	L
31	VF-821	F9F	123425	AA(Med)	Port wing stub, wing stbd wing stub, in board flap	D-3

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Damage Inflicted on enemy

	Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged
Oxen &			
Oxcarts	18	-	15
Trucks	58	63	63
Troops	187	57	13
RR Cars	41	16	33
Boats	97	-	33
Bldgs (small)	187	13	132
RR Bridges	8	-	31
Hwy Bridges	-	-	16
Vehicles	10	1	5
Warehouses	72	1	51
Gun Positions	68	26	27
RR Cuts	82	2	40
Storage Tanks	5	1	-
Locomotives	-	2	6
Barracks	59	12	25
Hydro Electric	-	1	2
Tanks	1	3	2
Ammo Dumps	2	5	2
RR Round House	-	-	1
Radar Site	2	3	-
Transformer Station	1	-	-
Factory	4	2	6
Saw Mill	-	2	2
Bunkers	32	8	8
Mining Facilities	2	-	9
Tunnels	-	2	-
Command Post	1	-	1
Piers & Docks	-	-	1
Locomotive Repair Facilities	2	-	-

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1. Jets

The use of VT frags on flak suppression hops has proved very satisfactory, but it is considered that six HVAR is the ideal loading for Recco hops. Aircraft on Recco hops do not have either the time or the altitude necessary for an accurate bombing run. If shortage in supply of rockets should necessitate the use of bombs, mixed loadings should be avoided. Half the aircraft loaded with bombs and half loaded with rockets is far more satisfactory than loading an aircraft with both bombs and rockets.

Some of the present Recco routes and combination of routes as assigned are much too long for satisfactory coverage. For example:

P10, P9, and G3	- 120 nautical miles
P13, and B1	- 105 nautical miles
B13, and B11	- 115 nautical miles
B16	- 85 nautical miles
B8, and B9	- 105 nautical miles

Camouflaged objects are often missed on first pass due to too rapid passage in an effort to cover the entire route.

One run flak suppression hops are not considered satisfactory. In areas where heavy flak is expected an initial run by all jets assigned flak suppression prior to the initial push over by the bomber type aircraft should be made on the known positions. This run to be made two to three minutes before the props there by permitting the jets to recover and take a position to make a second run either with the props or just following them when the flak is most evident and the props are most vulnerable. The effectiveness of the 20MM gun for flak suppression has been greatly underestimated and is considered to have great effect on suppressing flak when used to cover the bombers in their run and during their pull out.

It is recommended that spare aircraft for the last strike hop of the day be launched to join with the strike group, operational commitments permitting. These additional aircraft would add additional strength to the strike group, make it unnecessary to respot or unload the spare, and increase the number of sorties flown by type by at least one per day.

In order to facilitate and expedite replacement of aircraft it is suggested that replacement aircraft be made available at K18 for pick up until approximately six operating days prior to

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the ships departure from the line.

Comments and Recommendations:

Aircraft and Equipment.

1. The F2H-2P has proven to be the finest photo plane in service. It's speed, maneuverability, visibility range and endurance far exceed any other fighter photo in Navy use. The present photo nose configuration incorporates many new features desired and required in combat photography. Due to the longer focal length of the cameras afforded by this configuration, larger scale photography is possible at 10,000 feet and above. The viewfinder is of great help in photo mapping and should be included in all future designs. However, a thirty-six inch grid should be included so that it will be of value when using this camera.

2. The Whipple Stamping Machine, used for the annotating of negatives wore out and broke down after the first ~~ten~~ thousand negatives had been stamped. After some experiment with the Roberts Numbering Machine, Model 79P it was made usable and has proven to be a much better machine and results with its use have been gratifying. This machine was used for aerial film marking several years ago, and while the wheel designs do not conform with the present system, they can be changed around to work.

3. Freshly annotated ink has not been drying due to the colder weather and so this Unit designed and built a film drying hot box, consisting of an old file cabinet, five film spools, six electric bulbs and connections at a total cost of two dollars thirty cents (\$2.30). This hot box is now in use and is so successful that it is impossible to smear any mixture of ink under any annotating condition.

4. A forward firing camera has become a necessity in combat photography with the high speeds of the jet aircraft. It is therefore recommended that a twenty-four or thirty-six inch forward firing camera be installed in all future photo designs.

2. F4U's.

On aircraft recovery under high wind conditions, one F4U-4 left wingfold cylinder was broken due to folding wings immediately after landing with flaps down. It is recommended that when high winds

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prevail pilot wait until the aircraft crosses the barrier and retract flaps before folding wings.

During this period COMRON-3 Unit ITEM has had ample opportunity to maintain pilot proficiency as compared to the last tour on the line. With the exception of two days, no night heckler missions were cancelled due to weather. At the beginning of this period Unit ITEM was cut to five pilots, which number is considered adequate to handle all assigned missions.

3. AEW Unit

During the reporting period COMRON-11 Air Early Warning Unit ITEM was utilized primarily for anti-submarine patrols. Although a few flights utilizing the primary mission were conducted.

The AEW flights were scheduled to evaluate the capability of the APS-20A radar to hold planes inland, with an eye toward airborne control of the TARCAP, and early warning of enemy aircraft in the target area. This procedure is complicated by the sensitivity of the gear itself and the difficulty of seeing through the land return on the PPI scope. Results were inconclusive, but in general it is believed that this procedure is not feasible with current gear. Good results were obtained from a communications standpoint, however, the AEW plane acting as relay between strike groups and the Task Force, both with and without the use of Middleman.

A dual purpose training program was conducted by this unit during the period of report. The first purpose of this program was to train their own personnel, currently in a non-crew status, in the equipment and methods of operation of the APS-20A radar and airborne controlling. The second purpose was a program to acquaint the Ship's CIC personnel and members of AEW Unit ITEM with each other's problems, capabilities and modes of operation. This was accomplished by a series of exchange watches and flights by ship's CIC personnel in the aircraft of this unit. Ship's personnel spent a total of 25.4 hours airborne under instruction, pilots, controllers and technicians of the AEW Unit spent 96 hours observing in CIC. It is believed that this program has been of great value to all concerned.

4. VA(N) Unit

Since joining ATG-2 and prior to this operating period very few night carrier landings were made by COMRON-35. It is believed

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a minimum of four night landings per pilot per operating tour be made to maintain maximum pilot proficiency.

It is recommended that a submarine be made available some-time during a cruise, possibly entering or leaving Yokosuka, to conduct training exercises with pilots and aircrewmembers of this squadron (COMFRON-35). In order to maintain proficiency in ASW at least one training flight per crew is considered essential.

During the majority of this period ECM flights were conducted in accordance with an Air Plan that gave no indication of the area to be searched nor the frequencies to be scanned. It is recommended that in the future this information always be contained in the Air Plan.

During this period a substantial increase of enemy truck traffic was noted during the hours of darkness, the majority being along route Green 3, and the Red routes south to the bomb line. On numerous occasions several hundred vehicle lights were visible from one location. Since the traffic does not move until after dark it is recommended that night heckler flights be launched at an hour that will allow the maximum time over land during darkness.

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ORDNANCE

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES

Type Ordnance	AD4	F4U4	F9F2	AD4N	F4U5N	Total
2000 #GP	63					63
1000 #GP	692	40				732
500 #GP	791	403		39	54	1287
250 #GP	1958	848	894	208	404	4312
100 #GP	391	456	735	200	92	1874
350 #Dept Bomb		4		2	14	20
260 #FRAG	596	491	987	12	12	2094
3"25 ASAR	10	18		96	54	178
5" ATAR	439	345	1086			1870
5" HVAR	20	44	48			112
20 MM	88656		123166	20000	30650	262472
.50 GAL		202900				202900
MK 6 FLARES				255		255
NAPALM	5					5
TOTAL						
LBS	2209508	812192	830487	132975	181163	4166325
TOTAL						
TONS	1104.25	406.10	415.24	66.49	90.58	2083.11

HUNG ORDNANCE REPORT

Type Ordnance	AERO 14A	MK 51	MK55 MOD 1	MK9 Launchers	TOTAL
ATAR	30			83	113
260# Frag			4		4
100# GP	1		4		5
250# GP	6		9		15
1000# GP		1			1
TOTAL	37	1	17	83	138

DISPOSITION OF HUNG ORDNANCE

Type Ordnance	Remained on Racks	Later Re- leased Manually	Released by Jerk- ing	Dropped off at Launch	Dropped off Landing	TOTAL
ATAR	112				1	113
260# Frags	3				1	4
100# GP	5					5
250# GP	14		1			15
1000# GP	1					1
TOTAL	135	0	1	0	2	138

AD4 Aircraft

The performance of the 20MM guns installed in the AD4 aircraft has been excellent. Few malfunctions have occurred. Some stoppages have been caused by defective ammunition or by insufficient lubrication of ammunition. All 20MM feed mechanisms have been re-lubricated for cold weather operation. All gun heaters have been installed and are given prescribed operational tests and care. No difficulty is anticipated during coming cold weather operations. Ordnance crews have become skilled in both rearming and maintenance operations. Shortages still exist in supplies of driving springs, chargers and charger spare parts.

All types of bomb racks and bomb ejectors have given satisfactory service. There were only two cases of hung bombs, these were returned aboard and remained on racks upon recovery of aircraft. One was the result of tight sway braces and the other caused by defective electrical circuit.

F4U Aircraft.

The .50 caliber machine guns used in the F4U aircraft have given excellent performance during this operating period. There were no malfunctions, and few stoppages occurred. During the first few days of this period some difficulties were encountered from ejector brass breaking rocket pigtails. Deflectors were manufactured and attached to the rack mounts on stations numbers 1, 2, 5, and 6, just forward of the pigtail plug socket. Since deflectors were installed there has been no reoccurrence of this trouble. An additional switch was added to the ordnance circuit to allow the pilot to drop the entire load of bombs. This switch when in the "on" position, connects the leads from the "bomb rocket" together, energizing the center pylons and all the wing racks. This makes possible a salvo of all ordnance with one touch of the firing switch. The Aero 14A racks have given excellent service.

F9F-2 Aircraft

No particular difficulties with maintenance or operation of 20MM guns were experienced during the operating period. The MK 55, MOD 1 bomb racks have given satisfactory service with the exception of the sway braces. Several of these braces have broken during launch or in flight. The break usually occurs on the after brace

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near the supporting post. As there are no spares on hand, repairs have been made by welding the broken braces if broken end is still available. The igniters of racks are starting to show some wear and some will require replacement in the near future. Many of the female rocket firing receptacles (igniters) have been found faulty and required replacement. There were 83 hung rockets out of 1,134 rockets carried. The majority of these failures occurred during the first week of the period and most of them were due to broken pigtailed. Tape was used to secure excess lead to rocket body. During the later part of the period one squadron installed a double spring clip to the wing structure about 6 inches forward of rocket receptacle. No failures have been experienced on rockets carried by planes on which these clips were used.

General.

Bomb carts continue to give trouble when it becomes necessary to move bombs to the after part of flight deck over arresting gear and cables. This difficulty has been partially overcome by close cooperation between plane handling personnel and ordnance personnel whereby all planes are loaded forward inasmuch as scheduling permits.

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MAINTENANCE

1. JETS

a. The most significant maintenance problem encountered during the operating period was malfunction of the altitude compensating unit of the TJC fuel control as installed on the J 42-P-8 engine. The malfunction consisted of the aneroid shaft seizing fast in its bushing. Since deploying to the forward area, jet units have had 39 separate instances of stuck aneroid shafts and 6 flame outs at altitudes above 23,000 feet to which frozen aneroid shafts directly contributed. The only satisfactory corrective action was to replace the entire TJC, leaving the aneroid unit sealed. Even replacing the aneroid shaft and bushing with a new, but old type, assembly afforded only temporary relief, perhaps because of the difficulty of properly preparing the parts for installation aboard ship. It is strongly recommended that modified aneroid shafts and bushings be supplied to units in forward areas immediately upon availability of the parts. Refer USS ESSEX REST dispatch 200726Z OCT.

2. AD

a. During the period of this report, overall availability for VA-55 was 90%. Maintenance problems were largely confined to ignition system troubles as in the previous operating period. Moisture condensation in distributors was determined to be the underlying cause of ignition trouble. ComAirPac was notified by dispatch of this re-occurring trouble and its probable effect on spark plug life. Suggestions were made for improvement in the venting system of the distributors and harness and instructions or a possible "fix" requested. In the last several operating weeks the problem seemed to be solved within the squadron by frequent removal and cleaning of harness leads, and removal, cleaning, and baking of distributor bowls. Noticeable improvement in plug life was immediately apparent with some sets lasting the 120 hours between major checks. Hydraulic and Electrical troubles were minor. Structurally, troubles were confined to extensive repair and patching of flak damage. Refer USS ESSEX REST dispatch 190458Z OCT.

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ELECTRONICS

1. AN-CRC-7

a. Radio transceiver batteries received aboard were very poor. Only 20 out of 50 batteries checked out properly when tested under load. The batteries appear to be very old and in many cases completely dead.

b. A battery tester was made up on board to test the AN-CRC-7 batteries in accordance with Section II, paragraph 2 of the AN-CRC-7 handbook. Subject tester enables technicians to make a quick thorough check of batteries before placing them in the transceiver. A report is being forwarded on subject tester.

2.

a. Hook drop of F9F aircraft was experienced in two cases, catching the barrier while coming out of the arresting gear. This was due to a faulty micro switch which had an intermittent break in the ground return. This opened the circuit allowing the hook to drop. This type of trouble is extremely hard to isolate as the circuits check out when the aircraft is stationary.

3. AN-ARC-1

a. No unusual trouble was experienced with this gear with the exception of one unit getting flooded with hydro lub, R51H110, due to battle damage. The gear was cleaned with carbon tetrachloride and reinstalled. This particular set is being examined daily for signs of corrosion due to the action of the hydro lub.

4. AN-APX-6

a. Several cases of resistors repeatedly burned out in one bank of resistors was believed to be caused by high surge currents, the source of which is being investigated. However it is believed that the F-104 fuse is too large to properly protect this circuit. This fuse required 250 mil-amperes to break the circuit. Due to the fact that the 5Y3 rectifier is capable of producing only 134 mil-amperes. It appears that the fuse could be a 1/8 amp. instead of 1/4 amp. This would allow protection for any high currents above 125 mil-amperes, which should be ample protection due to the fact that the normal current in this circuit is 102 mil-amperes. Refer USS ESSEX REST dispatch 310442Z OCT.

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5.

a. Electronics maintenance and availability has been excellent. All other equipment performed satisfactory.

Recommendations

It is recommended that batteries for the survival radio be thoroughly checked under load in accordance with the respective handbook for each type. The common practice of checking two transceivers with each other for transmission and reception is good for the transceiver check, but it is a needless drain on the battery. The transceiver would check out during test, but might operate for only a short time when really needed due to the short life of the aged batteries.

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MEDICAL

1. Performance

a. Performance has been outstanding during this period of operation. Morale had been excellent until the last 5 or 7 days, at which time a slight generalized feeling of depression and dissatisfaction made itself evident. This is attributed to the length of this tour being extended greatly from that which was anticipated.

2. Illnesses.

a. There have been 12 pilots grounded during this period; 9 for short periods of time, 3 for longer periods. Of the 3, there were 2 cases of severe burns and one case of infectious hepatitis. The case of infectious hepatitis is no longer attached to the air group as he is under prolonged hospital treatment. Two pilots have been grounded more than once.

b. There have been two aircrewmen grounded for short periods of time during this period. One was grounded more than once.

3. Casualties.

a. Wounded in action:

(1) LT. Roger Duboise NELSON, Jr., 320661/1310, USN, received minor wounds of the face and left leg as a result of enemy anti-aircraft fire while flying a combat mission in an AD4 over communist territory, North Korea, on 29 September 1952.

(2) ENS. Peter Manx MORIARTY, 507799/1315, USNR, received first and second degree burns of the face, neck and knees as a result of his airplane having caught fire after being hit by anti-aircraft fire while flying a combat mission in an AD4 over communist territory, North Korea, on 17 October 1952.

(3) LTGJ Joseph Norman KANEVSKY, 521579/1310, USN, received wounds of the left thigh and right forearm as a result of enemy action anti-aircraft fire while flying a combat mission in an F9F-2 over communist territory, North Korea, on 17 October 1952. At present this pilot is on a hospital ship and has not yet returned to his squadron.

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(4) LTJG John LAVRA, 492220/1315/USNR, received first and second degree burns of the face, neck, right axilla, and both hands as a result of his airplane having caught fire due to enemy anti-aircraft fire while flying a combat mission in an AD4 over communist territory, North Korea, on 19 October 1952.

b. Missing in action:

(1) LCDR Maury Fontaine YERGER, Jr., 165477/1310, USN, was reported as missing in action after he crash-landed his airplane in communist territory, North Korea, 17 October 1952, while on a combat mission in an F9F-2. Pilot was seen to leave aircraft immediately thereafter in apparently good physical condition.

(2) LT. Alfred Edward NAUMAN, Jr., 304153/1310, USN, was reported as missing in action after his airplane was seen to crash in communist territory, North Korea, 18 October 1952, while on a rescue mission in an F4U.

(3) Gordon Harwood CHANDLER, AO3, 345 36 23, USN, was last seen at 2200 on 31 October 1952 and was missing for muster the following day. Search has not yet revealed his presence aboard.

4. Psychiatric disorders.

a. No man hours were lost due to psychiatric disorders.

5. Venereal disease.

a. There were 17 cases of venereal disease; sixteen of which were gonorrhea, and one of which was chancroid.

6. Deaths.

a. There were no deaths reported for this period.

7. Recommendations.

a. It is recommended that either the tours on the line be shortened, or the personnel should be informed of the probability of long tours prior to departure. Not adhering to this definitely influenced the morale of the entire group, and hence diminished their motivation somewhat. Although performances were not measureably affected in this instance, it is firmly believed that repeated similar episodes will produce a noticeable drop in performance.

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