U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)  
Cavo of Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California  

CV45/14-3  
Serial: 0111  

4 October 1950

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE  
(2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN (CTF 77.4)  
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(4) Commander U.S. Naval Forces Far East  
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for period 6 through 21 September 1950

Ref: (a) CNO ltr Op 3 45 rec recr 1197734 of 3 August 1950  
(b) SEVENTH Fleet Dispatch 2123251 of September 1950

Encl: (1) CVC-5 conf ltr recr 072-50 dtd 4 October 1950,  
Action Report for period 6 through 21 September 1950

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b), the action report  
for the period 6 September through 21 September is submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Mission:

USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) with ConCarDiv THREE and Carrier Air  
Group FIVE embarked departed Sasebo Harbor, Japan, 11 September  
1950 in company with other units of Task Force 77 for operations  
in accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet Operation Plan 9-50,  
Commander Amphibious Group ONE Operation Order 14-50 and Commander  
Carrier Division ONE Operation Order 1-50. CTF 77 is ConCarDiv  
ONE. Commander Joint Task Force SEVEN is Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
in USS ROCHESTER (CA-124), not in company. CTC is ConCarDiv ONE  
in the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47). The task force proceeded for  
Korean waters to furnish support for United Nations Forces in  
ambitious assault on the Inchon-Seoul area.

PART II Chronological Order of Events:

Upon completion of replenishment, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)  
departed Sasebo Harbor, Japan, at 0545, 11 September 1950, and  
sorted with other elements of Task Force 77. A firing practice  
was conducted during the morning. Upon completion of firing  
practise, the task force formed formation 4-8 and proceeded for the  
operating area west of Inchon, South Korea. During the period  
from 12 to 15 September the VALLEY FORGE and its Air Group were  
engaged in air operations to soften up the Inchon-Seoul area in  
preparation for D-Day, 15 September, when UN Forces landed at  
Wolmi-Do and Inchon, Korea.
During this period air strikes and sweeps were conducted during all daylight hours with partial replenishment during late afternoon of 15 September.

Following the initial landings at Wolmi-Do and Inchon, aircraft were flown in close and deep support of the advancing troops. During the period from 15 to 21 September, carriers in the task group refueled every third day with only defensive flight operations being conducted on replenishment days. The VALLEY FORGE began replenishment according to this schedule on 17 September.

During the afternoon of 15 September Task Group 77.4 was joined by the USS BOXER (CV-21) with Carrier Air Group TWO embarked.

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment:

No comment.

PART IV Resume of Battle Damage - Own and Enemy:

The ship sustained no battle damage. For damage inflicted upon the enemy, see enclosure (1).

PART V Comments:

A. Operations

1. Logistics

(a) The definite need for more expeditious transfer of aviation gasoline to the carrier operating jet aircraft was again apparent. During the current operations, jet sorties averaged 36 a day, with resultant avgas usage of approximately 30,000 gallons a day. The result of high tempo operations of both jet and propeller types, such as this was, necessitated the taking on of some 100,000 gallons every third day. Experience to date with present type A0, with but one avgas fueling station, has shown the average maximum fueling rate is approximately 27,000 gal/hr at sea. (This figure may be increased when fueling via the forward fueling connection to the forward tanks only) This rate necessitates a three and a half hour period of considerable vulnerability to sub-surface and surprise air attack. If for good reason it is necessary to replenish after as much as 3 or 4 days operations, the time alongside rapidly reaches unacceptable proportions. To safeguard against attack by a determined opponent would require an abnormally strong screen or a fueling area well removed from probable enemy craft. It should be noted that in the current operations the replenishment area was within 100 miles of the operating area, thereby affording a minimum loss of time away from the operations.
(b) It is urgently recommended that present type AOs be refitted to allow a second aviation gasoline fueling station aft and that future construction be such as to provide for a greatly accelerated transfer rate.

2. Combat Information

(a) During this period the use of jet aircraft in combat air patrol was extensive. It was found that their obvious advantage of speed over the propeller driven aircraft eliminates the requirement of having the CAP stationed on two or three sides of the force because they can be maneuvered with as much facility as propeller aircraft and in much less time. The greatest difficulty noted with employment of jet aircraft on CAP is the poor jet tracking characteristics of the SX type radar. However, by the use of G Band IPP in conjunction with the SX radar acceptable jet tracking is achieved. It has been found that by stationing the jet CAP at least 30 miles from the controller that continuous tracking can be accomplished with the SX-G Band combination. Excellent controlled intercepts were conducted up to 50 miles from the force in this manner. Vessels in the task force equipped with SPS-6B radar have maintained excellent jet presentation from approximately 7 to 90 miles. Conventional aircraft have been picked up as far away as 140 miles from the force.

It is recommended that in order to afford more complete control of jet CAP and more complete protection to the fleet by early detection of incoming flights, SPS-6B type radar be installed on all CV's at the earliest possible date. It would also seem highly desirable for all other vessels responsible for aircraft control to be outfitted with the SPS-6B.

(b) Because of the great amount of radio traffic concerning air control in a task group of two or more carriers, the use of a distinct air control not is considered highly desirable. Utilizing the CI not to carry this traffic overly crowds it and it thereby loses much of its value for fast relay of information within the task force.

(c) CAP control within the task force was hindered in many cases during this operation as a result of heavy use of most aircraft VHF channels by TACG control, TACG ashore and TAC and their TACP and TAO in the target area. Frequently CAP experienced serious delay in executing a vector as a result of the controller being blocked out on the air by a transmission from an amphibious or shore-based controller. It is felt this communication difficulty would prove disastrous if enemy aircraft should attack.

It is recommended that the aircraft and ships of a fast carrier task force be crystallized so a minimum of two clear
channels be available for CAP control exclusively when operating within 150 miles of an amphibious operation or its VHF equivalent.

PART VI Personnel, Performance and Casualties:

No comments,

W. T. SHIELDS,
Acting.

Copy to:

CNO (Advance)
ComAirPac

ComCdrDiv ONE
ComCdrDiv FIVE
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA
CO, USS BOXER
CO, USS FRANKLIN
CO, USS LEYTE
CAG 5
CAG 11
CAG 19
CAG 3
CAG 2

(Airmail)
(Airmail for further distribution as deemed appropriate)

AUTHENTICATED:

D. G. HILLMAN, LT, USN
Administrative Officer

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