U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
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26 September 1950

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander U.S. Naval Forces Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet


Ref: (a) CNO ltr Op 345 res ser 1197P34 of 3 August 1950.

Encl: (1) CTF-5 conf ltr ser 070 dated 20 September 1950, Action Report for period 25 August through 6 September 1950, p.5

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period 25 August through 6 September 1950 is submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Missions:

USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) with ComCarDiv THREE and Carrier Air Group FIVE embarked departed SASEBO Harbor, Japan, 25 August 1950 in company with other units of Task Force 77 in accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet Operation Order 14-50. Acting Commander SEVENTH Fleet, CTF 77, and CTG 77.1 is ComCarDiv ONE. OTC is ComCarDiv ONE in the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47). The task force proceeded for Korean waters to furnish support for United Nations Forces in Korea.

PART II Chronological Order of Events:

About 1200, 25 August 1950, the VALLEY FORGE departed SASEBO Harbor, Japan, sortied with elements of the SEVENTH Fleet, and conducted AA firing practice during the afternoon with other units of the task force. Practice was discontinued upon receipt of a report of a submarine contact. The contact was later evaluated as not a submarine. The task force then proceeded northward toward the operating area in the Sea of Japan in formation 4-4.

Planes were launched August 26 to provide close air support in eastern Korea and to strike targets north of the bomb line. During the night the task force steamed northward taking position off the east coast of North Korea where strikes were launched August 27 against targets in the Wonsan-Chongjin area.

The task force retired from the area upon completion of the day's operations and proceeded southward to rendezvous with the Replenishment Group, Task Group 77.7, south of the Korean Peninsula. The two groups rendezvoused early August 28, and the remainder of
the day was spent refueling.

During the night the task force took a position in the Yellow Sea from which strikes were launched August 29 for targets near Seoul and Inchon. From the same operating area the force struck at targets in the Chinnampo-Pongyang area August 30.

After completion of air operations for the day, the task force steamed southward to rendezvous with Task Group 77.7 to refuel and rearm. Rendezvous was effected early 31 August.

Upon completion of replenishment that night the task force steamed northward taking a position in the Yellow Sea where strikes against targets in the Seoul-Inchon area were launched on the morning of 1 September 1950.

At noon, emergency orders from ComNavFE were received to provide immediate all-out close air support for the 25th Division of the 8th Army in order to aid in repulsing enemy attacks in southeast Korea. All aircraft from the target area were recalled and close air support missions were launched from 1312K until dark. The task force remained in the operating area during the night and planes were launched for controlled support missions throughout the next day.

Upon completion of air operations, the task force proceeded southward for rendezvous with Task Group 77.7 on 3 September. At 1433K the task force ceased replenishment operations in response to an emergency request from U. S. 8th Army Headquarters for close air support of UN ground forces in southeastern Korea. At 1645K, support missions were launched. After completion of air operations for the day, the task force moved northward in the operating area where strikes were launched for targets in west central Korea on 4 September. At 1415K another emergency request for close air support for UN ground forces in southeastern Korea was received. Strike groups were recalled and preparations rushed to launch support missions. At 1545K CinCFE annulled the request for close support and the task force resumed its strike operations. The task force remained in the operating area during the night.

At 0658K, 5 September, weather reconnaissance flights were made over the target area. Target area weather was determined to be unfavorable for launch of strike missions; whereupon the task force proceeded for SUSESO, Japan to replenish, arriving about 1400K, 6 September 1950.

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment:

No comment.

PART IV Resume of Battle Damage - Own and Enemy:

The ship sustained no battle damage. For damage inflicted upon the enemy see enclosure (1).
PART V Comments:

A. Operations

1. Use of Emergency Turns

It is recommended that two emergency turns of the same magnitude not be given in quick succession by the OTC particularly at night in view of normal communication difficulties experienced in the task force. There are many times when some ships do not receive the original transmission which entails a repetition of the signal and possible misinterpretation by other ships in the force. It is recommended that the second turn be made a different magnitude in order to obviate the possibility of confusion and resultant hazard.

B. Air Department

1. Shipboard Plane Handling

(a) During this reporting period frequent use was made of the "split spot" to give maximum flexibility on the flight deck. This spot consisted of seven jet aircraft on the extreme after end of the flight deck. Seven jets were used because it conveniently constitutes two full rows of planes and only seven tractors are available for towing forward in ease of the need for a ready deck. Ahead of the jets the ADs were spotted in two rows on one side of the flight deck and the F4Us in two rows on the other, so that either type could be taxied out for launch without moving the other. In front of these were spotted the special purpose aircraft: AD-3W, AD-3M, F4U-5N, and F4U-5P. If these special purpose aircraft are not needed for ASP, R/CAP, or NITECAP there was ample room to strike them below using the side deck elevator.

The principal reason for using this spot is to achieve maximum flexibility in order to meet the needs of the tactical situation which many times required a shift from strike to close support or vice-versa on short notice.

(b) During this period two emergency landings of jet aircraft were effected without injury to personnel or damage to the aircraft beyond the capacity of shipboard maintenance facilities to repair. In the first instance the starboard landing gear could not be lowered. The plane made a normal landing, the hook engaged the wire normally and damage to the wing tip was all that resulted. The second plane had hydraulic failure and was unable to lower the hook or flaps, and was without aileron boost. On landing, the crippled plane engaged the first two jet barriers and came to rest with the right wing tip against the flight deck crush crane, parked alongside the island structure. One main landing strut was sheared off and the right wing damaged to the extent that replacement was necessary.
PART VI Personnel, Performance and Casualties:

No comments.

L. K. RICE

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AUTHENTICATED:

D. C. HILLMAN
LT. U.S. NAVY
Administrative Officer

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