

U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)  
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CV45/A4-3  
Serial: 013

14 January 1951

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NAVHISTDIVINST 5500.1  
By: OP-09B92C

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE (CTG 77.3)  
(2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN (CTG-77.4)  
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(4) Commander U.S. Naval Forces Far East  
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for period 5 to 19 November 1950

Ref: (a) CNO ltr Op-345 res ser 1197P34 of 3 August 1950

Encl: (1) Ordnance expended and resume of damage to the enemy *PL*

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period 5 through 19 November is submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Mission:

USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) with Commander Carrier Division THREE (ISIC and CTG 77.3) and Carrier Air Group FIVE embarked departed SASEBO Harbor, Japan, in company with other units of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN and Seventh Fleet for operations in accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet Operation Order 17-50 and Commander Carrier Division ONE Operation Order 3-50, modified. CTF 77 (Acting) is ComCardiv THREE. CONSEVENTHFLT embarked in USS MISSOURI (BB-63). OTC is ComCardiv THREE. The task force proceeded for the east coast of North Korea to answer an emergency request from UN ground forces for air support needed as a result of Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War. //

PART II Chronological Order of Events:

The USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) departed SASEBO Harbor, Japan at 0733 on 5 November and sortied with other elements of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN and SEVENTH Fleet. Winds up to 50 knots and heavy seas necessitated a reduction in speed, delaying start of operations by seven hours. On the afternoon of 6 November armed reconnaissance missions were flown north of the bomblime to the Manchurian border in areas assigned the task force. Strikes, close support, and jet sweeps were conducted during the next two days. On the 9th the task force was joined by the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) with ComCardiv ONE (CTF 77) embarked. The task force was assigned the mission of destroying bridges across the Yalu River at the boundary between Korea and Manchuria. Strikes were launched on the Changtien-ho-kow highway bridge. On the 10th the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) replenished. On the 11th and 12th

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coordinated strikes were launched against bridges at Changtjen-ho-keu, Ceschengdong and Sinuiju. One span of the Sinuiju highway bridge was destroyed by combined attacks by planes of the USS LEYTE (CV-32) and USS VALLEY FORCE (CV-45) on the 12th. On the 13th the force launched a coordinated strike on military installations in Hyosanjin at the request of TENTH Corps. Replenishment was conducted on the 14th. Close support and armed reconnaissance missions were flown on the 15th, the scheduled strike on Sinuiju bridge being diverted due to restricted visibility at the target. Following replenishment on the 17th, close support, armed reconnaissance and a coordinated strike on the Sinuiju bridge were launched on the 18th. Combined attacks by planes of the USS LEYTE (CV-32) and the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) dropped both bridges at Hyosanjin on the 17th. On the 19th the USS VALLEY FORCE (CV-45) was detached from the task force to proceed to Yokosuka, Japan, preparatory to returning to the United States.

On six of the thirteen days included in the report period, weather affected air operations adversely. Although there were no days when all scheduled offensive air operations were cancelled, at least part of the force's offensive power was aborted due to weather limitations on 5, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 18 November.

### PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment:

No comment.

### PART IV Resume of Battle Damage - Own and Enemy:

The ship sustained no battle damage. For damage inflicted upon the enemy see enclosure (1).

### PART V Comments:

#### A. Operations

##### 1. Air Operations

(a) During this period coordinated strikes were conducted against railroad and highway bridges across the Manchurian border employing the skyraiders as dive bombers carrying one and two thousand pound general purpose bombs and utilizing the corsairs as fighter bombers with the primary mission of bombing, rocketing, and strafing AA positions. For the first time in the Korean Campaign, due to the advent of the Chinese Communist Air Force into the Korean War, the jets were employed as fighter cover for the props while they were in the target area. The targets were approximately 225 miles from the launching position. By launching the jets 50 minutes after the prop launch the props were afforded protection 8 to 10 minutes prior to the attack and an additional 20 minutes while in the target area. A second jet launch 10 to 15 minutes after the first jet launch from a carrier in company

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afforded cover for the props on their retirement from the target area.

(b) On two occasions enemy jets were encountered by VALLEY FORGE jets. On the first occasion the enemy jets did not make an attack. However, on the second occasion a MIG-15 was shot down and seen to explode on striking the ground. The skyraiders and Corsairs were not attacked by enemy fighters at any time, encountering only fire from AA batteries.

(c) It is noted with grave concern the reported superior performance of the MIG-15 as compared to the F9F-3. It is believed that if they had been manned by pilots as aggressive and well trained as ours that own pilot and plane losses would have been great.

(d) It is believed that all means available should be employed in developing a carrier based fighter that will compare favorably if not out perform any aircraft a potential enemy may put in the air, and equip the fleet with this aircraft at the earliest possible date.

(e) The operational personnel who should have been conversant with FFP 224 (Selection of Bombs and Fuzes for Destruction of Various Targets) were not aware of this publication for the first three months of the Korean Campaign. Its existence was discovered only by accident. It is recommended that a copy of this publication be held by the Air Operations Section of the Operations Department and that it be added to the list of required publications of the Air Operations Section and be included in the Type Commanders Administrative Inspection check off list.

## 2. Intelligence

(a) During the period of this report the Air Intelligence Section functioned satisfactorily and intelligence material was adequate for the assigned mission. However, the Air Intelligence Section has suffered from peacetime complacency since the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) and Carrier Air Group FIVE became involved in the Korean Campaign. Although intelligence material pertaining to the Western Pacific area was requested prior to the sailing of this vessel from the West Coast none was received. Aerial navigation charts had been ordered for all possible areas and were adequate for the initial operations. Trained personnel were not available on board, therefore it was necessary to train inexperienced personnel as the operations progressed.

(b) Each squadron based aboard requires a non-flying air intelligence officer in order to insure thorough and up to the minute briefing. Air Group FIVE was forced to place this added burden on its flying personnel with incomplete briefing and debriefing as an end result. Photo interpretation was a "lost art" to the Air Intelligence Section. Two reserve officers were finally

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received on board in September coming directly from civilian pursuits after being completely divorced from photo interpretation work since 1945, a period of approximately 5 years. Obviously the work was not of a required standard for an appreciable period.

(c) It is recommended that an emergency source of trained photo interpretation officers be made available in aerial photo training squadrons ashore to meet situations of this nature in the fleet. In addition, photo interpreters should definitely be made available in the organized reserves where they may keep their training at an acceptable standard.

(d) In order to maintain an acceptable state of readiness in the intelligence section it is recommended that during peacetime it be mandatory for the following to obtain on CV type carriers:

(1) That the officer assigned to the air intelligence billet be a graduate of an intelligence school and that this be a primary billet.

(2) Have at least one AF3 graduate of Photo Interpretation School assigned to the photo laboratory during peacetime and readily available for the air intelligence section when an emergency arises.

(3) That a YN3 or YNSN be assigned for typing, filing, and other office duties.

(4) That a man be assigned to the Intelligence Section familiar with serial charts, publications, and common chartroom equipment.

(e) It is recommended that a job classification code under the basic rate of Air Operations Man be established to handle the job described in paragraph (d)(4) above.

(f) Recommended changes to the basic wartime and peacetime allowances are being forwarded under separate correspondence.

### 3. Operations Evaluation

(a) There appears to be a definite need for an operations analyst on an operating carrier. Representatives from various bureaus and from several boards appeared on the ship from time to time, all requesting various data and records. The information, though available, had to be dug out by personnel whose primary job was operational. The limited time available to most of these representatives often necessitated incomplete and perhaps inconclusive data being obtained. It is felt, however, that had an officer, or team, been detailed on the ship to do nothing but collect data of any and

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all operational interest from the commencement of operations, then a ready source of information would have been immediately available to any and all data seekers. It is believed that such a billet should be set up as a wartime billet and filled at the earliest practicable date upon the commencement of any type combat operations.

REMARKS: Personnel, Performance and Casualties:

No. Comment.

J. M. CARSON

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CAG 11		
CAG 19		
CAG 3		
CAG 2		

AUTHENTICATED:

*J. M. Carson*  
D. C. MILLER, LT, USN,  
Administrative Officer.

ORDNANCE EXPENDED AND RESUME OF DAMAGE TO THE ENEMY

1. Tons bombs: 225.8 - 5" HVAR: 542 - 6.5" SC: 26 - Tiny Tins: 17  
20MM Ammo: 25,480

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>
Aircraft	1	
Trucks	27	13
Carts		8
Tanks		2
Boxcars		7
RR Bridges		6
Hwy Bridges		7
Warehouses	2	4
Troop Concentrations		24
Barracks	5	
Ammo Dumps	1	
Supply Dumps		1

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ENCLOSURE (1)