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
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U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE CVA-45
AND AIR GROUP FIVE

PEARL HARBOR

ACTION REPORT

25 MAY 1953 TO 9 JUNE 1953
AND


SUMMARY REPORT

31 DEC. 1952 TO 9 JUNE 1953

YOKOSUKA

JAPAN

KOREA



U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA45)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CVA45/A16-13
Ser 0177
14 Jun 1953

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NAVHISTDIVINST 5500.1
By: OP-09B92Q

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA45)
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-55)
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces FAR EAST
(4) Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 25 May 1953 through 9 June 1953 and Summary Report for period 31 December 1952 through 9 June 1953; submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAV Inst 3480.4 of July 1951

Encl: (1) Carrier Air Group FIVE Action Report

1. In compliance with reference (a), the Action Report for this command for the period 25 May 1953 through 9 June 1953 is submitted herewith. In addition, comments relative to the experiences of this command during the entire cruise are included in Part VI of this report and in enclosure (1).

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

On 27 May 1953, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45) Commanded by Captain Robert E. DIXON, USN, with Carrier Air Group FIVE, embarked; joined Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in accordance with CTF 77 dispatch 220240Z of May 1953. Upon joining, Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was composed of the USS BOXER (CVA21), USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA47), and various ships of the Screening Force.

The mission of this Force in general terms was to conduct air and surface operations off the coast of Korea in order to support U.N. forces in Korea, and to support the policy of the United States in the Far East.

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6-1-53: The Task Force replenished in the morning. This ship replenished from the USS CHIKASKIA (A054). Air operations commenced at 1315. Panther jets flew Cherokee strikes north of the II ROK area, while propeller planes flew Close Air Support for the II ROK and X U.S. Corps. A total of 50 sorties were flown. The USS MANCHESTER (CL83) departed the Task Force.

6-2-53: Air operations commenced at 0200. Pre-dawn hecklers hit trains in the Tanch'on area and storage buildings at Sinch'ang-ni and Kokku, south of Tanch'on. Panther jets bombed supply buildings at Kojo and Pukch'ong and flew Cherokee strikes north of the II ROK and X U.S. Corps area. Corsairs flew Naval Gunfire Spot for the USS MANCHESTER (CL83) and teamed up with the Skyraiders to fly Close Air Support for the I, IX, and X U.S. and II ROK Corps. A total of 123 sorties were flown. The USS MANCHESTER (CL83) joined the Task Force.

6-3-53: Pre-dawn hecklers bombed a power sub-station and trains at Hungnam and storage buildings north of Sinch'ang-ni. Panther jets hit gun positions at Wonsan, a locomotive and boxcars at Hungnam, storage buildings west of the Pujon'gang Reservoir, northeast of Hungnam and southeast of Kilchu. Propeller planes bombed caves and gun positions at Wonsan and flew Close Air Support for the II ROK Corp. While on a strike at Wonsan, Ensign T. Y. KORSGREN's (VF54) Skyraider was hit by enemy fire. He bailed out over Wonsan Harbor and was picked up by helicopter, uninjured, southwest of Yodo Island. A total of 122 sorties were flown.

6-4-53: No air operations were conducted as the Task Force replenished. This ship replenished from the USS CHIKASKIA (A054), USS MOUNT BAKER (AE4), and USS POLARIS (AF11). The USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA47), COMCARDIV THREE embarked, joined the Task Force. The USS MANCHESTER (CL83) departed the Task Force. RADM R. E. BLICK, USN, COMCARDIV THREE relieved RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, COMCARDIV ONE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

6-5-53: Air operations commenced at 0915. Panther jets rocketed Chosen #1 power plant, bombed a mining area south of the Changjin-gang Reservoir and a billeting area north of the I Corps. Propeller planes flew Close Air Support for the

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I, IX, and X U.S. and II ROK Corps. A total of 75 sorties were flown. During the afternoon, RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, COMCARDIV ONE and his staff were transferred from the USS BOXER (CVA21) to the USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45) via helicopters and destroyers.

6-6-53: VADM J. CLARK, USN, COM7THFLT presented awards to officers and enlisted personnel of the VALLEY FORGE and Air Group FIVE for their outstanding performance during the past cruise. During the afternoon, aircraft were transferred to the USS BOXER (CVA21), King 6, and NAS, Atsugi, Japan. The USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45) and USS OBANNON (DDE450) were detached from the Task Force.

6-7-53: Enroute Yokosuka, Japan.

6-8-53: Enroute Yokosuka, Japan. Typhoon "Judy" necessitated a change in voyage routing and introduced necessary delays enroute. The USS OBANNON (DDE45) was detached.

6-9-53: The remainder of the aircraft to be delivered to NAS, Atsugi were launched. Arrived Yokosuka, Japan.

6-10-53: RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, COMCARDIV ONE and his staff were transferred from the USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45) to the USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA39).

PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

The following ordnance was expended during this period:

	<u>Ship</u>
5"/38 Caliber	0
40mm	0
	<u>Aircraft</u>
<u>Bombs</u>	
2000# GP	78
1000# GP	112
1000# SAP	9
500# GP	252
500# SAP	10

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250# GP	962
100# GP	268
220/260# Frag	448

Rockets

3.5" Solid	26
5" ATAR	265
A/C Parachute Flares	174
Napalm	16

Gun Ammunition

20mm	82,495
50 Caliber	33,735

The data on hung ordnance experienced during this period is included in enclosure (1). (Also, see page 29, on Rocket Barrier).

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

The ship was not attacked during this period and sustained no battle damage.

Damage inflicted on Communist forces by Air Group FIVE is included in enclosure (1) of this report.

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PART V

PERFORMANCE OF PERSONNEL AND CASUALTIES

Personnel performance during this last tour of operations in the forward area was excellent.

The shortage of petty officers in some ratings was alleviated with the advancement in ratings on 16 May 1953. A shortage still exists however, in the ET and FT ratings. The ship is still somewhat under-complemented in the steward's ratings which causes some difficulties in the wardroom.

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Morale continued to be excellent, spurred by the large number of advancements in ratings in May and proximity of the tour's end.

Ensign Theodore Y. KORSGREN, JR., 554621/1325, USNR, bailed out of his AD4NA over Wonsan Harbor as a result of his plane being hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire. He was rescued uninjured by helicopter from LST 1138. An afternoon flight picked Ensign KORSGREN up at Yodo Island and he was back aboard the VALLEY FORGE the same day.

On 6 June 1953, the last day of operations, 4 rounds of 20mm ammunition were accidentally fired from the number 4 gun of F9F BuNo 126058 damaging F9F BuNo 126132 and injuring ODIAN, Robert (n), 460 71 91, ADAN, VF53. He sustained serious missile wounds involving the left ankle, left leg, right leg, left groin, left arm and left hand, plus various small lacerations of the chest wall and face. His wounds and fractures were repaired in surgery, and his condition, while serious, is satisfactory. The cause of the firing is undetermined and is the subject of a Board of Investigation convened by this command. A full report of the incident will be forwarded when completed by the board.

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

OPERATIONS

Air Intelligence

The fifth and final period of operations on the line presented no unusual problems or developments in intelligence. The smoothness and efficiency with which the A.I. office had been functioning continued at its high level.

An improvement to the intelligence program was introduced by COMCARDIV ONE Intelligence Office. This was the issuance of 1/30,000 scale photos of the Cherokee target area. These photos instead of the previously used target charts are highly recommended especially for carriers for the first time on the line. It enables the new pilot to better familiarize himself with the terrain and insure a quicker and more positive identification of the target. Although Air Group FIVE pilots

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were experienced, use of the area photos was well received and proved to be a help in quicker orientation.

Communications ✓

Communications in general were improved during this period. The primary reason being the reduced traffic load which resulted from not having a flag embarked.

It was noted that the net control station on CW circuits often used the operating signal ZBM2 (place a competent operator on watch) when an operator could not copy a speed key. Frequently it appeared that traffic conditions did not warrant use of a speed key. It is considered that with the lack of qualified speed key operators usually on board, traffic would usually be delivered as expeditiously if the transmitting station used a standard key at the speed of the slowest operator on the circuit.

CW circuit discipline could be improved for the most part. There were numerous instances of improper usage of break-in procedure on the JOC Korea CW circuit, which thereby resulted in delays and confusion.

During this period on the line a total of 5,301 messages were handled by Radio Central with 306 sent and 4,995 received.

Photographic Laboratory

Eighteen photographic sorties were flown during this operating period and the following work performed:

<u>Negatives</u>		<u>Prints</u>	
9x18"	1,620	9x18"	6,700
9x9"	230	9x9"	473
7x7"	25	7x7"	25
8x10"	10	8x10"	1,821

GUNNERY

Refueling

During the period, the VALLEY FORGE went alongside 3 ships for refueling. Dates, ships, and pertinent data are shown in the summary part of this report.

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Re-Arming

In the same period, the VALLEY FORGE went alongside 2 ships for ammunition. Dates, ships, and pertinent data are shown in the summary part of this report.

Supplies

During the same period, the VALLEY FORGE went alongside 1 ship for provisions. Date, ship, and pertinent data are shown in the summary part of this report.

Miscellaneous

Highline transfers of personnel and light freight were made on 3 occasions.

EXECUTIVE

Recreation

The crew's library has been open daily from 0615 to 2100, and the crew's lounge has been open daily after working hours. A weekly newspaper "Take-off" has been published and distributed each Sunday with the morning press and from 27 May to 2 June 1953 copies of "Stars and Stripes" obtained by COD flight, have been distributed on board.

Religious Activities

Protestant Divine Services were conducted twice on Sundays and Devotions were conducted twice on week days. Sunday school was held every Sunday and a week-day Bible Class met on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday while the ship was at sea. The Protestant Fellowship met each Sunday evening followed by an Evangelistic Service. Latter Day Saints Services were held each Sunday and a Latter Day Saints Training Class was held on Thursday of each week. The series of lectures on "Marriage and Family Life" were completed and a new series on "Moral Responsibilities" were started.

Catholic Mass and Rosary were held daily in the Training Room. Confessions were heard on Saturday evening in the Chaplain's Office. Masses were offered on Sundays at 0630, 0900, and 1430 with Benediction following the second Mass.

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The second annual Pontifical Mass of Thanksgiving and Communion Breakfast were held at the Naval Base, Yokosuka, Japan, on 21 May 1953.

The daily prayer at taps was offered by both Chaplains on alternate nights. Daily visits were made to the Sick Bay and occasional visits to the Brig.

Training

Shipboard training went along with regularity on the last lap of the cruise. Most of the training continued to be on-the-job training. The training room was utilized extensively for lectures, training films, group study classes, and in the evenings, religious services. The Algebra class completed its course of study at the end of the period. The testing center remained active in giving GED examinations and USAFI end-of-course tests.

Public Information

With the ship's arrival in the U.S. imminent, concentration of effort has been on material to be presented to the press relative to the ship's homecoming. This material included recapitulations of highlights of the news features occurring during the deployment period and biographies and rosters of the ship's officers and crew. In addition, the following material was prepared for release during the period 27 April to 6 June 1953:

- 10 Navy news dispatches, by radio.
- 2 news photographs releases.
- 2 news feature stories and layouts.
- 15 hometown feature stories (to FHTNC).
- 1534 hometown stories by roster (to FHTNC).
- 12 hometown photographs (to FHTNC).
- 1 magazine article submitted.

MEDICAL

A total of eighteen patients were admitted to the sick list on the medical service. There were two cases of hepatitis, acute, infectious, with jaundice. Following is a tabulation of medical admissions:

EENT	11
GI	3

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SKIN	1
MISCELLANEOUS	3
Total	<u>18</u>

Venereal Disease

The following is a tabulation of venereal disease incidence for the period 11 May 1953 through 6 June 1953:

Syphilis	0
Chancroid	3
Urethritis, acute, due to gonococcus	13
Urethritis, acute, non-gonococcal, nec	42
Prostatitis, acute, non-gonococcal, nec	0
Total	<u>58</u>

Air Group

The morale and health of the air group has been good. Two pilots were grounded for a period of two days, and two pilots for longer periods due to appendicitis and bursitis.

CRUISE SUMMARY

31 December 1952 through 9 June 1953

OPERATIONS

The assignment of a two day enroute period between Yokosuka and the Task Force should be recognized as a marginal operation. With a 25 knot SOA authorized the trip is feasible, but a very small margin remains in order to accomplish other required or desirable operations. The uncertain currents encountered enroute quite often require 27 knots through the water to make 25 knots good over the ground. Before joining the Task Force, it is highly desirable to refresh the air group and air department personnel and to fly all aircraft at least once in order to correct all mechanical deficiencies incurred during the in port period. It is mandatory to conduct an ECM exercise at least once during a tour with the Task Force (COMNAVFE requirement) and desirable to conduct a joint exercise with the JADF. Further, a gunnery firing exercise should be conducted enroute if possible. Refueling of the escort destroyer is sometimes directed. The two day enroute period with the other requirements obviously permits

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flight operations only when weather and wind conditions are ideal, and these must of a necessity be held to a minimum. It is recommended that a three day enroute period with an appropriate SOA be authorized whenever possible.

Air Intelligence

During the past six months of combat operations, the organization and scope of the intelligence office improved with the experience gained during its previous tours on the line. Flak studies still continue to be one of the most important functions of the intelligence office. A concentrated effort was made to insure that the latest flak positions were positively presented to the pilots. Flak summaries and indices followed one another frequently and changes to the flak charts were made daily. The effectiveness of the flak analysis program on the ship is at least partly reflected in the low number of casualties and aircraft lost during the cruise by Air Group FIVE.

The organization of the ship-air group intelligence team remained unchanged throughout the entire cruise. At the commencement of the cruise all but one of the officers and half of the enlisted men assigned to the team were inexperienced in the combat phase of air intelligence.

The Air Group AIO was assigned to work as an assistant Air Intelligence Officer in the ship's office. In addition to augmenting the complement of the office, he was able to gain experience in other phases of intelligence. This arrangement has proved highly satisfactory for the past two cruises by the VALLEY FORGE. It is recommended that the Air Group AIO be given temporary additional duty to the ship for carriers deploying to the Far East.

The enlisted complement of 4 men in the Intelligence Office was reduced by the loss of one during the cruise, and this proved to be somewhat of a handicap. It is recommended that 4 enlisted personnel be the minimum assigned to the ship's office if a 24-hour watch is to be maintained. All non-rated men were rated during the cruise and were assigned the Air Intelligence Specialist Job Code Number 9936. When practicable, all enlisted personnel should be a graduate of the enlisted AirPac Intelligence School. It is recommended that an Air

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Intelligence Specialist rating be originated, since the time available while working on the line makes study and training for advancement in other rates very difficult. Further, no time is readily available for any practical application of knowledge gained in the rate earned. Separate correspondence is being originated on this subject.

The stowage spaces in the Intelligence Office fail to allow adequate room for properly caring for security information, confidential and above. In order to make available space in the safe and other stowage spaces, periodic burning of material was held. All pertinent and operational information was removed from periodicals, etc., put in special folders and retained. Only a limited number of operational charts could be kept in the office. All other charts were stowed in a fan room or other convenient space available. The photo interpreters continued to work in the Intelligence Office. Although this presented a hardship, the benefits gained by the ship and squadron AIOs working in the same space more than offset the disadvantages of close quarters.

CIC

The general installation design of the Combat Information Center on the CVA class ship is functional and adequate for the type of operations conducted in the Task Force at present. Since major emphasis is placed on the air phase of CIC, the CIC watch officer has ready access to all information necessary for fulfilling his mission. However, in a general situation wherein the surface phase must be given more consideration (i.e. HUK Operations), the present design presents a problem. The air and surface pictures are so widely separated that the CIC watch officer has considerable difficulty in adequately supervising both operations. This requires the designation of a surface watch officer in addition to the CIC watch officer thereby increasing the officer requirements for CIC.

This problem can be resolved by re-designing the CIC with both the air and surface pictures grouped around the CIC watch officer's station in a semi-circular fashion, thereby enabling him to supervise and coordinate the two operations.

The ECM equipment location is unsatisfactory from the standpoint of adequate supervision with a minimum of personnel assigned to CIC, a situation which prevailed throughout the cruise. The relocation of this equipment within the CIC, or

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adjacent thereto will serve as a palliative in this respect. Present ship alteration plans include this change.

The number of CIC school trained officers available was adequate for filling all CIC billets. However, the enlisted personnel problem was critical throughout the cruise. The greatest number of men available to the O-I Division at any one time was fifty-four. This included eight men in Class "A" School on a returnable quota and those assigned from the division to mess cooking, MAA force, etc. This situation, aggravated by the supplemental functions of a flagship, necessitated a two-section watch schedule during the first two tours on the line. The fatigue factor, which rapidly increased under this schedule required internal adjustments, accepting otherwise undersirable compounding of duties, to permit a three-section watch schedule.

Subsequent to the return of the Class "A" School graduates, a directive was received to transfer to COMAIRPAC four RD3s because of an over-complement in that rate. At that time, there existed an under-complement of 12 RDCs, RD1s, and RD2s. The transfer of the four RD3s worked a serious hardship at a time when the services of trained men were at a premium.

The radar and allied equipment functioned satisfactorily throughout the cruise. The failures experienced were those normally to be expected in prolonged periods of operations. These were kept to a minimum by a continued and vigorous preventive maintenance program prosecuted by the electronics technicians.

The IFF equipment proved of inestimable value in the aircraft control function, the integral antennas proving generally more reliable than the slave antenna.

An experiment with two colors on the vertical plot was conducted and proved highly satisfactory from an evaluator's point of view. All unidentified air contacts were plotted in dark red with friendly air contacts being plotted in yellow. The proper symbols were used with the only deviation being in the colors employed. As air contacts became identified, the color was shifted from red to yellow. The initial reaction to change and ineptness of the vertical plotters in coordinating the proper use of two colors was overcome with practice. The two color presentation allowed the air situation

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to be immediately apparent to the evaluator, the CIC officer, and such staff CIC and gunnery liason officers as are required to divide their attention among several simultaneous duties.

The need for a general understanding of the CIC functions on the part of all personnel concerned in operating a fighting ship was self-evident, and was largely satisfied by an exchange of personnel and a general indoctrination program between bridge, air group, and CIC personnel.

The value of having the URD-2 direction finder located convenient to the air controller was proved many times, as it is indispensable to him in discharging his responsibilities.

The lack of frequency separation in the FAD net channels caused feed-over and reduced the flexibility intended by the establishment of the several channels within the net. This lack of separation also hampered, and in many cases, precluded the use of middleman, a feature sorely needed to gain over-target data, particularly during marginal weather.

The re-establishment of the AC net would materially reduce the often prohibitive traffic on the presently used combined CI-AC net. The establishment, within Task Force 77 of the Air Ops net helped relieve the situation somewhat. The implementation of project SHAMROCK presents an excellent opportunity for rectification of this discrepancy.

Communications

In a period of 97 days with the Task Force a total of 78,177 messages were handled by radio for an average of 805.9 messages a day. Of the total figure 13,116 were transmitted and 65,061 received.

It is recommended that Signal Bridge personnel exercise greater care in assigning relay instructions for messages addressed to the Task Force or all ships present. Instances occurred in which screen group ships have had station indicators close up and were in the process of changing stations when relay instructions were assigned. If the screening ship moved to a station distant from the ship assigned to relay the message, delay in delivery and excessive transmissions resulted.

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In the readdressal of messages, readdressal headings should be made in accordance with effective publications rather than using the operating signal ZFHL followed by the call signs of the readdressal addressee. This procedure results in an erroneous change of heading rather than a readdressal, and causes confusion as to the correct originator.

Radio equipment has been subjected to severe usage and wear in four combat tours. Equipment outages were successfully kept to a minimum by a strenuous preventive maintenance program employed by the electronics technicians.

Photographic Interpretation

During the first three tours on the line, the personnel assigned to the photo interpretation section were one officer, photo interpreter, (LT), and two enlisted photo readers (PH3). After the third tour an additional photo interpreter (ENS) reported for duty. It is believed that two photo interpretation officers and two enlisted assistants are an adequate allowance for all photographic interpretation requirements under the present operating conditions. The photo interpretation spaces are located in the Air Intelligence Office, compartment B-201-1L. Although there are definite space limitations, the convenience afforded pilots and squadron Air Intelligence Officers in respect to photographic information and materials far outweighed the advantages of using separate spaces.

The K-38 36" focal length camera was used on practically all photographic interpretation missions. It proved to be satisfactory in all respects. The K-25 capsule externally carried produced few satisfactory photographs. The F-56 externally carried capsule camera is far superior to the K-25. For strike photographs, an externally carried camera with a longer focal length is highly recommended.

Photographic Laboratory

Upon our departure from San Diego, nineteen men were attached to the Photographic Laboratory, of which seven were petty officers and two designated PHAN. Ten men had been selected from the ship's company and an intensive program of training was set up to qualify these men for photographic work. During the first tour on the line, much difficulty was experienced trying to keep the cameras and equipment in an operating condition, but this problem was solved when a rated camera repairman reported aboard.

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The A10-A dryers proved too slow for normal operation and two 1000 watt heating elements, normally used in a Pako print dryer, were installed increasing the speed of drying to approximately twenty feet per minute. After the winter season was over, aerial negatives had a tendency to lose contrast, due to weather conditions, but this was eliminated by the use of an A-25 (red) filter in place of the minus blue filter.

One hundred fifty-eight photographic sorties were flown during the entire tour and following number and types of negatives and prints have been processed by the ship's photographic laboratory during the entire period in the forward area.

<u>Negatives</u>		<u>Prints</u>	
9x18"	14,272	9x18"	82,192
9x9"	1,676	9x9"	9,588
7x7"	1,400	7x7"	2,000
8x10"	2,758	8x10"	16,282

EXECUTIVE

At the beginning of the tour on 31 December 1952, there were 2,052 enlisted personnel attached to ship's company, 92 of whom were away on temporary additional duty and 4 on emergency leave, leaving a total of 1,956 on board.

A total of 113 men were received on board for duty during the cruise; 36 petty officers, 77 non-rated men. 184 men were transferred to other duty, of whom 103 were petty officers and 81 non-rated men. The assignment of personnel with sufficient obligated service to serve out the entire tour in the forward area proved to be invaluable in the resulting teamwork evidenced in many departments.

During the cruise, 59 requests for emergency leave were submitted of which 29 were approved. Those rejected presented a morale problem because of their failure to understand the fine line of distinction set forth in the Area Commander's policy directive.

Officer personnel rotation continued at a high rate in that 33 ship's company officers reported for duty, relieving a like number during the entire period in the forward area.

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The value of having the URD-2 direction finder located convenient to the air controller was proved many times, as it is indispensable to him in discharging his responsibilities.

The lack of frequency separation in the FAD net channels caused feed-over and reduced the flexibility intended by the establishment of the several channels within the net. This lack of separation also hampered, and in many cases, precluded the use of middleman, a feature sorely needed to gain over-target data, particularly during marginal weather.

The re-establishment of the AC net would materially reduce the often prohibitive traffic on the presently used combined CI-AC net. The establishment, within Task Force 77 of the Air Ops net helped relieve the situation somewhat. The implementation of project SHAMROCK presents an excellent opportunity for rectification of this discrepancy.

Communications

In a period of 97 days with the Task Force a total of 78,177 messages were handled by radio for an average of 805.9 messages a day. Of the total figure 13,116 were transmitted and 65,061 received.

It is recommended that Signal Bridge personnel exercise greater care in assigning relay instructions for messages addressed to the Task Force or all ships present. Instances occurred in which screen group ships have had station indicators close up and were in the process of changing stations when relay instructions were assigned. If the screening ship moved to a station distant from the ship assigned to relay the message, delay in delivery and excessive transmissions resulted.

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In the readdressal of messages, readdressal headings should be made in accordance with effective publications rather than using the operating signal ZFH1 followed by the call signs of the readdressal addressees. This procedure results in an erroneous change of heading rather than a readdressal, and causes confusion as to the correct originator.

Radio equipment has been subjected to severe usage and wear in four combat tours. Equipment outages were successfully kept to a minimum by a strenuous preventive maintenance program employed by the electronics technicians.

Photographic Interpretation

During the first three tours on the line, the personnel assigned to the photo interpretation section were one officer, photo interpreter, (LT), and two enlisted photo readers (PH3). After the third tour an additional photo interpreter (ENS) reported for duty. It is believed that two photo interpretation officers and two enlisted assistants are an adequate allowance for all photographic interpretation requirements under the present operating conditions. The photo interpretation spaces are located in the Air Intelligence Office, compartment B-201-1L. Although there are definite space limitations, the convenience afforded pilots and squadron Air Intelligence Officers in respect to photographic information and materials far outweighed the advantages of using separate spaces.

The K-38 36" focal length camera was used on practically all photographic interpretation missions. It proved to be satisfactory in all respects. The K-25 capsule externally carried produced few satisfactory photographs. The F-56 externally carried capsule camera is far superior to the K-25. For strike photographs, an externally carried camera with a longer focal length is highly recommended.

Photographic Laboratory

Upon our departure from San Diego, nineteen men were attached to the Photographic Laboratory, of which seven were petty officers and two designated PHAN. Ten men had been selected from the ship's company and an intensive program of training was set up to qualify these men for photographic work. During the first tour on the line, much difficulty was experienced trying to keep the cameras and equipment in an operating condition, but this problem was solved when a rated camera repairman reported aboard.

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The A10-A dryers proved too slow for normal operation and two 1000 watt heating elements, normally used in a Pako print dryer, were installed increasing the speed of drying to approximately twenty feet per minute. After the winter season was over, aerial negatives had a tendency to lose contrast, due to weather conditions, but this was eliminated by the use of an A-25 (red) filter in place of the minus blue filter.

One hundred fifty-eight photographic sorties were flown during the entire tour and following number and types of negatives and prints have been processed by the ship's photographic laboratory during the entire period in the forward area.

<u>Negatives</u>		<u>Prints</u>	
9x18"	14,272	9x18"	82,192
9x9"	1,676	9x9"	9,588
7x7"	1,400	7x7"	2,000
8x10"	2,758	8x10"	16,282

EXECUTIVE

At the beginning of the tour on 31 December 1952, there were 2,052 enlisted personnel attached to ship's company, 92 of whom were away on temporary additional duty and 4 on emergency leave, leaving a total of 1,956 on board.

A total of 113 men were received on board for duty during the cruise; 36 petty officers, 77 non-rated men. 184 men were transferred to other duty, of whom 103 were petty officers and 81 non-rated men. The assignment of personnel with sufficient obligated service to serve out the entire tour in the forward area proved to be invaluable in the resulting teamwork evidenced in many departments.

During the cruise, 59 requests for emergency leave were submitted of which 29 were approved. Those rejected presented a morale problem because of their failure to understand the fine line of distinction set forth in the Area Commander's policy directive.

Officer personnel rotation continued at a high rate in that 33 ship's company officers reported for duty, relieving a like number during the entire period in the forward area.

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During the cruise, there were 124 wardroom guests representing all U.S. military services, the navies of the Netherlands, Canada, and England. Of the 124 guests, 35 visited the embarked Flag and his staff. The duration of all visits varied from one day to 30, a total representation of 684 man-days.

Recreation

The Special Services Officer arranged boxing shows, rest and recuperation leave, conducted tours, and stage shows. Boxing matches were set up during the interval between departure from the line and arrival in port. 1009 men took advantage of the facilities at rest hotels during in-port periods. 406 men went on conducted tours of Tokyo sponsored by the COMNAVFE Special Services Tourist Bureau. 600 men went on conducted tours of Hong Kong while the ship visited that port.

Training

During the course of this cruise, classes were held in Beginning and Advanced Algebra, and in Beginning German, as well as in the ratings of Aviation Boatswain's Mate, Storekeeper and Coxswain. All divisions used the training room for divisional lectures and training films during working hours. On-the-job training was found to be the most profitable, as well as the most practicable method of training during extensive operations. Interest in educational advancement by means of correspondence courses was very high. Over 500 sections of GED tests were administered. Over 200 USAFI correspondence courses were issued. There was an extremely large number of enlisted correspondence courses issued for advancement in rating studies.

Training is considered to have been carried out to a maximum degree in conjunction with the long hours and extensive duties required by the operations of the Task Force.

Public Information

With the staff public information officer of COMARDIV 3 and his journalists on board until the last month of the deployment period, the ship's public information officer concentrated on material for the Fleet Home Town News Center and most of the ship's tour in Western Pacific. For the period from 1 January 1953 to 6 June 1953, the material submitted totaled:

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- 15 navy news dispatches, by radio.
- 32 news feature stories and layouts, by mail.
- 67 news photo releases.
- 189 hometown news stories (to FHTNC).
- 2413 hometown news stories by roster (to FHTNC).
- 105 hometown photographs (to FHTNC).
- 992 letters home.

Two newspaper correspondents were embarked for short periods during the cruise and they interviewed men from the cities and vicinities of the papers they represented.

Commanding Officer's Comment

The Commanding Officer's Sea Cabin, as provided in the VALLEY FORGE, is a source of discomfort to the Captain rather than relaxation. In operations such as are conducted in Task Force 77 this small, poorly arranged room is the Commanding Officer's home for weeks. In this case, the encroachment of space required for habitability has reached the limit. It can almost be said that the Captain must either stand up or pull down his bunk and go to sleep. It is recommended that future construction provide as a minimum for the commanding officer's sea cabin, space sufficient for a comfortable chair, a bunk and minimum head facilities.

During the numerous occasions when this ship was required to go alongside replenishment ships (total of 60 approaches) all of the senior officers and a few of OODs were permitted to make approaches. It was discovered that the most expeditious and surest procedure was as follows:

When released for approach go to plus 10 knots above Base speed.

At 1700 yards range cut to plus 3 knots above Base speed.

At overlap cut to Base speed.

When proceeding from one line or from waiting line to next ahead, modify the above as required depending on distance.

DENTAL

A continuous program of oral hygiene has been carried out which included lectures to personnel. Starting in April, evening

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appointments were made for oral prophylaxis thus providing treatments for an additional one hundred patients a month.

This resulted in a low incidence of periodontal conditions and provided clean mouths for the Dental Officers to operate in.

A dental prosthetic laboratory has been authorized. When this is accomplished, a complete dental service will be rendered to personnel aboarda CVA as well as services to other ships in the Task Force.

It is recommended that space be provided for an additional operating room which will be utilized for combined services in the following manner:

Oral prophylaxis: This would enable a full time continuous program during the day as well as an evening program. This would result in the Dental Department carrying out its mission of providing oral hygiene for all personnel.

Prosthodontics: The prosthetic laboratory work can be accomplished without interfering with the oral prophylaxis unit.

Radiodontics: The X-ray unit could be transferred to this room thus permitting radiodontics without interruption of the Dental Officers operating under the present set up. Separate correspondence is being originated on this subject.

MEDICAL

For comparative purposes, venereal disease incidence during the four periods previously reported was:

	<u>1st</u> <u>Period</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Period</u>	<u>3rd</u> <u>Period</u>	<u>4th</u> <u>Period</u>
Syphilis	0	0	0	0
Chancroid	2	15	3	9
Urethritis, acute, due to gonococcus	7	16	11	13
Urethritis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	46	124	53	67
Prostatitis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	3	7	8	4
Total	<u>58</u>	<u>162</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>93</u>

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Venereal incidence aboard the VALLEY FORGE continues to be a problem. However, the rate during the present operating period equals the rate for January 1953, and these two reported periods form the low points in venereal disease. Incidence declined during this period because there were fewer sexual exposures during our last in-port period prior to returning to the CONUS.

ENGINEERINGMaintenance

Since departure from San Diego, 20 November 1952, a total of 44 days has been available for maintenance. This was divided into five periods; one of fourteen days, two of eight days each (one of which was for emergency repairs to strut bearing), and two of seven days each. The excellent facilities of SRF Yokosuka were available for assistance in every case except for one seven-day period in Hong Kong.

For adequate maintenance, availability periods of seven or eight days are not worth while; no major repair can be undertaken with any assurance of completion. All vital repairs were accomplished, but only because of excellent spirit and much round-the-clock work at sea and during normal liberty hours in port on the part of ship's force. Under these conditions fatigue will inevitably lead to poor performance, and improper short-cuts will be taken which will sooner or later invite serious mechanical derangement.

Had operational commitments permitted, it is considered that four upkeep periods of ten to twelve days each would have paid far higher dividends in useful maintenance and rest for the crew in the same number of total upkeep days.

Logistics

For period 29 December 1952 through 6 June 1953:

Miles steamed:	50,095	
Fuel used:	8,645,415	gallons
Received from tankers at 60° F.	7,648,288	gallons
Refueling time:	43.9	hours
Receiving Rate (average)	174,000	gallons per hour
Fuel transferred to DDs at 60° F.	117,134	gallons
Time to fuel DDs	95	minutes
Average transfer rate to DDs:	1,233	gallons per hour
Water distilled:	8,694,370	gallons

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GUNNERY

The primary concern of the VALLEY FORGE in replenishment evolutions has been to combine efficiency with maximum safety. During the entire cruise, no casualties occurred while the tons per hour averages demonstrate an acceptable high degree of efficiency and training.

Refueling

During this cruise the VALLEY FORGE went alongside 25 ships for refueling and regassing. Dates, ships, and pertinent data are presented in tabular form:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	
1-4-53	USS CHEMUNG (A030)	9,472.7 134,800	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
1-10-53	USS MISPILLION (A0105)	6,773.00 46,000	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
1-11-53	USS MISPILLION (A0105)	27,000	Gals Gasoline
1-19-53	USS GUADALUPE (A032)	12,709.74 158,046	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
2-11-53	USS MISPILLION (A0105)	8,281.85 45,000	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
2-15-53	USS GUADALUPE (A032)	5,647.15 107,000	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
2-19-53	USS KASKASKIA (A027)	4,497.83 203,660	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
2-23-53	USS MISPILLION (A0105)	6,605.28 96,030	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
2-27-53	USS MISPILLION (A0105)	7,123.60 159,700	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
3-3-53	USS GUADALUPE (A032)	5,588.31 104,000	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	
3-7-53	USS GUADALUPE (A032)	5,608.83 186,130	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
3-11-53	USS MANATEE (A053)	4,690.19 111,000	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
3-29-53	USS GUADALUPE (A032)	11,951 20,370	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
4-2-53	USS NAVASOTA (A0106)	9,567.7 161,430	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
4-6-53	USS KASKASKIA (A027)	7,362.4 142,560	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
4-10-53	USS TALUGA (A062)	7,446.52 159,830	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
4-22-53	USS MANATEE (A053)	4,518.35 51,260	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
4-26-53	USS MANATEE (A053)	8,038.34 206,070	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
4-30-53	USS NAVASOTA (A0106)	6,036.83 98,200	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
5-4-53	USS MISPELLION (A0105)	7,949.31 172,160	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
5-8-53	USS MISPELLION (A0105)	7,135.42 139,560	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
5-12-53	USS CIMARRON (A022)	5,695.69 63,330	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
5-26-53	USS CIMARRON (A022)	11,044 116,900	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
6-1-53	USS CHIKASKIA (A054)	6,442.62 82,200	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
6-4-53	USS CHIKASKIA (A054)	5,771.9 176,500	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline

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Re-Arming

In the same period the VALLEY FORGE went alongside ammunition ships on 23 occasions. Data for re-arming is given below. It is significant that there is a steady rise in tonnage received per hour, indicating that improvement in efficiency and dispatch was steady and continuous. Of course, this improvement cannot be graphed as a straight line, since weather conditions and other variables (such as type of load) constitute definite limiting factors.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Tons per Hour</u>
1-4-53	USS MT. KATMAI (AE16)	75	100.
1-10-53	USS VIRGO (AKA20)	170	45.7
1-19-53	USS CHARA (AKA58)	205	91.1
2-11-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	80	66.6
2-15-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	140	118.7
2-19-53	USS VIRGO (AKA20)	298	119.2
2-23-53	USS CHARA (AKA58)	130	111.1
2-27-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	165	97.1
3-3-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	153	136.3
3-7-53	USS VIRGO (AKA20)	130	113.4
3-11-53	USS CHARA (AKA58)	203	116.
4-2-53	USS MT. BAKER (AE4)	233	116.4
4-6-53	USS CHARA (AKA58)	238	142.8
4-10-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	201	134.
4-22-53	USS MT. BAKER (AE4)	47	128.18
4-26-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	282	143.39

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Tons per Hour</u>
4-30-53	USS VIRGO (AKA20)	136	85.89
5-4-53	USS VIRGO (AKA20)	229	85.34
5-8-53	USS FIREDRAKE (AE14)	223	121.64
5-12-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	62	37.58
5-14-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	80	126.32
5-28-53	USS VESUVIUS (AE15)	85	106.24
6-4-53	USS MT. BAKER (AE4)	305	124.92

Supplies

The VALLEY FORGE received provisions nine times and aviation stores three times during the reporting period. The below summarizes these evolutions.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Tons per Hour</u>
1-10-53	USS GRAFFIAS (AF29)	99	79.2
1-19-53	USS GRAFFIAS (AF29)	88	66.
1-19-53	USS CHOURRE (ARV11)	12	40.
2-11-53	USS ALADURA (AF55)	51.5	60.
2-15-53	USS CHOURRE (ARV11)	15	33.3
2-19-53	USS ALADURA (AF55)	47	56.
3-3-53	USS ALADURA (AF55)	39	78.
3-29-53	USS ALADURA (AF55)	60.5	124.6
3-29-53	USS JUPITER (AVS8)	15.5	29.04
4-22-53	USS ALSTEDE (AF48)	67.5	5.79
5-8-53	USS PICTOR (AF54)	76.25	35.23
6-4-53	USS POLARIS (AF11)	140.5	43.8

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Highline transfers of personnel and light freight were made on 62 different occasions during the cruise.

Gunnery

Eleven successful firing exercises were conducted during the reporting period. Ammunition expenditures were as follows: 623 rounds of 5"/38 and 8,134 rounds of 40mm. The majority of these exercises were conducted enroute Yokosuka or in the operating area. It has been the experience of this ship that firing exercises conducted while on the line are not completely satisfactory for carriers because the replenishment schedule is usually so restricting that in the greater number of cases it is impossible to participate.

The following ordnance was expended during the entire cruise:

	<u>Ship</u>
5"/38 Caliber	623
40mm	8,134
<u>Bombs</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
2000# GP	264
1000# GP	1,333
1000# SAP	27
500# GP	2,701
500# SAP	24
250# GP	9,886
100# GP	3,443
220/260# Frag	1,896
100# Incendiary	743
350# Depth Bomb	4
Leaflet Bomb	241
<u>Rockets</u>	
11.75" Tiny Tim	2
3.5" Solid	139
3.5" Smoke	66
5" HVAR	878
5" ATAR	1,016
A/C Parachute Flares	967
Napalm	156

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The overloading of the deckedge elevator was held to a minimum and limited for the most part to the striking below of duds which developed during a launch.

VALLEY FORGE has been unable to obtain sufficient hardware for the fabrication of nylon tie-downs. This type of tie-down has proved to be extremely satisfactory and it is hoped that an adequate number of parachute friction "V" rings or satisfactory substitutes will become available. The manufacture of hooks presents no problem and was easily accomplished by SRF, Yokosuka. Care must be used in obtaining hooks which are properly heat-treated so that they do not fail when subjected to a load.

The deckedge elevator performed satisfactorily (with careful treatment) and survived the cruise. The minimum diameter of the cables is now 1".006, a decrease of 0".059 since January 1953, and a decrease of 0".144 from original installation.

Catapults and Arresting Gear

During the deployment, which consisted of 78 air operating days, the following usage of catapults and arresting gear was made:

<u>Catapults</u>	<u>Port</u>	<u>Starboard</u>
Total Jet Shots	1,604	1,473
4,000# Jet Shots	814	731
Total propeller shots (average pressure 2,525#)	279	436
Total Shots prior to 31 December 1952	1,885	1,914
Grand Total	7,172	7,952
	9,057	9,866

<u>Catapult Pumps</u>	<u>Total Shots Since Installation</u>	<u>Date and Place of Installation</u>	<u>Date and Place of Installation of Replaced Pump</u>
#1	627	4-26-53 Cat Crew at sea.	9-20-51, Yokosuka 4,441 when failed
#2	236	5-28-53 Cat Crew at sea.	Original pump 9,630 when failed

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<u>Catapult Pumps</u>	<u>Total Shots Since Installation</u>	<u>Date and Place of Installation</u>	<u>Date and Place of Installation of Replaced Pump</u>
#3	9,866	Original	-
#4	9,866	Original	-
#5	463	Overhauled 5-4-53. Cat Crew at sea.	1-25-52, Yokosuka 3,521 when failed.
#6	1,029	3-3-53 Cat Crew at sea.	1-25-52, Yokosuka 7,175 when failed.
#7	2,846	5-16-52 Yokosuka replaced	1-25-52, Yokosuka 1,281 when failed.
#8	4,127	1-25-52 Yokosuka replaced	Original Pump 4,930 when failed.

Three pumps were replaced during the deployment, and one required substantial repair. All work was accomplished by ship's force. A pump can be replaced by a spare in about 16 hours. Normal operations can continue during the replacement. With the exception of the replacement of the cable tensioning piston on the starboard machine, no maintenance of other than routine nature was required. The crosshead sheaves show heavy wear. The throats are worn to a depth of 3/16" and will require replacement when next in the Navy yard.

Arresting Gear

Average runout, jets 132
Average runout, propeller planes 125

Engagements

Pennant #1	1,283	Pennant #10	11
Pennant #2	1,613	Pennant #11	4
Pennant #3	1,392	Pennant #12	4
Pennant #4	785	Barrier #1 (Conventional)	16
Pennant #5	571	Barrier #3 (Conventional)	7
Pennant #6	234	Barrier #5 (Conventional)	0
Pennant #7	100	Barrier #2 (Jet)	6
Pennant #8	43	Barrier #4 (Jet)	15
Pennant #9	17	Barricade (maximum runout 90)	14

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Total Landings, Jet	3,089
Total Landings, Propeller Planes	2,968
Non-engagements	12
Grand Total	6,069

There were seven hook point failures which resulted in seven jet barricade engagements. Six sockets on arresting gear cables were poured. Only one purchase cable (#1 engine) required replacement and this engine was ~~replaced~~ overnight. No casualties to arresting gear occurred on this deployment.

The frequent return of hung rockets necessitated the development of a "jury" rocket barrier (photographs attached). The barrier was fabricated from used nylon barricade webbing which was interwoven and then secured with bolts and light aluminum washers. Fortunately, or unfortunately, the barrier was never subjected to an actual rocket engagement.

Aircraft Maintenance

The installed generators for starting jets have been used to a maximum during this deployment, with the aim of utilizing the jeep starting units as auxiliary sources rather than the primary sources of power. The aim has not been completely realized in that jumper cords cannot reach all jets on deck. The installation of additional generators would be desirable if sufficient topside weight compensation could be found.

The towing tractors have been subjected to severe usage. The tractors cannot pull a loaded aircraft in high gear which consequently requires much operation in low gear at high RPM. This high RPM combined with the use of aviation gas for fuel creates the need for constant heavy maintenance.

Turnups of F9F-5 aircraft have been a constant headache, requiring much respotting of aircraft. Since 21 February 1953, there were 355 turnups made on the hangar deck alone.

Aircraft Service

The metal-lined plywood shipping boxes of 100# AN-M12 incendiary clusters created a problem not only on breakout but also in disposition. Most of the assembly bolts were so badly corroded that the nuts could not be removed and it was necessary

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to drive the bolts out. The manner of securing the metal lining to the plywood box prohibited burning and hindered preparation for jettisoning. The cylindrical containers are quite satisfactory.

In compliance with COMAIRPAC conf disp 221845Z of May, issue-operational tests on the 36 Mark 25 Mod 2 mines aboard were performed. No discrepancies were found except the minor adjustments normally expected when preparing the mines for issue.

Since 22 April 1953 operational evaluation tests of the Aero 13B bomb hoists have been conducted. The evaluation proved that the hoist is generally unsatisfactory, primarily because of its weight and poor handling characteristics. A report of the evaluation was submitted to COMFAIRJAPAN in VALLEY FORGE rest ltr ser 1806 of 10 Jun 1953.

During this deployment, 3,074,165 gallons of aviation gasoline and 17,642 gallons of aviation lube oil were used. No particular servicing problems existed except the desirability of a higher avgas pumping rate when fueling jets and the well-known need for a greater storage capacity. On one occasion the returning strike aircraft could not be refueled after recovery because of lack of avgas aboard.

F9F-5 Aircraft

The operation and handling of the F9F-5 aircraft aboard the unconverted CVA 9 type carrier taxes the carrier to its maximum capabilities.

The replacement of propeller aircraft in an Air Group by jets, places a requirement for utilizing at least a portion of the jets aboard as fighter-bombers. Disregarding any decrease or increase of bombing accuracy by substitution of jets for propeller driven aircraft, the inescapable fact remains that the loaded jet aircraft must get airborne. The F9F-5 with a strike load of 1200 pounds external ordnance grosses 19000 pounds. The normal temperature experienced by VALLEY FORGE in the latter stages of deployment was about 70° F. Operating the H4B catapult at top accumulator pressure requires at this air temperature, a wind over the deck of 38 knots. Experience has proven that this can be shaded to 37 knots when the pilots are well experienced in the aircraft. In its CAP

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configuration, ~~3~~ - ~~3~~ knots of wind are necessary. It is obvious then that the deployment of the carrier in areas of high temperature and little or no wind such as normally expected near the equator would preclude F9F-5 operations with an H4B catapult. If substantially lower airborne endurance could be accepted for CAP, the aircraft could be launched with empty tip tanks. However, the carrier may be faced with the fact that she can launch neither strike nor CAP in certain areas, even though the weather may be CAVU.

The most frequent strike loading of the F9F-5 has been with an external ordnance load of 1200 pounds. The aircraft then grosses 19000 pounds. As has been pointed out in previous VALLEY FORGE Action Report and VALLEY FORGE Alteration Request 4-53 of 7 February 1953, the capacity of the deckedge elevator is not sufficient for easy handling of the loaded F9F-5. It is desirable that a loaded aircraft of 19000 pounds plus a tractor of 5700 pounds be capable of operation on the elevator. Further, there are occasions when loaded ADs at 21000 pounds should be capable of being struck below during a catapult launch of propeller aircraft. Obviously the difficulty of aircraft handling is increased by the low capacity elevator.

The Mark 5 arresting gear has given no indication of being over extended.

SUPPLY

Aviation Spare Parts and Material

During the first half of the current tour the USS CHOURRE (ARV11) furnished support which included two replenishments at sea. The overall efficiency for furnishing material was approximately 58%. During the latter half of the tour the USS JUPITER (AVS8) furnished support. One replenishment at sea and one in port replenishment was made with the efficiency again approximately 58%. Irrespective of this limited efficiency, the finest cooperation was received from the USS CHOURRE (ARV11) and USS JUPITER (AVS8). It is believed that this limited efficiency was a result of stock capacity. It is felt that the present system of passing NIS items is a major improvement over the former one of obligating and holding requisitions until receipt of the material from CONUS. A high percentage of passed items were furnished by ASB, NSD, Yokosuka and ASA, NSD, Guam.

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The following is a breakdown of delivery time for material under the various priorities:

Priority A (AOG)	8 days
Priority A	3 weeks
Priority B	3-7 weeks
Priority C	9-16 weeks

At the direction of COMFAIRJAPAN, a 90 day allowance of F9F-5 spares was off-loaded at NSD Yokosuka for the USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA39) and some selected items for the USS JUPITER (AVS8), also some material to fill shortages on the USS BOXER (CVA21).

Number of individual requests from squadrons per month	approximately 1,460
Number of such requests filled from stock on board per month	approximately 1,390
Number of such requests passed to other sources of supply	approximately 20
Allowance list items	approximately 20
Non-allowance list items	approximately 50
% efficiency, over-all	approximately 95.2
% efficiency for allowance list items	approximately 98.5

General Stores and Non-Aviation Repair Parts

GSM - While in the area this vessel received General Stores Material from the USS POLLUX (AKS4), USS CASTOR (AKS1), and NSD, Yokosuka. The USS POLLUX (AKS4) gave outstanding service, completing 98% of the requisitions submitted. The USS CASTOR (AKS1) completed 66% of the requisitions submitted. NSD Yokosuka gave excellent service whenever this vessel was allowed to submit requisitions to that activity.

The current policy of COMSERVPAC in regard to requisitions for material not available in the WESTPAC area is to cancel requisitions bearing priority indicator "C" instead of holding them as an obligation or passing them to a continental source

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of supply for action. While this policy provides an opportunity for the service force to gain valuable experience in mobile supply support, it creates, at the same time, an undesirable situation for carrier type vessels currently rotating between CONUS and WESTPAC.

Experience gained by this ship in four WESTPAC deployments has proven that the scope of operating schedules and storage space limitations preclude the stowage of 180 day stock levels of all items on departure from CONUS. Therefore, it becomes necessary to replenish stock periodically on the basis of currently generated usage data or established high and low stock limits. However, this is not possible with COMSERVRON THREE's policy of cancelling priority "C" requisitions for items which are not available.

The justifications stated as acceptable by COMSERVRON THREE for allowing priority "C" requisitions to be passed to CONUS were, "Essential for operating in NAVFE", "Essential for health and comfort of crew", and "To be held for ship's return to CONUS", normally this type requisition would be assigned priority "A". The third case is of little value to vessels operating for extended periods in WESTPAC. These restrictions either require and/or invite the misuse of priority indicators.

Electronics Spare Parts (BUSHIPS)

Electronics material was obtained from the USS PROTON (AKS28) and the USS ELECTRON (AKS27) during in port periods. Both vessels provided adequate services.

Repair Spare Parts (BUORD)

Ordnance repair parts were obtained from the USS CHIMON (AKS31) and the USS LEAGUE ISLAND (AKS30) during in port periods. Both ships provided adequate services.

Ships Repair Spare Parts (BUSHIPS)

Ship's repair parts were obtained from the USS CHIMON (AKS31) and the USS LEAGUE ISLAND (AKS30) during in port periods. Both ships provided adequate services.

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Procurement of spare parts for tow tractors and fork lifts usually proved very difficult due to non-availability. Procurement was made through NSD Yokosuka. However, that activity's maintenance shop was exceedingly cooperative in making repairs to inoperative equipment.

Individual issues of General Stores per month 1,231

Monthly average of items received aboard from all sources:

General Stores	850
Ship's Repair Parts	500
Electronics Parts	240

Commissary

Provisions - while in the area provisions were supplied by the following ships: USS GRAFFIAS (AF29), USS ALSTEDE (AF48), USS ALUDRA (AF55), USS PICTOR (AF54), and USS POLARIS (AF11).

The services rendered by the USS ALSTEDE (AF48), USS POLARIS (AF11), and USS PICTOR (AF54) were considered good. The quality of provisions and small amount of breakage was considered noteworthy. The services rendered by the USS GRAFFIAS (AF29) and USS ALUDRA (AF54) were considered adequate; however, shortages and breakage were always experienced on delivery.

Receipts at Sea	864.9 tons
Receipts in Port	187.9 tons

Ration Data:

Rations Served	487,650
Value Stores Consumed	\$581,365.31
Average Cost of Ration	\$1.1967

Ship's Store Retail Facilities

The USS POLLUX (AKS4) and USS CASTOR (AKS1) gave adequate service in supplying both ship's store stock and clothing and small stores items:

Average ship's store monthly sales	35,000
Average % profit	10%
C&SS average monthly sales	9,500

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RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are contained in this report:

That 1/30,000 scale photos of the Cherokee target area be used, page 6.

That Air Group AIO be assigned as Assistant Ship's AIO for carriers deploying to the Far East, page 11.

That four enlisted personnel be the minimum assignment to the ship's Air Intelligence Office, page 11.

That an Air Intelligence Specialist Rating be originated, page 12.

That for strike photographs, an externally carried camera with a longer focal length be used, page 15.

That a three day trip to and from Yokosuka and the Task Force be authorized when conditions permit, page 11.

That in future construction, the commanding officer's sea cabin be provided with sufficient space for a comfortable chair, a bunk, and minimum head facilities, page 18.

That space be provided for the combined services in oral prophylaxis, prosthodontics, and radiodontics, page 19.

That communication personnel exercise greater care in assigning relay instructions for messages addressed to the Task Force or all ships present, page 14.

That immediate steps be taken to improve the design of arrangement of aircraft rocket pigtails on existing rockets provided existing stocks on hand warrant. Entirely too many rockets are returned aboard with cut or broken pigtails. This is particularly true of jet aircraft. The percentage of rockets returned due to above cause was 4% for 1,616 rockets loaded.

MISCELLANEOUS

The following quoted dispatch is the departure message from Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN:

"YOU LEAVE OUR TASK FORCE WITH THE DESERVED WELL WISHES OF EVERYONE AND OUR GREAT ADMIRATION FOR THE MAGNIFICENT ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE VALLEY FORGE AND HER EMBARKED AIR GROUP X WELL DONE TO ALL CONCERNED."

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R. E. Dixon
R. E. DIXON