

U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
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CV45/Al6-3/aej
Serial: 023

DECLASSIFIED

1 February 1951

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NAVHISTDIVINST 5500.1
By: OP-09B92C

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 19 December 1950 through
19 January 1951

Ref: (a) CNO restricted ltr Op-345/aa ser 1197P34 dtd 3 Aug 1950

1. In accordance with reference (a) the Action Report for the period 19 December 1950 through 19 January 1951 is hereby submitted:

PART I: Composition of Own Forces and Mission

Complying with ComNavFE secret despatch 180326Z of December 1950, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) with Carrier Air Group TWO embarked departed independently from Yokosuka, Japan on 19 December 1950 joining CTF 77 (ComCarDiv ONE) embarked in the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) and other units of TF 77 on 22 December 1950.

Carrier Air Group TWO commenced operations under the command of Commander D. M. WHITE, USN and eleven staff officers with the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft:

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>No. of Pilots</u>	<u>No. of Aircraft</u>
VF-24	29	17 F4U-4
VF-63	27	17 F4U-4
VF-64	26	17 F4U-4
VA-65	28	20 AD-2 - 2 AD4Q
VC-35	6	3 AD4N
VC-3	4	2 F4U-5N
VC-11	5	3 AD4W
VC-61	5	3 F4U-4P
<u>HU-1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1 HO3S</u>
Total	130	85

On 7 January 1951 Commander R. W. RYND, USN assumed command of Air Group TWO.

The mission of Task Force 77 was to provide close air support, air cover and air interdiction to enemy forces in support of UN Troops in Korea in accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet Operation Order 12-50 of 12 December 1950.

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CV45/A16-3/Aej
Serial: 023

PART II: Chronological Order of Events

(A) 19 December 1950: Departed independently from Yokosuka, Japan at 0824 to proceed to Task Force 77 in Korean Waters. Launched HU-2 detachment of 8 helicopters for First Marine Air Wing at Itami, Japan for further transfer to VMO-6.

20 December 1950: Conducted refresher landings, day and night. The USS HOLLISTER (DD-788) and USS OZBOURN (DD-846) joined the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) to act as escort.

21 December 1950: Conducted day refresher landings before passing through Van Diemen Straits.

22 December 1950: Launched tow target planes for AA firing practice conducted by 5 inch, 40 mm and 20 mm weapons. Rendezvoused with Task Force 77 at 1605.

23 December 1950: Conducted close air support operations on roads and villages containing troops in the vicinity of Hanhung. Planes were vectored to targets by Army and Air Force controllers. Ensign J. R. BRINKLEY, 506737/1310, USN, in F4U-4 Bu. No. 96899 crashed from enemy AA fire north of Hungnam. Pilot and plane were lost in flames. Attacks for the day were made on Kolori, Tongdong, Chosin Reservoir, Wanpung-ni, Songburi, Changhungni, Toejo, and Oro-ri in 56 sorties.

24 December 1950: Air Operations consisted of ASP and CAP over formation. Ten sorties were flown.

25 December 1950: Launched tow target planes for AA firing practice by USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) and destroyer screen. Replenished 525,168 gallons of fuel oil, 63,800 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 74.3 tons of ammunition.

26 December 1950: Remained with replenishment Task Group 79.1 and received 128,014 gallons of fuel oil and 6,135 gallons of aviation gasoline.

27 December 1950: Remained with replenishment Task Group 79.1 and received 81,113 pounds of provisions.

28 December 1950: With the evacuation at Hungnam completed, close air support involved reconnaissance attacks on road routes in Eastern Korea north of the bombline. Air Force controllers also pointed out specific targets for attacks. Attacks were also made on Kalchon, Paporri, Kuun-ni, Chigyong-dong, Hwachon, and Songdongni in 32 sorties for the day.

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29 December 1950: Close air support continued in Eastern Korea with attacks made on twelve small villages, troops, and vehicles along the road routes. 76 sorties were flown.

30 December 1950: Attacks were made on seven villages, troops, and a bridge inflicting considerable damage and troop casualties. 12 sorties were flown. Operations were delayed due to bad weather.

31 December 1950. Rendezvoused with replenishment Task Group 79.1 and received 227,220 gallons of fuel oil, 43,500 gallons of aviation gasoline and 11.8 tons of ammunition.

1 January 1951: Early morning combat air patrol started flight operations and was followed by close air support and photo reconnaissance flights over Northeast Korea. Attacks were made on Wontong-ni, Whachon, Pia-ri, Kisan-ni, Kumhwa, Hyon-ni, and Sindal-ri. Damage was rendered to warehouses, buildings, trucks, and bridges. Troop casualties were estimated low. Photographers recorded conditions of many highway bridges, RR tunnels and bridges and road routes. 51 sorties were flown.

2 January 1951: The close air support operations this date included attacks on Kumhwa, Ponge-ri, Changjon, Sangtan-ni, Kojin-ni, Songbyon-ni, Naesokyo, Chorwon, Yanggu, Kumsong, Tongduch-ri, and many small villages where troops were concentrated. Five mobile guns and an artillery piece were destroyed in addition to damage to targets similar to 1 January 1951. Photo reconnaissance recorded enemy activity in villages and troop movements along main routes. 91 sorties were flown.

3 January 1951: Continued close air support operations with attacks on Uijongbu, Kogo, Yonggin-ni, Oenyan-ni, Wonson, Tokahotan, Songbyon-ri, Pyongni, Hwachon, Chipo-ri, Yanggu and smaller villages as directed by controllers. 90 sorties were flown.

4 January 1951: Rendezvoused with Task Group 79.1 and replenished with 156,702 gallons of fuel oil, 98,530 gallons of aviation gasoline and 144.7 tons of ammunition.

5 January 1951: Close air support operations included attacks on Kosong and many small villages where troops had concentrated. A large number of enemy troop casualties were estimated for the strikes this date. 91 sorties were flown.

6 January 1951: Flight operations were cancelled because of low ceiling and poor visibility. ComCarDiv FIVE broke his flag aboard the UCS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45).

CV45/A16-3/aej.
Serial: 023

DECLASSIFIED

7 January 1951: Rendezvoused with replenishment Task Group 79.1 and received 114,912 gallons of fuel oil, 36,600 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 82.2 tons of ammunition.

8 January 1951: Flight operations were cancelled due to low ceiling and poor visibility. ComCardiv FIVE hauled down his flag in USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) and departed for USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47).

9 January 1951: Low ceiling and poor visibility continued to prevent flight operations. USS GURKE (DD-783) came alongside and received 61,530 gallons of fuel oil.

10 January 1951: Poor weather prevented flight operations. Task Force moved to position off southern end of the Korean Peninsula.

11 January 1951: Flight operations were delayed until noon, for better visibility. Close air support attacks were made on Kangnong, Suwon, and Pyongyang-ni. Damage included a number of buildings and RR cars, and some troop casualties were observed. 33 sorties were flown.

12 January 1951: Close air support attacks were made on Wonju, Chunchon-ni, Kangnong and some troop trenches. The operating distance from the base location hampered proper execution of missions. 60 sorties were flown.

13 January 1951: Rendezvoused with replenishment Task Group 79.1 and received 361,746 gallons of fuel oil, 41,000 gallons of aviation gasoline and 68.2 tons of ammunition.

14 January 1951: Close air support and armed reconnaissance attacks were made on Yongwal, Kosuri, Cheksong-ni, and Hangnung damaging warehouses, many large buildings, a radio antennae and accounting for some enemy troop casualties surrounding the evacuation of friendly troops by helicopter. The photo mission located a mobile gun near Majukkonni. 65 sorties were flown.

15 January 1951: Close air support and armed reconnaissance missions destroyed four villages, 220 troop casualties, and 160 buildings in many small villages including Suwon, Pyongchang, Kawachon, Anson and Hongchon. 68 sorties were flown. Ensign E. J. HOFSTRA, 0507028/1310, USN, ditched his F4U-4, Bu. No. 98865 near Wonsan and was rescued by a British Sunderland Flying Boat.

16 January 1951: Close air support and armed reconnaissance attacks were made on Hoeng-song, Ouigong-ni, Yongwal, Yongchun and other small villages and damage was rendered to a highway

17 January 1951: Rendezvoused with replenishment Task Group 79.1 and received 413,952 gallons of fuel oil, 35,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 98.6 tons of ammunition.

18 January 1951: Close air support and armed reconnaissance attacks were made on Chonchon-ni, Sangchang, Bougui, Tachwa-ri, Suwan, Sinwon-ri and smaller villages. One RR bridge was destroyed and two highway bridges were damaged. 71 sorties were flown. The photo flight verified the bridge damage.

19 January 1951: Close air support and armed reconnaissance attacks were made on many small villages including Tanyang, Wondong and Yongwal. 80 buildings and two RR bridges were damaged. Many troop casualties were reported. 98 sorties were flown. Departed operating area for Sasebo, Japan.

(B) Summary of Sorties

	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>Total</u>
Offensive	547	273	820
Defensive	78	43	121
Photo Reconnaissance	39	00	39
Weather Reconnaissance	1	9	10
Tractor	0	2	2
Courier	1	1	2

PART III: Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

(A) Ammunition Expenditure:

	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Bombs:	100# G.P.	2959
	220# Frags.	239
	250# G.P.	146
	260# Frags.	1498
	500# G.P.	190
	1000# G.P.	109
	2000# G.P.	18

	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Machine Gun		
ammo:	50 Caliber, rds.	422,325
	20MM, rds.	39,695
Rockets:	5" HVAR	462
Napalm:	F-51 and Mk. 12 Drop Tank.	712

CV45/A16-3/aej
Serial: 023

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(B) Performance of Ordnance Equipment:

See special comments, PART VI.

PART IV: Battle Damage:

(A) Damage to ship: None.

(B) Damage to aircraft:

	<u>COMBAT</u>		<u>OPERATIONAL</u>		
	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Lost	2	0	1	1	4
Damaged	2	4	2	2	8

(C) Damage inflicted on enemy:

<u>TARGETS</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>
Aircraft	0	1
Trucks	4	12
Tanks	2	0
Carts	17	4
RR Bridges	0	5
Highway Bridges	0	14
Field Pieces	8	0
Armed Cars	1	0
RR Cars	3	8
Ammo Dumps	3	0
Supply Dumps	0	3
Warehouses	29	19
Villages	17	49
Houses	400	12
Oil Storage Tanks	1	0
Observation Posts	1	0
Radio Stations	0	1
Junks	0	1

Possibly 4,000 casualties.
No means of confirming
estimate.

PART V: Personnel

(A) Performance: See Special Comments, PART VI.

(B) Casualties: Ensign J. R. BRINKLEY, 506737/1310, USN
killed in Action.

PART VI: Special Comments

(A) Airmen Training:

Large drafts of AA and AN ratings have been received during the past three (3) months. These men were all eager and willing to take their places in the ship, but were completely ignorant in the scope of airplane handling, aviation ordnance, aviation gasoline handling, and fundamental knowledge of aircraft. This imposed the problem of training and absorbing large numbers of personnel into the Air Department during rather strenuous operations.

It is recommended that a study be made of recruit training of airmen with an eye toward giving them at least a working knowledge of the subjects listed in the paragraph above. It is not difficult to visualize the type of training required to make them familiar with these subjects. Whether they go to an aircraft carrier or not it will still be sound training and well worth the effort. This is particularly true in the field of aviation safety. It would be a relatively simple problem to simulate a flight deck or parking ramp with their inherent dangers of propellers, high noise level, wing folding and taxiing.

(B) Aviation Ordnance:

During the period covered by this report the use of napalm as a primary weapon reached an all-time high. This brought to light certain deficiencies in the handling of napalm on board aircraft carriers.

Consideration should be given toward the development of a suitable napalm container. At the present time the Japanese manufactured F-51 tank and the Mark 12 external fuel tanks are used. Both are unsuitable as napalm containers although they will serve the purpose for the time being. The Mark 12 tank is too expensive to use as a napalm container. More important, however, is the difficulty encountered in hanging or dropping the Mark 12 tank when filled with napalm. During cold weather operations the tanks must be filled at a central filling station since it is mandatory to use "hot" gasoline. This, of course, necessitates transporting the full tank to the aircraft and hanging the full tank. For transporting full tanks the Mark 5 Mod 0 torpedo-bomb skid is used. This skid serves the purpose but is large and somewhat unwieldy. This limits the number that can be assembled on the flight deck which in turn limits the number of tanks that can be handled in a given time. If and when a napalm container as such is developed consideration should be given to adapting it for transportation on a Mark-1 Mod-1 bomb skid. These skids are available in large numbers and can be easily stowed in a matter of minutes thereby not interfering with flight deck operations.

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At the present time the Mark 12 tank is suspended by using a Mark 7 or 8 bomb hoist in conjunction with a "home-made" belly strap. This system is rather awkward since it requires about three men to juggle the tank the last two or three inches of the way. In the development of a napalm container a padeye between the suspension lugs should be installed to receive the swaged fitting of the bomb hoist cable. This will insure rapid loading and unloading of the full tank. It is pointed out that this proposed padeye must be small enough to allow the tank to reach the suspension hooks without interference between the padeye and bomb cable swage fitting and the bomb rack.

The deficiencies noted above also apply to the Japanese tank with the additional undesirable feature of having to bash on the tank to accomodate sway braces.

The Mark-1 Mod-0 Incendiary Mixer is used to mix napalm powder and gasoline. This mixer is unsatisfactory. All napalm must be sifted prior to using in the Mark-1 Mod-0 mixer. It is necessary for one man to continually agitate the pre-sifted napalm as it is poured in the mixer to prevent clogging. On the flight deck this is a rather messy procedure. It is strongly recommended that serious consideration be given toward the development of a larger and more adequate mixer. The proposed development should envision a large mixer capable of handling at least 1000 pounds of napalm powder. The mixer should be mechanical and have the ability to mix automatically a pre-determined napalm mixture.

At the present time the E3R5 and E4R8 igniters are used on napalm bombs. While the percentage of duds has been very low it is felt that some duds have occurred as the result of the igniters inability to arm due to the tumbling of the napalm bomb. Experiments should be conducted to ascertain the ability of the anemometer type arming device on these igniters to rotate the required 18 turns on a tumbling bomb dropped from low altitudes. The tumbling bomb is more desirable than the finned bomb since it gives a better "spread" of napalm and resultant fires.

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