From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL 29)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force 95
     (2) Commander Seventh Fleet
     (3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
     (4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report; period 12 May 1951 - 13 June 1951;
      submission of

Ref: (a) Navy Regulations, 1948
     (b) CNO ltr Op345/aa, Ser 1197P34 dtd 3 Aug. 1950,
         NDB 15 Aug. 1950

Encl: (1) Action Report period 12 May 1951 - 13 June 1951

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b), enclosure (1),
   with parts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI, is submitted herewith.

2. During the period covered by this report U.S.S. BATAAN
   operated with TG 95.1.

               W. MILLER

Copy to:
ComAirPac
ComCarDiv 15
U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL 29)

ACTION REPORT

(period 12 May 1951 - 13 June 1951)

PART I Narrative
PART II Chronology
PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment and Ammunition Expenditure
PART IV Battle Damage
PART V Personnel; Performance and Casualties
PART VI Comments and Recommendations
PART I

NARRATIVE

During the period 13-18 May BATAAN replenished at Sasebo and made ready to operate against the North Korean and Chinese Communists from 20 May to 3 June, 1951, pursuant to the orders of CTF 95.1. At 0641 19 May, Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, USN, CTF 95, together with members of his staff, embarked and broke his flag in USS BATAAN, at 0700 King, BATAAN, with CTF 95 and VMF 312 embarked, and with HNMS VAN GALEN (DD) as escort, sailed from Sasebo for the west coast of Korea. At 0945 HMAS WARRAMUNGA (DD), which had sailed earlier from Kure, joined off the northern approach to Sasebo as an additional escort. From 1035 to 1145 all three ships participated in a pre-arranged AA firing exercise. The formation arrived in operating area MIKE at 191100Z at which time USS BATAAN relieved HMS GLORY in TE 95.11, Captain W. Miller, USN in BATAAN becoming OTC and CTE 95.11.

TE 95.11 then comprised USS BATAAN, USS RUPERTUS (DD 851) with ComDesDiv 32 embarked, USS FECHTENDER (DD 870), HMAS WARRAMUNGA (DD) and HNMS VAN GALEN (DD). The U.S. destroyers joined the formation at 200230 King in the vicinity of Lat. 37-00N Long. 125-00E where the task element operated daily during daylight thereafter.

Operations during the period 20 May - 3 June were conducted in accordance with CTF 95 OpOrder 1-51, CTF 95.1 OpOrder 1-51 and 40, USS BATAAN OpOrder 3-51 (revised). Surface operations comprised those necessary to conduct air operations, replenishment, and radar surveillance of the northern part of the Yellow Sea at night. Formation 4R was used throughout, with a circular screen during daylight and an anti-submarine screen at night.

Commencing 22 May radar patrol "Bugatti", to provide early warning of any enemy surface or air movement between the Shantung peninsula and Korea, was conducted nightly in accordance with CTF 95.1 OpOrder 1-51. This patrol formerly had been accomplished by CTE 95.12. As conducted by CTE 95.11 a destroyer was detached at the end of each day's flight operations to patrol along longitude 124-00E between latitudes 37-40 and 39-00 North, search as prescribed, and rejoin the formation prior to resumption of flight operations the next morning. U.S. destroyers only were used in view of their superior radar search capabilities. On the night of 31 May USS RUPERTUS reported a radar and RADCM contact initially evaluated as "possible submarine", later reevaluated as "doubtful submarine". This contact was reported to ComNavFE who concurred in the final evaluation. Results of other "Bugatti" patrols were negative.
Air operations comprised armed-reconnaissance, close air support, airspot, and combat air patrol missions. The primary task of armed reconnaissance was the interdiction of enemy shipping on the west coast of Korea. Emphasis was placed on the destruction of junks and sampans in the Taedong Gang estuary. Land transportation routes in the Hwanghae-Do region also were interdicted when feasible, with emphasis being placed on the systematic destruction of railway bridges and the location and destruction of vehicle parks. At the request of Commander First Corps, Eighth Army in Korea, the Han river estuary was kept under close air surveillance to detect any unusual activity that would indicate an enemy attempt to cross the estuary from the vicinity of Kaesong to the Kimpo peninsula above Inchon. Results of this surveillance were negative and it was discontinued as unnecessary after 26 May due to the advance of friendly ground forces north of the Han.

Close air support missions performed were those required to cover the various Army Corps sectors as assigned by the Joint Operations Center (JOC) Korea.

Combat air patrol was maintained over TK 95.11 when weather permitted, and over United Nations forces conducting mine sweeping and diversionary amphibious operations on the Nampo coast near Cho Do Island during the period 20–22 May in accordance with CTG 95.1 OpOrder 3–51. Armed-airspot also was provided for the diversionary forces and, when feasible, was made an additional task of the combat air patrol furnished those forces.

Air operations were seriously curtailed by inclement weather, characterized by heavy rains and dense fogs, which made flights impossible on 21, 25, 26, 27, 29, and 30 May, and which curtailed operations on 3 June. Despite the bad weather 407 sorties were flown, of which 305 were offensive and 102 defensive (combat air patrol). Offensive sorties consisted of 159 armed-reconnaissance missions, 104 close air support missions, 14 combined armed-airspot and combat air patrol missions, and 28 strikes on railway and highway bridges. One pilot was lost during these operations when, on 28 May, 1st Lt. Austin "H" Brenneman was shot down one mile east of Anak, North Korea, while on an armed-reconnaissance mission. Witnesses stated that his plane was hit in the cockpit by 40 mm. flak after which it made a right gliding turn into the ground and exploded on impact. No radio contact with the pilot was established and he made no attempt to parachute after being hit. Witnesses stated that there was no possible chance of survival.

Replenishment operations consisted of refueling the various destroyers on 21, 23, 25, 28, and 31 May and refueling and rearming BATAAN on 25 May. BATAAN was refueled 31 May.
On 21 May, WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN were detached to refuel from the British siler WAVE PREMIER about 15 miles west of the Clifford Islands. HMS SIOUX, which had been escorting WAVE PREMIER, joined the screen temporarily during the absence of WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN. At 1250 King, refueling completed, WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN rejoined and SIOUX departed to resume escort of WAVE PREMIER. RUPERTUS and FECHTELER were detached at 0630, 23 May, to refuel from USS MANATEE (AO 58) in the vicinity of Lat. 36-30N, Long. 124-30E, and rejoin. On completion, about 0900, FECHTELER escorted MANATEE to Incheon prior to rejoining the formation.

On 25 May, USS DIPHDA (AKA 59), escorted by HMS SIOUX (D 225) and MANATEE rendezvoused with the task element in the vicinity of Lat. 36-30N, Long. 124-30E at 0630. BATAAN rearmed from DIPHDA and all units refueled from MANATEE. On completion of rearming about 0930, DIPHDA and escort returned to Sasebo, and at 1220 refueling was completed and VAN GALEN was detached to escort MANATEE to a rendezvous with USS TOLEDO (CA 133) in the Inchon approaches. VAN GALEN rejoined at 2225 King.

On 28 May WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN were detached to refuel from WAVE PREMIER as before. They departed at 0540 and rejoined at 0855. The final refueling of all units took place, without interruption of flight operations, on the morning of 31 May from USS MANATEE in the vicinity of Lat. 37-00N, Long. 124-45E. Refueling was completed about 0930 and MANATEE returned to Sasebo.

Changes of command and composition during the period were as follows:

Pursuant to CTF 95.1 confidential dispatch 210134Z May, CTE 95.11, Captain W. Miller in BATAAN was designated OTC West Coast effective at 212100 King May.

On 24 May two TBMs aircraft arrived from Itazuki AFB, Japan to provide airlift for RADM. Smith to Seoul for a conference with ranking Army and Navy commanders in the First Corps area. RADM. Smith departed at 1330 and returned at 1313 the following day, having remained overnight aboard USS EL Dorado (AGC 11) at Inchon.

On 28 May USS HENRY W. TUCKER (DDR 375) joined the screen at 0700. At 1308 RADM. Smith, CTF 95, hailed down his flag in BATAAN and, together with members of his staff, transferred to the USS FECHTELER. On completion of the transfer at 1320, FECHTELER was detached and proceeded to Pusan, Korea, under the operational control of CTF 95.

At 0200 King, 3 June, USS MASON (DD 852) joined the screen. At 0650, after mail had been passed between MASON, RUPERTUS, and TUCKER, RUPERTUS was detached pursuant to orders of CTF 95 to pro—

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ceed to the east coast of Korea and report to CTG 95.2 for operational control.

At 1330 King, 3 June, flight operations were cancelled due to rain and fog. In view of the prevailing bad weather and its expected continuation for the remainder of the day, TUCKER and MASON were detached to conduct radar patrol "Eugatti" and, on completion the following morning, to join HMS GLORY. USS BATAAN, escorted by WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN, proceeded to Sasebo and, at 2100 King, was relieved in TE 95.11 by HMS GLORY and escorts as previously scheduled by CTG 95.1.

Between 0800 and 0845, 4 June, BATAAN, WARRAMUNGA, and VAN GALEN conducted a pre-arranged anti-aircraft firing exercise in the gunnery area off Sasebo. At 0945 King, while operating about 60 miles west of Fukuoka, Japan, BATAAN launched all flyable aircraft of VMF-312 to proceed to Itami AFB Japan, by way of Itazaki AFB because of weather. At 1038 WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN were detached to proceed to Kure, Japan as previously scheduled. BATAAN proceeded unescorted via the northern swept channel to Sasebo for logistics, and on arrival at 1250 King reported to CTF 95 for operational control. At 0700 King, 5 June, BATAAN sailed for Kobe, Japan to complete debarkation of VMF 312 personnel and equipment. BATAAN arrived at Kobe at 1030 King, 6 June, and departed for Yokosuka, Japan at 1300 King, 7 June. On arrival at Yokosuka at 1000 King, 8 June, a conference was held with representative officers of USS SICILY (CVE 118), which was enroute to the Korean operating area as relief for BATAAN in TG 95.1. The purpose of this conference was to turn over operational information and intelligence material to SICILY, as well as to arrange for the transfer of critical material items between the two vessels. This accomplished, SICILY sailed from Yokosuka the following afternoon.

On 11 June USS BATAAN assisted ComCarDiv 15 in conducting the annual administrative inspection of USS BAIROKO (CVE 115).

Meanwhile, during the period 8-12 June, BATAAN made ready to sail for the United States, and at 0800 King 13 June departed Yokosuka, Japan for San Diego, California.
PART II

CHRONOLOGY (ALL TIMES KING)

13-18 May 1951
Sasebo, Japan for logistics.

19 May 1951
0645 Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, CTF 95, embarked and broke his flag in BATAAN.
0700 departed Sasebo, Japan in company with HMCS VAN GALEN (D803) enroute north of Quelpart Island and west of Makau for the operating area off west coast of Korea.
0945 HMAS WARRAMUNGA joined.
2100 relieved HMS GLORY and two British destroyers in TE 95.11. Captain W. Miller in USS BATAAN assumed duties as CTE 95.11.

20 May 1951
Operating as TE 95.11 off the west coast of Korea.
0630-2030 launched 12 CAP and 37 offensive sorties, including 25 Armed Recco and 12 Tar-Cap in support of TE 95.12 in the Manap-to area, near Cho Do Island.
0855 the USS FECHTELER (DD 870) and USS RUPERTUS (DD 851) joined. The Screen Commander was Captain Becher in WARRAMUNGA.

21 May 1951
Operating as before.
0730 WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN proceeded to refuel from WAVE PREMIER.
0855 HMCS SIOUX joined the screen while the WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN refueled.
1250 WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN rejoined, SIOUX departed to rejoin WAVE PREMIER. No flight operations due to dense fog in the operating area.

22 May 1951
Operating as before.
0630-2030 launched 12 CAP and 33 offensive sorties, including 25 CAS and 8 Armed Recco.
2045 RUPERTUS proceeded on radar patrol "Bugatti" between Paengnyung-Do and the Shantung promontory for the purpose of detecting any enemy surface or air movement between the Shantung peninsula and Korea during the night.

23 May 1951
Operating as before.
0550 RUPERTUS rejoined. Night radar patrol negative.
0610-0915 RUPERTUS and FECHTELER refueled from USS MANATEE (AO 56).
0630-2030 launched 12 CAP and 36 offensive sorties, including 20 CAS and 16 Armed Recco.
2042 FECHTELER departed on night radar patrol "Bugatti".

24 May 1951
Operating as before.
0645 FECHTELER rejoined. Night radar patrol negative.
0630-2030 launched 12 CAP and 32 offensive sorties including 16 CAS and 16 Armed Recco sorties.
1330 CTF 95, Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, departed via TB for a conference at Inchon. 2040 RUPERTUS departed to patrol "Bugatti".

25 May 1951
Operating as before.
0545 RUPERTUS rejoined. Night patrol negative.
0700-1220 TE 95.11 refueled from MANATEE (AO 58) and BATAAN rearmed from USS DIPHD (AKA 59).
1313 CTF 95 returned aboard. There were no air operations due to fog in the operating area.
1955 FECHTELER departed to patrol "Bugatti".

26 May 1951
Operating as before.
0725 FECHTELER rejoined. Night radar patrol negative. There were no air operations due to fog in the operating area.
2000 RUPERTUS departed on radar patrol "Bugatti".

27 May 1951
Operating as before.
0510 RUPERTUS rejoined. Night radar patrol negative. There were no air operations due to fog in the operating area.
1900 FECHTELER departed on radar patrol "Bugatti".

28 May 1951
Operating as before.
0510 FECHTELER rejoined; patrol negative.
0540 WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN proceeded to refuel from HMS WAVE PREMIER.
0630-2030 launched 10 CAP and 35 offensive sorties, including 20 CAS, 11 Armed Recco and 4 Strikes in the Yongang - Ongun area. About 0730 an F4U4 piloted by 1st Lt. Austin E. Brenneman, USMC, was hit in the cockpit by enemy AA fire while reconnoitering the Anak area. The plane crashed with no chance of pilot survival.
0800 USS TUCKER (DDR 875) joined the screen.
0855 WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN rejoined.
1308 RADM. Smith and staff transferred to FECHTELER.
1320 FECHTELER with CTF 95 embarked departed for Pusan.
2055 TUCKER departed to patrol "Bugatti".

II-2
29 May 1951
Operating as before.
0504 TUCKER rejoined; patrol negative. There
were no flight operations due to fog in the
operating area.
1900 RUPERTUS departed to patrol "Bugatti".

30 May 1951
Operating as before.
0434 RUPERTUS rejoined. Reported encountering a
possible submarine. ComNavFE informed. This
contact later reevaluated as "doubtful submarine"
on receipt of additional information. The task
element was unable to replenish from USS MANATEE
(AO 58) as scheduled due to dense fog in the
operating area. MANATEE and escort remained with-
in radar contact until the weather cleared.
1810 TUCKER departed to patrol "Bugatti".

31 May 1951
Operating as before.
0445 TUCKER rejoined; patrol negative.
0630-2030 launched 10 CAP and 28 offensive sorties,
including 24 Armed Recco and 4 Strikes in the
Yonan area.
0645 TE 95.11 refueled from MANATEE, completing at
1050.
2012 RUPERTUS departed to patrol "Bugatti".

1 June 1951
Operating as before.
0518 RUPERTUS rejoined; patrol negative.
0630-2030 launched 12 CAP and 44 offensive sorties,
including 40 Armed Recco and 4 Strikes in the
Hasju area.
0750 VAN GALEN proceeded to WAVE PREMIER for mail
and topped off with fuel while alongside.
2023 TUCKER departed to patrol "Bugatti".
1717 VAN GALEN rejoined.

2 June 1951
Operating as before.
0500 TUCKER rejoined; patrol negative.
0630-2030 launched 12 CAP and 40 offensive sorties,
including 31 Armed Recco and 9 CAS.
2045 RUPERTUS departed to patrol "Bugatti".

3 June 1951
Operating as before.
0207 the USS MASON (DD 852) joined the screen.
0530 RUPERTUS rejoined; patrol negative.
0647 RUPERTUS was detached to proceed to the east
cost of Korea and report to CTG 95.2 for opera-
tional control.

II-3
0630-1330 launched 6 CAP and 19 offensive sorties, including 15 CAS and 4 combined CAP and Airspot in support of HMS GEYLON in the vicinity of the Cho Do Island.
1410 BATAAN, escorted by WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN, proceeded toward Sasebo, and TUCKER and MASON were detached to patrol "Bugatti" with orders to join HMS GLORY and screen the following morning.
2100 GLORY and escorts relieved BATAAN, WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN in TE 95.11. CO, HMS GLORY became OTC and CTE 95.11.

4 June 1951
Enroute Sasebo, Japan.
0800-0845 conducted AA firing exercises for all ships of the formation.
0945 launched 25 aircraft for Itami AFB, Japan. All planes landed at Itazuke AFB because of weather.
1038 WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN were detached to proceed on to Kure, Japan.
1250 the BATAAN arrived Sasebo for logistics.

5 June 1951
0700 departed Sasebo, enroute Kobe, Japan to disembark VMF 312 personnel and equipment.

6 June 1951
Enroute Kobe, Japan.
1030 arrived Kobe. Personnel and equipment of VMF 312 off-loaded.

7 June 1951
0700 departed Kobe for Yokosuka, Japan.

8 June 1951
Enroute Yokosuka.
1000 arrived Yokosuka.

9 June 1951
At Yokosuka, Japan, made turnover to USS SICILY (CVE 118).

10 June 1951
At Yokosuka, Japan.

11 June 1951
At Yokosuka, Japan. The BATAAN assisted ComCarDiv-15 to conduct an administrative inspection of USS BAIROKO (CVE 115).

12 June 1951
At Yokosuka, Japan.

13 June 1951
0800 Underway for San Diego, California. U.S.A.
PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

1. Material and Equipment

During this and the preceding two weeks operating period Fuze Extension, M1, in combination with Noze Fuze AN-M103 was employed with 100, 500, and 1000 lb. GP bombs for anti-personnel purposes in lieu of the Anti-Personnel Attachment (daisy cutter) extension formerly employed. Pilots reported that the new combination was definitely superior in producing above ground bursts and that the percentage of "duds" was much lower than with the old rod type "daisy cutter". Whereas the old "daisy cutter" assembly required careful handling to avoid bending the extension rod, the new fuze extension was used by ordnance personnel as a grip to assist in manhandling bombs, with no apparent ill result. Moreover, since the fuze was attached to the forward end of the extension instead of at its base it could be set with a delay, if desired, without removing the extension. This feature permitted fuze settings to be changed expeditiously on the fuses of bombs already loaded on aircraft as required to obtain best results when last minute changes in target assignments were made.

2. Ammunition Expended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cal. 50 MG</th>
<th>216,400 rds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100# GP Bombs</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# GP Bombs</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000# GP Bombs</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0&quot; HVAR Rockets</td>
<td>1,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 MM</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 MM</td>
<td>1,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm thickener</td>
<td>5,715 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm tanks</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Own

1. No damage was suffered by surface units.

2. Damage to aircraft by enemy anti-aircraft and small arms fire is summarized below. Details of these casualties were reported separately in Aircraft Vulnerability Reports, OPNAV-55-120-(7-50) forms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>No. A/C hit</th>
<th>Times Hit</th>
<th>Type Fire</th>
<th>Damage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Light AW</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Light AW</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Recco</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Light AW</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Heavy AW</td>
<td>Major</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Notes 1: 1. Machine guns of Caliber .50 and smaller are reported as Light Automatic Weapons. Heavy Automatic Weapons comprise those firing 20 and 40 mm type ammunition.


3. No damage was incurred by aircraft assigned AIRSPOT or CAP missions.

B. Enemy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESTROYED</th>
<th>DAMAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings 297</td>
<td>Buildings 141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotives 1</td>
<td>Warehouses 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges 3</td>
<td>Bridges 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Pieces 10</td>
<td>Railcars 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pack Animals 10</td>
<td>Locomotives 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks 23</td>
<td>Boxcars 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampans 30</td>
<td>Trucks 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Casualties inflicted on enemy troops, estimated 722
PART V

PERSONNEL; PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. The performance of all personnel was excellent.

2. Personnel casualties were as follows:

   28 May 1st Lt. A.E. Brenneman, 039340, USMCR, crashed in enemy held territory when the plane of which he was pilot was hit in the vicinity of the cockpit by enemy anti-aircraft fire. The aircraft exploded on impact and there was no chance of 1st Lt. Brenneman's survival.

   31 May 1st Lt. R.D. Bianchi, 037254, USMC, received cuts on his right hand and the left side of his face from pieces of plexiglass when the canopy of the aircraft he was piloting was shattered by enemy light machine gun fire.
PART VI

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Operations:

Comment: During the period of this report and on previous occasions some replacement pilots who had never qualified aboard a carrier, and others who had qualified over five years ago were received aboard. Under normal circumstances qualification and requalification would have been conducted in accordance with USN 50 and type commanders' directives, but operational requirements and aircraft availability made this impracticable. However, it was found possible to conduct the qualification of replacement pilots in three phases without setting up special flights or interfering with combat operations.

The first phase, aircraft familiarization and field carrier landing drill, was conducted at a Japanese base by a Marine service squadron. In general the time spent by replacement pilots in this phase was less than the desirable minimum due to the urgent need for replacement throughout the Marine Air Wing and the lack of sufficient aircraft for training purposes. Except in one instance, the Landing Signal Officers assigned to the ship were unable to participate in this phase. Phase two consisted of a thorough briefing on carrier operations by cognizant ship and squadron officers, plus two days shipboard observation of actual operations. During this period replacement pilots were used only as taxi pilots to familiarize them with flight deck procedure. The third phase commenced with employing the new pilot on all combat air patrols except the dawn and dusk patrols. The landings made at the conclusion of these CAP flights were considered to be their qualification landings. Two successive satisfactory landings in connection with CAP missions were required before each new pilot was considered qualified to fly air support or armed reconnaissance missions in his regular turn. Even when flying on these missions however, each new pilot continued under critical observation and if his landing technique was below par he was again assigned CAP missions until his technique improved.

Between 15 January and 3 June 1951, sixteen replacement pilots were successfully qualified by using the method outlined. Only one pilot thus trained failed to qualify for unlimited employment. It is felt that by this method of careful briefing, deck training, preliminary flight training, and incentive to "make the team", replacement pilots can earn while they learn. It is pertinent to observe that the method would not be feasible except under conditions of no aerial opposition expected. Under other conditions, the employment of a training carrier would be most desirable, in order that fully qualified pilots could be provided when needed, since it is undesirable that operating carriers be
burdened with the details of qualifying pilots either during operations or at the expense of time normally assigned for logistic replenishment, upkeep, or recreation.

Comment: Target information received from covert sources during this and previous operating periods proved to be both accurate and useful. Enough targets were recommended and described in detail to enable almost every armed reconnaissance flight to be pre-briefed on at least one "covert" target in the area assigned to reconnoiter. This was insurance against an unproductive mission. It also provided each flight leader a worthwhile target on which to expend external stores if it became necessary to "streamline" his flight in order to attain high speed to reconnoiter with reasonable safety a heavily defended area. Covert sources often reported results of attacks on the targets they had recommended. These reports were always heartening to the pilots who so often never learned whether their efforts had been really productive. They also provided a basis for correcting mistakes in technique or arming which may have been made in executing attacks.

Comment: Aircraft sometimes returned from flights with rockets "hung" on wing racks. As a result of arrested landings these rockets frequently dropped from their suspension pylons and skidded up the flight deck. The rocket fins sometimes engaged an arresting gear wire or a partially lowered barrier and thus brought the rocket to rest. Others lost their fins or failed to engage a wire and continued up the deck, endangering parked aircraft and flight deck personnel. In order to decrease the probability of wild rockets in the forward flight deck area, the forward elevator was lowered about eight inches during the recovery of aircraft with "hung" rockets. It was found that rockets which came adrift and were not otherwise stopped were almost invariably caught in the shallow pit thus imposed in their line of travel. The elevator structure suffered no significant damage due to this practice.

Comment: Comments on the inadequacy of the aviator's immersion suit Mark II, Mod 1, and recommendations for its improvement have been submitted in previous reports. During this period of operations a further difficulty associated with the immersion suit became evident as set forth below.

Water temperature in the operating area during the period averaged 53°F, for which temperature most survival manuals and instructions recommend immersion suits be worn. However, air temperatures at low altitudes over the target area averaged 65°F and, together with the bright sunshine which frequently prevailed over the land, caused relatively high cockpit temperatures in aircraft engaged in close air support and armed reconnaissance missions. Since performance of these missions required unusual phy-
trol the exercise as much as possible in order to train the maximum number of personnel in the fundamentals of AA coordination.

Recommendation: This type of training exercise is recommended for small formations. It is considered that the short period a star shell remains visible in daylight furnishes an excellent criterion of the alertness and effectiveness of condition watch gun crews in taking a target under fire. Successive exercises showed marked improvement in the performance of all ships.

Aerology:

Comment: Haze aloft was prevalent in the Korean theater two or three days after dust storms, associated with the eastward movement of a high pressure air mass, had been reported in the Gobi Desert and Lake Baikal regions. This condition was experienced twice during the period covered by this report and its occurrence was forecast one of those times. At one time the dust blanket, apparently extending from about 200 feet to 10,000 feet above the surface, was clearly visible from the ship for several hours.

The principal characteristic of this weather phenomenon is the high surface visibility which prevails (average 8-10 miles) while at the same time air-to-air and air-to-surface visibility is only 1-3 miles. When the haze prevailed, surface contacts were obtained with the SPS-6B air search radar at ranges up to 200 miles, the maximum scope range. These contacts included both ships and terrain features. In one instance USS Tucker (DD 875) was tracked continuously while she proceeded on patrol to a distance of 103 miles from the formation and rejoined. The performance of the SQ-6 and SP radar in detecting surface contacts was also improved, but only to the extent of about 150% of normal range. No unusual ranges were obtained on air contacts with any of the three radars named.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the weather phenomenon described be brought to the attention of fleet aerological personnel and that forecasters in the Korean theater indicate the probability of exceptional radar coverage in their forecasts when the conditions outlined above pertain.

Comment: During this and earlier operating periods the absence of weather reporting stations to the westward of the carrier operating area in the Yellow Sea made it difficult to forecast with accuracy the time, extent, and duration of impending non-flyable weather. Detailed information was lacking concerning orientation of fronts, their direction and rate of movement, and the nature and extent of frontal activity. The latter was very difficult to prognosticate due to the Yellow Sea being a veritable "mixing pot" for weather, particularly at this season of the year. The characteristics of fronts changed during their passage over the area and complicated
forecasting. Consequently, on several occasions when the weather deteriorated earlier and to a greater extent than forecast, some difficulty was experienced in recovering flights which had been launched in anticipation of the weather remaining flyable for their scheduled duration. Most of these occurrences could have been avoided had it been possible to obtain reports of the weather 80 to 100 miles north and west of the carrier operating area as of 0600 and 1300 LST daily. The aerial weather reconnaissance made daily at 1130 by the Fifth Air Force covered the area satisfactorily, but the information obtained, although complete, was not timely from the carrier's viewpoint. Commander Fifth Air Force was requested to modify his weather flight schedule to provide coverage at the times mentioned above, but as of the end of this reporting period the action requested had not yet been taken.

Recommendation: It is recommended that weather flights be conducted along the China coast, as far north as the Shantung Promontory in the early morning and late afternoon, in order to provide data for forecasting the flying weather for the Yellow Sea. In event restrictions on aerial penetration of Chinese territory are lifted it is suggested that this area be used as a proving ground for the automatic weather transmitting station recently developed by Navy Electronics Laboratory. (See Naval Aviation Confidential Bulletin, April 1951).

Communications:

Comment: While Commander, United Nations Blockade and Escort Force (CTF 95) was embarked in BATAAN communications operated at peak load. Considerable difficulty was experienced in keeping up with traffic due to the overcrowded communication spaces, and overloaded equipment. The largest single deficiency was the lack of sufficient transmitters to handle the additional flag traffic. The six (6) high frequency transmitters available were already committed to circuits required by the task element communication plan. Despite special transmitter guard arrangements made with screening ships, adequate communications could not be maintained. Outgoing CTF 95 traffic was of such volume that delays in delivery resulted even though CTF 95 controlled his own (Task Force Commander's) net.

Inadequacy of working space in Radio Central, the Main Communication Station, and the Crypto Room has been apparent since BATAAN was recommissioned. Enlargement of these spaces has been recommended by the Board of Inspection and Survey and approved by the Bureau of Ships for accomplishment during the next major overhaul of this vessel. Until modernization and expansion of present communication equipment and spaces is accomplished, it is considered that the communication facilities of the CVL 22 class carriers are woefully inadequate to accommodate a flag officer's requirements.

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Comment: Previous reports have commented on misuse of the tactical primary voice net (TBS) for passing administrative traffic. As a result of local representations to responsible commanders a great improvement in the use of this net was apparent during the period of this report. No administrative traffic was heard on the tactical net. In addition, tactical communications were much improved. It was evident that other commands present in the operating area had given this matter serious attention with the result that at all times the tactical net was clear for tactical use.