From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
(2) Commander Task Force 95
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 23 June through 4 July 1952

Ref: (a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.1
(c) CINC PACIFIC INSTRUCTION 3480.1
(d) OTC 95.1 OpOrder 2-52
(e) OTC 95.11 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule

1. In accordance with reference (a), (b), (c) and (d), the Action Report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 23 June through 4 July 1952 is submitted herewith.

PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. During the period 23 June through 4 July 1952, the USS BATAAN (CVL 29), under the command of Captain H. R. HORSEY, 61175/1310, USN, with the Marine Aircraft Squadron VMM-312 embarked, operated as a part of the U. S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of the Commander Task Group 95.1.

2. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL 29), was OTC West Coast of Korea and Commander Task Element 95.11 throughout the period 2100X 23 June to 2100X 3 July 1952. At 2100X 3 July Commander Task Element 95.12 assumed OTC West Coast of Korea and Command of Task Element 95.11 shifted to the Commanding Officer, HCS OCEAN. During the reporting period, TE 95.11 consisted of the USS BATAAN and a maximum of four screening vessels. At varying times HMCs TROQUIS (DE-217), HMCs CHUGSHER (DE-228), USS BRAFORD (DD-545), USS HARSH (DE-699) and USS JOHN R. CRAIG (DD-885) acted as screening ships. The screen was reduced to less than four ships when required by operational demands. For Worthington Patrol one destroyer daily was ordered to OTC 95.12 to patrol the islands south of Haeju. Ships were detached late in the afternoon to proceed on this patrol, returning the following morning after refueling from a tanker located near Taechong Do.
SECURITY INFORMATION

a. The mission of the Task Element is as follows:

(1) Assist in enforcing the United Nations blockades and in the defense of friendly islands of the West Coast of Korea.

(2) Assist in protecting sea communication in the Yellow Sea.

(3) Provide air spotting services for control of naval gunfire in order to support the United Nations effort in Korea.

(4) Conduct air strikes against selected targets.

(5) Conduct air reconnaissance.

(6) Render close air support services to ground forces.

(7) Act in accordance with current directives of CTG 95.1.

b. The mission of the Carrier Unit is as follows:

(1) Conduct armed air reconnaissance of the West Coast of Korea from the United Nations front lines northward to Lat. 39°15'N.

(2) Attack enemy shipping and destroy mines.


(4) Provide airdrop services to naval units on request.

(5) Provide close air support and armed air reconnaissance services as requested by Joint Operations Center, Korea (JOOC KOREA).

(6) Conduct air strikes against coastal and inland targets of opportunity at discretion.

(7) Be prepared to provide Combat Air Patrol to friendly naval forces operating off the West Coast of Korea.

(8) Render SAR assistance.

3. No enemy surface or air forces were encountered by this Task Element and therefore, no surface or air action is related. However, enemy small craft operating in the rivers, estuaries, and along the West Coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this element when directed or as targets of opportunity. Action of TE 95.11 on Patrol Worthington is reported by CTG 95.12.
4. During this operating period, VMA-312 aircraft flew Armed Reconnaissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol and Close Air Support, in proportions indicated in schedule, (envelope 1). Flight operations were carried out eight of the nine days scheduled, but were sharply curtailed by weather. 100 sorties were scheduled. 162 (10.5%) were cancelled due to weather. During these nine days VMA-312 flew 236 combat sorties. Four (4) flights were aborted. There was a total of 513.6 combat hours flown for an overall average of 57.1 hours and 26.2 sorties per day. The squadron allowance was 24, average on board was 24 and the average aircraft availability 20.

5. During the operating period, ships of Task Element 95.11 operated in the Korean Coastal Area NAM in the vicinity of Latitude 37° 30' N. and 124° 30' E.

PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

23 June 1952 -

Left Sasebo, Japan, in company with HMCS IROQUOIS (DDE-217) with intentions of conducting carrier qualifications. However, the effects of Typhoon ENMU were felt before leaving the Sasebo swept channel. Heavy seas and high winds were encountered and aircraft were ordered to remain at Sasebo, Japan. Typhoon Condition 1 was set and in accordance with dispatch of CGO 95.1 the formation steamed to and remained along the 100 western side of Tsushima in the Korea Strait. 1740Z set Typhoon Condition III and at 2300Z commenced steaming southward toward carrier qualification area near Eo Shima.

24 June 1952 -

0755Z secured from Typhoon Condition III. During the day fourteen VMA-312 aircraft were brought aboard, bringing onboard total of VMA-312 aircraft to twenty-four (24). Carrier qualifications for eleven (11) reporting pilots were partially completed. Damage to aircraft: one broken tailhook. Qualifications were discontinued when the second aircraft went down, leaving a full hangar deck with one non-flyable aircraft on the flight deck. This eliminated the clear deck necessary for further qualification. 0945Z formation set course for operating area NAM. At 1515Z the BATAN held an abandon ship drill. 1650Z HMCS CRUSADER (DDE-228) joined the formation. 2100Z Commanding Officer, USS BATAN assumed command of Task Element 95.11 and CTC West Coast Korea.

25 June 1952 -

0621Z USS BRADFORD (DD-545) joined the formation. 0530Z launched aircraft as scheduled. 0948Z the Operations Office of USS OCEAN came aboard by helicopter for the purpose of observing operations aboard USS BATAN. 1541Z USS MARSH (DE-699) joined the formation. 1555Z HMCS IROQUOIS was detached on Worthington Patrol.
SECURITY INFORMATION

Forty-four (44) combat sorties were launched this date. Damage inflicted included the destruction of 103 buildings and three (3) gun positions. Seven (7) rail cars were made.

26 June 1952 -

First flight was launched before sunrise to provide TADCAP for CTE 95,12,4. Forty-five (45) sorties were launched during the day with 107 buildings destroyed as principal targets.

At 0520I a surprise gunnery firing exercise was held. During the morning HMCS IROQUOIS returned from Worthington Patrol and in the afternoon HMCS CRUSADER was detached for similar patrol.

27 June 1952 -

Forty-four (44) aircraft of VM-312 were launched against the enemy with good results. One flight of four discovered 1000 enemy troops, killing and wounding over 300.

At 0830I HMCS CRUSADER returned from the daily patrol and at 1012I the USS BRADFORD was detached for patrol service.

28 June 1952 -

Flew four (4) Close Air Support missions this date. Sorties were limited to twenty (20) for the day due to inclement weather in the afternoon. The morning flights accounted for twenty-four (24) troops killed in action. Another principal target was the closing of a rail tunnel.

0730I one VM-312 aircraft floated into a barrier and flipped over on its back. Strike damage to aircraft; no injury to personnel.

At 1051I the USS BRADFORD rejoined the formation, having been on Worthington Patrol. At 1733I the USS MASH departed for the daily Worthington Patrol.

29 June 1952 -

Poor flying weather continued throughout the day forcing the cancellation of all flights.

At 1051I the MASH returned from patrol. At 1136 the USS BRADFORD was detached from TE 95,11 to join its squadron organization. Her position in the screen was taken by the USS JOHN R. CRAIG who joined the Task Element at 1142I. At 1730I HMCS IROQUOIS departed on patrol.

30 June 1952 -

Poor flying conditions continued to exist until late afternoon with the result that only 12 sorties were launched this date. Principal targets included three (3) railroad bridges and one (1) transformer station damaged.
SECURITY INFORMATION

At 0828I HMCS INQUOIS returned from patrol and at 1755I
the USS JOHN R. CRAIG departed for the daily Worthington Patrol.

1 July 1952 -

Flying weather in the Yellow Sea and over the target areas
continued poor, causing the cancellation of one half of the forty-four (44)
scheduled sorties. During the short periods when the target areas were open
the TARCAP and REDCO flights inflicted damage on the enemy, including the
destruction of eight (8) railroad cars and the damaging of nine (9) boats.

At 0541I held surprise gunnery firing exercise. 0632I the
USS JOHN R. CRAIG returned from patrol and at 1758I HMCS CRUSADER departed
on Worthington Patrol.

2 July 1952 -

Poor flight conditions persisted throughout the day with
only four (4) sorties being launched.

At 1340I HMCS CRUSADER returned from patrol. 1646I HMCS
INQUOIS departed for a similar mission.

3 July 1952 -

Full flight operations were resumed on the final day of
the operating period. VM-312 pilots flew forty-six (46) combat sorties
which resulted in considerable damage to the enemy. A principal damage
included eight (8) rail cars.

At 0651I CTE 95.11 held General Quarters Drill and gunnery
firing exercises. Between scheduled launches in the afternoon the prospective
commanding officer VM-312 in an FJU, and one TBH from K-6 made carrier
qualification landings.

At 1257I HMCS INQUOIS returned from patrol. At 1755I the
USS JOHN R. CRAIG was detached on Worthington Patrol and further duty with
CTE 95.11 with HMCS OCEAN.

At 2100I Command of Task Element 95.11 shifted to HJS OCEAN
and CTE 95.12 became TTO West Coast of Korea. 2332I the USS NARWHAL was detached
for duty with Task Element 95.11.

4 July 1952 -

Steaming enroute Sasebo, Japan from operating Area WNB.

At 1352I one aircraft of VM-312 was launched for Itami,
Japan. 1700I moored buoy #18 Sasebo, Japan.
# SECURITY INFORMATION

## STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TOTAL SORTIES</th>
<th>CAS</th>
<th>ARMED RECCO</th>
<th>TARGCAP</th>
<th>CAP</th>
<th>ABORTS</th>
<th>ENGINE RUN-IN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/25</td>
<td>h4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/26</td>
<td>h4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/27</td>
<td>h4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>6/29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/3</td>
<td>h6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average sorties per day **26.2**

Total combat hours **513.6**

Daily average **57.1 hrs.**

Average hours per sortie **21.8**

* Does not include engine run-in
PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

A. Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

(1) No undue difficulties were experienced in the handling of ordnance.

(2) Sixteen (16) white phosphorous rockets failed to fire. There were four (4) cut pigtails, one pigtail disengaged from the ignitor and eleven (11) dud rockets.

(3) A 500 lb bomb was dropped from the aircraft port pylon bombrack during catapult shot on two different occasions. The catapult bridle striking the manual release mechanism on the rack is believed to be the cause. Corrective action was taken by placing a fairing on the inboard side of the port pylon and no further incidents have been experienced.

(4) One (1) 500 lb GP, one (1) 1000 lb GP and one (1) 1000 lb bomb failed to explode. All aircraft returned with one or both armament wires. It is possible that these bombs had insufficient arm travel to arm.

(5) Two (2) napalm duds were reported. The reason for their failure to explode is unknown, both aircraft returned with one or both armament wires.

(6) On two occasions a total of five (5) bombs (100 lb GP) were returned to the ship. Since the racks checked out on the dock, cause was evaluated as pilot error.

(7) Fusing on bombs listed in paragraph 4 and 5 above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOMB</th>
<th>NOSE FUSE</th>
<th>TAIL FUSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-500 lb GP</td>
<td>AN-M39A1 .01</td>
<td>AN-M1001A2 .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1000 lb GP</td>
<td>AN-M39A1 .01</td>
<td>AN-M1001A2 .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-100 lb GP</td>
<td>AN-M103A1 Inst.</td>
<td>AN-M1001A2 .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Napalm</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-M2.5 Igniter, WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-M2.6 Igniter, WP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. Ordnance Expenditures

(1) During the operating period covered by this report, the following ordnance was expended by VM-312 aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>1000#/ GP</th>
<th>500#/ GP</th>
<th>260#/ Frag.</th>
<th>100#/ GP</th>
<th>WP Rocket</th>
<th>Napalm</th>
<th>20MM</th>
<th>50 Cal.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>14,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>6/26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>8,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>6/27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6,650</td>
<td>14,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/28</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>14,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/29</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>8,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20,150</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bomb total lbs. 150,500

Bomb total tons 22.5 17.25 1.5 30.7

Operating period, total tons 75.25

PART IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Own Battle Damage:

(1) None of the ships of the Task Element sustained battle damage.
(2) For damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare Aircraft Vulnerability Report.

B. Battle Damage Inflicted on the Enemy:

(1) Ships of this Task Element inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of this Task Element during the period covered by this report.

(2) For detailed battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of the Task Element, see Naval Air Warfare Attack Report. A summary of damage follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Tunnel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Bridges</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Bridges</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformer Station</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Cars</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pack Animal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxen</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Stacks</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>1406</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Dumps</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops KIA</td>
<td>338</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouses</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Cuts</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Cuts</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelters</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnel</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Positions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Personnel Performance:

(1) Personnel performance was considered excellent. During this period the average on board count of personnel was 1017 (exclusive of squadron) which was adequate.

B. Casualties:

(1) No casualties.
PART VI - SPECIAL COMMENTS

A. Air Intelligence:

Comment: Air Intelligence functions were hampered during the
      --------------------
BARTI's earlier cruises in the Yellow Sea due to inexperience of the Air Intelligence Officers. A period of T.D. at JOG, Korea was considered helpful in this respect.

Recommendation: That carriers being ordered to duty in the
      --------------------
Yellow Sea area arrange for their Air Intelligence Officers to make one of the last cruises of the carrier being relieved before a period of T.D. at
      --------------------
JOG, Korea.

B. Aerology:

Comment: During the first three days of the operation the area
      --------------------
was under the influence of a weak high pressure cell centered in the Sea of
      --------------------
Japan. Early morning hours were marked by coastal fog and stratus over the
      --------------------
bay areas which dissipated during early afternoon, leaving high broken
      --------------------
clouds and good visibility over the target areas.

On the morning of 28 June a stratus overcast from the west, an
      --------------------
increasing southeasterly wind and a rapidly falling barometer were all
      --------------------
indicators of a deep low approaching the area from interior China, so flight
      --------------------
operations were suspended near midday. Ceilings lowered rapidly to 300 feet
      --------------------
and visibility decreased to near one-quarter mile in fog and rain. Surface
      --------------------
winds increased to 35 knots from the southeast and south. As the ship
      --------------------
moved southward to escape the center of this intense storm, the winds
      --------------------
veered to westerly and maintained a velocity of 30 to 35 knots. The
      --------------------
weather improved only slightly in the wake sector of the storm and these
      --------------------
weather conditions, low ceilings and poor visibility, continued until the
      --------------------
passage of the cold frontal system accompanying the storm early on the
      --------------------
morning of 30 June. A subsequent deterioration of ceiling and visibility
      --------------------
accompanied by rain and fog and a wind veering from northwest to east
      --------------------
indicated a formation of a secondary wave on the cold front. The weather
      --------------------
cleared over the operating area very late on 30 June, but the target areas
      --------------------
were marked by low stratus and fog thru the second of July.

On 3 July a cool high pressure area pushed east over the Korean
      --------------------
peninsula following the low pressure area into the Sea of Japan and caused
      --------------------
excellent flying conditions over both the operating and target areas.