CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL-29)
To: Chief of Naval Operations

Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
(2) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(3) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report; period 15 January 1951 - 7 April 1951; submission of

Ref: (a) Navy Regulations, 1948
     (b) CNO ltr Op345/aa, Ser 1197P34 dtd 3 Aug. 1950,
         NDB 15 Aug. 1950

Encl: (1) Action Report period 15 January 1951 -
      7 April 1951

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b), enclosure (1), with Parts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI, is submitted herewith.

2. During the period covered by this report U.S.S. BATAAN operated with TG 95.1.

Copy to:
ComAirPac
ComCarDiv 15

CONFIDENTIAL
GENERAL NARRATIVE

On 15 January 1951 USS BATAAN with VMF 212 embarked reported to CTF 95.1 for operational control in accordance with COMTHFLT Secret dispatch 110212Z. CO USS BATAAN further reported to CTG 95.1, then Vice Admiral Andrews, RN, for duty and was directed to take BATAAN with VMF 212 embarked and DesDiv 72 under orders and sail from Sasebo on 16 January for the west coast of Korea operating area and on arrival relieve HMS THESEUS (CVL) and screen as TG 95.11. BATAAN and escorts departed Sasebo at 0735 on 16 January and relieved the THESEUS group at 1930 I in the vicinity of Lat 36-30 N, Long. 124-54 E, 0TC and CTE 95.11. Captain E.T. Nesle, USN, in USS BATAAN (CVL).

From 17 to 26 January, with the exception of 21 January operations in support of the United Nations troops in Korea were conducted from sunrise to sunset. The Task Element Refueled and rearmed at sea 21 January. Operations were in accordance with CTG 95.1 Operation Order 11-50 and CO USS BATAAN OpOrder 1-51.

The daily air plan called for forty sorties of which eight were defensive CAP missions, and the remainder Close Air Support (CAS), Armed Recco (A/R), and Target CAP (TCAP) missions. The CAS missions covered Tactical Air Coordinators of the various Army Corps as assigned by the Joint Operations Center (JOC), Korea. Armed Recco missions had as their primary task reconnaissance of the coast and off-lying waters from the bombline north to the 39th parallel in implementation of the UN blockade of Korea. These missions also reconnoitered airfields at HAEJU, ONJIN, ONJONG-NI, and SEOUL, all of which are adjacent to the coast. Secondly, armed recco flights reconnoitered enemy land communication routes as assigned by JOC Korea. Generally these were routes between HAEJU, CHINAMPO, SARIWON, and SEOUL, which were covered by returning coastal recco flights. In view of the danger of encountering enemy jet type aircraft and in accordance with CTG 95.1 Operation Order 11-50 missions were restricted to the area south of Lat. 39-00N.

Surface operations comprised those necessary to conduct air operations, replenishment, and night steaming. The group maintained formation 4A except during replenishment and enroute to and from the operating area. On 21 January the group replenished from USS PARACUTIN (AE18) and USS MISPELLION (A0105) in the vicinity of Lat. 36-15N, Long. 124-16E. High winds, heavy seas, and generally bad weather prevailed and delayed the replenishment 6 hours.
During this operating period the following noteworthy events occurred: On 18 January an F4U4 aircraft piloted by Captain R. G. Patterson, Jr., USMC, was hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire during a Close Air Support mission. Capt. Patterson proceeded toward friendly territory but was forced to make a crash landing behind enemy lines near Suwon. He was uninjured and on clearing the aircraft took cover while other members of his flight formed a RESCAP (rescue combat air patrol) to prevent enemy troops from effecting his capture. An Air Force helicopter was called to the rescue from Pyongtaek and effected Capt. Patterson's rescue within 29 minutes after his landing. No difficulty was experienced in making the rescue.

On 19 January an F4U4 piloted by 1st Lt. Alfred Joseph Ward, USMC, was hit by enemy machine gun or rifle fire while making a strafing run on exposed enemy troops near Kumchon and crashed among the target troops. The aircraft exploded on impact. There was no chance that the pilot survived.

On 20 January an F4U4 piloted by Captain Alfred Hiram Agan, USMCR, was hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire or by own bomb blast during recovery from a glide bombing attack on a target in Inchon. The pilot elected to head for a nearby island believed to be friendly to effect a forced landing necessitated by damage sustained from the hit. His alternate choice was to effect a landing on the beach south of Inchon in enemy held territory. He was forced to land in the water before reaching the island and was seen to leave the aircraft alive. However, the scene of the crash was about sixty miles from BATAAN and forty miles from the nearest land based rescue aircraft and although aid was dispatched from both, the pilot died from exposure in the cold water (water temperature about 40 degrees) before rescue could be effected. Initial attempt at rescue by helicopter dispatched from the USS BATAAN was made at 1320 but was unsuccessful due to the cold water. A second attempt was made at 1500 under adverse sea conditions and after considerable difficulty was experienced by the helicopter crew, the body was recovered and returned to the USS BATAAN. Full details of this incident were reported by the USS BATAAN on Medical Officers Report of Aircraft Accident OPNAV-53-339B Rev. 3-50 dated 2-51 and addenda thereto, pertinent parts of which are appended to this report.

When the loss of Capt. Agan is compared with the rescue of Capt. Patterson two days earlier, subsequent rescues effected during the period covered by this report, and others known to this command it is clear that it is better to risk a landing in enemy held territory than in cold water when it is in any way probable that rescue cannot be effected almost immediately.
In all incidents but one with which this command has been connected a RESCAP was formed and was able to keep the downed pilots safe from enemy action until helicopter rescue could be effected. In the excepted instance an Australian pilot landed in an area surrounded by enemy anti-aircraft batteries and at extreme helicopter range. His rescue was not possible before nightfall and AA fired forced the RESCAP to leave the scene, and he was presumably captured.

At 1900I, 25 January, 1951 BATAAN and escorts were relieved as TE 95.11 by THESEUS and escorts, and proceeded to Sasebo for replenishment and upkeep. The group arrived at Sasebo at 1450 26 January and the escorts reported to COM7THFLT for operational control. BATAAN engaged in upkeep and replenishment.

On 1 February ComDesDiv 162 with USS ZELLARS (DD777), USS MASSEY (DD778), and USS FORREST ROYAL (DD872) reported for duty as screen. At 0730 3 February BATAAN and screen departed Sasebo and proceeded to the operating area off the west coast of Korea to again relieve H.M.S. THESEUS and escorts as TE 95.11 in accordance with CTG 95.1 Confidential dispatch 311021Z Jan. Relief was effected at 1900I, 3 February. Air operations commenced at sunrise the following morning. The same general plan as for the previous operating period followed. The group replenished at sea from USS CIMARRON (AO22) on 9 February in the vicinity of Lat. 36-00, Long. 124-30. without incident. The more northerly position selected for this replenishment permitted air operations against the enemy to be conducted during the replenishment period. Operations throughout were in accordance with CTG 95.1 OpOrder 11-50 and CTF 95 OpOrder 1-51 which was effective.

During this period the following noteworthy events occurred:

Airport and CAP were provided daily for USS ST PAUL, USS HANK, and HMS BELFAST at Inchon during the period these ships were providing Naval Gunfire Support for the advance of the FIRST CORPS in that area. Both CAP and Airspot aircraft were provided with ordnance load as for close air support missions. It was found practicable to divert these planes from their primary missions long enough during their period on station to employ them with profit against enemy positions in the bombardment area. In many instances these aircraft were able to coordinate attacks on reverse slopes, inaccessible to naval gunfire, with the general fire support plan.

On 11 February Rear Admiral E. A. CRUISE, ComCarDiv 15 was flown to the ship from Itazuke Air Force Base, Japan, for a two day informal inspection and visit. RADM CRUISE departed 12 February and returned to USS BAIROKO, his flagship at
Yokosuka, Japan. Air transportation in TBM type aircraft between BATAAN and Itazuke AFE was provided by COMFAIRJAP.

At 1900I, 13 February BATAAN and escorts were relieved as TE 95.11 by THESEUS and escorts and proceeded to Sasebo for replenishment and upkeep in accordance with CTG 95.1 Confidential dispatch 110300Z. The group arrived at Sasebo at 1440I, 14 February, having conducted AA firing in Area George enroute. During the period 15 to 22 February the group engaged in upkeep at Sasebo.

At 0730, 23 February the group again sortied to relieve the THESEUS group in accordance with CTG 95.1 Confidential dispatch 180635Z. The group conducted AA firing and tracking exercises in Area George during the morning and at 1900, 23 February relieved the THESEUS group as TE 95.11. Air operations commenced at sunrise the following morning. A schedule of five ten-plane flights per day was attempted in view of the longer hours of daylight but it was found that the principal target area assigned, the vicinity of HOENGSONG near the center of the UN battle line, was too distant for the schedule to be maintained effectively. Accordingly, the forty sortie schedule previously employed was again used. During this period USS ST PAUL (CA 73) at Inchon requested aerial mapping and photographs of the north bank of the Han River west of Seoul. In the absence of a photo configured airplane an attempt was made to fulfill this request using a K-25 camera, vertically mounted in a homemade installation, for mapping and a hand held K-20 for obliques. Results were only partly successful but pointed the way to further improvements which were later incorporated and proved successful. A report of the installation is being made to cognizant commanders.

The group replenished at sea from USS GUADALUPE (AO 37) on 28 February in the vicinity of Lat 37-00 N Long. 124-00 E. A more northerly position was selected for this replenishment to permit air coverage of ships operating in Changson-Got. During this period no unusual events occurred. On two days, operations were curtailed because of extremely poor weather featured with low visibility and almost continuous snow showers. During this period operations were conducted in accordance with CTF OpPlan 1-51, CTG 95.1 OpPlan 1-51 and CO USS BATAAN OpOrder 1-51 (revised on 5 March 1951). On 5 March USS BATAAN put into Pusan, disembarked VMF 212 and embarked VMF 312 then proceeded to Sasebo arriving 1358I 7 March.

The Task Element departed Sasebo 13 March enroute to the West Coast of Korea to relieve HMG THESEUS, commencing operations the morning of 14 March in accordance with CTE 95.11 and CO USS BATAAN Confidential Operation Order 2-51. During this
period Major Prestley was shot down 10 miles NW of Seoul and 1st Lt. Knowles was forced down behind enemy lines. Both pilots were rescued and returned aboard by helicopter. On 18 March units were replenished at sea by the USS PASSUMPSIC (AO 107) and resumed normal operations.

When relieved by HMS THESEUS, units of the Task Element departed the operating area on 22 March and proceeded to Yokosuka, arriving on 25 March. An administrative inspection of USS BATAAN was conducted by personnel of USS BAIROKO on 27 March. On 28 March USS BATAAN reported as a unit of CARDIV 15 by Confidential despatch 2805COZ.

On 30 March the group departed Yokosuka in accordance with CTG 95.1 Confidential despatch 280455Z, relieving HMS THESEUS on station 1 April and commenced operations early morning 2 April. Misfortune befell the first morning when 1st Lt. Hauge was hit by AA fire and after fighting his plane back to vicinity of Inchon he was forced to bail out. He landed offshore and was recovered by a friendly boat; later returned to the ship by helicopter. The following day Captain W. MILLER, USN, prospective Commanding Officer, was flown aboard.

Misfortune struck again on 4 April when VMF 312 lost their Commanding Officer, Major D. P. Frame. Struck by AA fire, his plane caught fire and he attempted to bail out, but his parachute streamed immediately causing him to strike the tail. The chute eventually opened and a normal landing was made in enemy territory 10 miles south of SARIWON. RESCAP held enemy forces down until rescue was effected by helicopter. Major Frame died of injuries while in the helicopter enroute to SUWON.

Replenishment at sea was conducted by USS OBERON (AK 14) and USS NAVASOTA (AO 106) on 5 April after which normal operations were again resumed until 6 April when the Task Element departed the operating area for Sasebo in accordance with CTF 95 Secret Operations Order 2-51, Annex Baker.

END
Subject: Exposure Suit

1. On 20 January 1951 Captain Alfred Hiram AGAN, 013674, USMCR, piloting a F4U4 sustained damage to his plane which caused engine failure when he flew through his own bomb blast; however, the possibility of his having been hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire cannot be excluded.

2. On ditching aircraft at approximately 1210 the pilot was observed to climb out of the cockpit, and after inflating life vest he began to swim toward land. Very soon afterward he appeared to flounder in the water being unable to swim farther. The temperature of the water was approximately 35° F. and that of the air 20° F.

3. The rescue helicopter reached the pilot at 1320, one hour and ten minutes after ditching aircraft. The crewman, wearing a BuAer Mark II exposure suit entered the water, but because of a wrist strap which broke when he tightened it, the suit immediately began to leak, saturating his clothing worn beneath the suit. This made swimming almost impossible and the rescue attempt was abandoned when the crewman was overcome due to exposure and ingestion of sea water. He stated there was no sign of life in the body at that time, that the extremities were rigid and the eyes fixed open. This crewman was treated for exposure in the ship's sick bay.

4. The helicopter returned to the scene at 1500 with a crewman wearing an underwater demolition suit. This was two hours and fifty minutes after the accident. This crewman entered the water and secured a line to the body without suffering any effects from exposure. He was in the water approximately ten minutes. It was necessary to drag the body about 300 yards to a nearby island and land the helicopter. The body was returned to the ship at 1615.

5. On cutting away the summer flight suit and the exposure suit it was noted that the long underwear worn beneath the suit was saturated with water. The right wrist band was tightly secured, however, the left cuff had been pulled out from under the wrist strap which was tightly secured and this allowed water to enter suit. The neck draw string was properly applied. There was approximately three or four quarts of sea water in the suit. It is impossible to estimate the quantity of water which entered due to dragging the body through the water; however, the tension of the line on the body tended to hold the body out of the water so it is felt that most of the water entered the suit beforehand. The crewman also noted that there seemed to be large quantity of water within the suit as he secured the line. There was superficial abrasion over the left elbow but no other evidence of trauma. The upper respiratory passages were full of water. The cause of death was apparently drowning with contributory factor of exposure.
6. It is believed that the present Buder Mark II exposure suit is inadequate in design and construction. There is too great a chance for leakage of water at the neck and wrist, as well as possibilities of having torn areas in suit. The suit is cumbersome and tends to limit activity in the water, making swimming and gaining entrance to life raft more difficult. Particularly is this true if bulky clothing worn beneath suit becomes wet.

7. The underwater demolition suit affords much more protection against exposure to cold water and allows for more activity and freedom of movement in the water.

8. It is recommended that an exposure suit for pilots be designed along the lines of the underwater demolition suit. The following points are offered for consideration.

A. The suit should fit rather snugly over garments worn beneath, for example long underwear, trousers and sweater or shirt. The possibilities of having several sizes of component parts, such as arms, legs, and trunk, which could be fitted to the pilot and then vulcanized together might be considered in order to afford a more satisfactory fitting.

B. The possibility of having rubber gloves of lighter construction or detachable rubber gloves is to be considered.

C. The possibility of having a high neck collar fastened at the back with an extension of the trunk zipper, and adjusted for comfort and water tightness by drawstrings should be considered rather than the open-faced hood.

D. The possibility of providing some means of heat in case of submersion in water, possibly by chemical reaction or electricity, should be considered.

E. The possibility of incorporating the life vest into construction of the suit should be considered. Pockets for survival gear, etc., within the suit might be possible; however, the external surface should be kept relatively free from apparatus which would offer resistance and obstruction to swimming.

F. Water tight construction at the wrist should be similar to the underwater demolition suit, i.e., a wide elastic band; however, it is recommended that this be secured by a broad hook and buckle assembly rather than snaps.

W.H. Jarvis
LCDR, MC, USN
Squadron Flight Surgeon
PART II

CHRONOLOGY

15 Jan 1951  At Sasebo, Japan for upkeep.

16 Jan 1951  Underway from Sasebo, Japan enroute operating area off west coast of Korea in company with DesDiv 72.  1900 assumed duties of TE 95.11.

17 Jan 1951  Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea, CTE 95.11 in USS BATAAN(CVL-29).  Launched 29 offensive sorties, 23 CAS, 6 ARMED RECCO and 8 CAP.

18 Jan 1951  Operating as before.  Launched 30 offensive sorties, 26 CAS, 4 ARMED RECCO and 8 CAP.  F4U-4, pilot Captain R. G. PATTERSON, Jr., USMC, crash landed near Suwon after engine failure due to drop in oil pressure as a result of damage inflicted by enemy ground fire.  The pilot was uninjured, rescue was effected by Air Force helicopter 29 minutes after landing.

19 Jan 1951  Operating as before.  Launched 32 offensive sorties, 24 ARMED RECCO, 6 RESCAP, 2 TCAP, and 8 CAP.  F4U-4, pilot 1st LT Alfred Joseph WARD, USMC, crashed near Kumchon due to enemy machine gun and rifle fire during strafing run.  Aircraft exploded on impact in approximately 30 degree dive leaving no possible chance of pilot survival; the body was not recovered.

20 Jan 1951  Operating as before.  Launched 29 offensive sorties, all ARMED RECCO and 8 CAP.  F4U-4, pilot Captain Alfred Hiram AGAN, USMC, crash landed in water south of Inchon after aircraft believed to have been damaged by own bomb blast.  Pilot dead from exposure prior to arrival of rescue helicopter from this ship, which recovered the body.

21 Jan 1951  Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea.  Replenished at sea from TG 79.3, USS MISPILLION (AO-105) and USS PARACUTIN (AB-18).  No air operations.

22 Jan 1951  Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea.  Launched 28 offensive sorties, 18 CAS, 10 ARMED RECCO and 8 CAP.
23 Jan 1951 Operating as before. Launched 33 offensive sorties, 23 CAS, 10 ARMED RECO and 8 CAP.

24 Jan 1951 Operating as before. Launched 27 offensive sorties, all ARMED RECO and 8 CAP.

25 Jan 1951 Operating as before. Launched 28 offensive sorties, all ARMED RECO and 8 CAP. 1900 relieved as TE 95.11 by HMS THESEUS and screening ships.

26 Jan 1951 Enroute Sasebo, Japan for short period of upkeep. 1940 ITEM arrived Sasebo, Japan.

27-31 Jan 1951 At Sasebo, Japan for upkeep and replenishment.

1-2 Feb 1951 At Sasebo, Japan for upkeep and replenishment.

3 Feb 1951 Underway from Sasebo, Japan enroute operating area off west coast of Korea in company with DesDiv 162 less USS SPERRY; 1900 assumed duties of TE 95.11. Received two replacement aircraft from Taegu.

4 Feb 1951 Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea, CTIE 95.11 in USS BATAAN(CVL-29). Launched 29 offensive sorties, 23 CAS, 6 MGFS and 8 CAP. Naval Gunfire Airspot was provided for USS ST PAUL and USS HANK at Inchon.

5 Feb 1951 Operating as before. Launched 31 offensive sorties, 21 CAS, 8 MGFS for USS ST PAUL, USS HANK and HMS BELFAST at Inchon, 2 ARMED RECO and 8 CAP.

6 Feb 1951 Operating as before. Launched 31 offensive sorties, 23 CAS, 4 MGFS, for ST PAUL, USS HANK and HMS BELFAST at Inchon, 4 ARMED RECO and 8 CAP.

7 Feb 1951 Operating as before. Launched 34 offensive sorties, 26 CAS, 6 MGFS, for USS ST PAUL and USS HANK at Inchon, 2 ARMED RECO and 8 CAP.

8 Feb 1951 Operating as before. Launched 42 offensive sorties, 36 CAS, 6 MGFS, for USS ST PAUL and USS HANK at Inchon, and 6 CAP.

9 Feb 1951 Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea. Refueled USS BATAAN and screen from USS CIMARRON.
Launched 13 offensive sorties, 5 CAS, 2 NGFS, for USS ST PAUL at Inchon, 6 ARMED RECCO and 5 CAP.

10 Feb 1951
Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea. Launched 37 offensive sorties, 27 CAS, 2 NGFS for USS ST PAUL at Inchon, 4 ARMED RECCO and no CAP.

11 Feb 1951
Operating as before. Launched 36 offensive sorties, 32 CAS, 2 ARMED RECCO, 2 ARMED ESCORTS for RADM CRUISE to Taegu and no CAP.

12 Feb 1951
Operating as before. Launched 35 offensive sorties, 31 CAS, 2 ARMED RECCO, 2 ARMED ESCORTS for RADM CRUISE to Taegu and no CAP.

13 Feb 1951
Operating as before. Launched 52 offensive sorties, 50 CAS, 2 ARMED RECCO and no CAP. 1900 ITEM relieved as TE 95.11 by HMS THESEUS and screening ships.

14 Feb 1951
Enroute Sasebo, Japan for upkeep. 1440 arrived Sasebo.

15-22 Feb 1951
At Sasebo, Japan for upkeep and replenishment.

23 Feb 1951
Underway from Sasebo, Japan enroute operating area off west coast of Korea in company with DesDiv 162 less USS SPERRY. 1900 ITEM assumed duties of TE 95.11.

24 Feb 1951
Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea, CTE 95.11 in USS BATAAN(CVL-29). Launched 40 offensive sorties, 34 CAS, 4 ARMED RECCO, 2 ESCORT for marine helicopter transfer to Pyongtaek, and 10 CAP.

25 Feb 1951
Operating as before. Launched 41 offensive sorties, 35 CAS, 4 ARMED RECCO, 2 PHOTO RECCO and 8 CAP. PHOTO RECCO to gain Naval Gunfire Target information for USS ST PAUL of area 3,000 meters deep north of Han River.

26 Feb 1951
Operating as before. Launched 38 offensive sorties, 32 CAS, 4 ARMED RECCO, 2 PHOTO RECCO and 8 CAP.

27 Feb 1951
Operating as before. Launched 42 offensive sorties, all ARMED RECCO, 8 CAP and 2 Courier aircraft to Pusan and return. II-3
28 Feb 1951  Operating as before. Refueled from USS GUADALUPE (AO-32). Launched 4 offensive sorties for pre-briefed strike on gun emplacements at Todan-gi, 3 ESCORTS for USS ST PAUL's helicopter carrying VIP, 8 CAP.

1 Mar 1951  Operating as before. No air operations due to foul weather including high winds, snow and low visibility.

2 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Air operations hampered by low visibility and snow showers. Launched 16 offensive sorties, 8 ARMED RECO and 8 TCAP for HMS BELFAST in Changsan Got.

3 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Air operations were hampered by low visibility and snow showers. Launched 28 offensive sorties, 20 ARMED RECO, 4 NGFS, 4 TCAP and 7 CAP. NGFS and TCAP for HMS BELFAST operating in vicinity of Changsan Got.

4 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Launched 39 offensive sorties, 29 ARMED RECO and 10 TCAP, NGFS for HMS BELFAST and DD's operating in Changsan Got. At 1900 relieved as TE 95.11 by HMS THESEUS and Screening ships.
PART II

CHRONOLOGY

5 Mar 1951
Proceeded to Pusan to off-load VMF-212 aircraft, equipment, and personnel and load VMF-312. Launched 12 aircraft for Pohang. 2100 Major General Field HARRIS, Commanding General 1st MAW boarded for passage to Sasebo to observe carrier qualification of VMF-312 enroute. At 2200 completed loading VMF-312, departed Pusan for Sasebo, Japan.

6 Mar 1951
Enroute Sasebo, Japan for upkeep. 1400 arrived Sasebo.

7 Mar 1951
At Sasebo, Japan for upkeep and replenishment.

8 Mar 1951
Conducted Carrier Qualifications for VMF-312 in local area NW of Sasebo. MASSEY and FORREST ROYAL provided screen and plane guard services. Returned to port to resume upkeep and replenishment.

9-12 Mar 1951
At Sasebo, Japan for upkeep, and replenishment.

13 Mar 1951
Underway from Sasebo, Japan enroute operating area off west coast of Korea in company with USS HANK(DD-702), USS SPERRY(DD-697) and HMAS BATAAN(D-191). launched 21 refresher flights. 1900 ITEM assumed duties of TE 95.11.

14 Mar 1951
Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea, CTE 95.11 in USS BATAAN(CVL-29). Launched 43 offensive sorties, 29 CAS, 14 ARMED RECCO and 10 CAP.

15 Mar 1951
Operating as before. Launched 41 offensive sorties, 26 CAS, 15 ARMED RECCO and 10 CAP. 1101 ITEM USS BORIE(DD-704) reported for duty. 1129 ITEM HMAS (D-191) was detached to proceed on assigned mission. F4U-4, pilot Major Frank H. PRESSLEY, USMCR, crash landed in Han River 30 miles NW of Seoul after engine failure due to enemy AA fire. The pilot sustained only minor injuries and rescue was effected by Air Force helicopter.

16 Mar 1951
Operating as before; Launched 43 offensive sorties, 24 CAS, 14 ARMED RECCO, 5 NGFS and 10 CAP. Naval Gunfire Airspot was provided for HMS BELFAST along NW coast from Chinnampo to Choppeki Point.

II-5
17 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Launched 40 offensive sorties, 21 CAS, 19 ARMED RECCO and 10 CAP.

18 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Launched 8 offensive sorties, all ARMED RECCO and 2 CAP.

19 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Launched 42 offensive sorties, 22 CAS, 20 ARMED RECCO and 10 CAP.

20 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Launched 40 offensive sorties, 20 CAS, 20 ARMED RECCO and 10 CAP.

21 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Launched 39 offensive sorties, 22 CAS, 17 ARMED RECCO and 10 CAP. F4U-4, pilot 1st LT Harold R. KNOWLES, USMC, crash landed 57 miles NW of Inchon after engine failure due to drop in oil pressure believed to have been result of enemy AA. The pilot received minor injuries and his rescue was effected by ship's helicopter which landed aboard after sunset.

22 Mar 1951  Operating as before. Launched 43 offensive sorties, 12 CAS, 29 ARMED RECCO, 2 NGFS for HMS KENYA along NW Coast from Chinnampo to Choppeski Point and 10 CAP. 1900 ITEM relieved as TB 95.11 by HMS THESUES and Screening ships.

23 Mar 1951  Enroute Yokosuka, Japan. 0344 ITEM USS HANK (DD-702) detached to proceed on assigned mission. 1544 ITEM USS BORIE (DD-704) detached to proceed on assigned mission.

24 Mar 1951  Enroute Yokosuka, Japan in company with USS SPERRY (DD-697).

25 Mar 1951  Arrived Yokosuka, Japan. 0800 ITEM preparation for administrative inspection by ComCarDiv 15.

26 Mar 1951  At Yokosuka, Japan preparing for administrative inspection.


28 Mar 1951  At Yokosuka, Japan for upkeep and replenishment.

29 Mar 1951  At Yokosuka, Japan for upkeep and replenishment.

30 Mar 1951  At Yokosuka, Japan for upkeep and replenishment. 1630 ITEM underway for operating west coast of Korea in company with USS SPERRY (DD-697).

II-6
31 Mar 1951  Enroute operating area.

1 Apr 1951  Enroute operating area. USS BORIE (DD 704) and USS ENGLISH (DD 696) rendezvoused, acting as screen with the SPERRY. 1900 ITEM assumed duties of TE 95.11.

2 Apr 1951  Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea, CTE 95.11 in USS BATAAN (CVL 29). Launched 43 offensive sorties, 23 CAS, 20 ARMED RECCO and 10 CAP. F4U-4, pilot 1st LT D. B. HOUGE, USMCR was hit by enemy AA fire in SARIWON Area. Pilot was able to fly aircraft over friendly territory where he was forced to bail out, landing near Yongjongdo Island where he was picked up by small boat from LSD in Inchon Harbor and returned to ship via ship's helicopter. No injuries to pilot.

3 Apr 1951  Operating as before. Launched 40 offensive sorties, 20 CAS, 20 ARMED RECCO and 10 CAP.

4 Apr 1951  Operating as before. Launched 43 offensive sorties, 16 CAS, 20 ARMED RECCO, 4 RESCAP, 3 pre-briefed strike on Kongse-ri and 10 CAP. F4U-4, pilot Major D. P. FRAME, Commanding Officer VMF 312, crashed after being hit by enemy AA fire near Hwangju. Pilot bailed out and was picked up by Air Force helicopter but pilot died enroute to SEOUL. It is believed pilot struck rear control surfaces upon bail out.

5 Apr 1951  Replenished from USS NAVASOTA (AO 106) and USS OBERON (AK 14). No offensive air operations, no CAP.

6 Apr 1951  Operating as before. Launched 12 offensive sorties, 4 CAS, 4 ARMED RECCO, 2 Naval Gunfire Spot for HMS BLACKSWAN in Haeju area and 2 CAP. 0295 ITEM departed operating area for Sasebo, Japan.

7 Apr 1951  Enroute Sasebo, Japan for replenishment. 0920 ITEM arrived Sasebo.

END
(e) 31 Mar - 7 Apr

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<th>Weapon Type</th>
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<td>50 cal A/C</td>
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PART IV
BATTLE DAMAGE

(A) Own

18 Jan, F4U-4 BuNo 81736 suffered one hit forward edge horizontal stabilizer. Bullet did not enter. Small arms.

18 Jan, F4U-4 BuNo 97352 hit left oil cooler, complete penetration. Small arms.

18 Jan, F4U-4 BuNo 96756 hit vertical stabilizer. Complete penetration. Hit fuselage, part penetration elevator. Stopped in battery compartment. 30 cal.

18 Jan, F4U-4 BuNo 80806 hit port wing, outboard. Complete penetration. Hit port wing, center, stopped in ammo can. Hit horizontal stabilizer, leading edge, complete penetration. 20mm and 30mm.

25 Jan, F4U-4 BuNo 81736. Hit wing butt, left wing, penetrated wheel well. 50 cal.

4 Feb, F4U-4 BuNo 81181. Hit right wing, complete penetration. Small arms.

5 Feb, F4U-4 BuNo. 97073. Hit right wing, complete penetration.

7 Feb, F4U-4 BuNo 80806. Hit left wing blast tube and leading edge. Leading edge and blast blown out. 50 cal.

8 Feb, F4U-4 BuNo 81181. Hit center right wing, complete penetration. Small arms.

25 Feb, F4U-4 BuNo 97128. Hit right wing, speed of projectile or own bomb blast, insufficient to effect complete penetration. Unknown.

25 Feb, F4U-4 BuNo 97191. Hit fuselage, center, complete penetration. 50 cal.

26 Feb, F4U-4 BuNo 97128. Hit right wing tip, complete penetration. Right wing bay, ammunition box, projectile entered ammo box causing other shells to explode. 30 cal.

26 Feb, F4U-4 BuNo 80869. Hit high tension lead on harness push rod housing cylinder baffle. Broke nut on high tension lead on harness, dented push rod housing and tore a 1\(\frac{1}{2}\)" gash in cylinder baffle. 50 cal.

IV-1
2 Mar, F4U-4 BuNo 96822. Hit propeller blade, 4" hole near tip of one blade. 20MM.

4 Mar, F4U-4 BuNo 97073. Speed ring, dented skin, slightly torn. Wing butts, right and left, dented and slightly torn. Gun camera window, left wing, 1 3/4" hole below window. Leading edge left wing 5" x 3" hole. Radio antenna broken. Verticle stabilizer dented. Target explosion from rocket hit.

4 Mar, F4U-4 BuNo 96872. Requires complete right wing change. 20" jagged hole through wing. 40MM.

14 Mar, F4U-4 BuNo 81879. Hit bulletproof windshield, chipped and cracked. Portion of exploding shell.


16 Mar, F4U-4 BuNo 82174. Hit starboard wing. Small arms.

16 Mar, F4U-4 BuNo 81770. Hit hydraulic lines, left wing. Hydraulic line to wheels. Small arms fire.

17 Mar, F4U-4 BuNo 81285. Hit propeller blade. Hole through prop blade two feet from end. Unknown.

20 Mar, F4U-4 BuNo 96949. Hit left wing, minor hole. Small arms.

2 Apr, F4U-4 BuNo 97128. Hit fuselage and severed hydraulic line to tail strut. Entered engine, severed accessory oil line. 30 or 50 cal.

3 Apr, F4U-4 BuNo 96949. Hit in belly tank. Minor damage. 30 cal.

4 Apr, F4U-4 BuNo 81879. Hit in horizontal fin. AA 90 MM.

4 Apr, F4U-4 BuNo 96979. Hit left wing, minor penetration. 20 MM.


4 Apr, F4U-4 BuNo 97048. Hit left wheel well. Minor damage. 30 cal.

4 Apr, F4U-4 BuNo 96804. Hit left aileron, foot from tip, fuselage 2 feet aft of cockpit. 30 cal.

IV-2
4 Apr, F4U-4 BuNo 97121. Hit engine cowling, severed oil line, causing loss of oil - went into cylinder. Hit left wing. Small arms.

6 Apr, F4U-4 BuNo 96979. Hit fuselage, entered battery compartment. Hole in wheel well.

(B) Enemy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pack Animals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tank</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Armored Cars (vehicles)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oxcarts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heavy Guns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machine Guns</td>
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<td>Ammo Dumps</td>
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<td>Fuel Dumps</td>
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<td>Supply Dumps</td>
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<td>Locomotives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boxcars</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Casualties inflicted on enemy troops, estimated - 1852
2 Apr. 1st Lt. Donald B. Houge, 027559, USMC, bailed out after being hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire. Suffered only minor abrasions and contusions trunk and extremities.

4 Apr. Major D. P. Frame, 07066, Commanding Officer, VMF-312, crashed after being hit by enemy AA fire near Hwangju. Frame bailed out and was picked up by Air Force helicopter but died enroute to Seoul. It is believe pilot struck rear control surfaces upon bail out.
PART VI
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Comment: During the period covered by this report bad weather prevented flying on only three days out of thirty-seven for which missions were scheduled. On two of these days it was possible to complete about one-third of the missions scheduled, despite the weather. The weather was bad enough on one replenishment day to have caused cancellation of air operations. In contrast, carriers operating off the east coast of Korea, and shore based air units in Korea and Japan were forced to cancel or severely curtail air operations about every fourth day because of weather. It thus appears that from a weather viewpoint the area to seaward of Inchon, in the vicinity of Lat. 37-00 N and Long. 125-30 E is most favorable for conducting air operations against Korea during the winter months.

Comment: The search and rescue incidents in which own aircraft were involved either as principal participants or in an assisting role emphasized the following points:

(a) RESCAPS must be promptly formed and vigorously maintained over pilots downed behind enemy lines. When this was done and rescue could be effected by helicopter the downed pilot was recovered in every instance.

(b) After ditching in cold water the pilot's (and aircrewmen's) first task after clearing the aircraft is to inflate and get in the life raft(s) provided. Too long a delay while in the water will cause the numbing of hands and arms, resulting in inability to inflate or get into the raft. In this connection aircrews must be sure that they carry the life raft with them when they leave the aircraft. It is usually difficult or impossible to reach back into the cockpit to recover a life raft left in the seat or other stowage.

(c) When it is known that rescue cannot be accomplished within ten minutes, and choice exists, it is preferable to land behind enemy lines rather than in cold water. This is particularly the case if RESCAP can be formed immediately.

(d) When RESCAP can be formed immediately by remaining planes of a flight, a pilot forced down behind enemy lines should select a landing area as much in the open as the exigencies of his landing will permit. This will facilitate the
RESCAP's locating and turning back any enemy attempting capture or injury of the downed aircrew.

Recommendation: It is recommended that above points be continually impressed upon all pilots in the combat area.

Comment: In view of the nature of the missions assigned, Close Air Support and Armed Recco, it was not generally possible to arm a flight to attack a specific or type target. After a certain amount of trial and error and with the limitations of the ship's magazines in mind, a standard split loading for each flight was settled upon. Half the aircraft (F4U-4s) scheduled were loaded with napalm tanks and half with 500 pound general purpose bombs. All were loaded with six 5" HVARs and two 100 pound general purpose bombs. "Daisy cutter" fuzes were used in the 100 pound bombs; 0.1 sec. delay nose and 0.025 sec. delay tail fuzes were used together in the 500 pounders. This was found to be a good standard load for use against a variety of targets. It also proved to be one which used small bombs and rockets from the magazines at an even rate with the magazines loaded to accommodate a maximum of each type of ammunition. Using the foregoing load the ship could operate at the rate of 40 offensive sorties per day for 8 days without rearming.

Recommendation: The foregoing loading is recommended for the type of general support operation in which this vessel has been engaged.

Comment: When "daisy cutter" fuzes were first employed in the "standard load" commented on in the foregoing paragraph, many "duds" were reported by pilots. Every effort was made to overcome this difficulty, but it was not until it was found that the duds were attributable to pilot technique that a solution was conceived. It was noted that duds occurred most often when bombs were dropped after several attacks with other ordnance had been made during which hard pull-outs were executed. It was assumed that the extension rods of the daisy cutter fuzes were bent by the imposition of "g"s during pull-outs and that when the bomb was dropped in a later dive the eccentricity of the extension rod prevented the fuze impeller from rotating at its normal rate, and slowed the arming of the fuze. On this presumption pilots were advised to use daisy cutter fuzed bombs first if practicable, but, if not, to avoid hard pull-outs and to release bombs so fuzed about 300 feet above normal release altitude. Pilots followed the above procedure and the percentage of duds was reduced immediately to normal.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the material discrepancy outlined above be investigated further.
Comment: During the recent operations in the West Coast operating area, clearance of operational traffic on task force and task group circuits continued to be a major problem. These circuits have been overloaded with high precedence traffic and this condition has been intensified as a result of the instructions contained in "NAVFE 61-51" wherein commands are directed to exhaust all means for delivering messages locally or via TF or TG circuits prior to placing on fleet broadcasts.

Recommendation:

Senior commanders amend operation order requirements so that op-summaries and other operational dispatch reports be transmitted only to those few who need to know instead of the lengthy lists of addressees currently required.

Senior commanders direct commands in the op-areas to submit all administrative reports by speedletter or by dispatch only after clearing the op-areas.

General Recommendation:

Establish a communication security activity within the NAVFE area to function in accordance with USF 70(B), Art. 978 with emphasis on:

1. Reduction or elimination of dispatch traffic through direct liaison with commands.

2. Improvement of radio procedure and discipline on all major nets including TF and TG Commander Nets.

3. Improved security practices.

Comment:

Intelligence dissemination from the principal area commands has been too voluminous and duplicative in some respects and too meager in others. The disparity appears due to the fact that much of the intelligence is not "slanted" to naval requirements. This, in turn, appears to stem from inadequate naval participation in such agencies as JOC Korea. Much improvement has been noted in the services rendered by JOC Korea since the establishment of a naval liaison desk there, but much remains to be accomplished.

Recommendation:

It is strongly recommended that Navy representation and participation in the Joint Operations Center (JOC) Korea and similar
agencies be increased in order that the services rendered may continue to be improved. It is felt that if further communications security measures are imposed the present staff at JOG Korea will be unable to cope with the situation. Only the unrestricted use of plain language broadcasts has enabled adequate information to be passed in a timely manner between JOG Korea and forces afloat.

Comment: Intelligence received from ROK sources through CTE 95.12 has been exceptionally accurate and detailed. At first this information was received several days late, but since the establishment of Major Burke on Paengnyong Do Island it has been very timely.

Comment:

Requests from naval surface forces on the west coast for airspot services and immediate strikes against coastal targets frequently have been received with insufficient details to permit their being fulfilled promptly. Most frequently lacking are communications instructions, designation of the coordinating agency, strike clearance information, and time limitations. In some instances apparently urgent requests have caused flights to be diverted from targets which events later proved to have been more lucrative. In other cases, airspot requirements have caused considerable inconvenience in the rescheduling of flights.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that surface units requesting air assistance make timely requests which contain full details of requirements and as much target information as possible. This will permit the carrier to distribute its air effort to best advantage, to arm its aircraft adequately, and to brief its pilots fully, and will eliminate delays due to requests for additional information.