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U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CVE116/HWP/jd
A16-13/30
Ser: 094

27 JAN 1953

[redacted]

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From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group NINETY-FIVE POINT ONE
(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 26 December 1952 through 5 January 1953; submission of

Ref: (a) Art 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) OpNav Inst 3480.4
(c) CinCPacFlt Inst 3480.1A
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule p. 72
(2) Aircraft Usage and Availability; Chart of p. 73

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d) the action report of the Task Unit 95.1.1 for the period 26 December through 5 January 1953 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT was Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 2100 on 26 December until 2100 on 4 January of this period.

2. This report is divided into six parts, as follows:

Part I General Narrative.

Part II Chronological Order of Events.

Part III Remarks on performance of ordnance, material, and equipment, including ammunition expenditure.

Part IV Summary of own and enemy battle damage.

Part V Personnel Performance and Casualties.

Part VI Special Comments on Doctrine and Operational Procedures.

3. Greater detail with respect to aircraft performance may be obtained by referring to VMA-312 Type "B" Report Command Diary for December 1952 and January 1953.

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PART I DECLASSIFIED

GENERAL NARRATIVE

A. During the period of 26 December 1952 to 4 January 1953, the USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) with VMA-312 embarked, operated as a unit of TE 95.11 (later redesignated as TU 95.1.1), Carrier Element, West Coast Blockade and Patrol Group, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1. The Officer in Tactical Command of TE 95.11 was Captain H. L. RAY, 62691/1310, USN. For the duration of this patrol this officer was also the Officer in Tactical Command, West Coast in accordance with paragraph 9, CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52. Ships assigned CTE 95.11 as screen included the USS LEWIS HANCOCK (DD-675), USS PORTERFIELD (DD-682), HMCS ATHABASCAN (DDE-219), HMS COCKADE (D-34) and the HMCS CRUSADER (DDE-228). Ships assigned the screen varied from two to three ships as units were transferred temporarily to CTE 95.12 (later CTU 95.1.2) for night patrols along the enemy held coast line.

B. VMA-312 commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. CAMERON, 07027, USMC, continued aboard for operations during this period. Planes aboard consisted of F4U-4 and F4U-4B type. The average number of aircraft aboard for the period was 21. Averable availability per day was 16. Total number of sorties flown during the nine day period was 255 including 8 sorties for carrier qualifications for a total of 562. hours. A total of 55.1 hours was "over the target time." A single helicopter from Helicopter Squadron ONE was aboard as plane guard and flew 47 sorties for a total of 32.8 hours.

C. The BADOENG STRAIT sailed from Sasebo, Japan, on 26 December 1952 as directed by CTG 95.1 dispatch 240655Z of December. Gunnery firing exercises were conducted in area GEORGE. Shortly afterwards five replacement aircraft were received aboard from Itami Air Force Base. The ship became a Unit of TE 95.11 at 262100I when the BADOENG STRAIT relieved the H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19) upon arrival in Area MIKE.

D. The general mission of the United Nations Forces operating off the West Coast of Korea is to blockade the coastline and control the sea approaches thereto. This mission is performed by the ships of TE 95.12, the Island Naval Defense Element; the troops of TE 95.15, the Island Defense Element; and the units of TE 95.11, the Carrier Element. The Island Defense Element is a most important portion of this group since it occupies and defends islands fringing the enemy held coastline from the HAN River on the South to the TAEDONG estuary in the North. These islands are extremely helpful to this Task Element in providing services for aircraft early warning, air-sea rescue, intelligence, and guerilla action. The tasks specifically assigned the Carrier Element have been briefed in previous action reports and will not be repeated herein.

E. In performing its assigned tasks, TE 95.11 normally operated in the area southwest of PAENGNYONG-DO, conducting dawn to dusk air operations, and retiring southward for the night. Five deck load launches were made daily at intervals of two hours with approximately fifty percent of available air-

craft in each launch. A two-aircraft CAP for TE 95.11 was launched with each deck load. Once a day a four plane TARCAP was provided for CTU 95.12.1 stationed in the vicinity of SOKTO Island. Modified instructions issued by CTG 95.1 now require this instead of a TARCAP with each deck load launch as was previously required. Other aircraft operating in the target area are briefed to assist CTU 95.12.1 at anytime their services are requested.

F. The reduction in TARCAP commitments permitted a more flexible employment of aircraft, and some changes in use and scheduling were made. Twice during this nine day period a four plane pre-dawn armed reconnaissance flight was launched at about 0615I to investigate rail and truck traffic in the area North of CHINNAMPO. Such flights are launched only under ideal weather conditions because of the limitations of pilot training and aircraft instrument flying equipment. It was also considered necessary to initiate launches from an area in close proximity to CHODO Island so that radar vectoring from both the ships and CHODO would be available to the flight. The early armed reconnaissance launch, dubbed the "early early" by the pilots, became quite popular, because both flights found locomotives for their targets, a type of target that the pilots are most eager to attack.

G. There were no urgent requests from other elements of the group for air support strikes during the period. Continued attention was paid to troop concentrations and gun emplacements in positions to attack friendly islands and surface vessels. CAP aircraft were again loaded with ordnance for short range strikes against targets in the PAENGNYONG-DO to HAEJU area when the Task Element was operating in the area southwest of PAENGNYONG-DO, as this area is well screened by radars on friendly islands.

H. In view of the reduction in TARCAP requirements, greater attention was given to armed reconnaissance of the coastal areas. Weather permitting, a careful search of the coastline from the HAN River to the TAEDONG-GANG was made daily and the flight northward to HANCHON was performed on alternate days when jet fighter cover was available.

I. A most unfortunate accident occurred in the afternoon of 27 December when First Lieutenant John B. GOERY, USMCR, was shot down by enemy anti-aircraft fire in the TAEDONG-GANG. The Lieutenant parachuted successfully and was observed uninjured in the water at the mouth of the estuary. Despite the attempts of two helicopters and one crash boat from CHODO Island, rescue was not effected, apparently because of material defects in the rescue equipment. During the rescue MIG aircraft made six firing runs on the Corsair RESCAP but did not penetrate to the helicopters. There was no damage to aircraft, friendly or enemy. A recommendation regarding the possible inadequacy of rescue equipment has been submitted separately.

J. For the first time BADOENG STRAIT aircraft experienced appreciable interference from bad weather and flight operations were reduced on four days of the nine-day period. During one night, with a heavy swell running from the northwest and with frequent heavy snow showers and a temperature of 19°F, a moderate amount of snow and slush ice from the spray collected on the

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flight deck. Assigned equipment was adequate for removal, however, flight operations were delayed until about noon because the pitching deck made fligh operations too hazardous. On another occasion with a ceiling of 300 feet and 1/2 mile visibility, it was necessary to vector a returning flight to the ship using the SG-1B radar. The aircraft made visual contact with the ship and LSO at approximately 1/2 mile and executed satisfactory landings. Low ceilings in the target area frequently limited target selection and restrict ordnance loads which could be carried.

K. Carrier qualification and re-qualification of replacement pilots was performed during combat operations on this patrol. Four replacements requiring requalification only were received aboard the day prior to sailing. By a slight reduction in combat flights, it was possible to qualify these pilots. They were subsequently given several CAP assignments to further their training and familiarization with the area and procedures. Then on the 7th day of air operations four additional pilots who required full carrier qualification were delivered aboard by the Marine "COD" aircraft. The following day full carrier qualification was given to two of these pilots. Additionally the Marine pilot of the "COD," previously qualified in Corsairs, was checked out in landing the TBM model aircraft aboard. Because of light variable winds it was necessary to delay qualification of the remaining two Corsair pilots until 5 January. The carrier qualification performed in this manner reduced the total combat sorties by five. However, two aircraft received major damage during qualifications, which indirectly reduced the offensive effort to a greater degree.

L. On the 27th of December as the Task Element retired to the South for the night with three ships in a bent-line screen (3C3), the U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK on station THREE reported a sonar contact with a probable submarine. The Task Element Commander considered this to be a Case I contact and as a precautionary measure directed an attack be made although it was considered that the contact might be a known underwater object charted in the vicinity. The U.S.S. PONTCHARTRAIN was directed to assist. Within six minutes of this contact, the H.M.S. COCKADE in station ONE reported a sonar contact, but evaluated it as non-submarine five minutes later. After investigating the contact further, the LEWIS HANCOCK made a flash LUNKHEAD report. The Task Element followed this with three amplifying reports mentioning the known underwater object in the vicinity and including a final report of non-submarine.

M. A fire occurred in the trash bin surrounding the BADOENG STRAIT's incinerator on the evening of 30 December. The fire started when embers which were being removed from the fire box burst into flame and could not be controlled by the CO2 bottle in hand. The fire was confined to the incinerator room and minor damage to electric wiring resulted.

N. Despite weather interference and reduction in total sorties made below that achieved on previous patrols, the results of air strikes appear to have been better than earlier strike results. An increased number of secondary

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explosions were noted. The first early pre-dawn strike North of CHINNAMPO located one locomotive and eight trucks and reported making damaging attacks. The second such strike found four locomotives made-up in three trains totaling over fifty boxcars apparently stopped because of rail cuts made by shore based night fighters. Immediately following this strike CHODO reported many MIG's in the area and went to a Warning RED alert. A flash report of the locomotive targets was sent to JOC Korea. Although there was no assurance that jet fighter cover would be available since proper coordination with shore based aircraft cannot be guaranteed under existing procedures, it was possible to launch two additional sorties totalling eleven aircraft against this target Information available to this command indicates that with the exception of a few F-84's which made high altitude rocket runs about noon that day, no other aircraft hit the target. This is believed to have resulted from an erroneous report received in the JOC that denied the existence of the trains. The statements of returning pilots from three separate strikes totaling fifteen aircraft were in virtual agreement regarding these locomotives and they reported doing considerable damage with one large secondary explosion. Photographic damage assessment could not be made, since photographic aircraft are not included in the allowance of the vessel.

O. The interchange of officers with H.M.S. GLORY and screening ships for familiarization and training was continued. Three officers were received aboard from H.M.S. GLORY to observe air operations. One officer from U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK and two officers from the U.S.S. PORTERFIELD were aboard for training as air controllers, while the BADOENG STRAIT transferred two officers to the GLORY for familiarization. The BADOENG STRAIT Operations Officer was transferred on three days TAD to JOC Korea at the end of the patrol for liaison and familiarization purposes.

P. In view of the targets located by two early morning patrols, it would appear profitable to give greater attention to the flat coastal area between CHINNAMPO and SINANJU. For best results, all-weather attack aircraft for locating targets and making initial road or rail cuts would be needed. Because of the areas' location with respect to communist jet airfields, the subsequent day attacks would require day attack squadrons operating under and closely coordinated with jet fighter cover. A fast carrier or fast carrier task force would be ideal for this purpose. The occasional appearance of a fast carrier in the Yellow Sea area would probably have a most disconcerting effect upon the enemy. Accordingly, periodic assignment of a fast carrier for Yellow Sea operations is recommended.

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CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

26 December

0642I/ In accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 240655Z of December 1952, the U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116), with VMA-312 embarked, departed Sasebo, Japan for Korean West Coast Operating Areas, "MIKE" and "NAN."

1130I/ Commenced 40MM AA firing on towed sleeve in area GEORGE.

1155I/ Completed 40MM AA firing having expended 1658 rounds of 40MM ammunition. One tow sleeve was knocked down.

1506I/ Recovered five VMA-312 aircraft from ITAMI, Japan.

2058I/ CTE 95.11 (H.M.S. GLORY) advised U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT that the U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK (DD-675) and U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) had been detached to investigate fishing vessels in prohibited area and some delay in their reporting for duty with BADOENG STRAIT was to be expected.

2100I/ Relieved the H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19) and assumed duty as CTE 95.11.

2100I/ Arrived in Korean Operating area "MIKE."

2300I/ Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT assumed duty as OTC of Naval Blockade and Patrol Group on the Korean West Coast.

27 December

0302I/ The U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) reported two Japanese fishing vessels at 36-11N, 124-52E. Vessels refused to move until a 40MM was fired overhead then both vessels were escorted to 124-00E and directed to proceed South of 36-00N. Vessels were identified as Kiayo Maru, 5-W061, Number YG2-293 and Kaiyo Maru, 3W-W060, Number YG2-294.

0500I/ PORTERFIELD reported for duty.

0725I/ Arrived in Korean operating area "NAN".

0740I/ U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK (DD-675) reported for duty.

0822I/ PORTERFIELD transferred one officer aboard by highline for training in air control duties.

0825I/ LCDR D. A. K. FINLAY, RN, Communications Officer and SUB LT J. M. SIMONDS, RN, an aviator from the H.M.S. GLORY, came aboard from the PORTERFIELD, by highline, to observe carrier operations and to discuss communications procedures common to the two service.

1102I/ CTE 95.11 advised H.M.S. BIRMINGHAM that gun fire spot could be provided at 1400I to 1530I and TARCAP would be available from 1600I to 1700I if desired.

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1134I/ H.M.S. COCKADE (D-34) reported for duty.

1220I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a command post near CHEIANG-NI with unassessable damage, then returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a railroad bridge near CHANGYON, damaging the bridge and making one rail cut. One plane of the flight jettisoned bombs and did not attack due to inoperative radio.

1340I/ Four plane STRIKE, two plane Gunfire Spot Team and three plane Carrier Qualification Group launched. The STRIKE group attacked supplies on a dock near CH'INNAMPO. A plane flown by First Lieutenant John B. GOERY, USMCR, 053549, was the second to deliver an attack. As he passed over the target at 1000 feet he reported that he had been hit and headed out to sea. Members of the flight observed pieces of his left wing falling from the plane and brown smoke pouring from his engine. LT GOERY jettisoned his remaining ordnance and proceeded down the TAEDONG Estuary toward the sea until his engine quit at which time he parachuted free. The plane crashed into the water. LT GOERY in his parachute drifted out to sea where he landed in the water about a mile from shore. He waved to the planes overhead and appeared to be in good condition. One plane of the flight escorted a helicopter to the scene from CH'O-DO Island while two others provided air cover for the downed pilot. The two plane Gunfire Spot team arrived to provide additional cover. About seventeen minutes after the pilot entered the water, a flight of four MIGS attacked the planes above LT GOERY. The MIGS engaged the covering planes for a period of ten minutes during which time they made six firing runs. No damage was inflicted on either friendly or enemy aircraft. The helicopter waited in a near by area until the MIGS had departed. The helicopter arrived over LT GOERY about thirty minutes after he entered the water, meanwhile a strong current had drifted the downed pilot and his rubber raft to within one half mile of the shore. The helicopter reported an inoperative winch, so a rope ladder was lowered to the pilot. During the next half hour LT GOERY was observed to climb to the top of the ladder six times without succeeding in getting inside the helicopter. At this time, a rubber raft was dropped to the pilot, however, he was unable to reach it. A second helicopter arrived from CH'O-DO and attempted to rescue the pilot, however, the winch cable broke and LT GOERY was dropped into the water again. A rope was lowered to the pilot but he was now too weak to attempt to climb it. A plane from the group then escorted a crash boat from CH'O-DO island to the scene. At this time a flight of F-86 jets arrived to assist in the rescue. The crash boat arrived about one and one half hours after the pilot was down. As the boat neared the pilot, shore batteries opened fire and were bracketing the boat with shells. The covering planes silenced two of the three guns firing before expending all their

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ordnance. The crash boat now reported it was unable to approach the pilot as one engine was failing and one running rough due to near misses of shell fire. The covering planes now lost sight of LT GOERY as it was late afternoon and the pilot was last seen floating low in the water with no visible movement. A second group of planes arrived to relieve the covering group. LT GOERY was not sighted again and is listed as missing in action.

1342I/ H.M.C.S. ATHABASCAN (DDE-219) reported eight Japanese fishing trawlers at 35-55N 125 12E and advised that vessels were ordered to proceed to authorized fishing areas.

1359I/ Recovered 1220I launch.

1417I/ Commenced Carrier qualification landings with three planes.

1419I/ One plane collapsed a tail wheel during a carrier qualification landing.

1500I/ Recovered carrier qualification planes having requalified three pilots with a total of fourteen landings. It was impossible to qualify these pilots prior to entering the operating area as the pilots reported aboard one day before the scheduled sailing date.

1500I/ ATHABASCAN reported that she would be unable to rendezvous with CTE 95.11 before dark and would proceed directly to CTU 95.12.1 if permissible.

1605I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. This STRIKE group relieved the 1340I group as cover for the attempted rescue of LT GOERY. No targets were attacked.

1708I/ Recovered remainder 1340I launch.

1748I/ Recovered 1605I launch.

1749I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

1801I/ CTE 95.11 released the ATHABASCAN to proceed to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

2018I/ LEWIS HANCOCK of the screen reported sonar contact with probable submarine at 37 36N, 124 27.5E, Case 1.
Due to the position in relation to the Task Element, CTE 95.11 concurred that it was Case 1 and directed an attack.

2022I/ PORTERFIELD was detached to join HANCOCK as assisting ship. CTE 95.11 advised the LEWIS HANCOCK that the contact was in immediate vicinity of a reported pinnacle.

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2026I/ COCKADE reported a sonar contact 2400 yards from the screen.

2031I/ COCKADE evaluated sonar contact as non-submarine.

2046I/ LEWIS HANCOCK completed depth charge attack on sonar target with impulse type depth charges. Depth charges did not detonate.

2053I/ LEWIS HANCOCK sent a flash submarine contact report.

2100I/ LEWIS HANCOCK completed two firing attacks with HEDGEHOGS. Explosions were observed.

2110I/ LEWIS HANCOCK reported sonar contact dead in the water at thirty fathoms.

2130I/ CTE 95.12 directed the ATHABASCAN to join CTE 95.11 to augment screen.

2136I/ PORTERFIELD gained sonar contact and evaluated it as improbable submarine.

2144I/ CTE 95.11 sent an amplifying report stating that sonar contact was in close proximity to a known underwater object and had been evaluated as doubtful submarine.

2149I/ LEWIS HANCOCK illuminated attack area to search for wreckage, no wreckage was observed.

2203I/ CTE 95.11 directed LEWIS HANCOCK and PORTERFIELD to rejoin the Task Element.

2209I/ CTE 95.11 suggested CTE 95.12 recall the ATHABASCAN since destroyers on contact had been ordered to rejoin.

2221I/ CTE 95.12 directed the ATHABASCAN to resume station on WHITBREAD patrol.

2228I/ CTE 95.11 sent second amplifying report stating that final evaluation of sonar contact was non-submarine.

2305I/ LEWIS HANCOCK and PORTERFIELD rejoined the Task Element.

Weather Summary:

A mild cold front passed HAEJU area at 0615I, preceeded by rain turning to snow by 0700I. Visibility was five miles with ceiling of 1000 feet in showers. Surface winds shifted from northwest to northeast and increased to twenty-eight knots. Morning strikes were not launched due to weather. Weather improved to operational minimums by 1100I with broken low clouds in operating area and clear skies in target area.

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Mission Summary:

Two CAP, eight TARCAP, and eight STRIKE for a total of eighteen sorties. In addition three carrier qualification flights were made.

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0015I/ U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK (DD-675) detached to investigate a radar surface contact at 36-35N, 124-35E.

0106I/ CTE 95.11 sent a dispatch in reference to initial submarine report and the two amplifying reports stating this as the third and final report and evaluating sonar contact as non-submarine.

0110I/ LEWIS HANCOCK reported contact was South Korean power junk No. 3 JUS Number 1F-1230 out of KUNSAN. Vessel was instructed to clear the area and CTE 95.12 was notified.

0220I/ LEWIS HANCOCK rejoined the Task Element.

0745I/ Two plane CAP and six plane STRIKE launched. One plane returned to ship after take-off due to canopy being jammed open. Remainder of STRIKE was unable to enter target area due to low ceiling and visibility. Flight jettisoned ordnance in clear area and returned to ship.

0759I/ Plane returning aboard with a jammed canopy suffered class "B" damage when port landing gear collapsed on contact with the deck.

0840I/ Eight enlisted personnel destined for the U.S.S. HANCOCK were transfered by highline. One officer came aboard from U.S.S. HANCOCK to receive training in air control duties.

0926I/ Recovered remainder of 0745I launch.

1136I/ H.M.C.S. ATHABASCAN (DDE-219) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1315I/ Six plane STRIKE launched to attack a radar site in a village near CHAERYONG. Twelve buildings were destroyed and a gasoline fire started. One plane was hit in external fuel tank by AA fire; the tank was jettisoned.

1510I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 requested TARCAP to attack gun positions near SOK-TO island that had fired on aircraft rescue boat 27 December. Damage to gun position was unassessable. Flight then attacked a village near CHANGNYON destroying three buildings and damaging four with ten troops killed.

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1531I/ Recovered 1315I launch.

1712I/ Recovered 1510I launch.

1714I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:

Overcast to broken clouds with ceilings of 500 feet and a visibility of four miles reduced morning flight operations. Target area cloudy until 1030I, gradually clearing during the afternoon. Weather marginal to undesirable during the morning, becoming average in the afternoon.

Mission Summary:

Three CAP, twelve STRIKE, and four TARCAP for a total of nineteen sorties.

29 December

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane armed reconnaissance launched. RECC group scouted from ONGJIN to YONAN, strafing ten railroad cars enroute. A grain warehouse near YONAN and three buildings in ONGJIN were destroyed. Medium and moderate AA fire was encountered over YONAN and ONGJIN.

0915I/ Two plane CAP, four plane armed reconnaissance, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP was unable to attack pre-briefed target due to weather. Troop bunkers near MONGGUMP'O-RI were attacked with unassessable damage before returning to act as defensive CAP. RECCO group scouted northern area inland without sighting any unusual targets. A radar station thirty miles North of CH'INNAMP(was attacked and destroyed. STRIKE group was unable to attack pre-briefed target due to weather. One building was destroyed with two buildings and a cave damaged near ONGJIN.

0941I/ Recovered 0715I launch.

1048I/ U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1115I/ Four plane CAP launched. CAP attacked troops in village of PAEKSA-DONG destroying six buildings and damaging four. Flight then returned to ship to act as defensive CAP.

1131I/ Recovered 0915I launch.

1205I/ Recovered two replacement aircraft plus a "COD" TBM, with mail from K-6.

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1217I/ U.S.S. HANCOCK (DD-675) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1325I/ Two plane CAP and seven plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near MONGGUMP'O-RI, destroying six buildings, then returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked railroad facilities near CHAERYONG. One railroad switch was destroyed, four rail cars damaged and five rail cuts made. A thirty foot boat was damaged near CH'INNAMPO. Two planes were diverted to K-6 for removal of hung ordnance.

1331I/ Launched "COD" TBM with LCDR D.A.K. FINLAY, RN, and SUB LT J.M. SIMONDS, RN, aboard for ITAZUKE, Japan.

1341I/ Recovered 1115I launch.

1515I/ Two plane CAP and two plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop village of ONG-DONG. Six buildings were destroyed and two damaged. Captain Carleton A. GREEN, USMC, suffered injury to his eyes from smoke produced by a premature rocket explosion in front of his plane. Injury resulted in a deferred emergency landing.

1530I/ Recovered remainder of 1325I launch.

1645I/ Commenced recovery of 1515I launch. One plane suffered class "B" damage as a result of engaging two barriers during landing.

1709I/ Completed recovery of 1515I launch.

1731I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:

Broken clouds with variable ceilings of 1500 to 2500 feet in operating area during the morning. Target area ceilings varied from 3500 feet in the North to 500 feet in the South with rain and snow showers during the morning. Flying conditions average until 0930I decreasing to undesirable at mid period and improving to average in the afternoon with ceilings of 4000 feet. An approaching cold front produced increasing winds and cloudiness. In many cases the weather limited the targets which could be attacked and the type of ordnance which could be employed.

Mission Summary:

Twelve CAP, two TARCAP, eight Armed Reconnaissance and eleven STRIKE for a total of thirty-three sorties.

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30 December

0615I/ A pre-dawn, four plane Armed Reconnaissance was launched. RECCO group attacked targets of opportunity by moonlight near P'YONGYANG Eight trucks were strafed and damaged. A locomotive and four rail cars were damaged near P'YONGYANG. A road bridge and bomb shelters were damaged near CHANGYON. Light AA fire was observed near P'YONGYANG.

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked buildings containing rice near ULLYUL and destroyed three buildings . A small boat was damaged near CHANGYON.

0819I/ Recovered 0615I launch.

0915I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP joined with two planes from K-6 that had been diverted there 29 December. Flight then attacked a troop village near SUNWI-DO destroying sixteen buildings and damaging a gun position. Planes returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked a railroad station near HAEJU destroying three buildings, One building was destroyed near SONGHWA. Moderate and accurate AA fire was encountered near HAEJU.

0936I/ Recovered 0715I launch.

1115I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP flew reconnaissance of railroad from ONGJIN to HAEJU. One flat car was attacked with unassessable damage before planes returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group attacked supplies stored near SINCH'ON with unassessable damage. Flight damaged two railcars and made a rail cut.

1130I/ Recovered 0915I launch plus two aircraft from K-6.

1300I/ H.M.S. COCKADE (D-34) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1315I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUNWI-DO destroying four buildings and killing an estimated ten troops. Flight returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack a troop village near CHANGNYON. Flight destroyed eighteen buildings and damaged six. STRIKE group attacked troops and reported mine storage area near CH'INNAMPO. Two gun positions were destroyed with an estimated ten troops killed and five wounded. A troop village near SINCH'ON was attacked with eight buildings damaged, an estimated five troops killed, and three wounded.

1336I/ Recovered 1115I launch.

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1400I/ U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK (DD-675) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1515I/ Two plane CAP and three plane Armed Reconnaissance launched. RECCO group made a reconnaissance of HAEJU Peninsula then attacked a troop village near YONAN, destroying six buildings. This flight strafed two small boats on the friendly island of KYODONG-DO by mistake. No personnel were observed in the vicinity and none were believed injured.

1540I/ Recovered 1315I launch.

1736I/ Recovered 1515I launch.

1736I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

2230I/ A Class "A" fire was reported in the Incinerator Space.

2305I/ The fire, confined to the incinerator space, was reported under control.

2330I/ The fire in the incinerator was completely extinguished. Fire was caused by smouldering embers ingiting trash in the incinerator space during removal of ashes. Damage resulting from the fir consisted of paint burned from bulkheads, and the loss of personal effects valued at $125.00.

Weather Summary:

Clear skies and unlimited ceiling with visibility aloft reduced slightly by haze. Surface winds West to North West at fourteen to eighteen knots. Flying conditions good to excellent.

Mission Summary:

Twelve CAP, four TARCAP, seven Armed Reconnaissance, and sixteen STRIKE for a total of thirty-nine sorties.

31 December

0025I/ H.M.C.S. ATHABASCAN (DDE-219) detached to investigate radar surfac contact. ATHABASCAN returned to assigned screening station after identifying surface contact as H.M.S. CRANE (PF).

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked troop villages near ONGJIN destroying thirty-seven buildings and a boat house with an estimated twenty troops killed and ten wounded. Fifteen buildings were damaged.

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0827I/ One officer was returned to U.S.S. PORTERFIELD (DD-682) by high-line, having completed training in air control duties. A second officer was received aboard the BADOENG STRAIT for similar trainin

0915I/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE and three plane Armed Reconnaissance launched. CAP destroyed four buildings and damaged four in a troop village near YONAN then returned to act as defensive CAP. STRIKE group destroyed fourteen buildings and damaged six in a troop village near CH'INNAMPO. One plane of this flight suffered damage to the starboard wing resulting from a hit by a 20MM AA projectile. Originally this was believed to have been caused by an explosion of a wing gun. The aircraft was escorted to K-6 for landing by a second plane of the group. RECCO group flew a reconnaissance to the HAN River then destroyed five buildings and damaged three in villages near YONAN. Light AA fire was encountered during the attack.

0949I/ Recovered 0715I launch.

1115I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked troops and bunkers near SUNWI-DO, damaging one bunker, then returned to act as defensive CAP. Remaining STRIKE planes attacked and destroyed one building near KYOMIP'O. Heavy snow showers hampered the attack.

1128I/ While awaiting the return of the 0915I launch the ceiling lowered to 300 feet with visibility of less than one half mile. The returning aircraft were vectored to the carrier using the SG-1b radar and a low visibility controlled approach procedure. The aircraft were successful in making visual contact with LSO at a distance of one half mile. The ceiling lifted shortly thereafter and the remainder of the 0915I launch was recovered.

1137I/ ATHABASCAN detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITBREAD patrol this date and on 1 January, then to report to CTE 95.12 for duty at 020001I January 1953.

1330I/ H.M.S. COCKADE (D-34) rejoined from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1340I/ Recovered 1115I launch. Remaining flights cancelled because of weather.

1500I/ H.M.S. COSSACK (D-57) reported three Korean fishing boats at 36-20N, 124-55E with side numbers BF-9524, BF-9525, BSO-9534 and BF-9535. Boats were instructed to proceed South out of the restricted area.

1613I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

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Weather Summary:

Scattered low clouds during the early morning. Cloudiness increased to overcast with a ceiling of 2000 feet by 0930I. Target area clear in the early morning with lowering ceiling as a cold front approached from the northwest. A wave developed in the Yellow Sea lowering ceiling to 500 feet and visibility to one mile, with snow and light rain by noon. Flying conditions average until 1000I, marginal from 1000I until noon and undesirable for the remainder of the day.

Mission Summary:

Seven CAP, eleven STRIKE and three Armed Reconnaissance for a total of twenty-one sorties.

1 January 1953

0001I TE 95.11 designation changed to TU 95.1.1 in accordance with change No. 12 to CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52.

0715I/ Scheduled flight operations were delayed because of heavy seas and frequent snow showers.

1500I/ Night plane STRIKE launched to attack the troop village of TAESOK-DONG. Thirty-two buildings were destroyed and fifteen damaged with two secondary explosions observed . Flight destroyed three rail cars at SAMCHON-NI then split into sections for reconnaissance of HAEJU area.

1650I/ Recovered 1500I launch.

1654I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:

Broken clouds to overcast with ceiling of 2000 feet lowering to 500 feet in snow showers throughout the day. Morning visibility was one half mile in snow and steam fog increasing to six miles in the afternoon. Target area clear from mid-morning throughout the day. Surface winds from the northwest twenty-five to thirty knots, with heavy seas decreasing to twenty-four knots in the afternoon. Flying conditions undesirable until 1400I becoming marginal for remainder of the day.
Frequent snow flurries and spray during the pre-dawn period kept a moderate coating of snow and slush ice on the flight deck. This alone would not have delayed operations since the mechanical sweeper was effective in keeping the deck clear enough for use.

Mission Summary

Eight STRIKE for a total of eight sorties.

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2 January

0630I/ Four plane Armed Reconnaissance launched to attack targets of opportunity near P'YONGYANG. CTU 95.1.5 (CH'O-DO) requested the flight investigate a reported railcut near KYOMIP'O. The flight located three trains near KYOMIP'O apparently stopped there by a rail cut made by shore based night fighters. There were a total of about sixty rail cars and four locomotives. The flight damaged all four locomotives and two rail cars. Heavy and accurate AA fir was encountered. The location of the trains was given to CTU 95.1.5 by voice radio by the returning aircraft.

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group divide to attack trains near KYOMIP'O. Three freight cars were damaged and a near miss on one locomotive produced a large secondary explosion. Three buildings were destroyed in a troop village near CH'INNAMPO. Heavy and accurate AA fire was encountered during attacks on the trains.

0833I/ Recovered 0630I launch.

0903I/ CTU 95.1.1 sent a flash report of the train's location to JOC Kore

0915I/ Two plane CAP and four plane Armed Reconnaissance launched. CAP attacked a troop village near MONGGUMP'O-RI destroying four buildings and killing an estimated ten troops. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. RECCO group was unable to attack the important train targets due to previously arranged rendezvous with planes from K-6. This group scouted to the HAN River area and attacked a troop village near YONAN. Thirteen buildings were destroyed and five damaged. RECCO group then made scheduled rendezvous with two aircraft that had been diverted to K-6 on 31 December and returned to the ship.

0935I/ Recovered 0715I launch.

1115I/ Scheduled four plane TARCAP augmented by three additional aircraft launched as STRIKE to attack stalled trains near KYOMIP'O. One locomotive and twelve rail cars were damaged. Three rail cuts were made. Air Force F-8A jets were observed overhead, attacking the trains with rockets from higher altitude. Heavy and accurate AA fire was encountered.

1209I/ Recovered 0915I launch including two planes from K-6.

1212I/ One officer was returned to the U.S.S. PONTCHARTRAIN (DD-682) by helicopter having completed training in Air Control duties.

1228I/ H.M.C.S. CRUSADER (DDE-228) joined the Task Unit.

1251I/ Recovered 1115I launch.

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1255I/ PORTERFIELD detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAD patrol.

1345I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched, the latter to replac earlier scheduled TARCAP which was diverted. CAP attacked a troo village near MONGGUMP'O-RI, destroying thirteen buildings, then returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.1.4 released TARCAP to attack a battalion head quarters near CH'INNAMPO. Twelve buildings were destroyed with one large secondary explosion observed. Light AA fire was encountered.

1515I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE attacked a troop area near UPCh'O-RI with unassessable damage. One road bridge was cut at SONGCh'ON-RI.

1534I/ Recovered 1345I launch plus one TBM "COD" from K-6 with four replacement pilots for VMA-312 aboard. Pilots had had no previous carrier experience and came aboard for qualification landings.

1712I/ Recovered 1515I launch.

1713I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:

Operating area had variable borken clouds to overcast with ceiling of 1500 to 2000 feet. A few light snow showers were in the area during the afternoon. Visibility was eight to ten miles. Target area was clear with good visibility throughout the day. Flying conditions were average during the period.

Mission Summary:

Eight CAP, four TARCAP, fifteen STRIKE, and eight Armed Reconnaissance for a total of thirty-five sorties.

3 January

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked buildings reported to house a rubber boat factory near ONCH'ON-NI. Three buildings were damaged. Two planes diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance.

0915I/ Two plane CAP and eight plane STRIKE launched. One TBM launched to qualify MAG-12 pilot in carrier landings. CAP attacked a troop village near SUNWI-DO destroying nineteen buildings with an estimated four troops killed. Flight then returned to act as defensive CAP. Light AA fire was encountered. STRIKE group attacked railroad overpasses near SONGNWA, damaging two. One building was damaged near CHANGYON. Two planes diverted to K-6 to remove hung ordnance.

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0941I/ Recovered remainder of 0715I launch.

1003I/ Commenced qualification landings with TBM.

1010I/ Completed TBM pilot qualification with a total of three landings.

1033I/ Launched the TBM "COD", with one F4U as escort, to K-6. The ships operations officer departed as a passenger in the TBM for TAD with Senior Naval Liaison Officer, JOC Korea, to discuss operating procedures with Naval Representatives in JOC Headquarters.

1115I/ Four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked troop bunkers North of CH'INNAMPO destroying two bunkers and damaging a cave. A road bridge was damaged near CH'INNAMPO.

1151I/ Recovered remainder of 0915I launch plus two planes that had diverted to K-6 from 0715I launch.

1202I/ U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK (DD-675) detached to CTU 95.1.2 for WHITBREAL patrol.

1315I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a troop village near SUNWI-DO. Flight damaged one building then returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.1.4 released TARCAP to attack troop bunkers near CH'INNAMPO. One bunker was destroyed and a loading wharf damaged. Five buildings were damaged near ONGJIN. Flight then flew reconnaissance of coast from CH'INNAMPO to PAENGNYONG-DO. STRIKE group attacked troop villages near HAEJU destroying nineteen buildings. A cave was damaged and a road cut made near ONGJIN.

1340I/ Recovered 1115I launch plus two aircraft diverted to K-6 from 0915I launch.

1515I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. Two planes launched for qualification landings. STRIKE group attacked troop bunkers near SUNWI-DO. Two bunkers were destroyed and some rice supplies damaged.

1534I/ Recovered 1315I launch.

1608I/ Commenced qualification landings.

1652I/ Completed qualification of two pilots with a total of twelve landings.

1658I/ Recovered 1515I launch plus qualification planes.

1800I/ Task Unit retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:

The operating area had broken low clouds with a ceiling of 2000 feet until 0900I. Remainder of the day was partly cloudy with unlimited visibility. Target area was clear throughout the day. Winds were from the North at twenty to twenty-five knots. Flying conditions were good.

Mission Summary:

Eight CAP, four TARCAP, and twenty-four STRIKE for a total of thirty-six sorties. Three pilots were qualified with a total of fifteen landings.

4 January

0121I/ H.M.C.S. CRUSADER (DDE-228) reported a sonar contact.

0123I/ CRUSADER reported sonar contact evaluated as non-submarine.

0715I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a reported rubber boat factory near ONCH'ON-NI. Three buildings were destroyed and four damaged. Troops were observed and attacked in a nearby village. Seven buildings were damaged with an estimated fifteen troops killed and ten wounded.

0915I/ Eight plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group split into two divisions to attack railroad targets. The first division attacked a railroad marshalling yard near CHAERYONG, destroying a road bridge and making seven rail cuts. A plane piloted by Captain Eugene N. JAMES, USMCR, was hit in the windshield by a 20MM projectile. The pilot suffered slight cuts from glass splinters. The plane later landed aboard safely. The second group attacked a railroad junction near CHAERYONG. Seven railcars were destroyed and three damaged. A coal shute was destroyed and four rail cuts made. One plane suffered minor damage from AA fire.

0925I/ Recovered 0715I launch.

0959I/ Two plane CAP launched.

1051I/ The Chaplain from the CRUSADER came aboard by helicopter to conduct religious services.

1115I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked a troop village near SINWON-NI destroying fifteen buildings and damaging five. Flight then flew reconnaissance to the HAN River.

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1136I/ Recovered 0915I and 0959I launch.

1144I/ H.M.S. COCKADE (D-34) chopped to CTU 95.1.2.

1315I/ Three plane STRIKE and four plane TARCAP launched. STRIKE group attacked and destroyed a transformer near SINCH'ON. Three buildings were destroyed in a nearby village. CTU 95.1.4 released TARCAP to attack a battalion headquarters near CHINNAMPO. One building was destroyed and one damaged.

1327I/ Recovered 1115I launch.

1345I/ U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK (DD-675) rejoined from CTU 95.1.2, WHITBREAD patrol.

1352I/ LEWIS HANCOCK alongside to transfer mail and personnel. LT CLABAR RN, came aboard by highline.

1426I/ Two BADOENG STRAIT officers plus LT CLABARD, RN, transferred to the CRUSADER by highline for further transfer to H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19). The BADOENG STRAIT officers are to observe air operations aboard the GLORY.

1515I/ Two plane CAP and four plane STRIKE launched. STRIKE group attacked troop villages near SUNWI-DO. Eighteen buildings were destroyed and six damaged. One plane of this group plus two plane defensive CAP returned to K-6 enroute to Itami for installation, test, and repair of wing rocket stations.

1532I/ Recovered 1315I launch. Scheduled carrier qualfication landings were cancelled because of light variable winds.

1713I/ Recovered remainder of 1515I launch.

1714I/ Set a course southward for Sasebo.

1726I/ The CRUSADER came alongside to transfer mail.

2058I/ CRUSADER chopped to H.M.S. GLORY.

2100I/ Relieved as CTU 95.1.1 by H.M.S. GLORY. Relieved as OTC, West Coast, by H.M.S. CRANE.

Weather Summary:

Operating area had a high overcast and low broken clouds with a ceiling of 1000 feet. Target area had an unlimited ceiling. Winds were light and variable at five to seven knots. Flying conditions average to good in target area for the entire period.

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Mission Summary:

Eight CAP, four TARCAP, and twenty-three STRIKE for a total of thirty-five sorties.

5 January

0845I/ Three plane CAP and two plane Carrier Qualification Group launched.

0924I/ Commenced qualification landings with two planes.

0940I/ One plane of the qualification group suffered class "B" damage as a result of entering the starboard catwalk during an attempted landing.

1026I/ Recovered remainder of 0845I launch. Two pilots were qualified with a total of seven landings.

1027I/ U.S.S. LEWIS HANCOCK (DD-675) chopped to CTU 95.1.1.

1729I/ Moored to Buoy Number eighteen in Sasebo Harbor.

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PART III DECLASSIFIED

REMARKS ON PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE, MATERIAL, AND EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES.

A. Ships ordnance expended 26 December 1952:

1. 1685 rounds of 40MM.

B. Performance of ship's ordnances:

1. AA firing exercise was conducted 26 December 1952 with no material casualties.

2. 30 December; improper assembly of breech block on right gun of Mount #5 caused the outer cocking lever to break, and burred the sear and inner crank. All parts were replaced.

3. The MK-34 radar of the MK-63 director system sustained the following casualties:

a. 27 December: (Radar II) Variance of crystal current in transmitter receiver caused by TR tube 724B. The tube was replaced.

b. 31 December: (Radar VIII) Power failure in 115 volt circuit due to a bad fuse in the MK-3 fuse box. The fuse was replaced.

c. 2 January: Intermittent transmission of range to receiver, also indication of no torque on range receiver dial. The malfunction was caused by a faulty 6L6 (low emission) tube in amplifier MK-4 Mod 1. The mechanical limit stop for range in the relay transmitter assembly also stopped. The tube was replaced and the limit stop set.

4. Mount #14 sustained the following casualty:

a. 31 December: Failed to synchronize in train due to a faulty amplifier. The amplifier was replaced.

C. The AA firing exercise on 26 December indicated a need for improvement in the accuracy of fire of the port battery. No firing was conducted enroute to Sasebo because of inclement weather.

D. A five point training program for the department has been promulgated. The five points are:

1. General Drills, i.e., G.Q., Loading drills

2. General Training Periods, i.e., Lectures, Practical exercises

3. Advancement Training, i.e., Correspondence courses

4. Personal Training via USAFI.

5. School Programs (Fleet and Service)

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E. Summary of Aviation Ordnance Expended:

TYPE	AMOUNT
1000# GP Bombs	39
500# GP Bombs	84
250# GP Bombs	139
100# GP Bombs	464
Napalm Bombs	50
5" HVAR Rockets	464
Rounds 20MM Ammo	20,820
Rounds 50 cal. Ammo	30,000

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PART IV

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SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. The ship sustained no Battle Damage.

B. Damage inflicted on the enemy by ships aircraft:

TARGETS	DAMAGED	DESTROYED
Boats	2	0
Buildings	103	292
Bunkers	2	5
Caves	4	0
Gun Positions	1	3
Radar Stations	0	1
Railroad Cars	33	10
Railroad Coal Shute	1	0
Rail Cuts	18	0
Railroad Locomotives	4	0
Railroad Overpasses	3	0
Rail Switches	0	1
Road Bridges	3	0
Road Cuts	4	0
Supplies (In Stacks)	Large Amount	Destroyed
Transformer Stations	0	1
Troops	18	50
Trucks	4	0

C. Damage Suffered by Ships Aircraft

1. Operational Damage

a. The tail wheel assembly was sheared from a plane during qualification landings on 27 December resulting in class "C" Damage.

b. One aircraft suffered class "B" damage when the port landing gear collapsed during a landing on 28 December.

c. A tail wheel collapsed during a landing causing a plane to strike the barriers and resulting in class "B" damage on 29 December.

d. One plane suffered class "B" damage as a result of entering the starboard catwalk during an attempted landing on 5 January.

2. Damage resulting from enemy action

a. One plane was lost in the sea after being hit by AA fire on 27 December.

b. One plane received minor damage consisting of bullet holes in the wing from AA fire on 28 December.

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c. One aircraft suffered class "C" damage as a result of a hit in the starboard wing by 20MM AA fire on 31 December.

d. One plane received a hole in the cowling as a result of flying through debris caused by a rocket blast on 3 January. Damage was minor.

e. One plane suffered a shattered windshield as a result of a hit by 20MM AA fire on 4 January.

f. One plane received bullet holes in the wing from AA fire on 4 January.

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PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A Performance

1. Personnel

Number of personnel assigned to the ship during the patrol, including marines, was 1123, Personnel absent for various reasons totaled 38 leaving 1,085 actually aboard during the period. Four marine pilots came aboard while the ship was at sea.

2. Education

Educational advancement received continued emphasis as personnel prepare for the advancement in rating examinations. In addition to courses already being utilized, nine correspondence courses, four USAFI courses and twenty-one course books were issued during the patrol. On the job training constituted the largest single phase of the program due to the heavy operating schedule.
Exchange of officers between units of the United Nations Fleet has proved to be an interesting and valuable source of training. Two officers from this ship were transferred to the British Carrier to observe Air Operations. Four officers from various units in the area came aboard for training and to observe operations.

3. Divine Services

Services conducted aboard during this patrol included, four protestant services with two holy communions, one catholic mass, daily rosary services, one bible class and two Latter Day Saints services. The Chaplain from the H.M.C.S. ATHABASCAN (DDE-219) came aboard to conduct Catholic Mass.

4. Welfare and Recreation

A heavy maintenance schedule reduced movie showings to four during this period. Each movie was attended by a capacity audience.
The library rates high as a form of recreation as evidenced by the large number of books currently checked out to personnel.
A summary of the days action, world news and sporting events is broadcast over the ships announcing system at noon each day by the Chaplain. A staff, headed by the Chaplain, prints a daily paper which is available for reading during the breakfast hour and is distributed to All Ships in the Task Unit.

B. Casualties

First Lieutenant John B. GOLRY, USMCR, 053549, was declared missing in action on 27 December 1952. Numerous attempts to rescue LT GOLRY from the water near enemy territory failed and it has not been determined that he survived to reach the shore. It is considered extremely improbable in view o his location in the water, the circumstances of the attempted rescue, and the temperature of the water that he could have survived.

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PART VI

SPECIAL COMMENTS ON DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

A. Air Department

Recommendations

The following recommendations set forth in the action report for 8 December through 17 December 1952 remain valid.

a. Operating squadrons should check regularly and frequently condition of E17-17 igniter plug receptacles on all aircraft, and replace as required.

b. Operating squadrons should renew circuit wiring on all aircraft showing release circuit wire deterioration.

c. Support FASRONs should replace or overhaul defective or deteriorating Aero 14A, MK-55, and MK-9 racks on aircraft prior to assignment of replacement aircraft to combat squadrons.

Comment

Three (3) new pilots with no previous carrier experience were carrier qualified. (Total landings 30). During carrier qualifications on 5 January 1953, F4U-4B, BuNo 97501, sustained probable class "A" damage when it went into the starboard catwalk incident to landing aboard. The pilot was uninjured. The aircraft was removed from the catwalk using the Le-Tourneau crane.

Comment

The HO3S-1 helicopter was out of commission on three occasions during flight operations because of an inoperative rotor brake resulting from brake shoe failure. Since the rotor brake is designed as a rotor parking brake, its required use in carrier helicopter operation to stop blade rotation subjects brake shoes to relatively severe conditions of wear. The HU-1 DET maintenance records show that six (6) sets of brake shoes have had to be replaced during the last six months. This vessel has strictly adhered to current operating instructions for this model helicopter.

Recommendations

a. A more rugged rotor brake shoe should be developed for the HO3S-1 helicopter. It is understood the brake assemblies on more recent models have been developed, taking into account the severe demands of carrier operation.

b. Until such time as a more rugged brake shoe is available, brake shoes should be thoroughly inspected before and after each flight, and that they be replaced prior to failure.

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Comment

The catapult bridle allowance for the CVE-105 Class Carrier contains requirements for F6F, F8F, AF, TBM, AD, and F4U type aircraft. In adding up the non-usable bridles, due to the basic fact that only one type aircraft can be efficiently operated at any one time, it is obvious that valuable storage space is used for items that will undoubtably never be used on any one particular cruise.

Recommendation

The allowance of bridles for types of aircraft not assigned be reduced to two (2) for each type for use in emergencies. Proper bridles can be loaded on the basis of type aircraft assigned for forthcoming operations. Thus monetary savings will result as well as the saving in stowage space.

Comment

Cold weather operational problems were encountered almost continously during this period. Scheduling ten (10) plane strikes for dawn launch presents difficult deck spotting problems to the CVE-105 carrier during extreme cold weather. To insure that the first launch was ready in all respects at the scheduled time, the following procedures were considered necessary:

a. Assigned aircraft were spotted on the hangar deck at least four (4) hours prior to launch in order to aid in turn-up.

b. These planes were respotted to flight deck just prior to turn-up check-out.

c. Topping off with gasoline of these aircraft was done on hangar deck.

d. Ammunition loading except fuzing was done on the hangar deck.

e. The formation steamed down wind during preparations for launching in order to have the least amount of freezing wind across the deck. This substantially improved the efficiency and safety of personnel on the flight deck.

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Comment

Aircraft handling tractors are not equipped with visible all-round red lighting for night flight deck operations. This command is placing a small red light on each fender as a safety measure to insure that all personnel can see the movement of the tractors at night.

Recommendation

Aircraft handling tractors should be provided with small all-round red lights as a safety measure to insure that personnel see its movements on a blacked-out flight deck.

Comment

The hung ordnance summary for the subject period is set forth below:

Items	Rack	Reason
HVAR		
19	Aero 14A	10-faulty igniter plugs (S ring fatigue, Aero 17-17 plugs) 2 -Parted pig tails 3 -Circuit failure 4 -Undertermined
10	MK-9	3 -Faulty igniters 7 -Cut pig-tails
29 Total HVARS		
250# GP		
1	Aero 14A	1 - Circuit failure
6	MK-55	6 - Circuit failure
100# GP		
4	Aero 14A	1 - Solenoid failure 3 - Pilot error (switches)
5	MK-55	5 - Circuit failure
16 Total Bombs		

While some improvement was noted with respect to hung ordnance during this operating period, the problem remains acute and requires further concerted effort for solution.

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Land - Launch Data is tabulated below:

Launches

	H-2-1 Catapult	H-4C Catapult
Number of Launches	60	188
Average Weight Pounds	14,500	15,000
Average Wind Knots	28	28
Average Pressure psi	2,650	2,000
No. Bridles Expended	5	3

Landings

Number of landings - 266
Average Wind Knots - 30
CPV psi - 600
Average runout feet - 114
Wires Caught - #1 - 49, #2 - 92, #3 - 77, #4 - 36, #5 - 8, #6 - 3, #7 - 0, #8 - 0, #9 - 1
Barrier Crashes - 1
Barriers engaged - 2 & 3

B. Operations Department

1. Combat Information Center

Watches in CIC were arranged into three rotating watch sections of enlisted men with a total of seven men to a section. There are six CIC watch officers and two Air Plot Watch Officers. During all air operations, there is an Air Plot Officer, a CIC Watch Officer, and an Air Control Officer on watch.

The carrier operates approximately thirty-five miles from enemy territory during daylight hours. A two plane CAP is maintained on station five to ten miles from the ship in the expected direction of enemy air activity. This provides approximately twenty-five miles in which to effect an intercept of approaching aircraft.

The major function of CIC during these patrols is control of STRIKE groups and the defensive CAP. Returning strikes are intercepted by defensive CAP to provide identification as well as training. Interception is usually made about fifteen to twenty miles from the ship. A better air search radar and IFF installation would substantially aid CIC in improving the air defense of the ship.

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Three officers from the screen destroyers were aboard to obtain training as air controllers during this patrol. The defensive CAP were split and used for practice intercepts in order to provide a maximum amount of training

2. Communications

1. Personnel

Due to a shortage of trained radiomen, watches were stood on a port and starboard basis, six hours on and six hours off. Standing of long watches over a long period of time decreased efficiency and increased the number of errors made. Although this command received three graduates from class "C" schools graduates were unable to meet minimum requirements for guarding a circuit, because of inadequate training. Moreover, during the period that this ship has operated as Commander Task Element 95.11, the radio traffic has increased several times over that experienced in operations previous to this assignment.

Recommendation:

a. Escort Carriers operating as Task Element Commanders in the Yellow Sea should be provided four (4) rated radiomen above the fleet average because of the unusually heavy traffic load in this area.

b. The requirements for completion of Class "C" radio school should be increased to the minimum point necessary to enable a graduate to guard the slower circuits.

2. Material

The coding machines, although never in an inoperative state, wer a constant source of trouble through faulty mechanical operation.

Recommendation

It is recommended that an additional medium-high frequency transmitter and an additional coding machine be provided in this class ship, when the ship is operating in the capacity of CTE 95.11

3. Services

It was found that requests for services from major relay stations were slow in being transmitted and on several instances it was necessary to initiate a second request. On messages of importance to operations, a delay in receiving a service could have serious consequences.

A message originated by this command was altered as to date time group, characters of groups, and message indicator when re-broadcast by NDT KATT. The date time group of the message was altered from 111358Z of December to 111357Z of December and the fourth message indicator was changed

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from CHARLIE to VICTOR. Numerous characters in the re-broadcast differed fr. those in the original message. These alterations made it impossible to decrypt the message. The resulting requests for reencryption from all addres: ees, in such cases, increases the work load on circuits and crypto centers substantially.

3. Photographic Laboratory

Photographic work was confined to routine ships work, photographs for the cruise book and support of the squadron. The aerial camera and assembly were lost in action the first day of operations as the plane carrying the installation was shot down by enemy AA fire. A replacement assembly was not available aboard the ship.

4. Aerology

Weather forecasting in the Yellow Sea is difficult due to lack of reports. During an average 24 hour period, the teletype response (RATT) is grabled about five hours, normally between 1000I and 1500I. It is difficult to keep a map sequence as the ship has no facsimile equipment, and no other outside aid is available. On the average less than two canned maps a day are received from AIF, Tokyo. It is considered that facsimile equipment should be installed on carriers at the earliest opportunity.

C. Engineering Department

1. Damage Control

At 2225 on 30 December, a class "A" fire broke out in the incinerator room. Approximately thirty minutes was required to extinguish this fire.

Personnel cleaning the fire box placed hot ashes and clinkers into a container to dump overboard. This material flared up and a CO2 fire extinguisher was exhausted in attempting to quell the flames. The personnel involved went to get a bucket of water, one departing immediately, and the second man when the first one was slow in returning. When both were gone, with the doors to the incinerator room dogged close, the fire broke out again and set fire to adjacent trash. The fire was brought under control with fire hoses.

As a result of the experience of this fire, the procedure for fire fighting has been changed to require ringing the general alarm. With the entire crew standing easy at battle stations the ability of the ship to counter a fire or to prevent a chain reaction of other fires or explosions resulting from the initial fire, is materially increased.

To improve safety in the incinerator room the personnel assigned there are being given additional training in fire fighting. Additional CO2 fire extinguishers have been placed there. Safety precautions requiring trash to be moved direct from the accumulation bins to the fire box will be rigidly enforced.

[redacted]

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

D. Medical Department

1. First Lieutenant John B. GOWAY, USMCR, 053549, was declared missing in action 27 December 1952.

2. There were no personnel wounded or killed in action during this patro

3. Medical Statistical Summary of Air Group and Ships Company

a. Admitted to sick list - 155
b. Total sick days out of 10 possible working days - 146
c. Officers admitted to sick list - 1
d. Total patients attending sick call - 422
e. Total medical treatments - 667
f. Patients received from other ships - 0
g. Patients transferred to hospital - 0
h. Number of minor injuries treated - 10
i. Number of major injuries treated - 0
j. Number of ship board injuries resulting in death - 0
k. Minor surgical procedures - 10
l. Major surgical procedures - 0
m. Veneral diseases cases and non-specific Urethritis - total - 25

1. Gonorrhea - 3
2. Chancroid - 7
3. Non-specific Urethritis following exposure - 15

n. Penicillin tablets issued during last port period - 128

4. Medical statistical Summary Air Group Pilots and Crewmen

a. Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons - 6
b. Pilots permanently grounded for medical reasons - 0
c. Average number days pilots grounded - 2
d. Crew grounded for medical reasons - 0
e. No. of pilots KIA - 0
f. No. of pilots WIA - 0
g. No. of pilots MIA - 1

H. L. RAY

Copy to:

CNO (2) Advance
CINCPACFLT (2) Advance
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVFE (1) Advance

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP
COMSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance
CTF 77 (1) Advance
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMSERVPAC
COMFAIRJAPAN
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
COMCARDIV-15
COMCARDIV-17
CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
CG, AIRFMFPAC (1) Advance
CG, FMFPAC (1) Advance
CG, 1st MARAIRWING
CO, MAG 12
CO, VMA-312
CO, USS BATAAN (CVL-29)
CO, USS ANDOVA (CVE-114)
CO, USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)
CO, USS SICILY (CVE-118)
CO, USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)

AUTHENTICATED

S. O. COLE
CDR, USN
Operations Officer

[redacted]

71

U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

DECLASSIFIED

[redacted]

26 December 1952

FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR 27 DECEMBER 1952

SUNRISE 0755 SUNSET 1730

EVENT	NO. A/C	MISSION	LAUNCH	LAND	AMMO	NOTES
A-1	2	CAP	0715	0855	A	
A-2	4	STRIKE	0715	0855	A,B	
B-3	2	CAP	0845	1140	A,C	
B-4	2	SPOT	0845	1140	A,E	On target 0930 - 1130
B-5	4	STRIKE	0845	1140	A,D	1 A/C camera and belly tank
B-6	4	CARQUAL	0845	1140	A	25 gals in belly tanks
C-7	2	CAP	1130	1325	A,C	
C-8	4	STRIKE	1130	1325	A,B	
D-9	2	CAP	1315	1510	A,C	
D-10	4	STRIKE	1315	1510	A,D	
E-11	2	CAP	1500	1730	A	
E-12	4	STRIKE	1500	1730	A,D	
E-13	4	CARQUAL	1500	1730	A	
			HELICOPTER			
		GUARD MAIL	0730			All ships
		GUARD MAIL	1150			Designated ships (WHITEBREAD)

NOTE:

1. All flight with belly tanks.

AMMO LOAD

A - All A/C with full gun loads.
B - All A/C 1000# /5 sec and 4-100# inst./ND.
C - All A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.
D - 2 A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.
2 A/C 500# 0.1/.025 and 6-100# 0.1/.025.
E - All A/C 500# / 5 sec and 6-HVAR.

SECOND-IN-COMM 7 30 JAN 1953 FAR EAST STATION

B. E. COLKITT JR
LCDR, USN
Air Operations Officer

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (1)

OPERATING PERIOD-27 DEC.1952 TO 4 JAN.1953