From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN  
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 28 January 1953 through 7 March 1953

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4

Encl: (1) CVG 9 Action Report 28 January 1953 through 7 March 1953

1. In accordance with reference (a) the Action Report for the period 28 January 1953 through 7 March 1953 is hereby submitted.

PART I - COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION:

The USS PHILIPPINE SEA, with CARRIER AIR GROUP NINE embarked got underway at 0711 28 January 1953 to join Task Force Seventy Seven by authority CTF 77 confidential dispatch 2506322 of January. The USS REPHAW (DE/499) joined the USS PHILIPPINE SEA off Sasebo on 30 January. The Task Force, commanded by RADM R. F. Hickey, USN Embarked in the USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33), was joined at 0630J on 31 January in operating area Sugar in the Sea of Japan. The composition of the Task Force included the following ships: USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33), USS ORISKANY (CVA-34), and destroyers of DESDIV 91, 92, and 152.

On 11 February the USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45) with RADM A. SORCEK, USN, embarked, joined the force relieving the USS ORISKANY. RADM SORCEK, CONCARDIV 3, relieved RADM HICKY as Commander Task Force 77. Other ships joining the Force during this operating period were: USS MISSOURI (BB-63) with VADM J. J. CLARK, COMTHLIT embarked, USS TOLEDO (CA-133), USS ROCHESTER (CA-124), and USS LOS ANGELES (CA-135) and DESDIVS 111, 172, and 182.

The Task Force operated in accordance with Commander Task Force 77 Operation Order 2-52. The mission of the Force was to conduct air and surface operations off the coast of Korea in support of the UN Forces in Korea, and to support the policy of the United States in the Far East. This was accomplished through close air support to front line troops; destruction of enemy built-up areas and industrial concentrations, and interdiction of the enemy supply lines and storage areas. At the conclusion of the period the USS PHILIPPINE SEA departed the Task Force at 1557J on 4 March 1953 and returned to Yokosuka on 7 March 1953.
26 Jun 1953  At 280711I not underway from Yokosuka, Japan, in accordance with CTF 77 confidential dispatch 2506322.

29 Jun 1953  Underway to operating area. Conducted AA firing.

30 Jun 1953  Joined by USS REMSHAW (DDF-499) off Sagafo. Conducted air operations in cooperation with Japan Air Defense Forces.

31 Jun 1953  Joined Task Force 77, area Swar, at 0630I. Conducted combat air operations consisting of attacks against Wonan airfield, enemy supply areas.

1 Feb 1953  Conducted combat air operations consisting of attacks against billeting and shelter areas, interdiction of enemy supply routes.

2 Feb 1953  Conducted combat air operations consisting of attacks against troop billeting areas, supply storages areas, and vehicle shelters. Interdiction work continued against enemy supply routes.

3 Feb 1953  No operations, Task Force replenished.

4 Feb 1953  Conducted combat air operations consisting of attacks against warehousing and storage areas, rail and highway bridges, rail road tunnels. ECM work was begun.

5 Feb 1953  No air operations due weather.

6 Feb 1953  Air operations limited due weather to ECM work and attacks against factory buildings in city of Hungnam.

7 Feb 1953  No operations, Task Force replenished.

8 Feb 1953  Conducted combat air operations consisting of attacks against billeting and supply areas, naval gun fire spot at Wonan, interdiction against enemy rail and road network. Strikes were instituted against factory buildings in Somjin.

9 Feb 1953  Conducted combat air operations consisting of attacks against warehousing and supply buildings, interdiction of main supply routes and bridges. Conducted AA firing.

10 Feb 1953  Conducted combat air operations consisting of attacks against supply shelters, factory and industrial area of Chongjin, enemy troop concentrations.

11 Feb 1953  No operations, Task Force replenished. USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45) arrived Task Force, USS ORISKANY (CVA-34) departed for Yokosuka.
12 Feb 1953 Conducted combat air operations consisting of attacks on enemy barracks and supply dumps, naval gun fire spot at Tonisan, rail and road interdiction. LTJG G. H. Palmer, USN, of VA-95 crash landed on Yodo Island due loss of fuel pressure. Pilot was uninjured.

13 Feb 1953 Air operations limited due weather to attacks on the main enemy supply routes and ECM work.

14 Feb 1953 Conducted combat air operations consisting of attacks on enemy bunkers and supplies, close air support in the front line area, interdiction of main supply routes.

15 Feb 1953 No operations, Task Force replenished. Conducted AA firing.

16 Feb 1953 Conducted combat air operations consisting of close air support and other strikes in the front line area, attacks on bridges and supplies, interdiction of roads and rails. LTJG H. T. Evans, USN, VF-93 crashed into water at force. Pilot not recovered.

17 Feb 1953 Conducted combat air operations consisting of attacks on coastal gun emplacements vicinity Wonsan, rails and tunnels, close air support for front line troops.

18 Feb 1953 Conducted combat air operations consisting of attacks on enemy barracks, bivouacs, supply dumps, and interdiction of main supply routes. LT R. B. Stamatis, USNR, VF-93, ditched from combat air patrol and was recovered by HMCS Athabaskan (DDE-219). Pilot suffered back injuries.

19 Feb 1953 No operations, Task Force replenished.

20 Feb 1953 Conducted combat air operations consisting of close air support, attacks against mining plants, ammo storage areas, rail and road strikes.

21 Feb 1953 Conducted combat air operations consisting of interdiction against rail system, attacks on cement plants, troop billeting areas.

22 Feb 1953 Conducted combat air operations consisting of close air support, ECM work, attacks on storage buildings, interdiction against bridges, rails, and tunnels. USS Kearsarge (CVa-33) departed for Yokosuka.

23 Feb 1953 No operations, Task Force replenished. Conducted AA firing.

24 Feb 1953 Conducted combat air operations consisting of close air support against enemy bunkers and trenches, attacks on supply and billeting areas and coastal gun emplacements vicinity of Wonsan, interdiction of main supply routes.
25 Feb 1953  Conducted combat air operations consisting of interdiction work, attacks against coastal gun emplacements vicinity of Wonsan, strikes on billeting areas and supply shelters. ECM work was conducted along coast.

26 Feb 1953  Conducted combat air operations consisting of attacks against personnel and supply shelters, electrical installations, vehicle repair facilities, close air support against bunkers and trenches, interdiction against main supply routes. LTG E. H. BOUSLOG crashed landed in friendly territory due to enemy AA fire. Pilot uninjured.

27 Feb 1953  No operations, Task Force replenished.

28 Feb 1953  Conducted combat air operations consisting of interdiction work on rail and road system, attacks against warehouses, billeting areas, coastal gun emplacements, industrial areas. ECM was conducted.

1 Mar 1953  Conducted combat air operations consisting of close air support against mortar positions and trenches, attacks against supply buildings, interdiction of rail roads. LCDR R. J. O'BEY, USN, executive officer of VA-95, crashed into water on take off. Pilot was recovered uninjured. FNS E. A. NIXON, USNR, VF-91, crashed as result of enemy AA fire. Pilot presumed killed in action.

2 Mar 1953  Air operations limited due weather to interdiction of rails and roads between Taejon and Sinchon.

3 Mar 1953  No operations, Task Force replenished.

4 Mar 1953  Conducted combat air operations consisting of close air support against mortar positions and trenches, attacks against personnel and supply shelters, naval gun fire spot at Wonsan. USS ORISKANY (CVA-34) arrived Task Force. USS PHILIPPINE SEA departed for Yokosuka 15571.

5 Mar 1953  Enroute to Yokosuka. Conducted AA firing.

6 Mar 1953  Enroute to Yokosuka.


PART III - ORDNANCE:

1. Material. There were no major casualties sustained by the Ship's ordnance and/or Fire Control Material. No piece of Ordnance equipment was out of commission longer than four (4) hours to effect necessary repairs.
2. Ammunition expenditures. Ammunition expended for training was as follows:

   a. Ship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5&quot;/33 AAC</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&quot;/33 VT</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&quot;/33 VT Non-frag</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 MM (all types)</td>
<td>2809</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   b. Air Group (see air group supplement)

3. Gunnery Exercises. AA Fire at was conducted at every opportunity. Firing on replenishment and operating days was limited due to weather and flight schedules. Enroute to the Task Force, firing was conducted using weather balloons. This is good familiarization practice for indoctrination of new men assigned to gun crews. Enroute from the Task Force to Yokosuka the following practices were conducted: AA Baker and AA George.

4. Remarks on replenishment.

   a. During the period of 31 January to 4 March 1953, the USS PHILIPPINE SEA refueled from AO's nine (9) times, receiving a total of 1,179,940 gallons of aviation gasoline and 2,144,675 gallons of fuel oil.

   b. Seven (7) destroyers were received at the after transfer station for the transfer of personnel or freight via the highline.

   c. Rearming operations were conducted eight (8) times:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Tons per hour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/3/53</td>
<td>USS TITANIA</td>
<td>130 tons</td>
<td>1 hr. 24 min.</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/7/53</td>
<td>USS VIRGO</td>
<td>124 tons</td>
<td>54 min.</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/11/53</td>
<td>USS CHARA</td>
<td>272 tons</td>
<td>1 hr. 41 min.</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/15/53</td>
<td>USS PARACUTIN</td>
<td>158 tons</td>
<td>1 hr. 33 min.</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/19/53</td>
<td>USS PARACUTIN</td>
<td>200 tons</td>
<td>1 hr. 53 min.</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/23/53</td>
<td>USS VIRGO</td>
<td>150 tons</td>
<td>1 hr. 17 min.</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/27/53</td>
<td>USS CHARA</td>
<td>138 tons</td>
<td>1 hr. 4 min.</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/3/53</td>
<td>USS VIRGO</td>
<td>202 tons</td>
<td>1 hr. 28 min.</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Over all average 125.4

   d. No difficulties were encountered during the rearming and replenishing operations.
PART IV - BATTLE DAMAGE:

1. No battle damage was inflicted on the PHILIPPINE SEA during the period.

2. Damage inflicted on Philippine Sea aircraft (refer to enclosure (1)).

3. Damage inflicted by Philippine Sea aircraft (refer to enclosure (1)).

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES:

1. Performance.
   a. Personnel

   The PHILIPPINE SEA, with AIR GROUP NINE embarked, departed from Yokosuka on 28 January 1943. None of the 2,801 enlisted men or 263 officers attached at the time missed the sailing of the ship due to unauthorized absence.

   During the period of this report, five men received non-judicial punishment at Captain's Mast and four were tried by summary court martial. Discipline has been no problem during the entire tour on the line.

   Despite the rigorous schedule of operations, the personnel aboard the PHILIPPINE SEA have displayed a keen interest in their educational advancement. During this period, 26 GED tests have been administered, 40 men have applied for USAF correspondence courses, 36 have checked out manuals for self-improvement, and 92 men have taken advantage of Navy correspondence courses to improve themselves for advancement in rating. A total of 150 counseling hours have been held to assist individuals to profitably plan their educational program.

   There were 1,216 competitive, service-wide examinations conducted in the month of February. Classes in College Algebra, Analytical Geometry, and Plane Trigonometry have been organized and meet for three hours each week. Mathematics classes are open to both officer and enlisted personnel.

   Morale remained exceptionally high throughout the tour.

b. Welfare and Recreation

   In addition to scheduled movies, the ship's band played regular concerts for the crew and an informal "hillbilly" band was organized with excellent results. Three variety shows were prepared and staged. They were very well received. Bingo games have been established as a regular Wednesday night feature. They have proved to be quite popular. The library was well patronized and the demand for record players and phonograph records has continued.
A hobby shop has been established with an officer assigned collateral duty as Hobby Shop Officer. The hobby shop, although relatively new on board this ship, has proven quite successful and most popular with the crew. The shop features various types of handicraft, among them being leather working, wood carving, model plane and railroad building.

A recreation room which was opened for the crew just prior to deployment has served its purpose exceedingly well.

Qualified physical training instructors have been assigned primary duty as supervisors of the crew's and Officers' workout rooms. A large number of officers and men regularly avail themselves of this opportunity to maintain themselves in physical condition.

c. Religious Activities

During this period, Divine Services were held as follows: Catholic Mass celebrated twice daily and three times on Sunday; Confessions were heard Saturday nights or as desired; the Blessed Sacrament was reserved, allowing sailors to receive Holy Communion at any time; Catholic Instructions were held three evenings a week; Protestant Morning Prayer service was held daily; Holy Communion held Sunday morning. Regular Sunday Morning Worship was conducted with choir. Bible study and Prayer Services were conducted three times each week. Jewish, Christian Science and Latter Day Saints services and study groups were held weekly. Each night evening prayers are broadcast over the public address system following taps. Memorial services were conducted for two pilots (Protestant) and one enlisted ship's company man (Catholic).

The ship collected donations in an amount of $5,556.30 for the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis.

A large quantity of clothing and shoes was collected for and sent to needy Koreans on Yodo Island.

2. Medical.

a. Performance

The morale of all hands aboard the ship during the period of this report has been outstanding. This ship arrived on the line as a clean ship in a sound state of operational readiness. The health of the crew suffered somewhat because of the rapid transition from one climate to another, and there were several admissions to the sick list because of influenza.

Cold weather clothing was adequate and properly distributed, and hot soup and coffee were always available to all personnel. Large hours because of heavy air operations scheduling produced occasional episodes of fatigue among personnel concerned, but since this was the first period on the line in this cruise this fatigue was temporary and did not become serious.
However, it is felt that this factor is one which must be watched for and guarded against as time in this area progresses. Chronic fatigue will lead to carelessness, breakdown of morale, and loss of efficiency.

b. Illness

The following figures are those for the month of February, and include both air group and ship's company. There were 109 admissions to the sick list of which 90 were for illness and 19 for injury. These people spent a total of 530 days in the sick bay. During the first two weeks about half of the ill had influenza, but later the admissions reflected the usual shipboard distribution.

There were 1424 visits to the sick bay for a total of 2009 treatments. Nineteen of these were the result of reportable injuries. During the month there were 29 surgical procedures in the operating room, 9 of which were major, and 20 were minor. These figures do not include suture cases done in the dressing room or the application of casts.

c. Casualties

One man died as a result of being struck by the propeller of an AD-4 on the flight deck. He suffered severe injuries to his left arm and a crushed left chest with lung damage.

d. Venereal Disease

There were 13 admissions to the venereal sick list from the ship's company. G.C. and chancre responded well to treatment, but the non-specific V.D. urethritis has been very refractive. The ship was in port three days.

e. Recommendations: None.

PART VI - CONTENTS

1. Aviation.
   2. Aircraft maintenance

   (1) Comments from ships in the operating area indicated 720 gallons of Stoddard solvent was required for a 30 day period. This ship used 160 gallons in a like period.

   (2) This saving in the use of Stoddard solvent has been accomplished by the following method:

       (a) Plane captains have been instructed to draw only a quart at a time and maintenance personnel only a half bucket. This has not caused any hardship and the fire hazard has also been reduced.

       (3) 12½ ton jacks were requested and received for use on AD type aircraft.
The lighter 10 ton jacks were then released for use by the F9F and F4U squadrons. Trouble with the 10 ton jack seals was experienced when used on AD aircraft with the ship underway. A recommendation for the 12½ ton jacks to be added to the Section "G" Allowance List will be forwarded.

(4) The portable high pressure gasoline compressor engine for filling F9F landing gear emergency air bottles occasionally failed to start. An emergency rig to furnish air for the bottles by using the torpedo air compressor was employed. The installation of a high pressure manifold (with 3 outlets) will be recommended for use on the hangar deck of this ship.

(5) It was found that during cold weather operations the allowance of four (4) NA-1 jet starter units was inadequate. Recommendations will be forwarded to increase the allowance to five (5) or, if this is not feasible, that a section "H" allowance list of repair parts be furnished. This ship does not have a permanently installed system for starting jet aircraft.

"The present "Nukeshay, Model B, APU frame has been found to be too low to the deck, causing the battery and control box support bracket to break from continued hitting and pounding on the deck. This condition is caused when the handles are raised for pulling, thereby allowing the bracket to hit the deck. In order to eliminate this, two Homelite APU rubber wheels will be used in place of the after support legs. A pin type lock is being devised to keep the unit from rolling.

(7) When using the Universal Tow Bar (R69-B-104300) on F9F-5 aircraft, it was found that the two tail wheel tow pins, provided for use on hollow tail wheel axles, cut the side wall of the nose wheel tire sufficiently to warrant a tire change. This was corrected by unbolting the nose gear towing hooks on the end of the tow bar and placing them so they were on the inside of the tow bar support plate. This change does not affect the use of the tow bar for tail wheel towing.

(8) It has been found that the present jury strut on the F9F wing can work loose and drop out of the lower wing fitting in high winds. A fuselage to wing, jury strut has been devised to take care of this situation. A letter with drawings will be forwarded to the appropriate Bureau via the chain of command.

(9) Numerous failures of the NAF 603410 arresting hook tips have been experienced on the F9F-2 aircraft. These hook tips had F9F aircraft service change 156 incorporated. Local corrective action taken included filing a 1/16" radius on all edges of the hook tip slot, dressing out all file, saw and grinder scratches and polishing the slot area to facilitate inspection. Some loose play was noted between the hook tip slot and the hook shank. Shimming has been employed as a remedy. There has been no recurrence of tip breakage since the action was initiated.

b. Aviation Ordnance.

(1) Squadrons having 20MM guns are, for safety purposes, in addition
to raising the feed mechanisms, using a safety block installed over the gas cylinder guide between the push rods and the gas cylinder yoke. The safety block is fabricated of \( \frac{3}{4} \)" cold rolled boiler plate, 11/16" side and 5 5/16" long, bent to the radius of the gas cylinder guide to an angle of 450. The safety block is effective only when the breach block is in the rear position. An original of this safety block was obtained from the USS BOX HOMER RICHARD.

c. Aviation Gasoline.

1. 1,056,000 gallons of Av/Gas, 4,004 gallons of Av/Lub 1100 was used during the operating period.

2. The following is submitted on this ships experience in receiving Av/Gas from tankers at sea and is based on samples taken every fifteen minutes at the main filling connection, starboard side forward.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>TANKER</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Highest Percent of Water Content</th>
<th>Time Required to Diminish Content Water to Zero</th>
<th>Visual Appearance of Samples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-3-53</td>
<td>USS PASSUPPIC</td>
<td>121,000</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>1.6 hrs.</td>
<td>cloudy - dirt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-7-53</td>
<td>USS WISPILLION</td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>.3 hrs.</td>
<td>clear - clean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-11-53</td>
<td>USS WISPILLION</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>.5 hrs.</td>
<td>clear - clean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-14-53</td>
<td>USS KASPASKIA</td>
<td>159,000</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>.5 hrs.</td>
<td>clear - clean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-15-53</td>
<td>USS GUADUPE</td>
<td>121,000</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.0 hrs.</td>
<td>clear - clean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-17-53</td>
<td>USS KASKASKIA</td>
<td>113,000</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>.5 hrs.</td>
<td>clear - clean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-27-53</td>
<td>USS TALUGA</td>
<td>128,000</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.8 hrs.</td>
<td>clear - clean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-3-53</td>
<td>USS TALUGA</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>clear - clean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Aircraft handling

1. Jet aircraft are spotted in a two-one spot on the port side forward of #2 elevator. This provides space for sixteen jets and two prop aircraft forward of the jets. A starboard spot was used, but it was found to create a handling hazard in rusty wind conditions due to the instability of the FOF in a wind folded position and to the necessity of turning the last few into the spot at an angle of 40° out of the wind. Nose bars are strongly recommended for taxiing all jets forward of the barricade.

2. AD aircraft are not taxied off #2 elevator to the hanger deck due to excessive power needed to swing the tail broadside into the wind and the ever present danger of nosing up.

2. Gunnery.

a. No additional comments.


a. Aviation Supply

1. Barrier engagements resulting from hook point failures caused abnormal usage of several items such as struts, fairings, etc.

2. The ship was replenished twice on the line by the USS CHOURFE. A total of 240 line items were requisitioned on the line and 103 items were received.
(3) An analysis of ACCG items is tabulated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allowance Items</th>
<th>F4U-4</th>
<th>F4U-5N</th>
<th>AD-4W</th>
<th>F9F-5P</th>
<th>AD-4L</th>
<th>AD-4N</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allowance items</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-allowance items</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total items</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the above items, 4 were later repaired on board or obtained from other aircraft, 4 were received from supply sources or from other carriers, and 4 are presently outstanding. Two fuel cans (R35-BPD-368010-2) are required for one F9F-5P. At present, action has been passed to the contractor indicating that the item is not available in the supply system. Commander Fleet Air, Japan, was asked to screen the area for availability and reported none available. This vessel was unable to obtain any part of the allowance of this item prior departing COMUS.

b. General Stores Material

(1) No unusual or critical shortages developed in GSK stocks during this initial cruise. Larger than expected usage was encountered, however, in the following items:

(a) Batteries, dry, flashlights and general use (G17-B-7410) - 4300 issued in a 45-day period.

(b) Gloves, light weight leather, reinforced (G37-G2985-10,20, and 30) - 150 pair issued in a 30-day period.

(2) Special clothing stocks based upon actual usage figures during the 1952 deployment proved to be satisfactory. Shortages developed in individual sizes but there were no shortages of an entire item.

(3) Considerable difficulty has been encountered with Electronics spare parts. Excessive usage of certain types of tubes and cables rendered several pieces of equipment inoperative. Seven priority "A" dispatches were necessary to obtain essential spares. Although air shipment has been requested in each instance, items furnished have arrived by replenishment ship.

c. Commissary

(1) During the operating period this vessel reprovisioned four times as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Provisions Ordered (tons)</th>
<th>Provisions Received (tons)</th>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Time (min)</th>
<th>Rate (tons/hr)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/3/52</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>USS GRAFFIAS</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/11/52</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>50.33</td>
<td>USS ALUDRA</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4/52</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>USS ALUDRA</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/3/53</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>72.37</td>
<td>USS ALUDRA</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The increased frequency of reprovisioning is a definite improvement over the schedule followed during the same period of 1952 when reprovisioning occurred normally once and never more than twice during a tour on the line.

(2) The supply of fresh fruits and vegetables as to quality and quantity was generally good with the exception of oranges. Approximately one-half of all oranges received have been surveyed.

(3) The few items that have been difficult to obtain although not critical are puddings, syrup, soft wheat flour, graham flour, and assorted dry cereals.

4. Engineering.
   a. No comment.

5. Damage Control.
   a. No comment.

6. CIC.
   a. General

A four section watch has been employed for the past three months, sections rotating with the watch officer every six hours. This watch bill has proven most satisfactory in that it makes each man an integral and essential part of the CIC system and deficiencies in individuals can be instantly noted and corrected. Thus, are removed the problems encountered under the old two or three section watch, namely - a few men carrying all the load; and the question of what to do with men on watch who are in a "rest" or standby status.

b. Radar Performance

Radar performance varied throughout this tour on the line from poor to excellent. The AN/SPS-6B went out of commission permanently after about three weeks on the line due to overheating which shorted out several co-axial cables: No spares were available and although dispatches were sent, the spares did not arrive prior to departing the combat area.

The RHI system was down frequently due to trouble in the scanner mechanism on the antenna. Immediate repair was not possible, since it was impossible to shut down the entire SX unit until operations of the Force permitted. Even when in operation, the RHI generally gave unreliable altitudes, varying from 5000 to 4000 feet too high.

The SX search radar was operational at all times except for routine maintenance. Performance was consistently good to excellent.
IFF continues to be the sole method of tracking jet targets beyond 40 miles.

c. Air Intercept

Unreliable altitude information has been the major factor contributing to the failure of air intercepts. Where altitude of raids was known, intercepts were conducted with a high percentage of tally-ho's.

d. Communications

Cross talk, particularly on the AN/ARC's, presented the biggest problem. Antenna shifting was tried to alleviate this condition, but with little success.

7. Communications

a. General

Considering the shortage of rated radiomen and telemen, communication performance during the first period of the PHILIPPINE SEA's third Korean tour is considered to have been excellent. The ship operated with a total of 7 radiomen and 7 telemen as against the authorized allowance of 27 radiomen and 16 telemen. The actual ratings on board were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RM1</th>
<th>TE1 (Teletype &amp; crypto repair)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RM2</td>
<td>TE2 (Navy Mail Clerk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RM3</td>
<td>5 TE3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above performance is due in part to the continued training program initiated last spring in anticipation of the petty officer shortage, and the excellent preventative maintenance program carried out by the Engineering Department's ET's. The accelerated training program is making possible maximum utilization of non-rated personnel in petty officer billets. Practically all circuit operators, both radio and teletype are non-rated men. The rotation of operators on all circuits and positions has contributed greatly to each man's knowledge of the "Plan" as a whole and to the overall efficiency of the organization. Of considerable importance is the preventative maintenance performed regularly during replenishment days by the ET's. One of the most important, and also vulnerable circuits (T-6) was maintained at peak performance during the entire period.

b. Visual

The use of Nancy equipment was a continuing process during the night watches.
c. Mail

The Post Office was enlarged during this operating period by extending the inboard bulkhead, further inboard a distance of 3½ feet, similar to the VALLEY FORGE's installation. An additional space of approximately 56 square feet was obtained. This permits quicker distribution of mail, provides a larger storage space, and meets the security requirements of the Post Office Department.

8. Air Intelligence

a. The ship was adequately supplied with intelligence materials upon departure from CONUS. Shortages in current charts, especially 1:50,000 D751 series were quickly filled by ANO Atsugi.

b. The Air Intelligence organization functioned well this first operating period. This was largely due to the fact that the Assistant Air Intelligence officer and both enlisted personnel had the experience of a previous tour. In addition, the senior Air Intelligence Officer proceeded the ship to the combat zone as an advance party, as did the majority of the Air Group Air Intelligence Officers. The advance trips to the forward area are of unquestionable value as long as sufficient time is allowed for a thorough indoctrination. As for preliminary scheduling after arrival, the air intelligence officer for COMPFAIRJAP has arranged a time table which adequately meets the needs of most advance parties.

c. The ship and air group were aided in a smooth start by having the air intelligence officer from COMFAVFB and COMPFAIRJAP on board for the first few days to conduct survival and escape and evasion lectures.

d. The flak maps inherited from the Essex proved very useful and successful. This method employed plotting all flak on 1:50,000 maps (four maps taped together and covered with acetate) and these were installed by stapling to plywood hangers and placing the hangers in a rack. This is similar to the arrangement described by the Oriskany. The racks prevent any swaying of the maps, take only a minimum of space, and allow easy transfer and stowage by the briefing officer. Otherwise, the officer functioned under the previous physical arrangement, with the fluorescent lighting and sliding panels continuing to be a big help.

e. Briefing became much easier as the period progressed and the intelligence personnel began to anticipate problems before they occurred. The conversion of the wardroom lounge into a ready room allowed the squadron using this room to have a first class briefing space, as the conversion was designed with this in mind. However, all ready rooms had adequate intelligence arrangements. The hecklers were briefed in the Flak Intelligence spaces, with the assistant ship's AIO acting as briefing officer. This arrangement, and the spaces, proved very satisfactory. Relief maps were especially helpful in heckler briefings.
9. Photographic Interpretation

a. A total of fifty (50) photographic reconnaissance missions were flown during the operating period utilizing three F9F-5P photographic planes mounting the following cameras: K-38 36 inch, K-17 24 and 12 inch. The efforts of the Photo Interpretation Officer have been directed toward target search, flak studies, damage assessment, and toward preparations with emphasis on target search. Mosaics of suitable targets prepared from flash prints were forwarded to the Carrier Division Staff. Following their selection of mosaics, negatives were forwarded to each of the operating carriers. The final result was a photograph of the target for each pilot on each target strike. This system has been very successful for pilot orientation, in all cases, except those photos having poor or undiscernable map reference check points.

b. At present the photo interpretation officer is located in the Flag Office. This is adequate space. One officer and two enlisted men are assigned. An additional officer or enlisted man could be utilized.

10. Photographic Laboratory

a. Personnel

(1) Presently assigned ship's company photographic personnel consist of 1 W.O., 1 CPO, 6 P.O. and 17 non-rated men, of which 1 AF3 is permanently assigned to Photographic Interpretation. Of the petty officers on board, the majority were assigned to this command less than two months before departure from the United States and had no previous carrier experience. It is recommended that whenever possible, personnel be assigned at least two months prior to departure from the CONUS in order to gain experience during carrier qualification operations and training periods.

(2) Non-rated personnel have been given intensive, on-the-job training and are able to perform routine assignments satisfactorily. However, it is considered that additional experienced petty officers are necessary for use in a supervisory capacity. Laboratory personnel are divided into three shifts of twelve hours each, 0700-1900, 1200-2400, 1900-0700, providing maximum man power at peak work load periods. A rated camera repairman is critically needed for proper preventive maintenance and repair of photographic equipment. Although quotas are available for Camera Repair School, it is considered inadvisable to deplete the number of experienced petty officers aboard due to the already existing shortage.

b. Production

(1) Fifty sorties were flown during this operating period. Fourteen rolls of $9\frac{1}{2} \times 390^1$ film and thirty six rolls of $9\frac{1}{2} \times 200^1$ film
were processed. Of these, 3703 9 x 18 negatives and 198 9 x 9 negatives were Sonne printed. A total of 20,206 9 x 13 prints and 1034 9 x 9 prints were produced.

(2) Due to the size of target areas photographed, entire rolls of 390' film were exposed on several occasions. It is recommended that a more suitable developing outfit than the Morse B-5 be acquired if the use of full 390' rolls becomes standard practice. Cutting rolls in half is not considered practical due to the danger of losing several vital exposures. Although the B-5 reels will accept a full 390' of film, the length of the roll causes a great inequality of development between the center and ends of the roll for optimum negative quality.

(3) UC-61 Unit "MIKE" is employing K-38 Cameras and A&B Magazines for the largest percentage of photo recce-maintenance missions. Required altitude and lowest safe airspeed of the F6F-5P's produce too great an image motion for a maximum shutter speed of 1/150 second.

(4) Preventive maintenance and repairs to K-38 cameras and A&B Magazines are largely a matter of guesswork due to lack of Technical Orders and instruction handbooks for this type of camera.

II. Aerology

a. Average flying conditions with low scattered clouds at 2500 feet, good visibilities, and moderate westerly winds prevailed in the operating area until 4 February. A low pressure system formed north of Okinawa, and deepened, causing the winds to veer in the operating area from the northwest to the northeast. This onshore flow of moist air created non-operational conditions in the target area. The weather in the operating area remained average until, as the low continued to deepen, a north-south trough formed over the continent of Korea. A small low developed in this trough in Central Korea, and moved east across the operating area. This low intensified in the sea of Japan, and caused poor flying weather until 6 February. Average to good flying weather again prevailed until 13 February when the same weather situation was repeated, in a milder way. Poor flying conditions lasted for about eight hours on the 13th.

b. During the period from the 14th to the end of February, flying conditions were generally good. The surface wind, however, was frequently very light, necessitating maximum ship's speed, and reduction of bomb load to attain satisfactory launching conditions. The light winds occurred on the 15th and 16th, and almost daily from the 20th to the 23th. They were usually preceded by a diminishing of the winds at 5000 to 10,000 feet.

c. On the 2nd and 3rd of March, the weather situation which occurred on the 4th, 5th and 6th, and again on the 13 of February, was once more experienced in the operating area. This low was the most intense of the three encountered, and deepened rapidly while moving east, so that its effects persisted in the operating area for 24 hours after the passage of the center.
the passage of the center.

d. Average temperatures for the month were about 32 degrees for the first half, with a relatively high average of 40 degrees for the second half of the month. Snowfall was generally very light, except for one or two occasions when heavy snow fell. On all occasions, the snow melted rapidly and presented no problems relative to flight operations aboard ship.

PART VII RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Operational

   a. With the enemy increasing his night vehicular and rail activity it is recommended that greater emphasis be placed on launching more night heckler sorties. Enemy night movements have always been heavily predominant. The recent increase in vehicular sightings can be associated with either his preparation for an offensive, or with an influx of replacement vehicles to offset his losses.

   Early February brought some of the highest totals of vehicle sightings on record, with Navy shore fire control parties reporting 3,392 trucks for a week's period, in the Wonsan area alone. Night hecklers from this ship, launched at 1800, consistently reported heavy traffic, especially on Red route 11, leading south from Wonsan to Sindo-san and the bombline, and on Green 3, the trans-peninsular line from Yangdok to Wonsan.

   It became apparent to these pilots that the enemy began his truck movements immediately at dusk and continued until 0200 or 0400. Dawn Heckler missions, launched at 0415, found much less truck activity than the night hecklers.

   There were 65 heckler sorties launched from the Philippine Sea during this reporting period, but at least 18 of these were hampered by poor weather and visibility, thus reducing effective night interdiction. Despite the comparatively few heckler sorties the great majority of trucks destroyed and damaged can be accredited to the night missions.

   Early in the period heavy train traffic was noted along the east coast. With the enemy employing a shuttle system were through lines are not available, night heckler missions appear to be the best method of destroying his means of transportation, both locomotives and trucks.

2. Photographic Laboratory

   a. Refer to page 25 paragraph b (3). It is recommended that a camera of higher shutter speed, or with an image motion compensating device, be supplied to all units in the forward area.

3. Air Intelligence

   a. This command concurs in the recommendations previously made by other carriers that an Air Intelligence Specialist rate be established for the enlisted personnel assigned to this duty. During operating periods it is almost impossible for these men to practice for whatever rate
they may desire as routine duties take up a great amount of their time. In the event these men find time to practice for their rate it is usually late at night, or in port during periods of rest and relaxation.

K. J. SANGER
Acting

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CINC PACFLT (2) Advance
CINC PACFLT EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVEF (1) Advance
COMNAVEF EVALUATION GROUP
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COMCARDIV 1
COMCARDIV 3
COMCARDIV 5
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COMFAIRALJFEDA
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USS BOXER (CVA-21)
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USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)
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CG 9 (15)
CG 11
CG 15
CG 19
CG 101
CG 102
ATG 2