


*Orig  
A. J. M.*

# U.S.S. PRINCETON CVA-37 AND CARRIER AIR GROUP FIFTEEN ACTION REPORT



13 April 1953 to 19 May 1953

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[REDACTED]  
SECURITY INFORMATION

U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37)  
Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

RMF/nls  
CVA37/A16-13  
Serial: 1222  
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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
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From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37)  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN  
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report of the USS PRINCETON (CVA-37) and  
CARRIER AIR GROUP 15; submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.4  
(b) CVG-15 conf ltr ser 013 dtd 29 April 1953 (Air  
Attack Reports for 17, 19, 20, 21 April 1953)  
(c) CVG-15 conf ltr ser 014 dtd 5 May 1953 (Air  
Attack Reports for 23, 24, 25 April 1953)  
(d) CVG-15 conf ltr ser 017 dtd 11 May 1953 (Air  
Attack Reports for 27, 28 April 1953 and 1,  
2 May 1953)  
(e) CVG-15 conf ltr ser 022 dtd 20 May 1953 (Air  
Attack Reports for 3, 5, 6, 9 May 1953)  
(f) CVG-15 conf ltr ser 023 dtd 20 May 1953 (Air  
Attack Reports for 13, 14 May 1953)

Encl: (1) Action Report; 13 April 1953 through 19 May 1953

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report of the  
USS PRINCETON (CVA-37) and CARRIER AIR GROUP 15 for the period  
13 April 1953 through 19 May 1953 is submitted as enclosure (1).

*O. C. Gregg*  
O. C. GREGG

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ACTION REPORT  
U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37)  
CARRIER AIR GROUP 15  
13 April 1953 through 19 May 1953

PART I GENERAL NARRATIVE

During the period covered by this report the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37) operated as a unit of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was composed of the aircraft carriers U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34), U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47), U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21), and U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37), along with various heavy support and screening ships.

Commander Carrier Division FIVE was embarked on the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34). Commander Carrier Division THREE was embarked on the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45) from 13 April to 12 May and on the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA-37) from 12 May until 19 May. Commander Carrier Division ONE was embarked on the U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21).

The mission of this Task Force was as set forth in CTF SEVENTY SEVEN Operation Order No. 2-52.

Various missions were flown by PRINCETON aircraft: strikes were launched against the enemy's supply and troop concentration areas, industrial targets, mining locations and transportation facilities; close air support, night interdiction, electronic countermeasures, photography and armed reconnaissance sorties were flown almost daily; combat air patrol and anti-submarine patrol operations were carried out during each day of flight operations.

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PART II CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

- 13 April - Departed Yokosuka 1600I for operating area.
- 14-15 April - Enroute to operating area. Gunnery exercises scheduled for 15 April were cancelled due to inclement weather.
- 16 April - Enroute to operating area. Conducted non-combat refresher air operations. Ninety-one sorties were flown.
- 17 April - Rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN at 0500I. One hundred and seven sorties were flown by PRINCETON aircraft. The primary targets were troop and supply build-up areas in close proximity to the front lines. Heavy vehicle traffic moving south was attacked by night hecklers who destroyed many trucks.
- 18 April - Replenished at sea. Conducted anti-aircraft firing exercises.
- 19 April - Conducted air operations. One hundred and nine sorties were flown. Morning hecklers attacked vehicles in the vicinity of Hamhung and northward along the coast. Close air support and Cherokee strikes were launched against enemy personnel and supply areas along the front lines.
- 20 April - Conducted air operations. One hundred and eighteen sorties were flown. Weather minimized the operations of morning hecklers. Most of the day's strikes were diverted by bad weather from front line areas to rear area supply concentrations.
- 21 April - Conducted air operations. One hundred and fourteen sorties were flown. PRINCETON pilots attacked approved targets of their own choosing and struck heavily against supply and industrial areas along the northeastern coast of Korea. In addition to these strikes, two close air support and one naval gun-fire spot missions were flown. Pre-dawn hecklers again attacked vehicles on the coastal routes during the morning.
- 22 April - Replenished at sea. AA firing exercises were cancelled due to extended replenishment activities. Commander Carrier Division THREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, relieved Commander Carrier Division FIVE, RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.
- 23 April - Conducted air operations. One hundred and twelve sorties were flown. PRINCETON planes again concentrated on large troop and supply build-up areas along the central front.

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Close air support missions were directed against the enemy central front line positions. The evening hecklers found little vehicular traffic along the coastal roads and railroads.

24 April - Conducted air operations. Flew 119 sorties. Close air support strikes dealt heavy blows to enemy positions along the eastern and central sectors of the front lines. Other strikes hit supply concentrations and coastal defense guns in the Wonsan area. Evening hecklers attacked heavy traffic west of Wonsan.

25 April - Conducted air operations. One hundred and eight sorties were flown. PRINCETON aircraft again struck coastal defense guns that had been shelling friendly islands and ships in the Wonsan area. Mortar and artillery positions as well as personnel shelters and trenches were attacked by close air support strikes on the central front.

26 April - Replenished at sea. Conducted anti-aircraft firing exercises.

27 April - Conducted air operations. Ninety-nine sorties were flown. Morning hecklers found several large vehicle movements and destroyed many trucks in the area northwest of Hamhung; a large supply and billeting area was attacked by jet fighters; close air support strikes attacked enemy front line positions.

28 April - Air operations were limited due to inclement weather. Sixty-four sorties were flown. Pre-dawn attack planes continued their efforts against supply trucks enroute to the front. Weather forced morning strikes to alternate targets.

29 April - Air operations were curtailed due to weather conditions. Four weather reconnaissance sorties were flown.

30 April - Replenished at sea. Conducted anti-aircraft firing exercises.

1 May - Conducted air operations. One hundred and thirteen sorties were flown. Coastal defense guns at Wonsan and on Hodo Pando Peninsula bore the brunt of PRINCETON aircraft attacks. Night hecklers destroyed at least twenty trucks and damaged as many more in the Wonsan area.

2 May - Conducted air operations. Ninety-one sorties were flown. Cherokee strikes against personnel and supply shelters obtained excellent results. Poor weather conditions hindered operations of the evening hecklers although considerable traffic was observed.

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- 3 May - Conducted air operations. Launched 105 sorties. PRINCETON planes concentrated on billeting and industrial areas near Hungnam. In addition to these strikes, close air support and naval gun-fire spotting missions were flown. One afternoon strike was diverted to the troublesome coastal defense gun positions on Hodo Pando Peninsula. Night attack planes devoted their efforts to large movements of trucks approaching Wonsan from the West and North.
- 4 May - Replenished at sea. Gunnery exercises were cancelled due to inclement weather.
- 5 May - Conducted air operations. Flew 111 sorties. Traffic on the coastal routes was found to be very light by the early morning hecklers. Numerous strikes were launched against Hodo Pando and Wonsan coastal defense installations.
- 6 May - Conducted air operations. Flew 101 sorties. Targets attacked included a mining area, supply and troop concentrations, and front line positions. Two strikes against the Komdok mining area destroyed a processing plant, several other buildings, and started many fires. Cherokee and close air support strikes effectively demolished supply shelters and artillery positions in proximity to the front lines.
- 7 May - Air operations were limited by bad weather. Nineteen sorties, including weather reconnaissance and defensive missions, were flown.
- 8 May - Replenished at sea. Gunnery exercises were cancelled due to inclement weather.
- 9 May - Conducted air operations. Eighty-two sorties were flown. Weather caused the cancellation of several events. Offensive effort was limited to attacks on supply areas in east and central Korea and to deep and close support of front line troops.
- 10 May - Air operations were limited by weather to defensive missions. Twenty-six sorties were flown.
- 11 May - Weather conditions again limited air operations to defensive missions only. Eleven sorties were flown.
- 12 May - Replenished at sea. Commander Carrier Division THREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, and staff embarked. Gunnery exercises were cancelled due to inclement weather.
- 13 May - Conducted air operations. One hundred and thirteen sorties were flown. Continued bad weather caused most flights

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to be diverted to alternate targets. Strikes were launched against troop and supply shelters along the northeast coast and coastal defense guns in the Wonsan-Hodo Pando areas were heavily hit.

14 May - Conducted air operations. One hundred and seventeen sorties were flown. Supply areas again were the primary targets as PRINCETON aircraft struck Pachunjang, Wonsan, and Osan-ni concentrations with good results.

15 May - RADM R. E. BLICK relieved RADM A. SOUCEK aboard this vessel as Commander Carrier Division THREE. Replenished at sea. 1649I detached from Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. Enroute to Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan. Commander Carrier Division ONE, RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, relieved Commander Carrier Division THREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

16 May - 0700I arrived Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan for additional reprovisioning. 1830I underway enroute Hong Kong, B.C.C. via Formosa Strait.

17 May - Enroute Hong Kong. Captain O. C. GREGG, USN, assumed Command of the PRINCETON, relieving Captain W. R. HOLLINGSWORTH, USN.

18 May - Enroute Hong Kong.

19 May - 1300I arrived Hong Kong, B.C.C.

PART III ORDNANCE

A. Ship

1. Performance

a. Fire control and ordnance equipment functioned efficiently during this period. There were no casualties to equipment. This performance is attributed to the extensive preventative maintenance program stressed on this vessel.

2. Expenditures

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Description</u>
85	D1	5"/38 Projectile, AAC
49	D12B	5"/38 Projectile, FCL (VT) (non-frag)
134	D8	Cartridge, Full, Non-flashless

B. Aviation

1. Performance

a. Difficulty has been encountered with Aero 14A bomb racks in use on the F9F, AD, and F4U. In accordance with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN directives, the racks are now disassembled after each malfunction and a report is made on the failure. It has been found that bent and broken sears and defective arming solenoids are causing the most trouble. Improvements that could be made on the rack include:

(1) Provision for latching and releasing the rack from either side. When the rack is mounted on the starboard wing, personnel must reach over the bomb load to latch the rack. Similarly, there should be provisions for tightening the sway braces from either side of the rack.

(2) A simple jettison release (either solenoid or manual wire) is needed to jettison hung ordnance due to malfunction of the sear or solenoid.

(3) A modification of the Aero 14A rack, to provide access ports for limited lubrication, maintenance, and inspection. A RUDM together with pictures is being prepared for submission.

It is believed that the proposed modifications will neither structurally weaken the rack nor adversely effect its flight characteristics.

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Aero 14A racks, while an improvement over previous racks, are generally not sturdy enough to stand up under the rigorous conditions that must be imposed upon them. Bombs up to, and including five-hundred pounds must be supported on taxiing aircraft with the wings in folded position, on catapult launches and on arrested landings.

b. Some difficulty was experienced with rusting in the Aero 14 rocket launcher solenoid. It is believed that this rusting was caused by moisture entering the launcher when the wings were in the folded position. As a preventative measure, a cover was designed by AOC BISCH of VF-152 and manufactured in the parachute loft from waterproof material. The cover can be easily slipped over the launcher when not in use and is secured at the after end by ties.

c. Upon trying to hang the Mark 78 napalm tanks on the centerline stations of AD4NA aircraft, it was discovered that the suspension lugs could not be hung on the Douglas bomb ejector suspension hooks. This was due to the armor plate interfering with the unusually wide suspension lugs of the napalm tanks. Cutting a 5/8 inch by 7/8 inch slot in the armor plate on each side of the suspension hook access ports was found to allow bind-free hangings.

d. One accidental discharge of 20MM machine gun was encountered during the arrested landing of an F9F-5. The gun fired one round due to a defective four-way solenoid valve (R 94 V 10000). The four-way valve failed to supply hydraulic pressure to the Aero 2B pressure switch holding chargers in the "safe" position. The hard landing was believed to have dislodged the sear momentarily permitting the gun to fire one round. The four-way valve worked intermittently when checked and appeared to be sticking. It will be forwarded to Inspection and Overhaul Activity for inspection.

e. The pigtail electrical connection for rockets is the weakest link in the rocket firing system. The high speeds of the F9F whip the wires into pieces or saw the wires at the rocket base. Several methods of shortening the wires to prevent whipping have been tried with varying success. The method now in use is to scotch tape the excess wire to the rocket base allowing just enough wire to plug in the rocket. It is recommended that a spring clip, similar to a Fahnstock clip, be developed to clip the excess wire to the rocket base to prevent whipping.

f. A few cases of bomb fins turning at high speeds have been encountered. The fins seem to be tight on the bomb prior to loading and are re-checked after being hung.

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When the fin turns in either direction, the arming wire is pulled and the fuze becomes armed. It is recommended that during manufacture a pin be welded on the bomb tail and that a slot be cut in the tail fin cone to prevent the fin from turning, even if it becomes loose.

g. The Bomb Skid (Mark 1 Mod 1) hold down assemblies (S/N R94-BuO-423858-1 and R94-BuO-423857-1) have a high rate of attrition due to their constant use and especially hard usage during replenishment. Requested replacements have had a web arrangement furnished as a substitute that does not last as long or hold the load as well as hold-down chains.

h. Bomb elevators #3 and #4 have developed excessive clearances in the track shoe after 115 days of service. The clearance of the shoes does not allow the platform to remain level which causes difficulties in loading and unloading the elevator due to the tipping caused with various bomb loads.

i. Each arming wire comes with a tag wired onto the swivel. Each tag must be removed before use and this procedure slows down re-arming time, with the attendant tag disposal problem. It is recommended that only one tag for each bundle of wires be furnished.

j. A detonator removal tool has been designed to remove stuck detonators when the fuze is removed and the detonator remains in the bomb. Information and pictures of this tool have been forwarded to Naval Aviation News for publication.

## 2. Expenditures

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Description</u>
1043	H1	40MM CARTRIDGE, HEIT-SD (UG LOTS)
32	H4	40MM CARTRIDGE, HEIT-(DI)-SD
132	K1	2000# GP
541	K2	1000# GP
492	K3	500# GP
3432	K4	250# GP
789	K5	100# GP
8	K6	1000# SAP
4	K7	500# SAP
22	K8	350# DEPTH BOMB, AN-Mk 54
950	K9	220/260# FRAG
263	K12	100# INC Cluster, AN-M12
6	K19	FUZE, NOSE, AN-M103A1

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<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Description</u>
3357	K20	FUZE, NOSE, AN-M139A1
2409	K21	FUZE, NOSE, AN-M140A1
168	K26	FUZE, NOSE, VT, T50E1
136	K27	FUZE, NOSE, VT, T50E4
206	K30	FUZE, NOSE, AN-Mk 219
206	K31	ANTI-PERSON BOMB FUZE
5345	K35	AN-M100A2 (ND)
496	K36	AN-M101A2 (.025)
565	K37	AN-M102A2 (.025)
8	K420	FUZE, TAIL M124/A1 (6 hr)
4	K43A	FUZE, BOMB TAIL M125A1 (1 hr)
4	K43B	FUZE BOMB TAIL M125A1 (2 hr)
49	K43C	FUZE TAIL M125/A1 (6 hr)
69	K43D	FUZE TAIL M125/A1 (12 hr)
22	K48	FUZE BOMB TAIL (HYDROSTATIC) AN-Mk 230
23	L1	3.5" ROCKET, SOLID, Complete Rd.
208	L5	5" HAVAR, Complete Rd.
198	L6	Anti-Tank Rocket, A/C 6.5" (ATAR)
62210	M1	20MM HEI, M97
53913	M2	20MM INC, M96
44329	M3	20MM AP-T, M95
160063	M4	Link, 20MM M8/M8E1
18714	M6	Cal..50 API, M8
18714	M7	Cal..50 INC, M1
9357	M8	Cal..50 API-T, M20
46785	M9	Link, Cal..50 A/C M2
119400	M10	Cal..50 Belted, (2-2-1)
4135	N1	Napalm Type 1 or M3
93	N2	Igniter, WP, M15 or M215
93	N4	Igniter, WP, M16 or M216
102	N7	Gas Tank Mk 12
58	N10	Xylanol
84	P2	Parachute Flare Mk 5
98	P3	Parachute Flare Mk 6
8	P9	LIGHT, FLOAT, A/C AN-Mk 6
11	P13	SIGNAL, DRIFT, (N), AN-Mk 5
299	P38	BOMB EJECTOR CARTRIDGE, Mk 1
40	P43	CARTRIDGE ENGINE IGNITER TYPE 2

3. Hung Ordnance and Ammunition Stoppage

a. Statistics

<u>Type Ordnance</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Later Manual Releases</u>	<u>Drop Offs on Landing</u>	<u>Remaining on Racks</u>	<u>Type Rack</u>
ATAR	12			**14	Aero 14A
HVAR	16			**16	"
100# G.P.	2			2	"
250# G.P.	12		1	3 (*8)	"
INCENDIARY	1			1	"
350# ADB	1	1		1	MK 51
500# G.P.	2	*2			MK 51
1000# G.P.	1	*1		1	Douglas Bomb Ejector

\*Not considered hung ordnance because bomb racks had not been energized.

\*\*Four percent of all rockets carried were returned with broken pigtails (mainly the result of high speeds). One per cent carried were returned as duds.

b. Twenty millimeter guns have averaged one stoppage per eighteen-hundred rounds. This performance, though below the average set during our first tour on the line, was considered satisfactory. Continued efforts will be made to improve the performance efficiency rate.

The fifty caliber gun performance during this period was excellent. An average of one stoppage per 8,500 rounds was established.

c. In view of the above ordnance equipment malfunctions, reports (including history, analysis, and beneficial suggestions encompassing proven maintenance procedures, effective ground test of components, and recommended design changes) are being prepared for submission in the form of RUDM's and RUDAOE's.

PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance

Performance of Ship's Company and Air Group personnel was outstanding.

B. Complement

1. The average on board count was as follows:

	<u>Flag</u>	<u>Ship's Co.</u>	<u>CVG-15</u>	<u>Marines</u>	<u>Total</u>
Officers	*30	118	129	2	254
Enlisted	*70	2,075	627	67	<u>2,780</u>
				TOTAL	3,034

\*Flag personnel are included in the total average for the period on a three-day adjusted basis.

2. There continues to be a critical shortage in the assignment of personnel to fill the authorized allowance of the following enlisted ratings:

RDC, RD1, RD2; FT (all pay grades); ETC, ET1, ET2; TEC, TE1, TE2; YN1, YN2; SKC, SK1, SK2; MMC, MM1, MM2; BT1, BT2; FP1, FP2; EMC, EM1, EM2; IC1, IC2; PH1, PH2; EM2; TN, TA

This command is aware that the shortage of petty officers is servicewide, and the on-the-job-training program continues in effect as one means of alleviating this shortage.

3. The following number of personnel were transferred and received:

<u>Received</u>	<u>Transferred</u>
1 CPO	1 P01
3 P03	10 P03
2 SN	2 SN
1 SA	3 SA

C. Training and Education

The "I and E" program on the PRINCETON is at present specializing in increasing the education of all non-high school graduates. A brief summary of the program which has been undertaken is as follows:

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All non-high school graduates on board have been divided into three groups. The first group consists of personnel who have completed the tenth grade or higher, the second consists of those personnel who have completed from seventh to ninth grades, and the third group consists of those personnel who have completed the sixth grade or below. These personnel have been given lectures by the Educational Officer telling them of opportunities, necessity, and facilities for increasing their education. The personnel are then interviewed individually and a series of USAFI courses are laid out for them. They are checked from time to time for progress and encouraged to stay with their studies by the Educational Officer. Those of the lower grade groups are divided among various officers who help counsel each individual. Great interest is shown by the men.

D. Morale and Welfare

1. In general the morale of all personnel including the Air Group pilots was excellent during the normal period of three weeks; however, due to the extended time in the operating area, increased fatigue was noticed in the crew and pilots, especially in the first three days after the extension. Pilot casualties were excessive during this period: of the total of seven men lost, four were lost during the extension period. Losses such as these tend to lower the morale of all hands. A tour of three weeks is considered to be the optimum time for a tour of duty on the line. //

2. Band Activities:

- 1 Morning Colors
- 29 Rehearsals (Concert and Dance Band)
- 15 Concerts (Average attendance 50 men)
- 8 Replenishment Serenades
- 4 Divine Services (5 musicians)

3. An enlisted hobby shop was established in April from Recreation Council Funds. An initial grant of \$100 for tools to be loaned out on custody slips was made and a \$300 revolving fund was established to provide a continuing supply of hobby kits. These kits are sold at cost plus a small mark-up to provide damage and loss to inventory. The first order of merchandise was sold out in three days. As a result of the interest shown, an additional sum of \$700 was voted by the Recreation Committee to be added to the revolving fund making a total of \$1,000.

4. A pamphlet containing information on Hong Kong, its history, points of interest and shopping guides was prepared

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and distributed. Additional information on shopping; prepared by the Supply Officer, was printed in the Slipstream, the ship's daily paper.

E. Public Information Activities

1. Operational press dispatches	27
2. Feature release stories	17
3. Feature release pictures	47
4. Hometown stories	10
5. Hometown pictures	77
6. Tape recorded interviews (hometown)	13
7. Tape recorded interviews (documentary)	1
8. Hometown roster stories	901

F. Casualties

1. Ship's Company

a. On May 13, MILLIGAN, W.E., AB3, V-2 Division suffered minor injuries to his knee and ankle when run over by an F9F-5 as he was inserting a tension ring on the hold back unit of the starboard catapult.

2. Air Group

a. On April 21, LTJG C. J. CLARKSON, 522112, USN, VF-153, was hit by flak and ditched in Wonsan Harbor. The pilot was recovered although he received minor facial lacerations.

b. On April 23, LTJG A. M. CLEMMONS, 395099, USN, VF-154, was listed as missing while on a recco hop south of Tanchon. The plane was believed to have been hit by anti-aircraft fire.

c. LTJG L. L. QUIEL, 540032, USN, VF-153, was killed on April 25, when his plane crashed and sank on a catapult shot.

d. On April 28, LTJG R. J. LEAR, 498753, USN, VF-154, was listed as missing after his plane exploded and burned over Hodo Pando. Probable cause was enemy AA.

e. On the evening of May 1, LT V. MAHONEY, VC-35, recieved multiple minor injuries when his plane crashed on the flight deck during a night landing.

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f. ENS W. M. QUINLEY, 554755, VF-152, was listed as missing May 5 on a naval gun-fire spotting mission over Wonsan. The flight encountered heavy flak and his plane was observed burning on the ground.

g. On May 6, LT L. R. RICKEY, 414319, VF-152, was listed as missing following a strike south of Wonsan. His plane was believed to have been hit by AA.

h. On May 6, ENS F. E. PAINTER, 553412, VF-153, was killed while ditching in the Sea of Japan. His plane was hit by anti-aircraft fire while on a strike north of Tanchon. The plane disintegrated upon impact and the pilot was not recovered.

i. On May 13, LTJG R. C. CLINITE, 521337, of VF-153, was drowned following a seemingly successful bailout. The plane was hit by AA fire while on a recco mission south of Wonsan and although the ejection bailout in Wonsan Harbor was successful, the pilot failed to get clear of his chute upon entry into the water. His body was recovered.

**G. Medical Dept. Statistical Summary of Air Group and Ship's Company:**

Admissions to sick list, enlisted . . . . .	103
Admissions to sick list, officers . . . . .	12
Admissions to binnacle list, enlisted . . . . .	15
Patients admitted to sick list by transfer from other ships. . . . .	2
Minor injuries treated. . . . .	46
Major injuries treated. . . . .	4
Minor surgical procedures . . . . .	84
Major surgical procedures . . . . .	7
Total visits to sick call . . . . .	2366
Pilots killed, enemy action, not recovered. . . . .	3
Pilots killed, enemy action, recovered. . . . .	1
Pilots killed, not result of enemy action, not recovered . . . . .	1
Pilots missing, enemy action. . . . .	2
Pilots injured, enemy action, recovered . . . . .	1
Pilots temporarily grounded, medical reasons. . . . .	9
Pilots permanently grounded, pending medical evaluation . . . . .	2
Crewmen grounded, medical reasons . . . . .	0
Average number of days grounded . . . . .	8.55

Venereal Disease Cases and Non-specific Urethritis:

Gonorrhea . . . . .	19
Chancroid . . . . .	10
Syphillis . . . . .	0
Non-specific Urethritis follow- ing sexual exposure. . . . .	94
Penicillin tablets issued during the last period in port. . . . .	4553

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PART VI SPECIAL COMMENTS

A. Carrier Air Group FIFTEEN

1. Operations

a. Flight Analysis

(1) The Air Group flew a total of 1,772 sorties for a total of 3,918 hours during the eighteen operational days.

(2) Breakdown of sorties:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Strikes</u>	<u>Recco</u>	<u>CAS</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>PHOTO</u>	<u>ECM</u>	<u>ASP</u>	<u>NGF</u>	<u>TARCAP</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
F9F-5	431	55	-	381	33	-	-	-	4	904
F4U-4	198	-	61	4	-	-	-	33	6	301
F4U-5N	-	49	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	50
AD4NA	204	-	90	-	-	-	45	4	-	344
AD4W	-	-	-	-	-	-	59	-	-	59
AD4N	-	23	-	-	-	8	14	-	-	45
F9F-5P	-	-	-	-	69	-	-	-	-	69
TOTAL	833	127	151	385	102	8	118	38	10	1772

b. The majority of the strikes were coordinated attacks consisting of AD's, F4U-4's as the main strike group and F9F-5's for flak suppression.

c. Results of close air support missions have improved during this period due to familiarization both with front line areas and "mosquito" control procedures.

d. Anti-aircraft fire encountered on most targets appears to have increased in quantity and effectiveness. A great deal of small arms and machine gun fire was encountered by night hocklers during attacks on truck convoys.

e. On all strikes the flak encountered was much less effective when jet flak suppression was present. Jet flak suppression is a "must" on heavily defended targets if the mission is to be carried out successfully.

f. Defensive maneuvering at high altitude is considerably more important when flying over an overcast than when VFR. Apparently radar controlled guns are reluctant to give their positions in clear weather.

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AD4NA	204	-	90	-	-	-	45	4	-	344
AD4W	-	-	-	-	-	-	59	-	-	59
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g. Particular care must be exercised when dropping incendiary clusters. Due to the lack of trajectory, and slow decent, when they are released they seem to form a cloud of little bombs. This increases the hazard of the succeeding planes flying into these bombs particularly if released in a dive. Tactics recommended for releasing incendiaries are: crossing the target in a relatively slow speed, shallow glide in nearly a line abreast. Results of this Air Group with incendiaries have been dubious. One squadron, after dropping 96 incendiary clusters, has not observed even one satisfactory resulting fire.

h. ASP tactics employed were the usual twenty mile box search, however, in a few instances the thirty mile barrier patrol was set up to provide voice relay between control ships and strike groups over the beach. "MIDDLEMAN" was not used. "BELLHOP" was utilized frequently and it's reception was reported good in most cases.

## 2. Electronics

a. Generally speaking, the majority of electronics equipment operated has performed satisfactorily with only normal maintenance being required.

b. Although the acquisition of much needed AN/ARC-1 spares has provided relief for critical shortages, the maintenance problem continues to increase tremendously. Tube usage is considered excessive due to bad tubes. Out of approximately 1,100 6AK5 tubes drawn from supply, only three out of every fifteen were useable. This is probably due to the fact that many of the tubes received have been in storage from six to nine years. The 6AK5 and the 5,654 tubes, which have proved very satisfactory when used, are not available in any quantity. The AN/ARC-1 equipment in use is requiring frequent alignment due to the deterioration of stability brought on by the old age of the equipment.

c. APG-30 continues to give very satisfactory service. The Chief in charge of the V-4 Division aviation electronics shop has built a portable alternator for injecting four hundred cycle alternating current into the aircraft for line maintenance on APG-30. This has proved very helpful and is an excellent example of the initiative displayed by the ship in helping to solve our problems. It is felt that authorizing a ship's allowance of two spare sets of APG-30 would effectively keep jet aircraft in an up status where otherwise they would be downed. Removal of the APG-30 equipment necessitates grounding of the plane because of weight and balance effects. With spares available an immediate switch could be made allowing the plane to make the next launch.

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d. Caution is being emphasized to ordnance and maintenance personnel working around the nose of the F9F-5. Several cases have occurred where the directional coupler of the antenna wave guide of the APG-30 have been jarred or slightly damaged. Because of the critical dimensions involved, slight damage is enough to seriously impair the efficiency of the gear. No couplers have been available to repair damaged ones, and the gear has to be operated without a coupler. Because of a lower impulse return a much more sensitive receiver adjustment is needed. This can be so critical as to cause a lock-on on clouds.

e. The night hecklers from VC-3 are encountering a great increase in jamming on all VHF channels used over the beach. It has been taking about fifteen minutes for the jammer to get on frequency and when the planes are separated on the longer recco routes the jamming has been about 75% effective. The jammer appears to be an automatic keying transmitter.

f. APS-19 radar has proven extremely effective for search operation but has been relatively useless on intercepts since it is so delicate on that position as to be unable to stand catapult shots or arrested landings.

g. Although the F4U5N aircraft being operated by VC-3 have recently undergone overhaul, the shielded wiring throughout the planes is breaking down. About fifty feet of wiring in each plane has had to be replaced due to the shielding crumpling.

h. The electronics equipment on the AD4W aircraft has held up very well. There has been only one major discrepancy. This was high voltage arcing within the APS 20 transmitter. The 8000 volt pulse across the primary of T2701 (pulse transformer) arced over to leads A, B, C, D, and E from J-2703 inside transmitter, breaking down the installation on all five leads and welding them together. Correction of this discrepancy entailed removal of the ART-26 (Relay Transmitter) ART-26 rack, R-142 (Radar Receiver), the duplexer, APA 81 power supply and the radar transmitter housing and the rewiring of the transmitter. This arcing also caused the rectifier tubes in the modulator to burn out (filaments to open) and the magnetron to be rendered defective.

### 3. Aerial Photography

a. The number of photo missions assigned daily varied from four to eight. Eight missions can be handled by the three aircraft assigned if maintenance problems are routine; however, five to six missions daily appears to be the optimum number for general practice.

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machine. Substitute "home-made" ink mixtures have not been too successful. The ideal ink would have adhering qualities, penetration qualities, and fast-drying characteristics. It is recommended that the possibilities of obtaining such an ink be investigated.

4. Air Intelligence

a. The Air Group Air Intelligence team continued to function smoothly with the ship's AI organization. No especially difficult problems were encountered.

5. Survival

a. During the period covered by this report, four successful water ditchings were made. In three out of the four instances the Mark IV exposure suit was worn and proved extremely satisfactory. It is felt, however, that the following modifications should be made.

(1) The inside snaps should be made stronger or replaced by a zipper. There have been many instances of the snaps open after the suit was put on.

(2) The knee hinges of the liner should be lowered on most suits from one to two inches.

(3) The attachment of the knit ankle is too small. To get their feet through the binding many of the pilots have had to cut it.

(4) The side pocket openings need to be changed so that small articles will not fall out when the pilot sits down.

b. The use of the exposure suit was made optional when the water temperature approached 60°F. The water usually reaches this temperature around the first of May.

c. There have been several instances in the Korean area where pilots have been lost because they could not be spotted by rescuers. It is highly recommended that all squadrons adopt the use of a brightly colored fluorescent cloth survival scarf.

d. During this period several casualties occurred as a result of ditchings and bail-outs. One pilot made what appeared to be a successful ejection bail out, only to be drowned when he was unable to get clear of his chute in the water. The chute acted as a sail and pulled the pilot across

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the water for approximately three minutes. Another pilot, after being hit by flak, made a water ditching that was observed to be correct in speed, altitude, and attitude. However, the plane broke apart upon impact and the pilot was lost. In a third case, a jet pilot made a successful water ditching despite complete hydraulic failure and inability to get his air-speed below 170 knots.

e. There were also two instances of planes going into the water on catapult shots. In the first case the pilot managed to hold the plane level and was recovered immediately. On the second ditching, however, the pilot made a shallow turn in a low wind condition and the plane stalled wing down and cartwheeled. The pilot was not recovered.

6. Miscellaneous

a. The incidence of auto-acceleration has decreased considerably with the advent of warmer weather. The altitude of maximum occurrence has moved from approximately 20,000 feet to approximately 30,000 feet. The relative merits of using alcohol is discussed under maintenance.

b. Considerable gasoline spillage resulted from the difficulty in determining the amount of fuel in jet tip tanks when refueling. This condition resulted in tip-tanks frequently being "short" due to the reluctance of the fueling detail to take a chance of spilling gasoline. This problem was solved by providing each plane captain with a dip-stick. A non-ferrous metal handle is attached to prevent falling in to the tank.

c. Four F4U-5N belly tanks were torn open by the bridle during catapult shots at the beginning of this tour. However, increasing the pressure on the shots from 2300 lbs to 2800 lbs has solved this problem.

d. With the advent of warmer weather it was found necessary to shorten the "turn up" time for props to prevent fouled plugs.

B. Air Department

1. Flight deck

a. The current landing weight of F9F-5 aircraft in conjunction with hook point contour and increased hook point deck impact forces have caused flight deck planking in the landing area to erode rapidly. Frequent inspections and repairs of the landing area (No. 2 crossdeck pendant to

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No. 9 crossdeck pendant primarily), are conducted to prevent excess deck erosion with subsequent hook point and hook shank failures due to hook point engaging flight deck tie-down cleats, cross-deck pendant chafing plates and other metal protuberances in the landing area. This vessel has replaced an average of two thousand (2000) lineal feet of flight deck planking after each twenty (20) days of air operations. During Air Group qualifications, however, this is increased considerably due to heavier fuel loads and inherent heavy landings.

b. During the last Navy Yard Availability in Yokosuka, Japan, a total of three thousand (3000) feet of teak-faced laminated Fir planking was installed using Minnesota Mining Company Caulking Compound specification 93517-c. Current operations have caused this caulking compound to fail, possibly due to its coefficient of elasticity. Non-turning and partially turning aircraft wheels passing over this elastic compound cause it to be pulled from between the deck planking to a depth of three quarters (3/4) of an inch. The moisture seal is destroyed by this action. It is believed this defect can be partially corrected by applying this caulking compound flush with the deck plank surface, or one sixteenth (1/16) of an inch below the planking surface. BuShips has been advised.

c. During recent operations it has been a policy to notify jets in the air to take a longer interval when the forward area of the flight deck is spotted full of aircraft. This allows jets to be taken to the hangar deck via number two (2) elevator with a minimum number of wave-offs and less consumption of fuel prior to landing aboard.

2. Arresting Gear

a. Statistics:

(1) Landings:

Day Landings	1525
Night Landings	48
TOTAL	1573

Jet Landings	1039
Prop Landings	534
TOTAL	1573

(2) Barrier and Barricade Engagements:

Prop Barrier	1
Jet Barrier and Barricade	2
TOTAL	3

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(3) Average Wind: 36 Knots

(4) Average Runout:

Jets 131 ft.  
Props 99 ft.

b. Description of Barricade Engagements:

(1) On 20 April 1953, at 0936I, F9F-5, BuNr 126224 appeared to make a normal approach. On landing plane engaged number three (3) cross deck pendant pulling out approximately fifteen (15) feet. The tail hook shoe broke allowing the plane to proceed up the deck engaging barriers number two and three, which functioned normally. The Davis Webbing was replaced and ready deck re-established in five (5) minutes. There was no injury to the pilot or flight deck personnel nor to other aircraft.

(2) On 1 May 1953, at 0950I, F9F-5, BuNr 125937 made a normal approach but upon landing the tailhook hit the deck hard and locked in the up position. The plane proceeded up-deck engaging barriers number two and three and the barricade, which functioned normally. There was no injury to the pilot or flight deck personnel nor to other aircraft. The Davis Webbing and Barricade Webbing was replaced and ready deck re-established in nine (9) minutes.

(3) On 1 May 1953, at 2218I, AD4N, BuNr 126926 appeared to make a normal approach, upon receiving a cut from the Landing Signal Officer, the plane descended slowly failing to touch the deck. The landing gear engaged barriers number four (4) and five (5), causing the plane to turn over. The pilot was injured, but no flight deck personnel were injured. Other aircraft were damaged. Supporting pendant shear pins were replaced and ready deck re-established in eight (8) minutes.

c. General Comments

1. The remainder of arresting gear operations during this period have been relatively routine with only normal maintenance problems.

3. Catapult

a. Statistics:

(1)	Day Shots	1072
	Night Shots	76
	Dead Load Shots	0
	No Load Shots	0
	TOTAL	<u>1148</u>

(2) Break Down of Catapult Shots:

	<u>Port</u>	<u>Stbd</u>	<u>Total</u>
Day	518	554	1072
Night	49	27	76
Dead Load Shots	0	0	0
No Load Shots	0	0	0
TOTAL	<u>567</u>	<u>581</u>	<u>1148</u>

(3) Types of Aircraft Catapulted:

<u>Type A/C</u>	<u>Port</u>	<u>Stbd</u>	<u>Bridles Expended</u>
F9F-5	508	525	5
AD	53	4	2
F4U-5N	2	51	1
TBM	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	<u>567</u>	<u>581</u>	<u>8</u>

b. General Comments

(1) Catapult maintenance during this period was comparatively minor. Those problems which were encountered were a direct result of vibration and use of high pressures.

(2) The high pressure oil line from the composite valve to the piston side of the piston valve (stbd catapult) developed a serious leak at the composite valve and was found to be cracked directly behind the flare. It is believed that this crack was the result of excessive vibration plus normal fatigue of the tubing. Replacement of this line from spare tubing stock on board, including shaping and flaring was accomplished by the ship's force, without difficulty, subsequent operations proved this line to be satisfactory.

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(3) A number of braces on both catapult engines frequently vibrated loose and had to be re-welded. Shuttle slippers were found to be excessively worn after 300 launches, making replacement necessary.

(4) Low wind conditions made necessary an increasingly larger number of launches at the maximum firing pressure, 4000 psi. putting an increased load on the catapults. However, availability of both catapults was considered very good during this period.

#### 4. Hangar Deck

a. Three fires occurred on the Hangar Deck during this tour on the line. The fires were of a minor nature and the alertness of handling crews prevented them from becoming more serious. Of interest is the fact that all three fires were of an electrical nature:

- (1) Auxiliary Power Unit
- (2) F4U-5 electrical wiring fire
- (3) F9F-5 battery cable

b. The Hangar Deck Sprinkler System was inadvertently actuated once during this tour on the line. To prevent a re-occurrence, guards have been built over the releasing mechanism.

This guard consists of a metal strap about two inches wide covering the "start" buttons in the sprinkler booths. The strap is hinged at one end and has a handle at the opposite end. The opening end is secured by a light wire seal which can be broken when force is applied to the handle.

#### 5. Maintenance

a. During this reporting period, maintenance work consisted largely of building up engines and propellers to a ready-for-issue condition, and canning or packaging material in class 265 for turn-in to overhaul activities. A total of four (4) R2800-18W engines were built up on quick engine change stands, of which three (3) were issued. One (1) R3350-26W engine was issued, and five (5) J48-P-6 engines were built up, of which four (4) were issued. Five (5) propellers, four (4) F4U and one (1) AD, were assembled to replace RFI propellers issued to the squadrons.

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b. An additional ten-ton capacity spur gear chain hoist was installed in hangar bay 2 to facilitate engine and propeller changes by lessening the amount of respotting necessary for maintenance work.

c. AD4N BuNr 126926 was stricken and stripped of usable and repairable items, and the remainder jettisoned. This plane was damaged beyond repair in a landing accident. In the same accident the vertical fin of AD-4N BuNr 126927 was badly damaged, and the damaged fin was removed entirely and repaired using structural parts and undamaged skin from both airplanes. Some difficulty was experienced in folding the wings of BuNr 126926, and portions of wing skin had to be cut away to obtain access to the hinge pins. It is suggested that hinge pin access doors might be provided in order to permit retracting the pins manually when the hydraulic system is damaged. This would save a great deal of time in clearing the flight deck.

d. A report was made previously concerning failures occurring in the AN3150 batteries used in the F9F and AD aircraft. The initial diagnosis was that a shorting of the battery from the terminals to the case was occurring and imposing a continuous drain on the battery. The cause of this trouble now appears to be largely the result of corrosion in and around the terminals at the points where they pass through the case. In some instances, however, it appears that some internal shorting might also exist.

This difficulty has been experienced with all makes of batteries in use. Gill batteries predominate both in number in use and in number giving trouble. Incorporation of the procedures outlined in ComAirPac GATB 24 seems to offer the best solution to prevent the corrosion around the terminals. Furthermore, while the bulletin applies specifically to Gill batteries, it should prove helpful on other makes as well. Its directives will be incorporated aboard this ship into new batteries before they are placed in service. Exercise of extreme care to maintain the top of the battery absolutely dry at all times should, it is believed, materially reduce corrosion. A RUDAEE has been submitted covering the problem.

e. None of the oxygen received on board has been tested and tagged for chlorinated hydrocarbon contamination in accordance with BuAer T. O. 89-52. A program has been established in the ships oxygen shop for testing and tagging. The facilities of this shop have been improved by the acquisition of an additional transfer unit from the USS ORISKANY (CVA-34), prior to her departure for the CONUS, and reworking of the existing unit.

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j. Availability for the period was considered to be excellent. The maximum availability for the period computed in accordance with the Naval Air Warfare Reporting Manual is listed below:

VF-152	VF-153	VF-154	VA-155	VC-3
87.4%	94.2%	91.6%	93.0%	88.3%
	VC-11	VC-35	VC-61	
	88.5%	87.5%	89.6%	

Excluding those sorties cancelled either by weather or higher authority, the squadrons flew practically all of their scheduled sorties. The table below indicates the percentage of sorties flown of those scheduled as explained above:

VF-152	VF-153	VF-154	VA-155	VC-3
99.6%	97.9%	99.7%	95.6%	95.8%
	VC-11	VC-35	VC-61	
	96.7%	93.6%	100%	

This shows that the squadrons are maintaining an excellent availability of aircraft to meet their schedule commitments.

k. A total of thirteen aircraft required replacement through loss or damage during the tour. Only two aircraft were off-loaded: an AD-4NA damaged in battle and an F9F-5 damaged in a barrier crash.

l. An R-2800-32W engine installed in a VC-3 aircraft required changing after only 65.7 hours because of failure to release from low blower. The engine used excessive oil and deposits of foreign matter were found in the blower outlets. This engine had been in a built-up QEC for approximately seven months prior to installation in the aircraft. Failure of three engine driven hydraulic pumps (S/N R86-VI-AA20334R) was experienced by VC-3. Replacement pumps were apparently over age as the seals were deteriorated and the pumps had apparently been improperly assembled during overhaul. RUDMs were submitted on the pumps.

m. Material support during this period was considered excellent. Twenty ACOGs were experienced for a total of fifty-three aircraft days. Of these, six were for allowance items for five aircraft days, and fourteen were for non-allowance items for forty-eight aircraft days. Two aircraft are still ACOG for non-allowance items not available in the forward area.

## 6. Aviation Gasoline

a. During this period the tankers have delivered AvGas at an average rate of 50,000 to 60,000 gallons per hour. Quantities used this period were:

Gasoline Aviation	761,628 Gals.
Lube Oil (Aviation 1100)	6,000 Gals.
Alcohol (Methanol)	920 Gals.

b. Several leaks in the flight deck risers occurred and were repaired by thorough cleaning and application of metal repair compound (Smooth-On) over which a neoprene gasket and brass cover were placed. These leaks are believed to be due to excessive vibration resulting in metal fatigue around the silver solder joints.

c. Several cases of fuel nozzle valve seat gaskets failing to seat properly have occurred, causing constant seepage. This condition is due to wear from constant use and was corrected partially by replacement of gaskets by gaskets of local manufacture, and replacement of nozzles.

d. The forward electrical fuel pump was replaced during this period with a newly overhauled pump. The pump seals were worn beyond maximum limits and no replacement seals were available for this type pump. It is believed the old pump was an obsolescent pump, as there were no prints or part numbers on the neoprene spring loaded seals installed. The new pump is equipped with standard Duro-Seal shaft seals that are listed as standard equipment in the Bureau of Ships Allowance Lists.

## 7. Air Department Safety

a. A never-ending safety campaign is being carried out among Air Group and Ship's Company personnel. The campaign has been to make each man safety-conscious.

b. For the benefit of all hands there appears a safety note in each Plan of the Day. These notes reflect violations of safety orders, previous accidents, and unsafe practices. It is felt that there are many personnel aboard the ship who have no realization of the inherent dangers in the handling of aircraft, gasoline, and ordnance.

c. Maximum use of the bull-horn is made to warn personnel on the Flight Deck, catwalks, and island structure when planes land with hung ordnance.

d. Close liaison is maintained between Primary Fly and the Conning Officer. The Conning Officer warns Primary Fly of impending ship's movements and this is relayed to Flight Deck personnel. With the heavy topside weights present and resultant heel in high speed turns, there is real danger to aircraft and personnel on the Flight Deck.

C. Engineering Department

1. Electronics

a. Electronics equipment operated normally except for the SX radar. The train amplidyne of this radar failed completely at 1400 on 13 May. When disassembled, it proved to be damaged beyond repair; there were no spares on board. A very satisfactory repair was accomplished, however, by running a lead from a 24" searchlight to the amplidyne terminal strip and connecting it to the proper terminals. The 120 volts DC available at the searchlight operated the antenna very smoothly at 3 RPM, and the equipment was back in operation by 2130. A detailed report will be forwarded to ComAirPac and BuShips.

D. Operations Department

1. CIC

a. CIC operations during the subject period proceeded in a generally normal and routine manner. A new policy of on-the-job training was instituted whereby first class petty officers relieved officers on the regular surface watch. The procedure has proved very satisfactory, both from the standpoint of training and efficiency.

2. Communications

a. Radio

(1) During the early part of this tour an Air Intelligence circuit, C 3.1 G, was set up and operated from Air Operations. Later on it was discontinued because the flagship did not have adequate equipment to maintain it. From a communications standpoint this circuit was easily kept up. There was also a perceptible decrease in high precedence messages concerning last minute intelligence information, diversions, and loading. Whenever equipment is available it is recommended that this circuit be set up.

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(2) Several gunnery exercises were controlled on the gunnery coordination net rather than the usual towing frequency. This practice is recommended in all cases. During one exercise it was noted that a considerable delay was caused by crowded circuit conditions. After the controlling station established contact with the tow plane he was frequently interrupted by radio checks, tuning, and cutting in. Leaving the towing frequency to the plane and OTC exclusively would eliminate the interference. Since the gunnery coordination net is guarded continuously there would be a minimum amount of checks and calls at the scheduled time of exercise.

(3) Experience with Trout has varied from unsatisfactory to excellent. The equipment is used on a TCZ transmitter which should be adequate for the job. The fact that some found the signals quite satisfactory seems to be proof enough. Undoubtedly the relatively few failures encountered were either in the particular aircraft or some phenomena of atmospheric.

(4) With the arrival of ComCarDiv THREE, this ship set up ship-to-shore relay on a duplex teletype circuit. A three-way patch plug was made to enable a T-6 teletype operator to receive hard copy from a ship in the force and at the same time cut a tape for relay to shore without changing patches on the TD.

(5) The TT23/SG panel has only two power outlets from the AN/SGC1 terminal set. Since one goes to the Model 19 there is only one left for the Model 14 or the TD. To save the operator a constant trip to the TT23/SG panel to change patches, a three-way plug connects the two in series. From the power outlet a lead goes to the Model 14, then to the TD, and back to power.

b. Visual

(1) During this period more than four-hundred visual messages addressed to this ship were handled and an additional one hundred visual messages were relayed for other units of the Task Force. These statistics show a slight but noticeable increase in the volume of traffic handled over our previous operating period in the combat area. Nancy gear is used almost every night.

c. Post Office

(1) During this period the Post Office handled the following:

(a) Mail

Outgoing	241 bags
Outsides	423 units
Incoming	321 bags

(b) Stamps

\$4,589.00

(c) Money Orders

\$81,351.00

(d) Class Easy

Msg's	19
Fees	\$22.58

3. Photo Lab

There seems to be an ever increasing demand for the use of 390 foot rolls of film. This ship does not have the processing equipment nor the printer to accomodate a 390 foot roll of film. In order to use this film, it is necessary to cut the film before developing, thereby losing several exposures on each end of the cut roll.

4. Aerology

a. High pressure dominated the operating area most of the period with resulting good weather, except for the following periods in which low pressure cells influenced the area; 15 April, 28 April, 7 May, 11 May and 12 May.

E. Gunnery Department

1. Ammunition replenishment

a. It has been this ship's experience that the rate of replenishing at sea depends largely on the rigging and organization of the ComServPac replenishing ship. The U.S.S. FIREDRAKE (AE-4) is cited as being the outstanding replenishment vessel serving TF 77. Rates of transfer of 220 and 200 tons of ammunition per hour were obtained while alongside the FIREDRAKE.

F. Supply Department

1. The supply of photo consumables fell critically low by the end of April, with on-the-line resupply of approximately 7,000 lbs of paper, film and chemicals required to maintain full photo mission capability for the extended period from 4 to 15 May. In this crisis, the supply support was outstanding---ComFairJap, the USS JUPITER (AVS 8), NAS and NOACT Atsugi and the VR23 Cod Unit all rising to the occasion with peak performances. Deliveries commenced the third day after a request was initiated, and in seven days total quantities of all items ordered were on board.

2. Non-section items continue as a major headache in ACOG procurements. During the period, 16 of 23 downed planes resulted from this cause. No one specific comment is possible as fixes were effected by manufacture on board, dud salvage as directed by ComFairJap, substitution, juggling, supply from CVAs in company, repair, and even redesign in one minor instance.

3. The R86-EC-1273-1A engine driven generator called out in the F4U-4 Baker allowance as replacing the R86-EC-1298-1A is not designed to run in the same speed range as the latter, and burns out almost immediately. Although on hand, no more EC-1273-1As are being issued for this application.

4. Great difficulty was experienced in getting requisitions to the JUPITER; a long three-part dispatch was sent as a last resort thirty hours before replenishment on the line after guard mail and courier had failed. This situation was principally caused by this CVA not knowing the JUPITER's movements. It is recommended that the responsible command distribute at practicable intervals short range schedules of the JUPITER's location to all carriers and tenders in NavFE (our courier went right past enroute to Yokosuka while the JUPITER lay in Pohang).

5. NAS Alameda quoted ComAirPac 182209Z March notal to the PRINCETON on 7 May as the reason for not supplying fifty-nine hook points. An AirPac transmission notifying the ships in NavFE of this action may have been missed, but thorough search has not revealed it. ComFairJap has coordinated action in exchanging annealed for unannealed points, but has not allocated area stocks of this item automatically, nor is it recommended that such action be taken. It is recommended that ships be informed directly of cancellations affecting any outstanding requisitions.

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6. Electronics spare parts requisitions, bearing DDDs to correspond to ship's sailing schedule, have been returned cancelled with the notation "Resubmit items NIS after (date)". This status information is entirely unsatisfactory, particularly when coupled with a loading schedule jammed against the ship's departure date with no intervening period to locate zero balance items through other channels. Status copies in some instances were received in the mail after the ship's departure from port for a two months period. Several zero balances in tubes and other fast moving parts were carried to sea. While unquestionably a more aggressive ship's program would have netted better results, it is recommended that NIS requisitions be forwarded or cancelled by the electronics supply ship within forty-eight hours (including weekends) of receipt.

7. The ship, for the first time in the Far East, had to cut down on night rations when a two weeks extension on the line completely disrupted commissary planning. Sandwiches were substituted for the hot meals previously served as the meat, vegetable, and fruit rations drew perilously close to the ration limit. No danger of over expenditure exists at the end of the tour, but the importance of daily control is obvious. The double entree system was continued in the general mess with better results from increased experience and a continuation of favorable comments from the crew.

8. A ship's store bazaar was held on 21 and 22 April that grossed over \$5,000 from the sale of Japanese merchandise. The space in the forward armory, O2 level, was too small for adequate display of merchandise. Plans for holding future bazaars in the parachute loft are being developed with the cooperation of the Air Department and Air Group. (The band room, where last cruises successful bazaars were held, has been converted into a living space and is no longer available.)

PART VII Recommendations

A. Ordnance

1. Reference page 6, paragraphs a.(1) to a.(3) - Improvements suggested for Aero 14A bomb rack.

a. Provision for latching and releasing the rack from either side.

b. A simple jettison release.....to jettison hung ordnance.

c. A modification.....to provide access parts for limited lubrication, maintenance, and inspection.

2. Reference page 7, paragraph e. - Pigtail electrical connection for rockets.

a. A spring clip, similar to a Fahstock clip, should be developed to clip the excess wire to the rocket base to prevent whipping.

3. Reference page 7, paragraph f. - Bomb fins turning at high speeds.

a. During manufacturing a pin could be welded on the bomb tail and a slot cut in the tail fin to prevent the fin from turning, even if it becomes loose.

4. Reference page 8, paragraph i. - Arming wire tags.

a. One tag is sufficient for each bundle of wires.

B. Personnel Performance and Casualties

1. Reference page 13, paragraph D.1. - Length of tours.

a. A tour of three weeks is considered to be the optimum time for a tour of duty on the line.

C. Special Comments - Air Group FIFTEEN

1. Reference page 20, paragraph d. - Photo plane cameras

a. The feasibility of installing a rotating mount in the forward camera bay of the F9F-5P should be investigated.

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2. Reference page 20, paragraph h. - Film marking ink.

a. It is recommended that the possibilities of obtaining an ink that has adhering, penetration, and fast-drying characteristics be investigated.

3. Reference page 21, paragraph 5.a.(1) through (4). - Mark IV Exposure Suit Modifications.

a. The inside snaps should be made stronger or replaced by a zipper.

b. The knee hinges of the liner should be lowered on most suits from one to two inches.

c. The attachment of the knit ankle is too small.

d. The side pocket openings need to be changed so that small articles will not fall out when the pilot sits down.

4. Reference page 21, paragraph c. - Spotting of downed pilots.

a. It is recommended that all squadrons adopt the use of a brightly colored fluorescent cloth survival scarf.

D. Air Department

1. Reference page 27, paragraph 5.c. - Manual Wing Folding.

a. Hinge pin access doors might be provided in order to permit retracting the pins manually when the hydraulic system is damaged.

E. Supply Department

1. Reference page 34, paragraph 4. - Communications with the USS JUPITER.

a. It is recommended that the responsible command distribute at practicable intervals short range schedules of the JUPITER's location to all carriers and tenders in NAVFE.

2. Reference page 34, paragraph 5. - Cancellation of Requisitions.

a. Ships should be informed directly of cancellations affecting any outstanding requisitions.

3. Reference page 35, paragraph 6. - Electronics Spare Parts Requisitions.

a. NIS requisitions should be forwarded or cancelled by the electronics supply ship within forty-eight hours (including weekends) of receipt.

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CNO (2) Advance  
CINCPACFLT (2) Advance  
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP  
COMNAVFE (1) Advance  
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP  
COMSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance  
CTF 77 (1) Advance  
COMAIRPAC (5)  
COMSERVPAC  
COMFAIRALAMEDA  
COMFAIRHAWAII  
COMFAIRJAPAN  
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
COMCARDIV ONE  
COMCARDIV THREE  
COMCARDIV FIVE  
COMCARDIV FIFTEEN  
COMCARDIV SEVENTEEN  
USS ESSEX (CVA-9)  
USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)  
USS RANDOLPH (CVA-15)  
USS HANCOCK (CVA-19)  
USS BOXER (CVA-21)  
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)  
USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33)  
USS ORISKANY (CVA-34)  
USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39)  
USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)  
USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)  
USS BATAAN (CVL-29)  
USS RENDOVA (CVE-114)  
USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)  
USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)  
USS SICILY (CVE-118)  
USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)  
CARRIER AIR GROUP TWO  
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIVE  
CARRIER AIR GROUP SEVEN  
CARRIER AIR GROUP NINE  
CARRIER AIR GROUP ELEVEN  
CARRIER AIR GROUP FIFTEEN  
CARRIER AIR GROUP NINETEEN  
CARRIER AIR GROUP ONE HUNDRED ONE  
CARRIER AIR GROUP ONE HUNDRED TWO  
CARRIER AIR TASK GROUP ONE  
CARRIER AIR TASK GROUP TWO

CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)  
CO, COMPOSITE SQUADRON THREE  
CO, COMPOSITE SQUADRON ELEVEN  
CO, COMPOSITE SQUADRON THIRTY-  
FIVE  
CO, COMPOSITE SQUADRON SIXTY-  
ONE

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