ORIGINAL

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U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA 33)
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

0200
DEC 24 1952

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division FIVE (CTF-70, CTF-77)
(2) Commander Carrier Division ONE (CTF-77)
(3) Commander Seventh Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the Period 20 October 1952 to 6 December 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4

Encl: (1) Carrier Air Group 101 Action Report for the period 20 October 1952 to 6 December 1952

1. In accordance with reference (a) the subject report is submitted herewith

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

1. During the period of this report the U.S.S. KEARSARGE, with Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED-ONE embarked, operated for various periods with the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA 34), the U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA 9), the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA 31), and with various heavy support and screening ships.

2. The U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA 33) operated off the East Coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operation Order 22-51 (2nd revision) and CTF 77 Operation Order 2-52, plus supplemental plans and orders issued during the period.

3. The assigned mission of the force, in support of the United Nations Forces in Korea, was interdiction of supply and transportation facilities and close air support of United Nations Troops.

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

20 Oct: 1137 Anchored in Berth 132, Yokosuka Harbor, Yokosuka, Japan.

21 Oct: 0746 Shifted berth to Berth 12, Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka Naval Yard, Yokosuka, Japan.

21-28 Oct: Moored port side to Berth 12, Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka Naval Yard, Yokosuka, Japan.

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(Chronology Continued)

DECLASSIFIED

28 Oct: 1315 Underway from Yokosuka, Japan for the operating area in accordance with COMCARDIV 5 dispatch 240650Z of October 1952. 1503 Formed Task Force 70 with U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA-133) and U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34). OTC is RADM R.F. HICKEY, USN CTF 70 and COMCARDIV 5, in this ship. U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) joined Task Force. SOPA is VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, in the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63).

29 Oct: Proceeding to operating area.

30 Oct: Conducted air operations. 0854 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN COMSEVENTH FLT, came on board via helicopter. 1444 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, left the ship.

31 Oct: Proceeding to rendezvous with Task Force 77. 0205 Dissolved Task Force 70, formed Task Element 77.01, OTC is RADM R.F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, in this ship. 1949 Rendezvoused with Task Force 77, dissolved Task Element 77.01. OTC is RADM H.E. REGAN, CTF 77, COMCARDIV 1, in the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31). Heavies present: U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA 31), U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA 9), U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA 34), U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA 33), U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133), and the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63). 2250 U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA 9) departed Task Force.

1 Nov: Conducted air operations during morning. Afternoon operations cancelled due to heavy seas. 0710 LT C.O. GLISSON, JR, 485189/1310, in F9F2, Bureau Number 123586, presumed crashed in water off K-50 Airfield. Cause unknown, pilot not recovered, listed as missing. 0835 LT R.G. RIDER, 480942/1310, in F4U, Bureau Number 97255, crashed on a scheduled combat mission. Probable cause, enemy anti-aircraft fire. Pilot declared missing in action 1631 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) departed Task Force. 1701 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) departed Task Force. 1730 RADM R.F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, in this ship assumed Tactical Command of Task Force 77.

2 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1405 U.S.S. LOS ANGELES (CA 135) joined Task Force.

3 Nov: Task Force replenished. 1314 Conducted Anti-aircraft firing exercise.

4 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1314 Conducted Anti-aircraft firing exercise. 2100 U.S.S. LOS ANGELES (CA 135) and U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA 31) departed Task Force.

5 Nov: Conducted air operations.

6 Nov: Conducted air operations.

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2

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(Chronology continued)

7 Nov: Task Force replenished. 0607 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) joined Task Force. 1122 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, came on board via helicopter. 1235 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN departed via AD aircraft. 1721 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) departed Task Force.

8 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1009 LCDR F.W. BOWEN, 116326/1310, in F4U, Bureau Number 97100, crashed while on a scheduled combat mission over North Korea. Probable cause, enemy anti-aircraft fire. Pilot declared missing in action. 1325 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) and U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) joined Task Force. 1432 Mrs. ANNA M. ROSENBERG, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, MGEN B. MILBORN, USA, and BGEN J.F. COLLINS, USA, came on board via helicopter. 1550 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) departed Task Force. 1620 Mrs. ANNA M. ROSENBERG, VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, MGEN B. MILBORN, USA, and BGEN J.F. COLLINS, USA, departed via COD aircraft.

9 Nov: Morning air operations cancelled due to weather. Conducted air operations during afternoon. 2235 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) departed Task Force.

10 Nov: Conducted air operations.

11 Nov: Task Force replenished. 1230 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) joined Task Force.

12 Nov: Air operations cancelled due to weather. 0800 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) joined Task Force. 1638 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) departed Task Force.

13 Nov: Air operations cancelled due to weather. 0926 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, came on board via helicopter. 1003 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, departed via helicopter. 1012 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) departed Task Force. 1023 U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) joined Task Force. 1410 RADM W.G. SCHINDLER, COMCRUDIV 3, came on board via helicopter. 1533 RADM SCHINDLER departed via helicopter.

14 Nov: Air operations cancelled due to weather. 1413 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) joined Task Force. 1506 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, LTGEN W.K. HARRISON, USA, RADM W.G. SCHINDLER, USN, and RADM J.C. DANIEL, USN, came on board via helicopter. 1655 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, LTGEN W.K. HARRISON, USA, RADM W.G. SCHINDLER, USN and RADM J.C. DANIEL, USN, departed via helicopter. 1708 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) departed Task Force. 2000 U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) departed Task Force.

15 Nov: Conducted air operations.

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DECLASSIFIED

(Chronology continued)

16 Nov: Conducted air operations. 0632 U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA 9) joined Task Force. 1111 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) joined Task Force. 1332 U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) joined Task Force. 1345 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, came on board via helicopter. 1605 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, departed via helicopter. 1710 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, returned on board via helicopter. 1900 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) and U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) departed Task Force.

17 Nov: Conducted air operations. 0825 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFL departed via AD aircraft. 2300 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) joined Task Force.

18 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1349 General Quarters. CAP from U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA 34) engaged seven (7) MIG-15 aircraft. Two (2) MIGs and a possible third shot down. 1615 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, RADM W.D. JOHNSON, USN, COMCARDIV 1, and RADM W.V. OREGAN, COMCRUDIV 5, came on board via COD aircraft. 1707 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN departed via helicopter. 1745 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) departed Task Force.

19 Nov: Task Force replenished. 1204 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) joined Task Force. 1702 U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA 34) departed Task Force.

20 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1730 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) departed Task Force.

21 Nov: Conducted air operations. 0913 Conducted anti-aircraft firing exercise. 1527 U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) joined Task Force. 1553 LCDR R.C. HOPPING, 116741/1310, in F9F2, Bureau Number 125173, crashed on a scheduled combat mission. Probable cause, enemy anti-aircraft fire. Pilot declared missing in action.

22 Nov: Conducted air operations. 0723 U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) departed Task Force. 0819 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) joined Task Force.

23 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1357 F9F2, Bureau Number 127175, Pilot LCDR D.W. DAVIS, 114580/ 1310, caught fire while being catapulted. Pilot made controlled water landing and was recovered by helicopter. Pilot suffered minor injuries.

24 Nov: Task Force replenished. 0855 U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA 31) joined Task Force. 1637 U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA 9) departed Task Force.

25 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1720 RADM W.D. JOHNSON, USN, COMCARDIV 1, in the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA 31), assumed Tactical Command of Task Force 77. 1809 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) departed Task Force.

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DECLASSIFIED

(Chronology continued)

26 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1304 U.S.S. LOS ANGELES (CA 135) joined Task Force.

27 Nov: Air operations restricted due to weather, only 16 sorties flown.

28 Nov: Task Force replenished . 1745 U.S.S. LOS ANGELES (CA 135) departed Task Force.

29 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1416 RADM R.F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, departed via COD aircraft.

30 Nov: Planned air operations cancelled due to weather. Flew weather RECCO and searched for downed Air Force transport plane - negative results.

1 Dec: 0858 U.S.S. ROCHESTER (CA 124) joined Task Force. Air operations cancelled due to weather.

2 Dec: 0817 Task Force rendezvoused with replenishment force, Task Element 92.11. Replenishment postponed due to heavy seas. Flight operations cancelled due to weather.

3.Dec: Task Force replenished from Task Element 92.11. 1058 RADM R.F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, arrived on board via COD aircraft. 1905 Task Force departed replenishment force.

4 Dec: 0400 Eight (8) sorties flown by dawn hecklers. 0820 U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA 34) joined Task Force. 0948 detached from Task Force 77, proceeding to Yokosuka Harbor, Yokosuka, Japan in accordance with CTF 77 CONFIDENTIAL dispatch 301112Z of October 1952. 1652 recovered 3 U.S. MARINE Corps helicopters on board for transportation to Yokosuka, Japan.

5.Dec: Proceeding to Yokosuka, Japan, 1101 launched one F2H2P aircraft for NAS Atsugi, Japan.

6 Dec: Launched 3 U.S. MARINE Corps helicopters for Yokosuka, Japan at 0753. 1014 moored starboard side to Piedmont Pier, Berth 12, Yokosuka,Naval Yard, Yokosuka, Japan.

PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Expenditure and performance of Air Ordnance is contained in enclosure (1).

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(PART III Continued)

2. Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance for AA practice.

5"/38

Projectile	Powder
184 AAC	184 Non-Flashless
5VT Frag.	5 Non-Flashless

3"/50

683 VT Frag.	Non-flashless Powder.

3. Performance of Ships Ordnance

a. The performance of ships ordnance is considered good to excellent except that the fuze output of the MK 56 GFCS primary computer MK 42 Mod 13 for director 30 to mounts 52 and 54 was outside the prescribed limits. This was apparently due to a mechanical slippage in the fuze line. The computer could still accurately control the firing of 5" VT projectiles from these mounts, therefore adjustments which would have placed the entire system out of commission, were not attempted while on the line. Assistance of the GENERAL ELECTRIC representative at Yokosuka has been requested to conduct required repairs while in port. There were no other major casualties. A few minor casualties occurred on the 3" battery but were quickly repaired by Gunners Mates. It was noted that constant adjustment of the loader mechanism of the 3" battery was necessary during cold weather.

b. Considerable trouble was experienced with the Mark 25 radar as outlined in PART VI paragraph 2. e. (3) of this report. During the periods the Mark 25 radar was inoperative, optical pointing and training with rangefinder ranges were used with good results. An extensive training program has been established for the training of rangefinder operators to meet such a casualty on the Mark 25 radar.

c. During Air Raid drills the ordnance equipment, other than the Mark 25 radar, functioned excellently. During these drills the Mark 25 radar was out of commission 50% of the time, but targets were aquired outside of gun range using optical methods. The GFCS Mark 56 and 63 were in excellent operating condition. It is estimated that 90% of targets were acquired outside of maximum gun range.

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Ship.
The ship was not attacked and sustained no battle damage.

2. Damage inflicted on the enemy by ship's aircraft is contained in enclosure (1).

3. Damage inflicted on ship's aircraft is contained in enclosure (1).

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PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES.

1. Performance.

a. Personnel

Personnel performance and morale has been excellent during the period of this report. During this period the average on board count of enlisted personnel was 1981 Navy and 59 Marines. There were nineteen (19) enlisted men received and twenty one (21) transferred.

b. Legal

During the period since our last report there has been an alarming increase in the number of domestic relations problems of men serving aboard ship. Special attention has been given to advising the men concerned of their rights under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 and amendments thereto.

The routine preparation and drafting of powers of attorney, wills and special instruments continued as well as the disposition of administrative matters touching legal assistance problems in relation to allotments and dependents.

Disciplinary cases continue at a low level. The offense of unauthorized absence in port supplies the greatest percentage of the total cases.

c. Education

Personnel aboard the KEARSARGE have demonstrated a continued interest in improving their educational background during the present tour of duty on the line. Nineteen GED and end-of-course tests have been administered, thirty five USAFI correspondence courses have been applied for, and one hundred fifty educational manuals have been checked out. Sixty four applications for Navy Correspondence courses have been completed. One hundred seventy seven men have been interviewed in an effort to assist each with his individual educational problem.

A screening and testing program involving one hundred sixty men with GCT scores less than 35 has been completed. Courses in basic grammer, reading, spelling and arithmetic are offered nightly. Participants have shown a keen interest and it is felt that they will profit greatly from these courses of instruction.

Recommendations for service-wide competitive examinations to be conducted in February were received, eligibility determined and examinations requested for 1282 nominees.

The training room has been constantly in use. In addition to the 200 one hour periods utilized for professional advancement instruction and billet training, Catholic Rosary services are held daily and a Protestant Bible Class meets weekly in this compartment.

d. Divine Services.

The number of Divine Services scheduled each week during the ship's second action period on the line was twenty six (26). Three Catholic Masses were said, three Protestant Divine Services, and a service for Latter Day Saints were conducted each Sunday. All Saints and All Souls Day were observed by two additional Masses. Daily Protestant devotions were held each week day from 1240 to 1300. A daily Mass was said each afternoon and a Rosary Service

DECLASSIFIED

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(PART V Continued)

conducted each evening for Catholic personnel. In addition to these Divine Services, Protestant Bible Class was held each Wednesday and Latter Day Saint class each Thursday. Two Protestant Memorial Services were conducted for pilots who were lost, and one Catholic Requiem Mass was held for a Catholic pilot who was lost. Thanksgiving services were conducted for both Protestant and Catholic personnel on Thanksgiving Day.

e. Character Guidance

Both chaplains gave character guidance talks to the enlisted men in the ship during the second tour on the line. The talks were aimed at the bolstering of the moral character and the sense of responsibility of the men. Each Chaplain covered about one half of the crew during this tour on the line. Thus, the men of all divisions and Squadrons constituting the enlisted population of the ship were given one character guidance lecture during the ship's second tour on the line.

f. Welfare and Recreation

Motion pictures constituted the main form of recreation along with reading and small games. On the average, twenty one showings of movies per week were held. The library was, as always, extensively used, issuing an average of 40 books per day. Pocket, paper bound books were circulated without accountability in great numbers. Sub-libraries in the various messes like the Wardroom, Warrant Officers Mess, and the Chief's mess furnished much reading matter on which statistics are not available. Daily press news and three issues of the ship's paper were published.

Approximately three hundred twenty three copies of magazines per month were distributed. Small games such as chess, checkers, acey ducey and monopoly remained popular among the men. Disc Jockey programs were broadcast from 1130 until 1300 and from 1600 until 2030 each day over the ship's RBO system. At 1900 a program of Task Force and world news continued to be a popular feature.

One happy hour was staged while the ship was returning to Yokosuka after completion of the first tour on the line. Another happy hour was staged whil enroute to Yokosuka upon completion of our 2nd tour on the line. One Air Force variety show from Guam played on board while theiship was in Yokosuka. All attending enjoyed the performance greatly. Several divisional parties were held at the EM club or at Japanese establishments in Yokosuka.

In Port recreation included four (4) sightseeing tours; two to Tokyo and two to Kamakura. More tours will be conducted in port as the demand continues. More than sixty officers went to Fujiya Hotel for a 72 hour period of rest and recreation. Somewhat over 10 percent of enlisted personne went to a rest camp or a rest hotel while the ship was in Yokosuka. Arrangements are in the making for rest camps and hotels on an extensive scale during the ship's next in port period. The Cruise book, which the ship expects to publish on the Far Eastern Cruise is beginning to take shape. Arrangement for printing in Japan have been made. It is planned to have the book ready for distribution during the trip back to the U.S.

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(PART V Continued)

i. Hobby Shop

Despite the low stock of hobby supplies from the states, an increasing number of men are working on hobbies. These men are taking advantage of the workshop and meet regularly to work and discuss new ideas. An exhibit of hobby crafts was on display in hanger bay #1 on 5 Dec. 1952. This included leather carving, model building, photography, sketches, drawings and plastics. After we reach Yokosuka all builders of U-control flying models plan to fly their planes at the base athletic field. The total Hobby Shop sales has dropped considerably due to the lack of supplies. Notice has been received of two large orders of model kits and supplies, but they have not yet been delivered. The hobby program is an excellent morale factor for the crew and could be expanded in many directions as space and supplies permit.

2. Casualties.

See PART VI, paragraph 6.f.

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PART VI

COMMENTS

1. Air Department

a. Flight Deck. Extended air operations during cold weather, and the resultant fatigue and discomfort of personnel, has required that flight deck operations be conducted with a minimum number of personnel for each of the various evolutions during a twenty-four hour period. Night respots were accomplished with three (3) handling crews. Early morning heckler launches were conducted with one (1) crew, three directors, and half of Repair Eight on deck as long as an immediate ready deck was not required.

The pilots ability to see the plane directors was greatly improved by sewing yellow flourescent cloth on the sleeves and fronts of the director's foul weather jackets. This served a twofold purpose of aiding the pilots, and provided increased protection for the directors from the wind.

b. Arresting Gear. During this period, the total number of arrested landings was 1683 and only two (2) barrier engagements occurred.

One barricade engagement (F2H-2) took place during the period. An excessively pitching deck was the primary cause of the accident. The nose was high as the plane approached the barriers and as a result proper barrier engagement did not occur. At the last possible moment, P13 was engaged, but this did not prevent the aircraft from continuing on into the barricade. The runout of the purchase cable was slight (four feet starboard and two feet port). The pilot was uninjured. Damage to the aircraft was slight, and the plane was in an "up" status the following day.

c. Catapults. During the period of this report therewere no accidents caused by malfunction of the catapults. One F9F suddenly caught fire on the track after being "fired", and subsequently ditched. There were 1129 aircraft launched during this tour on the line. Of these, 866 were jets and 263 were conventional aircraft. Total number of launches on the Port Catapult was 563 and on the Starboard Catapult was 566.

The F9F forged eye pendant is currently being used with excellent results. This was accomplished only after ensheathing all bungee strands inside a suitable length of fire hose to protect the strands from being cut between the shuttle toe fitting and pendant at the end of the brake stroke. The forged eye has been striking the shuttle causing dents in both shuttle and eye.

A decresse in the crews efficiency due to the awkardness of winter clothing has increased the catapult launching interval slightly.

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(PART VI Continued)

DECLASSIFIED

d. Maintenance.

(1) Electronic shop. This ship has received several radio receivers AN/ARC-1 from destroyers in Task Force 77 for routine maintenance and repair. To facilitate transfer, a system has been put into effect whereby a standard AN/ARC-1 radio is set up on the frequencies used by the destroyers and turned into the ship aviation supply storeroom. This set is then available to the destroyer on an exchange basis.

With the help of the ship's electricians, an indicating light was installed in the electronic shop to register whenever the ships 400 cycle AC generator is operating. This eliminates the possibility of the ships system operating when the current isn't being used.

(2) Electric Shop. The electric shop has experienced some difficulty with the 28.5 volt D.C. Homelite Auxiliary Power Units in that the battery vents are in an exposed position and are continually being broken. They are made of plastic and there are no spares available. With the help of the metal shop, metal battery covers have been manufactured locally and installed on all Homelite APU's.

(3) Parachute Loft. Survival gear. The large end of an R2800 engine container was placed under the electric hoist on the after end of the hanger deck and filled with water. The pilots then used these facilties to test out their survival suits. It is not only a good way to test the suits for leakage but also serves to refresh the pilots in ditching and recovery by helicopter. Mae Wests were inflated with the parachute harness in position. The helicopter sling was lowered into the water by the hoist and the pilot was hoisted clear of the water in the sling. The operation was highly successful.

(4) Engine Shop. Quick engine change units were built up as follows:

R-2800	3
R-3350	2
J-34-WE-34	3

Jet engines are left in the shipping container until needed for an engine change.

(5) Metal Shop. The metal shop personnel constructed a wire mesh tool cage on the hanger deck for stowage of special engine build-up tools. Another cage was completed in the engine stowage compartment for stowage of accountable winter clothing being held for Air Department personnel.

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(PART VI Continued)

e. Ordnance Handling Equipment. Seven new Aero Mod 12B Bomb Skids with Adapters Mods 8B and 9B were received on 3 December for test and evaluation.

f. Gasoline and Lube Oil Expenditures.

Date	Gasoline (gal)	Lube Oil (gal)
28-31 October	44,985	87
1-30 November	858,601	3406
1-6 December	1,450	0

g. Oxygen-Nitrogen Plant. Operation of the oxygen-nitrogen plants during the operating period was satisfactory. Oxygen production figures are as indicated below:

Date	Quantity
28-31 October	20,764 SGF
1-30 November	72,188 SGF
1-6 December	None

2 Engineering Department

a. Main Propulsion. The most formidable problem facing the main propulsion group is that of maintenance. This vessel is operating with a task force under difficult engineering conditions. The combination of heavy aircraft and light winds has required the ship to operate 17 days of the 38 days period at speeds in excess of 25 knots for flight operations. This demands an availability of auxiliary machinery to an extent such that even emergency repairs must be done at night or on replinishment days. Since departure from San Diego, the longest period this vessel has had for maintenance has been six days in October, with the prospect of nine (9) days in December. In order to perform even the minimum maintenance, particularly cleaning of boilers in these short periods, it is necessary to work some sections of the department on shifts during rest and recreation periods. The plant experienced one propulsion casualty during this operating period. On completion of the forenoon strike launch at about 0800, 27 Nov 1952, at a speed of 29 knots, a mechanical failure of the differential regulating valve in No. 3 main condensate system caused a loss of deaerating tank head pressure, resulting in loss of feed booster pressure in No. 3 and No. 4 firerooms. Personnel on watch handled the casualty effectively and no damage to machinery resulted. Propulsion was restored to the after plant in approximately thirty (30) minutes; the ship was brought up to 29 knots for succeeding launches with no difficulty.

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DECLASSIFIED

(PART VI Continued)

b. Electrical. No major casualties were experienced in the electrical equipment. Continuous maintenance and minor repairs were conducted without difficulty, except in the IC section where heavy attrition losses of experienced maintenance personnel has occured.

c. Auxiliaries. During a routine inspection of the port steering unit, the oil seal insert on the motor end of the HS pinion shaft was found cracked and partially crumbled. This unit was put on standby service. Inspection of the starboard unit revealed identical cracking, but to a lesser degree. Since the installation entails disassembly of the entire high speed pinion assembly both inserts will be replaced during the in port period at Yokosuka. Material Data reports will be prepared in accordance with existing instruction when details are known. These inserts are not allowance items nor are sufficient details available in the instruction book to permit manufacture. Detail plans have been requested from Puget Sound Naval Shipyard by dispatch. No further major troubles have been experienced with the electro-hydraulic rearming at sea winches. Of interest, is the extreme difficulty of obtaining replacement parts for these winches. A status report from Inspection Material, Philadelphia, on a valve control block assembly ordered prior to deployment in August 1952, indicates the material will be delivered FOB the contractors plant in April 1953. It is doubtful if this part, needed now, will be available even at the next deployment of the KEARSARGE.

d. Damage Control. The difficulty previously reported, of maintaining a watertight flight deck is still present. Additional recaulking and pitching has been requested from SRF Yokosuka during the next in port period. The steel deck below the wood in the area of the catapult flash plating continues to leak badly. The presence of the embarked aircraft, and the short duration of in port periods in the forward area, limits flight deck repairs to patching and caulking only the worst areas. Complete repairs entail yard availability and this subject will be handled by letter to the type commander.

e. Electronics.

(1) General. No major difficulties were experienced with the electronics equipment during the past operational period. During replenishment days, as much equipment as the situation would allow was secured in order to bring up to date the preventative maintenance schedules and to correct any potential failures noticed during the time the equipment was in operation. Maintenance and technical difficulties have been normal and routine in nature, except as indicated in the following paragraphs.

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DECLASSIFIED

(PART VI COntinued)

(2.) Radar AN/SPS6B. The transmitter has been gradually settling on its mountings, causing a misalignment of the coupling where the wave guide joins the transmitter. Hence the standing wave ratio has increased to 1:1.54 causing a subsequent loss of power; as evidenced by ring time reading of 4200 yards. Realignment of the waveguide coupling by shimming up the transmitter has twice been accomplished (June and October 1952), but the transmitter settles over a period of time causing the misalignment to recur. This command will investigate the possibiity of a flexible wave guide coupling to eliminate future misalignments. The side lobing mentioned in the previous action report has returned and retuning does not seem to be more than a temporary answer to the problem. On discussing the problem with field Engineers in this area (METU-5 & SRF, Yokosuka) they mentioned that this side lobing appears to be an inherent characteristic of AN/SPS6B antenna with the integral MK 10 IFF antenna. No further information is available at present.

3.) MK25-3 FC RADAR. During operations on the line it was discovered that Director 52 radar would not shift from conical scan. The difficulty was found to be of a mechanical nature and was corrected by re-adjusting the balance spring and the female clutch lock in the scanner mechanism. Identical trouble was experienced with Director 51 during this period and was corrected as reported above. An intermittent high voltage arc (4.5 KV plus setting on HV variac) developed between the magnetron shield sub-assembly, apparently due to the loss of filament voltage. This was found to be caused by a malfuctioning of the 4 minute time delay relay which was breaking, but not making contact. Normal operation was obtained by adjusting the relay.

(4) Radio. Inter-Ship interference between the VHF radio circuit continues to be the major electronic problem. As mentioned in the last action report, the interference is definitely "spill over" into receivers from shipboard VHF transmitters, with several cases of cross-modulation noted. Between the most active and important VHF circuits, (141.48 mcs, 142,56 mcs, 142.74 mcs 143.64 mcs and 145.08 mcs) the interference is such as to practically preclude full time simultaneous operation, in that received signals are blocked out or over-riden. As much as 4 volts of RF energy has been detected at the receiver antenna connection, and on one occasion a ME-11/u wattmeter needle has been un-pegged by the RF energy from a shipboard transmitter. Transmitters tuned to 116.10 mcs and 121.5 mcs cause some interference with the above mentioned frequencies, key-clicks an occasional breakdown of silencer bias, but not enough of these difficulties have occured to cause any concern. It has been noted that the interference from a particular transmitter affects higher channels considerably more than the lower ones, and not necessarily the "nearer" higher channel; ie-141.48 mcs can be read much louder and clearer on a receiver tuned to 145.08 mcs, than on a receiver tuned to 142.56 mcs. The type of equipment used seems to have little effect on the amount of interference experienced. It has been observed when using TDQ and RCK, or AN/ARC-1. Transmitter power output and receiver sensitivity and selectivity have their expected effect, but operational requirements practically "fix" these variables. Similarly, channel frequency selection is fixed.

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(4) Radio Continued

Antenna selection, as expected, has the most marked effect on interference levels and for any one case of interference, possibly two, the interference can be eliminated, however only at the expense of creating it on another channel. The ship's force has been unable, to date, to find an antenna combination that is an all-around improvement. With the proposed shift to UHF in the immediate future, the ship's force went to considerable trouble to set up similar interference problems in the UHF band for study. Very little or no interference was noted, even between adjacent channels. At present, it appears that the only answer to the problem is the maximum physical separation of receiving and transmitting VHF antennae, utilizing multi-couplers to reduce the number of antennae; or the allocation of widely separated frequencies to each of the various commands; or a combination of both. On completion of the forthcoming inport period on 16 Dec 1952, a full letter report on radio interference will be submitted to the type commander.

3. Gunnery Department

a. Ammunition re-supply.

(1) Replenishment was accomplished six times during the period:

DATE	FROM	TONNAGE	AVERAGE TON PER HR.
11-3-52	U.S.S. CHARA (AKA 58)	102	85
11-7-52	U.S.S. CHARA (AKA 58)	228	99.1
11-11-52	U.S.S. PARICUTIN (AE 18)	176	97.2
11-19-52	U.S.S. PARICUTIN (AE 18)	295	84.3
11-24-52	U.S.S. PARICUTIN (AE 18)	365	97.2
11-28-52	U.S.S. TITANIA (AK 13)	137	60

b. Ammunition Handling Problems.

(1) During the period of this report no major difficulties were experienced in the handling of ammunition. Minor difficulties are still being experienced with the presently installed interim winches. Through the continued efforts of the Engineering force the winches have been kept in an operational status but with a slower rate of operation.

c. Recommendations.

(1) That the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA 33) alteration request No. 7-52 be given strong consideration. This request recommends changes at No. 3 loading station. It is believed that by making these changes the tons per hour loading at this station could be greatly increased and that an added improvement in safety to personnel and equipment would result.

DECLASSIFIED

(PART VI Continued)

5. OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

a. Combat Information Center.

(1) Operating Procedures. CIC continued to function as the Flag CIC until 25 November, when tactical command was shifted from ComCarDiv FIVE to ComCarDiv ONE in the BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31). CIC functioned primarily as air control center for TF 77 from 25 November to 4 December, since the Flag Ship was without air search radars during this period. During normal operations Strike and CAP controls were assumed alternately every other day, and on days of CAP control, strike flights were monitored in case strike control needed to be assumed without notice. From 25 Nov to 4 Dec all air control was assumed, with only an occasional relinguishment of CAP control to a destroyer or cruiser.

Strikes were under positive control with each flight identified at all times between the beach and the Task Force, with the range of control averaging about 70 miles and reaching as far as 100 miles. Positive control and identification was usually accomplished with the combined use of SPS-6B radar, MK 10 IFF, and communications, the latter by using a combination of TDQ transmitters, AN/ARC-1 receivers, and the URD-2 receiver.

The entire period continued to hold the same routine pattern of continuous strikes against land targets from 0400 until 2000, except for the defensive measures taken against enemy aircraft on 18 November. On 17-18 November strikes were conducted against major targets in Northeastern North Korea. The northernmost position of the force was at 41-33N. At 1310 I and for a duration of two and one half hours, enemy aircraft became very active in the seaward areas to the north, approaching to within 25 miles of the force. Effective and continuous radar tracking was accomplished as far as 120 miles against jet and prop targets. One successful interception was made against MIG-15's by the ORISKANY, at 40 miles distance with two enemy aircraft destroyed. A second interception against prop aircraft at a distance of about 45 miles failed due to the lack of altitude determination. A third interception, against MIG-15's, was accomplished by this ship at 45 miles but CAP was broken off when the enemy retired. Difficulty was experienced in breaking CAP off from combat due to fading communications.

This was the first time this ship has experience a true combat situation against enemy aircraft in the vicinity of the force. Coordination of CIC with Flag and with the CIC's of other ships appeared good. CIC changed its mode of operation from surveillence of strike flights to a local combat situation with no appreciable difficulty and with little change in internal organization. It is belived that continuous air defense drills for the past few months have been most productive in this respect.

16

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DECLASSIFIED

(PART VI Continued)

(1) Operating Procedures (continued)

This period comprised the second tour on the line for this ship. It is believed, from the experience gained, that the following major factors are requisite to the efficient operation of CIC:

(a) Sufficient personnel to man all positions without undue doubling of functions performed by individuals.

(b) An efficient and cooperative ER division of the Engineering Department.

(c) Constant training of all enlisted men in more than one CIC function, and assignment of enlisted men to positions of responsibility and control, thereby stimulating interest and raising morale.

(d) Close cooperation between ship and Flag CIC watch officers without restrictive regard to demarcation of command.

This ship has experienced the advantages of all these factors.

(2) Equipment Performance. The SPS-6B radar was continually used whereas the SX was kept in standby as much as possible to reduce maintenance difficulties and always insure the availability of one air search radar. SPS performance has been excellent although major reliance still is made on IFF for the tracking of jet aircraft. On 18 November SPS performance in tracking MIG-15's was amazing, with reliable tracking reaching 120 miles. The pips on the scopes, reflecting flights of about 6 aircraft, were large and were seldom lost. This was a rare performance and is believed to have been due to atmospheric conditions aloft. Abnormally large side lobes continued with the SIS when operations were near land masses. It is believed that this may be caused by the integral installation of the IFF antenna with that of the SIS.

The SG-6B radar has been reliable except for excessive sea return during heavy weather. The antenna labors considerably in winds above 40 knots.

The SX Height Finder performance was extremely poor, with a maximum reliable range of only 30 miles.

(3) Communications. The scope of operations during this preiod was not great enough to overtax available circuits. VHF communications were barely acceptable for the type of operations being conducted, due to the lack of sufficient range and due to the excessive feed-over and mutual interference on the ship between difference frequencies. Considerable experimentation has been conducted with VHF equipment to eliminate feed-over. (See Part VI, Par 2.e.(4)). This places communications in a dilemma since it is absolutely essential to get range and also to minimize feed-over. A compromise has not been found. It is believed that a minimum acceptable range for reliable communications is 80 miles. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the frequency range of transmitters, receivers, and antennas is being seriously limited by present installation design.

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(4) PERSONNEL. The state of training has progressed much more rapidly than was thought possible. This ship reached the line in September with less than 10 percent of enlisted men and only one officer having previous CIC experience and less than half of the non-rated men had any formal CIC training except for a short course in elementary basic functions at CIC Team Training Center, San Diego. There was little opportunity for actual operations prior to September, except for routine ship control functions, routine air control during CarQuals, and mock battle problems. Therefore, the real training conducted has been on the line in Korea. At the end of this second period on the line, it is believed that the air control functions of CIC are very efficiently performed. The Surface Control functions are continually improving.

Sixty-two enlisted watch standers were employed in two heavy sections of 24 men each for air operations and one light section of 14 men for the night watch. Officers included the CIC Officer, three CIC Watch Officers, three air controllers, and three Surface Control Officers. Three men filled a position in AA Control, which is in excess of actual CIC requirements. Flag requirements necessitated the full utilization of eight men. It is considered that the above is the minimum required for efficient CIC operation. A further reduction in personnel will eliminate essential positions and will result in a proportionate loss in efficiency.

Two Ensigns were transferred from CIC to other departments in accordance with the policy of rotating Ensigns every six months. Two Ensigns were received from the Gunnery Department. The new officers are assigned to regular surface watches but stand duties under close supervision for the first month.

One Ensign from a destroyer was trained as Day air controller during the period, and one officer from the Gunnery Department was qualified as air controller. Operations seriously limit training in all weather air controlling.

b. Communications.

(1) Postal Affairs. The volume of postal business conducted by a relatively small Postal Section is such that continual supervisory attention, liaison, and aid is required. About 1800 money orders are issued monthly totalling thousands of dollars, most of which is handled immediately after pay days. About 80 bags of mail, mostly parcel post, leaves the ship each replenishment day. The supply of mail bags becomes a problem which was barely solved by taking 100 empty sacks to sea, where the bulk of gift packages are presented for mailing. It was found that replenishment ships do not carry empty mail sacks for other than their own use. With due regard to Christmas shopping, in addition to the normal heavy souvenir purchasing, it is planned to have not less than 200 mail sacks on board prior to our next departure for the operating area.

DECLASSIFIED

(PART VI Continued)

(1) Postal Affairs continued.

With the aforementioned volume of mail, attendant supplies become critical. It is recommended that the Fleet Post Office, Yokosuka, be equipped to issue money order application forms, lead seals, custom declaration forms, other similar supplies, and to sell stamps in bulk to ships in port. At present, each ship must arrange for and procure these items from the Army Fleet Post Office at Yokohoma, with the attendant transportation and communication difficulties.

By keeping all hands advised of the postal situation at all times via the Plan of the Day, complaints from embarked personnel and their coorespondents have been rare. An interest and understanding of the difficulties encountered in the forward area has been engendered. Especially important, for information of the crew, has been the time normally required for deliver of air and surface mail and parcel post to the U.S., recommended wrapping, customs information, and special fees.

Distribution of incoming Parcel Post at the rate of 80 to 300 bags at a time has been accomplished in a matter of hours by extending the limits of the Post Office to include the Hanger or Mess Decks as convenient, and calling upon properly instructed division Mail Petty Officers to aid in sorting and distributing mail.

(2) Visual Signalling. Nancy signalling at night, difficult under ideal circumstances, becomes unfeasible except for the shortest of plain language messages with the onset of extremely cold weather. Physical discomfort combined with inadequate equipment reduces operating abilities to a point of diminishing return. It is strongly recommended that binocular type Nancy receivers be designed and issued to alleviate the universal eye-strain problem now encountered in all Nancy method signalling. This vessel is equipped with types C-3,C-3A, and CAM type receivers. The latter have proven to be completely without value. It is recommended that procurement and Navy issue thereof be discontinued. A separate letter will be written on this subject.

The inter-task force Ultra High Frequency Radio Teletype net continues to prove its value, especially during hours of darkness and in view of the above remarks.

(3) Registered Publications. Rapid supercession of cryptographic publications plus the extended period of this command on the line necessitated transfer by mail of certain registered publications. Repetition of these circumstances is probable. The effecient, rapid response of the Registered Publications Office at Yokosuka to a message request for superceding publications was noteworthy.

(PART VI Continued)

(3) Registered Publications continued.

General messages announcing emergency supercession of cryptographic publications are promulgated by deferred message. Due to the large volume of high-precedence traffic handled both by this vessel and relaying commands, little advance notice was actually received in the operating area, and in some cases, notification was received after the effective date of a new edition.

This vessel has been designated as a Minor CRF and has been called upon to furnish services, under emergency circumstances while in the operating area. In each instance, problems have been satisfied by the close attention of officer-personnel to equipment available, and transfer of entire ECM units where a few minutes work by trained enlisted personnel would have repaired minor difficulties. Each problem of this type requires a destroyer to come alongside twice for underway transfer of ECM's with accompanying inconvenience to the entire task force. Further, it is considered most undersirable to transfer this equipment at sea. It is recommended that continued vigorous attention be given to the lack of qualified crypto-repairmen in the fleet. Local shore activities require a minimum of 30 days to service an ECM, which is unacceptable considering the short in-port periods experienced in this area. Noteworthy also, with regard to this problem, is the fact that this vessel, as a flagship, employs two ECMs continuously while on the line with a third in use about eight hours per day, seven days a week. The ideal solution to the cryptographic problem is considered to be the transfer of a crypto-repairman with tools and spare parts kit by helicopter to commands requiring these services.

(4) Radio. The message traffic volume continues to average 250 to 280 messages per day with more than half of these messages classified. In addition, the Force Flagship relays all ship to shore traffic for vessels composing Task Force 77. The efficient handling of traffic at this volume is feasible only by:

(a) Reduction of message traffic to an absolute minimum.
(b) The use of radio teletype for shipshore and shore-ship traffic.

Radio teletype continued to prove its value. It is considered that communication effectiveness would drop 25 to 50 percent without the CTF 77-Radio Tokyo duplex RATT circuit and the intra Task Force (heavy ships only) UHF RATT simplex. The latter circuit reduces visual signalling to a role of minor importance employed for relatively un-important messages of low precedence, and for use with destroyers which are excluded from circuit T6 by equipment and manpower limitations.

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DECLASSIFIED

(PART VI Continued)

c. Photographic Laboratory. During the last in-port period mechanically defective K-20 cameras, K-17 magazines and a K-17 lens cone were sent to the photographic laboratory, NAS, Atsugi for repairs. Repairs were not effected due to the lack of spare parts. If a competent camera repair school graduate had been assigned to the ship it is felt that some of these cameras and magazines could have been put into operation by an interchanging of parts by the ship's photographic laboratory.

Supplies were ordered and received from Fleet Activities, Aviation Supply depot in sufficient quantity to fulfill all needs during this operating period.

There were a total of sixty seven photographic sorties flown, shooting a total of one hundred forty one rolls of aerial reconnaissance film from 30 October 1952 to 29 November 1952. The photographic laboratory delivered 24,261 9 X 18" Sonne' prints, 4,985 9 X 9" Sonne' prints, 191 plot chart negatives, 1427 plot chart prints, 723 negatives of aerial mosaics, 5009 8 X 10" prints of aerial mosaic negatives, 79 18 X 22" enlargements of aerial mosaic negatives in addition to prints and negatives for public information, RUDM's and identification of personnel.

d. Air Intelligence. This second tour on the line has been free of all but minor difficulties. It is believed that adequate and proper planning prior to departure for forward areas, can assure this result in all cases.

In almost each instance, it has been possible to have all intelligence materials, i.e. brief notes, mosaics, charts, plotted flak, etc., available for Squadron AIO's by 1930 each evening for the next day's operations. This has allowed the flight leaders to make preliminary plans prior to actual briefings.

The following diagram illustrates a satisfactory method to facilitate Squadron AIO's procuring the latest intelligence available prior to each briefing.

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AIO's
READ & INITIAL

(The upper part of this board is used for intelligence of a static nature pertaining to all operations, an entire period of operations, or of a general nature presented primarily for background information. All must be read and initialled by Squadrion AIO's and may be checked out for use in Ready Rooms.)

ACTION FLAK BOMBLINE CAS FRIENDLY SHIPPING

(This portion of the board supports 10 clip boards for dispatches on the indicated subjects. Each dispatch must be read and initialled by each Squadron AIO prior to his briefing. It is essential that officer personnel enter the time of actual receipt on each dispatch.)

INFORMATION WEATHER CVA 33 FLASH REPORTS OTHER CVA FLASH REPORTS AIR PLAN

Briefing Intelligence Board

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22

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DECLASSIFIED

(PART VI Continued)

5. Supply Department

a. Aviation Stores

(1) Availability

2,928 items requested, 2,804 items furnished from stock or 95% of all items requested. Of the 124 items not in stock, approximately 57% represented items for direct turnover.

(2) AOG Requests

AOG requests totaled 30 items. Other Carriers on the line furnished 7 of these items.

U.S.S. KEARSARGE CVA-33

AOG REQUESTS 28 OCTOBER THROUGH 4 DECEMBER

	HOS 3	F4U 4	F4U 5N	F9F 2	F2H 2	F2H 2P	A4D	A4D 4L	A4D 4N	A4D 4W	TOTAL
NOT ON ALLOWANCE		8			5	5	1				19
NIS		5	1			1	2				9
FLEET CONTROLLED		1	1								2
TOTAL	0	14	2	0	5	6	3	0	0	0	30

(3) On 30 November a salt water main in the main Aviation Structures Storeroom (C-414-a) ruptured, covering the deck with approximately two (2) inches of salt water. All material contacted by salt water was quickly removed, and washed with fresh water; steel surfaces were also oiled. No loss of material was involved.

(4) Line replenishment by U.S.S. CHOURRE ARV 1. 231 requisitions for 477 items were submitted to the CHOURRE between 29 October and 19 Novemb 206 items or 43% were furnished by the CHOURRE on line replenishment 19 Nov.

(5) Recommendations

It is recommended that advance notice be given of fleet freight to be received during replenishment. An estimate of cube, weight, and number of pieces of such freight, 24 hours in advance of replenishment would greatly facilitate plans for handling and stowage. This matter will be handled by separate correspondence.

b. Provisions

(1) When receiving provisions at sea, damage and breakage of boxes and crates has been excessive. Most canned goods, celery, lettuce, tomatoes and

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(PART VI Continued)

oranges have been delivered in regular commercial containers. The lettuce crates are much too weak to stand the strain which is imposed on them in the nets when being handled from the reefer ship. Many paper containers are opened at the top, split, torn, and crushed in this same process. A heavier overseas pack of all provisions would be extremely helpful in preventing waste when receiving these stores at sea. It was noted during a recent provisioning at sea that V-3 type paper cartons with wire bands hold up unusually well. Large quantities of items such as tomatoes, lettuce and celery have had to be surveyed as a result of rust and decay due to age and their poor keeping qualities.

(2) It was found to be expedient to prepare arm bands in various colors and combinations of colors for use by working parties. Working parties are assigned in units of eleven men - ten men and a petty officer in charge. The men place the colored arm band on their left arm and the petty officer wears two of the same color - one on each arm. Thus, it is very easy for the officer or chief in charge of a particular operation to distinguish his men from other groups working in the same area. It is felt that replenishment has been accomplished more orderly and efficiently by employing this system of identification and responsibility.

(3) Percentage of provisions received on 3 November and 19 November from the U.S.S. GRAFFIAS were as follows:

Date	Tons Ordered	Tons Received	Percent Received
11/3	80	50	62.5%
11/19	136	59	43.4%
Totals	216	109	50.5%

(4) Common usage items such as lamb, grapefruit, American cheese, blackeye beans, tomato paste, blueberries, fruit cocktail, pineapple chunks, jams, jellies, vanilla flavoring, sweet pickles and ripe olives were NIS on 3 November.

White potatoes, tomatoes, grapefruit, apricots, fruit cocktail, jams, jellies, tomato catsup and sweet pickles were NIS on 19 November.

6. Medical Department

a. Medical Department supplies and equipment were replenished during the last inport period. This, together with receipt of a requisition from CLUSA provided adequate supplies and equipment during the operative period. No significant equipment breakdown occured.

b. Medical Department personnel shortage continues to be an acute problem. It has been an arduous task to perform the requirements of the department with only 76% of allowance on board.

DECLASSIFIED

(PART VI Continued)

c. Medical Evaluation of the Air Group Pilots and Air Crewmen.

(1) The general health, well being and morale of the Air Group pilots and Air Crewmen was excellent for the first 21 to 26 days on the line. With the postponement of return to port there was general let down in morale but no significant alteration in physical well being or efficiency was noted.

(2) Despite the frequency of inclement weather and concomitant increase in upper respiratory infection, exceptionally few pilots and crewmen were grounded. Other illnesses or injuries were very minimal and did not create any medical problem.

(3) Definite mood swings were concurrently observed with combat casualties and successful encounters with enemy aircraft. With each of the four (4) pilots reported missing in action, a noticeable depression and uncertainty was observed. However, this reaction was of a relatively temporary and benign nature. With the completion of a successful mission or engagement with enemy aircraft, a definite resurgence of enthusiasm and vigor was noted.

(4) Although no problems of a significant nature referrable to combat and its emotional sequelae were encountered, the prolonged period on the line did create some generalized unrest and languidness which replaced the initial vitality that existed during the first 3 weeks.

d. Medical Evaluation of Ship's Officers and Crew.

(1) In general, the health, well being and morale of the ship's officers and crew followed a pattern similar to that of the Air Group. No significant medical or psychologic problems, directly attributable to the ship's operations, occurred. However, unrest and languidness did become apparent with the prolongation of the operating period.

e. Medical Statistical Summary Air Group and Ship's Company.

(1)

Admitted to sick list	163
Total sick days out of 120,000 possible work days	275
Officers admitted to sick list	6
Total patient visits to sick call	4210
Total medical treatments	8214
Patients received from other ships	2
Patients transferred to hospital	14
Number minor injuries treated	23
Number major injuries treated	2
Number shipboard injuries resulting in death	0
Minor surgical procedures	85
Major surgical procedures	4
Venereal disease cases and Non-specific Urethritis total	114

Gonorrhea 63 Chancroid 25
Non-specific Urethritis following sexual exposure.. 26

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(PART VI Continued)

Penicillin tablets issued during last in port period.....5400

(2) Planes lost, enemy action, pilot missing in action..... 3
Planes lost, operational, pilot missing..... 1
Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, minor injuries. 1

(3) Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons..... 2
Pilots indefinitely grounded pending medical evaluation.. 3
Pilot availability..... 98.8%
Crewmen grounded for medical reasons..... 1

f. Description of Aircraft Casualties.

1 November LT Charles O. GLISSON, USN, VF-721, flying a F9F-2, BuNo 123586, enroute on strike mission over North Korea apparently developed engine trouble and presumably crashed into the sea. No other information was available. LT GLISSON was declared missing.

1 November LT Richard G. RIDER, USN, VF-884, flying a F4U-4, BuNo 97255, on a strike mission over North Korea was hit by enemy AA fire. His plane crashed into the ground in the vicinity of Chun-Chon. LT RIDER was declared missing in action.

8 November LCDR Frederick William BOWEN, USN, CO of VF-884, flying a F4U-4, BuNo 97100, on a close air support mission in the vicinity of Pyongyang, was apparently hit by enemy AA fire and crashed. LCDR BOWEN was declared missing in action.

21 November LCDR Robert C. HOPPING, USN, XO of VF-721, flying a F9F-2, BuNo 125145 on a flack suppression mission over North Korea, was hit by enemy AA fire and crashed about five (5) miles west of Yangdok. LCDR HOPPING was declared missing in action.

23 November LCDR D.W. DAVIS, USN, ditched his F9F-2, BuNo 127175, after it caught fire during a catapault launch. After two attempts he was rescued by helicopter suffering from immersion, laceration of the right wrist and a simple fracture of the right ulnar styloid. Encumbered by his Mark III exposure suit, he was unable to unbuckle his parachute or inflate his life vest and because of exhaustion he could not enter the helicopter yoke properly. Recommendations for a quick detachable parachute harness and revision of the helicopter rescue yoke were submitted with Medical Officer's Report of Aircraft Accident OPNAV FORM 3760-22 (Rev 8-51).

L.E. French
L.E. FRENCH

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COMCARDIV FIVE
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COMCARDIV SEVENTEEN
USS ESSEX (CVA-9)
USS BOXER (CVA-21)
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)
USS ORISKANY (CVA-34)
USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)
USS BATAAN (CVL-29)
USS RENDOVA (CVE-114)
USS BAIROKA (CVE-115)
USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)
USS SICILY (CVE-118)
USS GILBERT ISLANDS (CVE-107)
USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)
USS TRIPOLI (CVE-64)
Carrier Air Group TWO
Carrier Air Group FIVE
Carrier Air Group SEVEN
Carrier Air Group ELEVEN
Carrier Air Group FIFTEEN
Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE
Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO
Carrier Air Task Group ONE
Carrier Air Task Group TWO
Carrier Air Group NINE
Carrier Air Group NINETEEN

CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
CO, Composit Squadron THREE
CO, Composit Squadron ELEVEN
CO, Composit Squadron THIRTY FIVE
CO, Composit Squadron SIXTY ONE
USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)
USS RANDOLPH (CVA-15)
USS HANCOCK (CVA-19)