30 September 1951

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE
      (2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
      (3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
      (4) Commander Air Forces, Pacific Fleet
      (5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action report for the period, 18 August 1951 to 21 September 1951

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4

Encl: (1) CVG 5 action report for the period 18 August 1951 to 19 September 1951

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period 18 August 1951 through 19 September 1951 is hereby submitted:

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Mission:

1. During the period of this report, Task Force 77 was composed of the following units: USS ESSEX (CV9), CONCARDIV ONE, RADN J. PERRY, USN embarked: USS EON HOPE RICHARD (CV31): USS BOXER (CV21): CONCARDIV THREE, RADN W. C. TOMLINSON, USN embarked: USS NEW JERSEY (BB52), CONSEVENTHFLT, RADN H. H. MARTIN, USN, embarked: USS HELENA (CA75): CONCRUDIV THREE, RADN R. E. LIBBY, USN, embarked: USS TOLEDO (CL133): USS LOS ANGELES (CA135) and units of Destroyer Divisions 12, 51, 131, 132, 151, 171, and Escort Destroyer Division 11 and 21. OTC was CONCARDIV ONE.

2. During the subject period, the USS ESSEX (CV9) operated off the east coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operation Order No. 22-51, plus supplemental plans and orders issued during the period.

The mission of TF 77 was, primarily, to support the United Nations ground forces in Korea, which was advancing north of the 38th parallel. The support missions included close support, deep support, armed and photo reconnaissance, interdiction of enemy supply lines, and strikes against enemy installations.

PART II CHRONOLOGY:

(Particulars regarding loss of aircraft are covered in CAG 5 report.)
18 August 0600K - Underway from Yokosuka, Japan for combat operating area in accordance with COMCABDIV ONE dispatch 171154Z August.

During the period 18 to 21 August, 1951, the ship was maneuvered to avoid typhoon "Mar ge". Heavy swells resulted in slight damage to the ship. See PART IV.

21 August At 0014K, the ship experienced a roll of 25°. During the afternoon the Air group conducted familiarization flights. 2052K, USS ANDERSON (DD786) joined the ship as escort.

22 August Joined TF 77. Ships present included; USS N.J. JERSEY (BB62), USS BOXER (CV21), USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV31) and various destroyer divisions. Commenced combat air operations. No serious difficulties were encountered at this time or subsequently in meeting the operational commitments. This is attributed to the training afforded in the Hawaiian area with the Air Group embarked. OTC and CTF 77 was COMCABDIV ONE, (RADM J. PERRY) in USS ESSEX, (CV9).

23 August Conducted air operations. Afternoon portion of flight schedule cancelled due to weather. 0830K - Lost first aircraft and pilot, (Pilot LTJG FRANTZ) in F4U BuNo. 62920. Pilot became separated from Flight Leader over enemy territory in vicinity of Wonsan Harbor in instrument weather and was not seen or heard from thereafter.

24 August Conducted air operations. 0804K, 1 AD-4 BuNo. 123987 lost power on take-off (Pilot LNS STICKLAND) made water landing ahead of ship. Pilot rescued by helicopter.

25 August Conducted air operations.

26 August Conducted air operations. On pre-dawn launch, about 5 minutes after take-off, an AD-4N BuNo. 124051 was observed to burst into flame in the air and crash. Pilot and one crewman (Pilot LTJG SMITH, and BLUCH, P., ATN) were not recovered.

27 August Replenished.

28 August Due to weather in target area and local weather conditions, launched only ASP flight.

29 August Conducted air operations.
30 August  Conducted air operations. **2245K F4U-5NL Bu No. 124558** (Pilot LTJG AKNO) flew into water while on down wind leg of his landing pattern after completing a night heckler mission. Pilot rescued by screen destroyer.

31 August  Conducted air operations.

1 September  Task Force replenished and conducted AA firing practice.

2 September  Conducted air operations. Lost 1 F4U-4B Bu No. 97530. Pilot ENS BAIMAN was forced to bail out after plane caught fire en route to target area. Pilot was recovered by helicopter attached to shore bombardment unit in Wonsan Harbor. F2H's taken off all flights except Cap due to suspected catapult hook cracks.

3 September  Conducted air operations. Lost 1 AD Bu No. 123967 and pilot (Pilot LT SISTRUNK) due to enemy action. Pilot was seen to crash approximately 15 miles inside enemy territory. Lost 1 F4T Bu No. 125122 (Pilot ENS AHSTHONG). Control locked, due to enemy AA. Pilot was able to regain control of aircraft. Bailed out over friendly airfield, K-3. Plane crashed and burned.

4 September  Conducted air operations. Lost 2 F9F's Bu No. 125102 and 127136 and pilots (Pilots LTJG ERAMXELL and LTJG HOFORD). Both aircraft crashed and burned in the vicinity of Haengsan.

5 September  Task Force replenished and conducted AA firing.

6 September  Conducted air operations.

7 September  Conducted air operations. 0730-0830K conducted AA firing practice. 1 AD Bu No. 123990 was hit by enemy AA fire and was ditched off Wonsan Harbor. Pilot CDR GREY was rescued by shore bombardment destroyer.

8 September  Conducted air operations. Lost 1 F4U-4B Bu No. 62974 due to enemy action; pilot LTJG WORKING was rescued by shore bombardment destroyer after flying his damaged plane from over enemy territory to the vicinity of Wonsan Harbor. Lost 1 AD Bu No. 123949 and pilot, LTJG PARSE due to enemy action. He was observed making a bombing run when his plane burst into flames, crashed and exploded in enemy territory, CU-6489. F2H's reassigned to all flights with no external ordnance however.

9 September  Task Force replenished.
10 September Conducted air operations.

11 September Conducted air operations. On landing, lost 1 F2H BuNo 124983 (Pilot LTJG TRAILDWAY) on taxing from arresting gear, lost all braking power, plane rolled over side. Pilot rescued by helicopter.

12 September Conducted air operations.

13 September Task Force replenished. At 1500I launched recco, strike flights.

14 September Conducted air operations. At 1830I lost 1 ADW BuNo. 124762. Landing hook caught catapult bridle on take-off and bridle wrapped around vertical horizontal stabilizer. Excessive vibration set in and pilot was forced to ditch inside the screen. Pilot LT O'BRIEN and crewmen were rescued by helicopter and destroyer.

15 September Air operations were limited due to weather over the target area. Weather recco, CAP and ASP only flights launched.

16 September Conducted air operations. At 1823I F2H BuNo. 124968 (Pilot LTJG KELLER) with air brakes extended made an approach for a deferred emergency landing having been in a mid-air collision prior to return to the ship. Wheels touched deck but aircraft immediately became airborne, cleared all three barriers, landed forward on flight deck, and crashed into aircraft parked forward (starboard) on flight deck. Total loss of aircraft: 2 F2H BuNos. 234978, 124966, and 2 F9F BuNos 235131 and 125128, destroyed by fire. Personnel casualties included 3 known dead, 4 missing and 16 injured. Damages to the ship are listed in PART IV. However, damages did not prevent continued air operations, but all starboard catapult launches were discontinued until inspection and testing of the starboard catapult revealed no damage.

17 September Conducted air operations.

18 September Conducted air operations in the forenoon. At 1115I joined replenishment forces to replenish.

19 September Conducted air operations. At 0606I 1 AD BuNo 123991 (Pilot LT BRYANT) lost power on take-off, aircraft made water landing ahead of ship and sank. Pilot recovered by ESSEX helicopter. At 1712I ESSEX left formation in company with USS HELENA, CORTESDIV 21 less USS WALLY, to proceed to Yokosuka, Japan for limited availability in accordance with COMTHFLT dispatch 130008Z September.

20 September Enroute to Yokosuka. Conducted AA firing practice with towed sleeves.

PART III ORDNANCE:

1. Expenditure of Air Ordnance.
   See enclosure (1)

2. Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance for training.

   20 MM           11,968 rds
   3"50 Cal        1,478 rds
   5"38 Cal        385 rds


   a. 3 percent of the bomb vanes for 1,000 pound bombs were received with bad
      spot-welds. The vanes fell apart when tested for tightness. This is considered
      dangerous in that tail fuzes could be armed in the air.

   b. Several bombs of all types were received with frozen nose and tail plugs,
      making it impossible to fuze them.

   c. Mark 6 and Mark 8 parachute flares are received in double suspension. Sin-
      gle suspension must be jury-rigged. The suspension band received with these flares
      cannot be locked on the wing racks. Experienced two cases where aircraft dropped
      flares on the flight deck, one on an arrested landing, and one during a catapult
      launch.

   d. Napalm powder received in lot #NY 51175 and NY 5884, manufactured by the
      Ferro Enamel Company, was in a lumpy condition, apparently due to moisture pene-
      tration. The color had turned a bright yellow. Powder in this condition made a
      poor mixture and in most cases had to be jettisoned.

   e. Mark 77 fire bombs are considered impractical for carrier use, especially
      when the reload time is short. These bombs require at least three men to assemble
      and considerable time to fuze. During the assembly, the slightest dent or scrape
      on the connecting surfaces causes leaks. Japanese tanks or Mark 12 belly tanks
      can be hung in 10 seconds, and filled in 7 to 10 minutes under normal operating
      conditions, and are inexpensive.

   f. Bomb skids should come equipped with spare hold-down straps and chains.

   g. Ships should have a bomb disposal officer and bomb disposal team on board.
      There have been several cases of fuzed bombs having fallen off aircraft on arrest-
      ed landings. At present, there are no bomb disposal personnel assigned.

   h. A number of 250 pound G.P. bombs have been received with suspension lugs
      that are unsuited for use with the Mark 55 bomb rack installed in the F4U-5NL,
      AD-2, and AD-N aircraft. The top angle of the suspension lug support bracket was
      too great to allow the bracket to be received and held by the recessed suspension
      hook of the Mark 55 rack.
PART IV BATTLE DAMAGE:

1. Ship.

a. No battle damage was sustained by the ship.

b. Enroute to combat operating area during period 18-21 August, ship encountered heavy weather and suffered following damages in the forecastle area:

(1) Seven 3"/50 ready service lockers were broken loose when sides of lockers separated from the locker bottom. One of these lockers was washed overboard.

(2) Twenty-two battle helmets were washed overboard.

(3) One protective clothing locker, type "A", complete with contents was washed overboard.

(4) One O.B.A. locker (H-O. B.A. capacity) was washed overboard. This locker had been emptied and the contents turned over to the repair locker.

(5) One-inch steam line (steam heat for secondary conn) was smashed.

(6) Empty case stowage bin located under mounts 32 (port side of bow) was caved in, one support member broken and another badly bent. The capacity of this bin has been decreased approximately 20%.

(7) Empty case stowage bin under mount 31 (starboard side) is caved in slightly, decreasing the stowage capacity approximately 2%.

(8) Two ring-type buoys washed overboard and one of the stowage brackets is bent and is not usable.

(9) The catwalk forward of secondary conn was caved in.

(10) Gasoline line and support brackets were bent out of line (port side).

(11) The forward MK 63 director (no. 31) was slightly damaged and has been repaired by the ship's force.

(12) The two forward 3" mounts were only damaged to the extent that all inspection plates and all junction boxes were filled with salt water and had to be dried out. One inspection plate on mount 31 (train stop buffer) was slightly bent. All discrepancies on the mounts have been corrected by the ship's force.

(13) The MK 25 Mod 1 antenna mounting and the associated parts of the MK 34 Mod 6 radar which is part of the MK 63 Mod 11 gun fire control system was severely damaged and required replacement.
(14) The ladder leading to director 31 was slightly bent and has been straightened by the ship's force.

(15) Two life rafts, rectangular, balsam wood, twenty-five person capacity, with all associated equipment were carried away from storage at frame 42, port side.

(16) A split seam in the underwater hull in Compartment A-601-AE (chain locker), about two feet below water line.

c. As a result of the crash on deck 16 September the ship suffered the below listed damages.

(1) Approximately 500 linear feet flight deck planking burned.

(2) 1500 sq. feet of deck planking charred.

(3) 8 stanchions on forward starboard catwalk destroyed.

(4) 24 sq feet of catwalk damaged.

(5) 1 inclined ladder damaged.

(6) 155 feet (various size) of electrical cable damaged.

(7) 2 light fittings destroyed.

(8) 3 pr sound-powered phones destroyed.

(9) 2 junction boxes destroyed.

(10) 6 stuffing tubes destroyed.

(11) 150 ft 1 and 1/4" gas hose destroyed.

(12) 1 quarter-inch gas nozel destroyed.

(13) 2 ship's twin 20MM gun mounts with MK 20 sights destroyed.

d. Damage inflicted on the enemy.
See enclosure (1).

c. Damage inflicted on ESSEX aircraft.
See enclosure (1).

PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES:

1. Performance.
a. Performance of duty and morale has been excellent.
2. Casualties.

a. There were no personnel casualties suffered by ship's company personnel as a result of enemy action.

b. The plane crash and resultant fire which occurred on the flight deck on 16 September caused the following casualties among ship's company:

Two enlisted missing and presumed dead.
Seven enlisted injured.

c. Total personnel casualties (ESSEX and Air Group 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the above casualties, the following occurred on 16 September when an F2H plane bounced over all barriers and crashed into parked planes on the forward end of the flight deck:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the sixteen injuries, fourteen were burn cases and three were fractures, one case having a fracture of the femur as well as extensive second degree burns. This case and one other burn case were classified as critical. Eight cases were serious and two of the remaining six cases required hospitalization. All cases were treated on board until 21 September, when the critical and serious cases were transferred to the Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan. All cases survived this period.

PART VI COMMENTS:

1. Engineering.

a. The Engineering Department experienced no casualties during this operational period.

b. Steaming data.

(1) Miles Steamed 16 August (12001) 19 September 12,643
(2) Average speed 15.8 kt/hr
(3) Fuel oil received from tankers (gallons) 1,871,308
(4) Fuel oil delivered to destroyers (gallons) 457,726
(5) Fuel oil consumed by ESSEX (gallons) 1,830,806

c. Recommendations.

None.

2. Supply.

a. Aviation Supply.

(1) The current section B allowance lists are most useful as guides for quantities to be carried and a base of augmentation of items required under war-time conditions. Heavy operating schedules and damage to aircraft surfaces from anti-aircraft and small arms fire have necessitated constant revision of high and low limits on the following groups of items:

(a) All aircraft surfaces.

(b) Aircraft paints, waxes and hydrolube.

(c) Nose wheel, main wheel, and main wheel struts.

(d) Accessories, pumps and reservoir assemblies.

(e) Firing assemblies.

(f) Mark 55 bomb racks.

In addition to the above, there are a number of fleet-controlled items which require A.O.B. priority "A" procurement.

(2) The Aviation Stores Ship, USS JUPITER, has been able to supply about 71 percent of the items requested, excluding F2H-2 parts which are requisitioned directly from ASO, Oakland. The logistic support offered by the JUPITER is considered to be excellent. However, the AVS might be able to provide more complete replenishments by stocking selected parts not listed in the Section "B" Allowance List, since most AOG's aboard the ESSEX originate from a lack of parts not stocked nor intended to be stocked aboard a carrier.

(3) A list of high usage and short supply items thoroughly coordinated would be of value. However, operating experience with CAG 19 and CAG 5 and the receipt of marked-up allowance lists from other carriers indicates considerable variation in requirements. A screening process would be beneficial if the composite were promulgated.
b. G.S.K.

(1) No major replenishment of GSK stores have been made, or required. The only requisitions of any large quantities were submitted to the USS CASTER while in Yokosuka, upon first arriving in the Far East. Approximately eighty-five percent of the items requested from the CASTOR were furnished. None of the remaining fifteen percent of items not furnished were in the critical category.

(2) While at sea, a few critical items of the BuShips and Electronics spares have been obtained from other ships or received from the carrier on deck delivery plane (COD) after requisitioning from ComServDiv 31. The ESSEX has been able to reciprocate in furnishing like items to the other ships in the Task Force. This exchange between ships is most helpful and advantageous.

c. Ship's Store.

(1) Ship's Stores sales have averaged $20,000 a month for the period reported on. The inventory limitation of $125,000 requires greater velocity of turnover in the bulk stores and requires careful selection of stocks as well as exacting planning for replenishment of all items carried.

(2) The laundry is now operating on a 24-hour basis, 5 days a week. This work time has been reduced from a seven day round-the-clock work week and has resulted in a fresh water saving of approximately 35,000 gallons a week.

(3) Hours of operation of the Ship's Stores are from 0900 until 2030.

(4) A system of cigarette rationing has been in effect since commissioning date. Each man and officer is required to have a cigarette ration card which is issued by the Ship's Administration Office prior to making purchases of Tax Free cigarettes. These ration cards entitle each holder to purchase one carton of cigarettes per week.

d. Commissary

(1) No difficulty has been experienced in the Commissary Group. The logistic support in this area has been excellent. However, it is suggested that a list of available fresh fruits, vegetables, and new and uncommon items be furnished the operating forces as a basis for the submission of requisitions.

(2) Night rations are being furnished men actually engaged in night work. At present this involves only about 50 men. The ration consists of two meat sandwiches, one piece of fruit and a pastry ration. The ration is drawn by a member of the working group and is taken to the men at their stations. Coffee is furnished by the individual divisional coffee messes. Rolls, jams and coffee are served to one-half hour before flight quarters when early morning flights are scheduled. Cookies, cake, or toast and jam and coffee are served to the flight deck crew for 15 minutes after flight quarters on the evenings of late strikes. It is further planned to have hot soup available at the battles feeding stations for all flight deck personnel.
Air Intelligence:

e. Physical equipment.

The Intelligence Office on the ESSEX is well equipped and air-conditioned. Working space is adequate but storage space inadequate. Communications consist of one ship's phone, one 2G sound-powered phone and two intercom units; very adequate. One important change recommended is that sliding plywood floor to overhead chart boards replace the expensive cork panel on the after bulkhead.

A high degree of intelligence data is classified secret. This necessitates making most of the file cabinets secret. Recommend the large size safe be eliminated and two more file cabinets substituted.

Each ready room should have a small built-in partition and desk in the rear for debriefing and for the general use of the squadron AIO. This is necessary even to the extent of removing some rear ready room seats.

On ESSEX type carriers a window should be cut between the Intelligence Office and Ready Room Three so as to enable the teletypewriter to be seen by the AIO.

A space near the Air Intelligence Office should be designated for Photo Interpretation. Print Shop No.2 is now being used for this purpose. A file cabinet in the Air Intelligence Office can be set aside as photo files. A separate space should be provided for annotation. Part of the gunnery training room is not being used for annotation of prints.

b. Personnel.

Prior to arriving at the combat area the Intelligence Officer should be assigned two assistants. The Photo Interpreter should be one of these if his work does not require full-time photo interpreter work. It is not necessary for the assistants to have attended an intelligence school.

When in combat, a 24-hour watch is necessary in the Intelligence Office. This necessitates a minimum of three ship's enlisted personnel, all of whom must be able to typewrite.

c. Maps, Charts and Grids.

ComAirPac and CINCPAC did an excellent job in supplying maps and charts. The job of storage should be simplified if the operating area could be predetermined at ComAirPac and eliminate those maps and charts for which obviously there will be no demand.

d. Briefings Prior to Entering Combat.

The best method of obtaining combat information of intelligence operation in the area is to have one or two AIO go to the forward area on TAD orders. Such officers can either be Air Group or ship AIO's. The ESSEX did this and much valuable information obtained.
e. Operations.

It is suggested that Intelligence Officers have free access to shore based intelligence activities. This policy was followed by the ESSEX in its pre-deployment period and from the results obtained, the time was well spent. It was found that by following the first alternative of Task Force 77 Air Intelligence Handbook "Suggestions for Responsibilities of Ship and Air Group AIO", misunderstandings were largely eliminated. Basically it involves separation of responsibilities rather than grouping all intelligence under one responsibility.

f. Target Dossier.

It was found that the usage of this material did not justify the time involved in keeping it up. It is suggested that distribution of such should be restricted to staff level.

g. Recognition.

The material available is adequate but the responsibility of instructing the appropriate ship's personnel should be that of the training officer. The Air Intelligence Officer should be responsible for only getting the material aboard.


Astronomical observations were taken regularly with occasional overcast sky conditions obscuring the horizon and celestial bodies. Radar navigational information has been excellent. Loran navigation has been usable only during the evening and morning sightings.

5. Communications.

GENERAL

Reporting on station in the operating area, ESSEX immediately relieved as task force flagship. The resultant increases in circuit guard responsibilities, in volume of radio and visual traffic, and in over-all demands placed upon both personnel and equipment called for a rapid and effective adaptation to the expansion of communication activities. Having obtained valuable information from reports distributed prior to arrival in the combat zone and receiving excellent assistance and worth-while suggestions from experienced staff and ship communicators of carriers (on the line and being relieved), the ship was prepared in no small degree for what might be expected of communications in the operating area. In general, those problems which were most difficult to solve were concerned with the preparation, routing and handling of messages. Ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore, and ship-to-aircraft communications were highly satisfactory during this period. Conditions which have tended to qualify this evaluation are considered below. 27A conversion, as it applies to communications, has put ESSEX communications in a very favorable position to perform operational commitments. At the same time, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that an operational maintenance program is absolutely essential to optimum communications. The matter deserves the greatest consideration due to the almost continuous operation, especially in respect to MF/HF transmitting equipment. Recommendations for improvement of
communications are indicated below.

**CW CIRCUITS**

The frequency allocation for communications with Joint Operations Control, Korea, leaves much to be desired. Under the present allocation, one CW frequency (D188) is available. Since this frequency is in the lower range of the HF band, it is not well-adapted to night (dusk-to-dawn) mission. Employment of the high frequency now used for voice communications with JOCC would be ideal for this purpose.

**VOICE CIRCUITS**

Recommendations have been made to the Fifth Air Force by the previous task force commander for a revision of the frequency allocation for the circuit with JOCC, Korea. At present, three voice frequencies are employed; only one (D189) is satisfactory. The high frequency mentioned above is only reasonably satisfactory.

In the VHF band, the frequency designated C4.2C appears to be employed for a number of purposes which has overloaded the circuit. The frequency is used as the screen common, secondary tactical, gunnery control, and administrative nets. It is recommended that the secondary tactical circuit, in particular, be assigned a separate frequency for that purpose alone. In the event of failure of the primary tactical circuit for maintenance, the burden on C4.2C becomes too heavy often creating confusion on an important circuit.

In Flag Plot it has been necessary to modify the pot-selector switches in order to make available in each of the speaker-amplifiers all circuits which can be remotely positioned in the five stations located in this space.

**TELETYPETE CIRCUITS**

During this period of operations, a duplex R.TT circuit was set up between the ship and Radio, Tokyo. Although the clearance of the heavy volume of ship-shore and relay traffic has been erratic on this circuit, the value of the circuit can in no way be underestimated. During the next in-port period it is hoped that arrangements will be made for improving the utilization of this circuit.

**RADIO JAMMING**

Considerable interference has been experienced on all wave-bands during the thirty days' operations covered by this report. Incidents of suspected enemy jamming have been reported and forwarded to the staff for relay to cognizant command. Interference on a local basis as a result of faulty equipment (including equipment operated on the flight deck and in other parts of the ship) has been thoroughly investigated and corrective action taken.
ANTENNA INSTALLATION

Frequent attention has had to be given to the forward and after whip antennas. A schedule has been set up for the cleaning and lubricating of this equipment.

PERSONNEL

Officers: During this period the following officer requirements have been established; CWO's (3); Assistant CWO's (3); Cryptographers (6).

Enlisted: Allocation of personnel has been as follows: Radio (55 RM's and TE's -- including postal clerks); Main Communications (25 TE's assigned duties as clerks, write-up men and messengers); Signals (28).

Discussion: Only after a number of changes and frequent shifting of personnel has this distribution proved to be the most efficacious plan. Augmentation of the ship's force by three staff officers and twelve enlisted personnel has made this plan possible. Experience is proving the best teacher and it is hoped that by the time of the next action report it will be possible to present a definite and detailed outline and pattern of personnel needs and the fulfillment of those needs on a carrier-task force flagship.

6. Aerology.

GENERAL

The period began with the operating area under the influence of a southeasterly circulation caused by the typhoon "MARGE" which had become nearly stationary off the coast of Shanghai. On 22 August, "MARGE" began to regenerate as an extratropical cyclone and move north-eastward across Korea on 23 August, causing undesirable flying conditions to prevail throughout the day.

This began the period of transition from the southerly monsoon to the northerly monsoon. Numerous weak cold front or trough passages occurred but generally with little effect on the weather other than wind direction and velocity.

Only on 27 August, when a low pressure system developed over the Yellow Sea and moved eastward across Korea, where flight operations curtailed by undesirable flying weather.

Surface wind velocities average over 10 knots on 13 of the 29 days in the operating area. Generally there was a noticeable decrease in velocity during the afternoon and light and variable winds during the afternoon prevailed on 9 days.

COMMUNICATIONS

a. FACSIMILE.

Weather charts received via the facsimile equipment installed in the Aerological Laboratory were unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

14
(A) Reception very good during daylight hours 90% readable; very bad at night 15% readable.

(B) Insufficient useful weather charts transmitted. Only one surface chart (10 hours old) and one 700 KB chart (13 hours old).

AIR FORCE AT TOKYO (Frequency shift - shared with R.T.T. - not simultaneous)

(A) Reception very good during daylight hours 90% readable; very bad at night 15% readable. Schedule irregular.

(B) Insufficient useful weather charts transmitted. No surface charts.

AIR FORCE AT TOKYO (90% frequency shift)

(A) Reception fair; only about 50% of charts readable.

AIR FORCE AT TOKYO (Sub-carrier frequency modulation - R.T.T. and facsimile transmitted simultaneously)

(A) Unable to copy.

COMMENTS

Number of weather charts transmitted by radio photo unit #5 was increased on 17 September to include three surface charts and two briefing charts. An additional increase to four surface charts, two 850 KB charts and two 700 KB charts is desired.

b. RADIO TELETYPE

Reception of weather reports from MACS Tokyo by radio teletype in the Meteorological Office was considered good during daylight hours (85%) and very bad at night (50%). During period of outages MACS Guam was copied with only fair results.

COMMENTS

The most important reports, the Korean, were lost due to outage of the Tokyo R.T.T. at the most important time, prior to first launch. Later in the day Carrier Pilot Reports were able to fill this gap. During the early part of the period 3182 kcs (Tokyo) was able to be copied with better than average results. Later in the period no signal was heard on this frequency.

7. Administration:

The overall complement of the vessel in some departments is not adequate under extended combat operating conditions. It is believed that an increase in ship's company personnel to augment the following departmental personnel is required to effect a maximum degree of efficiency during extended operations under combat
8. Air Department.

During the period covered by this report, there were 1684 landings made aboard. The arresting gear operated normally in all respects and only routine maintenance was required. 931 catapult shots were made, 373 on the starboard machine and 558 on the port. Operation of the catapults was satisfactory during this period, however, on three occasions launches were held up for a period of minutes due to a loss of electric power. It is believed that this was due to an overloading of the generators that feed power to the catapult system, and has been corrected.

During normal operation when launching jet aircraft, planes were launched in sections, the second plane being catapulted approximately three seconds after the first. Launching in this manner will be increasingly important during periods of poor visibility, when it will be especially desirable for the sections to remain joined up. When launching night hecklers or ASP planes, only one catapult was used since the other half of the flight deck forward could be utilized for parking planes on the bow.

Gasoline and lube oil expenditures were as follows: Gasoline, 1,020,507 gallons; 1120 lub oil, 8,234 gallons; 1010 lube oil, 3,809 gallons.

The handling of two types of jet aircraft initially presented several problems which are in the process of being smoothed out. The biggest problem with the F2H aircraft is the inability to fold or spread the wings with gcs in the tip tanks. This has required that the tip tanks not be gassed until the plane is in a permanent parking spot, ready to be taxied out and up to the catapult for launch. It has been found that the most convenient spot for parking has been just aft of the number two elevator on the port side, with the tail angled outboard and the wings interlocked. In this manner, the wing tip tanks can be gassed, and the planes scheduled for the launch parked with a minimum use of space. In the case of a dud aircraft, there are only two things that can be done if planes are to be deck launched after the jets are off. If there is only one dud, it can be parked forward of the island, if the nose is angled inboard and the tail parked over the side. This allows just enough room for the prop aircraft to be deck launched. In the case of two duds, the second dud must be put on the number two elevator and dropped to the hanger deck level where it must be left until the launch is completed. The tip tanks must be degassed, in order to fold wings and stow the aircraft.

A tail tow bar has been developed by flight deck personnel, for rearward towing of the F2H by tractor. This has been accomplished by adding a cushioned saddle to the universal tow bar which supports the after fuselage of the aircraft.
when being towed rearward.

In view of the recent casualty suffered by this vessel, when an F2H aircraft bounced and went over all barriers, it is strongly recommended that a higher barricade be installed on the flight deck in order to prevent any repetition of this type accident.


a. Aerial Film Dryers.

During this first period of operations, laboratory personnel experienced difficulty in drying aerial film fast enough to meet operational requirements.

Two (2) aerial film dryers (SN EL8-d-796 bore A-5) were being used in the chemical mixing room of the laboratory. The high moisture content in the air made it almost impossible to dry the aerial film in any reasonable length of time. The two (2) aerial film dryers were relocated in one of the uptake spaces near the photographic laboratory. The uptake space furnished the required dry heat to dry the aerial film when operating the dryers at maximum speed. (Maximum speed of this type dryer is five (5) feet per minute.)

b. Photo enlarging paper.

Prints being produced on photographic roll paper SN EL8-P-328-503 (for use with Sonne printer, Rapid Resisto manufactured by Eastman Kodak and Company) are being marked with yellow-brown bloches. These bloches were first noticed during the first week of operations. The bloches at first were believed to be caused from mishandling by photographic personnel. One roll of paper, half of which was bloched the other half free of bloches, was found. It is now the opinion of the Photographic Officer that the bloches are the results of poor photographic paper.

An RUDM has been submitted. A detailed report will be submitted on the operations of the photographic laboratory in the next report of the next operational period.

AUSTIN W. WHEELOCK

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