From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE  
(2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN  
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(4) Commander, Naval Forces, Far East  
(5) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet  

Subj: Action Report for the period 12 May through 6 June 1952  
Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3420.4 as modified by OpNav Instruction 3420.5  

Encl: (1) Commander Carrier Air Group ELEVEN conf 1tr ser 028 of 6 June 1952  

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period of 12 May through 6 June 1952 is hereby submitted:

PART I - COMPOSITION OF CVN FORCES AND MISSION

The USS PHILIPPINE SEA in company with the USS BOXER (CV-21), ComCarDiv THREE embarked, USS ST PAUL (CA-73), USS ISSEY (DD-869) got underway at 0620, 12 May 1952 to join Task Force 77 by authority of ComCarDiv THREE dispatch 0907302 of 9 May 1952. The ship joined the Task Force at 0852, 14 May in the operating area off the east coast of Korea. The Task Force was commanded by RADM A. SOOKE, USN, embarked on the USS BOXER (CV-21) and operated under Task Force 77 Operation Order 22-51 (2nd revision) dated 6 December 1951. The Task Force was composed of the USS BOXER (CV-21), USS ST PAUL (CA-73), USS JUNEAU (CLAA-119) and units of DesDiv 51, 52, and 131. On 26 May RADM J. PERRY, USN, embarked on the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), assumed command of Task Force 77 vice RADM A. SOOKE, USN. The USS BOXER (CV-21), ComCarDiv THREE embarked, departed the operating area. Air Group ELEVEN was embarked on the USS PHILIPPINE SEA. After a period of 26 days of operations the ship departed for Yokosuka for a period of maintenance and upkeep.

The mission of Task Force 77 was to conduct a systematic program of air and surface interdiction, provide close air support of ground operations, assist in maintaining control of vital sea areas and operate as a fast carrier task force when directed; in order to support UN forces in Korea, and support the policy of the United States in the Far East.

PART II - CHRONOLOGY

12 May At 120620 in company with the USS BOXER (CV-21), ComCarDiv THREE embarked, USS ST PAUL (CA-73), USS ISSEY (DD-869) formed TE 77.01 and got underway to join Task Force 77 by authority of ComCarDiv THREE dispatch 0907302 of 9 May 1952.

13 May Underway for the operating area. Conducted air training operations and gunnery exercises on towed sleeve.

14 May Joined Task Force 77 at 0852. ComCarDiv THREE embarked on the USS BOXER (CV-21), assumed command of Task Force 77 at 1130.

15 May In company with USS BOXER (CV-21), USS ST PAUL (CA-73), USS JUNEAU (CLAA-119) and units of DesDiv 51, 52, and 131 conducted air operations. Rail interdiction.

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION
16 May  Conducted air operations. Rail interdiction. One AD piloted by Ens G. D. MACALLISTER, 538982, USN ditched on take-off. Pilot was recovered by the ship's helicopter.

17 May  Conducted limited air operations due to inclement weather.

18 May  Task Force replenished.

19 May  Conducted limited air operations due to inclement weather. Rail interdiction. One AD piloted by Ltjg S. G. BOLUMNSH, 498233, USN ditched while returning to the Task Force from a strike over Korea. The cause of the crash was presumed to be due to anti-aircraft fire resulting in engine failure. The pilot was recovered by the ship's helicopter.

20 May  No air operations due to inclement weather.

21 May  No air operations due to inclement weather.

22 May  Conducted air operations. Air Group Strike over Wonsan, Korea.

23 May  Conducted air operations. Rail interdiction.

24 May  Task Force replenished. Conducted gunnery exercise on towed sleeve.

25 May  Conducted air operations. Air Group Strike over Chongjin, Korea.

26 May  ConCarDiv FIVE, embarked on the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), assumed command of Task Force 77. Conducted air operations. Rail interdiction.

27 May  Conducted air operations. Rail interdiction.

28 May  Task Force replenished. Conducted gunnery exercises on towed sleeve.

29 May  Conducted air operations. One F6U piloted by Ens N. C. WIGGERS, 050790 USN ditched in Wonsan Harbor, Korea. Pilot was recovered by the USS LST-799. One AD piloted by Ltjg P. S. SHANNON, 5262190, USN ditched at approximately 40-07 N 128-37 E. Pilot recovered uninjured by the USS ANS-123.

30 May  Conducted limited air operations due to inclement weather.

31 May  Conducted air operations. Rail interdiction.

1 June  Conducted air operations. Rail interdiction. One F6U piloted by Ltjg G. C. GUDG, 414501, USN ditched in Wonsan Harbor, Korea due to anti-aircraft fire. Pilot recovered uninjured by the USS ANS-8.

2 June  Conducted air operations. Rail interdiction. One F6U piloted by Ltjg J. R. BROWN, 505733, USN crashed on take-off. Pilot was not recovered.

3 June  Task Force replenished.


5 June  Conducted air defense and gunnery exercises.

6 June  1051 moored to Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan.
Three marine helicopters that were aboard for transportation were launched for K-18.

22 March Conducted air operations and air defense.

23 March Task Force replenished.

24 March No air operations due to inclement weather.

25 March Conducted air operations. Despite bad weather 24 sorties were flown with no losses for a total of 73.1 hours.

26 March Conducted air operations and air defense.

27 March Conducted air operations. LCDR A. G. RUSSEL, USN, while on a night heckler mission ditched his aircraft in Wonsan harbor. The USS BRINKLEY BASS (DD-887) effected the rescue. LTJG W. J. COOPER, USN, when released from rescape landed at K-18.

28 March Conducted air operations.

29 March Task Force replenished.

30 March Conducted air operations. One F4U flown by LTJG W. J. COOPER, USNR, crashed and burned 5000 yards from the ship. Pilot was recovered by the USS LAWYER (DD-770) in good condition. This was an early morning heckler flight. The cause of the crash was believed to be mechanical failure. Aircraft not recovered.

31 March Conducted air operations with USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) and USS BOXER (CV-21).

1 April Conducted air operations with USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) and USS BOXER (CV-21).

2 April Task Force replenished. USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) departed area. ComCarDiv THREE assumed command as CTF-77.

3 April Conducted air operations. LTJG D. G. GOEDE, USN, while flying an AD crashed in the water. He was picked up uninjured by the helicopter from the USS BOXER (CV-21). Cause of the crash was not determined.

4 April Conducted air operations. LTJG W. R. CARTER, USN, was wounded about the face and hands while flying an F9F on a jet strike over Korea. Unable to land aboard ship he was escorted to K-18.

5 April Conducted air operations and air defense.

6 April Task Force replenished.

7 April Conducted air operations.
PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

a. General

1. MK-5, MK-6, and MK-8 Aircraft Parachute Flares were not available. Upon depletion of existing stock on board, AN-M26 Aircraft Parachute Flares were utilized. The performance of AN-M26 Flares were unsatisfactory. VC-3 HUDNAE No. 1-52 refers.

PART IV - DAMAGE

a. Own

1. Ship - None.
2. Aircraft - See enclosure (1).
3. Damage inflicted on the enemy - See enclosure (1).

PART V - PERSONNEL, PERFORMANCE, AND CASUALTIES

a. Personnel Performance of the Crew

1. The morale and general health of the ship's company continued at its previous good level. The number of persons at sick call remained at the same as in the previous period and the number of patients who were admitted to the sick list remained at 3 percent. There were no serious illnesses.

2. The number of venereal disease patients has decreased though the cases are still very resistant to treatment. During the period, the venereal disease rate has dropped approximately 22 percent as compared with the rate in the previous period.

3. Casualties

   (a) On 5-28-52 a patient was transferred from another ship with a diagnosis of Appendicitis, Acute and this was confirmed at the operation. He has made complete recovery.

   (b) On 6-2-52 a pilot from VT-113, ENS Gerald Rodney BROWN, 505733/1310, USN was presumed to have been immediately killed when his F4U crashed on take-off. His body was not recovered.

PART VI - GENERAL

a. Air Department

1. Safety - No comment.
2. Napalm - No comment.
3. VT Pukes - No comment.
4. Catapults

   (a) 416 F9F's, 89 F4U's, 58 AD's and 3 TBM's were catapulted during this period without mishap.

   (b) The port machine developed cable tension trouble which was diagnosed as a sticking clapper valve. The bushing in the cylinder was found to be elongated and was replaced with one machined on board.
form. After all the Squadron AIs have given their information to the Ship's AI, the flash report is then typed from the debriefing sheet. When the Flash Report has been sent, the Squadron AIs fill out the Air Attack Reports and erase the acetate in preparation for the next event.

3. Several advantages have been realized by the above procedure:

(a) The pilot retraces his flight on the map thereby refreshing his memory, and recalls sightings and other information that might otherwise have been overlooked.

(b) The coordinates of the flak positions and other information are checked thereby reducing the number of errors appearing on the flash report.

(c) The pilots time is not wasted while the AI officer works from a map to a debriefing sheet.

(d) The flash report is expedited. It cannot be started until all Squadron AIs have turned in their information. As the Squadron AIs give their information the Ship's AI compiles the damage, sightings and flak positions in appropriate columns on his debriefing sheet. When all the information has been given and recorded, it is then in an organized form for writing up the flash report.

(e) The debriefing sheets of the Ship's AI serve as a handy reference. The flash report is of necessity very brief, not indicating, among other things, which squadron participated in the event. By reference to the debrief sheet this information is readily available.

4. Photo Interpretation

(a) Photo interpretation consisted largely of routine rail status reports, target searches, damage assessment and flak analysis.

(b) Flak study "tournales" were made for the following rail routes: BENG, ESTHER, FERN, FLO, FRANCIS, GLADYS, JEANNE, HELEN and HILDA. It was found that a 1/10,000 mosaic laydown was better for orientation than the 1/15,000 mosaic.

(c) Target mosaics at 1/10,000 were made for special strikes on Chongjin, and Wonsan. These mosaics proved very satisfactory in briefing the strike leaders. K-17 and K-25 photos of individual targets were also given the strike leaders.

d. CIC

1. General

(a) There has been little change in the complement in CIC. At present there are nine (9) qualified watch officers, two of whom are qualified Air Weather Controllers. Six (6) of the nine (9) watch officers are qualified Day Air Controllers. In addition there are three (3) Assistant Watch Officers, not fully qualified as CIC Watch Officers, who normally perform the duties of CIC Surface Control Officers. The Enlisted complement now on board is eighty seven (87) men. This includes one chief radman and one (1) radman, First Class, both of whom are listed above as CIC Watch Officers. The total on board includes lookout personnel, as the present ship's organization requires the activation of an O-L Division only under wartime conditions.

(b) Excellent results have been obtained by on-the-job training during actual operations of approximately 70 percent of CIC enlisted personnel who are inexperienced seamen strikers.
Photography

1. Photo missions were flown on 13 days consisting of 39 individual sorties. A total of 61 rolls of K-17 aerial film were exposed, including both vertical and obliques. From these rolls, 4,818 negatives were used and 23,745 (10" x 10") finished prints were made. Distribution was made of 311 individual sets of prints. The K-25 pod, with each camera loaded with the full 50 exposure rolls, was carried on 55 strike sorties. Much valuable damage assessment data was obtained from these pictures, especially from those flown at low altitudes.

2. As usual, some paper was scarce. We operated the last ten days with only one contrast of paper on hand but managed to meet the schedule of distribution by manipulating the developing time.

3. It is strongly recommended that at least one camera repair school graduate be assigned to each carrier in the forward area. There is need for a full-time man to keep equipment in shape. Attention to minor repairs can often avoid major breakdowns. There is always a need for a qualified man to synchronize shutters, tighten up screws, and maintain equipment.

4. The drive belt from the motor to the flywheel on the Morse Developing Unit motor often snapped. It was only by robbing the other outfits that the schedule was maintained. No spare belting of this type was available aboard the ship. The above was an example of the lack of spare parts which was one of the biggest Bottlenecks blocking production. Most items were minor but the lack of parts and qualified repair men caused a bottleneck.

5. Tour aids and other routine copy jobs compete for developing room space. To take the pressure off this phase of the work it is strongly recommended that the room sinks on the inboard side of the developing room be removed. This will leave room for a drop table and space for a copy camera.

6. The F9F2P aircraft did an excellent job of photo coverage and the logistics support on supplies was very good with the exception of much needed some paper.

f. Gunner - No comments

g. Supply

1. Aviation Supply

(a) A marked increase in AOG's and priority ABBE dispatch traffic during this period prompted this vessel to investigate the situation in an effort to determine the underlying causes. To accomplish this, a group of items primarily peculiar to the F9F-2 aircraft and in short supply was thoroughly analyzed from the standpoint of allowance, usage, stock status at time of ordering, priority assigned, and the deadline delivery date. Two items will be specifically mentioned in a later paragraph, however, to present herein a detailed breakdown would be entirely too lengthy. It is preferred, instead, to present below the general conclusions drawn from this study, and to discuss in detail with Confair representatives the problems encountered. Conclusions:

1. That the increase in combat hours flown coupled with the age of the aircraft has resulted in increased maintenance and upkeep with consequent high usage of parts on which there had been little or no usage during previous tours on the line.

2. That priorities and deadline delivery dates were assigned realistically but were seldom realized. In numerous cases, AOG's would have been prevented had the original DDD been met. It is felt that maximum use of available transportation facilities is not being made. This is discussed below.
(3) That, in several cases, the original outfitting allowances of space was inadequate although requests to have the Section B allowances filled completely or to be outfitting in excess were refused prior to departure from CONUS. The quarterly reports to ACO have contained recommendations for increases in allowances.

(b) Combat planes (R85-BF-160553) became critical during the import period prior to the period of this report and, through vigorous action by Cen

    Pein Japn, three planes were received. These satisfied the immediate requirements but were far short of the quantity required to maintain the aircraft during the combat tour. In fact, 5 AOG's resulted from lack of this item, and, in each instance, it was necessary to beg planes from the accompanying carrier. Although 10 planes were shipped by air on a priority "A" basis from ASA, NSD, Guam on 10 May, the planes have not yet been delivered. It appears that they should have been delivered either by CPO plane or replenishment ship in order to meet the deadline delivery date of 3 May 1952.

(c) Another item in critical supply has been the fuel shut-off valve (R85-BF-16417-5), the lack of which resulted in 7 AOG's. Deadline dates on three outstanding requisitions (two priority "B" and one priority "A") were passed over 30 days ago.

(d) Recommendations:

1. That high priority material not be consolidated at transshipment points but be routed forward either by CPO plane or replenishment ship. Judging from shipments received during this tour, it is believed that a greater volume of freight can be handled both by air and surface transportation.

2. That supply activities make every effort to meet the priorities and deadline delivery dates assigned to ship's requisitions. To do so would avoid the common tendency to assign a priority "A" where not warranted merely to insure prompt handling and delivery of material. This procedure, of course, defeats the entire purpose of the priority system.

2. General Stores Material

(a) The general stores group encountered no particular problems during the operating period. The inventory of general stores and machinery repair parts was completed.

(b) Some difficulty was experienced in drawing compressors gases from vessels alongside. In the case of one replenishment, approximately 30 percent of the cylinders received were empty. This necessitated returning the cylinders to the vessel and caused a delay in breaking away. It is recommended that the replenishment vessels test the cylinders prior to delivery to ships being replenished. This vessel now gives the replenishment ships advance notice of its compressed gas requirements.

3. Disbursing

(a) Disbursing activity continued in a routine manner during this operating period. AWC was secured in the amount of $2,640,000 prior to leaving port to augment $192,000 on hand for disbursing purposes. Two regular pay rolls plus the special pay rolls paid out approximately $279,000 in cash and $16,000 in checks. Supply Store, C&I, money order business and miscellaneous collections returned approximately $70,000 to the cash fund.

4. Conclusions

(a) Provisioning at sea was accomplished twice during this period from the USS PHILADELPHIA (AF-11). Approximately 20 percent of the items requisitioned...
were not available. The usual shortages existed in fresh vegetables; namely, lettuce, tomatoes, cabbage, and celery due, in part, to the breakdown of refrigeration equipment on the USS PICTOR. The non-availability of these desirable items was partially alleviated by purchase ashore of tomatoes and tangerines.

(b) It is recommended that Japanese vegetables and fruit products be made more readily available to fleet activities, possibly through quarterly provisions contracts as is done in CONUS. It would appear more economical to purchase fresh produce from Japanese markets, even to the extent of replenishing the freezer ships, than to ship such highly perishable items from the states.

5. Ship's Store and C58S

(a) Prior to leaving Yokosuka for the operating area, an attractive assortment of ship's store stock was obtained from the USS POLUX (AKS-4) and from Central Purchasing Office, Tokyo, resulting in unusually heavy sales during the month in excess of $21,000.00.

(b) Soda fountain operation continued at peak level. The supply does not meet the demand at any time, due to lack of sufficient freezer space.

(c) Clothing and Small Store stocks have been seriously depleted. Many of the popular sizes of chungaroes and white uniforms were not obtainable in port, and black and white seaks were also in short supply.

h. Welfare and Recreation

(a) At Sea

(1) Recreational facilities were limited at sea by the nature of the operations. Motion pictures provided the main form of recreation. Morning Press was issued daily with a Sunday Supplement featuring cartoons and ship's news. A radio program was broadcast over the ship RBS system for four and one half hours daily. It appears quite popular. Record players for the living spaces soon to be enjoyed. There is a rather extensive selection of records. Warm up for baseball was conducted when practicable. Badminton and Volleyball have been played on the hangar deck when possible.

(b) In Port

(1) The recreational program is continued when the ship is in port. Divisional parties are being held ashore. Tours are arranged and stage shows are brought aboard for entertainment. Stars and Stripes newspapers are obtained each evening and Nippon Times newspapers in the mornings. Divisional softball games are held ashore. Rest leave has been granted and are greatly appreciated by the personnel.

1. Chaplaincy Functions

(a) At Sea

(1) Weekdays

1. Daily morning religious services are conducted in the crew library consisting of: (a) Catholic Mass at 0630 and Protestant Morning Service at 0715 and on Wednesdays and Fridays Protestant Communion Service at 0715.
(b) Catholic instructions in the crew library at 1300 Mondays and Fridays.
(c) Protestant Bible Study in the crew library at 1300 Tuesdays and Thursdays.
(d) Jewish Day Services in the crew library Wednesdays at 1300.
(e) Jewish Sabbath service in the crew library at 1700 Fridays.
(b) Sundays

2. Protestant Divine Service at 0715 - 0930,
3. Latter Day Saints Service at 1000.

(c) On 4 June 1952 Memorial Services were held for the late ENsign Jerry R. Brown, USN by the Protestant Chaplain at 1400 hours.

[Signature]
Allen Smith, Jr.