From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE
      (2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
      (3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
      (4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
      (5) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 21 June through 6 July 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4 as modified by OpNav Instruction
     3480.5

Encl: (1) Commander Carrier Air Group ELEVEN conf 1tr ser 031
     of 8 July 1952. -F.?-

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period of
   21 June through 6 July 1952 is hereby submitted:

PART I - COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

The U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA in company with the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21),
ComCarDiv ONE embarked, USS TUCKER (DDR-875) got underway at 0450, 21 June
1952 to join Task Force 77 by authority of ComCarDiv ONE dispatch 202182.
SOFAS was Com7thFlt embarked aboard this vessel. The USS PHILIPPINE SEA joined
the Task Force at 0520, 23 June in the operating area off the east coast
of Korea. The Task Force was composed by RADN As SOCEK, USN, embarked
on the USS BOXER (CV-21) and operated under Task Force 77 Operation Order
22-51 (2nd revision) dated 6 December 1951. The Task Force was composed of
the USS BOXER (CV-21), USS PRINCETON (CV-37), USS JUNEAU (CLAA-119)
and units of DesDiv 12, 32, 201, and CortDiv 13. Air Group ELEVEN was embar-
ked on the USS PHILIPPINE SEA. After a period of 16 days of operations
the ship departed for Yokosuka for a period of maintenance and upkeep.

PART II - CHRONOLOGY

21 June At 210450 in company with the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), ComCar-
Div ONE embarked, USS TUCKER (DDR-875), formed TE 77.01 and got
underway to join Task Force 77 by authority of ComCarDiv ONE
dispatch 2002182.

22 June Underway for the operating area.

23 June Joined Task Force 77 at 05201. In company with USS BOXER (CV-21),
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31), USS PRINCETON (CV-37), USS JUNEAU
(CLAA-119), units of DesDiv 12, 32, 201, and CortDiv 13 conducted
coordinated air strikes against hydroelectric plants at Suiho,
Kyosen and Fusen.

24 June Conducted air operations. Attacks on hydroelectric plants Kojo
sector, troop billeting area, political headquarters, CU sectors.

25 June Conducted air operations. Attacks on supply and troop concentra-
tions in the CT and CU sectors.

26 June No air operations. Task Force replenished. Com7thFlt disembarked.
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31), USS PRINCETON (CV-37), departed the
Task Force.

SECURITY INFORMATION
27 June  Conducted air operations. Attacks on troop concentrations, troop billeting areas, supply storage, truck parking, repair shops and troop headquarters in the CI sectors.

28 June  Conducted air operations. Rail strikes.

29 June  No air operations due to inclement weather.

30 June  Launched weather recco, no other air operations due to inclement weather.

1 July  No air operations. Task Force replenished.

2 July  Conducted air operations. Attacks on troop billeting and supply areas in the CI sectors.

3 July  Limited air operations due to inclement weather. Attacks on Puryon power plants, troop billeting area and rail lines.

4 July  Conducted air operations. Rail strikes, package targets, marshaling yards, troop and supply areas. One corsair piloted by LTJG G. C. CHICK, 414401, USN, crashed while on a combat mission, pilot not recovered. One AD, piloted by CDR C. H. CARR, USN, 100106, ditched in the sea off of SINCANG, pilot recovered.

5 July  Conducted air operations. Attacks on troop and supply concentrations in the CI sectors. One corsair piloted by ENS J. R. MULLEN, USN, 539521, ditched in vicinity of the Task Force due to possible AA damage, pilot recovered.

6 July  Task Force replenished. Departed Task Force at 1355. Conducted Carrier qualification and familiarization flights. Transferred 2 F9F-2 to BOXER. Launched 13 F9F-2 to NAS ATSUGI. Transferred 2 AD-4 to PRINCETON.

7 July  Underway to Yokosuka. Conducted gunnery exercise. Launched 23 PAU-4, 6 AD-4, 3 ADX-4 to NAS ATSUGI.

8 July  Moored to Buoy Number 10, Truman Bay, Yokosuka, Japan at 1036.

PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

a. General

1. The after suspension lugs on AN-M26 aircraft parachute flares were removed from around flare body, separated approximately ¼ inch and then brazed together. This provided a wider suspension lug for suspending flares to single suspension bomb racks. USS PHILIPPINE SEA RUDAO dated 1 July 1952 refers.

PART IV - DAMAGE

a. Own

1. Ship - None.

2. Aircraft - See enclosure (1).

3. Damage inflicted on the enemy - See enclosure (1).
PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

a. Personnel Performance of the Crew

1. The morale and general health of the ship's company continued at its previous excellent level. The number of persons at sick call remained at the same level as in the previous period and the number of patients who were admitted to the sick list remained at .3 percent. There were no serious illnesses.

2. The number of venereal disease patients remains at about .3 percent of the total ship's company and air group complement combined.

3. Casualties

(a) On 4 July 1952, LTJG Grover Cleveland CHICK, 414501, VF-113, was killed when his plane crashed into a mountain during a combat mission over North Korea.

(b) On 4 July 1952, CDR Charles Harrison CARR, 100106, Commanding Officer of VA-115, suffered compound fractures of both bones of right forearm, a severely contused laceration over the right supraorbital ridge and other minor lacerations and abrasions about the face and head when his plane crashed into the sea after having been struck by enemy ground fire. His condition was not considered serious.

PART VI - GENERAL

a. Air Department

1. Safety - No comments.

2. Napalm - No comments.

3. VT Fuses - No comments.

4. Catapults - No comments.

5. Arresting Gear - No comments.

6. Aircraft Maintenance

(a) During deployment in the forward area, this vessel has changed and installed the following engines; ten (10) R-3350-26WA, thirteen (13) R-2800-18W, two (2) R-2800-32W, and three (3) J-42-P8, for a total of twenty-eight (28) engines.

7. Aviation Electronics - No comments.

8. Gasoline System

(a) Aviation gasoline received from tankers during this period of operating contained no water and was of excellent quality.

(b) 106,500 gallons of 115/145 AV/gas were received from the USS CALIENTE, and 78,300 gallons of 115/145 AV/gas were received from the USS CIMARRON.

b. Aerology

1. During the subject period, weather over the operating area was good south of 40 degrees north with one exception; this being two (2) days of
rain and low ceilings over the entire Sea of Japan and Korea which was caused by a low pressure area deepening rapidly to 985 millibars in the Yellow Sea and moving slowly across Korea and stagnating in the Sea of Japan. North of 40 degrees north the weather was non-operational over the Sea of Japan because of low ceilings and fog approximately 60 percent of the operating period. Cumulus activity was increasing over Korea and there were daily build-ups over the mountains.

2. Winds were generally east to southwest, but predominately southeast and light. No heavy seas or high winds were encountered.

c. **Air Intelligence**

1. There are no comments on intelligence during this period, however, as a result of experience throughout the entire tour the following recommendations are presented:

   (a) As soon as practical after leaving CONUS operational intelligence information be made available to the Air Intelligence Officers.

   (b) Upon arrival at the operating base of the Task Force a briefing session for the Air Group pilots should be conducted by an Air Group Operations Officer and an Air Intelligence Officer familiar with operating procedures in effect.

   (c) Upon reporting to the Task Force either for the first time or from an R and R period, an Air Group briefing be given by an Operations Officer and an Air Intelligence Officer from one of the carriers on the line.

   (d) When returning to port from a tour on the line some system should be instituted for dissemination of current operational intelligence information to personnel whose function is to collect the intelligence Information for further distribution.

   (e) A briefing be given to the Air Intelligence Officers immediately prior to the ships leaving port on all current intelligence information.

2. **Photo Interpretation - No comments.**

d. **CIC**

1. **General - No comments.**

2. **Radar Performance**

   (a) Air control of jet aircraft continues to be a problem in that the MK5 10IFF is the only sure medium through which effective control of jet aircraft at high altitudes can be accomplished.

   (b) In general excellent results continue to be obtained with the installed PO equipment. However, the YE frequencies are so close to the frequency spread of the AEF-26 that a great deal of interference is experienced at times on the ship's PO remote indicator.

   (c) On one occasion MK5/10 IFF, emergency mode, was received from a lost aircraft 170 miles distant thereby making it possible to successfully home the aircraft to the parent carrier.
Evaluation of the detection of low flying aircraft (500 feet or below) with the SX and SPS air search radars was conducted for a member of the Operation Evaluation Group. The average range of detection for either radar was 35 to 40 miles for propeller type and jet aircraft.

3. Air Control

(a) During adverse weather conditions (low overcast at 350 feet, visibility 1-3/4 miles), the low visibility approach procedure as outlined in OIF 77 letter serial 080 dated 17 May 1951, was used with good results. However, these conditions (350 feet ceiling - visibility 1-1/2 miles) are considered to be absolute minimums for this type of operation and lower min- imums would require actual COA procedures.

(b) During four (4) carrier operations good results were obtained by using two AN/ARC-1 channels for strike control with an air controller on each channel. All the jet strikes (including photographic and reconnaissance flights) were controlled on one channel and all the propeller strikes were controlled on the other channel. This procedure led to more rapid identification and ease of control of all returning strikes, during operations in which twice the number of aircraft normally airborne, were controlled.

4. Communications

(a) During four (4) carrier operations the UHF communications between ships was not satisfactory. In many relative positions it was impossible to maintain direct communications with the flag ship and usually one (1) other carrier on the CI net. This is believed to be a result of blind spots and antenna positioning.

(b) There continues to be excessive cross-talk between the two (2) AN/ARC-1s and other receivers within the AN/ARC-1 frequency spread.

(c) No air control net as defined by current CIC instructions has been used or needed. Satisfactory results have been obtained without the use of this net even with four (4) carriers in the Force.

(d) On one occasion a lost aircraft at a distance of 170 miles was controlled by using a TDQ with its antenna on the main mast. Using the same TDQ with ship antenna decreases the average range to 50-75 miles.

(e) TBS communications have been excellent at all times.

5. Recommendations and Comments

(a) AEW aircraft have not been able to act as an early warning for low flying aircraft. The primary mission for this type aircraft has been ASP. In order to have both early warning and ASP, two (2) VAW aircraft must be airborne at all times. The availability of aircraft has precluded this being done. Hence, an evaluation of early warning by use of this aircraft and its installed gear is not now feasible.

(b) It is recommended that a maximum number of radars be left in the standby on/off position as often as possible. It is believed this can be accomplished by rotating all radar guards and assigning CAP control to support and screening ships whenever practicable. The reason for this recommenda tion is to insure adequate time for electronic technicians to perform effective routine maintenance and thereby help to eliminate sudden breakdowns during operations.
(c) It is believed that the RCM equipment as now installed is not practical for aircraft carriers. In order for the intercept system to be useful, all ships radars must be put in the standby position.

c. Communications - No comments.

d. Photography

1. This photo laboratory does not have a camera repair man and minor breakdowns often held up production. It is strongly recommended that CV class carriers in the WESPAC have a camera repair man quota assigned and that the quota remain filled.

2. It is recommended that a high speed glossy drier be perfected or obtained for the allowance list. The present model does not heat up sufficiently to run the dryer at any but the slowest speed. This causes a bottleneck in an otherwise speedy system of processing film and paper.

3. If the F2H Banshee photo planes remain aboard it is recommended that at least one more K398 camera and two A-8 magazines be added to the allowance list.

g. Gunnery - No comments.

h. Engineering - No comments.

i. Supply - No comments.

j. Welfare and Recreation - No comments.

k. Chaplains Functions - No comments.

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Copy to:

USS Kearsarge (CV-33)
USS Essex (CV-9)
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
USS Antietam (CV-36)
USS Princeton (CV-37)
USS Valley Forge (CV-45)
USS Boxer (CV-21)
CGN (2 advance)
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (2)
CINCPACFLT (5 advance)
COMAIRPAC (10)
COMFAIRALLAMEDA
CINCPAC EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVFE
COMSEVENTHFLT (1 advance)
CTF 77 (2 advance)
COMFAIRJAPAN
COMSVPAC
COMCARDIV ONE
COMCARDIV FIVE
CVG-2
CVG-5
CVG-11
CVG-15
CVG-19
CVG-101
CVG-102
ATC-1

SECURITY INFORMATION