

Retransmission Original

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Photo*

U. S. S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
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8 May 1951

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From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
 To: Chief of Naval Operations
 Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
 (2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
 (3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
 (4) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 1 February through 15 March 1951

Ref: (a) CNO res ltr Op-345 ser 1197P34 of 3 August 1950

04037

Encl: (1) Damage inflicted on the enemy *p. 6*


1. This action report for the subject period is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

Part I - Composition of Own Forces and Mission

During the subject period, the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA operated off the east coast of Korea as a unit of TASK FORCE 77, in accordance with Commander Carrier Division FIVE Operation Order No. 1-51, plus supplemental plans issued from time to time during the period. TASK FORCE 77 was a component of the SEVENTH FLEET.

TASK FORCE 77 consisted of the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63), U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37), U.S.S. MANCHESTER (CL-83), U.S.S. JUMENTAU (GLAA-119), U.S.S. ST. PAUL (CA-73) and units of DesDiv 51, 52, 71, 81, 111, 112, 131 and 132.

On 1 February 1951, SOPA and OTC was ComCarDivFIVE (RADM R. A. OFSTIE, USN), embarked in the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37). On 12 February 1951, ComCarDivONE, embarked in this vessel, became SOPA and OTC when the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37), with ComCarDivFIVE embarked, was detached from the force to proceed to KOMI KAI, TRULAM BAY, YOKOSUKA, Japan. On 25 February 1951, the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37) rejoined the force and ComCarDivONE transferred his flag from the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA to the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE. On 26 February, ComCarDivFIVE, in the U.S.S. PRINCETON assumed duties as OTC and the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE with ComCarDivONE, departed for YOKOSUKA, rejoining Task Force 77 on 13 March 1951



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The mission of TASK FORCE 77 was to support the United Nations ground forces which were advancing toward the 38th degree parallel. The support missions included close support, deep support, armed and photo reconnaissance, interdiction of enemy supply lines, and strike against enemy installations.

Part II - Chronological Order of Events

On 1 February 1951, the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA, operating off the east coast of Korea, furnished close air support for the United Nations ground forces and struck against enemy main supply routes from the Manchurian border, down the east coast and inland to the front lines. Upon completion of air operations on 1 February 1951, the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA took departure for YOKOSUKA, Japan for nine days availability for repair and upkeep.

On 10 February 1951, the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA with ComCarDivONE embarked, departed from YOKOSUKA, rejoining TASK FORCE 77 on 12 February 1951. For the remainder of the period of this report, operations consisted of furnishing close air support to United Nations ground forces in Korea, spotting planes for surface ship shore bombardment and strikes against enemy east coast lines of communications, with emphasis on bridges.

In March alone, 203 of the 352 offensive sorties flown by Air Group 11 from the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA were assigned bridges as targets. In the 20 days of flying during this operating period, a total of 11 bridges were totally destroyed and an additional 62 were damaged to an extent that made them inoperative for an extended period. (see Part IV, paragraph b of this report). The slowdown in enemy movements and consequent reduction in his effectiveness as a result of this effort is believed to be considerable.

On 25 February 1951, Captain Ira E. HOBBS, USN, relieved Captain W.K. GOODNEY, USN, as Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA.

No air operations were conducted on 14, 27 and 28 February and 6 March because of inclement weather nor on 12, 17, 21 and 25 February and 1, 5, 9 and 13 March when replenishment operations were conducted.

The U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA was detached from Task Force 77 on 13 March 1951 and took departure for YOKOSUKA, Japan for a much needed period of rest, recreation and upkeep, and to prepare for the coming exchange of Air Groups with the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE and the embarkation of Commander SEVENT Fleet.

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Part III - Ordnance

a. Ammunition expended:

Napalm:

10.03 tons

Machine Gun Ammo:

325,705 rounds of 20MM

Bombs: (631.83 tons)

133 - 2000# GP
416 - 1000# GP
31 - 500# GP
18 - 1000# SAP
1 - 500# SHAPED
16 - 350# ADB
485 - 260# FRAG
140 - 260# GP
102 - 250# GP
110 - 250# FRAG
451 - 220# FRAG
2162 - 100# GP

Rockets:

4 - 11.75" TINY TIMS
22 - 6.5" ATAR
1241 - 5" HVAR
188 - 3.25" ATAR

Part IV - Damage

a. Own

(1) Ship - None

(2) Aircraft:

	<u>COMBAT</u>				<u>OPERATIONAL</u>			
	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Lost	: 0	: 1	: 0	: 1	: 2	: 1	: 0	: 3
*Damaged	: 39	: 24	: 3	: 66	: 20	: 8	: 14	: 42
Total	: 39	: 25	: 3	: 67	: 22	: 9	: 14	: 45

* Includes all Class "B", "C" and "D" damage.

b. For damage inflicted on the enemy, see enclosure (1)

Part V - Personnel, Performance and Casualties

a. Health and Performance of Crew:

(1) The health and performance of the crew has been excellent. Most complaints seen at sick call were of minor nature. There has been the usual amount of routine surgery i.e., appendectomies, circumcisions, etc. The number of work days lost due to illness has been held to the minimum.

b. Casualties:

(1) LIEUTENANT COMMANDER D. M. JONES, 99701, USN, received a shrapnel wound of the right shoulder and right jaw when an accidental discharge from a 20MM gun ricocheted in the officers country. ENSIGN T. H. THORNBURG, 508448, USN, received multiple abrasions and contusions of the face and scalp when the F4U he was flying went into the sea. One enlisted man, G. A. BLACK 263 44 36, AA, USN, received a shrapnel wound left side of head from an accidental discharge from a 20MM gun while fighting a fire on the flight deck.

Part VI - Doctrine and Operating Procedures

a. -Jet Employment:

(1) During the period of this report, the employment of jets was extremely limited, resulting in the low average pilot time of 4.9 hours per month which is considered unsatisfactory for maintenance of pilot proficiency. It is realized that considerations of fuel economy, superiority of conventional types for strike missions and the lack of enemy air opposition, may be dominant factors influencing the overall employment of aircraft. On the other hand, the advantage of retaining jets in the group complement as a form of insurance against the day when the enemy decides to use his air power may be seriously impaired if pilots are not given sufficient opportunity to retain their proficiency. A secondary, but not unimportant consideration is the detrimental effect on morale within the air group when vast inequities in flying opportunities occur.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that one or more of the following measures be adopted to correct the above situation:

- a. Use jet aircraft for CAP whenever the operating schedule permits. This would not only increase the air defense capabilities of the Task Force but would also release more conventional type aircraft for strike missions.
- b. Reduce the pilot ratio in jet squadrons to 1.1 pilots per plane.
- c. Reduce the number of embarked jet aircraft to the minimum considered necessary for air defense purposes.

b. Interdiction Program:

(1) The program which was undertaken during this operating period, of

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disrupting enemy lines of supply by systematic destruction of selected bridges is considered a particularly effective employment of carrier aircraft in the Korean conflict. (See Part II and Part IV (b) of this report). The superior capabilities of carrier aircraft in delivering concentrated bombloads on pinpoint targets makes them well adapted to this purpose. This is borne out by Air Group Eleven's consistent performance in severing bridges assigned as targets. Despite the fact that the enemy has demonstrated his ability to effect temporary repairs in a short space of time, it is felt that this can be counteracted by systematic, thorough surveillance, and that the net result in depriving the enemy of his main lines of supply more than justifies the effort.

RECOMMENDATION


It is recommended that bridge strike mission be continued as primary missions for carrier aircraft.

I. E. HOBBS

Copy to:

CNO (Advance) (2)
CinCPacFlt (Advance) (2)
CinCPacFlt Evaluation Group (5)
ComAirPac (10)
Naval War College (3)
CAG-11 (5)

AUTHENTICATED:



J.J. OBLISKEY,
CHSCLK, U.S. Navy,
Ship's Secretary

DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
Aircraft (on the ground)	2	0
Ammunition Dumps	1	0
Barracks	7	0
*Bridges	11	62
**Buildings	510	130
Canals	7 (killed)	
Carts	59	79
Factory Buildings	2	0
Fishing Boats	8	23
Gun Emplacements	18	17
Hangars	1	1
Horses	9 (killed)	
Jeeps	4	1
Junks	3	23
Locomotives	0	8
Observation Towers	2	0
Oil Stowage Tanks	0	2
Oil Supply Dumps	0	7
Oxen	107 (killed)	
Power Boats	0	8
Radio Stations	0	8
Railroad Cars	20	204
ENCLOSURE (1)		

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
<u>TARGET</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>
Railroad Control Towers	0	1
Railroad Hand Cars	1	0
Railroad Roundhouses	0	1
Railroad Tunnels	0	1
Repair Barges	0	1
Sarapans	2	3
Slods (supply)	0	2
Supply Dumps	0	3
Tanks	1	5
***Troops	2263 (killed)	
Trucks	15	43
Vehicles (unidentified)	21	35
Villages	1 (75% destroyed)	
Warehouses	48	59

* Bridges cannot be considered destroyed unless all spans are dropped or destroyed.

** The Term "Buildings" applies to all military structures not otherwise listed.

*** Troops are not listed as killed unless seen by the pilot, TAC or TACP.

AUTHENTICATED:


J. J. OBLISKEY,
CHSCLK, U.S. Navy,
Ship's Secretary.

ENCLOSURE (1)