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From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces FAR EAST
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 11 June through 29 June 1953

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 of July 1951

Encl: (1) Carrier Air Group FOUR Action Report *P. 30*

1. In compliance with reference (a) the action report of the U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39) and Carrier Air Group FOUR for the period 11 June through 29 June 1953 is submitted herewith.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES

The U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39) commanded by CAPT G. T. MUNDORFF, USN with RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, and Carrier Air Group FOUR embarked, joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in accordance with CTF 77 091305Z of June 1953. Those units of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN present when joined by the U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39), were the U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21), U.S.S. PRINCETON, (CVA-37), U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47), U.S.S. MANCHESTER (CL-83), and various ships of the screening force.

MISSION

The mission of this force in general terms is to conduct air and surface operations off the coast of Korea in order to support U.S. Forces in Korea, and to support the policy of the United States in the Far East.

26 April 1953: Underway from Norfolk, Virginia for Yokosuka, Japan in accordance with Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet Employment Schedule and Commander Carrier Division SIX Operation Order 5-53 with supplementary instructions dated 2 Apr 1953.

9 June 1953: At 1437 moored to buoy #11, in Yokosuka Harbor, Yokosuka, Japan. Received orders to report to Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in combat area as soon as possible and ready for sea. Commenced replenishment immediately and reported ready for sea at 110400I.

10 June 1953: At 1330 relieved the USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA 44). Latter vessel underway CONLUS. At 1533 alongside Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan. Embarked RADM W. D. JOHNSON, Commander Carrier Division ONE, and staff.

REPORTING PERIOD

11 June 1953: Underway for Korean operating area from Yokosuka, Japan at 0359I in accordance with instructions contained in Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN confidential dispatch 091305Z with Commander Carrier Division ONE and Carrier Air Group FOUR embarked. At 1000 recovered 16 VF-44 aircraft which had been temporarily based ashore at the Naval Air Station, Atsugi, Japan.

12 June 1953: Enroute from Yokosuka, Japan to join Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN. Conducted air operations for training purposes with 119 sorties flown. At 1105 entered combat area and rendezvoused with the USS CUSHING (DD 797) at 1110 enroute to join force.

13 June 1953: Joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in area SUGAR at 130522I. Ships in company when joined by the USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA 39) were: USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA 47), (Commander Carrier Division THREE and Officer in Tactical Command embarked), USS BOXER (CVA 21), USS PRINCETON (CVA 37) and units of the screening force as follows: USS CAPERTON (DD 656), USS O'BANNON (DDE 450), USS DASHIELL (DD 659), USS RADFORD (DDE 446), USS GATLING (DD 671), USS CUSHING (DD 797), USS DORTCH (DD 670), USS OWEN (DD 536), and USS CARPENTER (DDE 825). At 1115 RADM W. D. JOHNSON, Commander Carrier Division ONE, departed the ship via helicopter, to attend a conference aboard the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA 47). At 1229 the USS BREMERTON (CA 130), flagship of Commander Cruiser Division THREE, joined the formation, and at 1230 the USS MANCHESTER (CL 83) was detached. Air operations were conducted with 113 sorties flown. Shortly after the last

landing VF-22 F2H-2 BUNO 123377 inadvertently fired several rounds of 20MM ammunition into two parked VF-62 F2H-2's, BUNOs 123333 and 123328. Both aircraft burst into flames and received strike damage.

- 14 June 1953: At 0641 RADM W. D. JOHNSON, Commander Carrier Division ONE in USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA 39) relieved RADM R. E. BLICK, Commander Carrier Division THREE as OTC and Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN. Conducted air operations with 110 sorties flown. At 2105 began refueling from USS CIMARRON (AO 22) and completed at 2300. Transferred cargo to USS CAPERTON (DD 650), commencing at 2005 and completed at 0030.
- 15 June 1953: Conducted air operations with 147 sorties flown. At 2117 began replenishing ammunition from USS RAINIER (AE 5) and completed at 2310. At 2242 received freight from USS CAPERTON (DD 635), completed at 2301.
- 16 June 1953: Air operations were conducted with 126 sorties flown. At 0435, HUDSON, Belvin (n.), 278 18 10, AD3, USN, of VF-44 fell overboard and was lost at Lat. 39°04.3"N and Long. 129°22"E in line of duty and was not recovered. At 1515 RADM J. M. CARSON, Commander Fleet Air Japan, came aboard via helicopter to conduct annual inspection of Supply Department. At 2001 began replenishing fuel from USS CHIKASKIA (AO 54) and completed at 2117. At 2020 received the USS RUPERTUS (DD 851) alongside for transfer of personnel, completed at 2030.
- 17 June 1953: Conducted air operations until 1500. Secured air operations due to inclement weather. 97 sorties were flown. At 0807 the USS NEW JERSEY (BB 62), flagship, Commander SEVENTH Fleet, VADM J. J. CLARK, joined formation. At 0820 RADM J. M. CARSON, Commander Fleet Air Japan left the ship via helicopter. At 1000 VADM J. J. CLARK, Commander SEVENTH Fleet came on board via helicopter for conference with Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN. At 1109 RADM R. E. BLICK, Commander Carrier Division THREE came on board via helicopter for conference with Commander SEVENTH Fleet. At 1235 RADM J. M. CARSON, Commander Fleet Air Japan left the ship via helicopter. At 1440 RADM J. M. CARSON, Commander Fleet Air Japan came on board via helicopter. At 1705 replenished ammunition from the USS MOUNT BAKER (AB 4) and completed at 1930. At 2033 reprovisioned from the USS PICTOR (AF 54) and completed at 2113.
- 18 June 1953: Air operations cancelled due to inclement weather. At 0941 RADM J. M. CARSON, Commander Fleet Air Japan left the ship via helicopter. Supply Department inspection completed.

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- 19 June 1953: Air operations were conducted until 1300 with 101 sorties flown. At 0300 the starboard catapult was rendered inoperative due to a runaway shot. At approximately 1230 LTJG D. E. BREWER, USNR, 394429/1325, of VA-45 piloting an AD-1N, BUONO 132263 was shot down in combat. Aircraft crashed on land at Lat. 38°36.N, Long. 127°36.E. At 1728 the USS BOXER (CVA 21) left the formation.
- 20 June 1953: Air operations were cancelled due to inclement weather. At 0615 went alongside USS CIMARRON (AO 22) for replenishment of fuel and completed at 0801. At 0800 the USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA 39) lost steering control and conducted emergency break-away procedures. At 0910 having repaired steering casualty, went alongside the USS MOUNT BAKER (AE 4) for replenishment of ammunition and completed at 1115. At 1307 the USS CAPERTON (DD 650) came alongside to embark CAPT E. J. SULLIVAN, Commander Destroyer Squadron SIXTEEN, via high line for conference.
- 21 June 1953: Air operations cancelled due to inclement weather. LTJG D. E. BREWER, USNR, 494429/1325, of VA-45 declared missing in action by VA-45 in dispatch 212240Z. Seven planes returned from K-18 having been grounded there by inclement weather. Three AD's included in above total landed aboard the USS PRINCETON (CVA 37) because of reduced visibility. At 0941 the USS STEMBEL (DD 644) came alongside for transfer of personnel. Notified by NLO JOG Korea that LTJG BREWER, was killed instantly on impact while attempting low altitude parachute exit on 19 June after his aircraft had been hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire.
- 22 June 1953: Because of inclement weather, air operations consisted of 2 combat sorties only and the return of 3 AD's from the USS PRINCETON (CVA 37). At 0955 VADM J. J. CLARK, Commander SEVENTH Fleet and RADM R. E. BLICK, Commander Carrier Division THREE came on board via helicopter. At 1300 RADM R. E. BLICK, Commander Carrier Division THREE left the ship via helicopter. At 1320 VADM J. J. CLARK, Commander SEVENTH Fleet departed via helicopter. At 1739 the USS DASHIELL (DD 659) came alongside for transfer of supercargo.
- 23 June 1953: Air operations were cancelled due to inclement weather. At 0133 the USS CUSHING (DD 797) came alongside for transfer of guard mail. Ship secured for heavy weather.
- 24 June 1953: Air Operations conducted. A total of 90 sorties were flown.

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- 25 June 1953: Air operations were conducted. At 0245 the port catapult was rendered inoperative and an AD4N BUNO 126937 was lost overboard as the result of a runaway shot. The crew consisted of LT A.F. KEOWN, USNR, 471061/1315, PELOQUIN, A. E., ALC, 666 10 64, USN and NAULT, R. O., AT3, 210 10 69, USN and were rescued by the USS MOALE (DD 693). At 2029, went alongside the USS RAINIER (AE 5), for replenishment of ammunition and completed at 2137. At 2107 the USS GATLING (DD 671) came alongside for transfer of supercargo. At 2241, went alongside the USS KASKASKIA (AO 27) for refueling and completed at 0020.
- 26 June 1953: Made preparations to depart Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN for Yokosuka, Japan pursuant to Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN dispatch 250232Z of June 1953. At 1245 RADM R. E. BLICK, Commander Carrier Division THREE arrived via helicopter for conference. At 1900 VADM J. J. CLARK, Commander SEVENTH Fleet arrived for conference and departed at 1930. Operations curtailed and departure delayed due to heavy fog which persisted throughout the day and night.
- 27 June 1953: At 0542I RADM R. E. BLICK, Commander Carrier Division THREE left the ship via helicopter. At 0725I RADM R. E. BLICK, Commander Carrier Division THREE embarked in the USS PRINCETON (CVA 37) relieved RADM W. D. JOHNSON, Commander Carrier Division ONE embarked this vessel as Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN. At 0728 departed the force for Yokosuka in company with the USS MOALE (DD 693).
- 28 June 1953: Enroute Yokosuka. At 0430 the USS MOALE (DD 693) came alongside to refuel and completed at 0550. Detached USS MOALE (DD 693) at 0555 to return independently to rejoin Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN.
- 29 June 1953: At 0930 arrived Yokosuka, Japan.

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1. Ammunition Expenditures.

a. During the period of this report the following ammunition was expended:

(1) Ship's ammunition - NONE

(2) Aviation ammunition:

2000 lb. G.P. bombs	136	
1000 lb. G.P. bombs	510	
500 lb. G.P. bombs	93	
250 lb. G.P. bombs	1222	
100 lb. G.P. bombs	665	
260 lb. Frag. bombs	96	
350 lb. Depth bombs	1	
3!5 Solid Rockets	18	
5! ATAR Rockets	397	
6!5 ATAR Rockets	148	
20 mm HEI		
20 mm INC		} 80,579
20 mm APT		
50 cal. API		
50 cal. INC		} 61,200
50 cal. API-T		
MK 6 Parachute Flare	21	

b. Material condition of Gunnery Department equipment.

(1) Ordnance:

(a) One 3/50 gun mount is out of commission. The elevation amplidyne motor generator Mk 6 failed because of shorted commutators. A replacement generator has been requested.

(b) The range unit of the forward radar Mk 25 developed binding and was removed and repaired.

c. Gunnery Exercises.

(1) Large drone exercises were scheduled for 27 and 28 June but were cancelled due to delay in being detached from TF 77 and resultant transit of the firing area during hours of darkness.

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d. Replenishment Operations:

(1) The ship rearmed five (5) times tabulated as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DELIVERY SHIP</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>TRANSFER RATE</u>
6-13-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	136 tons	62.4 tons per hour
6-15-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	190 tons	97.4 tons per hour
6-17-53	USS MT. BAKER (AE4)	244 tons	96.9 tons per hour
6-20-53	USS MT. BAKER (AE4)	172 tons	79.4 tons per hour
6-25-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	117 tons	94.8 tons per hour

During replenishment on 20 June 1953 the operation of Station No. 3 was discontinued when a boom on the MT. BAKER carried away after six (6) lifts.

(2) The ship reprovisioned one (1) time as follows:

6-17-53	USS PICTOR (AF54)	54 tons	60 tons per hour
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(3) The ship refueled four (4) times as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DELIVERY SHIP</u>	<u>QUANTITY AVGAS</u>	<u>QUANTITY NSFO</u>	<u>TRANSFER TIME</u>
6-14-53	USS CIMARRON (AO22)	129,000 gals.	457,022 gals.	2:37
6-16-53	USS CHIKASKIA (AO54)	283,000 gals.	181,000 gals.	1:17
6-20-53	USS CIMARRON (AO22)	94,000 gals.	214,000 gals.	1:46
6-25-53	USS KASKASKIA (AO27)	127,000 gals.	322,611 gals.	1:46

(4) During the period fifteen (15) destroyers were received alongside for the transfer via highline of mail, guard mail, light freight and thirteen (13) personnel. One destroyer was refueled on 28 June 1953.

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

1. The ship was not attacked during this period and sustained no battle damage.
2. Damage inflicted on Communist forces by Air Group FOUR is included in enclosure (1).
3. Damage inflicted on Air Group FOUR by Communist forces is included in enclosure (1).

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PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE1. Personnel.a. Casualties:

(1) There were no combat personnel casualties of Ship's Company personnel as a result of enemy action. Air Group casualties are reported by the Air Group in enclosure (1).

b. Performance:

(1) The morale and performance of personnel was excellent.

(2) During the period of this report the average on board count was:

	<u>Flag</u>	<u>Ship's Company</u>	<u>CVG-4</u>	<u>Marines</u>	<u>Total</u>
Officers:	31	116	123	2	272
Enlisted:	61	2109	695	68	2933

(3) The number of personnel on board is considered adequate to fulfill the assigned mission except that a critical shortage in ET rating exists especially in the supervisory rates. The ship has an allowance of 27 ET's and 19 are on board. All of the shortages are in the CPO, first class and second class ratings. During this period there were 7 losses and 4 receipts.

2. Training and Education.

a. There continued to be a high interest in USAFI Correspondence Courses and Navy Training Courses as indicated by the following:

	<u>Courses Ordered or Issued</u>	<u>Courses Completed</u>
USAFI Correspondence Courses	36	83
U. S. Navy Training Courses (Correspondence)	153	86
U. S. Navy Training Courses (Tests)	118	83
USAFI GED Tests Administered		83
Enrollment in College Extension Courses	11	

3. Morale and Welfare.

a. The ship departed Norfolk, Virginia on 26 April and arrived in Yokosuka, Japan on 9 June 1953. During this 46 day trip, 3 liberty ports were visited. Due to ordered sailing schedules, liberty periods in these

ports were limited, the maximum being 16 hours in the ports of Athens, Greece and Colombo, Ceylon. Liberty in Manila, Philippine Islands was shortened due to the approach to that area of typhoon "Judy". On arrival Yokosuka plans called for an 8 day availability period prior to leaving for the operating area. Simultaneously, Commander SEVENTH Fleet, having need for maximum forces afloat in the Korean operating area instructed Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN to order the LAKE CHAMPLAIN ready for sea earliest. Thirty-eight (38) hours after arriving Yokosuka, the ship departed for the line. Despite the long trip from Norfolk and the unexpectedly short turn around in Japan, the morale of ship and air group personnel was outstanding in all respects and the sudden departure for the combat area was received with enthusiasm.

b. Divine services were held as follows:

Catholic Mass daily in the morning, and daily evening rosary services.
Protestant Divine services every Sunday.
Religious instruction classes and Marriage Forums were conducted weekly.

4. Recreation.

a. The following activities were conducted for the welfare and recreation of officers and enlisted personnel during the period of this report.

- (1) Issue of a daily radio press summary.
- (2) Weekly issue of the ship's newspaper - "The Champ".
- (3) Ship's RBO broadcast daily of Ship's information, news, and recorded music.
- (4) Daily band concert.
- (5) Weekly games.
- (6) Organized and planned Cruise Book.

b. Movies were shown daily for crew, officers and pilots.

c. The Hobby Shop was well patronized. Considerable interest was shown in the following crafts:

(1) Leather work, model railroading, model planes, model automobiles,, model boats, and painting.

(2) The space occupied by the shop is small and is primarily for the sale of materials.

PART VI

SPECIAL COMMENTS

OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

CIC

1. Personnel. Fifty (50) men were divided equally into two (2) teams. Each team stood either a full day or a full night watch. The reasons for this method as opposed to conventional watches were:

a. Overcoming the problem of fatigue on the scopes. By using a full shift of personnel several were available for messenger duty and so rotated that as a man came off scope duty he was able to get a quick breath of fresh air and a cup of coffee or cigarette before assuming the duty as messenger and later plotter, talker, etc., thus, not only did he rotate during the day (or night), but also the variation in work served multiple purposes. The man knew more than one job, had more of a team spirit, and transfers or sickness did not leave a hole in the team because others could easily fill the gap.

b. Elimination of change-over duties and information at General Quarters. This is vitally important. If an emergency arises, there is no time for confusion. The day or night team idea avoided the necessity for additional personnel storming into CIC at General Quarters. Each man was already there and knew what was going on. The few extra sound-powered circuits manned at General Quarters were taken over by the messengers and an additional air controller was required, otherwise no other changes were necessary.

c. Officers. Three (3) CIC officers have been standing OOD watches underway as part of a program of training for all CIC watch officers.

2. Radar Performance.

<u>RADAR</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>MAXIMUM RANGE</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
SPS-6	Air	100 miles	NONE
	Land	110 miles	
SPS-8	Air	60 miles	Inoperative 12 days due to lack of gas. Provided only relative altitude during entire period due to inoperative cross-level stabilization system.
SRa	Air	96 miles	Inoperative for overhaul about 10 days during period.
	Land	90 miles	
SG6b	Surface	60 miles	NONE
	Land	104 miles	

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<u>RADAR</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>MAXIMUM RANGE</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
SG1b	Surface	35 miles	NONE

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Numerous returns at 200 miles. Maximum officially reported range 216 miles.

3. Electronic Equipment. Electronics equipment performance improved considerably during this reporting period. A daily performance report highlighting all deficiencies noted by watch personnel was delivered to the Electronic Material Officer by the O-I Division Officer and thence to the CIC and Operations Officers. This system called attention to required work and gave the Electronic Technicians timely and detailed data to aid in their maintenance work.

4. Recommendation. When more than three (3) carriers are operating together recommend that the CI/AC net be split into two (2) separate circuits. The traffic load on this one circuit when four (4) carriers are operating in company is too heavy to be handled efficiently.

AEROLOGY

1. A deep cold low formed over the Sea of Japan on 20 June and had little movement for four (4) days. Low ceiling, poor visibilities, high winds, and rain limited flight operations. This was a typical winter synoptic situation and was an abnormal development for late June. Additional hours of flight operations were lost on other days due to the formation of advection fog.

2. Launching of radiosonde balloons with strong apparent winds across the flight deck has been a problem. Several months ago with an apparent wind of over 20 knots the launch would be considered difficult. We found however that by sewing the four (4) sides of the nylon shroud about another yards length enabled the balloon to be more firmly encased and prevented the balloon's bursting. With practice the aerographers acquired experience in better coordinating their release so that transmitters were not jarred and broken. The balloons now can be released with apparent winds in excess of 40 knots

3. While in the Sea of Japan aerology was confronted with no special problems.

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COMMUNICATIONS

1. On 13 June the ship joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN and early on the morning of the 14th, Commander Carrier Division ONE relieved Commander Carrier Division THREE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN. For the first five (5) days the volume of traffic taxed all circuits in Radio Central, the capacity of the cryptocenter, and message handling facilities in the Communication Office. Finally, a break in the weather curtailed flight operations, and traffic dropped to more easily handled proportions-continuing at approximately the same level for the remainder of the period on the line.

2. As an indication of the traffic volume, for following approximate statistics are tabulated for the period of intensive operations from 13 to 17 June and the inclusive period 31 to 23 June:

a. Radio Central Traffic (number of messages handled).

	<u>13-17 June</u>	<u>13-23 June</u>
GEORGE Broadcast	1382	2818
NDT RATT Broadcast	1059	2530
Ship-shore RATT - Incoming	375	722
Ship-shore RATT - Outgoing	195	431
CW - Incoming	983	1758
CW - Outgoing	152	380
Voice - Incoming	70	130
Voice - Outgoing	27	52
RATT - Relay	337	849
CW - Relay	137	246
	<u>4717</u>	<u>9916</u>

b. Cryptocenter Traffic.

Incoming	420	860
Outgoing Ship Messages	30	43
Groups	5614	6607
Outgoing Flag Messages	77	77
Groups	<u>15354</u>	<u>26779</u>
Total Messages	527	1104
Total Groups - Outgoing	20968	33386

3. During the period from 13 to 23 June, approximately thirty-eight hundred messages were written up, reproduced by ditto process, and delivered internally. Approximately one hundred and fifty reams of ditto paper were used. Additionally, around two hundred outgoing and five hundred and twenty-five incoming messages were handled by flashing light and NANCY, about one hundred and twenty by the latter method.

4. Postal business during the same period was as follows:

a. Money orders \$24,628.52

b. Stamps	\$ 922.00
c. Bags, incoming	155 bags
d. Bags, outgoing	120 bags

PHOTOGRAPHY

1. Personnel. A total of eighteen (18) ship's company and air group personnel are assigned to the photo lab. Analysis by rate is as follows:

<u>RATE</u>	<u>SHIP'S COMPANY</u>	<u>AIR GROUP</u>
AFC/PHC	2	0
AF1/PH1	2	0
AF2/PH2	1	2
AF3/PH3	3	4
Non-rated	2	2
	<u>TOTAL</u> 10	<u>8</u>

a. Duty assignment of personnel is as follows:

(1) Lab (two shifts for 24-hour processing, administration, and general photography)	11
(2) Photo plane servicing and maintenance	3
(3) Flight quarters and general photography	2
(4) Photo detachment (sorties plotting and titling)	2
	<u>TOTAL</u> 18

b. An additional six (6) photographers are considered necessary if full utilization of laboratory production facilities and the meeting of general photography commitments are to be effected. This need for additional personnel applies particularly when the mechanical and administrative processing of reconnaissance photography covers an extended period.

2. Production. Pertinent statistics on delivered photography of an intelligence type are as follows:

a. Days of productive aerial reconnaissance missions	6
b. Photo sorties scheduled/ flown/ acceptable	61/23/17
c. 9x18 aerial negatives, K-18, 36"	1,310
d. 9x9 aerial negatives, K-17, 12"	122
e. 9x9 aerial negatives, K-17, 6"	876
f. 9x18 prints, K-18, 36"	3,930
g. 9x9 prints, K-17, 12"	366
h. 9x9 prints, K-17, 6"	876

i. 8x10 copy negative (target and plot charts)	490
j. 8x10 prints (target and plot charts)	1,675
k. Gun camera footage processed	7,720

3. The recent reduction in quantity of prints required has relieved appreciably the production load on the lab. Current distribution of reconnaissance negatives, prints, and related material is as follows:

	<u>STAFF</u>	<u>SHIP PI</u>	<u>NAS, ATSUGI</u>
a. Original reconnaissance negative.			1
b. 9x18 (36")/9x9 (12") flash print.		1	
c. 9x18 (36")/9x9 (12") smooth print.	1	1	
d. Plot chart negative.			1
e. Plot chart prints.	1	1	
f. Data sheets.	1	1	4
g. 9x9 (6") duplicate coverage negatives.	1		
h. 9x9 (6") prints.	1		

3. Duplicate coverage of all 36" or 12" reconnaissance photography is obtained with the K-17 6" camera for use in plotting or checking the larger scale photography.

4. Subsequent to familiarization of both photographic and photo interpretation personnel with the routine of mass production, delivery time on the first flash print Sonne roll to the interpreters is currently averaging 1.1 hours. All one day's photography is completed for mailing or delivery by hand prior to 0800 the following day.

5. An unanticipated requirement was that of both the staff and ship's AIO's for extensive photocopying of target mosaics. Staff requirements include 5 or 6 negatives and 3 prints of newly selected target mosaics, and ship requirements include a minimum of 10 prints each of target negatives for use by strike pilots. The unpredictable changes in target assignment and the buildup of an adequate supply of prints from existing target negatives has resulted in a 24-hour alert on copying and contact printing - sometimes with deadlines of one-half hour. The relative smoothness with which this particular problem is being met is a reflection of the excellent spirit of cooperation and understanding which exists between the photographic personnel, the staff and ship's AIO's.

6. Subject to the over-riding priorities of accomplishing intelligence photography, the lab has provided services and facilities to 4 TAD Combat Camera Group photographers, 1 special assignment photographer, the Staff PIO, and 2 correspondents, all of whom were conducting special projects involving photography directly or indirectly. Harmonization of the often conflicting requirements of the ship and this group has been surprisingly effective considering the conditions of limited space and shortage of ship's photographic personnel which exist.

7. Material. As a result of stocking a 6-month supply of consumable materials and an almost complete allowance of equipment, plus such additional supplies as recommended by COMAIRPAC, shortages have occurred in only a few items. One such item is 400-foot rolls of aerial film. The requirements for these rolls depends on the type of target assigned. To date, an average of one sortie in three requires a 400-foot roll in the K-38 camera. Careful preliminary evaluation of sortie requirements has resulted in minimizing the use of 400-foot rolls and using 200-foot rolls instead.

8. Recommendations: That six (6) additional photographer strikers are required for extended operations.

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION

1. Operations.

a. Daily photo surveillance of North Korean airfields was given a high priority in order to determine their operational status. Special photo missions were flown along with strike groups to obtain pre- and post-strike photography. Damage assessment of the airfields was made a few hours after the strike.

2. Spaces.

a. A review of action reports from other ships indicated that space in the ozalid room, air intelligence office, or the flag office could be used for photo interpretation. The ozalid room has been selected in view of the already crowded conditions existing in the air intelligence office and the unavailability of the flag office space.

b. The need for a permanent photo interpretation space is apparent. An investigation is being initiated to determine what space other than one of those referenced above can be converted to photo interpretation use with a minimum of effort. A recommendation based on the results of this investigation will be submitted within thirty days unless in the meantime a satisfactory solution can be developed by this or other CVA's which reportedly have this same problem under consideration.