U.S.S. ANTIETAM (CV-36)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV36/10
A16-13
Ser: 068
17 November 1951

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. ANTIETAM (CV-36)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE
(2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, FAR EAST
(5) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 15 October through 16 November 1951

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4 dtd 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Commander Carrier Air Group FIFTEEN ltr of 17 November 1951

1. The Action Report for the period 15 October 1951 through 16 November 1951 is hereby submitted in accordance with reference (a).

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

The U.S.S. ANTIETAM arrived at Yokosuka, Japan at 1400I on 4 October 1951. The period 4 - 11 October was spent at anchor in Yokosuka Harbor and was devoted to voyage repairs, restricted availability, and conferences with personnel from the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21). At 1000I on 11 October 1951 the U.S.S. ANTIETAM got underway for the operating area to join Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in accordance with CTF-77 Confidential dispatch 082216Z. The U.S.S. SHELTON (DD-790) accompanied the ship in order that refresher air operations could be conducted enroute. The ship joined the Task Force at 0600I on 15 October in the Operating Area near the 38th parallel near the east coast of Korea. The Task Force was commanded by RADM J.J. CLARK in the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31), and operated under Task Force 77 Operation Order 22-51 (Revised) dated 7 October 1951. It was composed of the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31), U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9), U.S.S. NEW JERSEY (BB-62), U.S.S. HELENA, (CA-75), and other screening units. Air Group FIFTEEN was embarked in the U.S.S. ANTIETAM. After 31 days of operations, the ship departed for Yokosuka for a period of maintenance and upkeep, leaving the action area on 14 November 1951.

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The Mission of Task Force 77 was as follows:

(1) Conduct air operations from an operating area off the coast of Korea to provide close air support of friendly troop operations, interdiction of enemy routes of movement and supply, and armed reconnaissance of enemy installations and lines of communications.

(2) Provide air cover for replenishment ships and other friendly naval surface forces when necessary.

(3) Protect the force against air, surface, and subsurface attacks.

(4) Provide air spot to bombardment forces when directed.

(5) Conduct photo and visual reconnaissance as required.

(6) Coordinate air operations with the 5th Air Force through JOC, Korea.

(7) Exchange intelligence information with friendly naval forces engaged in surface interdiction operations on the east coast of Korea.

The Commanding Officer of Carrier Air Group 15 is CDR R. H. FARRING-TON, USN with the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 11 October 1951.

SQUADRON	NO. OF PILOTS	NO. & TYPE OF AIRCRAFT
VF-713	26	17 F4U-4
VF-831	22	16 F9F-2B
VF-837	23	16 F9F-2B
VA-728	27	7 AD-4, 9 AD-4L 2 AD-4Q.
VC-3	6	4 F4U-5NL
VC-11	5	3 AD4W
VC-35	6	4 AD-4NL
VC-61	4	3 F9F-2P
CAG-15	8	- - - - -
HU-1	2	1 HO3S

Particulars concerning loss of aircraft are given in enclosure (1).

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

10/11/51 - The U.S.S. ANTIETAM (CV-36) in company with the U.S.S. SHELTON (DD-790) sortied from Yokosuka at 1000I after having been delayed four hours by dense fog. Refresher air operations were begun at 1530I and secured at 1730I. 27 Sorties were flown of which 7 were jet and 20 prop. At 1730I the ship began to secure to typhoon RUTH and headed for the Sea of Japan.

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10/12/51 - Steaming in company with U.S.S. SHELTON (DD-790) heading for Sea of Japan to avoid typhoon RUTH. No air operations. Inclement weather.

10/13/51 - Refresher air operations in Tsushima Straits Area began at 0800I and secured at 1400I due to inclement weather. 56 sorties were flown of which 18 were jet and 38 prop. U.S.S. EVERSOLE (DD 789) joined at 1845I.

10/14/51 - Steaming in company with EVERSOLE and SHELTON on courses to avoid typhoon RUTH. Inclement weather all day. No air operations. AA firing scheduled was cancelled.

10/15/51 - Rendezvoused with TF-77 at 0600I. Began air operations at 1215I. Flew 14 jets and 21 prop sorties on CAP, armed recco, and railroad interdiction strikes.

10/16/51 - Began Air operations at 0430I and continued until 1645I. 74 sorties were flown of which 24 were jets and 50 were props. CAP ASP, armed recco, photo recco, and railroad interdiction strikes were flown.

10/17/51 - Replenishment day. AA firing in afternoon. The U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) departed during the night. Rear Admiral JOHN PERRY, ComCarDiv ONE, relieved Rear Admiral J.J. CLARK as CTF-77.

10/18/51 - Morning flight operations were delayed until 1030I because of fog and afternoon operations were secured at 1515I due to poor weather over target area. 16 jet sorties and 27 prop sorties were flown on CAP, ASP, armed recco, Naval Gunfire spot, and railroad strikes.

10/19/51 - Launched 10 jet and 14 prop sorties. Weather over Korea poor and air operations were secured at 1115I. Rendezvoused with replenishment group at 1400I and spent remainder of day replenishing.

10/20/51 - Bad weather over force and target area restricted flight operations to 7 jet and 26 prop sorties. Flew CAP, ASP, and strikes.

10/21/51 - Flew 31 jet and 47 prop sorties on CAP, ASP, armed and photo recco, NGF, and railroad strikes. LT A.S. KALAS, VC-61 Photo pilot, was hit by AA during a photo run. Plane was badly shot up but pilot made a successful landing at K-18. LT KALAS was wounded in left thigh. Made 19,000th landing.

10/22/51 - Flew 33 jet and 45 prop sorties. 2 F9F's landed at K-14, low on fuel. 1 AD-4W made a water landing at 2030I ahead of ship due to engine failure after taking one wave off. All three occupants rescued by plane guard destroyer.

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10/23/51 - Replenishment day. Poor weather forced cancellation of scheduled AA practice.

10/24/51 - Flew 75 sorties of which 34 were jets and 41 were props. In addition, recovered 2 F9F's and 2 AD's from K-3 which had been there for hook trouble, and 2 F9F's from K-14 which had landed there short of fuel.

10/25/51 - Flew 73 sorties of which 34 were jets and 39 were props. LTJG L.W. DORSEY, USNR, ditched his F4U in Wonsan Harbor due to engine malfunctioning caused by enemy small arms fire, and was rescued by the helicopter from the U.S.S. HELENA, (CA-75)

10/26/51 - Flew 75 sorties of which 34 were jets and 41 were props. Missions consisted of CAP, ASP, armed and photo recco, NGF spot, and railroad interdiction strikes.

10/27/51 - Replenishment day.

10/28/51 - Flew 39 jet and 48 prop sorties for a total of 87. Flew first close air support missions in addition to the usual offensive and defensive missions.

10/29/51 - Flew 43 jet and 37 prop sorties for a total of 80 on CAS, CAP, ASP, armed and photo recco, NGF, and railroad strikes.

10/30/51 - Flew 90 sorties of which 43 were jet and 47 were prop. LTJG R.E. KRAMER, VC-3, crashed over port side on night landing. Pilot rescued by U.S.S. EVERSOLE with no injuries.

10/31/51 - Replenishment day. Rear Admiral J.J. CLARK, USN in BON HOMME RICHARD relieved Rear Admiral J. PERRY as CTF-77.

11/1/51 - Poor weather over target area limited operations to 52 sorties; 23 jet and 29 prop.

11/2/51 - Poor weather over target area limited operations to 28 sorties. Landed 1 F4U and 2 F9F's from BON HOMME RICHARD with engine trouble.

11/3/51 - Flew 72 sorties; 29 jets and 43 props.

11/4/51 - Today was the ANTIETAM's red letter day. On the pre-dawn launch at 0500I a bridle broke on the port catapult and LTJG N.K. DONAFOE, VC-35 in an AD-4NL, crashed into the water. All three occupants of the plane were rescued unharmed by the U.S.S. UHLMANN (DD-687). Then at 0945I LT GEORGE S. BRAINARD, USNR, of VF-837 made a normal approach to the ship in his F9F but made a hard landing. The plane bounced without engaging a wire and the pilot pushed over to get down to the deck again, landing nose wheel first. The nose tire blew immediately and the nose wheel began to disintegrate at once. The plane went through all Davis barriers without actuating them and continued on up the deck crashing into the parked planes forward. The pilot and a deck crewman were killed instantly. Two other crew members died later in the day. One pilot received serious injuries and nine crewmen lesser injuries. Three F9Fs received strike damage, 1 F9F, 2 ADs, and 1 F4U received minor damage. Flight operations for remaining part of day cancelled. Flew 18 jet and 27 prop offensive and defensive sorties for a total of 45.

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11/5/51 - Replenishment day.

11/6/51 - Inclement weather over force and target area forced cancellation of all flights.

11/7/51 - Continued poor weather cancelled flight operations. Force rendezvoused with replenishment group at 0700I and devoted the morning to replenishing.

11/8/51 - Flew 79 sorties on jet CAP, armed and photo recco, and railroad interdiction strikes. At 1320I, LTJG H. G. GOODELL, USNR, VF-713, ditched his plane in Wonsan Harbor after being hit by AA fire. Pilot was rescued by helicopter from USS TOLEDO.

11/9/51 - Flew 77 sorties. CDR David MARKS, Commanding Officer of VC-35, made the 20,000th landing at night.

11/10/51 - Flew 76 sorties. General RIDGEWAY visited Task Force during the day and observed air operations from the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) Marine Detachment celebrated the 176th birthday of Marine Corps by a special dress parade on the flight deck at 1600.

11/11/51 - Replenishment day.

11/12/51 - Inclement weather over the Task Force held air operations to only 10 sorties devoted to ASP, CAP, and night hecklers. At 0500I, LTJG L.O. WARFIELD, USNR, VC-3, crashed into the water after a normal catapult shot from the port catapult. Cause unknown. Pilot rescued unharmed by U.S.S. BOYD (DD-754)

11/13/51 - Flew 69 sorties on night heckler, ASP, CAP, NGF and railroad interdiction. Fired AA practice in afternoon.

11/14/51 - Flew 67 sorties on the usual offensive and defensive missions. Conducted AA practice. At about 1400I the U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9) rendezvoused with the Task Force and at about 1420I the Antietam with DesDiv 172 less USS SHIELDS was detached to proceed to Yokosuka for yard availability. At about 1530I the task element rendezvoused with the replenishment group and topped off with fuel and ordnance.

11/15/51 - Enroute to Yokosuka. At about 1430I rendezvoused with ComCruDiv 3 in the U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA-133) who assumed tactical command of the task element. Scheduled AA sleeve firing and Z-3-G exercise were cancelled due to inclement weather.

11/16/51 - Enroute Yokosuka. About 1000I conducted AA sleeve firing practice. Four aircraft were launched at 1300I for Atsugi. The ship moored at Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka Naval Base at 1613I.

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SUMMARY OF SORTIES

DATE	REMARKS		OFFENSIVE			DEFENSIVE			MISC		TOTAL
	First Launch	Last Recov	Day Prop	Day Jet	Nite Prop	Day Prop	Day Jet	Nite Prop	Prop	Jet	
Oct 11	Enroute	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	20	7	27*
12	"	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	38	18	56*
13	"	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
14	"	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
15	1215	1745	21	6	- -	- -	8	- -	- -	- -	35
16	0430	1627	42	17	4	2	7	2	- -	- -	74
17	Replenished		- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
18	1030	1453	25	8	- -	3	8	- -	- -	- -	43
19	Replenished		12	8	- -	2	2	- -	- -	- -	24
20	1230	1616	22	7	- -	4	- -	- -	- -	- -	33
21	0800	2040	35	21	4	6	10	2	- -	- -	78
22	0800	2049	33	23	4	6	10	2	- -	- -	78
23	Replenished		- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
24	0430	1552	35	25	4	- -	9	2	- -	- -	75
25	0445	1552	33	26	4	- -	8	2	- -	- -	73
26	0445	1548	35	27	3	- -	8	2	- -	- -	75
27	Replenished		- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
28	0700	2015	36	25	4	6	14	2	- -	- -	87
29	0800	1715	31	33	- -	6	10	- -	- -	- -	80
30	0800	2013	35	33	4	6	10	2	- -	- -	90
31	Replenished		- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
Nov 1	0500	1230	23	17	4	- -	6	2	- -	- -	52
2	0930	1400	16	2	- -	6	4	- -	- -	- -	28
3	0500	1400	33	17	4	4	12	2	- -	- -	72
4	0500	1109	19	10	4	2	8	2	- -	- -	45
5	Replenished		- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
6	Inclement Wx		- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
7	Inclement Wx		- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
8	0930	2015	32	23	4	2	14	2	- -	- -	77
9	0930	2015	29	25	4	2	15	2	- -	- -	77
10	0930	2012	30	22	4	2	16	2	1*	- -	76
11	Replenished		- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
12	0500	0935	- -	- -	6	2	- -	2	- -	- -	10
13	0500	1415	28	19	4	4	12	2	- -	- -	69
14			26	19	4	4	12	2	- -	- -	67
15	Enroute	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
16	"	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
TOTALS			631	413	69	68	203	34	59*	25*	1418

* Not included in totals.
Total prop sorties: 802 Total Jet sorties: 616

TOTAL SORTIES: 1418

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PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. Ammunition Expenditure (Aviation)

100 #G.P. Bomb	2,312	5" Rocket Motors	1,646
250 #G.P. Bomb	1,952	5" Rocket Heads	1,395
260 #G.P. Bomb	528	6.5" Rocket Heads	176
500 #G.P. Bomb	439	3.25" Rocket Motors	147
1000 #G.P. Bomb	622	3.25" Rocket Heads	147
2000 #G.P. Bomb	100	Flares, MK 6-4	66
100 # Incendiary Cluster	89	Drift Signals, MK 6-2	67
350 # Depth Bomb	5	Mine, MK 24 (thru damage)	1
Napalm Thickener, Type 1	5,520#	50 Cal. inc.	126,280 rds
Napalm Tanks	112	50 Cal API	126,280 "
Xylenol	50 Gals.	50 Cal APIT	67,140 "
		20 MM inc.	49,840 "
		20 MM HEI	49,840 "
		20 MM APT	21,420 "

B. Ammunition Expenditure (Ship - for training)

40 MM 4,255 rds
5"38 Cal. 303 rds

C. Comment on performance of ordnance material and equipment.

1. Aviation

Napalm thickener-Type I has in many cases been found to be unsatisfactory for use. Most of the unsatisfactory thickener was manufactured by the Chicago Pulverizer Co., however, a small part of the thickener made by the Ferro Enamel Corporation was also unsatisfactory. In most cases. thickener made by the Ferro Enamel Corporation was in excellent condition. There should be some system devised for detection of damp and lumpy Napalm Thickener, or it should be thoroughly screened before being issued to aircraft carriers.

No difficulty was experienced with the VT Fuzes T90 and T91. In addition to the regular arming wire and jump-out pin, a second arming wire was attached to the sway brace and led through the arming safety plate, and then through the second hole in the additional jump-out pin (2 pins used). This eliminated the possibility of arming the fuzes while the bomb remained on the aircraft. In the case of the VT Fuze T90, the safety pin had to have an additional hole drilled due to the thickness of the fuze ring.

Aviation Ordnancemen are a critical rate and the allowance of personnel available for the V-3-0 Division should be increased to 100 men prior to deployment. This increase is necessary to operate on a two-shift basis, as is required in the type of operations this ship is performing.

The MK-10 type suspension band used on the 2000# G.P. Bomb has proved to be very satisfactory and is very easy to install. For carrier work, where time is critical, the MK-10 is highly recommended, however a great advantage and time saver would be gained if the magazine stowage space would accommodate the 2000# G.P. bomb with the

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suspension band installed prior to stowage.

The present type bomb skid in use should have several undesirable features improved, or a new skid should be devised. The bomb skids are easily overturned when carrying a maximum load of 260# Frag or 250# G.P. Bombs. Moving bombs from the forward part of the flight deck, to the after part of the flight deck, over arresting gear cables or cross-deck pendants is a very difficult and tiresome task which literally saps the strength of the personnel involved.

The No. 3 (upstage) Bomb Elevator is inadequate due to it's limited capacity, location and small size. In order to be able to arm a "strike" in a limited amount of time, bombs must be pushed (including 2000# G.P. bombs) from the after Bomb-Arming station on the third deck frame 150, where a 2000# G.P. stowage is located, to No. 2 (upstage) Bomb Elevator (Frame 83), to be sent to the Flight Deck. It is recommended that No. 3 (upstage) be increased in size and capacity at the next overhaul period, in order that it will accommodate 2000# bombs.

Three-hundred napalm tanks, MK-77 were issued to this ship upon deployment to the Korean Area. Stowage aboard ship was provided in the hangar deck overhead in original crates. Forty were stowed in what was formerly 20 MM gun tubs forward on the port side. The MK-77 Napalm Tanks have proven satisfactory except that they are fragile when assembled and must be handled with extreme care to prevent leaking at joints due to buckling or denting. A few of the igniter cavities on the Napalm Tank had to have burrs removed by filing before an igniter could be inserted. The MK-77 tank when jettisoned from the flight deck, readily falls apart and this is a very desirable disposal feature. The MK-8 universal Bomb Hoisting Band has proved satisfactory for hoisting the Napalm Tank MK-77.

It was found that to a certain degree, some stockpiling of Ordnance on the Flight Deck, forward of the island structure and No. 51 5" Gun Mount was absolutely necessary if planes were to be completely re-armed for closely scheduled strikes, which allow only a minimun amount of time for re-arming with Bombs and Rockets before normal warm-up prior to the next launch. Due to periodic and common malfunctioning of Bomb Elevator limit switches requiring electrical repairs and constant attention by the ship's electricians, and also due to the limited capacity and small size of No. 3 upstage Bomb Elevator, some stockpiling cannot be totally avoided if aircraft are to be fully armed, and launched on time.

All fuzing of Bombs was performed by the squadrons on the Flight Deck, with the exception of Rocket Fuzing, which was performed on the third deck, in accordance with Task Force 77 Instructions.

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PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Damage to ship

1. None

B. Loss and damage of aircraft.

1. See enclosure (1).

C. Damage inflicted on the enemy.

1. See enclosure (1).

PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance

1. Performance of duty and morale has been excellent.

B. Casualties

1. There were no personnel casualties suffered by ship's company personnel as a result of enemy action.

2. The plane crash on the flight deck on 4 November 1951 resulted in the following casualties to ship's company. Casualties to Air Group personnel are reported in Enclosure (1).

NAME	RATE	USN or R	Service No.
ARNESON, W.D.	AA	USN	299 30 37
Fracture, simple, right radius and ulna.			
BENNETT, R.S.	AN	USN	323 87 73
Contusion, hip and left leg.			
KELLEY, L.C.	ABAN	USNR	260 62 30
Contusion, left thigh muscles			
LIGHT, T.L.	AN	USN	426 12 23
Amputated, traumatic, distal phalanx, right big toe			
ROSPRIM, F.A.	AN	USN	334 38 53
Fracture, compound, left fibula, with artery and nerve involvement.			
WHITWORTH, S.C.	AN	USN	211 44 10
Contusion, head.			

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	DEAD	INJURED	TOTAL
OFFICERS	1	1	2
ENLISTED	3	9	12
TOTAL	4	10	14

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

A. AIR DEPARTMENT

1. Flight Deck

Operations with thirty five (35) jet aircraft aboard poses many aircraft spotting and maintenance problems when jet launches are small. It is believed that the number of missions presently scheduled could be met nearly as well if only a twenty-four (24) plane squadron and three (3) photo planes were aboard.

Jet blast deflectors have worked very well and are considered a necessity for efficient handling of jets. Blast dangers to personnel are considerably reduced and dud aircraft can be handled safer and more expeditiously with their use.

Jet CAP is always launched first and standby is spotted just forward of deckedge elevator in order to facilitate rendezvous of CAP in case of a dud. The CAP standby is usually briefed for another type flight in order to provide an additional standby if needed.

The split spot for propeller aircraft has been used exclusively with two rows of AD's on port side and two rows of F4U's on starboard side spotted aft for deck launch. However, with the large number of aircraft aboard it was found necessary to spot AD's aft of F4U's in order to provide more deck run for the six and seven thousand pound loads of the AD's.

It is necessary to spread the AD wings in order to load wing stations. This is accomplished at night for the initial launches, but subsequently must be accomplished when taxiing aircraft forward after a launch or when spotting them forward after a recovery.

It was found necessary to remove the governors from all tractors in order to cut down respotting time. No adverse tractor maintenance problems have been encountered as result of this measure.

Jet nose wheel tiller bars that can remain on the aircraft while it is being taxied are highly desirable. Such tiller bars would make it easier to taxi aircraft at slow speeds and expedite handling at the catapult spot.

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2. Hangar Deck

The handling of large numbers of jet aircraft on the hangar deck has posed many problems. The entire area of bay one has been used for maintaining and servicing jet aircraft and number one elevator is seldom used. Many minor aircraft handling accidents have resulted from the close spot required, and the close tolerance of clearance of jet wing tip tanks with the overhead.

The non-skid deck treads installed as a ship alteration on the hangar deck has proved very satisfactory, although it is recommended that only the area from the center line to port be covered in order to facilitate movements of heavy cargo sleds during replenishment.

3. Catapults.

The Catapult engines have required only routine maintenance to keep them functioning properly. However, it is apparent that the great use of catapults at high pressures is beginning to take its toll on the hydraulic pumps. To date one pump has failed completely on the starboard catapult and one is not building up pressure at the required rate, while one pump on the port catapult is slow building up pressure. It is feared that at least two more pumps will become inoperative during subsequent operating periods this tour and should be on hand for installation during availability periods in Yokosuka.

Considerable difficulty has been experienced with the present lot of bridles aboard. One F9F and two AD bridles have broken to date and it is believed the breaks resulted because of faulty manufacture. This opinion was substantiated by visiting representatives from BuAer. New lots of bridles are being requisitioned and RUDM's have been submitted on faulty bridles. Sample bridles have been shipped for test and inspection.

4. Arresting Gear

Experience to date has been routine with respect to normal landings. With present flight schedules, wires will stand an average of 80 to 100 landings per wire before a change is necessary. The greatest problem has been keeping yielding elements near the deck center functioning properly. In many cases, jet tail skags inflict major damage to yielding element parts. The use of nailed down blade-type elements in such cases is expedient while repairs are being effected.

One malfunction of the Davis barrier was experienced. An F9F-2 passed through two barriers, both of which were ineffective. While the cause is still being investigated, it can be said that the nose strut began to break apart before barriers were engaged, and wreckage of the strut was grinding on the deck passing through the barriers. Copies of NAVAER 3142, with photographs, are being sent to all appropriate commands in the area.

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This ship is experiencing a very heavy usage of Davis barriers by reason of dropped tail hooks and miscellaneous taxi damage. Constant pressure on tractor drivers and plane directors has had favorable results. During the period of this report, more than a six month's allowance of spare lifter straps has been expended, and it is recommended that the present allowance be doubled.

During this period we have also been experimenting with a bomb barrier, fabricated of 3/8" and 5/16" wire rope. Stanchions used are 24" high, resulting in about an 18" height of wire net at deck center. Experience has shown the best location to be immediately aft of #1 barrier. Such a barrier has been successful in stopping hung ordnance dropped from landing aircraft. Also arresting wires have been successful in stopping dropped rockets when yielding elements are left in the up position after aircraft has landed.

5. Aircraft Maintenance

General

Aircraft maintenance personnel attached to the ship have for the most part been integrated into air group maintenance organization. This has resulted in much better utilization of manpower than otherwise would be the case if personnel were assigned specific jobs of engine buildup, wing changes and non-aviation metalsmith work. In addition, both rated and non-rated men are getting a much broader background in line maintenance work.

Transportation

Tractor maintenance has consisted of routine work such as replacing spark plugs, starter, water pumps and carburetors. Three major overhauls have been accomplished. It is anticipated that four tractors will be turned into the pool at Yokosuka for replacement. Replenishment day usage is particularly hard on this type tractor due to the large loads equipment must handle.

Aircraft Starting Facilities

Only four jet aircraft can be started from the two jet starting motor generators presently installed near the catapults. The remaining jets spotted for the launch must be started by the three (3) wheeled jet starting jeeps. It would be desirable to have more jet starting motor generators installed on the ship at the following locations: Frame 60 starboard, frame 75 port, frame 110 port, frame 130 port, and frame 145 starboard. With this coverage all jets could be started by ships power and coverage would also be afforded in the event of a power casualty on any one of the starting motors. This installation would not require the use of jeeps on the flight deck except in cases where more than one power casualty might occur. A minimum of three jet starting jeeps would still be required for hangar deck turn-ups and such emergency uses as might be required.

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The 28 volt D.C. starting system for propeller driven aircraft has given satisfactory service, however indications are that in the future some difficulty may be experienced as the 250 amperage output may not be sufficient for cold weather. APU's have been turned over to individual squadrons for operation, while the ship's aviation electric shop provide service and maintenance. No particular service or maintenance problems have been encountered. Five self propelled jet starting units are aboard. One is used for electronic work, and of the remaining four (4), one has been out of commission since the first day of operations this period. This has been due to failure of blower drive chain, a part which could not be obtained through supply channels because it is not a maintenance spare. With exception of above unit, no serious problems of either mechanical or electrical nature have been experienced which assigned personnel could not repair.

Oxygen

The oxygen generating plant has not presented any particular problems outside of regular maintenance required for such installation. However, modifications have been introduced which greatly facilitate aircraft oxygen servicing. Service outlets at Frame 70 starboard, flight deck; frame 191 starboard, flight deck and frame 70, hangar deck; have been equipped with 250' lengths of hydraulic hose (Stk No. R-33-H-3-3000#) which greatly speeds refilling operations as bottle removal is not required. This is a much more convenient method than using the re-charging service trailers, as no problem is encountered moving in a tight deck spot. It is felt that with the present system, two trailers for hangar deck servicing only is sufficient.

6. Aviation Electronics

General

The aviation electronics maintenance has been performed under the joint supervision of the ship's aviation electronics officer and the air group staff aviation electronics officer. Electronics personnel are organized into three groups: Trouble shooters, check crews, and shop technicians. Rotation of personnel will be made to afford an opportunity for training, and for men to gain experience in all phases of maintenance.

Shop Facilities

All test equipment and shop installations have operated satisfactorily during this operating period.

The size of shop #1 is inadequate to efficiently perform maintenance on all electronic equipment now being supported. There are 18 different equipments regularly being serviced in one shop for the support of four squadrons and three composite units. Often a technician has to wait his turn to get to a test position due to the crowded conditions in the shop. At least one more shop is urgently needed in addition to the present.

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shop #1 and shop #2 (AEW shop). It would be advisable to equip this additional shop primarily for radar maintenance leaving shop #1 on the 02 level for the lighter weight communications equipment. Due to the radar being bulkier and heavier it would be desirable to locate this shop on the hangar deck level, possibly in B-127-L on the starboard side just outboard of the number 3 aircraft elevator.

Power

Present power supplies to all the shops is adequate and is performing satisfactorily.

Four-hundred cycle power is available on the flight deck and hangar deck but no eight-hundred cycle power is available at either place. The ship was advised prior to departure from Alameda to procure a Waukeshaw auxiliary power unit and istall a 800-1-D alternator on it with the output fed to the plane through a Kellogg Compensating Capacitor.

After the air group embarked it was found that VC-11 had a three wheeled starting jeep equipped for a 600 cycle power output; and VC-35 had a locally designed and manufactured kit capable of 800 cycle power output for their planes. Of the three different portable power units now available on the ship the kit made by VC-35 is considered the most practical. The kit contains an 800-1D alternator, and a Kellogg Compensating Capacitor built into a small metal box with a handle on top of the box for carrying. It can be carried like a suitcase by one man to the hangar or flight deck and plugged into any 28 volt outlet box on the ship. The kit is usually placed in the catwalk out of the way of slipstream and the output fed to the plane by means of a 75-foot extension cord. The output is controlled by the installation of an ON-OFF switch built into the box. The kit is cheap in comparison and easy to manufacture. It presents no stowage problem and does not require the use of an elevator in moving it between hangar deck and flight deck.

Performance

All airborne equipment in use has performed in a satisfactory manner. The APS-20 radar performance has been particularily outstanding requiring no more than routine upkeep. Although the APS-31-B radar in the AD4-NL was causing trouble at the beginning of the cruise it is now giving excellent performance. The APS-31 radome on the AD4-NL, protruding as it does, receives much abuse. Of the three planes on board all have patched radomes. No spares were available in the forward area at this time.

Supply

No information on availability of Section R spares can be given at this time as all requisitions for replenishment of spares have been marked for delivery on the ships return to Yokosuka.

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7. Gasoline

The main problem encountered in servicing aircraft with fuel has been refueling of jet aircraft with their wings folded. This necessitates the use of wing ladder and experiments to date have not resulted in a satisfactory ladder. The ladder must be light in weight and yet strong enough to withstand constant heavy usage . New ladders of thin-walled steel tubing are on order and it is hoped they will provide the answer.

The present arrangement for use of oil proportioners for mixing jet fuel is not satisfactory for flight deck use in cold weather. The oil will not flow properly during cold weather and it is necessary to use regular gasoline cans to pour warm oil in the after main tanks of jet aircraft.

Considerable difficulty was experienced initially in taking aboard aviation gasoline at required rates during initial replenishments and it is recommended that carriers be allowed to replenish with aviation gasoline during the Underway Training period and prior to deployment to the forward area.

There is often much "lost time" in hook ups due to the fact that loose "Y" fittings are encountered in the six-inch hose furnished by the tanker. It should be standard practice for the tanker to tighten hose fittings prior to sending over fueling hose.

It is also recommended that it become standard practice for the tanker to flush out hose with gasoline just prior to sending over the hose in order to diminish the possibility of getting water, oil, and foreign matter in the carrier's gasoline system.

8. Safety

A constant safety drive is carried on by the flight deck safety officer who is the Flight Deck Boatswain and Repair VIII Officer. He is constantly patrolling the flight deck to insure that safety precautions are complied with and providing "on the spot" instruction for those personnel observed violating precautions. Furthermore, all air department personnel have signified in writing that they have read and understand all existing safety precautions.

B. AEROLOGY

1. Weather Summary.

Upon leaving Yokosuka for the operating area, the ANTIETAM was given a typical Western Pacific meteorological welcome. A severe 120 knot typhoon named "Ruth" was heading north from Okinawa. Recurvature to the east of Japan was indicated for "Ruth", but after passing close to Okinawa on a northerly course, it appeared that the storm would enter the Sea of

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