

U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL 29)  
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**DECLASSIFIED**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1  
(2) Commander Task Force 95  
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 23 June through 4 July 1952

Ref: (a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations  
(b) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4  
(c) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1  
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52  
(e) CTE 95.11 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule

1. In accordance with reference (a), (b), (c) and (d), the Action Report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 23 June through 4 July 1952 is submitted herewith.

PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. During the period 23 June through 4 July 1952, the USS BATAAN (CVL 29), under the command of Captain H. R. HORNEY, 61175/1310, USN, with the Marine Aircraft Squadron VMA-312 embarked, operated as a part of the U. S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of the Commander Task Group 95.1.

2. The Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL 29), was OTC West Coast of Korea and Commander Task Element 95.11 throughout the period 2100I 24 June to 2100I 3 July 1952. At 2100I 3 July Commander Task Element 95.12 assumed OTC West Coast of Korea and Command of Task Element 95.11 shifted to the Commanding Officer, HMS OCEAN. During the reporting period, TE 95.11 consisted of the USS BATAAN and a maximum of four screening vessels. At varying times HMCS IROQUOIS (DDE-217), HMCS CRUSADER (DDE-228), USS BRADFORD (DD-545), USS MARSH (DE-699) and USS JOHN R. CRAIG (DD-885) acted as screening ships. The screen was reduced to less than four ships when required by operational demands. For Worthington Patrol one destroyer daily was ordered to CTE 95.12 to patrol the islands south of Haeju. Ships were detached late in the afternoon to proceed on this patrol, returning the following morning after refueling from a tanker located near Taehong Do.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

a. The mission of the Task Element is as follows:

- (1) Assist in enforcing the United Nations blockade and in the defense of friendly islands of the West Coast of Korea.
- (2) Assist in protecting sea communication in the Yellow Sea.
- (3) Provide air spotting services for control of naval gunfire in order to support the United Nations effort in Korea.
- (4) Conduct air strikes against selected targets.
- (5) Conduct air reconnaissance.
- (6) Render close air support services to ground forces.
- (7) Act in accordance with current directives of CTG 95.1.

b. The mission of the Carrier Unit is as follows:

- (1) Conduct armed air reconnaissance of the West Coast of Korea from the United Nations front lines northward to Lat. 39-15N.
- (2) Attack enemy shipping and destroy mines.
- (3) Maintain surveillance of enemy airfields in the Haeju-Chinnampo region. (ONGJIN, HAEJU, and ONJONG-NI).
- (4) Provide airspot services to naval units on request.
- (5) Provide close air support and armed air reconnaissance services as requested by Joint Operations Center, Korea (JOC KOREA).
- (6) Conduct air strikes against coastal and inland targets of opportunity at discretion.
- (7) Be prepared to provide Combat Air Patrol to friendly naval forces operating off the West Coast of Korea.
- (8) Render SAR assistance.

3. No enemy surface or air forces were encountered by this Task Element and therefore, no surface or air action is related. However, enemy small craft operating in the rivers, estuaries, and along the West Coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this element when directed or as targets of opportunity. Action of TE 95.11 on Patrol Worthington is reported by CTE 95.12.

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

4. During this operating period, VMA-312 aircraft flew Armed Reconnaissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol and Close Air Support, in proportions indicated in schedule, (enclosure 1). Flight operations were carried out eight of the nine days scheduled, but were sharply curtailed by weather. 400 sorties were scheduled. 162 (40.5%) were cancelled due to weather. During these nine days VMA-312 A/C flew 236 combat sorties. Four (4) flights aborted. There was a total of 513.6 combat hours flown for an overall average of 57.1 hours and 26.2 sorties per day. The squadron allowance was 24, average on board was 24 and the average aircraft availability 20.

5. During the operating period, ships of Task Element 95.11 operated in the Korean Coastal Area NAN in the vicinity of Latitude 37° 30'N. and 124° 30'E.

PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

23 June 1952 -

Left Sasebo, Japan, in company with HMCS IROQUOIS (DDE-217) with intentions of conducting carrier qualifications. However, the effects of Typhoon DINAH were felt before leaving the Sasebo swept channel. Heavy seas and high winds were encountered and aircraft were ordered to remain at Itazuke, Japan. Typhoon Condition I was set and in accordance with dispatch of CTG 95.1 the formation steamed to and remained along the lee western side of Tsushima in the Korea Strait. 1840I set Typhoon Condition III and at 2300I commenced steaming southward toward carrier qualification area near Iki Shima.

24 June 1952 -

0755I secured from Typhoon Condition III. During the day fourteen VMA-312 aircraft were brought aboard, bringing onboard total of VMA-312 aircraft to twenty-four (24). Carrier qualifications for eleven (11) reporting pilots were partially completed. Damage to aircraft: one broken tailwheel. Qualifications were discontinued when the second aircraft went down, leaving a full hangar deck with one non flyable aircraft on the flight deck. This eliminated the clear deck necessary for further qualification. 0943I formation set course for operating Area NAN. At 1515I the BATAAN held an abandon ship drill. 1650I HMCS CRUSADER (DDE-228) joined the formation. 2100I Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN assumed command of Task Element 95.11 and OTC West Coast Korea.

25 June 1952 -

0042I USS BRAINFORD (DD-545) joined the formation. 0535I launched aircraft as scheduled. 0948I the Operations Officer of HMS OCEAN came aboard by helicopter for the purpose of observing operations aboard the USS BATAAN. 1541I USS MARSH (DE-699) joined the formation. 1555I HMCS IROQUOIS was detached on Worthington Patrol.

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Forty-four (44) combat sorties were launched this date. Damage inflicted included the destruction of 103 buildings and three (3) gun positions. Seven (7) rail cuts were made.

26 June 1952 -

First flight was launched before sunrise to provide TARGAP for CTE 95.12.4. Forty-five (45) sorties were launched during the day with 107 buildings destroyed as principal targets.

At 0520I a surprise gunnery firing exercise was held. During the morning HMCS IROQUOIS returned from Worthington Patrol and in the afternoon HMCS CRUSADER was detached for similar patrol.

27 June 1952 -

Forty-four (44) aircraft of VMA-312 were launched against the enemy with good results. One flight of four discovered 1000 enemy troops, killing and wounding over 300.

At 0834I HMCS CRUSADER returned from the daily patrol and at 1812I the USS BRADFORD was detached for patrol service.

28 June 1952 -

Flow four (4) Close Air Support missions this date. Sorties were limited to twenty (20) for the day due to inclement weather in the afternoon. The morning flights accounted for twenty-four (24) troops killed in action. Another principal target was the closing of a rail tunnel.

0730I one VMA-312 aircraft floated into a barrier and flipped over on its back. Strike damage to aircraft; no injury to personnel.

At 1051I the USS BRADFORD rejoined the formation, having been on Worthington Patrol. At 1733I the USS MARSH departed for the daily Worthington Patrol.

29 June 1952 -

Poor flying weather continued through-out the day forcing the cancellation of all flights.

At 1054I the MARSH returned from patrol. At 1136 the USS BRADFORD was detached from TE 95.11 to join its squadron organization. Her position in the screen was taken by the USS JOHN R. CRAIG who joined the Task Element at 1142I. At 1730I HMCS IROQUOIS departed on patrol.

30 June 1952 -

Poor flying conditions continued to exist until late afternoon with the result that only 12 sorties were launched this date. Principal targets included three (3) railroad bridges and one (1) transformer station damaged.

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At 0828I HMCS IROQUOIS returned from patrol and at 1755I the USS JOHN R. CRAIG departed for the daily Worthington Patrol.

1 July 1952 -

Flying weather in the Yellow Sea and over the target areas continued poor, causing the cancellation of one half of the forty-four (44) scheduled sorties. During the short periods when the target areas were open the TARCAP and RECCO flights inflicted damage on the enemy, including the destruction of eight (8) railroad cars and the damaging of nine (9) boats.

At 0544I hold surprise gunnery firing exercise. 0632I the USS JOHN R. CRAIG returned from patrol and at 1758I HMCS CRUSADER departed on Worthington Patrol.

2 July 1952 -

Poor flight conditions persisted through-out the day with only four (4) sorties being launched.

At 1340I HMCS CRUSADER returned from patrol. 1646I HMCS IROQUOIS departed for a similar mission.

3 July 1952 -

Full flight operations were resumed on the final day of the operating period. VMA-312 pilots flew forty-six (46) combat sorties which resulted in considerable damage to the enemy. A principal damage included eight (8) rail cuts.

At 0454I CTE 95.11 held General Quarters drill and gunnery firing exercises. Between scheduled launches in the afternoon the prospective commanding officer VMA-312 in an F4U, and one TEM from K-6 made carrier qualification landings.

At 1257I HMCS IROQUOIS returned from patrol. At 1755I the USS JOHN R. CRAIG was detached on Worthington Patrol and further duty with CTE 95.11 with HMS OCEAN.

At 2100I Command of Task Element 95.11 shifted to HMS OCEAN and CTE 95.12 became OTC West Coast of Korea. 2332I the USS MARSH was detached for duty with Task Element 95.11.

4 July 1952 -

Steaming enroute Sasebo, Japan from operating Area NAN.

At 1352I one aircraft of VMA-312 was launched for Itami, Japan. 1700I moored bouy #18 Sasebo, Japan.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TOTAL SORTIES</u>	<u>CAS</u>	<u>ARMED RECCO</u>	<u>TARCAP</u>	<u>CAP</u>	<u>ABORTS</u>	<u>ENGINE RUN-IN</u>
6/25	14		16	14	14		
6/26	14*		14	16	14	1	1
6/27	14		16	14	14		
6/28	20	4	4	6	6		
6/29	0						
6/30	12		4	4	4		
7/1	22		8	6	8		
7/2	4			2	2		
<u>7/3</u>	<u>46</u>		<u>17</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>3</u>	
Total	236*	4	79	76	77	4	1

Average sorties per day 26.2

Total combat hours 513.6

Daily average 57.1 hrs.

Average hours per sortie 2.18

\* Does not include engine run-in

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING  
AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

A. Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

- (1) No undue difficulties were experienced in the handling of ordnance.
- (2) Sixteen (16) white phosphorous rockets failed to fire. There were four (4) cut pigtails, one pigtail disengaged from the igniter and eleven (11) dud rockets.
- (3) A 500# bomb was dropped from the aircraft port pylon bombrack during catapult shot on two different occasions. The catapult bridle striking the manual release mechanism on the rack is believed to be the cause. Corrective action was taken by placing a fairing on the inboard side of the port pylon and no further incidents have been experienced.
- (4) One (1) 500# GP, one (1) 1000# GP and one (1) 100# bomb failed to explode. All aircraft returned with one or both arming wires. It is possible that these bombs had insufficient air travel to arm.
- (5) Two (2) napalm duds were reported. The reason for their failure to explode is unknown, both aircraft returned with one or both arming wires.
- (6) On two occasions a total of five (5) bombs (100# GP) were returned to the ship. Since the racks checked out on the deck, cause was evaluated as pilot error.
- (7) Fusing on bombs listed in paragraph 4 and 5 above.

<u>BOMB</u>	<u>NOSE FUSE</u>	<u>TAIL FUSE</u>
1-500# GP	AN-M139A1 .01	AN-M101A2 .01
1-1000# GP	AN-M139A1 .01	AN-M102A2 .01
1-100# GP	AN-M103A1 Inst.	AN-M100A2 .01
2 Napalm		1-M15 Igniter, WP 1-M16 Igniter, WP

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**B. Ordnance Expenditures**

(1) During the operating period covered by this report, the following ordnance was expended by VMA-312 aircraft:

DATE	1000# GP	500# GP	260# Frag.	100# GP	WP Rocket	Napalm	20MM Rds.	50 Cal. Rds.
6/25	2	18		140	72	10	4,300	14,500
6/26	5	12	2	114	88	12	2,900	8,700
6/27	6	22		114	64	2	6,650	14,200
6/28	4	6		64	24	4	2,100	14,800
6/29								
6/30		4		40	16	4		1,000
7/1	7	3	4	58	8	4	500	1,500
7/2	1			10		1	300	
7/3	<u>19</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>3,400</u>	<u>8,300</u>
Total	<u>44</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>694</u>	<u>312</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>20,150</u>	<u>63,000</u>

Bomb  
total  
lbs.      44,000      34,500      2,600      69,400

Operating period, total lbs. 150,500

Bomb  
total  
tons      22.0      17.25      1.3      34.7

Operating period, total tons 75.25

PART IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

**A. Own Battle Damage:**

(1) None of the ships of the Task Element sustained battle damage.



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(2) For damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare Aircraft Vulnerability Report.

**B. Battle Damage Inflicted on the Enemy:**

(1) Ships of this Task Element inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of this Task Element during the period covered by this report.

(2) For detailed battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of the Task Element, see Naval Air Warfare Attack Report. A summary of damage follows:

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>		<u>DAMAGED</u>
Railroad Tunnel	-		1
Tower	1		-
Railroad Bridges	3		9
Road Bridges	2		9
Vehicles	6		-
Transformer Station	1		6
Railroad Cars	17		5
Pack Animal	1		-
Oxen	45		-
Carts	4		3
Boats	4		22
Supply Stacks	16		-
Buildings	406		98
Supply Dumps	4		1
Troops KIA	338		-
Warehouses	3		6
Rail Cuts		19	
Road Cuts		16	
Bunkers	9		8
Shelters	5		3
Tunnel	-		1
Gun Positions	5		8

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

**A. Personnel Performance:**

(1) Personnel performance was considered excellent. During this period the average on board count of personnel was 1017 (exclusive of squadron) which was adequate.

**B. Casualties:**

(1) No casualties.

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

PART VI - SPECIAL COMMENTS

A. Air Intelligence:

Comment: Air Intelligence functions were hampered during the BATAAN's earlier cruises in the Yellow Sea due to inexperience of the Air Intelligence Officers. A period of TAD at JOC, Korea was considered helpful in this respect.

Recommendation: That carriers being ordered to duty in the Yellow Sea area arrange for their Air Intelligence Officers to make one of the last cruises of the carrier being relieved before a period of TAD at JOC, Korea.

B. Aerology:

Comment: During the first three days of the operation the area was under the influence of a weak high pressure cell centered in the Sea of Japan. Early morning hours were marked by coastal fog and stratus over the bay areas which dissipated during early afternoon, leaving high broken clouds and good visibility over the target areas.

On the morning of 28 June a stratus overcast from the west, an increasing southeasterly wind and a rapidly falling barometer, were all indicators of a deep low approaching the area from interior China, so flight operations were suspended near midday. Ceilings lowered rapidly to 300 feet and visibility decreased to near one-quarter mile in fog and rain. Surface winds increased to 35 knots from the southeast and south. As the ship moved southward to escape the center of this intense storm, the winds veered to westerly and maintained a velocity of 30 to 35 knots. The weather improved only slightly in the warm sector of the storm and these weather conditions, low ceilings and poor visibility, continued until the passage of the cold frontal system accompanying the storm early on the morning of 30 June. A subsequent deterioration of ceiling and visibility accompanied by rain and fog and a wind veering from northwest to east indicated a formation of a secondary wave on the cold front. The weather cleared over the operating area very late on 30 June, but the target areas were marked by low stratus and fog thru the second of July.

On 3 July a cool high pressure area pushed east over the Korean peninsula following the low pressure area into the Sea of Japan and caused excellent flying conditions over both the operating and target areas.

*H. R. Hornley*  
H. R. HORNLEY

